The 2001 article by Mathew Hyde addresses the structural reforms in the Russian Government that incoming President Vladimir Putin put in place at the turn of the century.[1] The author addresses the ways in which Putin consolidated federal power through legislation and executive decrees, and does so partially by comparing Putin’s actions to that of his predecessor Boris Yeltsin. [2] The author makes two main and almost contradictory assertions with regards to Putin’s reforms. The first is that Putin has had relative success in changing the status quo and reversing the immense power shift that occurred, with the devolution of power to regional governments under Yeltsin.[3] However the author also argues that because of the already entrenched regional powers, Putin, much like Yeltsin, will be forced to compromise and tolerate a slow transition and lack of drastic change in government behavior.[4] The author conducts a small-n analysis using five of Putin’s 2000 reforms as his cases of study.[5] The author used a variety of data sources to aide in his analysis, including an analysis of regional and federal laws, as well as the analysis of governmental critics in Russia, the statements of Russian leaders themselves, and a variety of secondary historical documents used to establish government structures and politics, before and after the reforms.[6] This article provides insights into the legislative steps Putin has taken to solidify his power, how these actions differ from Putin’s predecessors, and the resistance they have and will likely continue to face.[7]
Bibliography
Hyde, Matthew. “Putin’s Federal Reforms and Their Implications for Presidential Power in Russia.” Europe-Asia studies 53, no. 5 (2001): 719-43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668130120060242.
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[1] Matthew Hyde, “Putin’s Federal Reforms and Their Implications for Presidential Power in Russia,” Europe-Asia studies 53, no. 5 (2001), http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668130120060242.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid., 735.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid., 720.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.