All clouds are clocks - even the most cloudy of clouds.

-Karl Popper
ALLISON BLAUVELT
A Statistical Analysis of Privacy Norms and State Compliance with Anti-Money Laundering Regulations

ADAM PARENTE
The Impact of External Support on Intrastate Conflict

JESSICA AGOSTINELLI
Do Western-Educated Middle East Leaders Pass the Democracy Test?

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JULIA SULLIVAN
India’s Anti-GMO Rhetoric: Wielding Gandhian Thought to Undermine Corporate-Capitalist Agriculture
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This year was very much a transitional year for *Clocks and Clouds*. Switching from a semester-long publication basis to a full year while at the same time attempting to greatly expand our online presence has been a journey for everyone involved. Throughout this process, however, we’ve been supported by a number of devoted people. Our journal staff has remained committed throughout the whole process, the SIS and SPA administration has never hesitated to lend a helping hand, and our faculty advisors have been a vital guiding force throughout the process to bring you this published product.

*Clocks and Clouds’* mission is to provide an outlet and a showcase for the fantastic research that American University undergraduate students do on campus, and this year’s journal highlights some of the best examples of what we have to offer. We had the opportunity to look at more than twenty fantastic papers in the last year, and the five that we’ve chosen to print here are the ones that we felt went above and beyond, showing the analytical and research skills that courses at AU aim to foster.

To start us off, Allison Blauvelt uses statistical analysis to look into the role of privacy norms as states around the world attempt to combat money laundering by criminal organizations, attempting to draw a distinction between government surveillance and economic record-keeping. Adam Parente tackles the issue of foreign support for participants in intrastate conflicts and its efficacy, highlighting the importance of domestic factors in the outcomes of civil wars and conflicts within states. Jessica Agostinelli combines qualitative case studies and quantitative analysis to examine the role of western education and the impact it has on Middle Eastern leaders and prospects for true democracy in the region. Next, in a first for *Clocks and Clouds*, Lia Green shifts our focus from conflict to composition with a study on the factors that bring about a successful international music industry; her work points to the economic implications of a globalizing world and its niche industries. Finally, Julia Sullivan delves deep into India’s GMO debate and the rhetoric used on both sides hearkening back to Ghandi and the Indian independence movement.

*Clocks and Clouds* exists to demonstrate that, even as undergraduates, students can conduct thought-provoking research that makes a real contribution to academic discourse. Join us in exploring the perspectives that these five student researchers have to offer.

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A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF PRIVACY NORMS AND STATE COMPLIANCE WITH ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING REGULATIONS

Allison Blauvelt

Abstract

Organized crime and terrorist organizations cannot be battled by force alone; anti-money laundering (AML) techniques have become key tools to trace these individuals through their finances. Every country has an interest in implementing internationally-standardized AML and counter the finance of terrorist (AML/CFT) regulations, yet there are still widely ranging levels of compliance between states. Previously, scholars have tried to explain this variability through political, managerial, bottom-up, and top-down approaches. However, they have all failed to fully recognize the importance of culture in dictating behavior. Through statistical analysis, this paper finds that one cultural factor, a preference for privacy, has a negative correlation with overall AML/CFT compliance. However, the findings reveal the paradox that the very definition of privacy has unintentionally been contorted by privacy watchdog organizations. The false equivalence made between surveillance and record-keeping is detrimental to the public perception of AML/CFT policies and impedes their implementation. This paradox can be further revealed by future qualitative research.

Introduction

To protect the homeland, the United States security community tracks down serious criminals, intercepts arms shipments, and monitors terrorist training grounds or recruiting hotspots. U.S. officials also engage in less glamorous work, running through hundreds of financial transaction records that have been flagged as suspicious. Although there is no butt-kicking involved, tracking and preventing money-laundering is an important part
of national defense. Money laundering makes crime profitable and terrorist financing possible. Both organized crime rings and terrorist groups pose a serious threat to national security because their activities endanger citizen safety and decrease economic stability. Anti-money laundering (AML) policies can allow government agents to track members of a network through the group’s finances, and often enable them to deny profit and income to the group members.

In 1989, the G-7 summit in Paris created the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to address money laundering concerns. In 1990, the FATF published 40 recommendations, known as the FATF 40. The recommendations are specific steps that member states should take to reduce money laundering. They include actions such as the criminalization of money laundering, enforcement of due diligence in the banking sector, and the creation of a system to monitor for and report suspicious transactions. Since 1990, the FATF added more recommendations and expanded its membership from 16 to 36 members. In the years after 9/11, the FATF added 9 more special recommendations to counter the financing of terrorism (CFT).

The list of other international instruments is long and cumbersome, so it will suffice to say that many of the other conventions and bodies are tasked with legally enforcing or evaluating the same recommendations. A list of relevant international agreements is included in the annex. The FATF works closely with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and MONEYVAL, the group responsible for evaluating non-FATF members of the Council of Europe (FATF.org 2014). The alphabet soup of cooperation has led to the application of a surprisingly consistent evaluation methodology. These evaluations have found that although the recommendations were intended to apply to all countries, and despite the fact that all states have some interest in fighting money laundering, there are widely varying levels of compliance and implementation of AML/CFT policies. In the next section, I will explain the theory behind the varying levels in compliance. Then, I will describe my hypothesis, that a strong culture of privacy is negatively correlated with high compliance. After that, I will walk through the methodology, including the variable definition and specification, that led me to my findings, that this negative correlation does exist. I will end with a discussion of the findings, the implications, and caveats.
**Literature Review: Compliance Theory**

Non-compliance is a common problem with international law and non-mandatory policies, and many scholars have puzzled over why states would negotiate and sign an agreement and then fail to implement it fully. Scholars thus far have attempted to explain this puzzle using a variety of approaches. The two main schools of thought can be grouped into political or managerial frameworks. Within each group, scholars tend to focus on bottom-up (domestic) or top-down (external) factors.

Cooperation theory grew out of a group of scholars who looked at compliance through a game-theoretic perspective, thereby emphasizing strategic structures and top-down factors. These scholars, embodied by the seminal book *Cooperation Under Anarchy* (Axelrod and Keohane 1986), believe that non-compliance is a state choice, and that those choices are determined by political factors (Mbaye 2009, 65). In *Cooperation Under Anarchy*, Axelrod and Keohane discuss cooperation and defection in terms of game theory. They treat states as rational, generally unitary actors who make decisions based on mutuality of interests, the shadow of the future, and the number of actors. Axelrod and Keohane discuss how the structure of the game, i.e. whether the situation favors cooperation or collaboration, changes the likelihood of striking a bargain and of complying with it (Axelrod and Keohane 1986).

Criticism of the state-centric aspect of the works came within a few years of publication, but the political perspective remained largely unchallenged. Robert Putnam (1988) preferred a mix of state- and domestic-level analysis; “The politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived as two level games” (434). He argues that the state, or group of central decision-makers, is as heavily influenced by domestic political groups as it is by foreign pressures. However, like Axelrod and Keohane and the strategic structuralists, he studies the political factors of compliance.

Maria Green Cowles, James Caparaso, and Thomas Risse (2001) also emphasize political factors, but use a domestic-centered approach. In *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic*, they primarily explore how international institutions affect change at the state level. Of interest to this work is their “goodness of fit” theory of compliance. The closer the terms of an agreement fit a state’s current policies or their preferences, the lower amount of adaptational pressure will apply, and the easier compliance grows (7).
The managerial school grew in indirect opposition to the game theorists. Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes (1993) argue, “compliance problems often do not reflect a deliberate decision to violate an international undertaking on the basis of a calculation of interests” (176). They believe that non-compliance is a function of managerial problems, primarily capacity and ambiguity, not the political problem of intentional defection. Ronald Mitchell (1994) adds that an important way to increase capacity and decrease ambiguity is by developing integrated compliance systems. Compliance increases as the regime succeeds in “increasing transparency, providing for potent and credible sanctions, reducing implementation costs to governments by building on existing infrastructures, and preventing violations rather than merely deterring them” (428). Although Chayes and Chayes recognize that states are not unitary actors (1993, 180), they believe the assumption that they are has theoretical value for their work, and focus on external and state-level, rather than domestic, factors.

In 2011, the IMF published Working Paper 11/177, called “Compliance with the AML/CFT International Standard: Lessons From a Cross-Country Analysis.” Concepcion Verdugo Yepes, who prepared the report, criticizes the field, complaining that only a small amount of scholarship looked at domestic, bottom-up factors (2011, 8). A few, such as Knill and Lenschow (2005), look at cultural, institutional, and socioeconomic framework conditions. Yepes investigated all three types of factors econometrically. He admits, “political discourses—the ideas and narratives behind policies and policy change—are set within the broader culture of a country” (Yepes 2011, 9).

The importance of culture has been underestimated. Cultural preferences are sometimes made express in political discourse and decision-making, but often they only implicitly affect managerial styles. For example, in the U.S., the American culture of individualism is often reflected in speeches that refer to the importance of “personal responsibility.” That rhetoric is reflected in managerial decisions, such as Secretary Eric Shinseki’s resignation in the wake of the Veterans Health Administration scandals (Shear 2014).

The intention of this paper is not to contribute to the managerial school’s body of work, but I do share the assumption that ambiguity plays a role in cooperation. Furthermore, the cultural context surrounding the interpretation of international law is a critical determinant of compliance.

Although Yepes agrees that culture is important, he only looks at one cultural factor: the degree of ML criminalization, which indirectly measures the cultural acceptance for the practice. Although this is a promising start, he
ignores a whole host of other explanations. Other cultural factors that could decrease compliance include a high value on sovereignty, a general distrust of UN/international bodies, an aversion to “snitching,” or a preference for strong privacy rights. Within the limited scope of this paper, I chose to investigate the relationship between privacy norms and compliance with AML/CFT policies.

**Research Question**

I hypothesized that a country’s culture of privacy, with the accompanying dislike of surveillance, negatively affects compliance with AML/CFT regulations. If politicians and bureaucrats highly value individual privacy, they may be skeptical of regulations that require monitoring and reporting of financial information, such as the requirement to implement a system of reporting suspicious transactions. Politicians might resist passing relevant legislation, and bureaucrats may be slow to implement new measures. Although a cultural value cannot easily be measured, a preference for privacy typically translates into stronger legal protections for privacy. This allows us to indirectly compare and rank cultural preferences between countries. This logic led to the following research question and hypotheses.

Q: Does a state’s privacy ranking negatively affect its compliance with AML regulations?

H0: Privacy will have no correlation with compliance.

H1: Privacy will be negatively correlated with compliance.

**Methodology**

I tested one independent variable, AML compliance, and six dependent variables (described under variable definition). First I found the correlation coefficient. For those that were correlated above 50% of the time, I calculated the t-value and p-value of the coefficient to find the significance level.

**Specification**

The data for my independent variable, AML compliance, is from the AML/CFT Compliance Index that Yepes uses in the 2011 IMF study referenced above. The AML/CFT Compliance Index judges seven groupings of recommendations: Legal measures, institutional measures, preventive measures for financial institutions, preventive measures for DNBFPs, preventive measures for the informal sector, entity transparency, and international
cooperation. Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions (DNBFPs) refer to casinos, real estate agents, dealers in precious stones, lawyers and independent legal professionals, trust and company service providers, and related positions. For more, see footnote 44 in Yepes.

For each recommendation, countries are judged as compliant, largely compliant, partially compliant, and non-compliant. For a select few, the criteria are considered not applicable.Yepes quantified these ratings, designating respective values of 1, 0.66, 0.33, 0, and 1. This led to cumulative scores ranging from 6 to 40.33, within a potential range of 0 to 100. For further information on the specification, see Yepes 2011 pages 14 through 16.

Variable Definition

I used six independent variables, the titles and descriptions of which follow. For information on the criteria, source material, and publication date, see table XX in the annex. The description is the author’s summary, but the criteria are quoted verbatim from the source material.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Short Title:</th>
<th>PRIV</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long Title:</td>
<td>National Privacy Ranking Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description:</td>
<td>Final score of state-wide levels of surveillance range from 1, with “extensive surveillance/leading in bad practice” to 5, with “no invasive policy or widespread practice/leading in best practice.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Components:</td>
<td>Constitutional protection; statutory protection; privacy enforcement; identity cards and biometrics; data-sharing; visual surveillance; communication interception; workplace monitoring; government access to data; communications data retention; surveillance of medical, financial, and movement; border and trans-border issues, leadership, and democratic safeguards.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Short Title:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Long Title:</td>
<td>Medical, Financial, and Movement Surveillance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description:</td>
<td>Rating of a country’s surveillance of medical records, financial records, and information on movement. The criteria specifically refer to “Anti-money laundering laws requiring reporting to the police of suspicious transactions” under financial monitoring. Ratings range from 1, “extensive surveillance/leading in bad practice” to 5, “no invasive policy or widespread practice/leading in best practice.” MFM PRIV is one of the 14 measures that make up PRIV.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The first independent variable I chose was PRIV, or the overall privacy ranking, from Privacy International’s National Privacy Ranking from 2007. This dataset had the most comprehensive ranking on the largest number of countries that I could find. That being said, as I will discuss later, only 47 countries were assessed. I then examined the components of the overall ranking to find more specific factors. I tested financial surveillance, even though it was lumped with medical and movement surveillance, which means that it is a distorted “specific” gauge. I chose government access to data because it includes access to financial information held by private companies. One can interpret due diligence requirements as a suggestion for a closer relationship between government agencies and these private firms. Finally, I chose constitutional privacy as an indirect measure of the historical-cultural public tolerance for surveillance.

None of these components were dedicated solely to financial surveillance, so I looked at later studies. The report, European Privacy and
Human Rights, published in 2010 by Privacy International, followed similar methods to the 2007 ranking, but separated financial information from medical and movement. The scope was limited to EU member states and a few other relevant states because funding for the 2010 report came from a European Commission program. Inexplicably, the report produced two sets of numbers, one scaled from 1 to 10, and the other scaled from 1 to 7. I have requested further information from the authors with no response as of the date of publication.

Country Selection

The total population was limited to the countries that agreed to the FATF agreements and were evaluated for their performance, a total of 161 entities. The population was limited further to those who were included in the 2007 Privacy International report. This left 47 countries. I then controlled for the corruption and income group, since Yepes found that those factors significantly affected compliance. Controlling for a corruption index of 70-100 out of 100 left 19 countries. Out of those, all 19 counted as advanced economies according to a World Bank report in 2007, the same report that Yepes used.

Findings

1. **The national privacy ranking total is negatively correlated with compliance at the p<0.01 significance level.**

   We have strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis. The correlation coefficient of the national privacy ranking total and AML/CFT compliance index is -0.530, and the p-value is 0.00975. Even though the correlation is not dramatically above 50%, the statistical significance is very high, since normally a p value under 0.05 would be considered strong evidence to reject the null. In addition, the fact that the correlation is so significant despite a sample size as small as 19 strengthens the rejection.

2. **EU Financial Surveillance is negatively correlated with compliance at the p<0.10 level.**

   EU financial surveillance 1 has a stronger negative correlation with the AML/CFT compliance than PRIV does. EU FIN 1 has a correlation coefficient of -0.580. This makes sense, since this is the most specific metric, and directly refers to the money-laundering regulations. On the other hand, the p-value is only 0.0506, which would not normally be considered significant. However,
the sample size is tiny, at only nine countries, which drastically hurts the confidence level. More data would raise the significance, whether it raised or lowered the correlation. The problems with acquiring more data are discussed above, in the methodology, and below, in caveats.

3. **All dependent variables are negatively correlated with compliance.**

   Even though the other variables have low correlation coefficients, they are all negatively correlated with compliance, which suggests that the hypothesis is not wildly off. Instead, we can infer that we would benefit from more refined variables.

   The correlation coefficient of EU FIN 2 is -0.417, which borders meaningful association, but is still low. It is puzzling that the more specific rating does not have as strong a correlation, especially since both ratings are from the same European Privacy and Human Rights report from the same year. This is an area for future investigation.

   The correlation coefficients of the components of PRIV are all quite low. The largest coefficient is for the medical, financial, and movement metric, at -0.258. This is unsurprising, since the advantage of having a specific financial surveillance rating is outweighed by the presence of two accompanying unrelated measures. The other two are so low as to be meaningless.

4. **There is no meaningful relationship between government access to data and compliance.**

   Government access to data has a correlation coefficient that is even lower, at -0.104. In the context of the assumption that more specific measurements lead to a stronger correlation, this seems surprising. Yet in this case, the wrong details are examined and too much of the rest of the AML sphere is excluded. GOV ACCS only rates government access to and cooperation with the private sector, which is only one part of financial monitoring, not to mention of AML measures more generally. Additionally, this metric does not account for the ways in which a culture of privacy could affect compliance more generally, on a systematic, political level. Instead, GOV ACCS is only indicative of part of the story: the managerial approach to the public/private information-sharing relationship.

5. **There is no meaningful relationship between constitutional protection and compliance.**

   Constitutional protection has the lowest correlation coefficient, at -0.024. Such a small coefficient is essentially meaningless. Given the above
complaint that GOV ACCS does not look at the political manifestations of culture, it seems like the rating of constitutional protections of privacy would fill that gap. I will discuss this puzzle in my analysis, but for now it suffices to say that there is no real relationship here.

Caveats

Before diving into implications, it is important to remember the caveats of these findings. The sample is small and is not random, the data is not contemporary, correlation does not prove causation, and surveillance is an indirect and imperfect measure of privacy.

Sample Selection

First, the selected countries do not constitute a random sample out of a population. As I described before, controlling for income and corruption reduced the population drastically and made sampling pointless. This could be addressed by more wide-spread data collection. However, there are only two countries that meet the control requirements that lack data. Hong Kong and Chile are the only entities that met the requirements of corruption and income group but were not evaluated in the 2007 Privacy International report. With a population as small as 19, sampling is impossible. Additionally, the controlled total population of 19 is too small to guarantee a normal distribution. However, the sample size is taken into account when calculating the p-value. I chose to have a smaller, better controlled, population. For the EU-only data set, I realize that a group of 9 is absurdly small for this type of test. However, the results indicate that this is a good area for future study, albeit using a different method that does not depend on a large population.

Timeliness

In addition to sample size, some inconsistencies in the data may be present because of the discrepancy in dates. Many of the reports from which I sourced my metrics are only reproduced every few years, and the FATF evaluations come in rounds that necessarily produce staggered results, since the organization does not have enough resources to simultaneously send teams to each country.

To address this issue, I decided to use data from reports close to the
center-point of 2007, instead of choosing the most recent data from each metric. I used the economic ranking that Yepes uses, which is from 2007, even though his work was published in 2011. I drew four of my metrics on privacy (PRIV, MFM PRIV, CON PRIV, GOV ACCS) from the most recent report that had data on a wide range of countries. I used Transparency International’s 2007 corruption perception index to limit my sample. Even though there is a more recent ranking, from 2013, the index from 2007 provides a more accurate comparison since my economic ranking and all my privacy rankings are from that year. As further justification, all of the assessments that Yepes relies on are from 2005 through 2010, and fall close to 2007. In this paper, I sacrificed using the most recent information in favor of consistency.

Correlation v. Causation

Although this is a familiar phrase, it is important to remember that correlation does not show causation. I speak of this more in my analysis, but my findings only show a negative relationship, without indicating whether one causes the other or if there are confounding variables that influence them both. My first finding is still important, though, because it clearly shows a negative relationship. This information could inform policy-making decisions but, if this caveat is forgotten, it could also easily be turned into a misleading headline such as “AML Regulations Decrease Citizen Privacy.”

Surveillance as an Indirect Measure of Privacy

A lack of surveillance is not equal to the existence of privacy. But the concept of privacy is fuzzy, and measuring the lack of surveillance is the best way to find concrete information, which means this approach is valid. Is the government allowed to listen to phone calls? Do they have to get a warrant first? Adding the second question, on limits, is important because it distinguishes between levels of surveillance that the citizen has accepted or not. These questions are easier than “Do citizens have privacy?” As the authors of the 2007 Privacy International report concede, they make a normative claim that all surveillance is bad, and that even surveillance to which the citizens have agreed to be subjected can sometimes be bad. However, as I will discuss in my analysis, I believe the authors have made a fatal error by not distinguishing enough between accepted and unaccepted forms of surveillance, nor between invasive and noninvasive practices. As I will explain, this created a weakness in my findings that goes beyond a small caveat.
Analysis

Here I shift to the critical analysis of these findings. Finding 1 is legitimate, despite the caveats. However, finding 5 reveals that there is a disconnect between measurement and reality. In effect, although there is a negative correlation between privacy and AML compliance, it is due to a structural reason based on the logical fallacy that all information gathering is surveillance.

First, I will address the mistake of the authors of the Privacy International report. Then, I will explain how this plays out in my work. Finally, I will show how the lack of a relationship between constitutional protections and compliance demonstrates this paradox.

The fallacy that all information-gathering is surveillance, or spying, continues to be perpetuated because a significant amount of both policymakers and policy-evaluators believe it to be true. These days, it is common to speak of privacy and surveillance as opposing ideas, or a zero-sum game. Therefore, politicians speak of “balancing” privacy and surveillance, just as they speak of finding the right balance between liberty and security. Then, since both surveillance and monitoring are techniques of gathering and storing information, many people feel comfortable equating them. They conclude that monitoring endangers privacy in the same way surveillance does. But monitoring is not the same as surveillance. Monitoring is not invasive; it is similar to counting the number of letters in each mailbox. Surveillance, on the other hand, would be like opening and photocopying every letter.

The authors of the Privacy International report measure privacy as the absence of surveillance. Yet, because of this fallacy, the authors also measure privacy as the absence of monitoring. Since many of the FATF recommendations require monitoring (but not surveillance!), high compliance necessitates high monitoring. The composition of the financial privacy metrics and of the overall privacy rating therefore structurally ensures a negative correlation between privacy and compliance.

The fact that there is no conflict between constitutional ideals of privacy and compliance could mean two things. First, it could mean that countries completely ignore their ideals, and that compliance is power- and interest-based. I reject this explanation because it ignores the complicated, multi-dimensional nature of domestic politics. In addition, although it is not in the scope of this paper to comment on the realist/constructivist debate, such an explanation denies the importance of ideas and norms at any level. More convincingly, the fact that the correlation coefficient is so low shows that there
is no real relationship, nor rivalry, between constitutional values of privacy and AML regulations. A constitution indicates the ideology and ideals of the founding political elite, rather than the \textit{de facto} situation. Yet it does reflect the stated priorities of politicians, and is an important symbol of the attitudes of the people. The only conflict comes from the rhetorical confusion that equates surveillance and monitoring.

\textbf{Conclusion}

There is strong evidence to reject the null hypothesis. There is in fact a negative correlation between privacy and compliance with AML/CFT measures. However, this is due to a structural feature of the rhetoric of privacy. The definition of privacy used here automatically judges monitoring as invasive surveillance. To get around this paradox, a new approach is needed to study the problem. If, as this research suggests, there is no relationship between constitutional ideals of privacy and AML/CFT compliance, a more qualitative research regime could tease out the details. A discourse analysis of parliamentary speeches on the topic of privacy could give evidence that the perception of surveillance and monitoring is confounded.

Such an analysis could decrease the ambiguity surrounding the role of AML/CFT regulations. With the assumption that ambiguity, rather than intentional defection, is an important factor in cooperation failures, we can predict that compliance will increase. If, as I predict, AML/CFT regulations pose no danger to individual privacy, formal and informal resistance to these measures should decrease.

In this case, compliance should increase even without a substantive change in current regulations. Instead, clarifying ambiguous wording could change domestic interpretations and perhaps make politicians, bureaucrats, and citizens more receptive to implementation at every level. This, in turn, would ensure that fewer criminals and terrorists will be able to launder their ill-gotten gains. \footnote{...}
Bibliography


AML International Agreements

Council of Europe. (1980, June 27). Recommendation on measures against the transfer and safekeeping of funds of criminal origin.


# Annex

## Table 1. Variable Definition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Short Title:</th>
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<tr>
<td>Long Title:</td>
<td>Total AML/CFT</td>
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<td>Description:</td>
<td>The total level of compliance for anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures for a given country, from 0 for the least to 49 for the most compliance.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criteria:</td>
<td>- This type of data is usually considered sensitive but not always adequately protected.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Government Access to Data</td>
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<td>Description:</td>
<td>Rating of to what extent the government has access to data and financial information, especially in the private sector. Ratings range from 1, “extensive surveillance/leading in bad practice,” to 5, “no invasive policy or widespread practice/leading in best practice.” GOV ACCS is one of the 14 measures that make up PRIV.</td>
</tr>
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<td>Criteria:</td>
<td>- Warrant regimes, e.g. governments entering homes without warrants</td>
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<td>Privacy International (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N:</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>Short Title:</td>
<td>Constitutional Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Title:</td>
<td>CONS PRIV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description:</td>
<td>Rating of the amount of constitutional protections for privacy, from 1, “extensive surveillance/leading in bad practice,” which means few constitutional protections, to 5, “no invasive policy or widespread practice/leading in best practice,” which means the country has adequate constitutional protections. CONSPRIV is one of the 14 measures that make up PRIV.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N:</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criteria:</td>
<td>- Does a constitution exist and does it protect privacy, even &quot;within the shadows&quot; of other rights? - Are there other protections, e.g. rights to data protection and private communications? - Have the courts defended the right of privacy? - Have there been recent cases?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source:</td>
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</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<td>Description:</td>
<td>Rating of financial surveillance, from 1, “endemic surveillance,” to 7, “consistently upholds human rights standards.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source:</td>
<td>Privacy International (2010)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Description:</td>
<td>Rating of financial surveillance in the European Union, with a low score indicating more surveillance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criteria:</td>
<td>- Are there protections around government access to financial information? - Are there safeguards around other uses of financial information by the private sector?</td>
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<tr>
<td>Source:</td>
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### Table 2. AML/CFT Compliance and Privacy Raw Data

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<th>GOV ACCS</th>
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Table 3. Correlation Coefficient of Independent Variables

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<th>MFM PRIV</th>
<th>GOV ACCS</th>
<th>CON PRIV</th>
<th>PRIV</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>-0.580*</td>
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<td>-0.258</td>
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</table>

Note:
*Significant at the p<0.10 level **Significant at the p<0.05 level ***Significant at the p<0.01 level
THE IMPACT OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT ON INTRASTATE CONFLICT

Adam Parente

Abstract

Supporting participants in intrastate conflict often appears as a relatively cheap, effective strategy to address security concerns by weakening and distracting enemies participating in those conflicts if not by outright eliminating them. Rebels are often underequipped and could benefit from external sources of weapons, supplies, and training. However, conflicts have multiple dynamics beyond combat capabilities that may limit the expected utility of providing additional resources such as popular support. Using an expanded version of the UCDP dataset on civil conflict, this paper addresses the issue of whether varying degrees of external support makes a statistical difference in the outcome of a conflict. The results indicate that external support in general has a negligible impact on the outcome of the conflict. Rather, the results emphasize the importance of domestic factors, notably the type of conflict. External support likely remains a useful policy tool because of alternative goals besides the outcome of the conflict, but cost-benefit calculations should contain a low probability of successfully impacting the outcome of the conflict.

Introduction

One of the difficulties of waging a successful rebellion against a state is the asymmetry of the resources both sides can effectively mobilize. Often rebel groups will turn to asymmetrical strategies such as guerrilla warfare to compensate for disparities in resources. However, rebels will either need to
defeat the state outright or make the conflict exceedingly costly for the state in order to achieve victory. Support from third parties can help rebel groups reduce the asymmetry between themselves and the government. Rebels may not receive the high-end resources a state may possess, but food, medicine, small arms, and potentially direct military support can supplement domestic resource mobilization and contribute to a more successful rebel movement.

The importance of this puzzle is the extent to which external support is an effective method to shape the outcome of an intrastate conflict. States often provide support to foreign rebels to cheaply achieve policy goals such as removing a hostile regime through domestic actors. The degree to which providers and recipients of external support evaluate the efficacy of external support for the outcome of intrastate conflicts shapes policy decisions and can thus have broad policy implications for how they achieve their policy goals. For example, a state may pursue a détente-like strategy with an opposing state rather than try to undermine them by supporting rebels if external support is considered ineffective. With a lower likelihood of success, states will consider support to a side of an intrastate conflict less as one of their primary tools to achieve goals and will focus on alternative strategies.

The goal of this paper is to assess the extent to which types of external support impact intrastate conflict. It is expected that external support to rebels should have a small but meaningful impact on the likelihood of a rebel faction to win. This should be particularly more pronounced at the higher levels of support (ex: direct troop deployment) as the higher levels of support should provide rebels with more capabilities to fight the state. This relationship should be identical for external support to states involved in an intrastate conflict, but with a smaller magnitude. The smaller magnitude is likely because external support supplements a state’s capabilities like external support to rebels, but that support will likely be marginally less effective than the equivalent support to rebels. While the various domestic factors should take priority, external support can be a supplement for the capabilities of both sides and should thus have some impact on the outcome of intrastate conflicts.

**Review of Statistical Analyses of External Intervention**

The current literature of statistical analyses on the impact of external intervention in intrastate conflict is insufficient. The common way that intervention is operationalized is by the direct military involvement of a third party state. Among common datasets, this is the criteria for external
involvement or internationalization of a conflict (Sarkees & Wayman 2010) (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Nonetheless, there are quality efforts to assess the role of external intervention through more nuanced statistical models of external support to participants of civil wars. Although this is not where the literature should be, it is moving towards a more satisfactory analysis. Even so, earlier attempts focusing on direct military intervention can portray some, but not all, dynamics that this paper examines because the literature generally examines external support at a much higher threshold of involvement.

The definition of a proxy is somewhat contentious due to the inherent ambiguity of proxy support. While there are obvious cases such as Soviet and Chinese support to North Vietnam, there are also smaller-scale proxy relationships such as those with Cuban and Latin American rebel groups. The traditional definition established from Cold War proxy conflicts is that there is an asymmetry in power and that the lesser power relies on the larger power for the capability to act (Duner, 1981, 356). Generally this relationship would create the expectation that the weaker power is submissive to the interests of the larger benefactor. This definition likely exaggerates the influence of the larger party on the lesser power. Withholding resources can be an effective way to induce compliance, but reducing the effectiveness of the lesser power weakens the benefactor’s ability to undermine the opposing actor. There is some overlap with an alliance and a proxy relationship in that both are coordinating towards a desired goal or outcome, and that some aid can flow between allies. However, allies do not become reliant on the aid, which makes the relationship less submissive. A proxy likely has a freedom of action much like local actors in the cleavages model described by Stathis Kalyvas (2013, pp. 475) because the benefactor cannot micromanage the proxy while maintaining minimum expenditures.

Dylan Balch-Lindsay and Andrew Enterline (2000, pp. 630) evaluate the impact external intervention has on the duration of a conflict. They find that interventions generally increase the duration of the conflict with a “balanced intervention” having the largest impact on duration. Their analysis is important for two reasons. Firstly, their control variables, particularly “government strength,” suggest that domestic factors are important to control for in order for a defendable statistical analysis of external support (Ibid). While domestic variables are important, intervention is still significant. Nonetheless, regardless of domestic factors, it is reasonable to expect that some conflicts, especially the Vietnam War and Soviet-Afghan War, would have ended years earlier if not for external investments in those countries. Secondly, to reiterate,
the use of a high threshold of external support excludes any commentary on lower levels of support that are more frequent.

Contrary to Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, Paul Collier, Anke Hoeffler and Måns Söderbom (2004, 261) argue that intervention can reduce the duration of a conflict. Their research on the duration of civil wars found that support only to rebels statistically lowered the duration of the conflict. This is expected to some degree because supplies to a rebel group are marginally more valuable and useful to the rebel group than additional support is to a government that should already have better resource mobilization. Furthermore, like Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, they assess the impact of military interventions, but also account for economic interventions (Ibid). While the expansion of types of external involvement is a step forward, it does not elaborate on the potentially effective low-cost support that takes the form of material aid short of direct military intervention.

Lotta Jarbom and Peter Wallensteen’s work with the UCDP dataset highlights the impact of external support on the outcome of a civil war. They suggest that continued external support to only one side tends to result in a ceasefire or victory and that those settlements involving external support are more durable than without external support (Harbom & Wallensteen, 2005, 629). Their work also emphasizes the importance of neighbors as intervening third parties which helps narrow the list of potential intervening states to reduce type two errors. Their inclusion of “secondary non-warring support” is an improvement in expanding the variation in support, but it can be further expanded (Ibid). Their work suggests that there is sufficient variation for outcomes in the UCDP dataset.

Patrick Regan and Aysegul Aydin (2006, 748) try to elaborate on the variation in outcomes and duration of the conflict by assessing “diplomatic intervention” as a way in which third parties can end the conflict. According to them, diplomatic intervention, such as economic intervention, improves the chances of the conflict resulting in a peace settlement, but the intervention declines in effectiveness over time. While their research emphasizes a different type of intervention than what is addressed within this essay, it is a useful way to explain how intrastate conflicts end; at some point there must be diplomacy and a third party can help speed that process up, whether by providing a neutral space to meet or incentives for each side to meet at the negotiating table. Their analysis goes beyond the scope of this essay, but it does reflect dynamics beyond relative capabilities and resources that are often missed in quantitative studies.

Tyrone Groh (2010, 7) evaluates the degree to which proxy war can
be an effective low-cost option in his dissertation. While he is right to point out that the degree to which the external benefactor controls the beneficiary is important for cost-benefit calculations, this aspect is beyond the scope of this essay. More importantly, he evaluates the cost of proxy support primarily in terms of material costs, influence, and reputation costs at the international and domestic level. While he categorizes costs and benefits, none of these variables represent the outcome of the conflict. Nor does it account for benefits and costs to interstate rivalries that appear in the literature as a reason to provide support (Ibid, 254). Nonetheless, his dissertation provides other benefits and costs outside of this paper which will help provide context for the results and implications.

The general limit of this body of research is that the lower levels of intervention that are far more common are not analyzed. The threshold of intervention for statistical analysis is high enough to omit a significant number of cases of external support that can improve the evidence for assessing the utility of intervention. In addition to being able to cover cases that would not have been considered external support under the usual dichotomy of military intervention, the treatment of external support as an ordinal variable allows for a greater variation in the independent variable in order to more accurately depict the influence of external support on a conflict. To address this limitation and contribute to the discourse, this paper treats external support as a more expressive variable that accounts for the variety of ways in which external support can exist.

**Hypotheses**

The primary hypothesis that this paper tests is that higher levels of external support to rebels increases the probability that the rebels will win and that the state will lose. External support to rebels as a whole should impact the outcome because it should allow them to improve their capabilities and more effectively resist and fight the government. The higher levels of external support, such as deploying troops, should have a greater impact because they represent a greater investment than lower levels. External support can provide the resources to help rebels mobilize manpower. Intangible incentives to mobilize individuals, such as promises, are not accounted for in this analysis (to the extent that it is not captured indirectly by control variables). At the very least, a soldier may fight for a cause, but at the end of the day he needs food, water, medicine, and a gun to effectively fight the state. Another state can provide that type of support.
The secondary hypothesis that this paper tests is that different levels of external support to states increases the probability that states win and that the rebels lose. This is expected because the state’s capabilities should improve from additional supplies and/or reinforcements. It follows the same logic as rebel support, but it is expected that the state should benefit less than rebels do from support because external support to a state is likely a smaller portion of a state’s total capabilities than the portion of external support to rebels is. A state should have the means to create and maintain a force to combat rebels in most cases. While not accounted for, the magnitude of support (within each category) may be larger than the support to the rebels. This is likely the case because, while rebels would not likely benefit from complex weaponry that is difficult to maintain and support, a state might be provided with complex weaponry since it likely has access to supporting infrastructure. Despite states likely receiving greater support than rebels, the support is probably a smaller percentage of total strength and should therefore have less of an impact.

**Variables**

The independent variable is the level of external support for rebels. The variable consists of five values: 0 is no support, 1 is alleged support, 2 is nonmilitary support (medicine, food, etc.), 3 is military support (guns, munitions), and 4 is direct military support (troops). This scale is also used for the level of external support to the state. Alleged support is the lowest level of external support because it is assumed that the support, regardless of type, is small enough to evade verification and thus have a lower impact on the conflict. It is assumed that each higher category costs more to supply because each section is more expensive financially and politically in general. However, it is entirely possible for nonmilitary support to be more expensive than military support or that a small troop deployment is cheaper than arming a rebel group. These cases should be rarities and should not impact the results to a significant degree. It is also assumed that the higher levels include the lower types of support because if a state is willing to support at a higher level, it should also be willing to provide cheaper forms of support. If noncombat supplies are needed, it would make sense for them to be sent in addition to military supplies.

Alleged support is included as a variable because cases where support is suspected should not be included in the no support category, as these cases would contaminate the no support variable. Likewise, including it within the other levels of support would potentially contaminate those as well. While the
number of cases is small (alleged support to the state was removed because there were so few cases), coding them as the other values would not be appropriate. There is also the potential that alleged support can impact the outcome through perceptions about rebel capacity. Alleged rebel support without actual support would more likely encourage a stronger state response that would defeat the rebels.

The dependent variable is the outcome of the conflict. The variable consists of three values. 0 is the absence of victory, 1 is rebel victory, and 2 is state victory. All outcomes were considered a neutral outcome if the outcome did not have a victorious side or did not terminate yet. It may not be appropriate to include vague types of termination such as “other” and “no or low activity,” but these were included to ensure a larger sample size and can be considered an absence of victory so it is appropriate. However, anti-colonial cases were removed because their outcomes were coded as “end of anti-colonial conflict,” which does not adequately describe the outcome for use in this analysis. While less descriptive than the Correlates of War outcome variable, the outcome variable used in this analysis allows for a larger sample size in each category to help find potential statistical significance.

The control variables consist of other ordinal or categorical variables such as conflict type, relative strength between rebels and government, the rebel’s internal capacity to recruit and acquire arms, and the existence of other non-state sources of external support. The control variables were chosen as other factors that should impact the outcome, notably the type of conflict and the rebel’s domestic capability relative to the state.

**Methodology**

The data used for this paper are taken from the Non-State Actor Data dataset compiled by Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan as an expansion of the UCDP dataset on civil conflict (2012). While retaining the structure of the UCDP dataset, the expansion includes variables reflecting different relative capabilities in addition to a more expressive external support variable than the UCDP dataset on civil conflict. Due to problems found with coding in other datasets, the external support variables were checked and slightly altered depending upon whether information contrary to the coding was found. Few cases were altered. This dataset provides a better independent variable with numerous control variables to account for general differences in domestic dynamics.
The data is analyzed through a series of logit models for rebel and state victory. This is appropriate because the goal of this paper is to discuss the average impact of external support to rebels and states on the outcome of the conflict. While a linear probability model may be similar, it does not adequately represent the limits of the impact of independent variables (under 0 and over 1). A logit or probit model is necessary to properly represent the probability distribution. While either model would work, the logit model is used out of convenience. The analysis is accomplished by running two nearly identical series of logit models side by side where each victory category is compared to the absence of victory. Each series consists of five models with each model including additional control variables. The marginal effects are reported at the mean because that is the best way to acquire meaningful values to analyze.

The independent variables were aggregated into binary variables because an ordinal scale would not be appropriate for analysis. The difference between nonmilitary support and military support is not the same as the difference between no support and alleged support. This logic also applies to control variables that are ordinal to more effectively measure their impact as a whole. While less concise, this method allows for specific relationships to be presented and avoids misleading trends.

The control variables were added in sets by the type of variable. For model two, external support to the state is added because rebel support and state support are likely correlated and the impact of government support would be captured by the rebel support variables without their inclusion. Model three added the types of conflict (baseline being civil war). The ways in which different conflicts are fought is different and the goals often vary. A terrorist campaign would emphasize suicide bombings and indiscriminate strikes against citizens, while a civil war is often open combat with an emphasis on securing the capital. These factors affect the inherent probability of success and are necessary to control for.
Model four added relative domestic capabilities of the rebel group (baseline being parity). While relative capabilities likely captures some of the impact of external support, without a more detailed description in the codebook, the degree to which the two sets of variables overlap in coding is uncertain. It is still better to use the relative capability variables to account for domestic differences because while there is likely overlap in explained variance, relative capabilities capture other domestic factors that are necessary to control for. With external support considered generally a supplement, domestic mobilization should represent a significant portion of state and rebel capabilities.

Model five added territorial variables (baseline is none) and non-state actor support (baseline being no support). Alternate sources of support (militias and smuggling networks) can potentially impact the conflict to the degree that state support could, depending on the magnitude. A rebel faction’s presence domestically and/or abroad can potentially be an indicator of their capacity to fight the state. If they control territory, they can more easily mobilize the resources of the territory under their control. Safe havens provide a sanctuary to prevent the collapse of a rebel group and can thus impact the outcome as well. States may only provide money as external support which would require access to a smuggling network to provide the resources necessary to fight.
### Results

**Statistical Results**

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<td>0.0321527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>0.004128</td>
<td>0.0943716</td>
<td>0.0151603</td>
<td>0.0841818</td>
<td>0.00107</td>
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<tr>
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<td>0.11583</td>
<td>0.047</td>
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<td>Nationalism</td>
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<td>0.02532</td>
<td>0.06497</td>
<td>0.02724</td>
<td>0.00285</td>
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<td>Terrorist</td>
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<td>0.14377</td>
<td>0.06863</td>
<td>0.016272</td>
<td>0.00154</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rebel strength very strong</td>
<td>0.0259381</td>
<td>-0.0297444</td>
<td>0.002923</td>
<td>-0.000073</td>
<td>0.0363343*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebel strength strong</td>
<td>0.0204655</td>
<td>0.3204328</td>
<td>0.0183357</td>
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<td>0.0095</td>
<td>0.129523**</td>
<td>0.01095</td>
<td>0.00292</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Rebel mobilization strong</td>
<td>-0.0085698</td>
<td>0.168994</td>
<td>-0.0404035</td>
<td>0.009573</td>
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<td>Rebel arms capacity strong</td>
<td>0.0270988</td>
<td>-0.04669**</td>
<td>0.0107513</td>
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<td>Rebel fighting capacity weak</td>
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<td>0.00562</td>
<td>0.01352</td>
<td>0.024199**</td>
<td>0.01452</td>
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<td>0.00787914**</td>
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<td>Rebels control territory</td>
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<td>0.0012143</td>
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<tr>
<td>Taqi Non-State rebel non-military aid</td>
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<td>Major Non-State rebel military aid</td>
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<td>17.31**</td>
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**p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, * p < 0.1**

Coefficient over 0.05
The results suggest that external support for rebels and states has a minimal impact on the outcome of intrastate conflict. Hypothesis one, that higher levels of rebel support would increase the likelihood of a rebel victory, is unsupported. Models three, four, and five either present the various types of rebel support as statistically insignificant or with a small magnitude of 1-2%. Furthermore, some of the rebel support categories that are statistically significant, such as alleged and nonmilitary rebel support in model four, are negative, indicating that additional assistance reduces the likelihood of a rebel victory.

Hypothesis two, that higher levels of state support would increase the likelihood of a state victory, is also unsupported. Similar to hypothesis one, the majority of state support variables were either statistically insignificant or have a negligible magnitude. The one significant type of state support is nonmilitary state support which has a 19% probability of a state victory in model four. While this piece of evidence provides partial support to hypothesis 2 in that nonmilitary aid improves the likelihood of state victory more than no aid, the lack of significance for military aid and troop support also means that a conflict with a lower level of external support to the state relative to troop or military support has a greater likelihood of state victory.

The significance of alleged rebel support in analyzing the likelihood of a state victory in models three and four is another unique result among the external support types. Alleged external support is the most ambiguous category in an analysis of inherently secretive behavior and is the least homogenous category. Alleged support could range from there being no support to covert troop deployments. Therefore this unique result should not be considered evidence that external support has an impact on the outcome of the conflict without concurrent results for the other categories of external support. With the absence of additional evidence, it is far more likely that conflicts with alleged rebel support have some unique characteristic related to the greater ambiguity in those conflicts that reduces the likelihood of a state victory.

While the reduced sample size for models four and five can be a reason that the external support variables fail to remain significant, these models capture alternative explanations of variance in the outcome. The relative capability variables added by model four are particularly useful. The additional explained variance of the last two models is demonstrated by the increase in the pseudo R^2 values for each model which justifies the additional control variables. The statistically significant results across models three, four, and five indicate that some types of conflict (coups) have a greater capacity for one
side to win while other types of conflict (ethnic and Islamist) more often lead to an absence of victory.

A noteworthy result of model five is the statistically significant impact of rebels having an external presence on state victory. The results indicate that while a rebel group with an external presence can reduce the probability of a state victory, it does not significantly improve their ability to win the conflict. Although the magnitude is about -2.5% for extensive external rebel presence and some rebel external presence, the percentage can still be considered a relevant result considering the plethora of factors involved in an intrastate conflict. This result can be logically explained through the increased difficulty a state has in removing a rebel group if the rebels can retreat to a safe haven across the border.

Another interesting dynamic is that a state is 6% less likely to win if it receives minor non-state actor support. This is likely the case because states that need to rely on non-state actors to fight rebels likely have a poor capacity to mobilize resources and poor governance capabilities. This variable can be an indicator that the state is desperate enough to rely on militias in order to combat the rebels.

While extraterritorial might appear to be a significant variable with a 98.5% increase in the probability of a state victory, this indicates the small number of extraterritorial conflicts rather than serving as a strong indicator of state success. The logic that would be needed to justify the results is not as compelling as the logic for the difficulties of a state victory in extraterritorial intrastate conflict. Fighting further away from a power base should make it more difficult for a state to win due to the difficulties of logistics, power projection, and mobilizing local support.

**Conclusion**

This analysis suggests that higher levels of external support in intrastate conflict to rebels and to states do not significantly impact the outcome of intrastate conflicts. What appear to be more important for the outcome of an intrastate conflict are domestic variables, especially the type of conflict. Domestic variables may account for the inherent selection bias of which states and rebels receive external support because states and rebels with an inherent high probability of success may receive support because they are already likely to succeed. While the statistical insignificance of external support is contrary to previous research on the impact of external support on intrastate conflict outcomes, the results encourage skepticism regarding the role of external
support rather than an outright contradiction of other analyses.

This analysis should be considered an initial attempt to discuss the importance of external support for intrastate conflict using a more expressive external support variable. Within the dataset, more concise models could yield more significant results. This would involve reducing the number of control variables while condensing ordinal scales. Filling in the gaps in the dataset could minimize the decline in the sample size across models. However, the key to improving this analysis is to increase the sample size by including more cases. The larger sample size should allow for the more inclusive model to find more statistically significant variables because the standard error would be smaller. While it would be difficult to research all the variables used in this analysis for pre-World War II cases, this dataset can be used to further experiment with models and make the necessary variables more explicit to simplify the expansion of the dataset to earlier cases.

In regards to the policy implications of this analysis, states should be more skeptical about their capacity to impact intrastate conflict through different types of external support. While the results indicate a limited impact on the outcome, there are other reasons to provide external support that may make it worthwhile that are not accounted for in this analysis. As some of the literature has suggested, external support can lengthen the conflict, which may be in the interests of the support providers (Balch- Lindsay and Enterline, 2004, pp. 475). Support could be a symbolic gesture to improve relations between the provider and recipient. In addition, there could be issues of credibility and future expectations, especially during the Cold War, that incentivize states to support rebels or states in retaliation to events such as regime change and interference by a rival state. In conclusion, states should continue to provide external support to participants in an intrastate conflict so long as it is considered beneficial, but its cost-benefit calculation should contain a low probability of successfully impacting the outcome of the conflict. ✗
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Parente, “Impact of External Support on Intrastate Conflict”
DO WESTERN-EDUCATED MIDDLE EAST LEADERS PASS THE DEMOCRACY TEST?

Jessica Agostinelli

Abstract

This research examines the assumed relationship between Western education and democracy as it relates to Middle East leadership. While previous literature on this topic has argued that a non-Western leader’s Western education is a positive contributor to democratization within that country, salient examples in the Middle East seem to contradict this trend. Among these are Bashar al-Assad, Hosni Mubarak, and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali—while these three individuals are recipients of Western degrees, the prospects of democracy in their countries are notoriously low.

The purpose of this research is to study this linkage and its implications for democratization efforts in the Arab World. First, a large-N study is used to see the overall impact in this region of Western education of a leader with its Economist Intelligence Unit democracy index. Then, to delve deeper into the issue, two cases will be examined: that of Gaddafi, the Libyan president who was not Western-educated and was highly nationalist, and his Tunisian counterpart Ben Ali, who was Western-educated and whose country is often regarded as the sole success story of the Arab Spring. The discourse and policies of these leaders are compared, and implications are drawn.

Introduction

Democracy is a concept generally associated with the West, particularly the United States and Western Europe. However, since the end of the Cold
War, there have been many efforts to spread this system of government throughout the developing world. This process has taken the form of foreign aid, as in the US’ Truman Doctrine, economic integration, as with the EU and Eastern Europe, and soft-power diplomacy, as well as military intervention. These methods have had varying degrees of success, but an often overlooked way of introducing democracy to the non-West is through the exposure of non-Western leaders to Western education systems.

There are many current and past leaders of non-Western countries who have attended universities and secondary schools in the US and Europe, a trend which has accompanied a wave of democratization in Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe in the last twenty years. Many scholars have theorized that these trends are connected, asserting that a Western education is the reason behind a non-Western ruler’s democratization initiatives; this theory has generally been supported by statistical studies. However, the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings drew the world’s attention to the Middle East as a hotbed of political oppression and protest. Despite the fact that many Arab leaders, such as Bashar al-Assad, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, as well as post-Arab Spring rulers, such as Mohammed Morsi, were educated in the United States or Europe, it appeared that a Western education did not have the desired effect on democratization within these countries.

This paper aims both to test the existing theory that Western-educated leaders are more likely to democratize as well as to uncover the dynamics of this relationship within the Middle East. It will be determined whether the Middle East is an exception to this theory and, if so, what factors play into this discrepancy.

**You Can Pay for an Education, but You Can’t Buy Democracy**

The issue of Western-educated dictators in the Arab World is ambivalent: on one hand, cases of benevolent leaders such as Ben Ali and Sheikh Hamad indicate that a Western education is the key to domestic stability; on the other hand, however, the examples of Bashar al-Assad, Mohammed Morsi, and Hosni Mubarak suggest that a Western education is insufficient to ensure democracy.

In order to understand the effects of Arab rulers’ education on their policies toward democratization, several other relationships must be examined: the power of individual leaders to control political developments and institutions, the influence of a ruler’s education on his or her leadership
philosophy, and the connection between Western thought and democracy. These relationships give insight into the effects of a leader’s education on his or her democratization practices. This is not necessarily a direct relationship, as existing institutions and attitudes may be hostile to democratization and may hinder a leader’s ability to affect positive democratic change. A deeper look into the debates surrounding this topic reveals that a Western-educated leader is more likely to democratize, but this process can be distorted by institutional factors.

Many arguments surround the question of individual leaders’ policymaking power, also known as the levels of analysis question. These arguments can be grouped into those that argue that a leader can be instrumental in affecting regime change, and those that cite institutions and external actors as greater determinants of governmental structure, as well as those opinions that fall in the middle. A moderate interpretation of this question is the most appropriate, because although these Arab rulers have sovereignty within their nations, they are often bound to other interests and institutions which may limit their political goals. A central goal of this research is to determine the degree to which these limitations affect Western-educated leaders’ political power.

Some literature places a heavy importance on the role of the head of state in pursuing political objectives. However, much of this discourse neglects the role of authoritarian rulers in democratization. Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski describe the ability of authoritarian rulers to manipulate institutions to achieve their political goals (2007). While most of the cases they examine describe rulers whose goals centered on maintaining power, this article also demonstrates the ability of rulers to establish democratic institutions and gain widespread support within their countries. If rulers are able to effectively manage political coalitions and gain a following, democratization is a realizable process. Torun Dewan examines the role of a leader’s rhetoric in shaping political events (2012). Her examination of the impact of rulers’ rhetoric on policy outcomes suggests that individual agency in leadership is an instrumental factor in policymaking and also indicates the importance of examining rhetorical decisions. Rhetoric can be shaped by, and reinforce, Western ideologies, as in the case of Gaddafi’s anti-Western inflammatory rhetoric or Ben Ali’s moderate stance. Laurence Louër describes the efforts of the ruling Al-Khalifa and Al-Sabah families in Bahrain and Kuwait to institute democratic reform (2005). This example illustrates the ability of monarchic rulers to institute democratic initiatives. However, polls
and surveys overwhelmingly suggest that in these countries, institutions and the public were very amenable to such reforms. A weakness of these arguments is that they do not assess institutional or societal obstacles to democratization that may be present in Arab Spring countries.

Eva Bellin presents the viewpoint that institutions and political groups are more important in shaping national policy than rulers’ decisions (2004). Bellin explains that domestic institutions and society in the Arab World are far more amenable to authoritarianism than democracy, and for that reason prospects for democracy are limited. Other scholars, such as Davorka Matic and Mirko Bilandzic, argue that Islamist movements and other special interest groups will largely determine political developments in the Arab World (2010). While it is true that democratization prospects are often hampered by inefficient government and corrupt institutions, Bellin does not seem to take into account the fact that, overwhelmingly, polls collected from Arab Spring countries indicate popular support for democracy in the Middle East. If Arab countries are hostile to democracy, as Bellin argues, that does not explain its popularity. However, an important point that Bellin raises is the role of Islam in government and society. Religion might be an impeding factor to rulers’ imposition of their Western education into their political programs, as institutionalization of Islam in society is often counterproductive to democratization.

In order to examine democratization prospects in the Arab World, a more nuanced understanding of individual agency in leadership is needed. Robert Jervis argues that ambivalence is necessary in determining this variable, as differences in public attitudes and institutional demands may vary over time (2013). However, his scope is constrained to US presidents, leaving out the possibility of inter-country differences. Additional factors, such as economic climate, can affect the efficacy of a ruler’s initiatives (Byong Kuen Jhee, 2008). This effect on Arab rulers’ political goals is unclear, and an objective of this research.

Given that Arab dictators are able to affect some degree of political change with regard to democratization, the next question is whether a leader’s education will contribute to his or her political philosophy. On this issue, literature is split between the realist view that rulers will pursue their self-interest regardless of the ideological justifications, and the constructivist view that education and ideology will factor into a leader’s decision making. Most literature on this subject revolves around the argument that a ruler’s political agenda is determined simply by cost-benefit analysis and
strategic action. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita describes the ambition of a ruler in affecting regime change as a function of the size of the winning coalition and voting base (2002). This view purports that leaders will consistently strive to maintain their own power, often at the expense of the general public. This realist argument neglects the influence of education and external influence altogether. Agnes Cornell claims that leaders will take action based on the perceived threat of losing power, demonstrating that, even in the presence of foreign aid as an incentive to democratize, a regime leader will often democratize only insofar as he believes that he will be able to retain power (2012). This claim may prove to be a caveat for the case of Arab Spring rulers, whose education and experiences are conducive to democratization, but who pursue authoritarian ruling styles out of fear of losing power. Conversely, Gandhi and Przeworski assert that leaders’ pursuit of policy concessions or fostering of political institutions is simply a guise for maintaining influence and forestalling a rebellion (2007). While these arguments provide insight into possible reasons behind authoritarian rulers’ actions, they neglect the issue of a ruler’s leadership ethic favoring democracy.

The opposing view to this realist perspective on ruling takes into account individual rulers’ personal histories when analyzing their discourse on democracy and Westernization. Thomas Gift and Michael Krcmaric evaluate quantitatively the positive correlation between Western-educated leaders and democratic rankings in non-Western countries (2013). This research establishes a theory that can be tested by examining its applicability in the Arab World, where outliers such as Bashar al-Assad and Hosni Mubarak indicate a need for further attention to the region. Daniel Byman draws a link between Gamal Mubarak’s Western education and his early rhetoric praising liberal economic policies, as well as supporting human rights initiatives (2010). He also uses the example of Sief Al-Islam, Gaddafi’s son, to claim that a Western education positively impacts an individual’s view of democracy. While he acknowledges external factors such as military influence and bureaucratic control of the government as hindrances to democratization, he draws the link between education and a philosophy of democratization. This argument effectively addresses the individual as well as institutional and national levels of analysis. What remains to be seen is the translation of this personal philosophy into democratic reform.

While it has been established that government leaders in the Arab World have a degree of sovereignty within their regimes, and that their political outlooks can be shaped by their education, the link must be established between
Western thought and democracy. Assuming that a Western university would espouse “Western” political and ideological traditions, it is generally agreed upon that Western thought is amenable to democracy. Classical Western thinkers such as John Locke, Jacques Rousseau, and Baron de Montesquieu establish the ideals of separation of powers, a social contract, and privatization of property (Locke 2002; Rousseau 1913; Montesquieu 1777). The works of these scholars are taught at most Western colleges and universities. Additionally, the United States in particular presents itself as a forbearer of democracy, as can be seen in its policies during the World Wars, the Cold War, and the War on Terror. Foreign policy has centered on spreading democracy in the non-Western world. This ideology is rooted in democratic peace theory, the theory developed by American sociologist Dean Babst which holds that spreading democracy will result in peaceful international relations (1964).

In light of existing literature, the argument of this paper is that Western-educated leaders, despite some constraint by political institutions and competing interests, will have the political power and reform ethic to promote democratization. Testing this argument will involve an examination of Middle Eastern rulers and their attitudes, methods, and practices of government.

**Research Design**

The proposed research design looks at the dynamics of the relationship between education and democratization within this specific region to see which factors might be inhibiting the connection. My argument is that a Western education will result in a propensity for democratization, although hindering institutional factors can be a roadblock to this process. If an Arab ruler is Western educated, then he will show a greater bent for “democratizability.” This concept takes into account a leader’s democratic tendencies, as well as his impact on the level of democracy within his domain. This concept is composed of several indicators of democratization and the ways that a leader demonstrates them. This two-part study will include a large-N statistical analysis of leaders’ education and democracy scores in a selection of Middle Eastern countries followed by a case study comparing two Middle Eastern rulers, one Western-educated and one not.
Operationalizing “democratizability” necessitates the use of an index to indicate how democratic a country is. More specifically, if a leader is Western educated, then the Democracy Index ranking of his country will increase (“Democracy Index” 2012). The discourse of Western-educated leaders will also demonstrate a favor for democratic institutions. Alternatively, if institutional factors such as a strong military or weak governmental establishment precede the ruler’s tenure in office, then his democratizability will be obscured.

Possible causal mechanisms are that a Western education inherently propagates democratic ideologies to its students, and these ideologies are carried throughout these students’ experiences. It could also be argued that living in a Western country during the time of university study exposes leaders to their host country’s laws and governance systems, including efficiency of government, balance of power, and civil liberties. Gift and Krcmaric also argue that networks gained from university study will have democratic connections (2013). The question of education and leadership rests on a wide range of factors and underlying causes.

This question must be addressed using a large-N study as well as a comparative case study, given the variety of cases within the Middle Eastern region. The independent variable is whether or not a particular leader was Western educated. The cases will be collected using the World Governments and Leaders data set (2013). The dependent variable will be the concept of democratizability as measured by the Economist Intelligence Unit’s Democracy Index. This score is expected to be higher in countries ruled by Western-educated leaders. In order to control for external political influence as an obstruction to this correlation, one possible control variable is the receipt of Western reform aid packages. However, foreign economic relationships can take many forms, from aid to investment to economic integration; therefore, this is too complicated to introduce as a single control variable. Another possible control variable is GDP, as wealthier countries have more resources and thus more freedom to democratize. These controls will allow for the assessment of the effect of education on ruling style.

There is possible endogeneity in the large-N component of this study, as Gift and Krcmaric point out, as it is likely that countries already on a path of democratization will elect leaders with Western educations, rather than the leaders taking the initiative in this process. However, several cases of power transfer in the Middle East involve nepotism and bureaucracy, rather than legitimate elections, so this endogeneity is unlikely.
The cases involved in this study will be leaders of the Middle East in the year 2010 (see Table 1). This circumvents the issue of countries in which leadership changed or became ambiguous in tandem with Arab Spring events. Limitations of this case selection are that it is difficult to control for all the institutional and developmental differences between countries in this region. Focusing on one or two cases might eliminate some of this discrepancy; however, this would not allow for as thorough of an analysis of the impact of leadership on the democratizability factors outlined above.

While it is hypothesized that a general trend will be observed between Western education and democratization, an argument could be made that the violence of many of the Arab uprisings, rather than the leader’s Westernized ideology, may have necessitated democratic reform; an examination of Arab Spring cases addresses this issue. Conversely, if this trend is not observed, it could be argued that institutional factors inhibited democratization. In order to determine the views of Middle Eastern leaders when faced with popular agitation for democracy, an analysis of discourse of these leaders must be included (Anderson 2011). Both Ben Ali and Gaddafi indicated an interest in maintaining power throughout the protests. However, differences can be observed in their discourse on democracy throughout their terms. Ben Ali of Tunisia was educated in France and the US and has demonstrated a more measured response to the Arab Spring uprisings in his country. Gaddafi of Libya, however, had a more traditional Islamic education in Libya and his response to the Arab uprisings was inflammatory.

These cases are comparable in that the conditions surrounding the uprisings are relatively consistent. Gaddafi and Ben Ali both held terms of similar length in office prior to the uprisings, the proportion of Muslims in the populations of their countries are the same, and the uprisings occurred during the same time period. The question that this portion will assess is whether Gaddafi serves as a foil to Ben Ali in his spurning of the protestors.
It is hypothesized that if a leader is Western educated, as in the example of Ben Ali, then he will be more amenable to democracy-oriented protests than his non-Western educated counterpart, Gaddafi. In this study, the independent variable is again the degree of Western education. However, the dependent variable becomes the degree of support for democracy and adaptability to demands for reform. The discourse of the two leaders on democracy will be assessed at three different points during their rule. Data will include speeches and interviews collected from these leaders during the selected years. This will allow for an analysis of their views and interests, a more micro-level analysis of this causal relationship. A drawback of this case selection is that, despite the fact that these two cases have good consistency, exceptional cases such as Bashar Al-Assad are left out. However, by choosing the cases of Libya and Tunisia, it is possible to examine the effect of a Western education in the most controlled way possible. From there, it can be assessed which obstacles impeded the process of democratization in these exceptional examples.

This two-part research will first examine the general trend of the effect of education on Middle Eastern ruling styles, and will then proceed to see how this trend plays out in a comparison of two cases. This allows for irregularities to be taken into account, as well as for the theory to be applied to this region in conformity with existing theories.
Democracy Testing: The Final Exam

In order to measure the effect of a ruler’s education on his country’s democracy index, the following formula is used:

\[ Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{1i} + \mu_i, \quad i = 1, \ldots, n \]

or

Democracy Index = \( \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{(Western Education)}_i + \mu_i, \quad i = 1, \ldots, n \)

Table 1:

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<td>62360446571</td>
<td>no</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Oman</td>
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<td>58813004375</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>5.44</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>1.25122E+11</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2.42</td>
<td>64791706914</td>
<td>no</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Bank, Economist Intelligence Unit
In this test, the independent variable is the nominal variable of whether a country’s leader is Western educated. The dependent variable is the country’s Democracy Index, as compiled by the Economist Intelligence Unit. It is expected that if a leader is Western educated, then that country will have a higher Democracy Index. The null hypothesis is that a Western education will have no effect on a country’s Democracy Index. Data will be collected from 2010, as irregularities from the Arab Spring could distort the results if taken from a more current year. Additionally, many leaders of interest, such as Gaddafi and Hosni Mubarak, are no longer in power.

The initial results indicate that the null hypothesis is correct, and that there is little to no correlation between a leader’s education and his or her country’s democracy score. The estimation of \( B_0 \) at 3.234 indicates that the score for most of these countries is low. The \( B_1 \) value of 0.267 indicates that there is little validity in this correlation. However, because this value is positive, it shows that there is a (weak) positive correlation between a ruler’s Western education and democracy. \( R^2 \), with a value of 0.071, also indicates that this correlation is weak, given that a ruler’s education only accounts for his or her country’s democracy index in 7.1% of cases. The p-value of 0.229 indicates that this test is not statistically significant.

### Table 2:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>R Square</th>
<th>Adjusted R Square</th>
<th>Std. Error of the Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.267</td>
<td>0.071</td>
<td>0.025</td>
<td>1.62837</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Predictors: (Constant), Wedu

Source: SPSS

### Table 3:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant 1)</td>
<td>3.234</td>
<td>0.515</td>
<td>0.267</td>
<td>6.280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wedu</td>
<td>0.864</td>
<td>0.697</td>
<td>0.267</td>
<td>1.240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Dependent Variable: Democracy Index
According to this data, the new equation is:

$$\text{Democratization} = 3.234 + .267 (\text{Western Education})_i + .697i, \quad i = 1, \ldots, n$$

In order to control for relevant variables, GDP must also be taken into account. Wealthier countries tend to have more resources and better institutions for democratization, and thus will tend to have higher scores. As this indicator increases, it is likely that democratization will also increase, affecting the results. The new independent variables are the education of a ruler (W.Edu) and GDP, measured in current US dollars. This makes the new equation:

$$\text{Democratization} = 3.234 + .267 (\text{Western Education})_i + .055 (\text{GDP}) + .697i, \quad i = 1, \ldots, n$$

After introducing GDP as a variable, the results indicate that a leader’s education has even less of an influence on the democracy index than when viewed independently. In this regression, the estimation of $B_0$ at 3.139 indicates again that most of the Democracy Index scores for these countries are low on the international ranking. The $R^2$ shows that GDP and education only account for 5.7% of democracy score cases. The Beta score for a Western-educated ruler drops to 0.239, and the Beta for GDP is 0.055, demonstrating a very low correlation. The p-value of both of these variables is high, with W.Edu at 0.315 and GDP at 0.813, indicating that these variables are not statistically significant.

Table 4:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>R Square</th>
<th>Adjusted R Square</th>
<th>Std. Error of the Estimate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.238</td>
<td>0.057</td>
<td>-0.048</td>
<td>1.68169</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Predictors: (Constant), GDP, W.Edu
The inclusion of a few measurements improves the validity of this study. The first involves measuring “democratization” not by the Democracy Index in a given year but by a change in the Democracy Index within a given span of years. This would more accurately reflect the success of each leader in democratizing within their countries. A possible intervening variable could be external aid to these countries by Western countries, as these aid packages may have a positive effect on democratization. However, it is difficult to measure the intent of such aid and its effects on governments’ agendas. Additionally, institutional factors such as military presence and the scale of corruption in government would affect democratization.

A limitation of the measurement of Western Education is that it could allow for greater variation. The number of years studying abroad and the level of the degree obtained could be influential in a ruler’s democratization efforts. However, for many leaders, information is scarce or discrepant on their biographies or the duration and degree of their studies is unknown. Another possible reason for the discrepancy between Gift and Krcmaric’s study and this one is that different indices are used, due to availability and coverage of certain countries. Different measurements of this kind may have yielded different results.

Finally, the limited number of cases limits the results greatly and may be a reason for the low statistical significance. Including only countries from the Middle East/North Africa region allows for focus on the anomalies found within it, but does not provide a wide enough sample that allows for conclusive results. However, expanding the geographic scope would defeat the purpose of limiting this study to the Middle East.

Table 5:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B</td>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>3.139</td>
<td>0.662</td>
<td>4.740</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Wedu</td>
<td>0.768</td>
<td>0.743</td>
<td>0.239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>5.880E-01</td>
<td>0.000</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Dependent Variable: Democracy Index
These statistical results disconfirm the hypothesis that a Western-educated ruler will lead a more democratic country, indicating that the Middle East is an exception to the existing theory that Western-educated non-Western rulers are more likely to democratize. This discrepancy merits a closer analysis, which is what a comparative case study offers. The statistics do not necessarily indicate that Western-educated Arab rulers are averse to democracy. It is possible that even if they hold positive views toward democratization, the challenges associated with democratizing are too great for this process to be realized. The Democracy Index may not be sensitive enough to the efforts of rulers toward democratization, or it may not take into account important historical and structural obstacles to democratization which vary between countries. A discourse analysis of Gaddafi and Ben Ali allows for these rulers’ attitudes and actions to be examined more closely. The hypothesis remains that if an Arab ruler is Western-educated, then he will hold a more positive view of democracy and peaceful protest under his domain. It will be determined how these two leaders discuss democratic institutions, elections, and the role of the president, as well as how these perspectives change as their terms of leadership lengthen.

Ben Ali, who attended Special Inter-Service School in Coetquidan, France, the Artillery School in Chalons-sur-Marne, France, the Senior Intelligence School in Maryland, and the School for Anti-Aircraft Field Artillery in Texas, has demonstrated a measured approach to democracy since he began his rule in the 1980s. He has maintained positive rhetoric concerning democratic institutions and civilian sovereignty, even in the face of Arab Spring protests. While a change can be detected over time in that he became more protective of his position as president, he still demonstrated respect for the constitution and elections.

In 1987, when he began his 24-year presidency, Ben Ali addressed Tunisia in a speech in which he lauded democracy and promised further democratization under his administration. He begins by addressing his “fellow citizens,” a term he repeats throughout his speech (“Tunisia: Overthrow of Bourguiba”1987). This epithet appears to be an effort to demonstrate equality and to portray the president as a member of the new country, with a stake in its political and economic success. He repeatedly cites the constitution and outlines his powers and responsibilities as president under it. He describes his desire to govern a country which “guarantees the conditions for a responsible democracy, fully respecting the sovereignty of the people as written into the constitution.” All of these statements indicate a strong respect and desire for democracy in Tunisia. While it can be observed that in some respects his
policies fell short of guaranteeing economic equality and fully supporting civil society groups, it is evident that Ben Ali’s official policy was supportive of democracy (Noueihed and Warren 2012).

In 1999, Ben Ali gave another speech following a series of elections in which he reaffirmed his support for the democratic process. However, within this support can be detected an effort to defend his power (“Tunisia: Speech” 1999). In this speech, the president congratulates the new House of Deputies members who were elected and praises the democratic process involved with his own election. He says, “I extend my sincere thanks...to all those who supported me to renew my commitment and continue to assume national responsibility during this term, as President of the Republic and President of all Tunisian and all Tunisians, regardless of their leanings” (1999). This statement appears to be at the same time both a celebration of the democratic process and a preemptive defense against threats to his legitimacy. The end of this phrase, “regardless of their leanings,” suggests the presence of a growing opposition that merited Ben Ali’s attention. While he does assert his leadership position, the inclusion of this phrase also suggests that the democratic principles for which the president advocates also apply to opposition and minority factions. What is notable in this speech is that the president also advocates for freedom of the press and unbiased media coverage, as well as for positive relations with other countries. This indicates support for transparency and greater freedom. Ben Ali concludes his speech by thanking the National Elections Observatory for ensuring the fairness of elections and the democratic process. Again, Ben Ali appears to use pro-democracy speech as a method of reinforcing the legitimacy of his power. Regardless, he does affirm the importance of democracy in Tunisia.

This combination of pro-democracy rhetoric and self-conscious affirmation of the democratic process in Tunisia came to a head in 2011, when Ben Ali made his last speech as president addressing his country in the wake of the Arab Spring (“Tunisia Document” 2011). The president addressed the Tunisian people as “citizens,” not “fellow citizens,” as he did at the outset of his term. This subtle contrast implies a hierarchy that he deliberately avoided in his early years. He maintains positive language toward Tunisia and democracy, but marginalizes Arab Spring protests as radical “terrorist act[s] that cannot be tolerated” (2011). This extreme language allowed for Ben Ali to maintain control of the unfolding situation in his country while still nominally serving the cause of democracy within Tunisia. Despite these hints of authoritarianism, in his speech the president also addresses the concerns of the protestors using pro-democratic language. He claims, “We continue to be attentive to the concerns
of all.” He outlines a plan of increasing localized representation, economic and employment opportunity, and education. These plans had clear deadlines and realizable goals, and suggested a positive democratic change that was absent in many other Arab Spring countries. Overall, despite some moments of defensiveness when his power was threatened, Ben Ali maintained positive discourse and efforts regarding democratization. It is significant that in his speech he promises to address the grievances of the protestors, appealing to their interests on official terms. This long-term positivity regarding democratization is indicative of Ben Ali’s Western education.

One might question to what degree the discourse of Ben Ali was reflective of actual democratic change under his rule. However, it can be seen that this pro-Western democracy perspective is largely missing from the discourse of Gaddafi, who was educated in various schools throughout Libya, and the Democracy Index score for Tunisia in 2010 was 0.85 greater than that of Libya. Given that these two countries were comparable cases in other respects, this supports the hypothesis that Ben Ali’s Western education gave him a more democratic bent to his ruling style.

Gaddafi’s stance toward democracy is better assessed through a mix of discourse. His 1975 Green Book outlines his formula for a direct democracy which disavows parties and parliaments in favor of people’s congresses. His discourse is consistently suspicious and inflammatory against contemporary democracy. Throughout his term, he clings to this stance in interviews and speeches, claiming that Libya has a perfect system of government and that all other forms of democracy are false. A 2003 interview with Columbia University and a 2011 speech in response to Arab Spring protests confirm this tendency.

Gaddafi’s Green Book addresses the selected topics of elections, democratic institutions, and the role of the president (1975). He claims to be the forbearer of true democracy (direct democracy), yet his perspective on contemporary democratic institutions is extremely negative. He claims, “It has become the right of the people... to destroy... the so-called parliamentary assemblies which usurp democracy and sovereignty” (Qaddafi 1975). He advocates instead for localized people’s councils in which to resolve policy issues. This suggests a shallow understanding of the operationalization of democracy in practice. One of the chapters concludes, “The deception, falseness, and invalidity of the political theories dominant in the world today [are] obvious. From these emerge contemporary conventions of democracy” (Qaddafi 1975). Gaddafi repeatedly refers to his Bedouin roots and his rich experience in Libyan politics and society. This is suggestive of this paper’s argument that leaders who are not educated in Western democracies are not
exposed to the ways in which these government systems operate in society, and thus pursue alternative methods of government.

Gaddafi sticks to this rhetoric throughout the following decades. In a 2003 Skype interview with Columbia University, he again decries the “travesty of democracy,” namely, the system of voting for representatives (2003). He claims that party systems are known for their “falsification,” and that “the government system is hated.” This appears to be an attempt to marginalize opposition within Libya that may be campaigning for greater representation in government. This trend continues when Gaddafi is asked about the highly restrictive freedom of the press in Libya. He states, “If one criticizes the system, they are criticizing themselves.” He claims that because of the presence of local people’s councils where debate and discussion can occur, there is no need for the press to cover opinions which run contrary to the government, explaining the logic that, because it is illegal to be insulting to a person in written material and the government truly represents the people, criticizing the government is against the law. The logical flaws in this argument have problematic consequences for Libyan citizens. When asked about human rights in Libya, given that this country is a signatory of the International Convention on Human Rights, Gaddafi referred to the right to self-determination and the right to labor as the two basic human rights, and then followed to say that Western democracies violate these rights with their systems of government while Libya does not. Interestingly, Gaddafi admitted that his country was plagued by “social backwardness.” He cited colonialism as the cause of this deficiency and Western education as a possible remedy. It appears that a source of his animosity toward Western systems of government stems from viewing the disastrous effects of colonialism, yet he acknowledges the quality of Western education systems.

As for his response to the Arab Spring uprisings within his country, Gaddafi used the same language of glorifying direct democracy and vilifying dissent in a televised speech from Green Square on July 1, 2011 (“Gaddafi Speech” 2011). He addresses NATO and many of the European countries who placed economic sanctions on Libya by speaking at a pro-Gaddafi rally using prideful and nationalistic language glorifying his country. He portrays the Arab Spring as an external threat, exclaiming, “You provoked the Libyan people by bringing them traitors and suggesting that they are the Libyan people! Is that your democracy?” (2011). He claims that “the Libyan people can change the system whenever they want” in an effort to illustrate that there are no problems with the government in Libya, before proceeding to marginalize the protestors as traitors who operated outside the realm of what was necessary in order
to undermine the government. He refers to the protestors as “traitors and mercenaries who are killing your children daily” (“Gaddafi Speech” 2011). His assertion is that because Western democracies do not understand the perfect system that is Libyan direct democracy, they are hostile to it and try to disrupt it by drawing attention to the “traitorous” protestors. Gaddafi states that the solution is in the hands of NATO and other Western powers, as they are the source of the problem. By framing the Arab Spring protests as an external threat, Gaddafi draws upon colonial resentment and anti-Americanism to rally support and squash dissent. This further illustrates Gaddafi’s disregard for freedom of expression and democratic institutions. By hiding behind his “perfect democracy” he avoids engaging in real democratic reform.

Neither Ben Ali nor Gaddafi are examples of perfect democratizers in the Middle East. However, given the comparability of their cases, Ben Ali demonstrates a much greater bent for democratizability in his perspectives toward democratic institutions and freedoms. Both leaders engaged in democratic discourse but they differed in their methods of endorsing their government style and reacting to democratic-oriented protests. While Ben Ali praised elections and parliaments and allowed for the demands of his citizens to be heard, Gaddafi vehemently clung to his notion of government and refused to acknowledge the legitimate demands of opposition in his country. These trends support the hypothesis that a Western education results in greater democratizability. The causal mechanisms that were revealed through this discourse are that through exposure to a variety of Western education and political systems Ben Ali was able to see democracy in action both in Europe and in different parts of the United States. This gave him a more positive view of democracy and how it operates in different countries, allowing him to more effectively implement aspects of democracy in Tunisia. Gaddafi, by contrast, associated Europe with colonialism and the United States with its imperialism in the Middle East. Because he was not exposed to the positive aspects of Western political systems, he attempted to forge his own way, defining his own system of government and labeling those who did not follow suit as puppets of the United States and Europe.

Conclusions

Looking at this issue statistically and qualitatively yields different results, but not results that contradict each other. The large-N study of Middle Eastern rulers and their education and democracy scores revealed no correlation between the two. This suggests that the Middle East is an exception
to the existing theory that Western-educated leaders tend to democratize. However, it is likely that the reason for this lack of correlation is that the Democracy Index does not take into account different political, economic, and social structures of the countries it measures. Using the starkness of statistics to measure something as dynamic and complicated as democratization within a country is problematic. Democracy is not a static concept, nor is it a universally applicable set of criteria. A more nuanced method for assessing democratizability is through qualitative methods. This brings us back to the question of an individual leader’s ability to affect political change, particularly in the Middle East. It appears that there is a definite transition of ideology from education to personal beliefs, but democratic ideals do not translate as smoothly from personal belief to real democratic change. Differences in leadership and government tradition, as well as the state of war or conflict, have dramatic effects on democratization within a country. Therefore, it is necessary to examine two similar cases to see how this proposed correlation plays out on a more micro level.

Looking at these two cases not only supported the hypothesis, but also brought up the underlying themes of colonialism and anti-Americanism. The role of discourse in the Arab Spring, as well as throughout these two politicians’ careers, is significant, as it sets the tone for their leadership style and future prospects of democratization. Gaddafi’s references to colonialism as a source of mistrust between Libya and many Western countries contrasts sharply with Ben Ali’s welcoming of good relations with Western countries based on political freedoms. It appears that, despite the deeply negative effects of colonialism on development and relations between Africa and Europe, a Western education can lessen the impact of these hostilities. Ben Ali, likely due to his exposure to a variety of Western societies and government systems, was able to integrate Western democracy practices into his country’s political and societal structure. However, Gaddafi, who decries modern democracy as rigid and false, remained steadfast in his commitment to his own ruling style and viewed any challenge to this system as a threat from the West. He even ridiculed leaders of countries who had good relations with European countries or the US. This suggests a competitive hostility toward democratic politics. Overcoming these rivalries is a daunting task, but part of this effort could include increased exposure to democratic systems through education. While a Western education does not guarantee democratic progress, as can be seen in the large-N study, it does appear to foster reform and democratization efforts within a country when looked at more closely.
Another issue, as discussed by Eva Bellin, which arose in this comparison, is the degree to which these presidents were motivated by religion. Islam is seen by many critics as an impediment to democracy, and though this is likely untrue and was therefore not a variable examined in this comparison, it is significant to note that Gaddafi demonstrated much more of a connection to his Bedouin and Islamic heritage than did Ben Ali. This may contribute to the rivalry observed between Gaddafi and Western democracies. The issue of secularism versus Islamism is one prominent in the Middle East which likely comes into play in this trend. Leaders such as Ben Ali who are educated in Western democracies are more likely to be exposed to secular, efficient governments, which they are likely to then export. While Tunisia is not a secular country, the intense religious proclamations which permeate Gaddafi’s speeches are missing in Ben Ali’s.

The implications of this research are that democratic attitudes, if not complete democratic change, can be fostered in the Middle East through educating rulers in Western countries. Ultimately, a Western education alone is not the sole determinant of democracy, yet exposure of a leader to efficiency of government can prompt the institutional reform that is needed in transitioning countries such as Libya and Tunisia. This is a positive prospect for Western democracies because, according to Democratic Peace Theory, shared democracy lessens conflict and warfare between states. If democracy can be spread throughout the Middle East through a method as simple as education exchange, then there is an incentive for Western universities to open up to non-Western students, preparing a new generation of politicians to have views conducive to democracy and positive relations with the countries of their education. At the diplomatic level, these cultural and educational exchanges should be encouraged as well. A key component of the Western education hypothesis is the cultural exchange that occurs during university education. As diplomatic lines stay open, this encourages overseas education, which in turn reinforces positive relations and democratization.

Possible further areas of research on this topic would involve investigating notable exceptions such as Bashar al-Assad or Hosni Mubarak, who were Western-educated but have strongly anti-democratic track records. Additionally, the application of this trend in law and policy could be examined, as well as the implications for peace keeping and the foreign relations of Middle Eastern countries. It could also be determined whether Western scholars teaching in non-Western countries have an effect on democratic attitudes in those countries. Public receptiveness to democratization under these circumstances is another important factor to be studied. Gift and Krcmaric took the first steps in establishing this broader trend of Western-educated
leaders democratizing more than their non-Western educated counterparts; however, there are many dynamics and implications of this trend that can be studied further.

The relationship between a Western-educated ruler and democratizability is one that is complicated, yet has many important implications for security, foreign policy, and human rights. Understanding the ways in which this pattern plays out involves examining the individual as well as state levels of analysis, and regional idiosyncrasies must be taken into account. For the Middle East, these idiosyncrasies are a combination of religion, post-colonialism, and increased global attention in the wake of the War on Terror and the Arab Spring. However, it can still be observed that a Western education could play a key role in the process of democratization in this region. »
Bibliography


THAT’S WHAT MAKES YOU SUCCESSFUL: AN ANALYSIS OF THE REQUIRED CONDITIONS FOR AN INTERNATIONALLY SUCCESSFUL MUSIC INDUSTRY

Lia Green

Abstract

The production, distribution, and consumption of music are highly international transactions. In the past, what made them so was the proliferation of American music throughout the rest of the world. Recently, however, things have begun working in reverse. In other words, there has been an increase in the amount of “foreign,” or non-American, music that has been able to permeate the American music industry. The music that has been able to do so has predominantly come from Europe and South Korea.

This paper attempts to identify the necessary pre-conditions that a country must have in order for its music industry to be strong enough to permeate American charts. Original research was conducted through the examination of past years’ Billboard Hot 100 charts in order to identify the countries that have been successful in permeating the American music industry. From there, three case studies—the U.K., South Korea, and China—were identified. Scholarly literature that addressed what could potentially cause “success” on a theoretical level was then examined and used to form a hypothesis regarding what the pre-conditions for success might be. Finally, the hypothesis was tested by examining whether or not these pre-conditions were present in the “successful” and “unsuccessful” case studies.

Introduction and Background

Time has been marked by popular music—from the Beatle-Mania dominated sixties to the rise of MTV in the eighties; from Michael Jackson’s
release of *Thriller*, to Milli Vanilli’s lip-synch scandal; from the 2003 Britney-Madonna VMA kiss, all the way to the current “Beliebers” and “Directioners” battling it out on social media. This evolution of music is by no means one-dimensional—the sound has changed, the subject matter has changed, the image has changed. Yet, there is one other change that I would argue is immensely important, if for no other reason than the fact that its implications extend far beyond the world of entertainment. This change is internationalism.

The American music industry has been what I would like to call “cannibalistic,” meaning that Americans tend to consume American music. Recently, however, other countries have begun to emerge as big players within the music industry. As the proverb of the tortoise and the hare goes: slow and steady wins the race. With the American music industry being the hare in this analogy, the question is: Who are the tortoises? This paper will explore the causes behind why some foreign music industries have been able to successfully catch up to, and permeate, the American music industry, while others have not.

The underlying assumption I am making, and the assumption that I will later base my hypothesis off of, is that the music industry responds the same way to economic forces as any other rational actor in the economy would. With this assumption in mind, I begin by reviewing the existing literature surrounding “success”—how it is achieved, and so on.

Following the literature review, I examine the identified general requirements for success in relation to the music industry and seek to explain, on a theoretical level, why these factors might be necessary to achieve success. Next, I will explore these three factors in relation to case studies, connecting the theoretical to the actual. And finally, I will conclude this paper with an analysis of the results and implications from this research.

**Literature Review**

The literature identifies three main requirements for general economic success to be achieved. The first is agglomerations, the second is access to technology, and the third is the ability to monetize the product in question.

To begin, an agglomeration economy refers to an area that is densely comprised of similar businesses and firms (Cohen et al. 2010). The reason why agglomeration economies are important for success lies in the fact that “cost reductions occur because economic activities are located in one place” (McDonald and McMillen 2006). For example, the geographical closeness of these similar businesses and firms make it so that people who are interested, or
perhaps even specialize, in the particular field in question will then concentrate in the particular agglomeration area (Malmberg and Maskell 2002). This is due to the fact that the agglomeration areas will have an abundance of jobs in that particular field, making it a logical choice for people who work in that field to reside nearby.

The effects of this labor concentration are beneficial to the businesses and firms of the particular agglomeration for which the labor has been pulled. Transaction costs involved in finding, hiring, and training new workers is mitigated due to the concentration of labor. What is more, this concentration of labor reduces costs in and of itself due to the “flow of knowledge spillovers” (Gabe and Abel 2010). Having specialized labor, and thus specialized knowledge, concentrated in a particular region benefits the businesses and firms for which that knowledge and labor applies, in part, to the sheer abundance of it, but also due to the fact that, again, having such a concentration reduces transaction costs.

Additionally, agglomeration economies make it cheaper to produce certain goods or services due to the pre-establishment of infrastructure and the abundance, and consequential cheapness, of “intermediate inputs” (Gabe and Abel 2010). Essentially, infrastructure works as a sunk cost—a cost that cannot be regained once made. If other firms cluster around an area at which these sunk costs in infrastructure have been made, however, the new firms themselves do not have to pay these costs. Similarly, the concentration of related firms makes it so that there is an abundance of, as well as easy access to, intermediate goods. Therefore, input costs are reduced as well. As a result, companies within an agglomeration economy that produce that agglomeration good become competitive.

The second identified factor of success is access to modern technology. While technology is a broad field, and while each component within the technological field no doubt plays a role in economic success, the aspect of technology that I am interested in looking at is the Internet.

On the general level, the ability to access the Internet plays a huge role in economic growth. According to a paper by James Manyika and Charles Roxburgh, the Internet engages more than two billion people and facilitates the transaction of more than eight trillion dollars a year (2011). These benefits, they claim, are the results of a plethora of different outcomes of Internet use. On one hand, they also note that the Internet has been a net producer of jobs—while it has rendered certain professions obsolete, it has, ultimately, created more than it has destroyed. They also attribute the Internet with developing human capital, mainly by making access to information much easier.
In tandem with this idea, Charles Kenny wrote that the Internet “appears to be a good candidate as a growth-promoting technology” (2003). They point to the relatively low cost of the Internet as a form of communication, as well as the fact that the Internet can produce positive externalities. Therefore, it is reasonable to claim that the ability to access the Internet plays a key role in economic growth.

Finally, the literature suggests that innovation is the key to economic growth (Chari et al. 2009). Yet, the question still remains—what causes innovation? The answer is profitability—connecting product to profit, work to reward, is a necessary step to insure innovation. This stems mainly from the fact that innovation is risky—creating something new has its costs, and yet, due to the newness and unknown consumer reaction to this new product, there are no guaranteed rewards. Thus, any steps that are taken to heighten the likelihood of profits heighten the attractiveness, and thus the likelihood, for innovation (Masangkay 2013). The question I am concerned with, therefore, is how products are ensured a profit, or, in other words, how the bridge between products and profits is made certain.

The literature mainly focuses on establishing a legal connection between products and profits. This is done through copyright law. One way that copyright law helps monetize a product is by mitigating the free-rider costs involved with innovation—if something is invented in a world without copyright law, there is nothing preventing another person from creating this product themselves, the difference being that they did not have to invest the time and money in actually innovating the product (Novos and Waldman 1984). Thus, in a world without copyright law, the incentive to innovate is much lower than in a world with copyright law, since in the world without, profits from innovation are easily lost. This idea is concurred by Hurt and Schuchman who write that “potential publishers might incur technological and risk costs which may be avoided by competitors who can copy a publisher’s costs; hence, there will be no incentive to publish in the first instance” (1966).

Returning to the question at hand—what allows the music industries of foreign countries to successfully permeate the American music industry—there are now three possible requirements.
Measuring Success

I have used the U.S. Billboard Hot 100 charts to figure out which countries over the past few years have been able to produce music that has been successful in the U.S. One drawback to the Billboard’s Hot 100 is that it has no fixed formula. Instead, it is a “ratio of sales (35-45%), airplay (30-40%) and streaming (20-30%)” (Trust 2014). Therefore, there are inconsistencies week-to-week in the way that the Hot 100 is calculated. However, the formula’s parameters are not so varying that huge discrepancies are likely to occur. In addition, this measure of success is suitable for addressing my research question since it takes into account a wide range of variables. My research question seeks to understand what enables foreign countries to permeate the American music industry; therefore, “success” is not so much revenue or profit, but rather proliferation.

Since the Billboard Hot 100 charts are published weekly, I looked at the charts released between 2010 and 2013 on the last weeks of January, June, and November. The rationale for this is that January captures the end of the year charts, while June captures “summer sales,” and November captures “holiday sales,” thus giving a comprehensive overview of that year’s music distribution. I then sorted the individual songs into three categories—domestic (U.S.), foreign, and, lastly, foreign artists produced domestically.

Of these categories, “foreign artists produced domestically” will be disregarded since I am interested in the music industry of certain countries, rather than individual artists. Therefore, if an artist from abroad produces music domestically using domestic infrastructure and resources, he or she would not constitute as foreign. There is also a distinction between operating in the United States and operating under an American music label. Operating under an American label while still being abroad would constitute, by my measurement, as “foreign.” In fact, the prevalence of American music labels within another country could potentially be a cause of a country’s success and, therefore, excluding that section of data would actually be ignoring a potential explanation to my research question (I will soon address this in greater detail). Conversely, then, an artist from the U.S. who operates abroad would constitute as “foreign” and, similarly, any artist operating in a country that is not their country of origin would be counted for the country in which they work and reside (this tends to apply to Irish artists operating in the U.K.).
The last step was to organize the “foreign” category by country. The chart below illustrates my findings.

Foreign Hot 100 Songs – Cumulative Last Weeks of Jan., July, Nov. 2010-2013


Based upon this chart, the U.K. has been the most successful in permeating the American music industry, followed by Canada, France, Australia, and South Korea. This conclusion will guide my case study selection.

Methodology & Hypothesis

Based on the data gathered above, I will be working with three case studies: the U.K., South Korea, and China. The U.K. and South Korea have both been selected for their prevalence in the Billboard Hot 100 charts over the last few years. As is evident from the pie chart above, the U.K. makes up a majority of foreign Hot 100 songs. As for South Korea, I am choosing to use it as my second case study since it is non-Western and non-English speaking. This will help factor out causes airing towards the taste and preference category, such as similar language or culture. Lastly, I am choosing China as my final case study due to its absence from the Hot 100 charts, allowing me to draw conclusions with more confidence.
While there are many countries that were absent from the Hot 100 charts, and thus many countries that could have been chosen in place of China, I am choosing to examine this case study due to the magnitude and significance of it. China has the largest population on the planet, as well as one of the largest and most rapidly growing economies. Thus, the success or unsuccess of China’s music industry would have tremendous implications. As a result, I find that examining China not only fulfills the need to include a “non-successful” case study, but also adds one of the key players in the world economy into the study.

Combining the results from the breakdown of the Hot 100 charts along with the results from the literature review, my hypothesis is that the three factors that were identified as necessary for economic success—agglomerations, access to technology (namely the Internet), and the ability to connect profits to production—are the three main causes of a successful breakthrough of a foreign country’s music industry into the United States’ music industry. I expect that agglomerations, accessibility of modern technology, and the ability to monetize music will be prevalent in South Korea, but absent in China. The rest of this paper will serve to explain why these factors cause successful music industries, examine the scholarly research done on these topics in relation to my case studies, and draw a conclusion regarding what causes countries to successfully permeate the American music industry.

Agglomerations

Theoretical Effects of Agglomerations

In the literature review, it has been established that agglomerations are generally beneficial to firms and businesses. The question now is whether or not this holds true for the music industry. On the theoretical level, it should.

In order for a music industry to thrive, it needs talent and it needs output. Therefore, one of the main costs of the music industry includes “A&R,” which stands for artists and repertoire—the process of finding and recording artists (Gerben 2014). In theory, a non-agglomeration industry would have a harder time with A&R. If the region that the industry is operating in has no agglomerations, it would be reasonable to presume that that region is not known for its music production, and thus talent would be scarce. The A&R costs would increase since it would be harder to find artists to record. As a result, a country without musical agglomerations would be at a disadvantage,
since the input costs of producing music exceed those of the agglomeration country.

**Agglomerations in the United Kingdom**

Allan Watson of the Department of Geography at Loughborough University investigated the geographical distribution of music production companies in the U.K. Overall, Watson looked at the spatial distribution of 1,310 record label and music publishing firms. The results of his findings are shown below.

![Spatial Distribution of Record Companies in the UK](Watson_2008)

As seen, London is the location of a music agglomeration. The actual number of firms located in London is 701, or 54% of all the firms in this study. Speaking directly to my research question, Watson writes that the success of music from the U.K. in reaching the U.S. “has been in large part due to the way the band is marketed.” By being able to gear their marketing strategies to American markets, U.K. music firms gave themselves a competitive edge. Watson then credits agglomerations with providing easy knowledge transfer, and one of the categories of knowledge is knowledge of marketing strategies. It is evident from the research that has been done on the geography of music firms in the U.K. that London is indeed the location of a music agglomeration. Such an agglomeration provides services like reduced input costs and knowledge transfer, making the music firms within the agglomeration competitive.
Agglomerations in South Korea

South Korea, another country to have successfully permeated the American music industry, goes about agglomerations in a slightly different way than the U.K. The traditional agglomeration is comprised of a concentrated and extensive number of firms within a certain location. South Korea has taken this idea and shrunk it down into what are called “Academies.” The academy system takes children from a young age and trains them to be popular musicians. This training includes everything from singing and dancing to image construction (Hyunjoon 2009).

The academies serve to eradicate a lot of the same problems that agglomerations do. For one, the problem and expense of scouting talent is lowered since, like with agglomerations, aspiring artists recognize the academies as a way of becoming successful and consequently seek them out, giving the academies easy and abundant access to talent (Shin and Kim 2013). By some estimates, over three million hopefuls audition for entrance to the SM Entertainment (one of the biggest South Korean music companies) academies annually (Shin and Kim 2013). In addition, the densely packed academies, which house artists as well as voice and instrument coaches, dance coaches, and marketing teams, allow for the knowledge-transfer that Watson identified as another agglomeration benefit.

While South Korea may not have agglomerations in the traditional sense, it has created a system that works to lower production costs, transfer knowledge, and provide key marketing strategies in the same way that typical agglomerations do. Therefore, these academies serve as modern agglomerations—producing efficiency and, ultimately, success. The last step in determining whether agglomerations play a role in the success of a music industry is to identify whether they are present in a non-successful country.

Agglomerations in China

There is not a lot of data on music agglomerations in China, which is telling in and of itself. However, studies regarding “creative industries” have emerged. These creative industries are comprised of several different fields, the result being that “music and video production” is one out of fifty-seven categories.
Classifications of Creative Industries (Ye 2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clusters</th>
<th>Gardening, Display Arts &amp; Porcelain</th>
<th>Legal Services</th>
<th>Publishing</th>
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<tr>
<td>Metal Arts</td>
<td>Consultancy &amp; Surveying</td>
<td>Radio Broadcast</td>
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<td>Lacquer Arts</td>
<td>Advertising</td>
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<td>Flower Painting Arts</td>
<td>IPR Services</td>
<td>Film</td>
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<td>Natural Fibre Knitting</td>
<td>Tourism Organisation</td>
<td>Music &amp; Video Production</td>
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<td>Embroidery</td>
<td>Other Business Services</td>
<td>Artistic Creation &amp; Performance</td>
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<td>Carpets</td>
<td>Engineering Research &amp; Development</td>
<td>Arts &amp; Performing Arts Sites</td>
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<td>Jewellery &amp; Related</td>
<td>Agriculture Sciences &amp; Development</td>
<td>Archaeology Relics &amp; Protection</td>
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<td>Other arts &amp; crafts</td>
<td>Medical Research &amp; Experiment</td>
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<td>Telecommunication</td>
<td>Engineering Technology &amp; Planning</td>
<td>Community Cultural Activities</td>
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<td>Internet Info Services</td>
<td>Other Professional Services</td>
<td>Culture &amp; Arts Brokerage</td>
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<td>Broadcasting &amp; TV transfer</td>
<td>Intermediary for Technology</td>
<td>Other Culture and Arts</td>
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<td>Satellite Transfer Services</td>
<td>Other Scientific Services</td>
<td>Sports Organisation</td>
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<td>Computer Systems Services</td>
<td>Tourism Site &amp; Management</td>
<td>Sports Sites</td>
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<td>Data Processing</td>
<td>Haircutting &amp; Beauty Saloon</td>
<td>Other Sports</td>
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<td>Other Computing Services</td>
<td>Wedding Services</td>
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<td>Public Software</td>
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<td>Leisure &amp; Exercises</td>
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<td>Business &amp; Management Consultancy</td>
<td>Newspaper</td>
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A review of the literature on these emerging Chinese “creative clusters” concludes with two things: Firstly, these “clusters” are not yet full and established agglomerations. Secondly, the rate at which different categories within the “creative clusters” are growing is not consistent. So while many scholars argue that they are in the process of becoming agglomerations (Hong et al. 2014), the truth is that, currently, they are not.

On the theoretical level, the presence of music agglomerations can logically be linked to the success of a country’s music industry. When tested against three case studies, this hypothesis holds up—the two countries that have been successful in permeating the American music industry both contain musical agglomerations, while the country that has failed to permeate the American music industry lacks agglomerations. Next, I will explore the role of technology in the success of a music industry.
Modern and Accessible Technology

Theoretical Effects of Technology

When talking about “technology” in the music industry, I am referring mainly to the Internet. The Internet has changed the way in which music is bought, sold, and produced. This can be seen by the “rise of online music distribution such as Apple’s iTunes music store, [and the] replacement of specialized music retailers such as Tower Records” (Hracs 2012). In terms of production, “[musicians] have always been able to create...music on their own but the recording, manufacturing, marketing, and distribution of these songs required capital skills beyond the grasp of most individual musicians” (Hracs 2012). The emergence of YouTube and other audio and video sharing websites has made it monetarily possible for artists to self-produce their music.

As a result, countries wherein the people have access to this modern technology have an advantage since the easiness of producing music will allow more musicians to hit the market. Of course, this does not guarantee “success” in the music industry, and in fact very few of songs that reach the Billboard Top 100 are independently produced. However, self-producing music via the Internet can be used as a stepping-stone for artists to gain recognition by major labels, which then can lead to them breaking through the U.S. Billboard Hot 100. In addition, referring back to the previous section on agglomerations, the Internet helps cut A&R costs as well. Scouting talent is made easier when the talent agencies have access to the Internet, since logging on to YouTube is a quick and inexpensive way to scope out new artists.

Lastly, it is important to remember how success is being measured. The Billboard Top 100 is comprised of several different factors, one of which is “streaming.” If a country does not have access to modes of streaming music, then they are being left out entirely from that category. So does this theory hold up in actuality?

Modern and Accessible Technology in the United Kingdom

The U.K. has indeed seen the effects of the prevalence of modern and accessible technology on their music industry, and the effects are as predicted. In line with Hracs’ article, Robert Strachan has identified a rise in what he calls “DIY” music, meaning independent labels and self-produced artists (Strachan 2007). In fact, referring back to the agglomerations chart from earlier, Watson claims that many of the music firms outside of London are relatively new
independent record labels (Watson 2008). Strachan also acknowledges that success does not come from these “DIY” projects alone; but rather, as discussed earlier, the DIY projects can act as a stepping-stone for an artist who aspires to be signed to a bigger label (Strachan 2007). The fact that the U.K. music industry is seeing many of the anticipated changes that come along with access to modern and accessible technology, and is successful in breaking through the American music industry, suggests that the prevalence of such technology is in fact a key factor in “success.”

**Modern and Accessible Technology in South Korea**

The South Korean pop music industry has harnessed modern technology differently than the U.K. has, but to the same effect. Rather than artists using YouTube as a way of gaining attention from major labels that then go on to make them internationally successful, the South Korean music companies use YouTube as a means of proliferating, and profiting from, their music. By providing music through YouTube, the listeners (or consumers) of music do not have to pay; however, the music company can collect royalties from advertisements streamed before the video begins playing (Oh and Park 2012). Therefore, the Internet has made the Korean music industry competitive by allowing it to drastically alter its prices to the total amount of nothing, while simultaneously allowing it to garner profits.

**Modern and Accessible Technology in China**

The last step in establishing “accessible modern technology” as a crucial feature in a music industry’s success is to look at a country that has not had success in the music industry and determine whether or not this factor is present. The Economist ran an article in June of 2014 naming six of the biggest Internet sites that are currently blocked in China. Among the six is Google (Frizell 2014), which in 2006 purchased YouTube (BBC News 2014), making it a two-for-one deal for China: block Google, and YouTube is blocked as well. This suggests that China’s music industry does not receive the A&R benefits that the Internet provides to the U.K., nor does it receive the royalty and price-competitive benefits that are received by South Korea.

It is possible to conclude, then, that accessibility to modern technology plays a role in determining whether a country can successfully break into the international music industry. This can be seen by the fact that countries that have made the U.S. Billboard’s Top 100 charts in the past few years not only
have free and relatively unrestricted access to the Internet, but also manage to utilize it as a way of promoting their music, whereas China, which has not been able to break into the U.S. Billboard charts, has heavily censored Internet access, especially on websites that have been identified as promoters of the music industry, such as YouTube.

**Monetization**

The last factor to examine is monetization. Basically, can the music industry of a certain country ensure that music will be turned into money and, perhaps more importantly, that the money will reach those who produce it? Without a proper method of monetizing music, there is no incentive for artists and producers to create and sell it.

*Monetization in the United Kingdom*

While technology—namely the Internet—certainly benefits the music industry, one problem has arisen as a result of it: music piracy has become easier than ever. This leads to problems with monetization because the money that had previously reached the artists and producers through the purchase of music no longer exists. The U.K. has tackled this through strong copyright laws and regulations on music piracy, which “provides the framework for transactions in the cultural industries and enables...firms to appropriate returns on their investment, therefore increasing the incentive to supply” (Towse 1999). By creating and enforcing laws that ensure the profits from music creation go to those who have worked to produce it, the incentive to produce music is maintained.

*Monetization in South Korea*

The approach that the South Korean music industry has taken in tackling the issue of appropriately monetizing music and ensuring that the proper dues get paid to artists and producers diverges from the U.K.’s approach, and falls more in line with a topic discussed earlier—making the music free, and then roping in sales through alternative methods. Unlike the U.K., South Korea’s digital networks “remain rife with pirate materials of all kinds” (International Intellectual Property Alliance 2007). While the government is working on changing its policies such that a crackdown on piracy will be possible, the music industry of South Korea has taken matters into its own
hands and simply restructured the way it makes money. As discussed earlier, a lot of Korean artists choose to stream their music for free by putting videos on YouTube and other audiovisual-transmitting websites. With the weak laws and regulations in place, this simply cuts to the chase. The benefit is that the artists are able to make money off of the advertisements that play before the clips, therefore working around the lax copyright law, and ultimately succeed in monetizing music such that the profits reach the producers.

**Monetization in China**

China does not see music copyright as a high priority. This is mainly due to the fact that the government believes creating stronger copyright law would have very few domestic benefits, due to the fact that most music consumption in China is foreign (Liu 2010). What the Chinese government has failed to acknowledge is the possibility that the lack of copyright law is reinforcing the stagnation and irrelevance of the Chinese music industry. China’s music industry, to begin with, languishes. However, without copyright law, there is no economic incentive to invest in the music industry, meaning that agglomerations cannot be created and, even if the technology were accessible, there would be no economic incentive to produce music since it could easily be pirated. In addition, the restrictions on Internet access limit the ability of the Chinese music industry to monetize music through alternative methods in the way that South Korea has managed to do.

**Limitations and Further Research**

This paper is only a beginning exploration into what I am sure is a much deeper and more complex international industry. One limitation of this research is simply the timeframe to which it applies. The data collected here looks at trends that have occurred over the past few years; however, to better understand what causes countries to establish successful and strong music industries, it might be necessary to look back in history and examine previous time periods where music internationalized. A comparison of the three factors that are identified as necessary for success today with the music industry in the past would provide an interesting insight into the robustness of this argument throughout time.

In addition, a follow-up study might attempt to widen the scope and generalizability of these findings. In this paper, only three case studies were examined. While these case studies were able to weed out some potential
lurking variables that then made the findings more valid, the issue of being able to generalize three case studies to the entire set of potential cases—which here would be to all countries—still exists. A paper that examines more case studies, or perhaps even takes a large-N quantitative approach, would certainly improve the robustness of this argument.

Conclusion

Everything about music is changing. In today’s world, the distribution of music has become digitalized; the purchasers, or consumers, are becoming younger and younger (Krasilovsky and Shemel 2007), and, most importantly, the industry as a whole is becoming more international. As certain countries have risen to power within this new international music industry, others have not. This has best been marked by which countries have been able to permeate the American music industry. Throughout the paper, three different causes of success have been identified—the presence of musical agglomerations, access to modern technology, namely the Internet, and, finally, the ability to monetize music. Reading literature that focused on the theoretical aspect of the music industry’s success, as well as literature regarding one of the identified “successful” countries—the U.K.—is what identified these three causes.

As seen throughout the paper, the hypothesis that these three factors are what led to a successful music industry holds up when tested against case studies. In countries that have shown success, the causes were present; whereas, in countries that have not shown success, the causes were absent. Of course, there is no country more likely to have these three factors present than the United States—the country against which this paper based “success.” Indeed, these three factors are present: The agglomeration requirement is satisfied with Los Angeles and New York being major cities for music production (Scott 1999). As for access to modern technology, the main Internet platform discussed was YouTube, which not only is unrestricted in the U.S., but also was actually created in California’s Silicon Valley. Lastly, monetization of music in the U.S. takes both the U.K. approach as well as the South Korean approach. There is very strong copyright law in the U.S., under Title 17 of the United States Code, Sections 501 and 506 (RIAA 2014). However, simply by logging onto YouTube, it becomes apparent that the law is not perfectly upheld. Therefore, artists have begun using platforms such as Spotify and Pandora, from which the consumers of music can obtain music free of charge but the artists, or producers, are still paid. In fact, this year has seen a tremendous rise
in music streaming revenues throughout the United States, to the point where it is estimated that these revenues will overtake CD sales (McCarthy 2014).

The implications for the results of this research are tremendous. Music is a big business with a lot of money. This paper shows that for countries that are hoping to enter into the international music industry, there are certain conditions that must be established in order for success to be achieved.

Policy-wise, the findings of this research would suggest that for any country hoping to enter into this growing international industry, intellectual property rights laws must be strengthened and consistently enforced in order to incentivize innovation. In addition, it would seem that unfettered access to the Internet is a requirement as well. For countries that, like China, still impose tight controls on the Internet, the inability to access music and video sharing sites is having a negative impact on the ability of musicians to publish their music. By doing these two things, it is more likely that a music agglomeration will naturally arise, thus fulfilling the last requirement. While the past few years have seen new countries emerge as actors within this international music industry, it will be interesting to see what the next few years bring. ∆
Bibliography


INDIA’S ANTI-GMO RHETORIC: WIELDING GANDHIAN THOUGHT TO UNDERMINE CORPORATE-CAPITALIST AGRICULTURE

Julia Sullivan

Abstract

As a predominantly rural and densely populated developing nation, India is positioned at the vanguard of the global debate surrounding GMOs. As concerns related to food security mount, what transpires in India is of great importance. Citizens’ collective memory of the country’s colonial experience and Gandhi’s role as an independence leader, however, have made for a poignant encounter with biotechnology. A range of diverse anti-GMO civil society groups have risen to the fore, some of which, despite not having come together on a cohesive campaign, articulate their organizational objectives through similar rhetoric. The principles of satyagraha, swaraj, swadeshi, and food as a reflection of identity that were espoused by Gandhi at the time of Indian independence from Britain serve as tools with which to dissect both the means and ends of civil society advocacy groups. When grounded in contemporary context, these principles reveal an underlying incompatibility between pragmatic, regulation-oriented approaches to GMOs and emotive Gandhian language. Radical organizations such as the Karnataka Raiya Raitha Sangha (KRRS) and Navdanya employ Gandhian rhetoric both in their mobilization efforts and in the articulation of their alternative societal visions, while organizations such as Gene Campaign avoid such rhetoric in their pursuit of legislative and regulatory reforms.

Introduction

As the most densely populated nation in an increasingly globalized world, India occupies a unique place among developing countries. China’s rapid
urbanization has rendered India the last of the large nations in which village life and traditional farm production persist, and it will soon claim the largest population of farmers in the world (Angotti 2012, 128). The implications of its decisions regarding agricultural biotechnology extend far beyond its borders, as this subject has come to occupy a central place in international development discourse. The debate about genetically modified (GM) crops “has become a much wider one: about the future of agriculture and small-scale farmers, about corporate control and property rights and about the rules of global trade” (Scoones 2008, 315). While some hail biotechnology as a tool with which to increase crop yield and ensure food security for a swelling global population, others contend that farmers will suffer increasing costs of inputs and declining diversity of seed choice, allowing for the domination of corporate-capitalist agriculture (Lalitha 2004, 187; Scoones 2008, 317). What transpires in India, therefore, is of great consequence, and it hinges on the efforts of some of the world’s most savvy activists that – fuelled by media interest and intensifying global debate – have launched a broad, albeit uncoordinated, movement against the country’s approval of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) (Stone 2004, 128).

Various organizations are incorporated under the anti-GMO umbrella, each of which tends to have a distinct view and charismatic individual leader. This paper will focus on three such organizations and the discourse they have employed in their mobilization efforts (Scoones 2008, 336). In combating the adoption of biotechnology, these actors within the anti-GMO movement have fostered doubt among Indian citizens with regard to the technology’s safety and desirability, and the civil society actors’ utilization of Gandhian rhetoric in order to appeal to the public as well as other national groups has been central to this process (Newell 2008, 133). Understanding the nature and intention of this discourse offers valuable insight into the large-scale resistance to agri-biotechnology occurring throughout the country and such insight is necessary to assess the relevance and replicability of India’s anti-GMO movement for other developing nations. This paper, therefore, seeks to answer the following question: To what extent and for what purpose do India’s anti-GMO civil society actors employ Gandhian thought in framing and executing their organizational objectives?
Theoretical Framework and Literature Review

My approach to this question is grounded in the theoretical area of social movements, particularly nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society advocacy. Furthermore, acknowledging that individual social movements are the products of particular historical circumstances, I have chosen to include a postcolonial perspective in my analysis of India’s anti-GMO movement discourse, focusing on the manner in which Gandhi’s rhetoric has been removed from its original context and applied to contemporary issues of food sovereignty in India. Ishizaka and Funahashi’s *Social Movement and the Subaltern in Postcolonial South Asia* (2013) as well as Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin’s *Post-Colonial Studies: The Key Concepts* (2013) develop the framework that guides my discussion and analysis. I have made a concerted effort to maintain objectivity and not allow my personal bias against GMOs to distort my treatment of this topic.

On a general level, Hasegawa and Machimura (2004) define a social movement as “a transformation-oriented collective action, which derives from people’s discontents with the present conditions or certain prospective situations” (19). In the case at hand, Indian anti-GMO activists are motivated both by their discontent with the manner in which GMOs have thus far been handled as well as the prospect of additional GMOs entering the country. In terms of location-specific social movement theory, according to Ishizaka and Funahashi (2013), models derived from studies in Europe and America have proven to be ineffectual in explaining the proliferation of various subaltern social movements in South Asia witnessed since the 1980s. Scholars, therefore, have recently begun to construct theoretical frameworks for the specific analysis of Indian social movements. One such framework is the “dual politics” theory put forth by Ray and Katzenstein (2005), which asserts that “the most common and distinctive characteristic of social movements in India is that they always focused on the twofold objectives of ‘equality’ and ‘identity’ simultaneously” (25). With regard to equality, most Indian social movements have sought the amelioration of unequal or unfair political-economic-social relations and, in terms of identity, “the formation or consolidation of collective (rather than individual in many cases) identities for specific castes, religions, classes, or regions” (Ishizaka and Funahashi 2013, 5). Furthermore, according
to Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin (2013), “the issues emerging from the engagements of post-colonized societies in a ‘global’ age have demonstrated the usefulness of postcolonial analysis” (74). As was the case with India, political independence did not necessarily mean “a wholesale freeing of the colonized from colonialisat values, for these, along with political, economic and cultural models, persisted in many cases after independence” (Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 2013, 74). Indeed, for many Indian citizens, particularly farmers, enduring neoliberal reforms and the imposition of elements of corporate-capitalist agriculture has been painfully reminiscent of colonialism under Britain. In Grassroots Activism Builds Wall Against Western Imperialism, Cartalucci (2014) captures this sentiment: “Just as the British Empire had done to India economically and sociopolitically, big-agri [sic] and other multinational corporate rackets are attempting to impose similar models of servile dependence via patented, monopolized biotechnology.”

With this theoretical framework that blends civil society advocacy with postcolonialism established, I provide the historical and contemporary context necessary to properly ground my discussion of India’s contemporary anti-GMO movement. Following a discussion of four of Gandhi’s principal concepts and a description of India’s current agricultural crisis, in the central section of this paper, I adopt a qualitative approach in order to examine the rhetoric employed in articulating the missions, visions, and strategies of three of India’s most active anti-GMO civil society organizations, as identified by Scoones (2008). Through discourse analysis, I assess the extent to which they include undistorted Gandhian thought and to what effect. While this relatively small selection of cases is somewhat limiting and not necessarily representative of the full breadth of anti-GMO civil society actors in India, given the high-profile status of the three organizations to be discussed, an analysis of their dynamics offers important insight. It is important to note that there are myriad other factors at play that undoubtedly influence the relative success of the groups I have chosen to examine. Due to the scope of this paper, however, I am only able to acknowledge the presence of such variables and cannot control for them. Finally, I characterize the organizations in question based on categories provided by Scoones (2008) before drawing broad conclusions as to the relevance and applicability of Gandhian thought for different activist purposes. The contextual information to follow provides the critical framework of Gandhian ideology and rhetoric that informs the remainder of this paper.
Historical and Contemporary Context

On August 9, 1942, Mahatma Gandhi urged Indian citizens to participate in civil disobedience in an effort to topple British rule. Sixty-nine years later, on August 9, 2011, a gathering of NGOs, health activists, and environmental organizations held a national day of action against GMOs in India, addressing Monsanto in particular. Both events shared the slogan “Quit India!” – the former demanding national sovereignty and the latter demanding food sovereignty (Kaur, Kohli, and Jawal 2013, 622). This event in 2011 was not the first to take this slogan out of its original independence-era context and apply it to the contemporary issue of GMOs; activists first seized upon the catalytic power of this phrase in 1988 to launch a campaign against Monsanto’s Terminator technology (Sanford 2013b, 70). The continued reemergence of this slogan in India’s anti-GMO movement is profound and intentional; the revolutionary spirit that animated India’s struggle for independence has been given new life in the country’s campaign against biotechnology (Angotti 2012, 391). Anti-GMO activists and advocacy groups have defined GMOs as a threat to Indian identity and the national interest, drawing directly from Gandhi’s anti-colonialist perspective, which warrants close examination (Fuchs and Glaab 2011, 734).

Gandhian Values: Satyagraha, Swaraj, Swadeshi, and Food As a Reflection of Identity

In the mid-twentieth century, although he never held government office, Gandhi was regarded as India’s supreme political and spiritual leader. Throughout the nation’s struggle for independence from Britain, he advocated nonviolent protest, emphasizing that self-control and self-discipline were crucial in order to achieve independence (Sanford 2013b, 80). He coined the term *satyagraha* to represent this concept of civil disobedience, which is the first of four Gandhian tenets to be examined in this paper. The famous Salt Satyagraha, or Salt March, that Gandhi led on March 12, 1930, against the British salt monopoly in India serves to exemplify this style of protest.

Furthermore, Gandhi conceived of and experimented with a set of societal values, among them regional self-sufficiency, or *swaraj*, and local economy. The concept of *swaraj* constitutes the second Gandhian concept of relevance. In terms of enacting these values, Gandhi insisted on the development of human-scale, appropriate village-based technologies that enhanced agricultural productivity while returning the benefits to village
residents – central tenets of the concept of *swadeshi*, which is the third Gandhian concept central to the analysis of this paper (Sanford 2013b, 78). He evaluated appropriate technologies by determining who benefited – an approach that was neither anti-science nor anti-technology. Instead, he strove to demonstrate that “appropriate technologies diffused knowledge, fit local conditions, and benefited local economies and so represented alternative and more equitable paradigms for development” (Sanford 2013b, 78). Gandhi was not, therefore, a Luddite, as evidenced by his promotion of locally produced cloth, or khadi, over imported textiles, which fit this model and simultaneously constituted a rejection of the inevitable dislocations of the global marketplace. Wearing khadi became “for Gandhi and many Indians a means to demonstrate their allegiance to the incipient Indian state and to related Gandhian ideals such as local economies” (Angotti 2012, 392; Sanford 2013b, 74-75).

Given that food, like clothing, is central to humans’ individual and social identities, food and, by extension, agriculture presents the opportunity to enact socially and environmentally sustainable choices (Sanford 2013b, 75). For Gandhi, food was more than a means to satiate hunger or a source of nourishment; he believed it to be “instrumental in shaping human consciousness.” This conviction led him to conduct numerous experiments with food on his own body in what became a lifelong search for the perfect diet (“The Story of Gandhi’s Experiments” 2008). These experiments began during his days as a student in London when he first adopted vegetarianism, and he later experimented with an all-fruit diet, a raw diet, and, later still, a diet of grains (Gandhi 1957, 56). He identified the taste, relish, and pleasure of food as serious problems with eating and, therefore, reduced the volume of his consumption dramatically and fasted for extended periods of time.

These later experiments were motivated more by religious and moral considerations than hygienic and physical ones, and they deepened his belief in the “intimate connection between food and health and to the unhygienic properties of a grossly corrupted modern civilization” (Atler 2000, 33). This fourth principle, albeit more nebulous than the aforementioned three, is the final Gandhian concept to be analyzed. Beyond these intimate personal experiments, however, the societal values put forth by Gandhi in the mid-twentieth century emphasized – in contemporary terms – sustainability, equity, and social justice regarding natural resources. The tenets of *satyagraha*, *swaraj*, *swadeshi*, and food as a reflection of identity were, for a time, central to India’s development policies, and civil society groups have effectively extended them to the present (Sanford 2013a, 96-97).
Neoliberal Reforms in Agricultural Policy

At the time of India’s independence from Britain, nearly the entire population lived in rural areas and small towns. Those who came to power identified as urban elites, but they confronted an overwhelmingly rural population demanding government action to improve rural life. Given this reality, the new government developed a program that focused on investments in the countryside, drawing heavily from the work of Gandhi. His earliest writings reinforced the aforementioned value of local self-reliance, and his seminal work *Hind Swaraj* detailed the philosophical basis for India’s policies promoting rural development. Gandhi recognized that an integrated, holistic approach to human development was necessary, or the large metropolises of Kolkata and Delhi, former British strongholds, would develop and be divorced from the land and its productive capacity (Angotti 2012, 391). In the decades to follow independence, therefore, policies were decidedly anti-urban and priority was given to investments in rural infrastructure such as roads, dams, and irrigation systems. While some of these projects, dams in particular, exacerbated problems among villages and displaced millions of people, the robust support by the Indian government for agriculture ultimately helped to sustain the village economy (Angotti 2012, 382-383).

Beginning in the late 1980s, however, the government began to shift its economic strategy to reflect the neoliberal priorities put forth by the World Bank. Loans and subsidies to rural areas decreased substantively, and services once financed by the central government were made the responsibility of local governments. The new public-private partnerships that have necessarily emerged from this decentralization served to undermine rural peoples’ self-reliance and are reminiscent of “similar arrangements that were the hallmarks of the British colonial period” (Angotti 2012, 397). Concurrently, spending in research and development and extension spending increased, both of which have tended “to favor the expansion of large-scale, industrial agriculture” (Angotti 2012, 382, 389). These trends have produced an agricultural landscape in which rural producers, due to the privatization of the seed industry, are growing increasingly dependent on industrially produced seeds, and experimentation with GMOs threatens to deepen this reliance on corporate suppliers. With the implementation of these neoliberal reforms, farmers have become increasingly disenfranchised, turning to grassroots resistance movements to demand reparation. Movements against displacement in both rural and urban areas first emerged during the Indian government’s implementation of Green Revolution initiatives, primarily in response to dams
and irrigation systems that were designed to appropriate water for industrial agricultural purposes. While these struggles remain pertinent, they have been subsumed by the more recent anti-GMO movement (Angotti 2012, 394-396).

**Flirting with GMOs: ‘Golden Rice,’ Bt-Cotton, and Bt-Brinjal**

The events that transpired surrounding the introduction of three GM-crops into the Indian marketplace serve to demonstrate civil society’s role and leverage on the national stage. While the GM crops to be discussed are not the only three to have breached Indian borders, a brief examination of their cases leads to a greater understanding of the reception of GMOs by Indian civil society. It is important to note that, throughout the deliberations surrounding these GM crops, concerns over biopiracy remained high; in a way, these initial events sensitized the Indian public to the issue of GMOs and set the tone for what has become a decades-long battle. The first of these crops, ‘Golden Rice,’ was invented in 1999 with the express purpose of combating malnutrition, particularly vitamin A deficiency; nearly two decades after its initial production, however, the GM-rice remains unavailable in India. NGOs and activist networks, together with scientists critical of GM crops, have been able to challenge the proposed benefits of ‘Golden Rice,’ establishing a deeply critical stance and protracting its introduction (Fuchs and Glaab 2011, 733-734).

In 2002, however, following five years of testing and acrimonious debate, India approved the sale of a different GM crop – Bt-cotton (Stone 2004, 128). Not only is cotton India’s most significant agricultural commodity, but Gandhi’s promotion of khadi throughout the independence movement endowed hand-spun cotton with great symbolic importance (Yamaguchi and Harris 2004, 467). It is, therefore, a crop of great economic and cultural importance, compelling civil society actors to participate intensively in Bt-cotton discourse (Yamaguchi, Harris, and Bush 2003, 47). Myriad anti-GMO activists have been uncompromising in their assertion that India’s staggering rates of farmer suicides are a direct result of the market dominance of Monsanto’s Bt-cotton, and this crop remains at the center of national attention (Cartalucci 2014). Finally, controversy in India over its would-be first GM food – Bt-brinjal (eggplant) – is ongoing and complicated further by the widespread use of brinjal in traditional Hindu medicine. Large-scale field trials of Bt-brinjal were conducted in 2006, coinciding with escalating public skepticism regarding the crop due to activist efforts. Ultimately, in response to apprehension expressed by India’s top brinjal-growing states, Minister
Ramesh issued a moratorium on Bt-brinjal in February of 2010 (Kudlu and Stone 2013, 21, 25, 32). Given that only one of the three aforementioned crops was ultimately commercialized, the approach taken by civil society and activist groups has proven to be relatively effective and to resonate deeply with an Indian public in the midst of an agricultural crisis.

**Agricultural Instability**

At the time of the 2001 census, nearly 60 percent of India’s labor force was engaged in agriculture, either living on and cultivating the land or working as agricultural laborers. This constitutes a 20 percent decrease from the time of independence. Furthermore, agriculture revenues in 1973 comprised 41 percent of GDP, and this value had decreased to 20 percent by 2005. Neoliberal policies have encouraged private investment in agriculture at a rate far faster than public investment, and agricultural subsidies have been channeled primarily into fertilizers or food price supports, which disproportionately benefit larger farmers. Amid these profound structural changes in agriculture, rural populations face mounting inequality and food security concerns (Angotti 2012, 386-387). It is in this context that India’s anti-GMO movement has risen to the forefront.

**Movement Dynamics: Civil Society Actors and Their Strategies**

While India’s anti-GMO movement is relatively dispersed and fragmented, the messages put forth by its various civil society actors are bound by a central theme and strategy that allow the movement to maintain a semblance of coherency (Angotti 2012, 394). The following three organizations were identified by Scoones (2008) as “main groups presenting an anti-GM position over the past decade,” and their operational dynamics offer insight into the degree to which activist anti-GMO rhetoric incorporates Gandhian thought and to what effect.

**Gene Campaign**

Of the three civil society organizations to be analyzed, Gene Campaign is the youngest, most pragmatic, and least incendiary. Furthermore, its rhetoric and strategies are the least Gandhian in their construction.
Mission & Vision

Founded in 1993 by Indian activist Suman Sahai, Gene Campaign declares a focus primarily on research, engagement with policy, and advocacy. The campaign is actively working towards “a just and equitable policy framework for research incorporating traditional and modern science” that enables “sustainable agriculture, self reliant [sic] farmers and food for all” (Scoones 2008, 336; “Vision and Mission”). Its manifesto professes a dedication to “protecting the genetic resources of the Global South and the rights of the farmers of these regions.” On the subject of GM crops, Gene Campaign “advocates for proper regulation and stringent biosafety testing of GM products,” asserting that the “careless and biased fashion” with which India has thus far implemented GM technology is highly irresponsible and dangerous (“About Gene Campaign”).

While Gene Campaign’s call for self-reliance may be construed as a nod to Gandhi’s concept of swaraj, given the dominant rhetoric of this organization’s mission and vision, the use of this term is more likely in line with the larger discourse of sustainable agriculture and, therefore, not necessarily a Gandhian association. Furthermore, unlike the following organizations to be discussed, Gene Campaign does not advocate an outright ban on GMOs; instead, it calls for the radical reformation of India’s testing and regulatory processes. This organization views GM crops not as the products of an oppressive corporate-capitalist agriculture reminiscent of British rule but as a potentially beneficial scientific innovation, and it is precisely this view that they convey to the Indian public. Given the reckless nature with which these crops have thus far been introduced, Gene Campaign adopts an anti-GMO stance, but its position is not unyielding; it is contingent on India’s regulatory capacity. This organization believes that there is an appropriate place in Indian agriculture for responsibly administered GMOs.

Strategy

In terms of its strategic approach and activities, Gene Campaign has devoted some of its organizational energy to the conservation of agro-biodiversity through the collection, characterization, and conservation of India’s agro-biodiverse rice. Additionally, it has established seed banks in order to conserve traditional varieties of seeds for future use, endeavored to protect indigenous knowledge, and initiated “large-scale awareness generation programs... explaining the process of globalization and... developments that
could threaten food and livelihood security.” Moreover, its advocacy work generally involves the careful framing of pivotal legislation with regard to seeds, biodiversity, and intellectual property rights (“Best Practices”). Through this work, Gene Campaign credits itself with “raising the national debate on the dangers of seed patents” and the threats posed to food security and sovereignty. Its efforts on behalf on farmers’ rights culminated in 2001 with the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights – unprecedented legislation that grants farmers legal rights to save, use, exchange, and sell farm-saved seed (“About Gene Campaign”). Finally, with the formal release of Bt-cotton in 2002, Gene Campaign held a high-profile conference in Delhi, asserting the need to overhaul the regulatory system – an event that serves to exemplify the strategic approach employed by this organization (Borras 2008, 152).

Gene Campaign’s methods are highly pragmatic, allowing this organization to maneuver its way through formal societal institutions in order to orchestrate meaningful change, as exemplified by the passage of the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights. The encouragement of nonviolent protest, or satyagraha, that is central to the strategies of the following organizations to be discussed, however, is absent here. Based on the strategies it does advocate, Gene Campaign is advancing a responsibly modern take on Indian agriculture in which globally aware farmers have both traditional and modern science at their disposal. This approach, albeit noble and seemingly effective, constitutes a departure from Gandhian thought. Aside from the fleeting mention of self-reliance among farmers, the Gandhian tenets of swaraj and swadeshi are not readily apparent, and the same is true of Gandhi’s beliefs surrounding food.

**Karnataka Raiya Raitha Sangha (KRRS)**

Unlike Gene Campaign, India’s Karnataka Rajya Raitha Sangha (KRRS), the Karnataka State Farmers’ Association, is explicitly Gandhian in its objectives and direct in its action. A more seasoned agrarian movement comprised primarily of middle- and upper-class farmers, it was formally created in 1980 by the late M.D. Nanjundaswamy and has become a prominent actor both in India’s anti-GMO movement and the global peasant movement (Scoones 2008, 336). Due to its particular history and “capacity to launch dramatic actions against transnational and GM seed companies,” it has become a close ally of La Vía Campesina, an organization that “defends small-scale sustainable agriculture as a way to promote social justice and dignity” and
“strongly opposes corporate driven agriculture and transnational companies that are destroying people and nature” (“Organisation” 2011). With regard to the global efforts of La Vía Campesina, the KRRS has come to assume the role of ‘gatekeeper’ in South Asia; it is operating, therefore, with a global development agenda at the forefront of its organizational objectives (Borras 2008, 24, 107).

Mission & Vision

While its efforts are focused primarily on food sovereignty, the KRRS aims for broad social change based explicitly on Gandhi’s philosophy of swadeshi, which emphasizes local technologies and economies. Its stated final objective is the realization of the Gandhian “village republic” – “a form of social, political and economic organization based on direct democracy, economic and political autonomy, and self-reliance.” It follows that the basic unit of this organization’s political structure is the village, and each participating village determines the breadth of its finances, programs, and actions (Khadse and Bhattacharya 2013, 1-2). Furthermore, while expressing a deep commitment to Gandhi’s principle of nonviolence, the KRRS engages in confrontational politics against what it perceives as unfair socioeconomic systems.

Strategy

Towards this end, the KRRS has been staging direct actions and nonviolent protests since its inception, leading the way with the destruction of Bt-cotton field trial sites in 1998. With the launch of Monsanto’s ‘terminator’ technology and the controversy that followed, the KRRS announced the ‘Cremate Monsanto’ campaign, and Nanjundaswamy launched a series of similarly sensational slogans including ‘Stop Genetic Engineering,’ ‘No Patents on Life,’ and ‘Bury the WTO.’ The leader also announced that all trial states in the southern Indian state of Karnataka would be burned, inviting the attendance of the media. Similarly, in the early 1990s, nearly one thousand farmers engaged in highly symbolic action, infamously ransacking the headquarters of global agribusiness giant Cargill Seeds Company, which is now owned by Monsanto, in Bangalore and dismantling its seed unit in Karnataka. Throughout the action, the KRRS echoed Gandhi’s independence movement tactics by pressuring multinational seed companies to “Quit India!” According to organization representatives, it was through this Cargill action that the KRRS officially launched the Bija (seed) Satyagraha, “inspired by Gandhi’s Salt Satyagraha, and used peasant seeds as a symbol of peasant resistance against
seeds patented by multinational companies.” These events prompted both national and global groups to voice their solidarity, further connecting the KRRS to international networks of organizations confronting unjust economic globalization (Khadse and Bhattacharya 2013, 2-3).

More recently, the KRRS uprooted Dupont’s GM rice field trials being conducted illegally without farmers’ prior knowledge in Dodballapur, Karnataka. Dramatic events such as these were and continue to be executed with the media in mind, providing journalistic opportunities and inspiring widespread replication by similar organizations throughout the world (Borras 2008, 161). The KRRS supplemented these direct actions with a series of citizens’ juries held in Karnataka in 2000 and Andhra Pradesh in 2001, which “provided foci for activists to denounce GM crops and their associated future for agriculture” (Borras 2008, 151).

Additionally, the KRRS is in the process of erecting an “international sustainable peasant development centre called ‘Amrutabhoomi’ in the Chamrajnagar district of Karnataka” with the express purpose of reviving traditional farmer knowledge and technologies. The center is set to include an agroecological training school to promote exchange among farmers, a seed conservation center to encourage the ‘in situ’ conservation of native seeds, and seed banks to facilitate the development of new varieties by farmers. Together, this center will “provide a space in which farmers can realize their new paradigm of self-reliance” and work to “reverse the disasters caused by green revolution technologies” (Khadse and Bhattacharya 2013, 4). A final initiative developed by the KRRS, although somewhat underdeveloped at this juncture, has been direct farmer-to-consumer marketing through village-level shops called Namdu, which means “ours.” These stores enable farmers to avoid middlemen and sell their products directly to local consumers, and the KRRS vows to expand these marketing efforts in the near future (Khadse and Bhattacharya 2013, 5).

In comparison to Gene Campaign’s research- and policy-oriented approach to achieving a middle ground between traditional and modern science, both the strategies employed by the KRRS and its ultimate objectives are far more radical. In the midst of what it perceives as destructive globalization, this organization embraces the central tenets of Gandhian thought and rejects biotechnology in its entirety. Its call for a new paradigm of self-reliance, pursuit of the “village republic” and strengthening of farmer-consumer linkages, and participation in the Bija Satyagraha are drawn directly from Gandhi’s concepts of swaraj, swadeshi, and satyagraha, respectively. While Gene Campaign concentrates on regulatory and legislative progress, the KRRS focuses on
revolutionary movement-building and impactful protest closely following Gandhian thought. Its organizational objectives and strategies are similar to those of the final group to follow.

**Research Foundation for Science, Technology, and Ecology (RFSTE) and Navdanya**

In 1982, perhaps the most celebrated and controversial of anti-GMO activists, Vandana Shiva, founded the Research Foundation for Science, Technology, and Ecology (RFSTE) in Dehra Dun, Uttar Pradesh “as a participatory research initiative... to provide direction and support to environmental activism” (“Research Foundation”; “Introduction”). Five years later, the RFSTE established the program Navdanya, a network of seed keepers and organic producers spanning 17 states in India. This pair of organizations works with networks of local and global groups towards the realization of its ultimate societal vision, and its approach, while similar in many ways, is distinct from those previously discussed.

**Mission & Vision**

Together, the RFSTE and Navdanya profess a mission of “improving the well being of small and marginalized rural producers through nonviolent biodiverse organic farming,” and their vision is “to accomplish such a development that all beings have a healthy environment to live, should have enough healthy food to eat and also have equal right to live, grow and evolve to their full potential through their self organisation [sic]” (“Our Mission”; “Our Vision”). Navdanya in particular is working to enact a vision of Earth Democracy – an alternative worldview in which seed sovereignty, food sovereignty, land sovereignty, and water sovereignty are paramount. The organizations deems GMOs to be incompatible with this vision, and the extensive research and campaigning of the RFSTE and Navdanya have sought to raise serious concern about their ecological and health impacts (“Food Sovereignty”). Navdanya is deeply engaged in the rejuvenation and protection of indigenous knowledge against the threats of globalization and, ultimately, demands a complete ban on GM seeds and foods in India (“GMO Free Campaign”). While these organizations’ missions and visions are not explicitly Gandhian, as is the case with the KRRS, Gandhi’s central principles permeate their language and strategy.
Strategy

Navdanya has been actively campaigning against the commercialization of GM crops and food in India since 1991, and the nearly decade older RFSTE has been responsible for research- and policy-oriented initiatives. After the initial importation of Bt material in 1999, for example, the RFSTE presented objections as a court petition, “with public interest litigation following thick-and-fast.” The petition entailed extensive hearings at the Supreme Court and presented massive amounts of evidence (Scoones 2008, 319). Together, the RFSTE and Navdanya employ many of the same strategies as Gene Campaign and the KRRS, respectively, but there are a number of salient distinctions, particularly with regard to Navdanya, which has somewhat eclipsed the presence of the RFSTE in the anti-GMO movement. Furthermore, there is a dearth of information available on the RFSTE and its recent undertakings.

Like the KRRS, Navdanya derived inspiration from Gandhi’s Salt Satyagraha and claims credit for launching the Bija Satyagraha. Navdanya did not stop at the Bija Satyagraha, however; it has used this event to kick-start its Bija Swaraj campaign, pledging to protect seed sovereignty and protesting the legalization of Indian patents on seeds and foods. This particular movement brings together “people from all walks of life including farmers, activists, scientist [sic], legal experts and students... committed... to the fight for the protection of seed sovereignty” in an effort to establish a national alliance of actors with which to “reclaim India’s seed freedom and biological diversity” (“Bija Swaraj”). In this way, the Bija Swaraj is representative of Navdanya’s integrative approach and broad constituent base. While the KRRS is comprised of and engages with primarily farmers, Navdanya draws in a diversity of participants.

Beyond its partnerships with seed-saving groups, organic farmers’ groups, and grassroots farmers’ organizations, it has forged alliances with women’s groups, school and children’s groups, volunteer organizations, globalization-focused networks, international organizations, and numerous others (“Our Partners”). Navdanya’s utilization of the terms satyagraha and swaraj throughout these constituent- and partnership-building initiatives demonstrates the organization’s commitment to Gandhian ideals and its confidence in their transformative power. Navdanya has a number of additional campaigns and research endeavors, but the organization’s concerted efforts to enact its alternative vision on a large-scale are what most distinguish it from other organizations active in India’s anti-GMO movement.
Navdanya has facilitated the establishment of 111 community seed banks across India and reports having trained more than 500,000 farmers in seed sovereignty, food sovereignty, and sustainable agriculture techniques. Additionally, it created Bija Vidyapeeth (School of the Seed/Earth University) on its biodiversity conservation and organic farm site in Uttarakhand, North India (“Navdanya”). Operating out of this central site, Navdanya has organized more than 50 international courses on subjects such as biodiversity, food, biopiracy, sustainable agriculture, water, globalization, business ethics, and, tellingly, Gandhian philosophy (“About Us”). One such course, ‘Gandhi and Globalization,’ explores “the contemporary relevance of Gandhi’s key concepts of Swaraj, Swadeshi and Satyagraha” and the manner in which they can inform living “peacefully, equitably, and sustainably on this fragile planet” (Shiva 2011, 35).

In sum, Navdanya, which has come to serve as a more visible extension of the RFSTE, incorporates Gandhian thought into the language of its organizational mission and vision, albeit less explicitly than the KRRS. The approach of the RFSTE is somewhat comparable to that of Gene Campaign, while the strategies employed by Navdanya are similar to those of the KRRS. Together, they cover a great deal of ground within the anti-GMO movement; efforts towards institutional change and the ultimate prohibition of GMOs are coupled with programs designed to bring about an alternative system of agriculture and, more broadly, Indian way of life. While Navdanya participates in protests of the satyagraha nature, it generally does not associate itself with the destruction of sites related to corporate-capitalist agriculture. Its methods, therefore, are unequivocally nonviolent. Furthermore, as evidenced by Navdanya’s comprehensive educational and training offerings and diversity of partner organizations, the breadth of its cause extends far beyond agriculture and, specifically, GMOs. More so than the KRRS, which relies almost exclusively on the involvement of its farmer members, Navdanya engages disparate activist communities in working towards the realization of a new societal model with which GMOs are inherently incompatible. While much of the Gandhian thought employed by the KRRS is for mobilization purposes, Navdanya makes use of Gandhian rhetoric primarily in its alternative society-building endeavors. This distinction, along with those previously discussed, provides an opening for the further characterization of the three anti-GM organizations examined here.
Analytical Insights

In a survey of anti-GM activist groups in the southern Indian city of Bangalore alone, Scoones (2008) identified more than 20 organizations, among them the KRRS, “with an explicitly stated anti-GM stance.” These organizations could be readily separated into four distinct camps: “those working practically in the field through demonstration projects on sustainable and organic agriculture, seed saving and biodiversity”; “those with a broader development focus”; “those with an explicit focus” such as workers’ rights or consumers’ rights; and “those with an environment focus.” Also among the groups surveyed were political parties and academic networks (Scoones 2008, 336-337). Identifying in which camp/s the three previously discussed organizations are positioned is a productive exercise in that it allows broad connections between organizational purpose and the relevance of Gandhian rhetoric to be made.

Further Characterization

Gene Campaign

Gene Campaign’s mission, vision, and strategic approach characterize it as a group “with an explicit purpose,” and that purpose is regulation. Gandhian thought, however, is notably absent from this organization’s rhetoric and operational dynamics. Moreover, Gene Campaign does not require a robust activist following to do its bidding at the national level but, instead, a handful of politically savvy negotiators. Towards this end, Gene Campaign’s conservation initiatives and seed banks do not represent extensive “in the field” work or serve to advance an alternative development paradigm; instead, they bolster the organization’s credibility through the availability of evidence. This research foundation allows Gene Campaign to back up its claims at the national level. Perhaps most significantly, however, this organization is advocating an adaptive, modern approach to agriculture that incorporates traditional elements – not radical societal transformation. For this purpose, Gandhi’s revolutionary rhetoric is not appropriate.
The KRRS

The KRRS, conversely, due to its pursuit of the Gandhian “village republic,” can be characterized primarily as an organization “with a broader development focus.” The approach by the KRRS to undermine corporate-capitalist agriculture, particularly GMOs, is blatantly made to mirror Gandhi’s protests against British colonial rule. Its tactics are incendiary, dramatic, and meant to convey a sense of revolution, as the KRRS wholeheartedly rejects the increasingly dominant modern agricultural system. Unlike Gene Campaign, the success of the KRRS is contingent on mass mobilization. Gandhian rhetoric, therefore, proves particularly useful not only in articulating an alternative for development and vision for the future, but also for engaging and inspiring a deep constituent base of farmers. Indeed, throughout India’s struggles for independence, Gandhi sought to move Indian citizens towards an alternative future of national sovereignty, and the same is true of today’s KRRS with regard to seed and food sovereignty. Furthermore, the KRRS is working “practically in the field” and has plans to expand this area of the organization’s function. In this way, as the organization builds revolutionary momentum, it is simultaneously enacting and disseminating its alternative agricultural model.

Navdanya

Finally, Navdanya, in addition to promoting “a broader development focus,” is deeply engaged in “demonstration projects on sustainable and organic agriculture, seed saving and biodiversity.” Like the KRRS, the RFSTE and Navdanya span two camps, but Navdanya invests in “in the field” projects to a greater degree than the KRRS. What the KRRS attempts to achieve through tactics of mass demonstration and civil disobedience, Navdanya seeks to do through mass agricultural mobilization. That is to say, while the KRRS devotes most of its energy to undermining the current system, Navdanya is actively realizing its alternative development vision while advocating for it. Towards this end, Navdanya maintains a diversity of partners, provides extensive training programs in agricultural techniques, and offers courses on a wide range of subjects. Gandhian rhetoric proves to be particularly relevant to these efforts as well; in terms of rejecting the trajectory of modern development and articulating a radical paradigm shift, the application of his independence-era thought is not a stretch.
Underlying Incompatibility

Based on the experiences of Gene Campaign, the KRRS, and Navdanya, it becomes clear that the extent to which Gandhian thought is utilized correlates with an organization’s degree of radicalism. Gandhi’s ideals are absent from Gene Campaign’s pursuit of legislative progress and systematic compromise, but they permeate the revolutionary rhetoric of the KRRS and are present in that of Navdanya. This suggests an underlying incompatibility between pragmatism and Gandhian ideals, and this is likely why civil society groups elect to avoid or incorporate them into their organizational rhetoric. The former begets realism and compromise, and the latter calls for outright rejection and revolution. Groups that seek responsible reformation, such as Gene Campaign, are better off pursuing other motivational discourse strategies, while groups that demand radical societal transformation are incentivized to recycle the same revolutionary tactics that were utilized by Gandhi in the mid-twentieth century. These familiar strategies are imbued with great meaning for the Indian population. Their use deliberately appeals to citizens’ latent revolutionary fervor and romantic nostalgia for times past, and it is meant to catalyze large-scale action.

The Apparent Absence of Gandhi’s Dietary Beliefs

A final analytical insight that warrants discussion is the apparent absence of Gandhi’s beliefs surrounding food among those organizations that made particular use of Gandhian thought. Gandhi’s view of food as a reflection of identity is not promoted to the same extent as his principles of satyagraha, swaraj, and swadeshi; indeed, it is scarcely mentioned. While seemingly pertinent to the issue of GM food, organizations’ unwillingness to wield this particular concept for the advancement of their activist efforts is likely due to the fact that Gandhi’s dietary experiments were undertaken on a highly individual basis and he did not advocate for conformity to his subsequent dietary convictions (Doctor 2009). Unlike the other Gandhian principles discussed, Gandhi’s beliefs on the subject of food are not as readily applicable to large-scale mobilization efforts. They can, however, be embraced at the level of the organization. Gandhi enjoyed total dietary freedom to omit those foods he believed to contain “unhygienic properties of a grossly corrupted modern civilization,” and, ultimately, organizations such as the KRRS and Navdanya are working to remove these foods from India’s national diet. In this way, these anti-GMO groups have scaled up Gandhi’s individual process of dietary
selection and are acting on behalf of the Indian public to omit those foods they deem “grossly corrupted.” Therefore, while not articulated or necessarily expressed, this Gandhian concept is visible and operative in the organizational dynamics of the KRRS and Navdanya.

Conclusion

India’s unique position as a predominantly rural and densely populated developing nation situates it in the vanguard of the global debate surrounding GMOs, but citizens’ collective memory of the country’s colonial experience and Gandhi’s role as an independence leader have made for a poignant encounter with biotechnology. A diversity of anti-GMO civil society actors have risen to the fore, some of which, despite not having come together on a cohesive campaign, articulate their organizational objectives through similar rhetoric. The principles of satyagraha, swaraj, swadeshi, and food as a reflection of identity that were espoused by Gandhi at the time of Indian independence from Britain, when grounded in contemporary context, have served as tools with which to dissect both the means and ends of civil society advocacy groups, revealing an underlying incompatibility between pragmatic, regulation-oriented approaches to GMOs and emotive Gandhian language. Organizations of the same radical nature as the KRRS and Navdanya employ Gandhian rhetoric both in their mobilization efforts and in the articulation of their alternative societal visions, and this is significant in that it casts the objectives of organizations such as Gene Campaign as submissive and damaging concessions to the forces of globalization.

With regard to those anti-GMO groups that adhere to and project Gandhian ideals, Scoones (2008) makes a critical point; considering India’s national population of well over one billion people and mounting food security concerns, the legitimacy and authority of these civil society actors may prove to be problematic. The ease with which corporate-capitalist agricultural giants such as Monsanto can dismiss slogans such as “Quit India!” is of great concern, as this calls into question the capacity of some of India’s most active anti-GMO organizations to actually influence those in power (Scoones 2008, 337). Indeed, these groups’ attempts to rally around the same words and principles that drove Indian citizens’ struggles for independence might very well be undermining their organizational legitimacy. Furthermore, the assertion of these powerful, India-specific historical linkages may limit the relevance and applicability of India’s anti-GMO campaign as a model for other developing nations. While these issues are of great consequence, however, radical anti-
GMO groups’ dogged unwillingness to compromise on the subject of GMOs and, more broadly, India’s development trajectory will likely not falter. In connecting the contemporary fight for seed and food sovereignty to that led by Gandhi more than half a century ago in the name of national sovereignty, demands for an “integrated, holistic approach to human development” are brought to the table. It remains to be seen whether or not the efforts of groups such as Gene Campaign will prove to be more impactful than those of the KRRS and Navdanya. Radically different societal visions are at stake – one in which GMOs are imposed externally by corporate-capitalist forces and another in which India commands its own relationship with this powerful technology. The fate of GMOs in a nation that will soon claim the world’s largest population of farmers hangs in the balance. ∗
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Clocks and Clouds is an American University undergraduate research journal that publishes articles on the cutting edge of political science, international studies, and public policy. The journal is meant to add a voice to the intellectual dialogue both within the American University community and in broader academia. Our name comes from the work of philosopher Karl Popper, where clouds are a metaphor for the disorderly and irregular in social sciences while clocks represent the predictable and rational. By providing a venue for top undergraduate research, Clocks and Clouds aims to find the clocks amidst the clouds.

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