BRADLEY HARMON
Economic Countercyclical Fiscal Policy and Growth in Democracies after the 2008 Recession

RICK BARTOLDUS
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JANETTA DEPPA
On Global Order: South Africa as a Case Study for the Validity of City-Specific Research in International Development

CONOR HUGHES
Denuclearization: A Models-based Approach
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

| Introduction | i |
| Staff List | ii |

**Bradely Harmon**  
*Economic Countercyclical Fiscal Policy and Growth in Democracies after the 2008 Recession*  
1

**Rick Bartoldus**  
*Vision to Product: Inconsistencies in Theories Used in Failed Peacebuilding Programs*  
15

**Adam Cook**  
*Intent to Harm: Factors Influencing Target Selection by Africa Islamist Militant Groups*  
35

**Janetta Deppa**  
*On Global Order: South Africa as a Case Study for the Validity of City-Specific Research in International Development*  
53

**Conor Hughes**  
*Denuclearization: A Models-based Approach*  
73
INTRODUCTION

*Clocks and Clouds* is now a campus institution. Over the past three
issues, *Clocks and Clouds* has profiled nineteen outstanding articles. This
fall, we add five more to that total. Our ongoing mission to provide an outlet
for premiere undergraduate research in political science and international
relations continues to connect students, faculty, and administrators across
our university.

Such an achievement would not have been possible without the
tireless work of both the talented authors who are profiled herein and our
dedicated editorial review staff. This journal is truly yours.

The undergraduate experience is often the first time when we as
students can break away from the mold of rote education and venture into
the unknown, genuinely seeking answers to questions still puzzling more
senior academics. Or better yet, ask those questions which have never been
asked before!

The authors profiled in this issue do just that. Bradley Harmony
depoliticizes the timely topic of countercyclical economic policy, reaffirming
its efficacy through skillful analyses of recent cases. Rick Bartoldus proves old
aphorisms about good intentions are still accurate, arguing that development
programs require organizational theory to be consistent in both vision and
execution to stand the highest chance of success. Adam Cook departs from
past literature to make a Constructivist argument for how Islamist militant
groups in Africa operate and select their targets.

In a different vein, Janetta Deppa explores the critical important of
integrating city-specific research into current International Development
literature for an increasingly globalized world. Lastly, Conor Hughes
examines the reasoning and motivations behind nuclear disarmament in key
success cases.

*Clocks and Clouds* is based on the premise that undergraduate
students have ideas that matter. We are convinced that the ideas presented
in this issue can make genuine contributions to a broader academic dialogue.
Join us now in appreciating the extraordinary voice of these talented young
student researchers.

Sean Dugdale
EDITOR IN CHIEF

Maria Cribbs
MANAGING EDITOR
ECONOMIC COUNTERCYCLICAL FISCAL POLICY AND GROWTH IN DEMOCRACIES AFTER THE 2008 RECESSION

Bradley Harmon

Abstract

After years of economic downturn and recovery, the debate over stimulus packages and countercyclical policy continues globally. Proponents of such policies claim that the various stimulus packages and policy initiatives around the globe helped bring about quicker recovery, while opponents claim that in many cases these policies brought further economic woes. This study seeks to examine the effects of stimulus packages and major countercyclical policy initiatives on economic recovery over the last six years. This study uses quantitative methods, and controls for bank leverage, population growth, and GDP per capita. The regression shows that countries that implemented major countercyclical policy initiatives grew significantly more than countries that did not, theoretically validating the use of such policies.

The 2008 financial crisis plunged the United States and the world into an economic downturn the likes of which had not been seen since the Great Depression. It was characterized by massive demand shocks, bank bailouts, widespread unemployment, and a very slow recovery for many economies worldwide. The debate has centered around how to expedite the recovery.

Internationally, and within the American political divide, the debate primarily exists between proponents of market-based procyclical economic policy and proponents of Keynesian countercyclical policy. Procyclical theories hold that government action cannot end crises in effective ways. The
only thing to do in a downturn is to reduce regulations, taxes, and government debt to ensure that, when the recovery begins, it is free to make progress without the government hampering growth. Countercyclical theories assume that a government’s best response to falling consumer spending is to step in and increase spending, thereby stimulating the economy. Now that the US has reached the recovery stage of this financial crisis, we can examine the evidence since 2008 to empirically test the validity of procyclical and countercyclical theories.

This study will consider the efficacy of stimulus packages, a principal tool of recovery for countercyclical fiscal policy. In particular, whether countries that instituted major countercyclical policy initiatives, like stimulus packages, in response to the 2008 crisis fared better economically than those that did not. This study will first propose that the economics behind the countercyclical fiscal policy initiatives in democratic countries is sound, and second, that countries that instituted such initiatives will have higher GDP growth post-2008 than those that did not. To examine this claim, I will run a statistical regression on GDP growth using country-years in all democracies, as defined by Freedom House, assessing data from 2009 to 2012. I distinguish between those nations which have instituted or continued major countercyclical policy initiatives that year for the independent variable, and I include bank leverage, population growth, and GDP per capita as control variables.

This study will first proceed to review existing literature on economic recoveries and the work of other scholars on the factors which may determine their success. Second, I will detail the underlying theory behind the factors I chose to examine and the causal narrative for each factor. Next, I will elucidate my hypothesis and detail the research design and methodology. Finally, the study will conclude with an analysis of the data and summary of findings.

**Literature Review**

Current gaps in the literature on economic recovery from financial crises arise from the present lack of major studies on the effectiveness of countercyclical fiscal policy. The lack of such work has been particularly glaring since the 2008 financial crisis. Much of the current literature on stimulus packages discusses how to make the policies more effective, but comparatively little has been written empirically on the outcomes of these policies.

Countercyclical policy is considered to have a positive effect on economic recovery among most literature on the subject, with a few notable exceptions. A 2008 report (Spilimbergo et al.) on fiscal policy and worldwide
recessions argues that, among the economies with the greatest demand drop resulting from the crisis, a timely, substantial, and targeted stimulus package is the best way to achieve full economic recovery. Drawing upon evidence from prior financial meltdowns like the Great Depression on the 1930s, the East Asian financial crisis of 1997 in Japan and Korea, and the Nordic crisis of 1990-1994, the authors argue that an “early, strong, and carefully thought out fiscal stimulus” is the best way for a nation to succeed in “rescuing the financial sector and increasing demand” (Spilimbergo et al. 2008, 12). Facets of these policies include increased infrastructure maintenance spending, expansion of targeted transfer payments such as unemployment benefits, and temporary reductions in consumption tax. These proposals are also touched on in a 2009 paper about the United States’ “road to recovery” after the recession. The paper argues that substantial restructuring and stimulating of the financial sector should be a major part of recovery plans, especially in countries with low imports to GDP ratios. (Zhang and Zhang 2009, 7) Many of the major democracies affected by the crisis, including the United States, France, and Germany, fit this economic profile.

A 2012 paper (Armingeon) similarly argues that while the default reaction to such downturns in a crisis is a mild and only partially effective expansionary fiscal policy, certain countries and governments break this mold with strongly countercyclical policies, causing major economic rebounds in the short run. However, this only tends to occur when there are not “lengthy negotiations or significant compromises between governing parties with different views on economic and fiscal policy” in the course of policymaking (Armingeon 2012, 9). While examples of such situations come primarily from authoritarian systems, de facto one-party democratic systems can and have implemented extended stimulus and recovery programs. This argument assumes that countercyclical policy alone leads to recovery but the importance of a unified government in leading to better recovery deserves further examination.

Another major factor in economic recovery is the role, size, and effectiveness of regulation regimes within the financial sectors of economies. The regulations frameworks of many major economies, particularly those which permitted high levels of public debt as in Europe, were flawed leading up to the 2008 crisis. (Porokowski 2011) Some mechanisms have since been proposed to address these flaws. Porokowski finds that countries that adopted regulatory regimes which monitored risky or overleveraging behavior by banks, such as the Czech Republic, Poland, and Norway, weathered the crisis without major downturns. Moreover, countries that commit to reforming their
regulatory regimes without major public debt increases recover more quickly (Porokowski 2012, 194). The role of effective regulation and the scope of regulatory regimes on economic recovery also deserves further examination.

Credit accessibility and availability, an important driver of consumption spending and household debt, was greatly reduced during the 2008 crisis. Not only is credit one of the most important aspects of a growing economy, lackthereof is also a major hinderance to recovering economies. Biggs et al. (2010) sought to explain and debunk the theory of a recovery in which credit does not also re-expand to pre-crisis levels, also known as the “Phoenix Miracle.” While prior research compared GDP with the current stock of credit during a single moment of recovery, this study examined the growth and flow of credit instead. The authors found that GDP growth recovery is correlated and temporally associated with a recovery in credit levels (Biggs et al. 2010, 16-17). In other words, credit growth is an important factor to economic recovery.

While the growth of credit during recovery can be positive, in some cases, and certainly in the case of the 2008 financial crisis, it can be highly problematic. According to Jorda et al. (2011), not only are financial crisis recessions simply more costly, but more credit-intensive economic expansion can also lead to a slower recovery. Assessing data on dozens of countries from 1870 to 2008, the authors conclude that a major factor in economic recovery is the extent to which credit played a role in the expansion before the crash (Jorda et al. 2011, 38). This finding is also supported by an IMF report that assessed data from the 2008 crisis, concluding that countries with larger booms in bank credit before the crisis generally experience deeper busts and slower recoveries afterward (Aisen and Franken 2010, 25).

The factors reviewed in the literature of countercyclical policy are innately intertwined. Fiscal stimuli are more likely with unity governments and one-party systems, uncertainty is derived from non-unity governments and regulatory systems being changed, and credit recovery varies based on how dependent the pre-recession economy was on credit. While many factors can potentially affect economic recovery and the efficacy of stimulus packages, there have not been any major post-2008 crisis studies on what the key factors are in determining recovery rates, in part because the global economy has not yet entirely recovered from the recession. This study aims to fill that gap by considering what I believe to be the most important individual factors: stimulus packages, bank leverage, as well as possible confounding factors such as population growth and GDP per capita. This study will examine these
factors and attempt to determine how economies can expedite the process of economic recovery.

Theory

Fiscal policy has been a popular and effective tool used by governments to influence economies since John Maynard Keynes popularized the strategy of attempting to counteract and thereby alleviate economic contractions at the macroeconomic level. Especially during the 2008 crisis, countercyclical policies were most visible manifest in stimulus packages worldwide. In the United States, there has been a major debate over the effectiveness of the 2009 stimulus package enacted by President Obama. In order to understand the impact of these policies and advance the debate, it is first necessary to understand the theory behind them.

When an economy crashes due to major shock, such as the bursting of the US housing bubble in 2008, a number of effects often follow. First, banks that have loaned out large sums of money suddenly find that too few entities can afford to repay them. The banks therefore stop giving out loans, causing businesses to lack the credit needed to invest in their own production and growth. At the same time, individuals who have defaulted on their loans have greatly reduced purchasing power. Similarly, struggling and overleveraged banks are unable to grow their portfolios.

Accordingly, overall demand in the economy soon drops significantly. With fewer people buying goods and corporations investing in their production, firms are forced to cut both jobs and output, leading to unemployment and ultimately lowering consumer demand even further. This spiral can continue for years if left unchecked. An economic stimulus package aims to supplement falling consumer demand with increased government demand, jump-starting the economy by injecting a large amount of money through temporarily increased government spending. This continues until all the debt left over from the crash is paid off, banks become solvent once again, and consumer spending rises back to normal levels.

What this concept means is that governments that institute major stimulus packages should have faster recovery and GDP growth rates than those that do not. This effect should be evident for all years after the package is enacted, not just the year that it goes into effect. In addition, the effect of such a stimulus should theoretically be greater than the cost of the stimulus package. While Keynesian economic theories say that it works, the evidence
since 2008 must corroborate the story in order to ensure that the theory is sound in this particular case.

**Hypothesis and Research Design**

The main hypothesis of this paper is that democratic countries that implemented major stimulus packages or countercyclical policies will grow at faster rates on average than countries that did not, while controlling for aggregated bank leverage ratios from 2007, GDP per capita, and population growth.

The independent variable of the hypothesis is whether or not a country enacted a major stimulus package or countercyclical policy after the crisis began. For each country year, the data table specifies whether or not, in the current year or before, there was a major countercyclical fiscal policy initiative. The dependent variable is the growth rate of GDP in each country after the crisis. Major stimulus packages are defined as specific legislation passed to stimulate demand and growth that exceeds 1% of GDP. This figure will reduce interference from routine spending increases while still maintaining a large sample size of stimulus programs. Data on the stimulus packages will be drawn from news media or public releases and OECD statistics on GDP. The annual GDP growth rates will be analyzed, starting from 2009. A democracy is defined as any country rated “Free” by Freedom House in their 2012 Democracy Index. Each country year will have one data point, 1 or 0 respectively, for whether or not it enacted a major stimulus package that year or previously.

To increase the validity of conclusions, this study will control for a number of variables in the statistical regression. The first such variable is bank leverage ratios. The 2007 aggregated bank leverage ratios among the selected cases show the ratio between liquidated assets and loans for each country in that year. In other words, if a bank loans out 5 dollars for every dollar it has in current assets, the leverage ratio of that bank is 5. Once a credit bubble bursts, many of the loans a bank funds do not get repaid. If the leverage ratio is too high, it becomes difficult for a bank to cover the losses on the defaulted loans. The more leveraged banks are, the longer the recovery period needed to return to solid financial ground and begin lending again. Accordingly, the pre-crisis leverage ratios should theoretically be a significant factor in the GDP growth for each country year. The bank leverage ratios are taken from the research of Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012). Each country will have the same leverage value for all 4 observation periods, as it is only the pre-crisis leverage peak of 2007
that is expected to have an impact on recovery.

A second control variable is the population growth of each country year, with data from the World Bank online database as well as the CIA’s published statistics for 2012. People produce goods and services, and it seems intuitive to say that more people will produce more goods and services. As a country expands, either through childbirth or more importantly immigration, its GDP generally expands to accommodate the increased workforce as well. Because GDP is a measure of all goods and services produced each year, and since a larger population should almost automatically produce more goods and services, varying levels of population growth could have the effect of swaying the data and should be controlled for.

A last control variable is the wealth of a country, operationalized as GDP per capita. Richer countries tend to experience different effects from economic policies, and the concept of economies of scale implies that the larger an economy is, the more effective a package over 1% of GDP would be at instituting growth. Additionally, richer economies that have already achieved technological productivity gains and have higher levels of capital generally have lower growth than poorer countries, as basic increases in technological spread or capital levels have decreasing marginal as a percentage for GDP. Due to both confounding pathways, I will control for wealth in order to get a clearer picture of the effects of stimulus packages across all economies.

Cases and observations

The cases selected are all democracies, as defined by Freedom House, and for whom the relevant data is available from the 2008 financial crisis to the present. This is because democratic countries are the countries with the resources, developed economy, and effective political systems to weigh the option of whether or not to implement a stimulus package. Democracies are also much more likely to have the financial resources to do so, as well as to possess the developed financial sectors impacted by the 2008 financial crisis. Additionally, democracies are much more likely than non-democracies to have accurate, reliable statistics. The study will cover 87 country cases, covering a range of recovery rates, leveraging ratios, uncertainty in economic policy, and stimulus packages. Because bank leverage ratios and uncertainty data is not available for all country years, the number of observations is adjusted accordingly for those two variables. Only country-level data on each of the variables is considered.
Method of Analysis

Due to the large volume of data and cases, quantitative methods are used for analysis. To test the hypothesis, I first use a bivariate regression between major countercyclical policy initiative and GDP growth. I follow with a multivariate regression including the aforementioned control variables to ensure the findings are not skewed by confounding factors.

Data Analysis

For the first regression, analyzing only stimulus and its effect on GDP growth without factoring in control variables, the B value shows that on average, countries that implemented major stimulus packages or countercyclical policies grew about 2.14 percent more per year than those that did not. The correlation is highly significant, with a P value = .005. This corroborates the hypothesis that countercyclical fiscal policy initiatives bolstered recovery rates following the 2008 financial crisis.

The second regression, controlling for bank leverage, population growth, and GDP per capita, further strengthens the validity of the hypothesis. However, the regression also contradicts some of the arguments behind the control variables themselves. The additional variables actually increased the effect of a stimulus package. In this regression, countries that initiated stimulus packages actually grew 2.38% faster on average from 2009 to 2012 than those that did not. The significance of this correlation also improved, with a P value = .003, expressing a confidence level of over 99%.

Some findings merit further consideration. The coefficients on bank leverage ratios are negatively correlated with higher 2007 leverage ratios and GDP growth from 2009-2012. Each unit increase in the leverage ratio corresponded to a .083% drop in GDP growth, a seemingly small correlation. However, given an average leverage ratio of around 14, with some ratios in Germany and the UK going as high as 30, this can account for much of the difference between the first and second regressions’ demonstrated effect of countercyclical policy on GDP growth from 2009-2012. However, this correlation is insignificant, with a P value = .168, and therefore does not support the theory behind controlling for bank leverage ratios.

Population growth was more significant and adhered more closely to the hypothesis. Population growth even outperformed my expectations as a factor in GDP growth and economic recovery. Each additional percent of population growth corresponded to a 1.459% increase in GDP growth, with a P
value = .004, indicating strong confidence in this correlation. Failing to adjust for population growth accounts for much of the divergence between the first and second regressions and the effect of stimuli on GDP growth.

GDP per capita had a negative impact on growth, with each additional $1,000 per capita corresponding to a .046 drop in the growth rate. However, GDP per capita was narrowly insignificant, with a P value of .073, just above the .05 significance threshold.

The following model summarizes the impact of countercyclical policy in explaining the variation in GDP recovery rates after 2008.

The adjusted R-Square measure shows that the model can account for about 12.1% of the variation in GDP growth among democracies from 2009 to 2012. Considering the high number of factors that influence growth and the high volatility of growth after the crisis, this R-Squared value does support the validity of the model and thus the validity of the results.

Conclusions

There is a strong, significant, and positive correlation between stimulus package implementation and faster recovery after the 2008 financial crisis. Controlling for population growth, bank leverage rates, and GDP per capita, countercyclical stimulus packages increased growth by about 2.4% annually. Additionally, this model explains around 12% of the variation in post-2008 GDP growth rates. The model itself is clearly not all-encompassing. However, these policies remain highly effective tools to increase GDP growth during economic recoveries and should be considered by policymakers following financial crises. Overall, the hypothesis is supported by the data. Economies that implement stimulus packages grew faster, controlling for other factors, after the financial crisis than those that did not.

Due to the constraints of only accounting for 12% of the variation, the implications of this study are not wide in scope but may advance responses to future financial crises. In the aftermath of the 2008 crisis, there is evidence to conclude that instituting stimulus packages over 1% of GDP is a significant positive factor in recovery. This study can serve to counter critics who claim stimuli categorically cannot improve GDP growth. This is not to imply that all stimulus packages are good, or to imply that countercyclical policy is the “right” choice for any country undergoing a financial crisis. Rather, this study is simply exhibiting empirical evidence that post-2008, countries that implemented such packages grew faster on average.
Nevertheless, this study has considerable limitations. First and foremost, while 1% of GDP seemed to be an effective cutoff for the countercyclical policy size, it is possible that another threshold might be more effective in distinguishing between major stimulus packages and smaller policy initiatives. Another factor the study did not incorporate is the effect of economic interactions between countries. Countries with high levels of trade can impact growth among each other, and a country with especially high or especially low growth can distort the growth of its trading partners. There may also be ways to improve the operationalization of control variables. For instance, the released aggregate bank leverage data may not be completely comprehensive or accurate. There was also not enough data or faith in the theory to include the effects of policy uncertainty, and only having data for certain countries on leverage may have skewed the results.

Future research should focus on additional factors that may affect economic recovery and work to integrate research on each individual factor into an overall study across multiple financial crises. Additionally, certain factors identified in the literature review, such as regulatory regimes or uncertainty, have little to no data available to date. As this data becomes available, it could shed much more light on the effect those factors have on recovery and growth.

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Bibliography


VISION TO PRODUCT: INCONSISTENCIES IN THEORIES USED IN FAILED PEACEBUILDING PROGRAMS

Rick Bartoldus

Abstract

This paper identifies and provides an initial analysis of the problem of mismatched theories in peacebuilding programs. This problem occurs when a project is developed by a group that subscribes to one theory of peacebuilding, but is then executed by a group that subscribes to a different theory. A single case study is chosen in order to analyze both the occurrence of the problem and its effects. The Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP) follows the simple formula of finding Afghan civilians adversely affected by conflict and offering assistance in order to help them rebuild their lives. The program was envisioned and funded by the U.S. Congress and executed by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), but the way in which it was implemented was highly affected by the differences in understanding of peacebuilding theory between Congress and USAID. Namely, ACAP was a program best suited for identity- and population-based approaches to peacebuilding, but the organizations that developed it supplemented it to governance-based peacebuilding and in doing so limited its potential.

Introduction

This paper will outline the new concept of mismatched theories and will test its explanatory potential on the case study of the Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP). While the concept of mismatched theories is new, it builds upon established literature that concentrates on the effects

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that theories have on how peacebuilding programs are implemented. The foundation for the concept of mismatched theories is that organizations and programs that work in the field rely on theories of peacebuilding in order to make sense of the problems they seek to address. Theories often start as explicitly stated scholarly theories. There are many scholarly theories of peacebuilding available, and three of these will be elaborated on later in this paper: Governance theory, which focuses on strengthening rule of law; Identity theory, which focuses on helping disadvantaged groups and ending adverse power structures; and Population theory, which concentrates on satiating potentially volatile youth bulges.

Organizations tend to subscribe to one or two scholarly theories of peacebuilding, but they often interpret them in such a way that transforms them into a unique organizational theory. These organizational theories often appear in mission statements, but more importantly they strongly affect the ways in which the organization interprets problems and implements programs. As a definition, the problem of mismatched theories occurs when a program is developed according to a specific scholarly theory, but is implemented by an organization that operates under a contradictory organizational theory.

This paper hypothesizes that mismatched theories can cause organizations to implement programs ineffectively through misinterpretation of the program’s purpose. Since the concept is new, the scope of the hypothesis is restricted to an initial investigation into the problem of mismatched theories. Analyses that make claims about the prevalence of the problem, or analyses that claim certain organizations are more prone to the problem than others, are beyond the scope of this paper. However, such analyses are important and the hope is that this paper, after highlighting the problem, will lead to further research on the issue.

Even though the importance of theories and their effects on programs are well documented, the literature on the problem of mismatched theories is small to non-existent, which can be blamed on the infrequency with which the problem occurs. However, rarity of a problem does not mean that analysis is unnecessary and there is evidence that this issue could become more common in the future. The issue is uncommon due to the fact that, generally, organizations develop their own programs. As such, the programs they develop are inspired by their own organizational theory. Thus there is no mismatch in theory between the development and the implementation of the program. However, there are organizations that implement programs developed by other groups. One such organization is USAID, which operates based on specific organizational theories but also often implements programs
developed by Congress (programs whose development are thus inspired by the scholarly theories held by their supporters in Congress). The issue has the potential to become more common due to the existence and growth of NGOs that fund the programs of other NGOs such as the Clinton Global Initiative and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. The problem arises when the funding group, and thus the developing group, operates based on a different organizational theory than the implementing group.

An overview of the literature on the importance of theories in regards to the effectiveness of peacebuilding programs is needed before detailing the scholarly theories of peacebuilding that are relevant to ACAP. The methodology section explains the reasons for the selection of ACAP as a single case study and provides an overview of the relevant variables. For the analysis section, the history of ACAP will be examined in relation to how the theories informed all stages of development and execution of the program. The analysis continues with an explanation of why ACAP is considered to be a failed program while also providing alternative explanations for ACAP’s failure. Afterwards, the paper will continue with an in-depth discussion of how the mismatching of theories in the different stages of ACAP’s development and implementation negatively affected the program. The paper will conclude with a discussion of the potential breadth of the problem, as well as avenues for future research.

**Literature Review**

Unfortunately, the literature on mismatched theories is small to non-existent, but there are areas of literature that this concept does build upon. The importance of theory in determining the effectiveness of peacebuilding programs provides a good starting point. A substantial amount of literature developed in the past decade specifically investigates the effects of Western framing of non-Western security problems. These framings can then influence programs in negative ways and can cause unanticipated secondary effects. This literature review aims to situate the wider debate of which USAID is a part. In addition, by providing an overview of the ways in which theories impact the effectiveness of peacebuilding programs, this paper hopes to set the stage for a discussion of how mismatched theories can have an impact on program effectiveness. Next, I will provide an overview of the potential scholarly theories, and their associated organizational theories, relevant to ACAP. Theories that were used to develop the program, and those the program was implemented under, are both discussed in this section. In order to provide context on the specificity of organizational theories, the differing interpretations of one
scholarly theory of peacebuilding by two separate organizations (USAID and UNDP) are dissected in turn.

Importance of Theories in Determining the Effectiveness of Peacebuilding Programs

When it comes to critiques of Western theories and their impacts on the effectiveness of peacebuilding, a substantial number of scholars start their critique from a single point of departure: the concentration on the theory of the Weberian state. To understand why this can affect programs, it is important to first identify what the Weberian state implies for peacebuilding programs. One of the most commonly cited definitions of the Weberian state is that which “claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force with a given territory” (Weber 1919, 26). Thus, as conflict constitutes a form of physical force, it is the duty of the Weberian state to suppress that force. As such, coming from the viewpoint of the Weberian state, the proliferation of armed groups falls under the jurisdiction of the state.

In the post 9/11 era, as William Miles explains, the purpose of U.S. aid to the Middle East and Africa has shifted “from counter-Communism to counter-Terrorism,” complete with an “unprecedented level of overlap between defense and development missions,” aimed primarily at increasing the capacity of the local state to maintain their monopoly of force (Miles 2012, 28). However, some scholars argue that Weberian states may not be as effective or as applicable to Africa as they were in their original European context and are in fact failing to perform their expected Weberian functions (Obadare and Wale 2010; Verhoeven 2009). At a basic level, this already poses some problems regarding the U.S.’s treatment of the state as the primary point of contact for stability promotion, but more importantly it provides the basis from which other authors have constructed their arguments.

This concentration on the Weberian state as the guarantor of stability permits some states to perform to the expectations of the U.S. in order to further their own interests. This paper will refer to these states as performative states. There are many examples that fall under this category. For example, Cédric Jourde examined the ways in which numerous small neoauthoritarian states “performed” according to U.S. conceptualization of the state. Small states are highly subject to international pressure, he explains, making them a good example of how the states react to such pressure.

Jourde found that small neoauthoritarian states managed not only to stave off international pressure for democratization, but actually managed to increase authoritarian action in some instances by manipulating the way in
which the West viewed the country. Jourde used the case studies of Guinea
and Mauritania to show that small regimes could perform heavy-handed
repression of potential opposition groups by labeling them as “alleged
'Islamists,' ‘warlords,’ and other transnational ‘subversive threats’” (Jourde
2007, 481). Not only did these countries not elicit disapproval from the
international community, but actually received support for their actions and,
in the eyes of the West, the “performances [defined] the regime as a ‘provider
of regional stability’” (Jourde 2007, 489).

The characteristics of performative states are not necessarily limited to
small neoauthoritarian actors. Andrew Walker, on behalf of the U.S. Institute
of Peace, investigated a similar problem in the large and mostly democratic
state of Nigeria. In a situation akin to that outlined by Jourde, the threat of
Boko Haram, a domestic militant Islamist group in northeastern Nigeria,
was used in order to gain power and silence opponents. Goodluck Jonathan,
the President of Nigeria, has been shown to inflate the perceived reach of
Boko Haram and “painted a picture of a puppet group that was being used
by aggrieved northern politicians to bring down his southern government”
(Walker 2012, 7). In addition, Jonathan has “played up the connections
between the group and international terrorism,” despite the fact that Boko
Haram is known to be a local group with few, if any, international ties (Walker
2012, 1).

Both Walker and LeVan state the Boko Haram emerged because of,
and was then radicalized by, grievances engendered by the Nigerian State
(Walker 2012; LeVan 2013). It is important to realize that in Nigeria, as in
many other countries, the state is not necessarily the maintainer of peace and
public goods that the Weberian state is supposed to be. Instead, these states
consider “excess and abjection [as] integral to the constitution and production
of state power and social (re)action” (Obadare and Adebani 2010, 23).
Negative encounters between the state and the populace create an interesting
side-effect that is often overlooked in conventional discourses of stability:
a desire to create bottom-up sources of governance to provide services that
traditionally fall under the purview of the state. In Boko Haram’s case, the
goal was initially “to set up a state-like organization ... [to be] parallel to the
federal government,” but the extrajudicial excess that inspired Boko Haram
then proceeded to lead to its radicalization (Walker 2012, 9). The case of
Boko Haram is not unique but it does provide a model example of bottom-up
solutions of failed governance being radicalized due to coercive action from
the state. Actions that can then be normalized in the view of the international
community through performances that portray said action as integral to
improving stability.
The focus on top-down approaches and the viewpoint of the Weberian state inflates the role of the state as the sole guarantor of stability, causing what Verhoeven calls the “Orthodox Failed States Narrative,” which he says “systemically equates failed states with chronic anarchy and the exportation of terrorism and instability” (Verhoeven 2009, 405). Verhoeven suggests that parallel systems of governance are inevitable and should be worked with, but says that the narrow viewpoint of the West dismisses them because they do not fit into the conventional top-down state approach. In the case of Somalia’s Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), an initially non-violent force for governance that aimed to fix the failure of the state was perceived as a threat by the state in Mogadishu. This was exacerbated when Ethiopia used the dominant narrative to portray the UIC as an example of an Islamic terrorist group and through attacking the formerly peacefully UIC, turned the group into the militant al Shabaab (Verhoeven 2009, 411). In a world of fracturing governance, where the state is increasingly losing its monopoly on the functions of governance, Verhoeven argues that it is dangerous and counter-productive to fight potential sources of alternative governance and focus solely on the state.

**Background of Theories Relevant to ACAP**

The literature shows that theory can have practical implications for policies and programs. This section reviews three scholarly theories of peacebuilding: governance, identity, and population. Governance theory is of particular importance because it is the scholarly theory on which the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), the group that originally implemented ACAP, based their organizational theory. Identity theory is also reviewed, as following the original proposal and funding of ACAP, the program’s proponents argued that it should be used to advance the position of women in Afghanistan, yet this vision never took full effect. Population theory is a scholarly theory supported heavily by USAID and the theory itself proposes solutions that ACAP is particularly suited to implement. However, two differing interpretations of population-based peacebuilding are analyzed in this paper: the organizational theory of USAID, which is based more on governance, and the organizational theory of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which is based more on identity. An analysis of this distinction is key to elucidating the nuanced differences that can exist between similar organization theories.

According to the theorist Roland Paris, governance theory is a critique of older peacebuilding strategies. He states that the majority of peacebuilding organizations in his time, the late 1990s, partook too heavily in the scholarly theories of liberal internationalism, specifically the belief that creating market
democracies would automatically lead to peace. While he agrees with the theoretical aspects of liberal internationalism, he disagrees with the way its proponents have implemented it. Organizations of that time acted as if development was a linear evolution into market democracy, and thus all a developing country required was a push in the right direction (Paris 1997, 56-58).

Paris put the destabilizing effects of democratization first and center in his scholarly theory. He pushed for “strategic liberalization,” a more gradual phasing in of market democracy that would limit the destabilizing effects of democratization (Paris 1997, 58). In 2005, Hurwitz and Studdard echoed Paris and argued “the rule of law should not be regarded as a subset of security objectives or as a purely technical component of development programs, but should rather be seen as an integral element of peacebuilding strategies” (Hurwitz & Studdard 2005, 11).

Peacebuilding in Afghanistan has reflected the advice Paris offered with his “strategic liberalization.” In lieu of rushing the creation of a market democracy, elections were delayed “until passions [had] cooled,” and peacebuilding efforts were extended beyond 1997’s “norm of one to three years, to approximately seven to nine years,” or, in the case of Afghanistan, even longer (Paris 1997, 58). One last bit of advice from Paris, calling for the creation of “effective, central coordinating bodies for peacebuilding operations,” This came to fruition in the form of USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), the group that implemented the Afghan Transition Initiative (ATI), the direct precursor to ACAP. As a group whose organizational theory is based on the scholarly theory of governance, OTI’s mission statement includes the following: “OTI works on the ground to provide fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key political transition and stabilization needs” (USAID 2009, 1).

Identity theory provides a more complete understanding of conflict and is connected to the school of Social Constructivism. Identity theory provides a full explanation of why conflict occurs, stating that a discourse develops in society allowing people to “securitize” groups, ideas, actions, etc. This is the process through which actors create biased lens where the “securitized” concept is always perceived to be a threat. Other less malevolent, yet still adverse, perceptions can arise and create social structures and power imbalances that cause or exacerbate conflict. Identity-based peacebuilding revolves around these socially constructed perceptions and structures, and attempts to mitigate or transform them.

Much of the literature on Identity theory centers on gender and how it
interplays with conflict. Amani El Jack, in conjunction with the Bridge Institute of Development Studies, explored the ways in which armed conflict creates gender-specific disadvantages, most often for women, and how peacebuilding efforts can address such problems. Jack states that gender inequality stems from “power imbalances in social structures” that are pervasive within societies. Armed conflict in particular can further entrench these structures and funnel problems through them causing increased inequality (Jack 2003, 3).

Ideally peacebuilding should be conscious of these structures and the effects they have, either offering specialized support or going as far as changing the social structures in question. However, many governments, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and international organizations fail to take gender into account, either by treating everyone the same or ignoring the problems women face, ultimately furthering gender stereotypes or failing to consider “women’s relative inequality in the context of gender relations” (Jack 2003, 3).

One particular peacebuilding strategy for identity, gender mainstreaming, focuses on putting gender front and center in peacebuilding operations. This strategy stems from critical theory, or the idea that the only way to bring about change is by changing the way people think. The hope is that by forcing gender issues into the open, civil society will become more aware and begin changing the core gender-constructive social structures. Sumie Nakaya puts forth a path for carrying out such visions, proposing that gender mainstreaming must happen at two levels: “postconflict institutional frameworks and the structural base of power” (Nakaya 2003, 472).

However, good intentions in tackling gender inequality can often go awry. Nakaya’s aforementioned article is a scathing review of organizations that believe simply bringing women to negotiating tables will solve everything. The bitter reality is that the inclusion of women at peacebuilding talks is too often simply a political move, showing quick and cheap commitment to women but then reverting to old ways afterwards (Nakaya 2003, 471). Another worry is that the organizations swooping in to help women abroad are still bound to Western stereotypes of gender. In 2002, the anthropologist Lila Abu-Lughod noted that the rhetoric of liberating Afghan women could cause problems of its own by securitizing the identity of Afghan women, thus hampering the pursuit of understanding in the region and making true change difficult (Abu-Lughod 2002, 783).

USAID, especially through its Youth and Conflict Toolkit, offers another scholarly theory for peacebuilding. This Population theory concerns
the destabilizing effect that a “disproportionately large youth cohort relative to the rest of the population” can have on a country (USAID 2005, 3). In some ways, this cannot be seen as an independent scholarly theory because it does not explain fully the causes of violence; it merely brings to light a destabilizing factor. The implications that USAID mentions, such as the strain on public services and institutions, can be seen as an addendum to governance-based programs such as those implemented by OTI. In the toolkit, USAID specifically mentions that a youth bulge is linked with conflict only when the country is also faced with “poor governance, a declining economy, or ... a high degree of ethnic or religious polarity” (USAID 2005, 3).

However, different organizations can have differing interpretations of even a single scholarly theory as it related to the framework for their organizational theory. This is particularly important to investigate as the present study seeks to examine the effects of USAID’s specific interpretations of scholarly theory and how those interpretations affect programs. Throughout the toolkit created by USAID, there is a theme of youth causing destabilization. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) looks at youth bulges from a slightly different standpoint. They chastise what they call the “securitization of youth,” saying that simply concentrating on the destabilizing aspects of a large youth population detracts from the potential good youth populations can create. Where USAID’s population-based organizational theory stems mostly from Governance theory, UNDP’s organizational theory stems mostly from Identity theory, going so far as to explore the concept of youth as a social construct and analyzing how it interacts with gender (Ebata et al. 2006).

Since USAID’s and UNDP’s organizational theories of youth draw from different base scholarly theories, the suggestions they put forth diverge. Both agree that youth training, political participation, and gender sensitivity are important, but where USAID’s organizational theory is aimed more at stabilizing the youth cohort, UNDP takes a more introspective approach. Where USAID asks for increased youth voting, UNDP warns that “youth wings of political parties are simply tools to amass political power” and suggests that organizations should strive not just for participation, but also for meaningful participation (Ebata et al. 2006, 75). Most tellingly, USAID states that “ideally, programs should be designed as ‘feeders’ into political, economic, and social institutions for adults,” whereas UNDP argues that “for maximum effectiveness, youth participation should go beyond consultation to real, meaningful involvement where young people are viewed not only as
beneficiaries or targets of assistance but as decision-makers” (USAID 2005, 14; Ebata et al. 2006, 76).

**Methodology**

**Hypothesis**

Mismatched theories can make organizations implement programs ineffectively by causing them to misinterpret the purpose of the program. Since the concept of mismatched theories is new, the scope of the hypothesis is restricted to an initial investigation into the problem of mismatched theories. Analyses that try to make claims about the prevalence of the problem, or analyses that claim that certain organizations are more prone to the problem than others, are beyond the scope of this paper. This paper concentrates on finding an instance that highlights the potential possibility of mismatched theories and then provides insight into the potential process by which mismatched theories negatively impact program success.

To isolate the potential effects of the problem of mismatched theories, this paper examines a single case study where the issue is present and then provides qualitative analysis in order to determine what effects the mismatching of theories had on the effectiveness of the program. This paper does not aim to prove that all mismatching of theories will cause problems, but rather aims to see whether the issue, which will likely become more common in the future, is one of concern. Following the initial analysis, the paper discusses the mechanisms by which mismatched theories are most likely to operate.

**Case Selection**

The requirements of case selection in this paper are twofold. First, the case must be considered a failure for the analysis to investigate the causes of program failure. Second, there should be potential for the problem to be caused by mismatched theories: i.e., the creator of the program should be different than the implementer of the program. If this paper aimed to state that mismatched theories are endemic, or attempted to claim that certain organizations on average suffer the problem more than others, or even tried to make other general claims, then multiple case studies would be necessary. However, since this paper only attempts to make an initial foray into the issue and aims to test whether or not mismatched theories could be a problem, a single case study will suffice.

The Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP) was chosen for this analysis due to the acceptance of the program as being a failure (criterion
1), as well as the disconnect between Congress’ initial idea for the program and the way in which it has been implemented by USAID (criterion 2). The previous literature has focused on negligence and incompetence as the causes of the program’s failure, but for the purposes of this paper, the factors leading up to said negligence and incompetence are more relevant. Public records and a series of reports will be used to analyze the history of ACAP and how organizational and scholarly theories affected each stage of the program’s development and subsequent implementation.

**Discussion of Variables**

In order to support the hypothesis, the case study must provide clear evidence that the program’s failure is caused by mismatching of theories. The independent variable for this analysis is the existence of mismatched theories in the program’s creation and implementation. This independent variable will be investigated through analysis of the program’s initial creation and implementation. If scholarly theories can be identified that inform the development of the program, and an organizational theory of the implementing group can also be identified, but the organizational theory does not match up with the scholarly theory that led to the program’s development, then the program will be said to have mismatched theories.

The dependent variable concerns the success or failure of the program. For this analysis, it is important to differentiate between proximate and root causes of failure. The idea is that the root cause of mismatched theories can lead to poor implementation of the program, which will manifest as a series of proximate causes, such as mismanagement, negligence, or misinterpretation of the program mission. As such, an analysis of the effects of the independent variable on the dependent variable will concentrate solely on how mismatched theories influence the proximate causes of the failure of the program.

**Analysis of ACAP**

**Existing Explanations for the Failure of ACAP**

The external scholarly literature has generally not engaged with ACAP, but within USAID, the failure has been well discussed. In the Final Project Evaluation Report for Afghan Civilian Assistance Program (ACAP), a report filed on behalf of USAID, Belquis Ahmadi determined that “ACAP is a very necessary and crucial ingredient to help bring stability to victims of military incidents,” but found that the program is “plagued by a number of issues that negatively impact its mission; ranging from lack of sufficiently trained staff, to
incidents of corrupt practices, to slow identification of beneficiaries, barriers to the timely delivery of assistance, and quality monitoring” (Ahmadi et al. 2010, 28). Overall, the proximate causes of ACAP’s failure were determined to be caused by negligence and incompetence.

Unfortunately, proximate causes are not enough and further investigation of root causes is necessary. Specifically, what caused the negligence and incompetence that led to the failure of ACAP? Scholars and investigative journalists alike have pointed to systemic problems with USAID that led to the failure of programs in Afghanistan, including corruption, prevalence of non-accountable and inefficient contracting services, and general incompetence (Brinkley 2013; Wolverson 2007). Another possibility for USAID’s failures is lack of accountability to the people they are helping, a problem that has been brought into the standard discourses of aid by William Easterly, who stated that “lack of feedback [from recipient to implementers] is one of the most crucial flaws in foreign aid” (Easterly 2006, 15).

However, the available explanations do not necessarily rule out the potential influence of mismatched theories. This claim is especially applicable to the most common explanations of USAID’s failures, most of which could be considered proximate causes (like negligence, incompetence, etc.) that are the result of broader root causes, which could include mismatching theories. With those ideas in mind, it is important to go over the history of ACAP in order to better understand its creation and implementation.

History of ACAP in Relation to Peacebuilding Theories

The goals of ACAP have changed slightly over the years, but the general idea has remained the same: find Afghan citizens hurt by conflict and help them. ACAP functioned as a “no-blame” program, whether the civilians were hurt by international or insurgent forces, ACAP provided assistance without focusing on why or how the incidents occurred (USAID 2011). According to their 2011 Fact Sheet, USAID lists its activities as the following:

- Distribute standard kit containing items for the home, children’s education, and tailoring supplies
- Distribute livelihood support kit from one of the following beneficiaries’ choices: grocery, rural livelihoods, haberdashery
- Liaise with and involve a variety of [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan], national and international stakeholders to promote awareness and further assistance to affected communities
Given these activities it becomes difficult to properly place the program. Is it conflict resolution? Is it development assistance? Is it humanitarian aid? The only way to truly understand where it stands is to observe its history.

The idea was originally proposed by Senator Patrick Leahy in 2002 as a way of providing “humanitarian and reconstruction assistance ‘...for families and communities that have suffered losses as a result of the military operation against the Taliban and insurgents’” (Ahmadi et al. 2010, 9). Nicknamed the ‘Leahy Initiative,’ it was funded in the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution of 2003 so “that assistance should be made available to communities and families that were adversely affected by the military operations.” The bill maintained a focus on women and “humanitarian, reconstruction, and related assistance for Afghanistan” (Public Law 108-7 2003). At this point the initiative was a mixture of development and moral obligation. Nowhere in the funding of the initiative was a mention of helping improve governance in the area or increasing the stability of Afghanistan.

The group that ended up implementing the program was the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), a USAID office with a basis in governance and stabilization. According to their mission statement “OTI works on the ground to provide fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key political transition and stabilization needs” (USAID 2009, 1). ATI, the precursor to ACAP, was funded by Congress as a humanitarian and development program with a concentration on women; it became a supplement to OTI’s governance-based programs. “The main goal for the first three phases (March 2002-March 2003) was to highlight the benefits of the Post-Taliban government (ATI) of the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan (TISA) through quick-impact, high-visibility projects,” building credibility by showing ability to help those in need in a timely manner (Ahmadi et al. 2010, 9). The next two phases did focus on women, then public awareness, political participation, and improving Afghan media capacity, but only as means to the end of stabilizing the region (Ahmadi et al. 2010, 9).

OTI, which solely handles countries deemed to be transitional, phased out of Afghanistan in 2005, was replaced roughly a year after the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan (TISA) by the current democratic government. The International Organization for Migration (IOM), the main implementing partner for ATI, sustained the program until 2007 (Ahmadi et al. 2010, 9). It should be noted that IOM’s main concern is migration, as per their mission statement:

As the leading international organization for migration, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to:
• Assist in meeting the growing operational challenges of migration management.
• Advance understanding of migration issues.
• Encourage social and economic development through migration.
• Uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

ACAP was then born in 2007 with an initial budget of $27 million and 11 staff members with the goal to “strengthen the US Government’s efforts to provide assistance for Afghan families and communities that have suffered losses as a result of military operations against insurgents and the Taliban, thereby contributing to overall stabilization efforts in Afghanistan and pre-emptively addressing potential causes of renewed disorderly migration” (Ahmadi et al. 2010, 9). The last part of that statement is particularly important, as it highlights the effects the theory of the organization implementing the program can have. ACAP started as a humanitarian effort funded by Congress; it was then changed to a stabilization effort by OTI, and then shifted to the prevention of disorderly migration by IOM.

Analysis of the Detriment of Mismatched Theories

ACAP could become a highly effective identity and population-based peacebuilding program. However, it has been implemented as a supplement to governance-based programs and its concentration on women and youth has fallen to the side, robbing it of its true potential.

The groups implementing ACAP have organizational theories based on governance theories of peacebuilding. As stated prior, governance-based peacebuilding concentrates on pushing countries to market democracy while mitigating the destabilization that such change can cause (Paris 1997, 58). In its earliest iteration ACAP was used to “highlight the benefits of the Post-Taliban government” and “build its credibility by showing its ability to provide services to those in need in a timely manner” (Ahmadi et al. 2010, 9). The concentration on stabilization as the program continued and evolved only served to cement its firm standing as a supplement to governance, an additional show of credibility for the rule of law programs being implemented in parallel.

ACAP’s position as a supplement to governance has become even shakier in recent years as governance-based programs phase out of Afghanistan. The governance theories are best suited for countries in transition, and while Afghanistan’s current government has not become the
full-fledged stable market democracy that westerners would like it to be, it has
reached a point in its development where governance-based theories start to
lose their grip. The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI), USAID’s governance-
based arm, left Afghanistan in 2005, and most other governance programs
left with it (Ahmadi et al. 2010, 9). However, ACAP remains as its legacy and
the governance theories that forged ACAP in its early years remain, but ACAP
must evolve beyond them.

Since the moment it was funded, ACAP and ATI had the potential to be
much more than a supplement to governance. ACAP’s program structure gives
it direct access to civil society, at-risk youth, women, and local community
groups. ACAP was funded with a concentration on women in mind (Public law
108-7 2003). According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM)
the focus of ACAP “has shifted from infrastructure to individually tailored ‘soft’
assistance, based on the specific needs of affected families and communities”
(Kaya and Northing 2008). Individual assistance is perfect for identity-based
peacebuilding, allowing individuals the chance to go beyond the opportunities
originally offered to them and become role models that challenge existing
social structures.

In terms of identity, the kits and assistance that ACAP distributes could
be forged in such a way that they give Afghan women and youth the chance
to improve their position in society. ACAP does offer vocational training, but
as one reviewer of the program stated: “in our evaluation of the ACAP, we
observed the troubling effects of its flawed design. The ACAP design does not
consider women’s special needs and circumstances, resulting in the exclusion
of many women from decisions regarding their assistance” (Ahmadi et al.
2010, 22). In terms of improving the social position of the next generation, an
even more worrying discovery was made: “in some areas girls were not given
school kits at all, while all the boys in the family received them” (Ahmadi et al.
2010, 26).

In terms of population theories ACAP has direct access to youth put
at a disadvantage by war. Even at its best, USAID youth policy takes an overly
straightforward and inflexible position that concentrates on mitigating the
destabilizing effect of youth. ACAP could benefit greatly from the identity-
based approach to youth that UNDP suggests (Ebara et al. 2006). In 2010
ACAP decided to “standardize the only assistance component that can be
standardized: the kits” (Ahmadi et al. 2010, 27). This represents an approach
to the problem typical of USAID programs; the kits act only as a band-aid for
those hurt by conflict. The assistance concentrates on mitigating the harm of
conflict, but instead the funding should be viewed as an opportunity to truly
change the lives of those given assistance. As UNDP argues, the beneficiaries should become key decision makers in the process and youth should be encouraged to become entrepreneurs (Ebata et al. 2006).

Lastly, ACAP could help its peacebuilding effects by working holistically on all levels. It has failed to do this with beneficiaries, and it has failed to do this with regional, national, and international groups. According to USAID’s scathing review of their own program “ACAP has neglected the importance of communication and coordination with stakeholders” (Ahmadi et al. 2010, 23). ACAP has gone through many program reviews prior to 2010, but they have been based on improvement of performance and limiting corruption (Ahmadi et al. 2010, 13). However, this analysis has suggested that ACAP’s failure stems from the mismatching of the theories that inspire the program. As such the program would need to be changed from its very core in order to make sure that the theories that influence its development and implementation are in harmony.

**Conclusion**

Mismatched theories can harm the effectiveness of peacebuilding programs and ACAP provides an example of this issue. Specifically the governance-based theories of the organizations implementing ACAP stifled its ability to be an effective identity-based program. With its direct access to community groups and at-risk women and youth, ACAP is in a perfect position to elevate the social position of women and youth and aid peace in the region.

The organizational fixation on governance that the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) imparted on ACAP is reflected by the repetition throughout ACAP’s development of the term “stabilization.” Despite stated goals of providing real assistance to those in need, ACAP has been treated as a supplement to the governance-based ideal of stabilization.

At the operational level ACAP shows discouraging failures at handling gender and youth. The standardization of kits available to those in need will only exacerbate the lack of tailored assistance and inability to truly change the lives of those reached by ACAP. Thus dooming the program to be a giver of band-aids: temporary relief to mitigate the pain of conflict and improve the credibility of the government.

This paper highlights the worrying concept that programs may be developed for one theory of peacebuilding but implemented through the lens of a different theory. Ideally the scholarly theory of the developers of the program and organizational theory of the implementers should work in
unison. This generally occurs, as organizations will develop programs that fit into their organizational theory and by default be in unison. However, USAID and its affiliates suffer from an odd problem. In the case of ACAP Congress developed a vision and allotted funding for the program using their theories, but the groups implementing the program on the behalf of Congress did not use the same theories as Congress. In many NGOs, for example, the people funding and creating programs take part in the same theory, but in the case of Congress and USAID the theories may not match up. The result of such mismatch in theory, as evidenced by the failure of ACAP, can be disastrous.

Further research is needed to see whether the problem of theoretical mismatch also negatively affects other USAID programs, as well as the programs of aid agencies run by other governments. In addition, it is possible that this problem could affect NGOs as well if donors or board members operate using different theories than the organization as a whole, or if one NGO develops and funds a program that is set to be implemented by another NGO. This paper has only highlighted the issue as a potential problem and set out an initial analysis for the mechanisms of the problem, but further research is required to see how widespread the issue truly is. □
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INTENT TO HARM: FACTORS INFLUENCING TARGET SELECTION BY AFRICAN ISLAMIST MILITANT GROUPS

Adam Cook

Abstract

The rise of Islamist militant groups and their propensity towards violence has perplexed researchers and policy-makers and lead to debate about how to handle this evolving asymmetric threat. However the general focus of past research has been on groups in the Middle Easter and Central Asia, overlooking African Islamist extremist groups, which have attacked both local and international targets. This case study examines one possible explanation for these groups’ target selection. The analysis indicates that government responses play a large role in determining the internationalization of targets by African Islamist extremist groups. This important finding challenges the standard response of using available security forces toward Islamist militant groups without a channel of dialogue. In addition, this paper assesses to what degree an international presence in case countries influences the internationalization of violence and reexamines how certain populations perceive foreign influences.

Introduction

One Sunday in 2011, a group of Nigerian political leaders were gathered outside a provincial official’s home. Suddenly, gunshots were heard. Militants, who were suspected Boko Haram members, were targeting a prominent member among the assembled group. While the official was not injured, one person died in the attack. Later that night and across the continent, two Kenyan police officers were injured when Somalia-based Al Shabaab militants

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<http://www.american.edu/clocksandclouds/>
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mounted an assault on a police post.

It is not uncommon to hear of the attacks, coups, rebellions, corruption, and extremely violent tactics that pockmark the political landscape of Africa. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) currently tracks 16 conflicts throughout the continent which are either actively violent or latent but unresolved, excluding the Arab Spring (“Africa’s Conflict Zones,” CFR). However, the targets selected for the attacks on March 27, 2011 are noteworthy for two reason: the type of group who committed the attack and where those groups were based.

Differences among conflicts in Africa are many. However, the fact that the groups involved were Islamist militant groups and one of the attacks was international validates the concern that numerous state actors worldwide have in regards to regional and international security. For example, in a regular update of worldwide threats against Americans, the U.S. Department of State noted three groups in the section about Africa, all Islamist in nature (“Worldwide Caution,” U.S. Department of State). Some groups are accused of spreading their destabilizing influence to other parts of the continent and the world (Rubin 2010). While there has been past literature focusing on terrorist groups, insurgency, and counter-insurgency (COIN) in Africa, there has not been a focused attempt to examine the target selection decision-making process by these groups and what factors impact said decisions.

Thus, this study focuses on the African Islamist militant groups that have committed violent actions but have diverse methods and areas of operation. These are distinct from more general Islamist groups, which have a political goal but which are not defined by violence. African Islamist militant groups, on the other hand, actively use violence to achieve their aims. What factors motivate a group to remain violent in the country where it was founded versus expanding into international operations? This study first proposes that initial government actions and the relevance of foreign influences in a country have an impact on the target selection of violent Islamist organizations in Africa. Second, this study will claim that this effect is due to the unique history of occupation and foreign relations on the continent.

To achieve a qualitative analysis, the theory section will trace the foundational theories of colonialism, group identity, and insurgency to create a lens through which the motivations of violent African Islamist groups can be examined. The theory is expanded on in the theoretical literature section and is used to contextualize the analysis of the cases chosen. Finally, the paper examines the merits and viability of the hypothesis and concludes with a discussion of counter-arguments, avenues for further research, and policy implications.
Literature Review

In order to provide contextual analysis applicable to African Islamic militant groups, this paper will assess three distinct schools of thought. First, colonalist studies provide insight into Africa’s internal structure. Second, Social Identity Theory plays an important role in the decision-making process. Finally, Insurgency/Terrorism literature provides a modern look at violence as a tool and the psychological factors that affect the perception of violence.

In 1960, both Nigeria and Somalia gained independence from Great Britain. Within a decade, both countries experienced violent military overthrows of their initial governments (“World Factbook,” CIA). The intensity of violence so soon after independence produced a well-documented field of study: colonialism and its effects on Africa. Victor Azarya notes that the ethnic configurations that were in place upon independence for many African nations were crystallized as groups struggled to gain power. Often, the new African nations lacked the ability to provide promised resources and meet expectations resulting in leaders restricting access in what Richard Joseph called “ethnoclientism.” Nigeria is a model of this problem, as its efforts to limit ethnic dominance only highlighted the regional differences within the state (Azarya 2003, 10-21).

Colonialism also brought about abrupt changes to the concept of what was valuable. In Somalia, colonial rule enabled an elite to engage in practices that were financially fruitful but environmentally destructive (Webersik 2004, 518-520). Governmental and societal changes affected and continue to affect the very nature of how Africa and its social groups interact as well as what these groups pursue in order to survive.

Colonialism’s lasting impact is the social tensions it brought about. In a phrase, colonialism disrupted African notions of identity (Idowu 2004, 425-427). In the eyes of extremist groups, notably those that operate in areas of weak governance, these groups view the government as merely puppets of the great powers. When the group is operating in a country with a relatively stable and central government, the viewpoint and focus of the extremist group is centered there, not on foreign powers. If political Islam is a reaction to the Western world’s influence encroaching on the Muslim world, then understanding colonialism through the eyes of those oppressed is key to qualifying why some members of militant groups are willing to take radical steps to expel those who represent a style of government favored by the West and other members are not (Stith 2010, 55-59).

That history is a component part of the most important facet of group
decision-making: how the group identifies itself. Identity is hotly debated and there is a wealth of theory and academic literature on the topic. The field is too rich with material to be able to cover the role of identity in group decision-making processes in its entirety, at least in this study. Despite this limitation, one strand of identity literature can help provide a theoretical backbone for the study of African Islamic extremism. Professor Celia Cook-Huffman notes in the Handbook of Conflict Analysis and Resolution that in communal conflict, situational factors that cause uncertainty are likely to aggravate and harden group identity cohesion. This uncertainty leads the groups to question the legitimacy of the prevailing institutions and is likely to encourage violent actions (Cook-Huffman 2008, 23-24).

Kaya expands on this point, noting that when talking about Africa, collective identities are often linked to “concrete interests,” such as foodstuffs or other resources. Additionally, he argues that this group support is a “blowback” reaction to globalization. As new vulnerabilities and economic dependence lessen people’s ability to control their financial survival, group extremism and emphasis on tradition will increase (Kaya 2004, 15). From a Realist perspective, this is supported by discussion of the security dilemma for new militant groups. If a group is newly formed, then the main basis for determining offensive or defensive capabilities and intentions will be history. Fanatical small groups are more likely to initiate conflict when facing a larger enemy the more dissimilar it is from said group. (Posen 1993, 28-33)

Like identity, the study of insurgency is a vast field. Unlike colonialism and identity theory however, which seek to addresses the internal nature of a group, insurgency theory is useful in examining an extremist group’s relations to outside units. It is particularly useful in examining how those relations can change the nature of the group. Populations tend to follow more than one logic pathway when deciding to support insurgent tactics. There is both an active weighing of cost versus benefit and also a “hearts and minds” component that implies an alternative to inexperienced or corrupt governments. The people who support these tactics, either implicitly or explicitly, hope that the groups perpetrating them will make their lives better (Long 2006, RAND Corporation, 21-31).

Several hypotheses have been proposed to explain this common affliction in Africa. These include weak governments, dependence on oil exports, exploitation of natural resources, separation from centers of power, and large populations, all of which are known to increase the likelihood of insurgent activity (Fearon & Laiten 2003, 75-90). Furthermore, an abundance of natural resources, also known as the “resource curse,” has been shown to
increase the likelihood of insurgency. Evidenced by colonial exploitation, Africa is not lacking for key natural resources (Pendergast et al. 2011, 415-417).

Additionally, some scholars believe violent insurgent groups will be more active in nations that face multiple external threats (Alozieuwa 2012, 40-63). However, this activity varies according to the level of popular support received and the group’s ties to local society, even when the insurgent groups share similar religious beliefs. Furthermore, “emotionally compelling” events, can psychologically affect the decision making process of the group’s leaders, influencing increasing violent innovation in insurgent tactics (Crenshaw 2000, 405-420).

While in the popular perception insurgencies are distinct from terrorism, an insurgency paradigm is perhaps more useful in understanding the actions of these militant groups: “Under this [terrorism] paradigm... terrorists are seen as unrepresentative, partly to discourage emulation...Under this [insurgency] approach, insurgents are regarded as representative of deeper issues or grievances within society” (Kilcullen 2005, 605). Organizations commonly labeled as “terrorists,” most notably Al Qaeda and its affiliates, take local grievances and change the perception of their origins to justify a global jihad aimed at empowering the entire Muslim world.

Violent Islamist groups use terrorist actions to force change in host governments or occupying nations vis-À-vis the actions of other groups, whether formally aligned together or not (Kilcullen 2005, 597-607). This view of insurgency is reflective of the environments in which these violent groups operate. Asymmetric groups lack the denial of power tactic available to states which are strong militarily. Instead, asymmetric groups must rely on tactics aimed at infusing fear of future punishment into the mentality of the state or governmental force they are opposing (Pape 2003, 346-350).

**Methodology**

If the theoretical literature is to serve a purpose, it must complement the realities “on the ground.” First, colonialism has left both visible and invisible scars on Africa’s societies and people. Second, Islam has a long and storied history in Africa stretching back into antiquity. Third, there are many issues that persist throughout the continent which create poverty and inequity and limit prospects for economic growth and development. These realities illuminate two persistent factors: national governance and foreign influence.

Historically, foreign influence, including both the arrival of Islam and
the later European colonization efforts, has had a great effect on the poverty and religiosity of African populations. African Islamist extremist groups exploit these influences through advocating for worldwide religion. Thus, government actions and foreign influence are possible variables that determine whether Islamic extremists choose to remain intra-state or become inter-state entities?

This study seeks to evaluate these two factors and the extent to which they determine an insurgent organization’s decision to internationalize. This study will compare two cases of violent Islamist organizations in Africa. The analysis of each organization will explore the history and context surrounding the formation of the group, the groups’ initial actions, their initial violent actions, and their current violent operations.

This study aims to bring meaning to the violent actions committed by insurgent organizations through an emphasis on their context. Qualitative context will enhance the visibility of foreign influence on select nations and the groups operating within their borders, enriching the understanding of government actions and the reasoning behind them. In both cases, the unit of analysis is an organization, thus the study is situated at the sub-national organizational level. Contextual information regarding government and international connections will be supplemented when necessary; however, all of the information referenced directly influences the violent Islamist groups being analyzed (Gerring 2004, 342-346).

This literature has many broad applications, examined in greater depth in the following sections. These include identifying additional COIN techniques, why insurgencies form, and how these movements are shaped by outside influences. This study aims to enrich the COIN debate by exploring how the answers to those questions affect an insurgent group’s decision-making process. Arguably, the most visible of those decisions is the violent actions a group chooses to pursue and this lies at the core of the study.

**Operationalization**

In order to ensure the relevancy of possible findings to conditions found throughout Africa, this study will adopt a narrow definition of an African Islamist extremist group, or AEIG. The groups selected for analysis must possess the following characteristics:

1. Have a leadership that is based physically in Africa.
2. Have performed violent acts directed against a population other than their principal membership.
3. Have perpetrated at least one of those attacks within an African country.
4. Have self-identified as acting on behalf of fundamentalist Islamic doctrine.

These criteria will be determined through source material provided by journalists, scholars, think tanks, and government organizations that actively track these groups and analyze their makeup, statements, and actions. To identify “extremist” organizations, this study will adopt the definition used by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS): “Extremism” should be regarded as a kind of radical negation of a state’s prevailing social norms and rules by individuals or groups (Bondarets 2012). Militant extremist groups are those that fit the preceding definition and use violence to advance their views. This paper will not use the term “fundamentalist,” defined as characterized by strict interpretation of a religious text, as a main identifier because no group is singularly religious in their identity.

It is also important to note what this study does not aim to do. Principally, the study will not attempt to work through the problematic issues associated with the branding of “terrorist,” look at ways to dismantle violent Islamist groups, or attempt to address and mitigate real or supposed grievances held by said groups. Case selection is strictly limited to focus on the factors influencing the decision to internationlize violence. Finally, due to time constraints and limited relevant literature, this paper will exclude “Arab Spring” organizations from its analysis, which also operate in the culturally distinct region of North Africa and the Middle East (MENA) as opposed to sub-Saharan Africa.

Data Analysis

The data analysis is split into two sections, one for a local Islamic group and one for an internationalized Islamic group, both of which fit the previously stated criteria. Each section will begin with evidence of that group’s case credentials and then proceed to outline how well the group fits the four case selection qualifications.

Group 1: Boko Haram, Nigeria

Self-labeled as Jama‘atu Ahl as-Sunnah li-Da‘awat al-Jihad, which translates to “People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings
and Jihad,” Boko Haram is an African Islamic extremist group that operates exclusively in Nigeria. Their colloquial name comes from locals in northern Nigeria, their region of origin, and means “Western education is banned.” In an effort to create group cohesion, the members of Boko Haram are urged to follow strict interpretations of the Quran and the group has founded a Mosque where their radical ideals could be preached to a wider audience (“Nigeria’s Crisis,” The Economist).

Boko Haram has had two known leaders, both Nigerian: Muhammad Yusuf, who was killed by Nigerian security forces, and now Abubakar Shekau, who was believed to be killed but has since re-surfaced in Internet videos. (Chothia 2012) Boko Haram has either perpetrated or is suspected of perpetrating 151 incidents of violence in Nigeria at the time of writing. Attacks have varied in method and target, from private citizens to religious figures and police (“Global Terrorism Database,” START).

While some figures from the Nigerian government claim that Boko Haram is an international terrorist organization, there is no conclusive evidence that Boko Haram is actively operating in foreign countries. There is at best tenuous evidence claiming that the group has communicated with and even recruited from peoples outside of Nigeria. Regardless, Boko Haram has only perpetrated violence in Nigeria as defined by this study. Any unproven international non-violent actions are irrelevant to this study’s analysis of factors affecting violent action (Solomon 2012, 6-7). Given the propensity towards violence, stated Islamic values, and violence that is focused solely in Nigeria, Boko Haram is considered a local AIEG.

Boko Haram operates in a deeply divided country. Home to a population of nearly 150 million, roughly half that of the United States, Nigeria is split between a mostly Muslim north and a mostly Christian south. The southern region is home to vast oil reserves and has higher rates of employment and literacy. The northern region is where Boko Haram is based and most active.

Boko Haram is not the first Islamic Extremist group to form in the northern provinces, however. In the 1980s, a decade marked by riots against extreme poverty and inequities in the region, similar groups emerged. There is speculation that Muhammad Yusuf belonged to groups that participated in those riots and possibly created an earlier form of Boko Haram in the 1990s (Adesoji 2011, 98-119). Shortly after Boko Haram’s formation in 2002, a confrontation with police left the majority of its founding members dead after being besieged inside a mosque. The surviving members returned to their homes and then gradually proceeded to set up an organization that expanded into several northern provinces, providing welfare and religious education (Walker 2012).
After these initial actions and brief violence, little information regarding Boko Haram can be independently verified between 2003-2007. From 2002 up until the violence of 2009, there are reports that suspected Boko Haram of cultivating support, gaining members, and establishing social services. But, as one journalist put it, “so little information about the organization can be verified and solid, dependable information is hard to come by in Nigeria.” (Walker 2012) Even the first instance of violence perpetrated by Boko Haram after the siege has not been completely verifiable.

A report commissioned by the U.S. Institute of Peace speculates that Boko Haram assassinated a rival imam in 2007, while the Global Terrorist Database records the first instance of violence as occurring much later in 2009. Despite the uncertainty surrounding initial violent action, the first comprehensive period of such action is not in dispute. In the second half of 2009, almost ten attacks can be attributed to Boko Haram (“Global Terrorism Database”). These attacks were aimed at Nigerian law enforcement over a motorcycle helmet law, but it is unlikely that something so seemingly insignificant would trigger such violence (Walker 2012). The U.S. Department of State’s report on human rights for Nigeria in 2009 lists massive repression of political rights, extrajudicial killings, and torture in the months leading up to when violence involving Boko Haram broke out (“Human Rights Report: Nigeria” 2009, U.S. Department of State). Given the historical disparity between the northern and southern provinces, these disturbing reports are a more likely trigger of the targeted violence against government forces.

As of writing, the most current information about Boko Haram was last compiled in 2011. Most recently, Boko Haram was identified as the perpetrator of 13 attacks in December 2011 alone. Additionally, there are media reports of violence across northern Nigerian provinces, including against foreigners who are working inside the country (Mshelizza & Brock 2012, Reuters). There are currently no reports of direct contact between foreign military forces or foreign peacekeeping and police forces and Boko Haram.

Group 2: Al Shabaab, Somalia-based International Group

After the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, Somalia has faced years of chaos while various groups have tried unsuccessfully to vie for control (“World Factbook” 2012, CIA). These groups, which varied from warlords to Islamic groups, occasionally foreign-funded, had different motivations for seeking power. The Islamic movements, some of which had formed early on and even before President Barre was overthrown, were unable to gain a political or physical foothold. When the tides briefly began to turn against
the warlords in the middle of the 1990s allowing an Islamic group to gain prominence, Ethiopian troops stepped in and overwhelmed it. It was clear to outside observers that no one group was going to gain power at the time and the status quo would likely be maintained. These observers included members of external and pre-existing Islamic extremist groups, such as Al-Qaida. However, the lack of a stable government encouraged external groups to operate more openly than they otherwise would have, beginning the links into the global jihad. These links proved attractive to those lacking a constitutional path to self-governance or even a legitimate government that could address their grievances (Kilcullen 609-612).

After years of bloody lawlessness and the dismantling of the one dominant Islamist organization, a union of Islamic courts banded together to impose a semblance of stability in Somalia. Al-Qaida provided funding to and training for the young militant members of the Islamic Courts who would later become Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahedeen, meaning “Movement of the Warrior Youth”, or more commonly just Al-Shabaab, “the Youth” (Shinn 2011, 203-215). Neighboring Ethiopia again became concerned when the propaganda disseminated by the Islamic Courts began mentioning attacking Ethiopian interests. Consequently, Ethiopia invaded Somalia, causing most of the Islamic Courts’ leadership to flee. However, the fighters who would self-identify as Al-Shabaab stayed to fight the Ethiopian forces (Wise 2011). An “Emir” known as Abu Zabayr currently leads Al-Shabaab. Zabayr, which is one of his many names and aliases, is a native Somali and is advised by an Islamist religious council (Horadam 2011).

Since the formation of the group, Al-Shabaab has been characterized by violence. The group harassed the Ethiopian forces for three years before the Ethiopians withdrew and were replaced with peacekeeping soldiers under the auspices of the African Union (AU). Since 2010, Al-Shabaab has been active outside of Somalia, notably with attacks in Uganda and Kenya, and the group has also been accused of aiding groups in Mali (Wise; “Global Terrorism Database”). Despite the increased pace of operations outside of Somalia, African Union forces have put pressure on the group and Al-Shabaab has lost ground in their fight to control Somalia (Bayoumy 2012, Reuters).

**Discussion**

Initial government reactions to Islamist groups and foreign influence in the country of origin are two potential variables in determining the internationalization of violence that both Somalia and Nigeria can showcase.
In Nigeria, Boko Haram members have borne witness to the perceived inequality in their country and corruption of the central federal government. Its members have seen foreign oil companies invest in the southern provinces while largely neglecting the north. Somalia has seen the opposite: almost no central government authority and a large foreign presence in the country in the form of various security forces.

This stark contrast illustrates how initial government actions play a crucial role in the formation of a militant group’s target selection. Nigeria’s central government is equipped with a sizable army that can and does enforce secular laws (Stearns 2011, VOA). These governmental forces wasted very little time in targeting the group due to the perceived threat it posed. After the initial attack, the government did not interfere with the survivors when they returned to their home provinces. Seizing on that initial attack, Boko Haram hardened its belief that the central government was corrupt, in turn feeding their ideology that they must fight political leaders in their home provinces and in Abuja. Furthermore, that initial attack on Boko Haram members inside of a mosque could be considered an act that necessitated revenge, but which took time to plan and initiate (Crenshaw 2000).

In contrast, Al-Shabaab was originally part of an alliance that was attempting to bring order to the chaos that had engulfed Somalia. Given that there was no effective Somali government to respond to Al-Shabaab and the Islamic Courts, they in effect saw themselves as a government. In a theoretical sense, one of the responsibilities of a government is to protect the sovereignty of the state from foreign invaders. As discussed in the proceeding paragraphs, it is this notion that influenced Al-Shabaab’s international goals. But as noted earlier in the data analysis section, the type of government that responds also seems to affect the decision of a group to internationalize. There were no cases apparent to this author where a vastly different form of government operated against a militant Islamist group in Africa. So while there could theoretically be intervening effects on this variable, the scarcity of current data relevant to Africa precludes the possibility of triangulation and should be an area of further study.

While the Islamic Courts/Al-Shabaab was forming, foreign governments along with exiled Somalis were forming the “Transitional Federal Government” in Kenya. Simultaneously, Ethiopia as a Christian nation was concerned about the religious nature of the Islamic courts (Wise). Given the rampant instability in Somalia, it is not extraordinary to understand why regional powers would be concerned. However, for the population in Somalia, the anarchy arose from foreign governments creating a societal system that
perpetuated weak institutions during the long period of colonial rule.

When the foreign colonizers pulled out, chaos ensued. For religiously motivated members of Al-Shabaab, the idea of having Christian foreign powers interfering with their affairs again was a formidable factor in shaping the organization’s decisions. Pursuing international targets therefore does not seem shocking when viewed through the eyes of the poverty stricken young members of Al-Shabaab. This is markedly different from Boko Haram’s vision of transforming the secular federal government of Nigeria into an Islamic state (Abimbola 2010, 95-108).

Conversely, while there is substantial foreign investment in Nigeria, only two cities in the northern provinces are even mentioned in an investor’s guide to Nigeria, lessening the degree of contact between Boko Haram and foreign influences (Uzonwanne 2011). While the group has targeted foreigners inside the country, the lack of a large foreign presence in the northern provinces, especially the lack of a “Western” economic presence, should be noted. Regardless of the debate over the depth and spread of official corruption, Nigeria still has an active government, security apparatus, and political process. This is the environment in which Boko Haram has been operating. Their focus is primarily not international targets because from their inception, they have been fighting extinction at the hands of Nigerian state security.

Without first-hand experience within these countries, it is impractical to attempt to measure or qualify how much interaction these groups, especially Boko Haram, have had with foreign influences. This is likely to be the most contentious point this study, as I do not attempt to specifically define foreign influence. For the purposes of this study, I can only say foreign influence includes economic and governmental types of interactions. To justify this method, it is important to note that foreign influences, such as economic investment and governmental support, often go hand in hand in Africa. This paper puts forth the inference that in the end, the specific type of influence is not what matters but rather the prevalence of “foreignness” in the case country.

The decision to internationalize target selection by violent Africa Islamist groups appears to be principally driven by the response of the government, or as the groups might see it, the neo-colonizers or the puppet government. Foreign influence is the trickier of the two variables. From the qualitative analysis, the two variables appear scalar. That is to say, the more autonomous the African government, the more that variable outweighs the effect of foreign influence. Conversely, the weaker the government, the more significant the effect of foreign influence becomes. The more power wielded
by a government, the less foreign presence seems to influence a group’s target selection. Therefore, foreign influence is more useful to the research when considered as an intervening variable rather than a distinct independent variable, departing from the original hypothesis.

Implications

The case analysis in this study presents findings that have the potential to enrich the field of COIN. If the initial by the government or governing entity is a key factor in how Islamist militant groups operate, then governments must be aware of the long-term implications of their actions. Rather than boldly countering a perceived threat with military or security forces, governments could engage religious and cultural leaders in order to make the community aware of the negative impacts a militant group can have on the welfare of the country as a whole. Additionally, with advancements in digital and information technology, governments should seek to pair the necessary and legitimate use of force with complimentary framing in public media, so as to reduce the likelihood that reactions from “militant” groups will be violent.

This paper also challenges ideas posed in some existing literature. Kilcullen suggests that breaking the links between regional Islamist insurgencies would be an effective tool in countering the violence associated with these groups. Disaggregation, Kilcullen argues, is the key to breaking global jihad and therefore should be the focus of government efforts. This study; however, points towards systemic issues as being more important than links to other militant groups in determining a group’s behavior. While it is true that aggregation among militant groups can give constituent members more resources and media attention, the perpetuation of insurgency appears to instead driven by initial systemic issues. If an insurgency is denied its raison d’être, the group should be less likely to join a global movement of Islamic jihad.

While foreign influence as an intervening variable appears to be significant, this generates additional questions regarding the specific role it plays in determining internationalization by militant groups. Further research differentiating the effects of historical foreign influence versus current levels of influence in a country could help to expand the implications of this study. Previous influence, such as colonialism, has had a seemingly immense negative impact. Nevertheless, positive perceptions of contemporary development and aid programs could potentially shift the national discourse towards a more positive view of said influences. It is possible that differences in the perception
of foreign influence contribute to determining the “area of violent operations.”

Another avenue of future research is the nature of Islamist groups and militant groups in African countries that are officially or majority Muslim. Nigeria is an officially secular country while the Somalia state is nominally non-existent, as component regions continue to act independently. Assessing the impact of a religious government could strengthen understanding of how these militant groups operate.

Some might argue that this research is less important given the violent nature of other types of militant groups, particularly in Africa. The Lord’s Resistance Army, for example, is infamous for its sudden violent attacks and use of child soldiers. However, research into Islamic extremism in other parts of the world, or even Islamic governments in Africa, is all the more important given that the Muslim population in Africa is shortly predicted to surpass that of the entire Middle East (“The Future of the Global Muslim Population,” Pew Research Center).

Of the many problems that afflict Africa, Islamist extremist groups are of particular concern because of their ability to reach out to Islamic extremists in other parts of the world. The “contagiousness” of this particular threat is why it is all the more necessary to understand the context surrounding AIEGs.

Conclusions

This paper has examined two African Islamist extremist groups (AIEGs): Boko Haram and Al-Shabaab, which met the case selection criteria. By examining the past literature, history, and context of these two cases, this study concludes that initial government actions are an important factor in whether a violent group chooses to internationalize its selection of targets. Additionally, the analysis suggests that foreign influence, with economic and military influence being considered equal, is only important in relation to the government of the country or region in question. Rather than being a distinct independent variable, foreign influence appears to be an intervening variable.

As policy makers around the world debate how to handle militant extremists in Africa, these findings should be noted when discussing possible courses of action on the continent. This research specifically dealt with conditions in Africa which are the result of the continent’s unique history, a typically Constructivist approach. However, the relevance of this research should not be considered isolated to the two cases considered. Rather, militant Islamist groups are active in several African countries and the findings herein could be applicable to these cases as well, and possibly more cases worldwide.
If government responses contribute to the problem, then current security assistance and developmental aid should be reexamined. If a lack of government services is part of the issue, then perhaps mediated talks or other conflict resolution and structural steps should be considered as well. Whatever the policy implications, there is now an initial foothold into research on the differences found in African Islamist groups and their perpetuation of violence. This research, while currently isolated, may help advance discussion on achieving peace and stability throughout Africa. ✱
Bibliography


ON GLOBAL ORDER: 
SOUTH AFRICA AS A CASE STUDY FOR THE 
VALIDITY OF CITY-SPECIFIC RESEARCH IN 
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Janetta Deppa

Abstract

This study provides an overview of the international development field’s attention to urbanization. Despite cities being proven the largest hubs of development for the industrializing world, patterns in urban areas often behave much differently than when assessing aggregate-level data. Assessment of cities as their own spheres of development is necessary. Currently, the development field fails to implement measures addressing the enormity of this phenomenon: while it acknowledges city-specific growth projects are important, very little raw data is available for analysis, and studies comparing multiple cities together are rare. This paper addresses the questions “are city-specific data important, and if so why?” through a mixed methods approach. The use of quantitative analysis highlights existing data found for three indicators of development. Qualitative analysis provides an overview of city-specific development by multiple players in the field, including international organizations, scholars, non-profits, think tanks, and governments. Findings point to the validity of increased attention to city-specific indicators in the future, as well as a need for collaboration on findings between involved actors. The study reveals a gap in the study of international development and calls for a shift in the way scholars view urbanization in our increasingly globalized world.

Introduction

Our world is changing. No longer are individuals bound to their respective nations as they once were, but instead beginning to identify

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themselves as global citizens interconnected by commerce, communication, and a common push for economic growth. Increasingly people are joining together, connected by urban hotspots around the world. In fact, urban sites are the principal incubators of development. Cities attract the highest levels of foreign investment, the brightest and most innovative minds, the largest international industries, and the most populous community organizations that can mobilize diverse bodies of people together. Yet a critical oversight in modern scholarship is how we persist in treating cities as completely subordinate to the state. Instead of considering cities as an indicator of development potential, scholars continue to measure output on an aggregate, statewide level.

This study explores how urban development diverges from typical notions of international development, using South Africa as a case study. The study focuses on the incredible gap in citywide research, a modality missing from nearly every realm of social science.

Context

In 1800, fewer than 3 percent of our world’s population resided in urban areas (Clark 1998). As the industrial revolution took hold of the globe and industries began to sprout up along city borders, this number increased dramatically. Driven by capitalism with the lure of higher wages and improved quality of life, a mass proportion of the world’s population migrated away from their farms towards more tightly concentrated urban areas. By 1950 approximately 27 percent of the world were urban dwellers (Clark 1998). The year 2008 marked the first time in history that a majority of the world’s population resided in urban areas. By 2050, it is estimated that over 70% of our world will live in cities, with most of this growth projected in developing countries (Population Reference Bureau 2014).

This fundamental change in where people live is monumental. The interdependency of globalization very closely parallels the interdependency that comes from living in closely confined urban areas. Increasing interdependence in every realm of human interaction shifts the way humanity organizes production, competition, and finance. Because of their international nature and lack of spatial boundaries, corporations and investors have the potential to drive economic growth fundamentally more than any government. For these international actors, it is not the resident country but rather “the world cities in which they are located that are the command and control points of the global economy” (Clark 1998, 94). Our world tends to urbanize when localized patterns of investment, production, and employment centralize. The
result is a domino effect of labor migration that in turn spurs new growth.

The dense population cities possess offers access to a larger labor forces, localized markets, and a demand pool for all types of goods and services available, in turn spurring investment. For the developing world, cities are frequently the only source of large-scale industries, hospitals, universities, transportation hubs, and community facilities ranging from sports arenas to labor unions. Research on urbanization, and in particular city-to-city relationships, is therefore fundamental to understanding modern-day development.

Yet international citywide data is nearly non-existent, despite prior acknowledgements that, “urbanization represents the largest shift in the distribution of population in history” (Clark 1998, 94). While a number of scholars, governments, and international organizations recognize the vital role of cities, virtually none of these entities explore development at city-specific levels in developing nations. When research is available, most studies focus on only focus on an aspect of development that nearly always reflects economics. When there is explicit urban data for a developing country, it is only for the capital or most populous city.

Furthermore, articles often speak about the merits of urbanization while using country and regional data to predict growth and prescribe development strategies. Few publications even recognized the need for city-level data. The rare exception was “global” city comparisons but none of these studies examined cities outside of the top metropolises identified by the Global Cities Report (Hales 2012).

The importance of city-level data is not confined to developing nations. For example, while developed nations, particularly the United States, tend to have more detailed state-level data, development work in cities are still hindered by a lack of data. Most city research focused only on each state’s capital city, rarely furnishing data for other important or populous cities within the state.

Considering that majority of expected growth over the next decade will come from “middleweight” cities, defined as having a population ranging from 150,000 to 1,000,000 people, this contradiction is puzzling (McKinsey Global Institute, 2012). Out of a total 250 middleweight cities within the U.S., the top 20 alone are projected to contribute one-third of total economic growth over the next two years (McKinsey Global Institute, 2012). As an international trend, middleweight cities will soon account for the largest share of global economic output. By 2025, half of the world’s global growth will be attributed to just 577 middleweight cities (McKinsey Global Institute, 2011).
This study proposes that the lack of city-specific research is hindering more accurate understanding of conditions worldwide in the field of international development. In order to test this prediction, the country of South Africa and its development landscape was chosen as a case study. South Africa presents an interesting case as a developing country with rapid growth and bright prospects for future investment and development, particularly in major metropolitan areas. South Africa also has fairly high levels of data reporting in relation to most other developing countries. While data on many individual cities is still weak, both Cape Town and Johannesburg are cities frequently referenced and treated as distinct entities in the literature. This presents a novel case as most developing nations have detailed data for only one major city, complicating comparative case studies.

This study will further assess the hypothesis that the validity of international development research can be enhanced through three new foci. First, city-specific perspectives must be included to triangulate findings on a regional or national level. Second, secondary- or tertiary-level cities, which are expecting to account for large shares of future economic growth, must also be included. Third, comparison of cities themselves, versus national development comparisons, can yield additional insights into how some development approaches have proven more successful than others.

Methodology

This study is framed to overcome limitations in data availability. Most city-level data is strictly economic, limiting analysis of development level, which is a more comprehensive measure. Development level encompasses quality of life, measures of relative security, and contentment within a society. While this study examines the merits of city-level data for the understanding of development in particular, it is still limited by ongoing discussions on how to operationalize the concept of development.

This study will adopt the Human Development Indicator’s conceptualization of development. The level of human development can be measured by: (1) enjoyment of a decent standard of living, (2) level of education and knowledge, and (3) length of a healthy lifespan (UNDP 2010). It was beyond the scope of this study to measure the complete HDI index of variables, however. This study will therefore measure one indicator from each category, maintaining the validity of the tri-partite definition of development while also allowing for the greatest breadth of data to analyze. These three indicators are: (1) crime rates, (2) school attendance, and (3) HIV/AIDS prevalence.
A city’s crime rate directly affects personal security and thus standard of living. School attendance is a key proxy for level of education in the developing world (Statistics South Africa (GHS), 2010). Lastly, HIV/AIDS was chosen as a proxy measure for healthy lifespan as it is one of the few development challenges that is more detrimental to urban populations.

These three indicators were also chosen as they scale well across both urban and rural communities. This is due to the concept of service delivery, whereby it should be the quality of the service provided, whether urban or rural, rather than just the service’s accessibility that should determine development level. For instance, dropout rates for South Africa’s provinces are more strongly influenced by unemployment and school quality than they are about being able to physically attend the school in question. Similarly, due to the country’s relative successes in HIV awareness education and contraceptives distribution, transmission rates are now more dependent upon population densities and socioeconomic factors than they are access to health services. However, this finding may not apply to other nations.

Due to differences in the data available, each indicator was analyzed in a variety of ways. Violent crime statistics, provided by the government, allowed for the conduction of regression analyses. Survey data for school dropout rates allowed for a mixed-methods analysis using qualitative data for correlation tests. Due to the private nature of data collection for HIV/AIDS rates, one particular city’s policies are analyzed in order to ascertain whether they believe transmission rates affect spatial populations differently.

Data Analysis

Crime

Crime is particularly pertinent problem for cities as populations are frequently tightly confined yet starkly split into communities based on economic strata. As crime and urbanization are strongly related, criminology as a discipline tends to acknowledge city variations in data much better than social science. As early as the 19th century, theoreticians Guerry and Quetelet observed that crime rates were uneven across locational spaces, with a higher concentration of crime in urban dwellings (Bruinsma 2007). More recently, researchers have paid renewed attention to their work, re-visiting the importance of city-specific measures as serious crimes, such as homicide, robbery, rape, and assault, are becoming disproportionately concentrated in cities (Ballentine 2006; Grahm 2000).

As consequence of both density and economic stratification, cities also
offer some of the worst examples of relative deprivation. Relative deprivation is the phenomenon where an individual tends to evaluate their wellbeing relative to others in the same environment (Barash 2000). Due to South Africa’s lingering spatial distribution of post-Apartheid cities, the urban poor predominately live on the urban outskirts. This creates urban hotspots for relative deprivation. The social stratification perspective, which asserts crime is related to economic conditions, can also be put forth as being especially relevant given South Africa’s unemployment rate of 29.8% (Grahm 2000). Additionally there exists a strong positive association between a city’s size and its reported level of crime. In fact, distinguishing between small and large cities has been “a much more important [descriptive] factor than the region where these cities were located.” (Grahm 2000, 273)

Data published by the South African government on crime rates is only produced regionally. The South African Police Department did offer crime data that was city-specific; however, there existed no reports from the government on population figures. These data will be utilized to provide a window into regional differences, giving us city-specific crime rates against which to measure.

To assess the claim that crime is most intense in highly dense areas due to relative deprivation factors, only crimes that potentially could be justified by economic and/or social grievances were analyzed. Such crimes included murder and attempted murder, assault with intent to inflict bodily harm, robbery, arson, burglary, theft and malicious damage to property. Crime statistics are broken down by both province as well as city when available from the South African Department of Police.

To adequately compare crime rates, population data on these respective regions and cities was also required. Population rates are broken down by province when available by the South African Statistical Bureau but published data on current population figures for cities was not found. Population data also varied greatly by source and is a potential confounding variable in the analysis.

The provinces in South Africa were then measured to determine whether a larger population would increase a region’s overall chances of experiencing crime. A province’s crime rate was not found to be indicative of its population size (Figure 1).
This finding supports this study’s claim regarding the nature of crime in cities, mainly that provincial-level data is not conducive to determine city-level crime rates, as provinces often contain many cities as well as rural areas. The case of Gauteng provides a strong example of this phenomenon’s importance. Gauteng’s total crime rate is not very useful if one considers that five out of ten of the country’s most populous cities fall within this one province. A high crime rate of any one of these cities would disproportionately skew Gauteng’s data in relation to other provinces, such as Limpopo, which has a large rural population yet contains no major cities.

City data was then tested in order to see if it differed from the provincial findings. Keeping with earlier findings that a larger city has higher levels of crime, South Africa’s three most populous cities, Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban, were first analyzed (Graham 2000). Three middleweight cities, Port Elizabeth, Pietermaritzburg, and Tembisa, were also included in the sample. Higher population was not correlated with higher crime rates. (See Figure 2).

These findings are not consistent with the original claim. Rather, these data indicate the smaller a city is, the more likely it is to experience crime.
While not supportive of this study’s claims, these findings provide avenues for future research. The over-arching meaning of these findings proves that city data is essential to understanding crime rates. The great disparity between these two levels of measurement represents how important city data is for criminology studies, as provincial data in no way indicates city-level conditions.

Additionally, the overall lack of data for cities, in particular middleweight cities, is detrimental to any valid research on development. Even data for population size at this level was lacking. When it was available, the difference in population figures between sources confounded accurate analysis. If the second source of population data were accurate, our results suggest that previous findings by scholars are no longer relevant for today’s crime patterns in specific cities. If the data were inaccurate, then our findings would likely have diverged significantly, potential leading to further avenues of research.

**Education and School Attendance**

Education is another vital aspect of development, as a child’s level of education has long-lasting implications on general quality of life. Advances in education, and in particular female education, have been one of the largest successes for development of the past century. Since 1970, no country has seen declines in literacy rates or years of schooling. Moreover, once one generation is educated, it is highly unlikely their children will not receive the same, if not higher, level of education (UNDP “The Advance of People” 2010).

Yet problems with education are still widespread. In Africa alone more than 30% of students will drop out of before completing primary school, making the Millennium Development Goal of universal primary education impossible to achieve (United Nations 2010). In addition, education rates and accessibility are highly skewed in favor of urban areas. In every developing country, urban areas equate to more and better schools, located within shorter reaches of the target population.

School attendance rates are also higher in urban areas. Out of 25 African countries studied, every one has higher school enrollment in urban areas and generally more even girl-to-boy ratios (Sahn and Stiefel 2003). Cities also offer better opportunities for those who are educated, with a child’s rate of schooling positively correlated with future occupation level and wages (Barnum and Sabot 1977).

Additionally, there is a positive correlation between one’s education level and the propensity to migrate to urban areas (Ibid.). Individuals with
higher education levels are more likely to migrate to cities, while those already living in a city are more likely to attend school for a longer amount of time. Essentially urban areas attract, and then retain a country’s educated population. Urbanization is seen as being the “key positive influence on changes in education and income, confirming an established finding on the vital role of cities in transmitting ideas” (UNDP “The Advance of People” 2010, 57).

Yet urban inequality in Africa grows at alarming rates. Urbanization rates in developing countries often outpace cities’ increases in employment and production, leading to higher unemployment rates. Policy makers frequently overlook other unexpected results of urbanization, including urban malnutrition and food insecurity (Thurow and Kilman 2009). These negative consequences are detrimental to urban education rates.

In South Africa, city municipalities are often too weak and underfunded to provide the service delivery necessary for increased population numbers. Individuals migrating from rural areas looking for better opportunities are frequently unable to afford the increased housing costs associated with moving to a city. They frequently relocate to informal settlements along city peripheries, comprised of “ex-White” neighborhoods existing since the Apartheid era. These informal settlements attract the largest percentage of the urbanizing population, yet due to their informal nature, are often under-regulated by the large city districts they fall under.

In terms of education, these areas are characterized by poor school infrastructure, high secondary school dropout rates, and high unemployment rates. Interestingly, the average level of education in these informal urban areas is closer to rural communities than their city-center counterparts. Despite drastic differences between rural and urban, and even urban-to-urban levels, education policies do not differentiate between South Africa’s “dualistic schooling systems.” Adequate research on a city-specific basis is key to creating meaningful policy recommendations with long-run implications, yet collection of this data is severely underfunded in South Africa. (Spaull 2012)

Since city-specific data was again incomplete, provincial data based on the behavior of schoolchildren was used for analysis. Measures of education levels by province were adapted from two surveys, the General Household Survey (GHS), and the Survey of Activities of Young People, both commissioned by the South African government.

The Survey of Activities of Young People looked at how children 7-17 years old divided their time between combinations of work, household chores,
and studying. Out of all provinces, Eastern Cape had the highest number of students who reported having no time to dedicate towards study. The province also had the highest percentage of students who dropped out of school (See Figure 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Total Population (thousands)</th>
<th>Job, Chores, no study</th>
<th>% Dropped Out</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KwaZulu-Natal</td>
<td>2628</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>1714</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mpumalanga</td>
<td>894</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauteng</td>
<td>1848</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North West</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free State</td>
<td>599</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpopo</td>
<td>1361</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western Cape</td>
<td>998</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11004</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3. School Drop Out Rates by Provinces

However, when assessing the relationship for all of the provinces, the two variables are not strongly correlated. Of the students involved in economic activity, 95% were involved in the production of goods and services for their own household. For those who worked in industries, 58.1% were involved in trade. Additionally, if children reported working for more than 14 hours a week, they were overwhelmingly employed in trade (Statistics South Africa 2010). The report did not indicate what types of jobs were associated with the trade industry. This limitation was disappointing, as it would have been interesting to determine whether these jobs were mainly urban-based.

The most interesting data from this report was what was left out of it. For example, the report indicated individuals without formal education were most prevalent in the Limpopo (13.4%), Mpumalanga (11.3%) and Northern Cape (10.9%) provinces (Statistics South Africa (GHS), 2010). This is important considering none of these provinces include one of the 10 major cities in the country. Only one other province does not include such a city—Eastern Cape—and that province has the highest national dropout rate. This revelation suggests that an individual will tend to have lower levels of education if they do not live near a city.

Yet such observations are impossible to predict for these areas, as city
data is not available for testing. It is most interesting that the report, written by the South African government, does not acknowledge this. Another similar oversight occurred in the Activities of Young People Survey. Out of those who did not attend school, “a lack of money” was the most frequent explanation. The second most frequent constraint was that the individual had to work, either at home or in a business. Individuals in Gauteng (29.9%) and Western Cape (26.3%) most frequently cited working as a reason they dropped out of school. Once again, the report fails to acknowledge that these two provinces contain by far the largest urban populations for the country.

Working in a business in order to support one’s family may give us a window into why students in urban locations drop out of school. The ability to have an out-of-home job, especially in trade, is substantially higher for urban than rural areas. Alternatively, if unemployment is increasing in cities and families cannot find jobs to support themselves, then those reporting a “lack of money” as the reason for dropping out of school will also be centralized around urban areas. A potential example of this could be Gauteng, where 37.7% of students said they were not attending schools because they could not pay for school fees (Ibid.).

Making projections about an urban area’s relationship of education and unemployment, based on provincial data, is not conclusive. In this instance, understanding provincial data fails to explain anything about its cities, besides the fact that it includes aggregate city-level data. Using provincial-level data to inform development policies at the city-level would appear to be a disastrous choice for developing nations.

HIV/AIDS

South Africa’s HIV/AIDS prevalence ranks among the highest in the world. However, thanks to South Africa’s proactive response to the epidemic, most recently with its HIV/AIDS Strategic Plan of 2007-2011, the rate of increase has significantly slowed and the infection rate has peaked at 11.42% (Tomlinson 2008). Yet there is markedly more to be done, especially considering there is “no single HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa” (UNAIDS, 2007), but instead that the disease’s spread is dependent on situational factors varying from region to region.

For South Africa as a whole there are a few general trends. First, there is a clear positive correlation between HIV/AIDS and poverty, as well as with poor access to social services including adequate nutrition, care, and support programs. Second, prevalence is highest for African females in their early 20s, living in informal settlements in high prevalence provinces (Tomlinson 2008).
Third, in places such as KwaZulu-Natal’s informal urban slums, prevalence is higher than in formal urban areas (Ramjee et al 2012).

Furthermore, special attention to cities facing the epidemic is critical to implementing successful prevention and treatment programs. First, while urban areas may not always have the highest prevalence rates, they almost always carry a higher probability of contracting the disease. Factors exacerbating HIV/AIDS transmission, including multiple concurrent partners, men-to-men transmission, co-infection with other STIs, and high levels of migration, are all more prevalent in cities (Tomlinson 2008; UNAIDS 2011). Second, informal settlements frequently bordering city lines have prevalence rates almost twice as high as formal urban complexes. Third, in informal urban areas, women frequently have a lack of economic freedom, education, health services, sanitation, and ability to negotiate safe sex practices (Ibid). Fourth, since cities also support significantly higher educational opportunities, access to health professionals and resources, and increased sanitation facilities, there also exists a divergence between availability and access to services. Accurately viewing the HIV epidemic requires identifying infection rates by in individual cities. By dividing these respective cities based on sub-level demographic indicators, health workers may better target infection rates while providing treatment to those who need it.

South Africa understands the importance of establishing city-specific HIV/AIDS strategy programs that involve the work of local governments and municipalities. In Cape Town and Johannesburg, thorough plans targeting resource allocations and service delivery have been proposed and some even partially implemented. For example, the strategy plan for Johannesburg acknowledges prevalence rates in the city are higher than they are in the Gauteng province as a whole and are “significantly higher” than in the rest of South Africa (See Figure 4; Tomlinson 2008). Yet there is a difference between identifying a problem and creating strategies to target it. For policy to spur genuine results, adequate research examining how urban populations uniquely experience the epidemic needs increasing attention.
In regards to developing a more urban-centric approach, the first steps have already been taken. Many professionals involved in HIV/AIDS prevention understand change needs to be spurred by the affected local communities. However, the overall lack of attention paid to these local municipalities in the first place reduced their chances of effectively implementing prevention strategies.

HIV/AIDS prevention usually requires large changes in city infrastructure. Increased sanitation and water facilities must be provided, waste removal delivery must become more coordinated, treatment facilities must be built in areas to serve as large a portion of the population as possible, and households must be able to pay for their increased health services. Not only does this mean giving out more contraceptives and medicine, this means creating more jobs, building more houses and formal community areas, and delivering health services more efficiently.

These development plans place huge demands on local governments, who simply do not have the capacity nor funding to make such changes. A large part of the blame for weak municipalities is attributed to the way in which they have been structurally ignored for so long, in favor of regional and national entities. For example, the South African government’s National Strategy Plan proclaimed that all local governments enact mainstream, integrated HIV/AIDS development plans within the next five years (Centre For Development and Enterprise). Yet the South African government failed to consider that the budgets of these municipalities were not large enough to even recommend, let alone implement, such programs.

Some municipalities have been more successful than others in service delivery. For example, the Johannesburg municipality stands out as a key example of power and influence in ground-level interventions. Yet Johannesburg also has the benefit of zero growth rates, higher reporting levels, and a larger governmental capacity than most cities (Corrigan 1998). In order
to achieve such success in other cities, such as Durban, a city that still struggles with a prevalence rate of almost 40% (Ramjee et al. 2012), policymakers must change the way they view local-level capacity. With more accountable reporting rates, increased coordination between national and local governments, and viable, long-term strategies for local governments, cities can lower infection rates while extending treatment to a larger portion of the affected population.

**Discussion**

The field of development still faces many challenges in the realms of quality of life, education, and healthcare, as detailed in the South African case study. This discussion section is devoted to assessing what progress has been made thus far on integrating city-specific data into the field of international development.

In policy research, both domestic as well as international think tanks have made headway in understanding how increasingly important cities are for economic growth. Yet aside from the reports, it is unclear how much attention and influence has really been generated. South Africa’s most prestigious developmental think tank, Centre for Development and Enterprise (CDE), established the need for increased city introspection in 1999 (CDE “Cities, Towns and Local Government”). CDE stressed the importance of strengthening South Africa’s major cities as many still “do not have many of the necessary powers required to compete effectively with other cities in the world economy” (Bernstein 1996). Yet even in these reports, only the largest three cities are analyzed and never in comparison to one another.

When think tanks do conduct research at the city-specific level, they fail to account for other factors of growth besides economics. Three US-based think tanks, the McKinsey Global Institute, Martin Prosperity Institute, and AT Kearney represent institutes that espouse an urban-specific focus.

Most of their work focuses on the United States, and so when international countries are analyzed only their most powerful city is researched for economic potential. Despite statements like “the world today is more about cities than countries,” few developing cities were included, and no middleweight cities anywhere, in their mainstream analysis (AT Kearney 2012).

Potential was only classified along economic and political means. Additionally, none of AT Kearney’s data was published, so the only information on cities that can be gained is from what AT Kearney supplies the reader graphically. While an index such as this one may be beneficial to many in
the business world, these think tanks repeatedly fail to generate substantial knowledge for up-and-coming cities. When one is able to pick out information for a scant few developing cities, this information is decentralized, economic in focus, and without accessible raw data.

In the non-profit arena, non-governmental organizations such as Global Water and Oxfam overwhelmingly base projects on the country level. Under the “South Africa” country page, all of Oxfam’s work is titled “Climate Change in South Africa”, “Helping women farmers in South Africa” and “HIV/AIDS in South Africa;” everything is measured in aggregate, general terms (Oxfam International). A closer examination of these projects only clarifies that projects occurred “in South Africa’s North West Province” or that Oxfam provided support for “families in four villages” (Oxfam International). Global Water is much the same. Their South African profile page only explains that shallow-well reconstruction occurred in South Africa’s “northern portion” (Global Water 2009).

Let it be known that this is not a failure for the organizations; NGOs such as Global Water and Oxfam do provide real, necessary support for those whom they help. What is missing is a lack of coordination, for once these specific projects are finished, NGOs provide no real data or measurements that could potentially aid future projects from other agencies (Polman 2010). These are the organizations that have the best insider’s access; they already work at the municipality level, actively interact with the population, and have viable funds and reporting methods that make data collection feasible. Yet these ground-level projects become grouped in together as one in support of overall country focus, thus blurring their importance and specific implications for specific cities and rural areas alike.

Alternatively, small city-centralized NGOs only focus on developmental issues involving their respective cities. The Development Action Group’s (DAG) aim is to create sustainable human settlements in urban areas, enhancing safety while spanning investment. Their local projects have achieved very high levels of success, as each specific project focuses implicitly on the community in question. Increasingly the Development Action Group has begun partnering with UN-Habitat on international reports. This is done so that their research may be projected large-scale. However, since these co-publications are international in focus, DAG is forced to apply their research to explain South Africa as an aggregate whole. Their most recent joint publication, Land Value Capture Scoping Study, speaks only about South Africa’s municipalities as a whole, meshing their ground-level research to describe South Africa in a sum of four paragraphs (UN-Habitat 2010).
In the case of international organizations, many aid groups do not adequately address the unique challenges facing development in urban areas. Even in broad strategy targets for these organizations, such as the USAID Policy Frame for 2011-2015, no mention is given to the specialized role that cities can play in achieving proposed goals, even while the organization should “nurture sustainable local institutions, systems, and capacities.” (“USAID Policy Framework” 2011-2015).

Conclusion

The crucial take-away is clear: development research needs to be viewed from an urban, city-specific focus. The development field has identified urban hotspots as the main catalysts of growth. However, accurate, verifiable research for use in development projects is sorely lacking. While the literature broadly acknowledge the validity of urban development research, very few explicit plans and reports are being produced studying how critical indicators diverge between population distributions.

To change this nation-based view of development will require a paradigm shift for the discipline of international development. This study recommends increasing the availability of accurate, verifiable data for urban entities as a first step towards solving the disparity in development research. Such primary-level indicators include general population statistics such as population size, density and percent growth. City-descriptive statistics, including the availability of sustainable housing, costs of living, GDP per capita, and unemployment levels, should also follow. Tertiary-level data measures of city services; local municipalities must report education rates, health and health service availability, waste, energy, water, and transportation facilities, and opportunities for city growth.

Finally, quality of life measurements must be accounted for in city-specific development research. This includes indicators such as civic engagement, social equity, women’s organizations, and technology and innovation rates. In turn, this city data must be used in comparison with other cities, not provinces, to understand growth patterns. Additionally municipalities need to be given their greater power to increase capacity in order to affect real change from the grassroots level. While the scope of this paper centers around South Africa as a case study, findings infer such a disparity of accurate, publically available data on urban municipalities is lacking in many nations, developing and developed alike. In our global age, it will be cities, not countries, which determine productivity and growth. Acting on this understanding is fundamental if we wish to prosper as a global society.
Bibliography


DENUCLEARIZATION: A MODELS-BASED APPROACH

Conor Hughes

Abstract

With nuclear proliferation a major threat to international security, this study examines the factors that led three countries to denuclearize by applying Scott Sagan’s three models: security, domestic politics, and norms. Rather than only observing security issues, which is the most common practice, this study also analyzes the importance of the other two models in denuclearization. The domestic politics model takes account of changes in leadership and state policies when denuclearization occurred. The norms model considers the prestige nuclear weapons bring and their role for the country, as well as the NPT and the pressure that a state faces through isolation by the international community. The study covers three cases – Argentina, Brazil, and South Africa – applying all three models in each case. Argentina and Brazil were two nations that were developing a weapon and reversed, while South Africa was a nation that developed a stockpile and rolled back. Analysis found that although a stable security environment was present for all three counties at the time of denuclearization, the change in domestic leadership for each case proved to be critical. The norms model hypothesis proved to be less significant for denuclearization and a deeper analysis should be conducted.

Introduction

Why do states denuclearize? The common view holds this question is simple: states primarily denuclearize in response to a lack of perceived security

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threats. This study seeks to analyze three cases where states denuclearized but in which security perceptions hold only partial explanatory power. A larger set of factors were evident that led nations to forgo their development. As it has been a pillar of U.S. policy since the end of the Cold War, non-proliferation under President Obama is a serious strategy (Obama 2012). Examining cases where major factors turned countries away from the bomb will be useful for policymakers to understand and recognize when applying policies to countries that are on the path to weapons development or have already developed WMDs.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was brought into force in 1970 to avert the spread of nuclear weapons and promote peaceful practices of nuclear technology (NPT, 2012). Yet even after forty plus years of implementation, there are still states that have not signed the treaty. Furthermore, some have even left the NPT to test nuclear weapons (New Scientist 2009). But what is even more puzzling is that some countries have even developed weapons programs and then proceeded to renege on their commitments (Sublette 2001). This paper will seek to explain not so much why states develop nuclear weapons programs but why states choose to dismantle them.

A brief examination of the literature related to this topic from various scholars will be explored. After adhering to Scott Sagan’s models approach to state proliferation, this study applies them to why states would choose to denuclearize. The research design introduces the dependent and independent variables, as well as the methodology for the case selection. Following this, the analysis section consists of the main body of this paper. Each model is applied to the three cases and examines the validity of the hypothesis. The study then concludes with how well each hypothesis was supported and what this means for current proliferation policies.

**Literature Review**

Kenneth Waltz’s adherence to the Realist school of thought has dominated proliferation debates. Under this theory, states develop nuclear weapons to have absolute power over nations with only conventional forces. To survive in an anarchic world, states develop nuclear weapons to provide deterrence (Waltz 1990). Nations can either pursue external or internal means to increase power. Having a nuclear weapon quantitatively increases a nation’s internal power and is the preferred means for states (Waltz 1981). Relying on an external power that has a nuclear weapon for security in this theory would
be a less preferred, but nonetheless also a sought after option.

However, Neo-Realism’s bias towards external threats does not explain why states acquire nuclear weapons when they have no security threat, or even why they avoid proliferating when they can (Samaddar 2005). More to the point, after researching the initial literature, it is clear that Neo-Realist thinking does not fully explain why states choose to denuclearize.

Etel Solingen expands on the domestic reasoning behind denuclearization, as well as the international relations theory lens of comparative regionalism. This line of thought advances two major assertions. First, denuclearization rests upon the important influences of domestic institutions within the state. Second, the nature of a regional context is integral for states developing coalitions for denuclearization (Solingen 2001). Grand strategies of a coalition are important to understand not just in the international context, but also in respect to regional and domestic policies. Solingen classifies states as either practicing “internationalizing” or “backlash” policies, which translate to their stance in a regional and global context on either pursuing nuclear proliferation or denuclearization. This does well to take into consideration domestic factors and regional factors as to why states denuclearize. Further examination of literature on this topic has even included use of norms by states and their roles, which is an important factor for the status of nuclear weapons.

Role theory, which explains compliance and non-compliance on nuclear proliferation more reliably than most other theories, must also be considered. According to this theory, states are “actors” that adhere to certain roles, much like individuals (Chafetz, Abramson, and Grillot 1996, 376–7). Nonsocial, social, and contextual frameworks are all elements that influence a state’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.

The nonsocial elements consist of population, economic strength, demographics, geography, and history. Social elements comprise the past and current experiences of a nation’s relations with other states, as well as current economic pressures, which allows for a nation to change the view of its own role. This role is considered to have the most influence on a state’s conception because it consists of a state’s social interaction. Contexts and settings also lead a state to develop a particular conceptualization of its role. This can be a regional or global setting in which a nation participates (Chafetz, Abramson, and Grillot 1996). However, the utility of role theory is limited due to its arduous collection and classifying of the fourteen categories of role type. Due to the research constraints of this study, a more simplified analytic approach will be adopted.
Scott Sagan develops a broader view on why states develop nuclear weapons, which is based upon three models: security, domestic politics, and norms (Sagan 1996). The security model adheres to the Neo-Realist model. Sagan’s second model, the domestic politics model, focuses on domestic bureaucratic interests. This can come from the nuclear energy establishment, the military, and states that have either political parties or a large public in support of a nuclear program. The final model, the norms model, focuses on whether actions taken by a state are perceived to be legitimate and suitable, rather than based off of security threats and domestic responses. Implementation of the NPT is now viewed as a legitimate norm for states to adhere to, whereas prior to the NPT, testing nuclear weapons was viewed more symbolically as inclusion in the prestigious “nuclear club.” Today, joining the NPT is viewed as a symbolic act from a responsible government.

In conclusion, what has been developed through the literature review is a much clearer understanding of the research question and variables to be tested. What leads states to denuclearize after adhering to a nuclear weapons policy is clearly multi-causal. However, this study aims to identify what the main causal factors are for denuclearization, thus presenting what would be the most conducive set of policies to promote denuclearization. Waltz’s theory addresses the security threats but does little to address the domestic conditions involved in this process. Etel Solingen provides another framework by focusing on domestic, regional, and global contexts, while also classifying states as “internationalizing” or “backlash” in nature. Chafetz, Abramson, and Grillot expand on role theory and the normative environment that changes a states reasoning for nuclear weapons. Scott Sagan’s three models (security, domestic, and norms) take into account all three frameworks, and provide a well-rounded approach to differing theories as to why states denuclearize. Although his models are applied to why states proliferate, they are still applicable to why states would choose to denuclearize.

**Hypotheses**

The literature explained the models that will be used for this study. The hypotheses will thus attempt to apply the three models in a practical approach to effectively verify if one can determine the causal factors for why states denuclearize. The hypotheses are as follows:

H1: A significant reduction in security threats is a necessary condition for a state to denuclearize.

H2: A shift in domestic pressure is a necessary condition for a state to denuclearize.
H3: States facing pressure from international norms is a necessary condition for a state to denuclearize.

Although these three hypotheses may all be present in each case, this paper also seeks to examine which hypothesis proves to be the most significant factor for why states denuclearize.

**Research Design: Variables and Case Selection**

*The Dependent Variable: Denuclearization*

Denuclearization is when a state dismantles its nuclear weapons program or a physical stockpile of nuclear weapons that it has accumulated. This study defines states that did not physically build nuclear weapons but did have weapons programs in place as states that denuclearized. The reason for this is the limited number of cases where states reversed course after developing a weapon. Therefore, this study will also take into account states that were in the process of development. Simply assigning denuclearization as the dependent variable for this research paper may be viewed as oversimplifying the complex relationship of nuclear policy. As scholars have noted, a linear causal relationship from measuring which independent variables will lead to the dependent variable is not a straightforward process (Palkki and Smith 2012). However, for the scope of this initial study, this model can provide a solid overall approach to the subject.

*The Independent Variables: Security Model, Domestic Politics Model, and Norms Model*

The security model variable takes into consideration the security environment that a state is in, whether regionally or globally. Military disputes over territory or regional wars are examined during the time period of a state’s nuclear weapons development and its subsequent reversal. For this variable to be present at the time of denuclearization, there would need to be a reduction of security threats. These include either a contextual change in the global environment that previously affected the country or an end to hostilities that previously led the country to develop a nuclear capacity. The domestic politics model variable takes account of individual leaders as well as bureaucratic organizations, specifically the nuclear establishments and military institutions. The change in the autonomy of nuclear programs under new leadership, as well as specifically examining the changes taking place
within states, are factors that will validate the presence of this model. The third model examines the norms variable of the international community and the symbolism associated with having a nuclear weapons program through a state’s status and prestige. Examining the international regime’s policies, such as the NPT, and their effectiveness at changing a state’s decision to adhere to standard and legitimate practices, is an important factor to verify in this model.

Case Selection

This study investigates two nations that had weapons programs over the past few decades and then reversed course: Argentina and Brazil. These two cases were chosen because the two countries are in the same region that both denuclearized at relatively the same time period. This controlled analysis can draw interesting comparisons. The third case examined is South Africa because this is the only case where a nation removed its stockpile of weapons after development. This paper does not attempt to furnish a history of each nation’s nuclear development, yet each model can be used for this and has been done previously in Sagan’s work.

Data was collected through examination of various secondary resources on each individual nation’s nuclear weapons development. The literature on this topic is rich enough to create an understanding of the research design and the general understanding for a states rationale in choosing to denuclearize.

Data Analysis

Argentina: Security Mode

Argentina was considered to have been developing its nuclear weapons program during the 1970s and 1980s (Reiss 1995). However, the initial development of its nuclear capabilities dates back to the early 1950s under the Statist, Nationalist leadership of General Juan D. Peron (Solingen 2001). Security developments during these decades, such as the 1978 Beagle Conflict border dispute with Chile and the 1982 Argentinean defeat in the Falkland/Malvinas War by Britain, are factors that would stand to reason for Argentinean strategists advocate develop of nuclear weapons. Argentina’s largest rival was Brazil at the time, which will be examined closer, but these two nations had not had a physical border dispute since the early nineteenth century. There was an important development that, although not related to the nuclear issue, did create a process for what led to Argentina’s nuclear reversal: the 1979 Rio
de la Plata agreement over disputed water resources on the Parana River. This agreement created the necessary conditions for confidence in both countries to develop faith in the other nation’s affairs (Bitencourt 2001).

Under President Carlos Menem in the early 1990s, Argentina’s nuclear program officially became transparent and peaceful with the Quadripartite Agreement (Argentina, Brazil, IAEA, and the Argentine Brazilian Agency of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials) signing in December 1991 (Reiss 1995). This signing was a development that had occurred over the previous ten years with Brazil. The security model shows that although there were some border disputes, there was no real security threat that hampered the process for nuclear reversal. This confirms the hypothesis for this case: stability through security is a necessary condition for denuclearization.

**Argentina: Domestic Politics Model**

As early as 1980, changes were taking place in Argentina under military rule, specifically in regards to the nuclear program. General George R. Videla reached agreement with Brazil’s General Figueiredo that laid the foundations for nuclear cooperation (Solingen 2001). Following the military’s political loss in the Falklands/Malvinas War in 1982, Raul Alfonsin became Argentina’s democratically elected president, and policies began to shift even more in 1983. Argentina faced cost overruns and problems in the nuclear program from their Atucha I and Embalse reactors (Reiss 1995). Alfonsin attempted to take control over the military’s influence in the nuclear realm. Under the previous military regimes the Argentine Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA) and the navy both had relative autonomy over the program. Thus, the success of the fiefdom programs was over exaggerated to make sure it continued its autonomy and budgetary incomes. As the repressive military regimes came and went, the stability of CNEA continued on until significant pressure was put on it to change course (Solingen 1996).

Alfonsin’s successor, Carlos Menem, faced economic disarray in 1989, which was even more of an incentive to shore up the nuclear program. By 1989, Argentina owed the U.S. $60 billion and another $7 billion in interest (Bitencourt 2001). Menem was seeking a more sensible approach to easing relations with the international community, specifically with the U.S. Menem also faced pressure from the military establishment, such as to maintain the ballistic missile program of Condor II. Condor II was a natural offshoot of the nuclear weapons program since the missiles would provide a means of delivery. However, defining a new role for Argentina was part of Menem’s policies, and the former prestige that weapons programs brought for the military regimes
did not coincide with the new environment taking hold in Argentina (Ibid.).

The transformation in political leadership appears to be a significant component in driving the change in Argentina’s nuclear development. Nevertheless, this case shows there was an initiation of developments under the military regime that started altering Argentina’s nuclear course prior to the change in democratic presidential leadership.

Argentina: Norms Model

Argentina signed the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), which created a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region (NWFZ). Yet Argentina did not ratify the treaty until 1994 (Riess 1995). This framework set up a political environment in the Southern Cone region for Argentina to adhere to a weapons-free zone. However, Argentina viewed the treaty as ‘discriminatory’ and took an amended version of the document to be ratified.

Argentina disapproved of the treaty, viewing it as a tool of control by international actors. During this time period, Argentine diplomats would frequently repeat the phrase that the treaty was “disarming the disarmed.” After President Menem assumed leadership, Argentina’s view of its role in the international community began to change, especially following the nuclear turnaround. This model provides a cautionary approach to why states choose to denuclearize. While the NPT was viewed as a tool of control throughout the military rule of Argentina, it was later viewed as a trusted mechanism through which Argentina could assure the world it had committed to denuclearization.

Brazil: Security Model

While similar to Argentina, Brazil’s security environment at the time was even more peaceful. Brazil had no border disputes with Argentina, nor was it involved in an isolated military episode similar to the 1982 Falklands/ Malvinas war. Brazilian military rulers during the 1960s through the early 1980s were seeking to enhance their position by gaining acceptance and legitimacy, rather than threatening and causing conflicts with their major regional rival (Azambuja 2010). The Cuban Missile Crisis motivated Brazil to sign the Treaty of Tlatelco, even though the country would not ratify the treaty until 1968 and did not fully abide by it until 1994. Brazil’s push for a nuclear-weapons-free zone at the U.N. did not ultimately lead to a solution in the crisis but it did lay the groundwork for the Treaty’s implementation in 1974 (Treaty of Tlatelolco). This security model hypothesis is still upheld, but it does not produce a sufficient reason for why the nuclear program changed course at the time it did.
Brazil: Domestic Model

Brazil’s nuclear program developed significantly during the 1970s after a multibillion-dollar deal with Germany. Leaders in Brazil were seeking energy security from the 1973 oil shock, as well as seeking to stay ahead of Argentina’s nuclear program (Reiss 1995). However, dissent from Brazilian scientists over the inefficiencies of the nuclear reactors led to President Ernesto Geisel and the president of the Brazilian Association for the Progress of Science in 1980 to discuss more modest approaches to Brazil’s natural resources (Goldenberg and Feiveson 1994). The alternate “parallel program” that took place in Brazil during the 1970s and 1980s, such as the National Nuclear Energy Commission’s (CNEN) ties with the military to create a nuclear test site at Cachimbo, created an even more insecure environment for nuclear suppliers and the domestic nuclear scientists when the program was discovered (Goldenberg and Feiveson 1994). By the time Jose Sarney, the first civilian president, took power in 1985, Brazil had a peaceful nuclear program in disarray and a cover weapons program led autonomously by the military (Reiss 1995).

These factors culminated with even larger changes to Brazil’s nuclear program. The new constitution in Brazil in 1988 restricted nuclear activity to peaceful purposes only (article 21, XXIII, a) (Brazilian Constitution). Sarney’s successor, Fernando Collor, pushed the military back to more traditional roles, reacting to a regime that had from 1964-1984 been in charge of Brazil’s entire organizational structure (Bitencourt 2001).

The domestic politics model hypothesis proves significant in this case, with the new leadership of Collor reversing the military’s development of nuclear weapons. This model further demonstrated how the process of pushing through additional measures to verify denuclearization was protracted. The passage of the Quadripartite Agreement in 1991, which created a bilateral verification system with international organizations, was delayed in Brazil after Collor was forced out of office following a bribery scandal. With Itamar Franco, Brazil’s presidential successor in power, there was no true support from Congress. This postponed the passage of the agreement through the Senate until 1994 (Reiss 1995).

Brazil: Norms Model

Brazil, similar to Argentina, viewed the non-proliferation regime as highly discriminatory. Brazilians not only view their nation as a regional power but as a major power as well. Thus, Brazil would not adhere to treaties that identified it as part of the latter group of states that would not be allowed
to possess nuclear weapons. Yet, from the Brazilian Embassy Policy Papers in 1997, the government changed its view regarding the social construction of the NPT. The Brazilians, while considering the NPT imperfect, believed that it prevented the spread of nuclear weapons, and further, that “Brazil may consider its position in the light of significant and tangible steps in the field of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with article VI of the NPT” (Bitencourt 2001, 161). Brazil, which signed the NPT in 1998, does not view the five nuclear powers as permanent, and believes that considerable positive efforts will bring about these nations’ denuclearization.

This model was not a necessary condition for Brazil to denuclearize. The NPT was perceived as the last vestige of international control over developing nations. Although the view of nuclear weapons changed during the final decades in the twentieth century, the leadership of Sarney and Collor focused more on regional agreements than on the global initiatives being implemented by the international community.

South Africa: Security Model

South Africa’s security environment improved markedly during its denuclearization in the early 1990s. Under the rule of Prime Minister John Vorster in the 1970s, South Africa was acquiring the capabilities to produce nuclear weapons. These capabilities underwent development as Portugal’s holdings in Angola and Mozambique fell in 1974, followed by the breakdown of the 1975 Alvor Accords in Angola, which brought with it Soviet aid and a Cuban intervention against South African-backed rebels. Isolated from the West and facing a U.N. arms embargo after the discovery of the Kalahari test site in 1977, the South African government deemed there was “no alternative but to develop a nuclear deterrent” (Liberman 2001). By 1990, six nuclear weapons devices had been created.

When F.W. de Klerk assumed power in 1989, the main security threats had receded. 1988 saw a cease-fire and a tripartite agreement between Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, and the threatening Soviet influence in the region was clearly receding. The resolution of these former external threats led many South African officials to view the nuclear deterrent as superfluous (Reiss 1995). This does confirm the security model’s hypothesis, yet analyzing the other models will lead to a more complete understanding of why South Africa would entirely dismantle its nuclear deterrent capabilities.
South Africa: Domestic Model

Within de Klerk’s first month in office he ordered a high-level report from the AEC (Atomic Energy Corporation), Armaments Corporations (Armscor), and the SADF (South African Defense Forces) on dismantling the nuclear devices (Reiss 1995). De Klerk had a clear anti-nuclear penchant, evident in his decisions to limit the military’s advice and role in nuclear policymaking compared to the previous administrations (Liberman 2001). An important development occurring in South Africa at the time was the change in its apartheid policies. The profound political transition brought the de Klerk administration to worry about “nuclear inheritance” by a radical political faction (Pabian 1995, 10). This led to the unusual activities of destroying all the decisions, design documents, and plans before publicly announcing in 1993 that South Africa would dismantle its nuclear weapons (Sagan 1996). These changes in nuclear policy under F.W. de Klerk were part of a broader set of plans to integrate South Africa with regional partners and the rest of the world.

Domestic actors that were previously involved in nuclear development left their positions, which made it considerably easier for de Klerk to gain momentum for the policy shift. During the 1960s, Wally Grant and A.J.A “Ampie” Roux from the AEC were instrumental in convincing the South African government to develop nuclear enrichment and then nuclear weapons. Other influential actors, such as the former Prime Minister P.W. Botha, left or lost influence, thus creating a vacuum of support for South Africa’s haphazard nuclear policy (Riess 1995, 20).

Examining the costs of the nuclear program, South Africa was able to develop its nuclear capability relatively cheaply. The weapons cost an estimated $300 to $600 million dollars, which was close to 1-2% of the defense budget (Ibid.). Yet Finance Minister Barend du Plessis questioned the economic costs of the nuclear enrichment program and worked during 1989 to break the isolation imposed on South Africa by supporting its economic orientation under de Klerk. These policies including reducing import tariffs and quotas, privatizing the steel industry, and opening up foreign exchange controls (Lieberman 2001).

The domestic politics model shows that the change in leadership under de Klerk brought about a major transformation in Pretoria’s nuclear stance. Although there was a reduction in security threats, it took a strategic change in the domestic environment for South Africa to alter its policies. Not only were the weapons unnecessary, but they were becoming a liability. De Klerk stated in March 1993 that, “a nuclear deterrent had become not only superfluous, but in fact an obstacle to development of South Africa’s international relations”
(Reiss 1995). This examination of the normative environment surrounding South Africa’s denuclearization sheds new light on what factors influenced de Klerk’s reasoning.

**South Africa: Norms Model**

During the 1970s, many South African officials viewed a nuclear deterrent as a symbol of strength. Brigadier Bossie Huysen had “grandiose ideas about the ‘status’ that nuclear weapons would bestow on South Africa” according to Dr. Andre Buys, a former South African nuclear official (Liberman 2001, 70). The NPT was viewed as discriminatory and hypocritical, since the 1974 nuclear test in India brought with it little public outrage compared to the diplomatic censure following the discovery of the 1977 Kalahari test site (Reiss 1995). However, pressure from the NPT regime after the discovery of the test site was enough to make the cost of testing further bombs too high for Pretoria. While this would not necessarily mean that the normative status of testing changed South Africa’s stance, the weight of force backed by the international community did alter the country’s nuclear development. Many South African officials would view the nuclear embargoes from the international community as an extension of the anti-apartheid campaigns. Thus, the non-negotiable stance of officials on apartheid in the 1980s did not allow for the sanctions to develop their full potential on changing Pretoria’s view on nuclear development (Ibid.).

De Klerk answered very differently to the condemnation from the international community than was analyzed in the previous models. He saw ascension to the NPT as a way to gain more credibility and draw support in the West for his domestic plans (Ibid.). However, this simply makes out the NPT as a tool to gain support for changes that had already been planned, not the main causal factor for reversing policies. Although the norms model had a constant presence on South African leaders, it did not shape the government’s reasoning enough to significantly change its policies until conditions in other arenas changed first.

**Conclusion**

In each of the three case nations, the hypotheses were examined to explain why each nation chose to denuclearize. An improved security environment proved to be a necessary factor for South Africa to denuclearize. In regards to Argentina and Brazil, these two nations were in an environment where each perceived each other more as rivals and competitors, rather than as
enemies. The choice to denuclearize by these two nations did not immediately stem from a reduction in security threats. However, an important finding between Argentina and Brazil was that the agreement over the Rio de la Plata dispute in 1979 was a necessary settlement before nuclear disarmament began in earnest. This bears similar resemblance to Pakistan and India’s ongoing dispute over Kashmir. Effective confidence-building measures need to be developed outside the nuclear dialogue. However, with the recent Mumbai attacks in 2008, rising fears of militant groups undoubtedly make any such measures very difficult (Ganguly and Kapur 2010).

The domestic politics proved to be a significant factor in all three cases. Argentina’s Alfonsin, and then Menem, significantly altered the nation’s nuclear position. As these same developments were emerging, Brazil’s Sarney, and then Collor, followed a similar path. Even South Africa’s leadership under de Klerk proved to be extremely influential. Consideration of this model should be necessary for U.S. non-proliferation policy, which only possesses a modest ability to alter a state’s nuclear status. Each of the three countries did not just confine change to the nuclear realm but also adopted changes in larger economic and international integration programs that were taking place. One needs to be careful not make the assumption that because the states’ became democracies, they chose to denuclearize. As was seen between Argentina and Brazil, these two countries’ military leaders initiated the first nuclear discussion between the two nations in 1980.

The significance of the norms model in these three cases is less clear. Throughout the military rule in Argentina and tenure of nationalist leaders in South Africa, each nation unsurprisingly viewed the NPT as discriminatory and hypocritical. However, the international condemnation through isolation of nuclear technology and weapons equipment was effective at slowing down and incentivizing the decision to forgo nuclear weapons. As more internationalizing governments came to power, the leadership was much more responsive to the condemnation, thus increasing the effectiveness of the normative environment. An important implication for this model shows that bilateral or regional nuclear negotiations may be more realistic for nations, as was the case for Argentina and Brazil, to abide by before adhering to international agreements. With the end of the Cold War, the symbolism attached to nuclear weapons has slowly started to recede, as well as their usefulness in solving critical issues. Thus, this model’s relevance and importance will continue to increase only if the NPT regime is able to eventually fulfill its main pillar in Article VI, calling for the disarmament of nuclear-armed states, or else successfully create an
alternative that satisfies demands for non-proliferation (Sagan 1996).

It is pertinent to draw a comparison between the norms model and the domestic politics model. They are more closely related to one another than this paper has taken into account. For example, international treaties are not all signed at the same time and there must be enough domestic support or support from the leadership to sign and ratify the policies. Therefore, it may be less useful to examine the normative environment separate from the leadership of the targeted countries.

This study also does not fully assess the role of sanctions and positive inducements from sender states designed to apply pressure on targeted countries. Iran and North Korea are two present-day cases that fall into this realm. If policymakers are to keep modest expectations for the influence international actors have on outlier states, as this paper’s thesis has developed, those involved in creating the right environmental conditions for nuclear proliferators to shift their calculus may become disenchanted by a lack of results. As the previous three cases proved, and as present-day cases hold true, the parallel nuclear programs of inward looking regimes have become more a symbol of nationalism than a program following a rational cost-benefit analysis.

Application of these models to a larger set of cases would help to further refine the role of each particular model in determining the choice to denuclearize. This future research should include an in-depth analysis on Pakistan and India’s environment security environment, and adapt the successful methods of denuclearization from the Argentina and Brazil cases.

Finally, the future role of the NPT regime is key in discussing lasting and effective policy on denuclearization. The power to delegate rules to the international community is shifting from the “nuclear five” to a greater number of rising powers. If the current nuclear powers not only accommodate these rising powers, but also find ways to answer or significantly respond to calls for all states to adhere to Article VI of the NPT, the treaty and its additional protocols can continue to lead future efforts on non-proliferation. If this process does not lead to perceived equity between current and rising major powers, then what occurred in the 2010 ruling of UNSC resolution 1929—with the two votes against the resolution coming from Brazil and Turkey on the latest international Iran sanctions—will likely lead to further reservation by the leaders of these and other rising nations in supporting punishment for NPT violators. ✱
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Clocks and Clouds is an American University undergraduate research journal that publishes articles on the cutting edge of political science, international studies, and public policy. The journal is meant to add a voice to the intellectual dialogue both within the American University community and in broader academia. Our name comes from the work of philosopher Karl Popper, where clouds are a metaphor for the disorderly and irregular in social science while clocks represent the predictable and rational. By providing a venue for top undergraduate research, Clocks and Clouds aims to find the clocks amidst the clouds.

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All clouds are clocks—
even the most cloudy
of clouds.

-Karl Popper