Clocks and Clouds

Emily Hoerner
“Worlds of Potential: Funding for Community-Based Organizations in Nairobi, Kenya”

Andrew Menefee
“The HIV/AIDS Epidemic in the Deep South”

Rosie Romano
“Increasing Voter Turnout: Can Mass Transit Help?”

Sebastian Beckmann
“American Aid to Greece: The Marshall Plan as a Model for Development Aid”

Angela Budzinski
“A New Missionary Method: Latin America as a Mission Field”

Gina Weires
“The Impact of the Zapatista Movement on Women’s Rights in Chiapas, Mexico”
INTRODUCTION

Over the past semester, we have watched Clocks and Clouds grow from vision to reality. It has been a tremendous honor to help establish a premiere outlet for undergraduate international studies and political science research, and a joy to work with the exceptional American University students who dedicated their time as authors, staff, and reviewers. As editors, we can claim little real credit for the success of the journal. Clocks and Clouds began with the idea that American University needed an outlet for outstanding undergraduate work, but once that idea took hold, the journal took on a life of its own. The vision of Clocks and Clouds united dozens of authors, editors, and reviewers behind a common goal. These collaborators, led by the power of an idea, contributed far more to the process and product than any single leader did.

The production of this journal demonstrates that good ideas can make a real impact. The ideas contained within these pages, however, have an even greater potential to spark change. All six of our authors demonstrate that good scholarship does not involve choosing between analytical rigor and real-world relevance; to the contrary, it involves uniting the two. The power of this scholarship unites our authors’ seemingly disparate subjects. Their articles use compelling and consistent academic methods to provide rich, sweeping, and novel perspectives on some of the most vexing questions in contemporary social sciences. They truly have potential to change how people think about and interact with their worlds.

The articles in this volume lead through scholarship on a wide range of national and international issues. For some authors, this means examining case studies local and global community development. Emily Hoerner and Angela Budzinski directly explore best practices for activism and development in Kenya and Costa Rica, and draw broadly applicable recommendations about how community organizations and missionary groups can effectively advocate for change. Meanwhile, Gina Weires shows how one community movement succeeded by reaching beyond its immediate supporters and casting a global spotlight on injustice. The guidance that these authors’ ideas can provide is tempered by Sebastian Beckman, who leads through a cautionary tale about the unintended perils of “top-down” development in Greece.

Other contributions in this work take a broader view of issues contemporary society, and examine the root causes of social inequity. Andrew Menefee challenges conventional wisdom to show that responses to AIDS must account for community narratives and attitudes as well as sociodemographic factors. In a similar vein, Rosie Romano encourages policymakers to think about spatial barriers to political participation alongside more familiar cultural and socioeconomic barriers. By highlighting the complex causes of pressing issues, these authors’ ideas lead the way towards more effective policy interventions, and a world in which disenfranchisement and disease are no longer scourges.

Clocks and Clouds is based on the premise that undergraduates have ideas that matter. The ideas in this issue strongly affirm that premise, and have great potential to a people towards more effective practices and a more humane world. Although we do not claim that our work will change the world over night, we are convinced that the ideas we present can make genuine contributions to a broader academic dialog. We believe Clocks and Clouds can help shape and voice the extraordinary ideas of American University undergraduates, and showcase the real power that research can have. It is our sincere hope that this journal will continue to do so for years to come.

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Abstract

Despite a proliferation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs) in Kibera, the largest informal settlement in Kenya, conditions for residents remain bleak. CBOs are uniquely positioned to catalyze change by creating local initiatives for common problems. However, most Kibera CBOs routinely lack access to the kind of funding that could make their programs successful on a larger scale (i.e., in more than just one localized neighborhood of Kibera). This study examines how CBOs in Kibera gain access to funding, either through grants or individual donations, and what factors drive the likelihood of sustained funding for those CBOs.

This study finds that most organizations that have received foundation funding in the past have been trained in resource mobilization, and/or know a grant manager within a funding foundation. Similarly, most CBOs that have received individual donations in the past engage in at least some aspects of donor relationship cultivation. On the whole, however, most Kibera CBOs tend to take an impromptu and rather undisciplined approach to fundraising. This paper concludes with some suggestions for Kibera CBOs, noting that if CBOs are willing to dedicate time and energy to fundraising they are likely to be more successful.

Introduction

Less than 10 kilometers west of Kenyatta International Conference Center, the premier landmark of the Nairobi city skyline and a symbol of the country’s capitalist ambitions, lies Kibera, the most densely packed informal settlement in East Africa. Kibera and its residents exist side-by-side with some of the most advanced communications infrastructure, sophisticated restaurants, and lucrative business deals on the eastern half of the continent. Figuratively, the settlement is worlds apart from the gated apartments and five-star hotels of cosmopolitan Nairobi.

Kibera residents are largely ignored by the Kenyan government and the city council of Nairobi. In the face of this neglect, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) step in to fill the gap left for service provision, health, and education. In 2000, over 200 NGOs were active in Kibera, a number that has most likely grown in the past decade (Barcott 2000, 13). At a more local level and on a smaller scale, community-based organizations (CBOs) form to address the problems NGOs will not, do not, or cannot tackle.

CBOs often initiate unsung acts of good in their communities. However, the author has observed through work and study in Kenya majority of CBOs suffer from a crippling lack of funding.
Run almost exclusively by locals who live in the settlements where they work, CBOs generally do not have access to the sorts of fundraising tips and techniques larger NGOs take for granted. Additionally, there is a staggering lack of simple, straightforward advice for CBOs looking to fundraise more effectively. Knowledge about fundraising, grant writing, and private donations exists, but far too often these articles, books, theses, and dissertations languish in university libraries – or are stuck in academic databases to which CBOs do not have access. All too often, CBOs flounder through the fundraising process with both private donations and grant-making institutions, using an unplanned and somewhat chaotic strategy that tends to waste time without raising substantial amounts of money.

Driven by this knowledge, I ask how successful CBOs attempt to gain access to funding – either through individual donations or through grants. I hypothesize that the most common strategy for CBOs to gain funding is knowing a grant officer or program manager within a grant-making institution. Five variables were studied: Adherence to donor relationship cultivation strategies, networking, relationship with a grant manager, resource mobilization training and capacity building, and fundraising frequency. After analyzing the results of the research, conducted via thirteen surveys and five interviews of CBOs working in Kibera, I find that, of the five variables examined, resource mobilization training and capacity building are the most commonly used strategies for fundraising success. Moreover, most Kibera CBOs take an ad hoc, rather improvised approach to fundraising, probably at least in part because of the largely informal nature of the work and environment in which most CBOs engage. I conclude by advocating that CBOs invest as much time and energy as possible in fundraising efforts, either by soliciting private donations or applying for foundation grants.

Why Kibera?

This study focuses solely on Kibera, one of the largest informal settlements in Africa. Despite Kibera’s large size, relatively high-profile international media presence, proximity to Nairobi’s central business district, and the proliferation of NGOs working within the settlement, Kibera residents still lack transportation infrastructure and access to healthcare, education, waste removal, and potable water. These types of living conditions are not unique to Kibera. However, the fact that so many NGOs – over 200 as of 2000 (Barcott 2000, 13) – are actively operating in Kibera to solve these problems, with only marginal success rates sets Kibera apart from other informal settlements like it, if only because of the fact that other informal settlements are not nearly as populated with NGOs.

In his article “The Kibera Slum,” Carolina for Kibera founder Rye Barcott states that, “Although there are over 200 NGOs in Kibera, residents expressed deep-seated resentment and hostility toward NGOs,” and that “even though every informant held an opinion about NGOs, 78 of 126 informants could not name a single NGO that operated in Kibera” (Barcott 2000, 13). Whether real or imagined, Barcott blames the “general perception of exploitation” for most residents’ negative opinions of NGO services (Barcott 2000, 13).

In his indictment of why Kibera-focused NGOs fail – “poor management and leadership”; “short-term planning”; and “administrative and staff positions [filled] with outsiders,” which “elicits great resentment from Kibera residents who are jobless” – Barcott also provides strategies for CBO success (Barcott 2000, 13). Kibera NGOs fail because they become caught up in a vicious cycle of project-to-project planning and because residents view them as “outsiders.” CBOs, by their very nature,
solve the latter problem. To solve the former, and to remain viable and influential community change agents, they must gain access to consistent forms of funding. This study looks at how CBOs can most effectively and successfully do that.

**State of the Field: Nonprofit Fundraising.**

**Community-Based Organizations & Donor Relations**

Community-based organizations fill a distinctive niche in the development field. In informal settlements such as Kibera, CBOs have a unique and important role to play. Almost exclusively staffed and run by local community members, CBOs can provide the sort of knowledge and on-the-ground experience that NGOs, especially international ones, tend to lack. Moreover, their ability to enhance a sense of community and capability are unparalleled, for it is truly local leaders who stand the best chance of mobilizing a community to advocate for change. It is most frequently articulate and passionate local community leaders who display this type of influence along with the skills necessary to be heard and understood outside the immediate community. Indeed, CBOs often exhibit unique strengths (Kang 2011, 233).

- A “bottom-up” approach to development;
- A focus on “participatory development;”
- An emphasis on partnerships and capacity building;
- “People-centered development;”
- “Responsiveness and flexibility;”
- Empowerment;
- Sustainability
- The delivery of basic services

However, it is important to note that CBOs and their leaders are no “silver bullet” for the problems that plague Kibera, and most CBOs do fall victim to certain predictable problems (Kang 2011, 233).

- “Ideological orientation when receiving funding from political entities;”
- A tendency to choose “self-preservation over flexibility and responsiveness;”
- Weak efforts regarding accountability and evaluation of program success and efficacy

To counteract these pitfalls, nonprofit scholars have provided suggestions for maximizing the potential of CBOs while addressing weaknesses they commonly display (Kang 2011, 234).

- “Finding alternative funding sources” through social entrepreneurship and social innovation;
- “Strengthening networks” both inside and outside of the community;
- “Applying democracy in operation and evaluation;”
If CBOs take these suggestions into consideration – and make the decision to honestly act on them – they can eliminate some common pitfalls, in addition to making their organization more attractive to potential funders, both individuals and institutions.

An Introduction to the Donor Relationship Cultivation Model

Despite their importance, there is a surprising lack of information about CBOs generally and, more specifically, and about how they fundraise. This lack of literature made formulating an informed hypothesis for this study difficult. However, a quick academic search of the term “fundraising” revealed that a large and thoroughly established body of literature does exist to address the cultivation of donor relationships, usually in the context of US- and UK-based nonprofits. Overall, the study of donor relationship cultivation can provide CBOs with a different way of thinking about where their donations are coming from. Though many CBOs are at least somewhat familiar with the grant-writing process, many CBOs also receive funds from individual donors, making this information quite topical. By learning more about the field of relationship cultivation, CBOs can utilize strategies to keep their donors satisfied and loyal.

For over a decade, nonprofit scholars have argued that organizations must conceptualize “organization-public relationships as multidimensional (professional, personal, and community relationship dimensions)” (Bruning & Ledingham 1999, 164). By thinking of relationships as multidimensional rather than flat, “the need arises for strategies that can be developed to manage” the different facets of donor relationships (Bruning & Ledingham 1999, 165). By understanding the interconnected dimensions of these models, CBOs can reach out to one-time donors, potentially turning them into lifetime patrons for their organizations.

Donor Relationship Cultivation

There is also a vast and rich body of literature discussing donor relationship cultivation strategies. CBOs can adopt many of these strategies to make their fundraising more effective and to keep individual donors loyal. Nonprofit scholars have argued that eight key variables can lead to successful fundraising and donor relationships: access for donors, both to organizational information and to organization members themselves; positivity; openness “to engage actively and honestly in direct discussions”; sharing of tasks (letting donors know where their money is going); networking; assurances, “both verbal and behavioral,” made to donors; keeping of promises; and stewardship, which includes reciprocity, responsibility, reporting, and nurturing of the organization-donor relationship (Waters 2009, 345-6). Communications to donors such as newsletters, annual reports, and handwritten thank-you notes, in addition to events like open houses, can help donors feel appreciated and involved (Waters 2008, 84). While not all of these strategies are entirely feasible for CBOs, the overall argument – that donors should feel appreciated, respected, and knowledgeable about an organization’s projects and finances – is certainly one CBOs should take to heart.

Once CBOs have secured donors, how they cultivate the relationship is critical. Scholars have offered tips for how to effectively engage in relationship stewardship. Organizations can enhance
top donors’ understanding of their work “if top donors are allowed to foster a relationship with top
nonprofits officials” (Metrick 2005, 40). While this may seem like a time-consuming distraction from a
CBO’s programming work, getting to know donors on a personal level can deepen their commitment to
an organization. Scholars further argue for “recognition [of donations] when appropriate”; “continued
thanks and appreciation”; and “ongoing cultivation” as methods to continue growing the donor
relationship (Metrick 2005, 40). Though they may seem costly at first, investing time and energy in
these strategies will only help CBOs in the long run. Richard Waters sums it up nicely when he says, “If
an organization wants to ensure its longevity, then it should be prepared to dedicate time to developing
relationships with its donors” (Waters 2007, 44).

One of the most potentially effective fundraising tools CBOs have at their fingertips is the
Internet, although online giving is not without its pitfalls. When people give online, they want to give
quickly and conveniently; they want to feel like they are somehow making a difference; they want
to “feel personally connected to something greater than themselves”; and they want to feel useful
(Andresen 2011, 15). Donor recognition strategies like the ones listed above can ensure even online
donors feel appreciated and part of the CBO’s work. Indeed, gratitude is something nonprofit scholars
have been advocating for since 2001 as an effective means of stewardship. By demonstrating thanks
and appreciation to donors, whether online or on paper, “donors feel respected because they know the
gift was appreciated and wisely managed” (Kelly 2001).

Ultimately, almost all nonprofit scholars conclude that the donor relationship must contain a
concrete element of trust. Without it, donors can easily lapse or find other organizations to which they
can give their money. CBOs can foster trust with donors by using their money wisely. Newsletters and
annual reports containing detailed financial information are two ways to foster this kind of financial
trust in the organization (Waters 2007, 47). Moreover, donors must trust that CBOs will follow their
mission and engage in the programs they say they will. Donors want to know how their money is being
spent. Transparency and accountability, then, are crucial (Waters 2007, 213).

The Grassroots Context

Thus there is a massive body of literature available that studies how organizations can most
effectively manage their donor relations. Many of the findings from this literature are applicable to
Kibera CBOs; but the information is often in a location and writing style inaccessible to them. If CBOs
were able to easily, quickly, and conveniently access this information, and if it were boiled down to key
suggestions rather than lengthy academic articles, CBO fundraising would probably be much more
successful than it currently is. For example, most of the fundraising strategies discussed up to this point
have been presented in a rather broad context. Here, these strategies will be discussed specifically in
the context of Kibera.

One recurrent theme throughout nonprofit fundraising literature is the importance of direct,
honest, and meaningful communication. This type of communication is especially important for Kibera
CBOs if they rely on international donors. It is much more difficult for international donors to see the
direct impact of their money on the community, making it critical for Kibera CBOs to use the tools
at their disposal — namely, the Internet — to keep donors up-to-date on projects to which they have
donated. Emails, Facebook updates, pictures, Tweets, blog posts, newsletters, and electronic reports,
can serve as excellent digital stand-ins to allow donors to visualize the impact of their donation.
The Internet is one of the most valuable tools available to Kibera CBOs, for multiple reasons. Contrary to popular assumptions, Internet access is relatively easy to find, even within the boundaries of Kibera, and almost all Kibera residents are literate enough to take advantage of it. In addition to facilitating the donor relationship, the Internet can be used to accept donations, although CBOs must be wary of the online giving pitfalls listed previously: distance and donors’ lack of hands-on interaction with the organization can make their donation feel less useful. Using many of the strategies listed in the paragraph above, Kibera CBOs can ensure they utilize the Internet to their advantage, using it as a tool both to attract new donors and to communicate with repeat donors. Moreover, CBOs can use the Internet to directly address donor concerns such as the ones listed in the 2003 Brookings report. For CBOs that rely on private donations, communication strategies such as newsletters and financial reports can assure accountability; social media updates and online program reports can also keep donors satisfied and loyal.

For those CBOs that rely on grants more than private donations, one very real problem is that most smaller-scale organizations tend to apply piece-meal for grants and other funding sources whose goals may only marginally align with the organization’s own. While this sort of ad hoc application strategy can certainly be appealing to CBOs in need of project funding, organizations risk wasting their time and energy applying to grant-making foundations whose priorities may only fit with their own to a small degree. This strategy is particularly tempting in the atmosphere of Kibera, where one initial “boost” of fundraising (through a seed grant or generous private donation) can easily provide the support an organization needs to start building up a track record of successful and effective programming. This track record of previous success and impact is needed if an organization wishes to receive more funding in the future, especially from grant-making foundations. However, CBOs in Kibera – where so many NGOs and other national and international organizations are already working – would use their time most productively by only applying for grants whose goals fit directly with projects the organization has the mission, vision, and capacity to implement. By fundraising in this kind of targeted manner and not allowing the siren sound of a generic call for proposals to lure them into a grant submission, organizations can more effectively and productively fundraise.

Methodology

This study hypothesizes that the most important factor for CBOs to gain funding is getting to know (and establishing a relationship with) a grant officer or program manager within a grant-making institution. To test this hypothesis, this study examines five independent variables: adherence to some or all of the donor relationship cultivation strategies discussed above; engagement in formal (i.e., foundation open houses and receptions, meet-and-greets) or informal networking; existing working or personal relationships with a grant manager; training, via workshops or classes, in resource mobilization and capacity building that provide CBOs with introductory knowledge to fundraising (i.e., how to write grants, how to properly engage in monitoring and evaluation, and other fundraising tricks); and frequency of fundraising attempts.

To understand the overall “landscape” of CBO funding in Kibera, this study involved the distribution of funding surveys to a small sample of Kibera CBOs (survey questions can be found in Appendix 1). Twenty surveys were distributed, and thirteen were returned.
surveyed can be found in Appendix II). These surveys were purposely distributed randomly so as to elicit responses that were as accurate as possible. Though organizations surveyed were generally similar in size (most organizations were run by a team of five or fewer people), they varied in purpose and programmatic focus. Some were arts organizations, others were women’s or children’s centers, schools or after-school programs, and others were part of umbrella religious organizations operating in Kibera. Paper surveys were distributed and administered by a Kenyan research assistant, who was ultimately responsible for which organizations received surveys because of her knowledge of the area and the CBOs working in it.

From the surveys, five of the most successfully funded organizations were then interviewed via Skype phone calls (and email, when the organization was unable to be reached by phone) to follow up on their survey responses. Interviews generally focused on how CBOs initiated and shaped their relationship with their donors, in addition to delving into how they received training in resource mobilization; what types of networking (if any) they engaged in; how their relationships with program managers at grant-making institutions had initiated and evolved, if applicable; and how they communicated and interacted with donors.

Results

This study is divided between two different types of fundraising: private, individual donations versus grants from funding foundations. In general, the results of the surveys and interviews conducted adhered to this division; only two of the thirteen organizations surveyed had received both grants and individual donations. Tables 1 and 2, below, present these findings regarding the five independent variables studied along the donation-grant divide. All organizations listed in the tables have fundraised “successfully,” defined in this study as having received multiple donations or grants in the past five years.

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<th>RM/CB Training</th>
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<td>3+ times/year</td>
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<td>Yes</td>
<td>3+ times/year</td>
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| Total percentage engaged in fundraising strategy | 14.3 percent network | 57.1 percent know a grant manager | 85.7 percent have RM training | 42.8 percent raise at least 3+ times/year |

Table 1: CBOs that have received grant funding
Table 2: CBOs that have received private donations

Discussion: Variables that lead to Fundraising Success

Adherence to Donor Relationship Cultivation Strategies

Nonprofit scholars have been quite clear: for those nonprofits that rely on private donations, cultivation of the donor-nonprofit relationship is critical for fundraising success. This study defines success for CBO fundraising as having received multiple donations or grants over the past five years. Of Kibera CBOs that rely on donations, 57.1 percent are engaging in at least some of the techniques for which donor relationship scholars advocate. Of the five CBOs interviewed, two rely heavily (one exclusively) on private donations as a form of funding. Even from this small sample size, it is evident that there is a fairly equal divide between reliance on grants versus donors as a method of fundraising. Moreover, this relatively even split proves both that reliance on donations is a viable fundraising strategy for Kibera CBOs and that information about the donor relationship cultivation model can be just as useful as grant writing tips.

The first CBO interviewed (organization G) that relies on private donations organizes fundraising forums to attract individual donors, most of whom are Kenyan. Most individual donations are small, although they do have some repeat donors. According to the interview, organization G also relies heavily on informal networks of friends, either for donations or to attract more donors. CBO members also write thank-you notes to donors. They engage in social media (mainly Facebook) to
keep donors apprised of their organizational activities and help donors visualize the impact of their donation. Organization B, the second CBO interviewed that relies on private donations, also goes door-to-door asking for donations. In the past year, they have received repeat donations from multiple individual donors. They engage in cultivation strategies, like personal visits to thank donors, as well as ad hoc reports to donors when programs they have donated to with are completed. They are also contemplating starting a newsletter.

This admittedly small sample size reveals that 57.1 percent of Kibera CBOs that rely on donations already engage in donor relationship cultivation techniques as they pursue and attempt to keep individual donors. Strategies like showing appreciation (via thank-you notes and personal visits) for donations, as well as keeping donors up-to-date about their programs and the impact of the donations are already being implemented in organizations B and G. Access to CBO leadership does not seem to be a major issue. Because most CBOs operate on a local scale, and because most of their donors are local, it is easy for donors to see where their money is going and how it is making an impact in the community. When donors are not local, CBOs are using social media tools like Facebook to publicize how donor money is being spent.

These techniques can help CBOs keep donors once they have initially attracted them. CBOs seem less successful in that initial donor attraction, however. While most CBOs do have some individual donors, they admit that their donor lists are not as strong as they could be. While it is good that CBOs are relying on the informal networks they already have in place, and while it does not seem like CBOs are merely resting on their fundraising laurels, CBOs do not seem to be leveraging their considerable strengths (their local influence, relative lack of bureaucracy, and close relationship with the communities in which they operate) to their advantage with formal networking.

**Networking**

Networking is another key variable for CBOs trying to procure funding, especially from grant-making foundations. None of the CBOs that rely on donations are actively engaged in formal networking. 14.3 percent of CBOs that rely on grants are engaged in networking in the form of local partnerships, while 28.6 percent are considering pursuing formal networking channels.

It is possible that networking is less of a contributing factor to private fundraising, but from the surveys it appears that networking is necessary for CBOs pursuing foundation funds (if only to increase their likelihood of hearing about funding opportunities, an idea that will be discussed below in the “fundraising frequency” section). Though it would appear many CBOs are already relying on their informal networks of contacts, friends, and colleagues for donations (even if they do not actually call it networking), most foundation funding is quite competitive, and CBOs should seek to increase their networking presence as much as possible. The more their mission, objectives, and programs are known, especially by those in positions to allocate funds, the more successful CBOs will ultimately be at fundraising.

It is quite possible that most CBOs simply do not know, or do not think they know, how to go about utilizing formal networking to their advantage. Clearly, CBOs are already building up informal networks, and this can only benefit them. By using social media to their benefit and attending open houses of potential funders – like grant-making foundations, national embassies, and multinational
companies with offices in Nairobi (like Coca-Cola) – CBOs might find more avenues of fundraising open to them. Like many of the other strategies recommended within this study, though, this type of commitment to networking takes both time and energy, and it is something CBOs should take seriously to truly make their organizations and their members more successful fundraisers.

*Relationships with Grant Managers*

I hypothesized that an existing relationship with a grant manager or program officer within a grant-making foundation was the most common factor for facilitating CBO funding. However, the evidence from the surveys conducted indicated that this does not seem to necessarily be the case: while a relationship with a grant manager may be slightly more common than networking, it is by no means imperative for CBOs. Of the CBOs that rely on donations, 28.6 percent know a grant manager; of CBOs that utilize grants as fundraising, 57.1 percent know or have a relationship with a grant manager. While this variable is common, it is not as widespread as this study had hypothesized. Of the five CBOs interviewed, two knew grant managers (and both had received grants), but only one thought that relationship had actually helped them procure funding they might not have been aware of otherwise.

In most cases, it appeared that CBOs had met the grant manager they knew through some form of networking, which is a positive sign. However, most of the CBOs surveyed did not seem to think this person had given them a substantial “edge” when applying for funding, or that this person had necessarily made them aware of a significant number of funding opportunities about which they might not otherwise have known. Additionally, none of the CBOs indicated that their relationship with the grant manager was anything other than strictly professional. Overall, the findings of this study point to the conclusion that, while knowing a professional in the grant-making industry can be helpful, the professional status of the relationship most CBOs have with these contacts does not actually lend itself to any significant boost in funding. Perhaps the relationship must extend to a deeper, more personal level for CBOs to receive significant benefit from the relationship, although this study cannot do more than speculate about that. Based on the success of other factors, like resource mobilization training and capacity building, it would appear relationships with grant managers can be beneficial for CBOs, although they are in no way a panacea for fundraising.

*Resource Mobilization Training & Capacity Building*

Of all the variables explored, training in resource mobilization and capacity building is the single most common factor that helps CBOs procure funding. Whether a team or an individual from the CBO has received training seems to matter little. What is important is that at least one member of the CBO has at least some familiarity with the basics of fundraising and what grant-making foundations expect from those to whom they give funds.

Of the CBOs that rely on grants, 85.7 percent have received resource training, while 57.1 percent of CBOs that rely on donations had some experience with resource mobilization training. Clearly, experience with mobilization techniques is important. For the most part, resource mobilization training took the form of seminars or workshops. Of the five CBOs interviewed, two of the four organizations that had received grants were trained in resource mobilization by the same organization that gave them the grant. Interestingly, these two organizations received training after they had already accepted the grant (Isabel Omondi & Ghetto Arts Promotion, pers. comm). The training focused more on how to monitor and evaluate programs and how to track and report how money was spent, rather
than focusing on key skills like grant writing. The other two CBOs who had received grants had also received mobilization training, and theirs took the form of one- or two-day workshops hosted by NGOs, not grant-making foundations.

Resource mobilization training can be a valuable tool for CBOs as they attempt to fundraise. Though most mobilization training tends to focus more on foundation grants rather than private donations, the skills (like grant writing) that CBOs can take away from these seminars can serve as an initial knowledge base that can make them more appealing to foundation funders. Knowing the basics of grant writing, monitoring and evaluation, and program management, can help a CBO stand out to grant-making foundations as serious, committed, and responsible organizations. Additionally, higher-level NGOs and INGOs frequently hold seminars or workshops to prove that they are committed to local participation and to helping the local population “own” their development projects. Mobilization training is often easily obtained, and it is something CBOs should absolutely take advantage of: The skills they gain can be quite valuable, especially if they continue to build on them with additional knowledge and practice.

Fundraising Frequency

Fundraising frequency, which I had not hypothesized to be a strategy for fundraising success, was important. 42.8 percent of CBOs that rely on grants fundraise at least 3 times a year, while 14.2 percent of CBOs that rely on donations fundraise at the same frequency. It is worth noting that three CBOs surveyed did not answer this question, either because they had never formally applied for funds or because they were currently relying on private donations.

Overall, it appears most CBOs (close to 55 percent of the organizations surveyed) take a largely ad hoc approach to grant submission; that is, rather than applying for grants methodically, they submit applications only when they are made aware of a call for submissions. Interestingly, of the CBOs that applied for grants when made aware of them, 75 percent had received grants; of the CBOs that applied for funding more regularly, all of them had received some sort of foundation funding, even if they were not receiving foundation money at present. Much like networking and a relationships with grant managers, fundraising frequency is common but not ubiquitous to successful CBOs. Certainly, applying for grants and other funds more frequently cannot hurt, although writing and submitting grants does require taking time away from programming. Because frequent fundraising does not lead to astonishing results for CBOs, fundraising frequency is probably something each organization should consider on an individual basis. CBOs should realistically look at how much time they can devote to this one particular aspect of fundraising, especially in relation to other avenues like resource mobilization training or capacity building.

Implications & Suggestions for CBOs

Of the several factors that may lead CBOs to attain funding, resource mobilization or capacity building training are the most common ways for CBOs to effectively fundraise. While all the necessary fundraising information may be available for CBOs somewhere, it is rarely available all in one place or in a concise format. In the interest of both condensing the existing fundraising “wisdom” and making it more readily available to CBOs who seek it, this study will now present a concise list of suggestions
for CBOs who seek to fundraise, either through private donations or grant-making foundations. Ideally, these suggestions would be published through an accessible venue, such as the Internet, and made readily available to Kibera CBOs as they engage in fundraising. To that end, these results will be shared with the organizations surveyed in the hope that they will both take these suggestions to heart and share them with fellow CBO members seeking to fundraise. CBOs should note that these suggestions are not mutually exclusive. In other words, CBOs should not rely “just” on private donations or foundation funds, but rather should seek to fundraise whenever and by whatever means possible.

Recommendations for CBOs Relying on Private Donations

• Use donor relationship cultivation strategies to attract and keep donors. These can include the following:
  o Be positive in organizational and donor communication,
  o Engage in honest discussion with donors,
  o Let donors know where their money is going, and
  o Keep promises
  o Write thank-you notes for donations (handwritten is best)

• Communicate with donors as much as possible: Use progress reports and newsletters to keep donors up-to-date on projects they have donated to

• Strive to cultivate a personal, not just a professional, relationship with donors

• Use the Internet as a tool to find donors and to keep them apprised of program impact

• Cultivate trust with donors: manage money wisely and be a transparent as possible with finances

Recommendations for CBOs Seeking Foundation Funds

• Network, both informally and formally. Use social media like Facebook and LinkedIn whenever possible

• Seek to build a relationship with a grant manager or project officer within a funding foundation

• Engage in resource mobilization training and capacity building whenever possible

• Fundraise as frequently as is feasible. Each call for proposals represents a chance to hone grant-writing skills, so take advantage of it

• Do not submit a proposal simply because a funding organization has issued a call for submission. Make sure the priorities of the funding organization to which the proposal is submitted mesh with the organization’s goals and programs.

Limitations & Suggestions for Further Research.

First and foremost, this is a case study of Kibera. While Kibera is similar in many ways to informal settlements around the world, it is also unique. Some of the strategies offered here may not be applicable to CBOs in other informal settlements, or even elsewhere in Nairobi. Moreover, the
suggestions offered here are guidelines. The more of these suggestions CBOs can engage the more likely it is they will procure funding, but each individual CBO must decide their limit on fundraising strategies. The underlying message, then, is “do what you can when you can.” CBOs should not become so caught up in fundraising that they neglect their programs or the communities in which they work.

At least in part because of the distance at which this research was conducted, some problems did arise during the course of the study. Though the surveys were distributed by a Kenyan research assistant, the fact that the surveys were being conducted for an American researcher meant that some organizations viewed the information gathering with mistrust, and some were unwilling to fill out all or parts of the survey because they viewed it as “spying” on the organization, especially its finances. This phenomenon was probably partly due to the overall mistrust Kibera residents tend to have for “outsiders” who engage in development work, and party because it was impossible to conduct this research in person in Nairobi. This distance factor, in addition to the lack of direct access to key organization members, meant that the data received was not as comprehensive as was initially hoped. Ultimately, these two problems resulted in a lower rate of survey return and smaller sample size.

Additionally, more research is needed in informal settlements outside Kibera to strengthen, corroborate, or disprove these findings. If it all possible, in-person research is recommended, as is taking the time to get to know the CBOs interviewed and building a working relationship with them; this could encourage the kind of trust and openness that this study seemed to lack.

Moreover, more research is needed overall about informal settlements. There is a shocking lack of academic information, beyond medical studies about HIV/AIDS or malaria, about residents of informal settlements. Research of all styles – ethnographic, discourse analysis, and scientific – is needed to build up a solid knowledge base about the lives of those who inhabit the world’s informal settlements. Increasingly, informality is becoming a hallmark of life in low-income countries, and more information about every aspect of informality, as well as its effects on the people who live, work, and learn in the informal sector, is needed.

Finally, more research is needed about CBOs – about how they operate, the environments in which they operate, what makes them successful, how they can become more successful, and how they can fundraise successfully. As the prevalence of informality increases, so, too, does the incidence of CBOs whose goals are to better the communities in which they work. CBOs represent a significant portion of the “development” work occurring throughout informal settlements, but often they are simply not receiving money to support their initiatives. Information must be disseminated through popular channels like the Internet to make the vast wealth of fundraising knowledge available to CBOs who could put it to good use. This study is a start, but there is still much work to be done.

Conclusion

After initially hypothesizing that a relationship with a grant manager was the most critical factor for CBO fundraising success, this case study of Kibera examined five variables for funding success: adherence to donor relationship cultivation strategies; networking; relationship with a grant manager; resource mobilization training and capacity building; and frequency of fundraising efforts. This study has found that of these five variables, the only predictable indicator of receiving grants or donations is whether or not members of a Kibera CBO have received any type of resource mobilization
training or capacity building. Moreover, this study has found that most CBOs in Kibera tend to take an ad hoc approach to fundraising efforts, and predictably enough the results of this type of approach are not spectacular. While presenting fundraising tips for organizations, both those that rely on private donations and foundation funds, this study urges Kibera CBOs to take a more systematic approach to fundraising, if it is at all feasible for the organization. This study concludes by recommending the necessity of much more research to corroborate, or perhaps disprove, the findings of this study, especially as they apply to informal settlements outside of Nairobi. As the world’s cities continue to grow, informality is becoming an entrenched aspect of life for many urban residents. More research is needed at every level to understand these phenomena of urbanization and informality, for they are surely here to stay. »
Appendix 1: Survey Questions

Part I: Funding History
1. In the past five years, have you ever received grants or any other type of funding from an organization or person? If yes, please describe.
   Please include how much money you received, who it was from, when you received it, and any other important information about the grant or donation. (For example, if it was a grant, for what period of time did the grant last? If it was from a person, had this person donated before?)

2. How often do you apply for grants or other types of funding? (If other, please describe).

3. If you have received funding in the past five years, what do you think were the most important factors that allowed you to receive it? Please list at least three.
   (a)
   (b)
   (c)

Part II: Organizational Structure
1. Please describe how your organization fundraises or receives money.

2. Is there a single person or team of people in your organization responsible for raising funds? If yes, has this person or team been trained in fundraising techniques? What experience does this person or team have?

3. Do you at present know a grant officer or program manager within a larger funding organization? If yes, how did you meet this person? For how long have you known them? Please describe your relationship with this person. Has this person ever helped you receive a grant or outside funding before?

4. Does your organization belong to any type of fundraising or professional network?

Part III: Funding Timing
1. Please describe the “timeline” of typical grants you receive or a grant you have received in the past five years. Please include the following parts: 1) when you heard about the grant or funding source, 2) when you applied for it, 3) when you were notified about whether you would or would not receive the money, 4) when the funds were given to you (if applicable), 5) when the project started (if applicable)..
Appendix 2: Organizations Surveyed & Organizational Identity Code

1. Kibera Wasanii Mtaani Initiative (organizational code A)
2. Orphir Gold Initiatives (organizational code B)
3. St. Martin’s Care Centre Women Project (organizational code C)
4. Know Kibera (organizational code D)
5. Ghetto Light Youth (organizational code E)
6. St. Martin’s School and Care Centre (organizational code F)
7. Kids Empowering Ability Centre (organizational code G)
8. Ghetto Arts Promotion (organizational code H)
9. Vision Mothers (organizational code I)
10. Siloam Childrens’ Centre (organizational code J)
11. Africa Health & Community Programme (organizational code K)
12. St. Catherine’s Educational Centre (organizational code L)
13. The Initiative for Community Action (ICA) (organizational code M)
Bibliography


“Save yourself a transatlantic airline fare to a developing country. Just come to Mississippi....”

-Craig Thompson, Director, Office of HIV/STD, Mississippi State Department of Health, interview with Human Rights Watch

Abstract This paper examines explanations for the current HIV/AIDS epidemic in the Deep South United States. The first set of explanations is categorized as social determinants of health and includes social and economic factors that influence public health care such as poverty rates, high school graduation rates, and existing health infrastructure in the region. The second set of explanations examines the influence of less visible barriers to health care, and includes studies related to shared communal narratives of conspiracy theories and stigma. The paper employs a quantitative analysis of social and economic data from four states, Alabama, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Ohio, to demonstrate that social and economic data alone cannot explain why the HIV/AIDS epidemic is growing so rapidly in the Deep South but not in other regions of the country. The results from the data analysis conclude that cultural factors, such as conspiracy theories and stigma, may carry greater explanatory power than what is generally assumed. This paper concludes with implications for future research into the impact of stigma and conspiracy theories on public health and the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the Deep South.

Introduction

The HIV/AIDS epidemic in the United States started in 1981. After contracting HIV a person can go eight years before symptoms appear. This makes the HIV/AIDS virus particularly hard to track. Throughout the 1980s the HIV/AIDS virus spread mostly in the northeast and western areas of the country. That has since changed. Now HIV/AIDS rates are increasing most rapidly in the six states that make up the Deep South (Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina and South Carolina). From 2000 to 2003, the number of new reported AIDS cases increased 35.6% in the Deep South, and only 4.0% in other Southern states (Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia, and Virginia) and 5.2% nationally (Reif, Geonnotti, Whetten 2006, 971). This presents a challenge to public health policymakers. Given the advances in the development of antiretroviral drugs, surveillance methods, and stopping the spread of the disease in other parts of the country since 1981, what is responsible for the increase in HIV/AIDS rates in the Deep South?

The Deep South states share several common factors, in addition to their rising HIV/AIDS rates. These states share a common history of an agrarian economy based on plantations and slave
labor. In addition, they have a 30% Black population compared to 12% nationally (McKinnon 2000). Nationally, African-Americans bear a disproportionate burden of 44% of HIV/AIDS cases, and this is especially true in the Deep South where 70% of the reported cases are African-Americans (Reif, Geonnotti, Whetten 2006, 971)

Identifying the barriers confronted by marginalized groups is essential for effective public health care. The rapid rate of the spread of HIV/AIDS creates an urgent need for more research into the factors explaining its increase. This paper will examine the role socio-economic and cultural barriers have in the rural Deep South’s HIV/AIDS epidemic, and the need for greater research and attention to less visible communal narratives, what one might be tempted to called “cultural” factors. Both socio-economic and cultural approaches are important. However, cultural barriers are hard to quantify and consequently are often over looked.

It is important to understand what the word culture means. In past social science research cultural relativism has been used to advance the idea that because every culture is unique, the inequalities within that society must be respected as an inherent part of that culture. Poverty, inequality, and structural violence are confused as endemic parts of a different culture. “Culture difference is used to explain away assaults on dignity and suffering instead of focusing on the national and international mechanisms that [perpetuate inequality]” (Farmer 2005, 48). Culture when used in this paper refers to the intangible influence of commonly held ideas within a certain community.

Specifically, two commonly held ideas are examined within the African-American community: conspiracy theories and stigma. Conspiracy theories refer to beliefs within some parts of the African-American community that government programs, including medical programs, are purposefully designed to harm and repress African-Americans. Stigma refers to the perception of HIV/AIDS as a mark or sign of disgrace, or even a manifestation of sin for sexual misbehavior. These ideas, however, are very much linked to and caused by state and national actions. Conspiracy theories are the legacy of narratives within the Black community that are the result of distrust and fear caused by a history of violent and repressive actions taken by the state against its own people. Stigma persists because of a failure by state health institutions to recognize the need for addressing it through adequate public health education or outreach campaigns.

The paper will examine the question, what is causing the increase in HIV/AIDS rates in the Deep South? The paper’s focus will be confined to the disease’s spread in the last 10 years, when the sharp increase in HIV/AIDS rates in the Deep South was first reported. The paper builds on several decades’ worth of literature on the structural barriers to health care in the Deep South. It also examines literature on imbedded conspiracy theories and stigma found in the Black community and their implications for HIV/AIDS.

Literature Review

A lot has been written about structural factors that create barriers to healthcare. Different models have been developed in the field of health education to determine why an individual is prevented from accepting preventative medical care. The Social Determinants of Health Model says that a person’s choices affect their health. Their choices are shaped by the socio-economic structures surrounding them (World Health Organization 2008). Social determinants of health, factors such as
the level of poverty in the surrounding population, income, and level of education, are useful predictors of disease rates. However, a person’s behavior, and therefore health, is also influenced by other beliefs and attitudes he or she holds. As the physician-sociologist Paul Farmer wrote, to understand the dynamics and distribution of suffering “one must imbed individual biography in the larger matrix of culture, history, and political economy” (Farmer 2005, 41). An ecological model outlook suggests that to adequately explain some behavior it is necessary to study the environment in which the behavior took place and, especially, the information that connects a person to their environment. A person’s environment entails the cultural perceptions and expectations that shape an individual’s worldview.

The issue of treating HIV/AIDS in the Deep South is compounded by the region’s unique problems. Doctors Anderson, Chandra and Mosher (2005) noted the difficulty of treating HIV/AIDS in rural areas in 2005. 42.2% of the Deep South population lives in rural areas, compared to 24.8% nationally. Males living in rural areas, however, are only 41.6% likely to get tested for HIV/AIDS, compared to 49.3% in urban areas (Anderson et al. 2005, 15). Nationally, males in the Deep South are among the least likely to get tested (46.3%) compared to a high of 48.5% in the West (Anderson et al. 2005, 15). Delayed diagnosis and treatment increases the likelihood of the disease spreading, and an under-counting of HIV/AIDS cases further complicates healthcare providers’ allocation of resources and their response.

Another factor that must be examined in understanding the disease’s spread is the region’s high incarceration rate and the possibility of infection of the general population through released prisoners. This was examined by Hammett and Drachman-Jones in 2006. Incarceration rates in the South (790 per 100,000) are the highest in the country (Hammett and Drachman-Jones 2006, 17). Additionally, approximately one fourth of all people in the United States who are living with HIV or AIDS in a given year pass through a correctional facility that same year (Hammett and Drachman-Jones 2006, 17). The South has the highest overall number, though not rate, of HIV infections among correctional releases (Hammett and Drachman-Jones 2006, 19). Patterns of incarceration may mirror the emerging racial pattern of infection. Blacks and Latinos are vastly overrepresented among correctional inmates. Blacks make up approximately 13% of the U.S. population but over 40% of jail and prison inmates (Hammett and Drachman-Jones 2006, 20).

In 2006, Reif, Geonnotti, and Whetten wrote the most comprehensive review of statistics explaining the spread of HIV/AIDS in the Deep South. They expanded on the unique problem posed by the Deep South’s rural population by describing several interlocking, multifaceted health indicators that leave the region more vulnerable to disease and poor health. They note that the Deep South states are ranked at the bottom of nearly every national health index, including diabetes, stroke, infant mortality, and sexually transmitted infection (STI) rates. A population already in poor health is particularly vulnerable to the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Five of the ten states with the highest rates of chlamydia and four of the ten states with the highest syphilis rates were in the Deep South (Reif, Geonnotti, Whetten 2006, 971). They note that STIs have been consistently found to facilitate HIV transmission.

Another factor is the endemic poverty of the region. Poverty has been recognized as a barrier to health care that inhibits access to preventive services and treatment. The Deep South states contain the highest rates of poverty in the country. Reif, Geonnotti, and Whetten (2006) extend their argument to explain the health disparities between Whites and Blacks. In the Deep South African-Americans rank far lower, compared to Whites, on measurements of income and poverty rates, and are therefore more
vulnerable to poor health. Nationally, half of African-Americans rank 200% below the poverty line (Reif, Geonnotti, Whetten 2006, 972). However, if STDs, poverty, and rural population were the only factors responsible for HIV/AIDS, then similar HIV/AIDS rates should be seen across the Midwest, which is not the case. The authors conclude, “There may be an association of disease with the unique history and culture of the Deep South” (Reif, Geonnotti, Whetten 2006, 972).

The Anderson (2005), Hammett and Drachman-Jones (2006), and Reif, Geonnotti, and Whetten (2006) articles explain the structural barriers that must be overcome to receive care and illustrate social determinants of health that are conducive to the infection’s spread. However, a healthcare provider’s response based solely on the above articles would only have the intended effect if the healthcare provider could assume that prevention measures and the disease itself were perceived in the same way by everyone. Without taking into account the psychological, cultural, and inherent “submerged” barriers to healthcare access, healthcare providers will be hindering their own efforts. How the disease is perceived by different groups of people living in the Deep South when placed in the context of their life experiences, daily interactions, and religious beliefs must also be taken into account.

In the Deep South the perceptions of HIV/AIDS is different and how information about it is received, differs depending on race. Across all groups, stigma is associated with HIV/AIDS. However, in the African-American community HIV/AIDS is associated with government conspiracy theories and more strongly tied to stigma. Writing in 1991 before the HIV/AIDS rate skyrocketed in the Deep South, Thomas and Quinn (1991) believed that the HIV/AIDS epidemic’s effect on the Black community could not be explained without taking into account the mistrust of health officials resulting from the Tuskegee Syphilis Study. They contended that this mistrust fueled government conspiracy theories about HIV/AIDS, creating another barrier to care.

The Tuskegee Syphilis study was conducted in Tuskegee, Alabama over the course of 40 years, from 1932 to 1972. During the study 399 Black men with syphilis were examined for 40 years and prevented from receiving medication, even after penicillin became available, or being told of their disease. The study was conducted by the Center for Disease Control, the Alabama State Health Department, and the Macon County Board of Health. The authors note that even as late as 1969:

*The CDC convened a blue-ribbon panel to discuss the Tuskegee study. The group reviewed all aspects of the experiment and decided against treating the men. This decision ended debate on the Tuskegee study’s future: It would continue until ‘end point’ (Tomas and Quinn 1991, 1501).*

When it was exposed in 1972 the study sent shock waves across the country. Thomas and Quinn (1991) contend the study has had a devastating impact on how the African-American community views healthcare providers by fueling conspiracy theories that HIV/AIDS is a weapon of genocide against the Black community. The authors observed that in presentations at public health professional meetings and in interactions with Black community based-organization staff members, “the Tuskegee Study is used to undermine trust and justify AIDS conspiracy theories” (Tomas and Quinn 1991, 1502). Though the fear in the Black community of professional healthcare providers is misplaced, its origin is legitimate. Indeed, “It must be acknowledged that public health research and practice operate in an
environment influenced by societal values and political ideology” (Tomas and Quinn 1991, 1504). As HIV/AIDS disproportionately infects the Black population, understanding the context in which Black Americans perceive the disease will be essential so that an effective response can be given.

The Tuskegee Syphilis Study affected not only how African-Americans trusted healthcare providers, but also how African Americans participated in high-risk sexual behavior. In 2006, Ross, Essien, and Torres examined the legacy of the Tuskegee Syphilis among four racial groups using a questionnaire and a random street sample in Houston. Participants were asked if “AIDS is an agent of genocide created by the United States government to kill off minority populations” (Ross, Essien, and Torres 2006, 2). The study found that widespread beliefs in HIV conspiracies occur across different racial and ethnic groups, but was most evident in African-Americans (Ross, Essien, and Torres 2006, 3). Also, genocidal conspiracy beliefs among African American men were associated with a reduction in condom use (Ross, Essien, and Torres 2006, 3).

A similar study, conducted by Williams and Sallar (2010) in Mississippi, also found a correlation between conspiracy theories and condom use. The researchers examined how myths, misconceptions, and prior knowledge of HIV/AIDS impacted sexual behavior among African American men in both a rural and urban setting. The study “revealed that the overall respondents’ HIV/AIDS knowledge did not translate into positive attitude or behavior” (Williams and Sallar 2010, 1147). Their knowledge did not translate into the predicted behavior, which led the researchers to conclude that other myths or beliefs were being taken into account. Among participants from the rural Mississippi Delta, who were relatively well informed about HIV/AIDS prevention and causes, more than “40% of the rural men responded negatively to the use of condoms at any time during sexual intercourse” (Williams and Sallar 2010, 1147). Many of the participants did not express any confidence in condoms’ ability to prevent HIV.

In addition to conspiracy theories, various studies have demonstrated that stigma in the Deep South is associated with STIs and HIV/AIDS, which is compounded in rural communities. In Sutton, Anthony, Villa, and Weidle’s 2010 survey of health care clinics, participant healthcare providers were asked to list perceived barriers to health care. A common response was perceptions of patients’ lack of trust in system privacy and confidentiality and their concern about HIV-related stigma (Sutton et al. 2010). Free responses revealed that there is a lot of potential for breaches of confidentiality that may occur when a health department is located in a small town or rural community. Patients were concerned about being identified entering or exiting an HIV testing facility or being recognized by health department staff. Healthcare providers also reported that efforts to heighten HIV awareness, education, and prevention were sometimes hindered by religious and moral objections to HIV education (Sutton et al. 2010).

Lichtenstein, Hook III, and Sharma’s 2005 survey of households in the Bible Belt state of Alabama explored how stigma is associated with STIs, which we can expect to be similar to stigma associated with HIV/AIDS and different across gender, race, and church attendance. The survey revealed a gap in perceptions between the African-American community and other ethnic groups. This gap does not bode well for HIV/AIDS prevention among the African-American community. African-Americans and church-goers (regardless of race) who attend church regularly were the two groups most likely to see STIs as a sign of immorality (Lichtensetin, Hook III, and Sharma 2005, 48). African Americans were more frequent churchgoers than Whites (81% versus 60%) (Lichtensetin, Hook III,
and Sharma 2005, 50). Stigma discouraged and impeded two common disease tracking and prevention methods; partner notification and contact tracing. Almost half (45%) of all respondents (African-Americans and Whites) said they would be reluctant to report names for partner identification to the health department, but African-Americans were more likely than Whites to say that they would not seek treatment at all (Lichtensetin, Hook III, and Sharma 2005, 50).

Greater stigma among African-Americans warrants greater investigation, which means the investigation arrives at the doorstep of the Black Church. In the Deep South, the church is the heart of the Black community. When Foster, Cooper, Parton, and Meeks (2011) interviewed Alabama pastors about the role the Black Church could play in spreading HIV/AIDS awareness, many pastors said that they personally were interested in such a project, but they felt that they were prevented from doing so because stigma continued to be an issue for their congregations. One pastor related; “People are afraid to address HIV/AIDS because it may put a dark cloud over your ministry...people will gossip and say, what they talking about that for, they must have a member who is infected” (Foster et al. 2011, 325).

These articles explore possible causes for the vulnerability of the African-American population to the spread of HIV/AIDS. They approach the issue from two very different viewpoints. The first set of articles employ a litany of statistics to list the barriers preventing access to health care for the individual, while the second set of articles places the individual within the context of their community’s perceptions and cultural worldview. The structural barriers of poverty and poor health infrastructure prevent people from reaching the health care they need, but the intangible presence of misinformation and stigma channels the disease through a person’s networks and relations, fueled by silence and distrust.

Hypothesis

I hypothesize that race will be the most important variable in predicting the spread of HIV/AIDS. The HIV/AIDS virus has devastated minority populations. The U.S. African-American population is concentrated heavily in the Deep South. 54.8 percent of the total U.S. African-American population lives in the Deep South and 18.8 percent lives in the Midwest (The Black Population 2000). The literature suggests the culture and history of the Deep South, including conspiracy theories and stigma, influence the spread of the disease.

Methodology

In order to discern the effects of various social determinants on the spread of HIV/AIDS in poor rural communities, a quantitative correlative analysis of selected statistics of variables at the county level was conducted. The dataset employed contained different socio-economic variables and HIV/AIDS rates for counties from four states, two representing the Midwest and two representing the Deep South. In order to build a dataset that generated statistically relevant results, a sufficient number of counties were necessary. The dataset combined counties from all four states instead of analyzing them as two separate datasets because it was the only method in which a sufficient number of counties were achieved.
There is a problem with only using counties from the Deep South because rural counties in the Deep South are heavily segregated along racial and economic lines; White counties are far richer compared to Black counties. In the Mississippi Delta and in the Alabama Black Belt, counties are nearly 70% to 80% African-American and among the poorest in the country. Counties from the Midwest were chosen because it was the only other region in the United States where equally poor, rural counties were found that were not uniformly African-American, thus facilitating the statistical analysis.

The quantitative method used is based in part on a paper by Song, Hall, Harrison, Sharpe, Lin, and Dean (2011). Their study developed a system demonstrating how correlation and partial correlation coefficients can be used to measure the impact of socioeconomic factors on AIDS diagnosis rates in certain geographic areas nation-wide. Out of 12 variables, they found the AIDS diagnosis rate was highly correlated with the distribution of race, population density, and marital status in an area (Song et. al. 2011). The study concluded that area-based measures of socioeconomic variables can be used to identify risk factors associated with AIDS. In the course of their study they noted that while correlation analysis is used to identify risk factors, confounding from other variables must be taken into account.

Data Sources

The American Community Survey. While the U.S. Census provides demographic information once every ten years, the U.S. Census American Community Survey provides data every year depicting a variety of subjects. The information is down to the census tract level and captures demographic and socio-economic information including variables such as age, education, employment, housing, income, mobility, country of origin, language spoken at home, and poverty (American Fact Finder). Information provided was from the 2005-2009 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates dataset. The 2005-2009 dataset is more accurate for small population levels.

Geographic area. Four states, Alabama, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Ohio, were chosen for analysis, two representing the Deep South and two representing the Midwest. Mississippi was chosen because of its particularly high HIV/AIDS rate, and Oklahoma was chosen because its per capita income is comparable to Alabama and Mississippi’s (United States and States, Median Household Income 2007). The other states were chosen based on the ease of finding publicly available HIV/AIDS data released by their respective state health departments.

The county level was chosen to best capture the impact of the socio-economic variables because demographic make-up can vary widely from one part of a state to another. Additionally, cities can distort data and this research focused only on rural populations. Counties with more than 50,000 people were designated urban and excluded from the data set. This loose definition was derived from the definition utilized by the 2010 U.S. Census (2010 Census Urban and Rural Classification and Urban Area Criteria).

HIV/Aids Surveillance Data. The spread of HIV/AIDS was measured by incidence rate. Incidence rate is defined as the number of new HIV infections in a specific population in a given year. This is uniformly measured at a rate per 100,000. State Health Departments receive funding from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to compile and report all incidents of HIV/AIDS infection (HIV Surveillance Report). The data for each individual county was compiled by visiting each state’s representative state health department website. HIV/AIDS incidences from 2008 and 2009
were used for Alabama and Mississippi, and from 2009 for Oklahoma and Ohio, with the discontinuity a result of trouble finding publicly available data (Public Health Areas January-December 2008, Mississippi HIV Rates 2006-2010, Harris 2009, 2009 HIV Public Surveillance Data For Ohio). County-level rates per 100,000 were not provided by the Ohio Health Department. These rates were calculated using the 2005-2009 American Community Survey Population data. In sparsely populated areas there may be too few data points causing HIV/AIDS incidence rates to vary widely from one year to the next. To prevent against this for Mississippi and Alabama counties, an average of the 2008 and 2009 HIV/AIDS incidence rates per 100,000 was compiled. Due to a lack of available data this operation was not repeated for Oklahoma and Ohio.

Data Analysis

First, data from the 2005-2009 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimate was used to measure relevant social determinant health variables. Except for per capita income, all of the variables were compiled as percentages. For example, the percent of the population 25 years and older with some college education was calculated by dividing the number of people 25 years and older with some college education by the number of people 25 years and older in the county.

The following demographic, social, and economic variables were selected:

1. HIV/AIDS rate per 100,000 (HIV/AIDS Rate)
2. Percent of county that is Black (Percent of County that is Black)
3. Percent of county with some college education, 25 years and older (College Education)
4. Per capita income (Per Capita Income)
5. Percent of the population that lives below the poverty rate (Poverty Rate)

Additionally, the following variables were collected for descriptive purposes:

1. Total population
2. Black per capita income as a percent of White per capita income
3. HIV/AIDS cases in 2008

This data was combined at the county level.

After the data set was constructed, and the urban counties had been removed, a matrix scatter plot was created to visually depict the relationship between the four Social Determinant Health variables and the HIV/AIDS rate. A scatter plot can reveal whether there is a linear correlation between variables. A strong negative correlation was predicted between the demographic variable Percent of County that is Black and the Social Determinant Health variables of per capita income, and percent of the population living below the poverty line. A bivariate correlation was conducted to determine the strength of the relationship between the variables, and whether the relationship is statistically significant.

A major problem of measuring the correlations between variables is that often demographic variables are strongly correlated with other social determinant health variables. In this research project it is particularly hard to discern the effects of different variables in the Deep South, because African-Americans are disproportionately at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder. As noted earlier in this paper, nationally, half of African-Americans rank 200% below the poverty line (Reif, Geonnotti, Whetten 2006, 972). This statistic demonstrates the reality described by one writer when he says...
“America is a place where class historically coincides with race. [This] is the heaviest legacy of slavery and segregation” (Bolina 2011). In Mississippi and Alabama, Black per capita income is on average half the per capita income of Whites (Table 1). Accordingly, what appears to be a correlation between two variables could actually be one variable appearing to correlate with the dependent variable because of its close relationship with a third variable. To adjust for this, a partial correlation was conducted. A partial correlation calculates coefficients that describe the linear relationship (correlation) between two variables while accounting for the effects of one or more additional variables.

After measuring the degree of correlation and after taking into account the indirect effects of other variables, a multiple linear regression was performed. A multiple linear regression specifies the nature of the relation between the variables and measures to what extent the independent variables are predictive of the dependent variables.

Results

With all four states combined the dataset included 258 counties (Table 1). Of these 258, 111 were from the Deep South, and 147 were from the Midwest (Tables 2, 3). The regional differences in the datasets mirror publicly reported data. Mean per capita income was almost $10,000 higher in the Midwest. In the Deep South HIV/AIDS Rates, as measured per 100,000, were higher at 16.36 compared to 3.35 in the Midwest. Also, in the states examined, African-Americans made up an average of 39 percent of the population in Deep South counties compared to an average of 4 percent in Midwest counties. In both regions, African-Americans are significantly poorer on average than Whites, and the education rate is nearly identical. It must be noted that this is an extremely poor population with per capita income never rising more than $39,000, and ranging as low as $11,275. On average, nearly 22 percent of the population captured in this dataset lived at or below the federal poverty level, with one county as high as 60 percent.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>2130</td>
<td>464956</td>
<td>42681.12</td>
<td>57848.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of County that is White</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>98.2293</td>
<td>73.46124</td>
<td>21.18532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of County that is Black</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>18.79108</td>
<td>23.01926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Education</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>26.15514</td>
<td>7.815085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Income</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>11275</td>
<td>38878</td>
<td>19295.78</td>
<td>3800.318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per capita Income-Percent of White Income</td>
<td>245</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>292.4535</td>
<td>59.29443</td>
<td>25.42014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>18.59807</td>
<td>7.956653</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, Combined Data Set (AL, MS, OH, OK)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AIDS Cases (2008)</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2.99</td>
<td>4.515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS Rate</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>9.64003</td>
<td>12.21846</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, Midwest (OK, OH)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>2652</td>
<td>464956</td>
<td>57715</td>
<td>72569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of County that is White</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>98.2293</td>
<td>85.067</td>
<td>11.293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of County that is Black</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18.9435</td>
<td>3.476</td>
<td>3.4171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Education</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>26.939</td>
<td>9.824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Income</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>13112</td>
<td>38878</td>
<td>21032</td>
<td>3667.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Income- Percent of White Income</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>292.4535</td>
<td>64.966</td>
<td>31.744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>15.084</td>
<td>6.9309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDS Cases (2008)</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2.36</td>
<td>4.869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS Rate</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>3.3533</td>
<td>4.8146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3: Descriptive Statistics, Deep South (AL, MS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>2130</td>
<td>49584</td>
<td>22771</td>
<td>11260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of County that is White</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>97.2881</td>
<td>58.091</td>
<td>21.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of County that is Black</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>0.1654</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>39.073</td>
<td>22.225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Education</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35.6631</td>
<td>25.117</td>
<td>3.5623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Income</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>11275</td>
<td>23774</td>
<td>16997</td>
<td>2555.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Income- Percent of White Income</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>84.9076</td>
<td>52.448</td>
<td>11.337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>10.2916</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>23.252</td>
<td>6.7676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIDS Cases 2008</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>3.872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS Rate</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>16.365</td>
<td>13.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From examining the regional data and noting the differences in poverty and HIV/AIDS between them, it at first seems there must be a correlation between income and HIV/AIDS. Per capita income especially is often considered to be an indicator of a population’s susceptibility to disease. This relationship was examined more closely in a scatter point graph of all four states (Graph 1), which appears to indicate there is a negative correlation between per capita income and HIV/AIDS rates. This correlation also appears when the Southern states are examined (Graph 2). There does not appear to be a negative correlation for the Midwestern States (Graph 3). It should be noted, however, that for all four states the per capita income is very low but there is not a large range of income. The small range in income may not provide an adequate variety of data points.

Graph 1: Per Capita Income and HIV/AIDS, Combined Data Set (AL, MS, OH, OK)

Graph 2: Per Capita Income and HIV/AIDS, Deep South (AL, MS)
All four independent variables were associated with the dependent variable in a scatter point matrix (Graph 4). Education appears to be irrelevant but otherwise there appears to be a linear correlation between the other independent variables and HIV/AIDS per 100,000. Additionally there appears to be linear correlations between all of the social determinants of health variables and the percent the percent of the county that is Black.
The correlations between the independent variables and HIV/AIDS rate per 100,000 were then measured using a bivariate correlation procedure (Table 4). A bivariate correlation determines the strength of the relationship between the variables, and whether the relationship is statistically significant. All variables with a significance of <.05 were considered statistically significant, with .000 considered especially significant. The significance of the correlations between the variables and HIV/AIDS Rate was .000 for all variables except for the percent the of population 25 years and older with some college, which, at a significance of .117 was not significant. Of the correlations that were statistically significant the strength of their correlation with HIV/AIDS Rate ranged from per capita income at -0.409 to .703 for the percent of the county that is Black. It is interesting to note that not only did the percent of the county that is Black have the strongest correlation with HIV/AIDS, but it also had strong correlations with the other variables.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percent of County that is Black</th>
<th>College Education</th>
<th>Per Capita Income</th>
<th>Poverty Rate</th>
<th>HIV/AIDS rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of County that is Black</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-.134*</td>
<td>-.594**</td>
<td>.674**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Education</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>-.134*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.193**</td>
<td>.215**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>0.032</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
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<td>258</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Income</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>-.594**</td>
<td>.193**</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-.699**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>.674**</td>
<td>.215**</td>
<td>-.699**</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS rate</td>
<td>Pearson Correlation</td>
<td>.703**</td>
<td>-.098</td>
<td>-.409**</td>
<td>.487**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (2-tailed)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.117</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Bivariate Correlations. *Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
The partial correlation procedure was performed to examine variables’ correlations with the HIV/AIDS Rate variable while controlling for other variables. There was no significant change in the strong correlation between the percent of the county that is Black and HIV/AIDS, which remained at around .62 (Table 5)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control Variables</th>
<th>Percent of County that is Black</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
<th>Significance (2-tailed)</th>
<th>Df</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate</td>
<td>0.625</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>252</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Partial Correlation, Percent of the County that is Black and HIV/AIDS Rate.

However, the other three variables were all found to be statistically insignificant in regards to having a correlation with the HIV/AIDS Rate (Tables 6, 7, 8). A significance of .05 or less must be attained for correlation to be considered statistically significant, but for the economic variables and for education the significance ranged from .432 to .716.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control Variables</th>
<th>Per Capita Income</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
<th>Significance (2-tailed)</th>
<th>Df</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percent of County that is Black</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.716</td>
<td>252</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Partial Correlation, Per Capita Income and HIV/AIDS Rate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control Variables</th>
<th>Poverty Rate</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
<th>Significance (2-tailed)</th>
<th>Df</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>College Education</td>
<td>0.052</td>
<td>0.409</td>
<td>252</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Partial Correlation, Poverty Rate and HIV/AIDS Rate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Control Variables</th>
<th>College Education</th>
<th>Correlation</th>
<th>Significance (2-tailed)</th>
<th>Df</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Income</td>
<td>-0.036</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>252</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Partial Correlation, College Education and HIV/AIDS Rate.
Lastly, a linear regression was produced to check for continuity in results and to measure the specific relationship between the variables and the dependent variables (Table 9). The results from the linear regression agreed with the results from the partial correlations that education and the economic variables were not statistically significant. From the adjusted R square value in the model summary we know that the independent variables explain almost 50% of the data points. While not extremely high, it is significant enough to signify that the variables are relevant. In the coefficients table displaying the independent variables, the only significant one (.05 or less) is the percent of the county that is Black. The coefficients table also informs the reader that for every 1 unit increase in Black population, there is a predicted .682 unit increase in HIV/AIDS Rate per 100,000.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>R Square</th>
<th>Adjusted R Square</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regression</td>
<td>.704</td>
<td>0.496</td>
<td>0.488</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.1: Regression, Summary. The dependent variable is HIV/AIDS Rate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unstandardized Coefficients</th>
<th>Standardized Coefficients</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Std. Error</td>
<td>Beta</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Constant)</td>
<td>-1.116</td>
<td>5.439</td>
<td>-0.205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of County that is Black</td>
<td>0.362</td>
<td>0.035</td>
<td>0.682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College Education</td>
<td>-0.049</td>
<td>0.087</td>
<td>-0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per Capita Income</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty Rate</td>
<td>0.108</td>
<td>0.131</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9.2: Regression, Results.

There is a very complicated relationship between race and poverty, income, and education. These variables influence each other in different ways. However, after controlling for race, there was found to be no statistically significant correlation between education, income, or poverty and HIV/AIDS in the sample counties. Instead of various social determinant health variables, the strongest correlation with HIV/AIDS Rate was found between the demographic variable, the percent of the county that is Black.

**Implications**

This research shows that within poor, rural counties, race is the variable that explains the rapidity of the disease's spread or the magnitude of its destruction. Inherited cultural and historical factors in the African-American community must be examined. I propose that additional qualitative research is necessary to explore whether lingering conspiracy theories surrounding the Tuskegee
syphilis experiments, coupled with social stigma, carry explanatory power in understanding the persistent phenomenon of elevated HIV/AIDS rates. The following proposal for qualitative research is grounded in an interpretative paradigm that there are multiple realities of the world according to different perceptions. In conducting his field research the researcher would focus on social relationships and the meaning and symbolism attached by people to interactions in their daily lives.

Invisible barriers often exist for marginalized groups such as minorities or poor people in a variety of venues, from the doctor's examination room to public health campaigns. In the examination room, White and middle-class patients may experience the interaction differently because they “seem able to create workable relationships with healthcare providers because of their ability to pay for services or utilize private insurance and because they have cultural support” (Heller et al. 2004, 32).

My proposed research agenda approaches a public health issue from a development perspective. Vulnerable populations are often the most marginalized groups in a society. Implementing development programs to effectively reach vulnerable populations (or a failure to so) depends on the ability of a program to bridge ethnic, religious, gender and class lines and to facilitate cross-cultural communication. This proposed research would build on previous work like Williams and Sallar’s 2010 studies in Mississippi, which revealed discrepancies between how African-American men understood HIV/AIDS and their resulting behavior, and Lichtenstein, Hook III, and Sharma’s surveys in Alabama, which revealed differences in how HIV/AIDS is perceived among different racial groups.

I propose conducting a series of semi-structured interviews and focus groups and applying discourse analysis to test whether conspiracy theories from the Tuskegee Syphilis Study and stigma can further explain the spread of HIV/AIDS. By employing interviews a researcher would better understand different perceptions. Through discourse analysis applied to focus groups, a researcher may be able to understand how behavior is affected and deduce additional factors in the disease’s spread that have not been considered previously.

Health departments in the Deep South are failing their citizens in enacting measures to control a disease’s spread. In the face of the fastest growing HIV/AIDS rates in the country Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi spend $10,413, $16,647, and $13,609 per patient respectively compared to a national average of $24,867 (Medicaid and HIV: A National Analysis 2011). More troubling is the example of the state of Mississippi’s refusal to accept federal funds to fight HIV/AIDS, including Governor Haley Barbour’s “attempt to block health care reform that would expand Medicaid benefits for people living with HIV in the state” (Rights at Risk 2011, 2). A report by the Human Rights Watch found that the state of Mississippi “leave[s] people with HIV/AIDS without treatment at rates comparable to those in Botswana, Ethiopia, and Rwanda” (Rights at Risk 2011, 2).

A qualitative, ethnological research agenda identifying areas of miscommunication could provide a unique insight into this pressing public health crisis by helping doctors understand the fears of their patients, helping communities develop a prevention plan, and helping policy makers allocate resources more efficiently. There is an urgent need for more research that can contribute to better understanding how the HIV/AIDS virus spreads through these communities. Beneath the numbers and graphs it is more important to remember that these values represent glimpses into lives. They capture the extremes, the mean of a middle class existence, the depths of poverty, and the blending of race, blood, and disease.
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INCREASING VOTER TURNOUT: CAN MASS TRANSIT HELP?

Rosie Romano

Abstract Since the mid-20th Century, voting rights activists have sought to open the American electoral system and reduce the costs of voting for all citizens. In this study, I look specifically at the impact of polling place localization in relation to mass transit stops on voter turnout rates in the District of Columbia. By compiling precinct-level data on the 2008 General Election and the 2010 Democratic Primary Election and measuring the distance between polling places and the nearest Metrorail station, I am able to determine the extent to which mass transit can lower the cost of voting. Through linear regression analysis, I find that there is no clear relationship between the distance from a polling place to the nearest Metrorail station and voter turnout rates. This study functions as an introduction to the potential voting rights implications of the availability of mass transit near polling places. Despite being unable to reject my null hypothesis in this study, I argue that a convenient mass transit system is capable of reducing the costs of voting among racial minorities and people of low-income status.

Literature Review

The Cost of Voting

Throughout American history, voter qualifications and access to the electoral system have proven remarkably malleable. Perhaps most significantly, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) addressed systemic issues of racial discrimination to increase the ability of minority voters to participate in the electoral process. While the VRA’s remedial provisions provide for federal oversight in the maintenance of ballot access for all voters, the likelihood for certain demographic groups to participate electorally remains highly unequal. Broadly speaking, studies have indicated a positive relationship between socioeconomic status and voter participation rates (Verba and Nie 1972; Murry and Vedlitz 1977). As measures of socioeconomic status often incorporate data on educational attainment and income levels of population groups, studies investigating these individual components have also demonstrated a significant relationship to voter turnout rates. Specifically, researchers have found that education has a positive effect on voter registration rates and level of political awareness, which translate into higher electoral participation rates (Jackson 1995). Citizens that have achieved a higher level of education are better prepared to navigate the registration process and more likely to gain a sense of satisfaction from voting (Morton 2006). In addition, income as a measure of economic well-being has also been shown to impact voter turnout. For example, in a study on the impact of economic adversity on electoral participation, Rosenstone (1982) finds that high poverty and unemployment levels greatly decrease voter turnout rates.
The education and income aspects of a voter’s identity impact the specific cost a person must incur in order to vote. Based on statistical analysis, Morton (2006) determines that for most citizens voting is a costly activity, and a rational person would choose not to vote in almost all circumstances. Indeed, according to a registration and election data compiled by the United States Census, citizens expressed a wide variety of reasons for not voting. In the 2008 general election, according to data assembled by the United States Election Project at George Mason University, nationwide turnout among the voting-eligible population (VEP) was over 62 percent. Among the nearly 38 percent of the VEP that did not vote, the most popular reasons for not voting were “Too busy” (17.5 percent), “Illness or disability” (14.9 percent), and “Not interested” (13.4 percent) (U.S. Census 2008). Based on the analysis of literature on this topic, it seems reasonable that these costs can be more easily overcome on an individual basis by citizens that have higher levels of educational attainment and income. Citizens with greater educational and financial resources can overcome the cost of voting, despite illness, disability, or lack of interest because of the more tangible social and “duty of citizenship” benefits (Morton 2006). In other words, more educated citizens are more likely to feel a sense of personal pride and receive respect from their peers in casting their ballot. Also, voters who are experienced in interacting with bureaucratic systems as a result of higher educational attainment, such as university or corporate institutions, are more likely to be able to navigate the voter register process and make it to the polls (Jackson 1995).

In addition to the participation barriers cited most by citizens, two other reasons for not voting deserve further consideration: “Inconvenient polling place” (reported by 2.7 percent of the VEP) and “Transportation problems” (2.6 percent) (U.S. Census 2008). Both barriers, while reported by a relatively small percentage of the population, have been studied and found to be relevant concerns in analyzing voter turnout. In a 2005 study on the importance of the location of polling places, Haspel and Knots (2005) found that “distance [to a polling place] has a statistically significant impact on the voting decision” (567). Similarly, in an analysis of Los Angeles polling places, Brady and McNulty (2011) found that the rate of voting at the polling place decreased as the distance to the polling place increased (124). Again, in a study on the relationship between distance to a polling place and absentee voting, Dyck and Gimpel (2005) found that as distance increases precinct voting drops significantly, while absentee voting by mail greatly increases. As a result, recent efforts to increase voter turnout have focused on increasing the number of polling places (Morton 2006). Ideally, this practice will decrease the distance to a polling place, thus increasing turnout.

Other researchers have argued that distance to a polling place is not the only aspect of location that should be analyzed in seeking to explain voter turnout. In 2009, Barreto, Cohen-Marks, and Woods conducted a study of the physical characteristic of polling places in Los Angeles. The researchers distributed a survey to examine the quality of polling places based on eight key criteria, including visibility of the location, availability of parking, and reliability of voting machines. Upon analysis of their data, they found that “low-quality precincts are not randomly distributed across the city and instead are more likely to be found in low-income and minority neighborhoods” (455). Moreover, the concentration of low-quality precincts in communities that are already more likely to record lower voter turnout rates creates a significant voting rights issue (Barreto et al. 2009). While this study discusses precinct quality from a ballot access perspective, it also has implications for voter turnout. Maintaining high-quality precincts, like creating a polling place near a voter’s residence, will reduce
the cost of voting and thereby increase voter turnout. Indeed, Gimpel and Schuknecht (2003) found that some precincts are more accessible than others, and accessibility makes a significant difference in turnout.

However, one feature of the distance to a polling place that researchers have overlooked is the accessibility of the polling place to voters who utilize mass transit services, such as city bus or rail systems. Research shows that there is high demand for mass transit services among low-income and minority residents (Garrett and Taylor 1999). Thus, based on previous research showing an inverted relationship between the distance to a polling place and voter turnout, it is relevant to investigate whether the distance of a polling place from mass transits stations has an impact on voter turnout rates. Furthermore, the ability to access a polling place by way of mass transit, as an additional element of the quality precinct index (Barreto et al. 2009) may reduce the cost of voting to provide more citizens with the opportunity to participate.

A Special Case: The District of Columbia

In analyzing the relationship between polling place location and voter turnout rates, the District of Columbia provides an interesting case study. The unique political and demographic characteristics of the District of Columbia demand creative solutions to alleviate disparities in electoral participation. Unlike any other local political community in the United States, the District of Columbia was created by the Constitution in order to “be free from any state control so as not to be obstructed in its actions and not to be subjected to any influence contrary to the national interest” (Franchino 1957, 213). As a result of this constitutional provision, residents of the District were not allowed to vote in presidential elections until the ratification of the 23rd Amendment in 1961 (Schrag 1989). Moreover, the District of Columbia did not have representation on the national stage until 1971 when its citizens gained the ability to elect a non-voting, participatory delegate to the United States House of Representatives, and in 1990, a three-member shadow congressional delegation traditionally awarded to territories preparing for statehood (Raskin 1999).

Locally, residents of the District of Columbia remained under the absolute authority of Congress until the District of Columbia Home Rule Act was passed in 1973. This act allowed for the election of a mayor and a thirteen-member city council, although Congress maintained “expressly reserved power to stop local legislation from becoming effective” (Schrag 1989, 313). Following these developments in federal representation and local governance, the District of Columbia has engaged in several attempts to enter the Union as a state (Schrag 1989). Today, according to the District of Columbia City Council website, “DC residents seek Statehood because it is the most appropriate mechanism to grant the US citizens who reside in the District of Columbia the full privileges of American citizenship...[including] full voting rights.” Thus, the contentious governmental and political situation in the District of Columbia provides a unique atmosphere in which to investigate the institutional costs of voting related to the locations of polling places.

Moreover, considering the voting rights implications surrounding the creation of precinct maps, it is important to understand the historical and demographic characteristics of the area. According to 2010 U.S. Census data, the District of Columbia is a racially diverse, yet highly segregated region home to over 600,000 people. In a special U.S. Census report entitled “Demographic Trends in the 20th Century,” Hobbs and Stoops (2002) report that “the population in the District of Columbia
has been 50 percent or more black since 1960” (92). The combination of a majority black population and complete District-wide disenfranchisement for a significant part of its history serves to illuminate the political climate in which residents of the nation’s capital continue to fight for equal voting rights.

In fact, despite the relatively recent expansion of voting rights within the District of Columbia, Raskin (1999) argues that due to the city’s majority-minority status, the categorical denial of the right to vote for voting members of the United States House of Representatives and Senate “bears an uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid” (67).

Among the eight wards of local governance, the racial and socioeconomic disparities raise valid questions about how the District of Columbia maintains equitable election administration and access to the ballot. For example, 2010 U.S. Census data assembled by NeighborhoodInfo DC show the extreme variance in the presence of certain racial groups, reporting a 96 percent black population in Ward 7 (located in the southeast corner of the District) compared to only a 5.6 percent black population Ward 3 (located in the northwest corner). In general, the white population is concentrated in the northwestern quadrant, while the black population, along with an increasing number of Hispanic people, makes up a majority of the other three quadrants. Similarly, reported annual family incomes vary from over $257,000 in Ward 3 to just more than $44,000 in Ward 8 (located in the southwest corner).

In addition, who votes and how they vote can be telling in an investigation into the fairness of election administration and polling place locations. On the whole, the District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics (DCBOEE) 2008 General Election registration statistics reports about 427,000 registered voters. By the 2010 General Election, the number of registered voters had increased to over 453,000 people. Registered voters are distributed fairly evenly among all eight wards with the largest variance between Ward 7 (79 percent registered) and Ward 2 (58 percent registered, located in the northwest quadrant). In reporting these statistics, however, it is important to note that Ward 7 claims the second-to-fewest number of residents, while Ward 2 is home to the largest overall population. The absolute number of registered voters per ward varies from over 59,000 in Ward 4 (located in the northeast corner) to about 46,500 in Ward 8.

Moreover, political party identification does not differ significantly among wards. In the District of Columbia, 75 percent of all registered voters align themselves with the Democratic Party, and no single ward electorate is composed of fewer than 65 percent of Democratic Party voters. While voter registration rates and political party identification certainly vary from election to election due to population changes and shifts in the political climate, these differences are much more obvious in voter turnout rates. For example, in the 2008 Presidential Election, the candidacy of Barack Obama spurred an increase in turnout in seven of the eight District of Columbia wards when compared to 2004 voter turnout rates (DCBOEE). In 2008, the highest and lowest voter turnout rates differed by just over seven percentage points. In 2004, that number was 20 percentage points.

**Research Design**

Through analysis of past research, it is clear there a strong relationship between distance to polling places and voter turnout. In addition, the creation of quality precincts can reduce the costs of voting and provide more citizens with the ability to vote. The role of mass transit in the struggle to increase voter turnout and maintain quality precincts has yet to be explored. As previously
discussed, the District of Columbia provides a unique case for analysis of electoral questions due to its political status, racial and socioeconomic composition, and electoral system. Moreover, according to a 2009 survey by the U.S. Census, the greater District of Columbia region is home to the third-highest transit ridership among urbanized areas (U.S. Census 2012). This system, which includes Metrorail and Metrobus, is administered by the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (WMATA). By combining these factors, I designed a research question to examine whether the distance to a polling place from the nearest Metrorail station has an effect on the voter turnout within that specific precinct. I hypothesize that citizens of the District of Columbia are more likely to vote if their polling place is located near a Metrorail station, especially among low-income areas. Thus, the null hypothesis to be tested is that proximity to a Metrorail station has no effect on the rate at which District of Columbia citizens vote.

In seeking to test this hypothesis, I designed a cross-sectional case study to compare rates of voter turnout with the distance between polling places and the nearest Metrorail station. To test the independent variable of distance to a polling place from the nearest Metrorail station, I gathered data on the location of polling places from the DCOEE website and Metrorail stations from the WMATA website. While previous studies on the relationship between distance from a citizen’s residence to his or her polling place have utilized Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to calculate precise distance measurements (Dyck and Gimpel 2005; Gimpel and Schuknecht 2003; Haspel and Knotts 2005), I was not able to utilize this technology in conducting my research. Instead, the mapping capabilities of Google provided a user-friendly and cost-effective alternative to GIS software, which allowed me to approximate the walking distance in miles to the polling place from the nearest Metrorail station. Then, in order to create a visual representation of this variable, I plotted the polling places and the Metrorail stations that serve them on a “DC Citywide Ward Map with Precincts” created by the DCOEE. Based on an initial visual analysis, I decided to aggregate the location data by dividing the data into eight groups to investigate whether different relationships to voter turnout rates exist among the individual wards. Then, considering theories from previous research in conjunction with the U.S. Census demographic data discussed previously, I sought to examine the differing statistical relationships between the two variables among the wards.

In order to gain a more representative sample of the recent participation rates in DC elections, I chose to look at data from two elections, including both a general election and a primary election. The 2008 general election, as previously discussed, featured a forty-year high in voter turnout nationwide (United States Election Project). This trend was evident in the District of Columbia election results, as well. With increased participation among statistically unlikely voters, such as blacks and people in lower income brackets, the 2008 general election results potentially exaggerate the overall electoral participation rates of many voters. In other words, characteristics of the political atmosphere in 2008, including the popularity of the candidacy of Barack Obama, likely lowered the cost of voting for many citizens to the extent that mass transit played a less obvious role in turnout rates.

On the 2010 primary election day, the DCOEE administered three party-specific primary elections. Overall, the voter turnout rate for the Democratic Party, Republican Party and the DC Statehood Green Party primaries was just over 37 percent. In order to capitalize on a slightly higher voter turnout rate (at about 40 percent), I chose to focus just on the Democratic primary. Moreover, two unique characteristics of the Democratic primary election made it an interesting case to include in this
study. First, the 2010 Democratic primary ballot featured all competitive races, as is often the case for District Democrats, but rarely the case for General Elections and the other parties’ primary elections. Second, by considering an election in which only registered Democrats are eligible to participate, the results of the statistical analysis may indicate a partisan divide in mass transit use among District of Columbia voters. The contrasting voter turnout rates, as well as the specific characteristics of each election, provided ample data from which to draw conclusions on the role of mass transit in voter participation.

In addition, to limit the voter turnout rate to the voters who actually traveled to their assigned polling place, I only considered the election day turnout as provided by the DCBOEE (excluding those voters who participated via absentee or provisional ballots).

The Electoral System of the District of Columbia

Other factors that must be taken into account in analyzing the relationship between voter turnout rates and the distance from individual polling places to the nearest Metrorail station include the institutional rules and regulations of the District of Columbia electoral system. First, the electoral map is composed of 143 precincts, each with its own polling place. The same polling places were used for both elections considered here. In 2008, the precincts varied in number of registered voters between 581 voters and 5,789 voters. Accounting only for Democratic voters, in 2010, the precincts varied from 443 voters to 4,636 voters. However, the average precinct contains just fewer than 3,000 registered voters for the general election and just over 2,300 voters for the Democratic primary election. The 143 polling places are located in a variety of public buildings throughout the District. Certainly, as Barreto et al. (2009) suggest, the quality of these polling locations varies. Indeed, in measuring the independent variable for this study, I found that the walking distance between the polling place and a Metrorail station varies between 0.09 miles and 2.3 miles.

Moreover, the District of Columbia municipal regulations dictate certain rules for participating in an election. Like many states across the nation, the District of Columbia has opened its electoral system to encourage voter turnout and reduce the voting inequities that have historically plagued many jurisdictions. For example, under Rule 3-713, a registered voter is permitted to cast a special ballot at a polling place in a precinct that is not his or her precinct of residence. While a voter casting a special ballot will not be able to declare a preference for ward-level officials or local advisory neighborhood commission representatives, their vote will be counted in federal and District-wide races (DCMR Rule 3-714.13). Because the voters who took advantage of this rule in the 2008 General Election submitted a provisional ballot, they were not included in this study.

However, the potential voting rights concerns raised by the accessibility of polling places by way of Metrorail may be somewhat alleviated by these relatively new laws that serve to open the electoral system and decrease the cost of voting. In terms of Primary Elections, the DCBOEE enforces a closed primary system, which means voters can only participate if they are registered with a party preference (DCMR Rule 1-1001.09). In addition, voters are not permitted to change their preference on the day of the election. This regulation is particularly significant in the context of this study because ideally it eliminates cross-over voters from other parties and gives credence to the argument that a partisan divide may exist in mass transit use by voters accessing polling places.
Metrorail Ridership

A second set of characteristics unique to the institutions analyzed by this research are those surrounding Metrorail. According to the WMATA website, the Metrorail system began operating in 1976. Today, Metrorail features 86 stations on five lines with a total of 106 miles of track (WMATA). In discussing the voting rights implications of the proximity of polling places to Metrorail stations, it is relevant to investigate the demographic composition of the passengers. In June of 2010, WMATA released a report to justify the proposed adjustments to routes and fares throughout the District of Columbia mass transit system. The document, entitled “Title VI Equity Evaluation,” uses data from Rail Passenger Surveys as well as the U.S. Census to provide introductory demographic information. According to the report, minority passengers account for 45 percent of Metrorail ridership, while low income passengers account for 14 percent of the ridership. The report also shows that minority and low income passengers make up a far greater percentage of Metrobus ridership, although this aspect of WMATA’s mass transit services will not be confronted in this research. Rather, I chose to focus on Metrorail’s impact on voter turnout because the abundance of Metrobus stops would diminish the possibility for variable distances to polling places among the precincts. In addition, because the role of mass transit use in increasing access to the polls has not been explored in any capacity, this study sets a benchmark for future research on mass transit by focusing on a single mode of transportation.

Statistical Analysis

After compiling the quantitative data, I conducted linear regression analyses of the variables for both elections in all eight wards. Other variables mentioned previously, including ward-level demographic data, partisan preference, and electoral competitiveness were considered in a more qualitative manner as they applied to the results of the statistical analysis.

Findings

The two main variables used to conduct this research, the percentage of voter turnout in the 2008 general election and the 2010 Democratic primary election and the distance in miles from polling places to the nearest Metrorail station, produced a wide range of data. In 2008, among the 143 precincts, voter turnout rates varied from a low of 37.3 percent to a high of 64.7 percent. In 2010, turnout rates among Democratic voters varied from 16.9 percent to 64.9 percent. In addition, the highest and lowest distances from polling place to the nearest Metrorail station varied by over 2.1 miles.

However, the lower rates of voter turnout did not correlate with the greatest distance from the polling place to a Metrorail station. A bivariate correlation test between the district-wide voter turnout rate and the walking distance from polling places to the nearest Metrorail station produced statistically insignificant correlation coefficient (r) for both the 2008 general election (r = 0.001) and the 2010 Democratic primary election (r = -0.014). Based on this first correlation test, the null hypothesis remains valid, and the proximity of Metrorail stations has no impact on voter turnout rates at the District-level.

Based on the regression analysis, none of the wards produced a statistically significant result in support of the rejection of the null hypothesis. Several of the regression coefficients have t-ratios that
approach the informal threshold for significance of 2. For example, in 2008, the regression coefficients voter turnout rates in Ward 1 and Ward 2 both have t-ratios over 1.4. Similarly, in 2010, Ward 4 has a t-ratio over 1.4. However, the resulting P-values for every Ward in both elections are extremely high, ranging from 0.16 (Ward 1, 2008 General Election) to 0.897 (Ward 2, 2010 Democratic Primary Election). For reference, if the P-value is greater than 0.05, then the observations occur too frequently by chance to be determined statistically significant.

Analysis of the adjusted R-squared values confirms that there is no relationship between voter turnout and polling place proximity to Metrorail stations. The visual representations of the data feature best-fit lines that are essentially horizontal, indicating no discernible linear relationship between the variables in either 2008 or 2010. While previous studies have indicated that the relationship between polling place accessibility and voter turnout is non-linear (Gimpel and Schuknecht 2003), this data does not suggest any alternative relationship. Thus, it is clear that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ward</th>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Adjusted R Square</th>
<th>Beta Coefficient</th>
<th>t-Ratio</th>
<th>Sig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2008 – Gen.</td>
<td>-0.074</td>
<td>-0.369</td>
<td>-1.486</td>
<td>0.160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010 – Pr. (D)</td>
<td>-0.008</td>
<td>-0.244</td>
<td>-0.942</td>
<td>0.362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2008 – Gen.</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>-0.381</td>
<td>-1.429</td>
<td>0.179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010 – Pr. (D)</td>
<td>-0.082</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
<td>-0.132</td>
<td>0.897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2008 – Gen.</td>
<td>-0.027</td>
<td>0.192</td>
<td>0.756</td>
<td>0.461</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010 – Pr. (D)</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>-0.212</td>
<td>-0.839</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>2008 – Gen.</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.235</td>
<td>1.028</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2010 – Pr. (D)</td>
<td>0.055</td>
<td>0.324</td>
<td>1.453</td>
<td>0.163</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>2008 – Gen.</td>
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<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.426</td>
<td>0.676</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2010 – Pr. (D)</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
<td>-0.077</td>
<td>-0.308</td>
<td>0.762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2008 – Gen.</td>
<td>-0.056</td>
<td>0.077</td>
<td>0.308</td>
<td>0.762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010 – Pr. (D)</td>
<td>-0.050</td>
<td>-0.107</td>
<td>-0.431</td>
<td>0.672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2008 – Gen.</td>
<td>-0.026</td>
<td>0.136</td>
<td>0.644</td>
<td>0.526</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010 – Pr. (D)</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.204</td>
<td>0.979</td>
<td>0.338</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2008 – Gen.</td>
<td>-0.054</td>
<td>0.129</td>
<td>0.488</td>
<td>0.633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2010 – Pr. (D)</td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>0.224</td>
<td>0.862</td>
<td>0.403</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Distance to mass transit on precinct voter turnout by ward

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election (all wards)</th>
<th>Adjusted R Square</th>
<th>Beta Coefficient</th>
<th>t-Ratio</th>
<th>Sig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008 – Gen.</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 – Pr. (D)</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
<td>-0.171</td>
<td>0.864</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Distance to mass transit on precinct voter turnout
The inability to achieve statistical significance through linear regression analysis of the relationship between these variables suggests that other confounding variables might have an impact on voter turnout rates in relationship to mass transit ridership. Several potentially explanatory variables are mentioned here as secondary variables, such as demographic data, partisanship, and electoral competitiveness. Upon initial analysis, the relationship (or lack thereof) between voter turnout rates and the distance between polling places and Metrorail stations is not obviously affected by any of the secondary variables in any of the wards. However, if taken out of the context of this particular research question, these secondary variables, particularly demographic characteristics, certainly impact the likelihood of citizens to vote, as well as the likelihood that they use some form of mass transit to get to the polls.

Future Research

While this study on the role of mass transit in District of Columbia voter turnout rates proved to be statistically insignificant, there are several aspects of the research design that could be adapted to potentially produce statistically significant results. First, the method used in this case could be applied to another city. The racial and socioeconomic residential segregation and the characteristics of Metrorail passengers in the District of Columbia introduce many secondary variables to this research, as mentioned above.

First, and perhaps most significantly, modifying the specific research method used in this study may produce more valid results. For example, rather than relying solely on statistical data, perhaps a survey of actual voters could provide more insight to questions on the relationship between the accessibility of a polling place by way of mass transit and the likelihood a person will vote. The use of statistical data in this study assumes that all voters access the polls by way of mass transit. Realistically speaking, this is not the case, as most precincts are too compact to necessitate use of the Metrorail system for voters travelling from their residences to the polling place. Thus, survey data may provide a better sample for this research question. Moreover, the ease and convenience of using the Metrorail system from the perspective of a college student may not be a universally supported view, and thus, utilizing mass transit would not reduce the cost of voting enough to result in widespread increases in voter turnout rates. In this way, more qualitative data could alleviate bias as a consequence of overarching assumptions.

Perhaps a city with a more homogeneous population would provide data capable of exceeding the limit of statistical significance, as racial and economic disparities would have a less obvious impact on voting. Similarly, a geographically larger city with a less concentrated population in which polling places are farther apart or markedly more or less accessible by mass transit may yield more substantive results. In addition, the political situation in the District of Columbia increases the cost of voting by limiting substantial participation of elected representatives within the federal government. In other words, District of Columbia voters who participate in the Congressional elections may get discouraged because they essentially vote for a figurehead who has little power to enact change on their behalf.

Finally, the data limits imposed on this study could be alleviated to introduce more cases or explanatory variables. For example, the inflated participation rates in the 2008 General Election could be toned down by including multiple general elections worth of voter turnout rates. Similarly,
the complex demographical situation in the District of Columbia could be accounted for by seeking out and including precinct-level racial and socioeconomic data in the final analysis. Controlling for certain demographic groups or employment status may help to refocus the analysis on those voters who use mass transit, rather than simply examining total turnout. Finally, in framing this research question as a voting rights issue, it may make sense to analyze a different form of mass transit that is more frequently utilized by racially and financially marginalized citizens. As previously discussed, WMATA (2010) reported that far more racial minorities and people of lower socioeconomic status use city buses rather than Metrorail.

Conclusion

While the basic statistical results and analysis in this study proved to be largely inconclusive, there is great potential for further research by adapting the methods and data utilized here to produce more significant results. The wealth of past research on the costs of voting and the role polling place location plays in reducing those costs provides a sturdy foundation for additional research on this topic. Specifically, the role that various modes of mass transit play in advancing the mobility of racial minorities and low-income groups to enhance their position within the electoral system should be investigated further. Based on the background information provided in this paper, minority and low-income communities make up a large portion of both the non-voter and the daily mass transit ridership populations.

Therefore, if election administrators make an effort to locate polling places along popularly traveled bus and rail routes, it seems logical that voter turnout among traditionally low-voting groups would increase. Although the results of this study suggest that the availability of rail transit cannot explain voter turnout rates, this does not rule out the importance of other forms of mass transit or the significance of mass transit in conjunction with other variables. Analysis of the distance to polling places and voter turnout rates (Dyck and Gimpel 2005; Gimpel and Schuknecht 2003; Haspel and Knotts 2005) suggests that voters, especially members of minority and low-income groups, do not want to take time out of their daily routine to vote. Thus, a polling place positioned at a bus or rail stop near a residential neighborhood should be able to attract voters as they travel to and from work or daily errands. Similarly, voters who are not employed, but use mass transit or live in neighborhoods serviced by mass transit, also should be more likely to vote. Of course, in many cases the characteristics of a high-quality precinct (Barreto et al. 2009), that would further increase participation are severely lacking in minority and low-income neighborhoods.

Nonetheless, as voting rights activists attempt to create a more inclusive electoral system, aspects such as creating mass transit-accessible and visible, quality polling places should not be ignored. Much of the current activity surrounding voting rights, especially in the District of Columbia, is centered on increasing both descriptive and substantive minority representation. While this is certainly important in terms of meeting the social and political needs of these communities, increasing minority and low-income groups’ participation in the electoral process could arguably be more beneficial. Indeed, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 attempted to provide underrepresented minorities with the right and the ability to elect officials of their choice. However, focusing on creating majority-minority districts that will elect minority officials skews the intent of the 1965 legislation, as there is no
guarantee that minority officials will truly represent the rights and interests of minority citizens. Thus, in an ideal world, polling places would be created equal and each voter regardless of the neighborhood he or she lived in would have to incur an equal cost in order to participate in the electoral system. In this way, the discrepancies in voter turnout rates across racial, socioeconomic, and geographical lines would greatly diminish. But, in reality, as researchers continue to consider the questions surrounding polling place location and voter turnout rates, it seems reasonable to consider the institutionalized characteristics of civilized life, such as mass transit systems. «

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<tr>
<th>Election</th>
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<td>2010 – Pr. (D)</td>
<td>-0.014</td>
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*Note: Correlation coefficients found using District-wide data.*

Table 3: Correlation Table
Bibliography


AMERICAN AID TO GREECE: THE MARSHALL PLAN AS A MODEL FOR DEVELOPMENT

Sebastian Bechmann

Abstract In response to a growing acknowledgement of the failure of international aid, one school of scholars has identified a lack of aid as the defining crisis in development. From their perspective, aid has failed in driving change not due to inherent flaws, but because developed nations have failed to give enough. This school points to the American Marshall Plan in Europe, which provided an enormous fund to the reconstruction and development of Europe’s shattered post-war economies, as the crowning achievement of international aid and a historical model for future endeavors. Surprisingly, few works have approached the Marshall Plan from a development perspective and even fewer analyze the Plan outside of Western Europe, whose states had relatively stable pre-war economic systems. This paper seeks to fill the gap in the scholarly literature by providing an analysis of the effects of American aid to an economy both shattered by the war and underdeveloped before it. This study concludes that, by reinforcing counterproductive economic regimes, protracting a violent political conflict through political conditions attached to aid, and limiting rather than expanding trading options, U.S. aid actually did more harm than good to Greece’s economic development.

Introduction: The Marshall Plan as a Development Program

Faced with the realities of delivering effective development aid, major personalities in and outside of the development field have joined voices in a rousing chorus calling for a modern Marshall Plan as a panacea for the ills that plague their respective aid projects (Chollet and Goldgeier 2005, 7). The Marshall Plan is largely regarded as one of the few unqualified successes of development aid, a remarkable humanitarian achievement in which the United States helped Western Europe to rise from the rubble of the Second World War. The Marshall Plan, according to the common consensus, both revitalized European growth and saved Western Europe from Communist domination (Chollet and Goldgeier 2005, 7). As a result, numerous personalities in the aid community have developed an awed nostalgia for the Marshall Plan, which they view as the epitome of a successful foreign aid program (Zachariou 2009, 303).

Perceptions of the Marshall Plan, at least in the West, have been generally positive. Americans use the Marshall Plan to highlight the tradition of alliance and friendship between Europe and the United States (Chollet and Goldgeier 2005, 10). In the U.S. and in most recipient countries, most historians view the Plan as an accelerator of European reconstruction; the Marshall Plan did not resurrect Europe singlehandedly, but it did hurry along Europe’s resurgence (Wexler 1983, 254). In countries with successful pre-war economies, such as Germany and Britain, this appears to be the case.
Yet these nations are hardly examples of the underperforming, chronically struggling economies that make up most modern aid recipients. The Marshall Plan in Germany or Britain may provide a blueprint for the successful reconstruction of economic powerhouses, but it cannot be used as a guideline for economic intervention in languishing countries.

Yet the Marshall Plan extended beyond Europe’s three strongest pre-war economies. While the Plan should not be described as a development program in Europe’s economic core, it could be approached from a development angle in the continent’s periphery. Greece makes for a timely example of the Marshall Plan as a development program. Unlike Western Europe, which had a strong economic foundation from before the war, Greece had one of the poorest per-capita economies in Europe (Wittner 1982, 190), a labor force still primarily engaged in the agricultural sector (Candilis 1968, 1), severe economic inequality (Athanase 1959, 23), abysmal electricity and road systems (Warren 1998, 87), and a legacy of dependency on Europe’s great powers (Kofas 1989, 13). In many ways, Greece when the first round of American aid began in 1948 resembles modern aid recipients.

In Greece, the legacy of American aid left a very different impression than in Western Europe. Instead of departing with amity and leaving behind booming growth, as American technocrats did in England and Germany, the American Mission of Aid to Greece (AMAG), left Greece in a state of mutual frustration and with mostly stalled or cancelled projects (Munkman 1958, 98). In fact, the Greek case exhibits many of the same problems that plague modern aid projects, from an idealistic mission staff eager to implement a one-size-fits all agenda (Warren 1998, 76), corruption and poor governance from the home government (Vetsopoulos 2009, 275), and a conflict of priorities that ultimately placed politics over development for both the donor and recipient governments (Wittner 1982, 185).

Moreover, development aid in Greece fell victim to Cold War themes that reduced the country to a proxy battlefield between Communist and American influences, undermining development efforts by polarizing a fragile body politic to eliminate the possibility of healthy compromise (Zachariou 2009, 303) and directing most remaining development money to strategic rather than humanitarian or economic concerns (Candalis 1968, 52). Simultaneously, however, Greece’s perceived strategic importance to American interests motivated the U.S. to send aid (Bland 1998, 50). Thus, Greece’s political salience both justified and undermined development aid. American policymakers viewed Greece as the first battleground of East and West, leading them to invest heavily in Greek “development” aid which the conservative and at times rightist Athenian government readily accepted, believing its aims to be aligned with American interests (Wittner 1982, xi). Nevertheless, the failure of American aid to sufficiently impact Greek development led to frustration and resentment from Greek elites and the population as a whole (Munkman 1958, 98).

Methods

This study aimed to determine the effectiveness of the Marshall Plan as a development model. In order to do so, Greece was selected as a case study because it was a country that received American aid through the Marshall Plan with a low level of economic productivity before the Second World War (Vetsopoulos 2009, 275). Greece thus presents an example of the Marshall Plan as a true development program seeking to facilitate the creation of new growth, rather than a reconstruction program meant to reinstate pre-war growth patterns. Furthermore, Greece in the postwar era, with its
history of destruction, imperialistic domination, internal polarization, and economic inequality loosely resembles modern aid recipients, making it a relevant case to examine the effects of aid.

The Marshall Plan in Greece is closely tied to aid the United States began sending through the Truman Doctrine in 1947. This study does not differentiate between aid received through the European Recovery Program (ERP, as the Marshall Plan is formally known) and this previous funding. The Truman Doctrine and ERP ultimately had similar military objectives and proportions of aid devoted to military aid; furthermore, Truman Doctrine bureaucrats with AMAG remained in their positions for the Marshall Plan, carrying over the same political convictions, methods, and results. Thus, it is impossible to disentangle the results of the two programs. However, due to their significant similarities, this does not alter the results of the study or its validity as an evaluation of the Marshall Plan as a model for modern development aid.

For the purposes of this study, development was defined as an increase in productivity of the economy as a whole accompanied by an increase in the standard of living. The success of the independent variable, American aid to Greece, was then evaluated based upon results in two dependent variables. First, success in the economic sphere was measured by changes in productivity in the short run from 1947 to 1952, but more importantly in the ability of the Plan to establish the foundations for future growth after the duration of the development mission, and catalyze a widespread increase in the standard of living of Greek citizens. Second, the political effects of aid were measured by the creation of political institutions conducive to further development. These variables can be articulated in the primary hypothesis tested by this study: that the American development program failed to achieve its ambitious economic objectives as a result of its inability to reform the structure of the Greek economy, and it failed in developing political institutions that would support future growth by polarizing the government, thereby prolonging civil war and destroying any potential opposition to the conservatives in power. This hypothesis matches most closely the revisionist view described in the historiography section, though this study was more generous in acknowledging positive effects of the aid mission than most revisionist literature.

**Historiography**

Views of the American aid mission to Greece range from complete success, often with a focus on the U.S. success in keeping Greece outside the Communist bloc and on the long term economic benefits, to complete failure emphasizing the period during and immediately after the implementation of aid. In the 1960s, a wave of Greek scholars lamented what they viewed as an American failure to provide lasting reforms to the Greek economy, criticizing the mission for its focus on large, visible aid projects. In hindsight, these criticisms generally appear more a reaction to continued economic weakness in Greece rather than any actual harm caused by the Marshall Plan (Delivanis, 1967, 333). Building on this argument, revisionist scholars, including Jon Kofas, who wrote by far the most comprehensive work on the Marshall Plan in Greece available in English, argued that the aid program was not only an economic disappointment, but also an unqualified catastrophe that perpetuated a civil war that could otherwise have been resolved peacefully. These two schools often appear to fall into bias and criticize every aspect of the aid program rather than targeting specific flaws, sacrificing an objective view of the Plan for a general critique of American aid.
In response to both of these groups, another set of scholars has defined the Marshall Plan as an economic and political success that set the economic foundations for Greek growth following the end of the civil war. These scholars reject the claim that the civil war could have been resolved without a violent, American-funded response. Instead, they assert that American aid was crucial to bringing the war to a close and making some progress on infrastructure creation to spur future growth. In some cases, these authors suffer the opposite problem as revisionist scholars: they view the Plan as a clear success, and reassert its success despite any economic failures.

Between these two extremes, a number of scholars have taken more qualified positions. Some emphasize the mission’s political success, ensuring Greek partnership with “the West” (Zachariou, 2009, 314). Still others have viewed the mission as economically successful in revitalizing the Greek economy, but hinted that the Marshall Plan may have set the political foundations for the military coup of 1967 by reinforcing the conservative right and destroying its socialist and communist opposition (Botsiou, 2009, 231). Discussion of the ERP in Greece has thus historically provoked a wide array of responses, varying both in emphasizing the economic or political aspects and in the degree to which the United States achieved success in both.

**Historical Analysis**

From its independence through the Second World War, Greece could be described as “an agrarian, merchant economy with modest resources and immodest aspirations” (Kakridis 2009, 243) that neglected the development of the former and depended on outside support to attain the latter. In this period, Greece was widely viewed as an inherently poor country that could only achieve economic viability through agrarianism, commerce, and emigration (Kakridis 2009, 243); in other words, Greece was expected to remain permanently poor. Following a coup that instated an authoritarian regime, rightist forces continued to mount resistance during the occupation.

The Second World War provides the immediate prelude to the American aid mission. The war resulted in a massive, widespread, and often systematic dismantling and destruction of the Greek economy and society. By 1945, 6.2 percent of the entire population had perished (Candilis 1968, 19). Furthermore, every sector of the economy had been decimated, with output in industrial production down to 36 percent of the pre-war level and agricultural production at 54 percent (Kofas 1989, 8). The German occupation also exacerbated Greece’s monetary problems. In order to avert monetary collapse, the military government flooded Greece with gold sovereigns, expanding on the groundwork for the Greeks’ over-reliance on the sovereign as currency in times of post-war instability (Kofas 1989, 11).

After the war’s end, England took control of the Greek rehabilitation mission. Under the London Agreement, the United Kingdom supplied Greece with a 10 million pound loan, forgiveness for the debt accrued from 1940-1941 during Greece’s involvement in the war, a package of consumer goods and other equipment, and development advice. In exchange, the English gained significant control over Greece’s monetary and trade policy, with the 10 million pound loan and an additional 15 million pounds from the Bank of Greece placed under British control (Vetsopoulos 2009, 279). Essentially, the Greek government surrendered its right to control its trade and central bank for a weak loan and a handful of immediate benefits. Although the deal was successful in keeping both the price of gold and
of the drachma relatively stable, it led to a significant decline in the gold and foreign exchange reserves of the Bank of Greece as Greeks hoarded alternative currencies in anticipation of a monetary collapse (Candilis 1968, 32).

The humanitarian counterpart to the London Agreement’s economic aid came in the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA), which sought to alleviate Greece’s desperate humanitarian position and construct a base for future development (Vetsopoulos 2009, 280). The UNRRA ran into familiar development problems in Greece. First, the mountainous north of the country had fallen under the control of Communists hostile to the Western aid mission, meaning that the UNRRA could not work effectively in the areas in which its help was most required (Kofas 1989, 14). Secondly, the agency’s goods flooded the Greek market, leading the price level of humanitarian goods to plummet; as a result, “the industrialists cut back on production and stockpiled goods, and the merchants resorted to hoarding. Moreover, the farmers preferred to sell their products in the black market, which offered higher prices than the government-regulated market. The black market thrived, therefore, and undermined the legitimate economy,” (Kofas 1989, 23). UNRRA goods fell victim to corruption, as the agency chose to channel products through the Greek government, which favored elite contacts in Athens for the ultimate distribution of aid materials. Thus, much of the UNRRA’s aid failed to reach its intended targets, and instead lined the pockets of Athenian profiteers. The Truman administration, which witnessed the relative ineffectiveness of UNRRA aid in the face of Communist insurgency, pledged to take a different approach (Kofas 1989, 23).

The promulgation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 marked the transfer of control over the Greek aid mission from Britain to the United States (Kofas 1989, 56). The UK, which was in the process of dealing with the destruction of its own territory, could no longer afford to prop up the Greek state, which was rapidly dissolving into civil war with Communist insurgents financially supported by Yugoslavia (Kaloudis 2006, 36). Truman, who desired to limit Soviet influence and viewed Communism as a political monolith (Kennan 1947), viewed Greece as vital to containing Russian influence (Jones 1998, 37) just as the British had done in the previous century (Kofas 1989, vii). Under the Truman Doctrine, the United States established AMAG, and delivered a total of $400 million, mostly in the form of military aid, to Greece (Jones 1998, 26). Accompanying this aid, hundreds of advisers arrived in Greece tasked with overseeing the distribution and implementation of aid. This mission would cooperate with the American embassy until the end of the Marshall Plan to ensure that their economic and political objectives could be achieved.

Although the Marshall Plan signified a rhetorical shift in priorities from military to economic aid, in actuality the Plan represented a continuation of the same sort of aid policy. Although the ERP did bring in significant funding for infrastructure construction, the United States maintained its focus on military aid. It attempted to strengthen the Greek military from the threat of internal Communism and, after the outbreak of the Korean War, against the Soviet Union (Munkman 1958, 17). As a result, about a quarter of all Marshall Plan funds were allotted exclusively to the military (Kofas 1989, 102). In addition, ERP money went disproportionately to infrastructure projects with primarily military purposes, including transportation and communication (Kofas 1989, 102).

The Marshall Plan ran until 1952, when ERP funds came to an abrupt end. American aid would continue to flow into Greece, still mostly directed towards military purposes (Munkman 1958, 17). Notably, these funds were no longer part of the Marshall Plan’s development mission. This
differentiated them from both the ERP and the Truman Doctrine, which at least nominally focused on economic aid. The departure of AMAG bureaucrats in 1952 thus marked the end of the American development mission to Greece.

**Results of Analysis**

**Political Effects**

The American development mission in Greece entailed a combination of political influence, military aid, development aid, and economic advice. Ultimately, politics motivated all five facets of the mission. The Truman administration based its decision to launch aid to Greece, both in the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, on a firm conviction that the Soviet Union had to be contained and that Stalin would not place limits on his ambitious expansionism (Kennan 1947). In reality, the Russian Premier had already acknowledged that Greece belonged into the Western zone of influence; therefore, when Greek Communists asked Moscow for support, they were told to take a legalistic approach and expect no help from Russia if they chose to turn to violence (Kofas 1989, 140). As promised, when the Greek Communist Party (KKE) resorted to civil war in 1946, they received economic and military support from the Communist government of Yugoslavia, but not the Soviet Union (Jeffery 2000, 177). Thus, Truman’s premise that Greeks were a “free peoples… resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures,” (Truman 1947) simply was not accurate. Instead of a Russian-sponsored minority fighting to overthrow the government, the Greek Communists were a popular party with only limited external support.

Nevertheless, the perception that Greece was in imminent danger of falling into the Russian sphere of influence dominated the Truman administration. Additionally, the presidents’ advisors placed Greece, alongside Turkey and Iran, into the “Northern Tier,” a region considered strategically important for its proximity to the USSR and as a buffer region to the Middle East’s oil fields (Kofas 1989, 61). An early conception of the Domino Theory pervaded the administration’s thinking in its approach to Greece; it was crucial to hold Greece not only in order to deter further Soviet aggression in other states, but also because the rest of the “Northern Tier” would fall to the Communism if Greece collapsed (Bland 1998, 51). These concerns motivated the deployment of aid and advisors to Greece and dictated the use of aid as a political tool. Aid money to Greece was not intended primarily to instigate development, but to ensure that a pro-American, vehemently anti-Communist government maintained power in Greece.

The politicization of aid for anti-Communist purposes began under the English mission immediately after the war. In 1944, the English distributed aid only in areas under control by the central government, excluding regions controlled by the KKE, successfully crippling the Communists for several years (Kofas 1989, 14). In 1945, rightists began a “White Terror” against Greek Communists with implicit Anglo-American support (Kofas 1989, 40). This violence undermined the KKE’s efforts to act within a legal framework and drove the party away from compromise and legalism. The result: full-scale civil war in 1946.

When the U.S. inherited the English mission in 1946, it reaffirmed its support for conservative and rightist forces as a bastion against Communism (Kofas 1989, 94). The United States went to great lengths to deny the Communists any role in government, at one point, actively debating supporting the
installation of a government that would be “more authoritarian” than the rightists already in power (Wittner 1982, 121). Furthermore, the U.S. persistently used the threat of aid withdrawal to dictate policy to Athens. During the election of 1952, for example, the American ambassador stated that the flow of aid would end if the results were not acceptable to the United States (Zachariou 2009, 312). Most importantly, the U.S. rejected a peace deal offered by the KKE in 1947 (Botsiou 2009, 218). At that point, the KKE had come to realize that they would not be able to persist as a political force outside of the system as a result of the Soviet Union’s refusal to extend aid and the insufficiency of funds coming from their cross-border allies (Botsiou 2009, 312). Instead, the KKE wanted to end the civil war and transition back into the political mainstream. By rejecting the peace offering, the United States forced the KKE to remain in political exile and continue in their violent efforts to gain control. By refusing to compromise with the Communists even when offered peace and promoting an unequivocally anti-left attitude, the United States unnecessarily prolonged the civil war, brought unconditional support to an ineffective but repressively anti-Communist government in Athens, and prevented any viable opposition to a government badly in need of compromise.

The American mission’s anti-Communist stance further harmed the Greek economy by dictating a trade policy that deliberately excluded Greece’s natural trading partners, its northern, Communist neighbors (Kofas 1989, 111). This decision withheld from Greece some of the major benefits that the Marshall Plan brought to Western European countries, where the U.S. provided loans to countries specifically for the purpose of intra-European trade in an effort to facilitate European economic integration (Wexler 1983, 252). By preventing Greece from trading with its neighbors and because Greece lacked goods desired on the Western European market, the U.S. denied Greece the opportunity to use these funds effectively and attain the tremendous benefits of expanded free trade that aided industrialized Western European states.

The Americans’ priority of containing Communism also explains the disproportionate share of aid that the Greek military received through the American development mission. Of the $1,149.8 billion of US aid to Greece from April 1948 to June 1955, $3,740 billion, or 22.7 percent, was formally allocated to military aid (Greece, Statistical Data Book 1956, 45). With the support of this aid, Greece maintained the largest per-capita military budget of the ERP countries, despite having 4 percent of Norway’s per-capita electricity consumption and 9 percent of Belgium and France’s (Athanase 1959, 25). The Greek government argued that it required its massive military budget to defend against future Communist aggression, thereby using this budget in order to justify continued aid and American support.

These official allocations do not necessarily reflect the reality of Greek aid. For example, in 1947, Congress appropriated $300 million for military aid, with a planned breakdown of 50 percent for the military, 48.5 percent for the economy, and 1.5 percent for administration. Because of the diversion of aid, however, the actual allocations of aid to Greece were 57.7 percent for the military and only 41 percent for economic aid. Once this money reached the Greek government, even more of the aid formally allocated for economic purposes went to military and strategic projects (Candilis 1968, 48). The Greek government favored infrastructure projects with a degree of military utility, including roads, railroads, and communications networks. Unfortunately, this prioritization of military objectives over humanitarian or long-term development, in addition to the constant reallocation of aid from economic to military purposes on every level of the process, translated into an enormous diversion of American
aid from development to the military (Wittner 1982, 188).

After the end of the civil war in 1949, the U.S. mission began to put more pressure on the Greek government to reform its use of aid money to favor development projects, reflecting the shift towards the more economically focused ERP. Unfortunately, the outbreak of the Korean War a year later revived American fears of expanding Communism and renewed the prioritization of a strong military against suspected Communist aggression (Botsiou 2009, 225). In reality, Greece had little to fear at that point in time from its Communist neighbors, and the end of the civil war had effectively destroyed the KKE as a viable political force, eliminating the need to focus on military projects (Zachariou 2009, 305). Nevertheless, the overstatement of the military for political purposes led to the persistent neglect of development goals.

**Economic Effects**

When aid money was used for development, AMAG ran into many of the same problems encountered by aid agencies today. Corrupt bureaucrats and poor coordination with the government created a nightmare of red tape and confused authority (Munkman 1958, 99). A review of the ERP in Greece led C.A. Munkman, a State Department observer of the implementation of the Plan tasked with explaining the outcome of the program in Greece to American taxpayers, to remark that, of all the aid earmarked for development, only 10 percent achieved its goals (Munkman 1958, 284). In his modern aid worker: the yearly appropriation of aid meant that AMAG coordinators could only plan a year in advance for major infrastructure projects that demanded more time and commitment, a lack of deadlines resulting from poor communication with local officials in Greece and those allocating funds in Washington, a failure to take into account the full consequences of decisions made on every level of the process leading to wasteful or doomed projects, and poor staffing on the part of the Greek government (Munkman 1958, 99). Moreover, the abrupt termination of the flow of ERP funds in 1952 left numerous major projects incomplete (Munkman 1958, 78), and the withdrawal of AMAG bureaucrats charged with running their completed projects left completed infrastructure out of action as the Greek government failed to step in and take over control (Botsiou 2009, 219).

To characterize these complaints in brief, ERP aid suffered from an extreme disconnect between those funding the aid, “Planners” in William Easterly’s development lingo (Easterly, 2006, 114), and those actually receiving that aid. ERP Planners in Washington, DC pushed through programs that appeared useful to experts studying the Greek economy but had no bearing to the reality on the ground. For example, the United States spent approximately $1 million to buy horses for Greece, to be used for agricultural purposes. While at face value the program may have been useful, most of the horses bought were too old to breed, and thus useless in the long term, and also often bred for racing and therefore useless in the field (Munkman, 1958, 193).

While aid workers developing infrastructure in Greece experienced frustration with this and other borderline quixotic projects, American officials in Athens confronted a corrupt bureaucracy and population unwilling to accept reforms. For example, attempts to balance the Greek budget by slashing the public budget prompted an immediate protest from public workers in Athens, forcing American bureaucrats to immediately roll back the cuts (Wittner, 1982, 174). Thus, those attempting to implement the American aid project faced frustrations very similar to those of modern aid workers.
wedged between difficult bureaucracies and a population not necessarily willing to accept reforms.

That said, the Marshall Plan did achieve significant successes in stabilizing the country after a destructive war. The Greek road system was successfully rebuilt and expanded, revolutionizing domestic trade by expanding the range to which rural farmers could bring their goods (Warren 1998, 87). Furthermore, Marshall Plan funds paid for important clean-water projects both in rural areas and in major cities (Munkman 1958, 188). Perhaps more importantly, Marshall Planners used the last year of their mission to put into place a mechanism to track and counteract inflation in Greece intended to build confidence in the drachma and end the disastrous hyperinflation that rocked Greece after the war (Kofas 1989, 11). The “Inflationary/Deflationary Sheet” regulated “imports and exports, tax collections and disbursements, bank credit, and gold sovereigns sales” and tied the deployment of funds to monetary stability (Vetsopoulos 2009, 292). Along with devaluation in 1953 (Vetsopoulos 2009, 293), this effort achieved the miraculous and ended Greece’s post-war hyperinflation, terminating an era of dependence on the gold sovereign as the favored unit of exchange and stabilizing the economy as a whole (Vetsopoulos 2009, 290).

However, instead of setting the foundations for future growth, this successful stabilization, restored Greece’s prewar economic status quo, which included high levels of inequality institutionalized by a regressive tax structure (Wittner 1989, 175), chronic government deficit leading to and resulting from an over-reliance on foreign aid (Botsiou 2009, 225), and an overemphasis on military spending (Kofas 1989, 115). AMAG officials refused to address these three issues, preferring instead to focus on political stability and superficial elements of the Greek economy. This failure stemmed from the alliance of Athenian elites with the American mission (Wittner 1989, 173), which pulled the Greek government firmly into the Western camp but also allowed the government to continue neglecting inequality and debt that plagued the country (Kofas 1989, 113). By prioritizing the military and highly visible, but relatively limited infrastructure projects, the Marshall Plan failed to achieve its full potential in laying the groundwork for future growth. Thus, a large portion of Marshall Plan funds went to waste, while those targeted to low-upkeep infrastructure projects such as roads, communications, and sewage met more success.

**Conclusion and Implications**

In analyzing the results of the Marshall Plan in Greece, it is important to note that, in implementing the project, the Truman administration aimed primarily to win Greece for the West and deny the Soviet Union a chance to expand its influence into the Eastern Mediterranean (Jones 1998, 24). Thus, a failure of the development agenda did not necessarily constitute a failure of the project from the American perspective. In fact, the Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan were highly successful in maintaining a pro-American government in Greece and all but eradicating Communism as a significant force in the country. However, as a development project rather than a political campaign, the American aid mission produced more mixed results.

On the positive side, American intervention helped to restore monetary stability to a country desperately in need of it. Considering the experimentation with different monetary policies on the part of Greek authorities in the pre- and post-war eras, it is plausible that American intervention significantly reduced the amount of time necessary for Greece to establish a degree of confidence in the drachma,
without which long-term growth would have faced severe impediment. Furthermore, development projects related to military goals no doubt aided long-term growth: building a more complete road network which connected isolated centers of KKE support, expanding clean water to rural areas to sway public opinion, and developing the communication system had both military and civilian purposes.

However, the prioritization of combating Communism over development created serious harm in the long term. By denying the KKE the opportunity to negotiate a ceasefire, the U.S. brought further destruction to Greece by lengthening a brutal civil war. Moreover, the conservative Greek government used American support to marginalize socialists who could have ended Greece’s dramatic inequalities if they been allowed within the political system. Without an opposition, the conservatives running the Greek government were able to reestablish a corrupt government and a regressive tax system without question. The American aid mission, whose political intervention cannot be separated from the aid it provided, killed the possibility of compromise in the Greek system and set the stage for ineffective authoritarian governance.

In Greece, the American aid mission achieved ambiguous results. Ultimately, it is impossible to determine whether Greece would have been able to achieve its significant growth after the end of the Plan without the stability the mission provided from 1947-1952. However, this growth does not appear to have stemmed directly from Truman Doctrine or Marshall Plan funds, which were relatively ineffective as tools of development due to their conversion into military funds, wasteful projects, and loss to corruption. Thus, the large, visible infrastructure projects labeled with Marshall Plan slogans and logos for which the Plan is best remembered do not appear to have played a role in Greek development in the long term, especially since many were abandoned when the money stopped flowing in or abandoned by Greek authorities after the departure of the American officials running them (Botsiou 2009, 219).

Those who wish to use the Marshall Plan as a model for future development efforts would do well to remember the highly charged political context in which the Plan was created. The true legacy of the Plan, at least in Greece, is not economic development, but political allegiance. Although the Plan did achieve some successes in stabilizing the Greek economy and providing basic infrastructure, the political baggage it carried overwhelmed its benefits, especially when the ineffectiveness of most American aid is taken into account. The huge funds attached to the plan were only possible due to the convergence of anti-Communist motivations in the Truman administration and Greek elites, the former of whom were willing to provide massive amounts of money to contain Communism and the both of whom were willing to sacrifice democracy and development in order to maintain a hold on power.

The Greek example ultimately discourages the use of the Marshall Plan as a model. Massive infusions of aid money delivered through an ineffective government and allocated for mostly non-developmental purposes failed to encourage development in Greece just as it would today. Furthermore, the scale of the Plan comes across less positively when accounting for the failure of many of its large, visible projects as compared to the success of less interesting, but more important efforts that could have been achieved with significantly less funding. While there are positive examples to draw from the implementation of the Plan, such as the stabilizing of the drachma through the controlled release of development funds, the ERP as a whole was not able to deliver sufficiently impressive results in Greece to warrant the applause it receives as a development program. Instead, the Marshall Plan should be used as an example of the importance of targeted, intelligent aid that takes the context of the recipient
nation into account.

When formulating future research, this study would suggest two potential courses. First, more quantitative analysis of the Marshall Plan in Greece could provide a more detailed explanation on the areas in which the program found success, where it failed to stimulate the economy, and potentially on its long-term economic effects. Such an analysis would need to overcome significant obstacles in finding reliable data, especially considering Greece’s questionable record in economic data keeping; however, it would add weight to the largely qualitative arguments provided by this paper. Second, it could be revealing to draw a direct comparison between the Greek development case and that of another country. This study views Greece as a case study of one development method - the application of politically qualified aid to a country engaged in internal conflict. By comparing the Greek case to that of another country, it could be possible to control for differences in the independent variable, the structure and application of the aid program, in accounting for differences in results. It may thus be possible to formulate more successful aid packages by comparing the variation in input and results between different aid programs. »
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A NEW MISSIONARY METHOD: LATIN AMERICA AS A MISSION FIELD

Angela Budzinski

Abstract Missionary work has been an integral part of community development in Latin America. However, does missionary work actually impact community development in Latin America today? While missionary methods, particularly holistic missiology, were significant to community development in the past, new, modern methods of development have evolved that do not include religion; consequently, this has largely discontinued the use of missionary work in development. This research is important because it examines whether holistic missiology is still relevant as a method of community development and whether it should continue to be utilized by agents for community development today.

My hypothesis states that holistic missiology does positively impact community development in Latin America, meaning that it is still significant to development. I then compare two cases—Bolivia and Costa Rica—using secondary sources and interviews respectively to gather data although this is not a comparative case study and the Bolivia case is simply used as a reference point. Based on evidence from the Bolivian case, I explore holistic missiology in modern-day Costa Rica through interviews with Costa Ricans and missionaries in Villa Briceno, Costa Rica. While this study evidenced that holistic missiology does have a positive impact on community development, it is to a small degree in many cases, meaning that it is not one of the best approaches to community development. However, because there was a positive impact, holistic missiology is still relevant to community development today. It still affects the communities, even if it is in a small way.

A New Missionary Method: Latin American as a Mission Field

How has holistic missiology impacted community development in Latin America? Since the age of exploration, the threads of cultures have been interwoven. Many cultural aspects come together to build up communities, religion included. In the past, missionary work was an integral part of community development in Latin America. However, missionaries often have differing ideas of how to carry out evangelization. Traditional mission history emphasized the role of the missionary as the bringer of civilization to Indians (Langer and Jackson 1995, 3). Yet, overtime, missionary work evolved into much more. Nowadays, the role of the missionary is different from that of their sixteenth-century counterparts. Missionaries now seek not only to evangelize but to develop communities as well. This method is known as holistic missiology.

Nonetheless, a puzzle exists of whether missionary work actually impacts community development in Latin America today. While missionary methods, particularly holistic missiology, were
significant to community development in the past, new, modern methods of development have evolved that do not include religion; consequently, this has largely discontinued the use of missionary work in development (McGavran 1984, 6). Hence, scholars constantly debate the role of mission in community development—does it make a difference? Is holistic missiology still relevant as a method of community development, and should it continue to be utilized by agents for community development today?

This research is important because it addresses community development, an important topic in international affairs today. Historically, religion and missionaries have had an important role in social movements, such as conversion and increasing education, which made way for community development. However, in many people’s eyes, the role of missionary work has faded as new methods of community development have arisen. Therefore, the puzzle that exists is whether missionaries using the contemporary method of holistic missiology are still important to community development. Is holistic missiology still relevant to community development?

My hypothesis states that holistic missiology does positively impact community development in Latin America, meaning that it is still significant to development. I examine various methods of missionary work that aim for community development before settling on holistic missiology as the most contemporary and comprehensive method. I then compare two cases—Bolivia and Costa Rica—using secondary sources and interviews respectively to gather data although this is not a comparative case study and the Bolivia case is simply used as a reference point. Community development did occur in Bolivia in the past due to holistic missiology. Based on evidence from the Bolivian case, I explore holistic missiology in modern-day Costa Rica through interviews with Costa Ricans and missionaries in Villa Briceno, Costa Rica. Does holistic missiology still positively impact community development?

The type of impact detected could have important implications. If holistic missiology does have a significant and positive impact on community development, then it would demonstrate that this method is a relevant and useful approach to community development. If holistic missiology still positively impacts development, then it would provide evidence that contemporary missionary techniques are still important to modern-day international development. However, if there is not a significant positive impact, this would reveal that holistic missiology might not impact community development on its own and must work alongside other forces, such as political policies and monetary contributions. Missionary methods might be outdated and irrelevant to the current development efforts in communities. Regardless of the results, this study will add to the current understanding of development methodologies and could help lead to improved approaches to community development.

The Puzzle of Missionary Methodologies

To understand the role of missionary work in the current puzzle of community development, one must first understand past missionary method. Religion and missionary work are historically important for community development in Latin America, and scholars have discussed several methods that were used. At some point, each method had a significant impact on community development. However, it is uncertain if they are still relevant today. This paper will examine these missiology methods in order to analyze the dynamics, impacts, and implications of each on community development. Based on this analysis, the paper will assess which approach cost comprehensively promotes community development in Latin America.
Before I explore these methods, it is necessary to operationalize missiology, evangelization, and community development. John F. Gorski defines missiology as “the specialized branch of theology that accompanies, analyzes, and gives direction to the missionary activity of the church” (Gorski 2004, 60). Evangelization is defined as the process in the Christian religion which seeks to spread the knowledge of the Gospel throughout the world. Community development is defined as social, cultural, and religious actions that consciously and successfully improve the livelihoods of underprivileged communities, an adaptation from theologian Steve de Gruchy’s operationalization of social development. Community development involves any activities that improve aspects of local communities and that provide individuals with skills they need to effect change in their own communities (Gruchy 2005, 29).

**Missionary Methodologies**

Over time, scholars have discussed various missionary methods that have contributed to community development in Latin America. These approaches can be categorized into three main schools of thought: post-imperial missiology, managerial missiology, and holistic missiology (Escobar 2002, 18-19).

**Post-Imperial Missiology**

Post-imperial missiology, also known as liberation theology, involves a critical interpretation of mission history and re-examination of missiological methods (Neill 1966, 445). Theologian Stephen Neill states that, in this methodology, missionaries must realize the need to alter their methods while still emphasizing the traditional calling of conversion. This is what liberation theologians call inductive method: “begin with a description of the world and the church within it, reflect on the situation from a biblical perspective, and act to bring the world and the church more in harmony with this biblical version” (Cleary 2005, 179). Post-imperial missiology combines conversion with service—working to better the communities of the people through post-colonialist frameworks (Warren 1967, 77).

While post-imperial missiology has several strengths, it is not very relevant to contemporary development. The main reason is because it focuses on conversion as a primary goal. In development today, conversion is not significant and, many times, is not relevant. Post-imperial missiology continues to denounce indigenous versions of Christianity, and pushes for conversion to traditional biblical perspectives (Orta 1998, 168). Nowadays, building up skills and livelihoods in the community are more important than converting the communities to Christianity (Escobar 2002, 17-18). Post-imperial missiology is not important to modern-day community development because it lacks a “theology of freedom” (Kater 2001, 739).

**Managerial Missiology**

Managerial missiology uses the approach that the Christian mission is a “manageable enterprise” that can affect community development using statistical data (Escobar 2002, 19). It uses statistics, marketing techniques, and managerial objectives. The goal is to evaluate missions realistically in order to comprehend how much mission activity certain communities need. It studies social factors that stimulate numerical spiritual growth and develops an effective strategy of community development based on these factors. Managerial missiology uses quantifiable methods to evaluate missionary action, and sees potential converts as consumers.

However, managerial missiology is also not relevant to development today. It sees societies
as static and does not take into account the contexts of individual communities (Escobar 2002, 19). Rather, it sees the communities as numbers and as converts who can be “consumers” for Christianity. Therefore, scholars sometimes see managerial missiology and its “management” view of mission as too dehumanizing. It, like post-imperial missiology, does not work to build up the livelihoods of the communities as much as it focuses on converting them to Christianity. Thus, because conversion is no longer seen as a vital aspect of community development, managerial missiology is no longer significant to the development puzzle.

Holistic Missiology

Holistic missiology is a method of dynamic missionary action, meaning it stresses contextual issues, considering the ethnic, social, and ecclesiastical situations of the areas and designing its methods of community development based on these factors (Escobar 2002, 19-20). In this method, missionaries guide the creation of new structures within communities and view this as an opportunity to forge new communal ties. It focuses on how the local communities pull new expressions of faith from their culture in not only biblical but local forms as well (Langer and Jackson 1995, 36-37).

Therefore, holistic missiology is the method that is most relevant community development in Latin America today. Escobar states that “the essential aim of mission is not solely the conversion of individuals, but rather the establishment of the visible church,” which is done through the building of community structures based on biblical support. Three features characterize Latin American missiology: participation in missionary acts, structure based on biblical models, and acknowledgment of the relationship that exists between the people’s faith and their interaction with social structures (Escobar 2002, 37-38). Because holistic missiology focuses on building up community structures, which in turn can build up livelihoods, this method is still important to development today. Holistic missiology is the most contemporary missionary technique, and it reflects both a historical and modern-day relevance to development. Holistic mission work allows for adaptation and emphasizes the role of the individual and the community while factoring in theology.

How to Explore Holistic Missiology

Because the holistic missionary method is the most relevant method to community development today, this paper will analyze the impact of holistic missiology on community development in Latin America. The research will examine this puzzle with the question: How does holistic missiology impact community development in Latin America?

I hypothesize that holistic missiology positively impacts community development in Latin America. The independent variable is holistic missiology, and the dependent variable is community development in Latin America. Based on previous research, I expect to find a relationship between holistic missiology and community development. In the past, holistic missiology has always had a positive and significant impact on community development. While modern-day development is different from past approaches, I hypothesize that holistic missiology will still have a positive impact on community development because this method emphasizes examining the context of communities and building up community structures rather than simply converting followers. It focuses on the effect of missionary action on the community, rather than just on individual human beings.
Case Selection

To examine the impact of holistic missiology on community development, I studied two cases of mission work utilizing this method. One case took place in Aymara-speaking communities in Bolivia in the late 1980s, while the other was in Villa Briceno in rural Costa Rica from 2006-2010. These cases were chosen for several reasons. Missionaries in Bolivia used holistic missiology by accounting for the context of the Aymara communities and by working to establish equivalence between Aymara and Christian identity, while using local features to build community structures (Orta 1998, 165). The missionaries in Costa Rica used holistic missiology by evaluating the context of the area and then building community structures based on context and biblical models. Both have attempted to use holistic missiology to build up communities. Additionally, Christian missionaries from the United States conducted both cases.

The differences between the cases also contributed to their selection. First, the cases took place in different countries, which means the identities of the people and the social and economic contexts of the areas were different. Also, they took place in different time periods—one in the late 1980s and the other in the 2000s. These differences could contribute to the analysis of how holistic missiology impacts community development. If the hypothesis holds true in both cases, this would show how holistic mission work has impacted community development in two very different places in Latin America.

These cases are typical of holistic missiology elsewhere in Latin America. Holistic missiology has been used in many Latin American countries, and many persons involved in development are looking to use this method in the future. These cases were chosen because they are samples of two diverse Latin American communities, which could show that holistic missiology can be utilized in any context and community.

Methodology

The primary focus of the research will be an analysis of the Costa Rican mission project and its impact on the development of the community of Villa Briceno. The Bolivian case was chosen as a reference point. Holistic missiology did occur here and had a positive impact on community development. In contrast, the Costa Rican case has not been previously studied. The research will analyze the use of holistic missiology in the Costa Rican case using the Bolivian case as a control group to see if what happened in one context (Aymara-speaking communities in Bolivia) holds true in a different context (Villa Briceno, Costa Rica).

The study will gather data through secondary sources, such as articles, books, and studies done on the Bolivian case and examine it to explore the use of holistic missiology and its positive impact on the Aymara-speaking communities. A positive impact did occur here, but the research is exploring how it occurred. The findings will be compared with the results from the analysis of the Costa Rican case to determine if the Costa Rican missionaries had a positive impact on community development.

The analysis of the Costa Rican case of holistic missiology will draw its data from interviews about work done by the missionary organization Costa Rica Mission Projects in the rural and
impoverished area of Villa Briceno. The data comes from interviews of the missionaries involved and of members of the community. The researcher conducted the interviews both over the phone and through Skype. The missionary interviews took place in English, the interviews of the Costa Ricans in Spanish. The interview questions for the missionaries consist of questions about their project in Villa Briceno, dynamics between themselves and the community, and their opinion of the impact on the area. The questions used to interview the community members ask about the mission project, their personal feelings, and changes in the community. Overall, seven interviews were conducted—three missionaries and four community members. This was fewer than desired; however, these were the only subjects that would respond. Thus, this is a limitation to the study.

Comparing Uses of Holistic Missiology

Aymara Communities in Bolivia

The Aymara are an indigenous ethnic group found in the Andes in western Bolivia. They lived in the region for centuries before becoming a subject people of the Spanish. Missionaries have long worked with the Aymara communities, and, for decades, these missionaries simply sought to convert the Aymara to Christianity, without caring about the impact on the community. However, in the 1980s, missionaries in rural Aymara-speaking communities began a different approach: inculturation, or holistic missiology. In recent years, Christian missionaries have tried to establish equivalence between the Aymara identity and the Christian identity. The missionaries used the context of the Aymara communities and culture to emphasize traits that reflected Christian values, such as their worship of Pachamama, who is seen as the origin of life and divinity (Orta 2004, vii). Missionaries tried to establish equivalence between the concept of Pachamama and the concept of God to increase understanding in the Aymara. The missionaries incorporated aspects of their traditions into religion, such as making offerings to Pachamama to assure a good harvest or cure illness. They also took into account Aymara mythology, including legends about the origins of things, such as the wind, hail, mountains, and lakes. Lastly, the missionaries took the Aymara idea of a god who taught the people their customs, languages, and the rules for a moral life, and tied that into concepts of Christianity. The evangelization done in these communities accounted for Aymara locality, ethnicity, and tradition. The missionaries used Aymara traditions to construct metacultural methods by adapting their efforts to a specific cultural context (Orta, 1998, 167). This demonstrates their use of holistic missiology.

This use positively impacted community development in several ways. Their method of holistic missiology strived to recuperate indigenous culture. For example, the missionaries embraced the ways of the Aymara ancestors, once considered idolatrous, as Christian, which led to a revival of Aymara traditions. Holistic mission work in these areas also practiced social action and promoted communal solidarity and justice (Orta 1998, 168-169). They emphasized the importance of helping one another and providing services to the community. These services included education, small jobs, and improved health care (Poma 1995, 443). The missionaries taught that communal was better than separate, and this helped to tighten the communities in both religious and social contexts. Father Alonso, a foreign missionary, demonstrated this in his sermon when he stated, “Which is more Christian? Communal or separated? Communal! This is seen not only in Christianity, but in your past as well” (Orta 1998, 168). The missionaries built up a nature of solidarity between the Aymara people, which strengthened
communal ties and, consequently, communal structures.

The missionaries also sought to increase Aymara involvement in the church through faith groups. Various rituals of community, along with evangelization, marked these gatherings. Locals first came due to the draw of community rituals but, eventually, began participating in not only the faith groups but also church services (Orta 1998, 171). Entire families would come together to attend these groups, and, consequently, the bonds of family in the communities were reinforced. Additionally, the missionaries increased involvement by having Aymara catechists, those who were trained to instruct others in the Christian faith, lead the faith groups. The community approved and appointed these catechists and often saw them as authority figures, which led to a more structured community (Orta 2004, vii). Missionaries also involved themselves in the community by participating in traditional rituals, attending community gatherings, and providing services, such as education and health, to the communities (Poma, 1995, 443). Hence, the Aymara saw them as facilitators of development as well as church representatives.

Because this study defines community development as social, cultural, and religious actions that improve the livelihoods of underprivileged communities, there was definitely a significant positive impact on community development in the Aymara communities. Through their work, the missionaries increased community involvement, reinforced family bonds, and brought the community closer together, thereby strengthening the institutions and foundations of the community. They improved education in the communities, provided health services, and sometimes offered the people work, which they did not have many opportunities for, as relatively isolated peoples in a new and competitive world (Poma 1995, 444). The missionaries used social services, culture, and religion to help the community and to increase the people's livelihoods. Consequently, their use of holistic missiology did have a positive impact on community development in the Aymara-speaking communities in Bolivia.

Villa Briceno, Costa Rica

From 2006-2010, Costa Rica Mission Projects, a Christian mission organization, went into Villa Briceno, Costa Rica to conduct missionary work. The missionaries invited mission groups from the United States as volunteers. Villa Briceno is a small, rural, and very impoverished area in southern Costa Rica. In the past, the United Fruit Company existed in the area but it later pulled out, leaving Villa Briceno in complete poverty. Costa Rica Mission Projects rebuilt a recreational center, or camp, as a gathering place, renovated a church, and built a classroom, all for the entire community to use. The group also employed holistic missiology. Rather than simply trying to convert the people, the missionaries worked to build up the community by building institutions, along with trust (Bailey 2011).

The purpose of this analysis is to examine whether the missionaries’ impact on the community goes beyond the construction of buildings. How did the use of holistic missiology impact community development in Villa Briceno? How did it affect the livelihoods of the Costa Ricans in the community? Was there a positive impact? In this modern case of community development, is holistic missiology still a relevant method? The study examines these questions first through interviews with the missionaries and then through interviews with the Costa Ricans in the community. I interviewed three missionaries and analyzed their responses to determine if holistic missiology had a positive impact on community development, beginning with the head missionary.
WIL BAILEY

Wil Bailey is the founder and head missionary of Costa Rica Mission Projects. He is in charge of many of the decisions for the mission projects. He also coordinates the groups of volunteers from the United States that come on short-term trips to help. He answered several questions about the mission project and the community.

INTERVIEWER: In terms of your focus, how much was placed on religious development and how much was placed on community development?

WIL: We provide churches with the infrastructure they need to develop the ministries that God has called them to in their communities. We hope that our presence in Villa Briceno was a blessing to the whole community, not just the church. However, generally, our focus was more church specific than community specific.

INTERVIEWER: What were the dynamics like between you and your fellow missionaries and the people of the community?

WIL: As far as the community goes, we were most directly involved with the church family. However, during the years we spent in Villa Briceno, we were constantly visiting the local store for snacks and doing activities with the children at the local school. We often heard stories and comments about how excited the volunteers were when they felt like they had gotten to know some of the local people, and vice versa.

INTERVIEWER: How did the community change over the four years of the project? What kind of change occurred? Did more people begin attending church functions?

WIL: I honestly do not know the answer to the first part this question. The church in Villa Briceno has grown during the time since we worked there. There has been about a twenty percent increase.

INTERVIEWER: In your opinion, what impact was left on the community due to the project and the volunteers that came?

WIL: Ultimately, only time will tell. I hope that our efforts motivate each church to rethink what they are capable of as far as their own vision for reaching out to their neighbors. The buildings are important, but embracing the fact that we are all part of a Universal Body of Christ is much more important (Bailey 2011).

This interview was interesting because, even though he is the founder and head of Costa Rica Mission Projects, Wil did not glorify the work done by the project. He seemed very honest in his answers. Based on his responses, it seems as if the project focused more on religious development than community development. Also, it seems like the missionaries had more contact with community members involved in the church than those who were not. His statement that, “We think it is
important that the volunteers from the States have the opportunity to interact with the local people, and worships services are a major way we see that happen,” reinforces this (Bailey 2011). Hence, most of the community involvement they had was with locals involved with the church prior to their arrival. Additionally, Wil admits that he does not know if there was an impact due to their work. He says more people did begin attending the church in Villa Briceno since the completion of their mission project, but there is no evidence that it was a cause of their work. Also, his answer “Ultimately, only time will tell,” indicates that no noticeable impact on community development occurred as a direct result of their mission work. They locals and the missionaries formed relationships, and the church itself was improved, but based on Wil’s interview, their work had more of an impact on religious development than community development in Villa Briceno. However, Lauren, the next missionary interviewed, was of a somewhat different opinion.

LAUREN DUNAGIN DE ALVAREZ

Lauren is a missionary with Costa Rica Mission Projects. She began working with them two years before the Villa Briceno project. Her responses were quite different from Wil’s in that she believes that their use of holistic missiology did have a positive impact on community development, making it relevant to development today.

INTERVIEWER: In terms of your focus, how much was placed on religious development and how much was placed on community development? Why?

LAUREN: I would say that the same amount of focus was placed on religious and community development. It is a religious organization so, for example, we had Bible School for the kids, which helped us form relationships with both the kids in the community and their parents. It was a pretty equal amount because we reached out to the community but we also worked to share the Gospel. Our main goal was to make connections with the community, but also to do construction.

INTERVIEWER: What were the dynamics like between you and your fellow missionaries and the people of the community?

LAUREN: I, and the other missionaries, became good friends with a lot of the people in the community because we were there for four years. The locals were open and wanted to get to know us. The kids were open and wanted to hang out. They were very welcoming and made me feel like a part of the community. Even now, some still keep in touch with me.

INTERVIEWER: How did the community change over the four years of the project? How did the people in the area become more involved in the community? Did more people begin attending church functions?

LAUREN: People did become more involved with the church. Sometimes it was because they were curious about what was going on and why so many gringos were there. Some would come in their spare time and help build because they felt like the work we were doing affected them.

INTERVIEWER: In your opinion, what impact was left on the community due to
the project and the volunteers that came?

LAUREN: I feel like the community understood the purpose of the construction of the camp. I also feel like the community was able to form relationships with people from a different country. Overall, I feel like there was a positive impact (Dunagin de Alvarez 2011).

Lauren’s responses gave the impression that there was a more noticeable impact on community development due to the mission project. She also answered that they placed the same amount of focus on religious development as community development. While they obviously worked to share the Gospel, they also reached out to the community to make connections and to do construction work. She stressed that the relationships formed with the Costa Ricans in the area had a positive impact. According to her, more people became involved with the church; however, the only reason given was that many were curious about the Americans. This does not seem as if the locals joined because of the missionary efforts to spread the Gospel. However, no matter what the locals’ reason for joining the church, the fact that they missionaries’ work did lead more Costa Ricans to join the church could have led to strengthened ties and structures within the community. So, while Lauren says there was an impact on community development, it was mainly through the creation of new relationships, which could have strengthened community ties and could have brought the locals closer together. It also could have led the Costa Ricans to see outsiders in a more positive light. Hence, while there was a positive impact, it was to a somewhat smaller degree. Karen, the third missionary interviewed, seemed to agree with Lauren in a few ways regarding their work.

KAREN WINTERCAMP

Karen is also a missionary for Costa Rica Mission Projects. The first project she worked with them on was in Villa Briceno. She has worked on one other project since then. Therefore, her responses to the questions are from a fresh perspective of mission work. Also, because she has only been involved in two projects as a missionary, this led her to compare the two.

INTERVIEWER: In terms of your focus, how much was placed on religious development and how much was placed on community development? Why?

KAREN: I think that there is about the same amount on each. When we worked in the community, we wanted to share God’s love and message. We also witnessed their religion and the way they worshiped. This built a sense of community between the Costa Ricans and us. They reached out to us, and we did the same to them. However, we were also very focused on the construction part. Our main goal every day was to work on the construction of the buildings.

INTERVIEWER: What were the dynamics like between you and your fellow missionaries and the people of the community?

KAREN: In Villa Briceno, we got to know many members of the community. They were open to us and wanted to hang around the groups. However, this has been different at the other project that we have worked at. Sometimes, working in the
city, there is not much of a connection at all.

INTERVIEWER: How did the community change over the four years of the project? What kind of change occurred? How did the people in the area become more involved in the community? Did more people begin attending church functions?

KAREN: I think more people became involved. People from the community came to the worksites to help us build. When the children got out of school, they come see what the “Americans” were doing.

INTERVIEWER: In your opinion, what impact was left on the community due to the project and the volunteers that came?

KAREN: I think in Villa Briceno, there was a positive impact on the community development. It is such a poor area that any work done will help. I think that the people were truly grateful that we were there. However, in the project in the city, it did not seem like the community changed at all and there wasn’t really an overall impact (Wintercamp 2011).

Karen’s responses make for interesting analysis. She says they placed an equal amount of focus on religious and community development, but, like Lauren, the “community development” she talks about is construction and building connections with the Costa Ricans. She does not say anything about more people becoming involved in the church, but simply talks about locals coming to the worksite and hanging out with them. This was her view of increased involvement. In addition, while she says there was a positive impact on community development, the reason she gives is because it is a poor area and that any work done would help. Therefore, while there was a positive impact because of the group work, it seems that work done by any group would help because Villa Briceno is so impoverished. Additionally, Karen’s comparison between the project in Villa Briceno and the project they did after in Alajuela, a big city, gives the impression that the area matters. According to her responses, in Villa Briceno, the missionaries formed relationships and made an impact in Villa Briceno, but not in Alajuela. Thus, it seems that the impact on community development could depend on the location of the project or the level of poverty and not solely on the work of the missionaries.

The last four interviews were of Costa Ricans who live in the area of Villa Briceno and who had daily contact with the missionaries. They saw firsthand the impact of the missionaries’ work on the community, and did believe that there was a positive impact.

KIKE AGUERAS ROJAS

Kike is a Costa Rican living in the community in Villa Briceno. He is currently twenty-one years old and is a member of the church in Villa Briceno that the missionaries worked with.

INTERVIEWER: What were the missionaries doing in the community? What did they do on a typical day? What do you believe they were there to do?

KIKE: The groups did construction most of the time, building a church, classroom, and so on. I think they were there to build structures that would help the community.
INTERVIEWER: What were your feelings about the missionaries and their work? Do you know how others in the community felt?

Kike: Personally, I like the missionaries and their work. I made a lot of good friends and I felt very blessed with all the things I learned while they were doing their work. I think the others in the community were very thankful for all the work and the programs that the missionaries did in the community and the church.

INTERVIEWER: Do you think your community is better off, worse, or the same due to the missionaries’ work? Why? How did you see your community change?

Kike: I think the community is better. We made friends with the missionaries, and some of us still keep in touch with them. They also built buildings to help our community. We were very grateful (Agueras Rojas 2011).

Kike’s responses reinforce that, overall, the missionaries mainly developed relationships with people in the community. He stresses that he was good friends with the missionaries and that other people liked them as well. He was also involved with the missionaries at church services and functions, but he was a church member before the missionaries’ arrived. He says that the community is better off because the missionaries constructed buildings that would benefit the community. There was a contribution made by the missionaries’ work to the development of the community. Kike’s interview gives the impression that these projects and buildings brought the people closer together. It is evident that the missionaries established strong connections with people in the community and constructed buildings for community use, and there was definitely an impact on the community socially.

HUGUITO GONZALEZ

Huguito is a twenty-six year old community member in Villa Briceno, as well as a member of the church before the arrival of the missionaries.

INTERVIEWER: What were the missionaries doing in the community? What do you believe they were there to do?

Huguito: They built a camp, worked on the church, and build a room at the school. They also worked with evangelism and distributed food and sometimes clothes. They had Bible School which also helped the children.

INTERVIEWER: What were your feelings about the missionaries and their work? Do you know how others in the community felt?

Huguito: The missionaries and the groups were a great help in the community. I think all the people liked when they came and would join in the church because they were there. Ticos and gringos shared together and became friends. We went to eat ice cream several nights and we shared devotions. They went to church with us. We had meals with them a lot too.

INTERVIEWER: Do you think your community is better off, worse, or the same due to the missionaries’ work? Why? How did you see your community change?

Huguito: With the arrival of the Americans, the community saw many benefits,
especially because we are in a rural area of the country. There was an impact because of the work of the gringos (Gonzalez 2011).

Huguito spoke of works the missionaries performed besides construction. He mentioned that they also evangelized the inhabitants, provided bible school, and distributed food and clothes to the community. The food and clothes distribution could have improved the livelihood of some poor families in the community for a short time. However, this was temporary, as the distribution would have ended after the missionaries left. He too focuses on the friendship of the missionaries and volunteers, describing how they went to church and fellowshipped. He did say that more people joined in church but his reasoning was that the “gringos” were there. This reinforces what Lauren said in her interview: some of the locals’ may have come to church and the worksite, but many times it simply had to do with curiosity rather than evangelization. Lastly, Huguito states that the community saw benefits particularly because they are in a rural area of the country, giving the impression that their location had much to do with it. Thus, if an impact on community development did occur, there is no evidence that it was solely due to the missionary work. He did express that the missionaries’ work helped increase unity in the community but this is one small step towards community development. The next Costa Rican interviewed, Felipe, was of a similar opinion.

FELIPE BARBAS

Felipe is twenty-four years old and lives in Villa Briceno. He too was a church member prior to the arrival of the missionaries.

INTERVIEWER: What were the missionaries doing in the community? What did they do on a typical day? What do you believe they were there to do?
FELIPE: They were building a camp and doing repair work. They also were helping poor people with food and preaching the Gospel. They also prayed for the community.

INTERVIEWER: What were your feelings about the missionaries and their work? Do you know how others in the community felt?
FELIPE: I liked the missionaries and the groups a lot. People usually liked them because they were helping us.

INTERVIEWER: Do you think their project aided in the development of the community? Why or why not?
FELIPE: Yes. The project helped in terms of infrastructure. The missionaries provided construction. They also gave out food.

INTERVIEWER: Do you think your community is better off, worse, or the same due to the missionaries’ work? Why? How did you see your community change?
FELIPE: I think the community is better. I also think people in the community got a different perspective of both the church and the Americans. They constructed buildings for us (Barbas 2011).
Felipe also spoke of how the missionaries distributed food and preached God’s message to the community. However, he mainly focuses on construction work, saying the community was better off because they constructed buildings and developed infrastructure. In addition, he was good friends with the missionaries and says people generally liked them because they were helping the community. From his interview, it seems that the missionaries’ work did have a positive impact on community development due to missionaries’ distribution of food and building of infrastructure. While this community development may be to a small degree, it did occur. The next interviewee portrayed a greater picture of the impact of the missionary work on the community of Villa Briceno.

DON HUGO GONZALEZ ARAYA

Don Hugo is a well-respected leader in the community, as well as a church patriarch. He is fifty-seven years old and has been involved in both the community and the church well before the missionaries arrived.

_INTERVIEWER:_ What were the missionaries doing in the community? What did they do on a typical day? What do you believe they were there to do?

_DON HUGO:_ The work they did was varied. The most was construction including the camp, a church, and a classroom. They presented the Gospel in different ways. They played with the children and did Bible School. They also assorted materials to the communities.

_INTERVIEWER:_ What were your feelings about the missionaries and their work? Do you know how others in the community felt?

_DON HUGO:_ I had feelings of respect, appreciation, and I think a lot of people felt that way.

_INTERVIEWER:_ Do you think their project aided in the development of the community? Why or why not?

_DON HUGO:_ I think the work in the community has helped the development. They have constructed buildings for community use. For example, they are used for classes and for meetings. The camp is used for graduations and weddings, and sometimes other churches nearby use it.

_INTERVIEWER:_ Do you think your community is better off, worse, or the same due to the missionaries’ work? Why? How did you see your community change?

_DON HUGO:_ I think the community is better. They built structures for us. The missionaries and the groups of volunteers also helped with sales at the store and with nearby hardware stores in the town nearby. They also bought crafts that people in the community made (Gonzalez Araya 2011).

Don Hugo is a different subject than the other community members interviewed. He is not only a patriarch within the church, but a community member as well. Nevertheless, his responses were relatively similar. He describes the work of the missionaries as including construction and social work. Social work included evangelism, bible school, and distributing materials to the community. Thus, it seems as if there was a focus on both religion and community, as the missionaries stated in
their interviews. According to Don Hugo, the work did help because the buildings were for community use for events such as class, meetings, and weddings. He also says that, while there, the missionaries and volunteers helped with sales at the store in town and bought crafts made by locals. However, this income that the missionaries provided would have ended as soon as they left the area. Thus, it was not a lingering impact on the livelihoods of the community members. Nonetheless, a positive impact did exist. Through the construction of buildings for gatherings and the establishment of connections, holistic missiology did develop the community socially.

**Drawing Conclusions: How Does Holistic Missiology Have An Impact?**

The study examined the hypothesis, holistic missiology positively impacts community development in Latin America, using two cases: missionaries in Aymara-speaking communities in Bolivia and in Villa Briceno, Costa Rica. Both cases involved holistic missiology, and, in both cases, missiology impacted community development, though it was to varying degrees. The Aymara case had portrayed a significant impact on community development because the use of holistic missiology led to better education, more jobs, better infrastructure, and stronger family and community ties. The Costa Rican case was different. While holistic missiology did have an positive impact on community development in Villa Briceno, it was to a smaller degree.

For the purposes of this study, community development was conceptualized as social, cultural, and religious actions that seek to improve the livelihoods of underprivileged communities. Using this conceptualization, the interviews, along with the Bolivian case as a reference point, it seems that holistic missiology did have a positive impact on community development in Villa Briceno, though perhaps not a lasting impact and perhaps not on the entire community.

There were several differences between the Bolivia and Villa Briceno missionary projects. While both emphasized forging ties with the community and spreading Christianity, the missionaries in Bolivia worked to increase community solidarity as well as to help livelihoods through improved education, providing health care and jobs, thereby strengthening the foundations of the community. Meanwhile, the missionaries in Villa Briceno focused on building connections, constructing buildings for the community and, to a small extent, distributing food and clothes. These differences were the reason why the Bolivian missionaries had a stronger impact on community development than the Villa Briceno project.

While the missionaries’ work in Costa Rica was important, it did not have a large effect on the entire community. The buildings are of a great use but will not improve the people’s status or work towards bringing them out of poverty. Additionally, the activities in the buildings (church, school, weddings, and meetings) would most likely still have taken place elsewhere had buildings not been constructed. The buildings simply give the people places to gather so that the community could come together. The distribution of food and clothes and purchases of goods were both temporary. However, despite this, there was still a positive impact on community development. There may not be long term financial effects, but the missionaries still contributed. These projects could have brought people closer together by offering accessible community meeting places.

The connections with people in the community are also beneficial but, likewise, does not increase people’s livelihoods. In their responses, the Costa Ricans largely focused on the fact that they...
liked the missionaries and became friends with them. However, the establishment of camaraderie allowed people from two different countries to meet and learn more about the other. It also could have brought the locals to regard outsiders in a more positive light.

Additionally, the majority of the interviews mentioned that the missionaries worked to evangelize, provided bible school, and were involved in church services. Despite the fact that they built structures for the community, the project still focused more on religious development than community development. Also, the missionaries’ seemed to be more involved with the community members who were also church members. The missionaries worked with the church and attended church services and functions; hence, they would naturally have more contact with people who were actively involved in the church. Of the many Costa Ricans contacted, the only ones willing to be interviewed were church members before the arrival of the missionaries. It appears that the missionaries did not influence the community as a whole but rather the portion of the community involved in the church.

Accordingly, the use of holistic missiology in Villa Briceno did have a positive effect but not to a large degree. The responses to the interviews reinforced that the work of the missionaries impacted people socially. Each of the responses by both missionaries and community members emphasized that the missionaries and volunteers focused on constructing buildings to establish places for gatherings and on establishing connections with the locals. Despite the smaller impact, holistic missiology did have a positive impact on the development of the communities in Costa Rica. This shows that holistic missiology is still relevant to community development today, though its impact may occur in varying degrees depending on the context and the community. Nonetheless, the use of holistic missiology for community development is still important. It could lead to stronger communities, increased infrastructure, distribution of food and clothes (though this may be temporary), and relationships between peoples of different countries. So, holistic missiology does have a positive impact on communities in Latin America, though, as a branch of community development, its impact is to a smaller, less significant degree.

Though the Bolivian and Costa Rican cases were examples of holistic missiology, the conclusion cannot be applied to all examples of holistic mission work. There were limitations to the study due to time constraints, resources, and intervening and antecedent variables. Because so few people were willing to be interviewed, this is a small sample size of interviewees. They might not be completely representative of the entire community in which the mission project took place. Also, the interviews of the Costa Ricans took place in Spanish, so there could be errors due to translation. The role of the memory is also a factor. Even though only two years have passed since the completion of the work in Villa Briceno, people’s memories could have changed. Things could have occurred since the completion of the project that might have affected the community, but due to memory, those interviewed could have attributed these changes to the missionaries’ project. Additionally, the only community members who responded were church members, and all except one were in their twenties. These factors could have skewed their views, as the missionaries could have appealed more to church members and young people. HoHO

Intervening and antecedent variables also exist. The intervening variables are the location and the cultural and political contexts of the mission area, and the antecedent variable is the existence of a local church or religious ideology before the arrival of the missionaries. Each of these variables could themselves affect community development and could alter the perceived impact of holistic
missiology on those areas. This is why, in his interview, Wil stated that he did not know if there was an impact on the community because of the project. Church attendance had increased, but there was no evidence that this was due to the mission work.

If this study were to be conducted again, some changes would be made. If further time and resources were possible, interviews conducted in the actual areas would be more informative and helpful than relying on responses through the Internet and phone. Face-to-face interviews might get more community members to participate, as the interviews would seem more personal. Interviews that could not take place over the phone or computer due to access problems could be conducted. Firsthand observation of Villa Briceno would be valuable to supplement the interviews. Comparing these observations and interviews could account for lapses in people’s memory and differences in their perspectives. The exploration of more cases could also occur if time and resources would allow for it.

To build further upon this research, one could examine several issues. One could examine holistic missiology in other cases or possible alterations to increase flexibility. One could also explore other development methods that might be more versatile and more likely to impact community development. Lastly, a continued study could explore the finding that holistic mission work affects communities socially, or social development, as a new hypothesis.

For scholars and political scientists, these findings are significant because they build upon knowledge used in the debate over development methods in rural communities. Some scholars argue that holistic missiology is one of the best modern approaches to development because of its flexibility and versatility in affecting community development, and some argue that it is no longer relevant to community development. This study shows that both have some validity to them. While this study evidenced that holistic missiology does have a positive impact on community development, it is to a small degree in many cases, meaning that it is not one of the best approaches to community development. However, because there was a positive impact, holistic missiology is still relevant to community development today. It still affects the communities, even if it is in a small way. Additionally, where proponents of holistic mission work would argue that it would impact community development in any context, this was not the case. The Aymara communities in Bolivia and the community in Villa Briceno, Costa Rica are quite different, and, upon examination, mission work impacted community development significantly in one but not the other. Overall, holistic missiology works in some cases but not others and might need other factors to aid in community development. Thus, this study of the case in Villa Briceno can be instructive. The findings show that holistic missiology has its weaknesses and scholars and political scientists can use this to explore improved methods of community development.
Bibliography


Abstract. This paper seeks to determine the impact the Zapatista Movement had on women’s rights in Chiapas, Mexico. I hypothesized that the movement positively, but indirectly, impacted women’s rights in Chiapas by causing increased awareness of the issues in the region and influencing various aid and development organizations to begin women’s rights work there since the start of the movement in 1994. Twelve non-profit nongovernmental women’s aid organizations with no political or religious affiliation were selected for analysis. Using content analysis of the NGOs’ websites, each organization was determined whether or not they had Zapatista ties in their founding by tracing their foundation history through information provided in various sections on their websites. After determining that at least 7 of the 12 organizations had clear influences from the Zapatista Movement in their founding, I argue that the Zapatista Movement did significantly contribute to the increased number of women-specific aid NGOs in Chiapas. However, the type of influence could be described as either direct or indirect, depending on the more specific relationship with the movement the organizers had. This study reveals an intersection of social movement and political science research because it demonstrates how one movement can spawn several other independent movements that have legitimate implications on the formation of institutions and on a broader population.

Introduction

On January 1, 1994, a group of 3,000 rebels stormed the Mexican state of Chiapas, taking over several cities, setting fire to police stations, and freeing prisoners from the state capital. The group of rebels, who called themselves the Ejército Zapatista de la Liberación Nacional (EZLN), or the Zapatista Army of National Liberation, enjoyed brief success before the Mexican army drove them back (Ross 1995, 169–187). The EZLN, a group that had been meeting and slowly gathering supporters for the past few years, chose January 1, 1994 to announce their presence to the international community in protest of the day the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into effect (Ross 1995, 23–35). The Zapatistas are a leftist group of indigenous Maya and non-indigenous sympathizers from the Chiapas region of Mexico who believe that the Mexican government no longer serves the common citizen, so they strive to achieve indigenous autonomy and work so that the extensive natural resource supply in the Chiapas region actually benefits the people who live there (Ross 1995).

However, one of the most unique aspects of the Zapatista strife compared to similar liberation movements is the extensive participation of women. Women have made up approximately one third of the combatants in the Zapatista army with several that have served in high ranking positions of
military authority (Speed, Stephen, and Hernández Castillo 2006). In addition, women constitute over half of the Zapatista support bases throughout Chiapas and have worked to improve a variety of both indigenous and women’s rights issues by means of the movement (Speed, Stephen, and Hernández Castillo 2006).

In Chiapas, indigenous women have a long history of abuse and treatment as second-class citizens. Christine Eber and Christine Kovic describe in their extensive study about women in Chiapas, Mexico how both “mestizas and indigenous women, whether urban or rural, single or married, are united in their struggles to support themselves and their families, to curtail domestic violence and rape, and to be treated fairly in the judicial system” (Eber and Kovic 2003). Though the Zapatista women do not consider themselves feminists, they identify with the indigenous movement as a whole and define themselves as another voiceless group within the movement that needs to be heard (Ross 2000); they seek to gather support and bring awareness within the indigenous communities and to the broader national and international community about the injustices of sexism that burdens every one of them. In my study, I have sought to discover the way in which the Zapatista Movement has affected women’s rights in Chiapas, Mexico since its official beginning nearly 18 years ago.

In the wide variety of literature on this topic, I discerned two dominant schools of thought concerning the impact of the Zapatista Movement on women’s rights. The first and dominating school of thought focuses on women who are directly enlisted in the EZLN and how their individual standards of living have changed (and often substantially improved) as a result of their direct involvement in the movement. The second school of thought, and the one that will be the focus of this paper, centers on the women in Chiapas as a whole population and the movement’s direct and indirect impact on their collective human rights status. In my study, I selected 12 non-profit non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that work in Chiapas to improve women’s rights, that have emerged since the start of the Zapatista Movement, and that meet various other criteria. I used content analysis of the organizations’ websites along with an interview to trace the Zapatista Movement’s progression as it brought awareness to women’s rights issues in the region. The goal was to determine if it led to the foundation of the numerous local and internationally based women’s rights NGOs in Chiapas. I have found that though the clearly stated pro-women’s rights goals of the Zapatista’s Women’s Revolutionary Law have not yet been realized in terms of the broader population of women in Chiapas, the movement has both helped to bring awareness to the international community and also spur local activism for the improvement of women’s rights. Activist organizations have gradually benefited the broader female population in Chiapas by making necessary resources accessible for women that the EZLN has not.

**Literature Review**

After reviewing a wide variety of scholarly literature about the Zapatista Movement, I found that there are two distinct schools of thought that dominate the study of the affect of the Zapatista Movement on women in Chiapas. The dominating school of thought in most of the reviewed publications emphasized the “Zapatista woman” as a woman who is directly involved or enlisted in the Zapatista Army. This type of research typically centers on personal, in-depth interviews with one or a few women in the Zapatista Army and typically compares their personal experiences before and after joining the EZLN. While this type of ethnographic research is very interesting and informative, it is really only
significant on a smaller scale because its results are really only applicable to a small minority of the female population in Chiapas – that is, the women who are actively and directly enlisted in the EZLN. For clarity purposes, I will refer to this first school of thought as the “Direct Enlistment” group.

The other major school of thought in the scholarship on this topic focused instead on the idea of the “Zapatista women” as the women who live in official Zapatista villages throughout the entire state of Chiapas. Zapatista villages are the small towns within the state of Chiapas that claim allegiance to the motives of the Zapatista Movement (Ballesteros Corona and Cuninghame 2000). Virtually all of the villages within Chiapas have claimed such allegiance (Ballesteros Corona and Cuninghame 2000). This school of research focuses on the broader female population of Chiapas and not specifically on the women directly enlisted in the EZLN. As a result, this school of thought varies greatly in research methods and results throughout the scholarly research in this field. While ethnographic methods such as interviews and observations are used, statistics such as literacy and maternal mortality rates often included or analyzed and heavily relied upon to demonstrate how the conditions described in a qualitative study are applicable to the broader female population of Chiapas. This school of thought will henceforth be referred to as the “Indirect Involvement” group because the women who are in focus in this scholarship are often not directly enlisted in the Zapatista Army.

The Direct Enlistment school of thought in the reviewed scholarly literature focuses on the women who are personally involved in the Zapatista Army. These women have typically left their homes and families to live and train at the Zapatista training camps in the secluded jungle regions of Chiapas (Speed, Stephen, and Hernández Castillo 2006). From this perspective, the women who were focused on have typically enjoyed great individual improvement in their women’s rights status as a part and a result of the Zapatista Movement. Also, because one of the foundational goals of the Zapatistas is to educate their members, women directly involved had almost immediate access to substantial education which has allowed them to learn not only to speak, but also to become literate in Spanish (Eber 1999) - an essential skill for any type of advancement in Mexico, yet a skill denied to the majority of indigenous women in the region (Eber 1999). Also, by living at the training camps, women in the EZLN enjoy a steady source of nutrition, which is rare because women “are often expected to wait until the men are finished eating before they can begin to eat; under the conditions of scarcity that are prevalent within those communities, the end result is that women eat much less than men” (Kampwirth 2002). A combination of steady nutrition and access to legitimate education paired with more readily available medical aid upon direct participation on the EZLN camps, women in the Zapatista army have commonly enjoyed substantial improvement the their individual standards of living. Coupled with the individual empowerment the EZLN offers, the Zapatista Movement has allowed some women access to freedom in several areas of their life, including liberty from the physical and sexual abuse that is rampant in the region (Munoz Ramirez 2003).

This Direct Enlistment school of thought focuses specifically on the change in individual women’s lives and the improved lifestyles they enjoy as a result of their own involvement in the Zapatista Movement. By focusing on individual interviews with a limited number of women who have seen a great change in their own lives due to their direct involvement in the Zapatista Army, many of the scholarly sources in this school of thought portray an impressive change in women’s rights in Chiapas. Such sources seem to assume that joining the Zapatista Movement is the answer to solving women’s rights problems in the region. However, as a young Zapatista woman named Daria described,
joining the movement for many women involves the difficult choice between marriage and family life or involvement in the Army. “I’m not going to marry because then I won’t be free to attend meetings, to visit other communities, whereas where I am, I can go to my meetings, I can stay and chat, but if I had a husband he wouldn’t let me, so I don’t marry” (Speed, Hernández Castillo, and Stephen 2006). As a result, the idea that the majority of the women in Chiapas will give up marriage and family life to join the movement is highly unlikely and as a result, there remains thousands of sexually and physically abused, monolingual, illiterate, and malnourished women at home in Chiapas who can not directly benefit from the individual opportunities the EZLN have to offer.

The Direct Enlistment school of thought is very limited in the context of the overall impact of the Zapatista Movement on women’s rights in Chiapas. As stated above, the majority of the research focuses on very few personal experiences of great change, but does not account for the rest of the female population in the region. As a result, this school of thought primarily outlines statically unusual or insignificant cases that would not be applicable to the rest of the population in assessing the broader impact the Zapatista Movement had on women’s rights.

The second major school of thought, or the Indirect Involvement group, focuses on this broader majority of the female population in Chiapas. The common argument explains that though there have been substantial changes for the women directly in the EZLN, these women are a distinct minority in the region and there has been relatively little immediate success for the common women of Chiapas in improving their human rights status as a result of the movement. The individual women who abandon their families to join the EZLN often do enjoy much improved living conditions, but they are often looked down upon as deserters of traditional family and tribal values (Speed, Stephen, and Hernández Castillo 2006). This Indirect Involvement school acknowledges that even though the Zapatistas as a whole encourage forward-thinking, the whole population’s mindset will not change as rapidly. Though changing the minds of their fellow indigenous men towards their treatment of their wives clearly poses a challenge, an obstacle within the female population also exists because some of the older generations of women believe that it is the husband’s duty to beat his wife to ensure she upholds her own responsibilities (Kampwirth 2002) - as has been traditionally taught. Since this school of thought acknowledges that the common women of Chiapas have not enjoyed the same benefits as those in the EZLN, it argues that one of the most important ways that the Zapatista Movement has helped to indirectly improve the greater female population’s rights status in the region is by calling more domestic and international awareness to the substandard living conditions of the indigenous women in the region.

The Indirect Involvement school of thought discusses concepts and questions that are much more applicable to the broader population of indigenous women in Chiapas. This particular school more readily supports the concept of increased awareness from the Zapatista Movement that may result in greater successful activism and subsequently improve women’s rights in the region. Likewise, the Indirect Involvement school of thought is more realistic in acknowledging that while the EZLN has greatly impacted some women, the vast majority of women in the region remain oppressed and have only experienced marginal improvements as an immediate result of the movement.

Within these two distinct twos of thought, I have found that the individual researchers of the reviewed publications have typically employed either qualitative or ethnographical methods, statistical analyses, or, most frequently, some combination of the two methods. Through the utilization of these
research methods, the literature on this subject collectively discusses several common themes and topics of dispute, often with a primary goal to firstly give an assessment of the common indigenous woman’s rights and lifestyle prior to and since the beginning of the Zapatista Movement, and thusly providing a level against which one can measure change or improvement. The most pressing human rights violations that most of the researchers and indigenous women alike emphasized are issues involving the indigenous woman’s lack of power and ability make decisions for her self, uncontrolled cases of physical and sexual abuse, and the lack of accessibility to basic resources, such as education, healthcare, and substantial nutrition. By utilizing a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods of research, the literature on this topic paints a picture of the pre-Zapatista and current situation for the women in Chiapas – both those directly enlisted in the EZLN and not.

During the first Declaration in the Lacandon Jungle, the Zapatista women, led by EZLN military leader Commander Susana, proclaimed a list of ten nonnegotiable demands for justice and respect, both to their own community and to the Mexican government (Anon. 1996). This subsection of the Zapatista Declaration in the Lacandon became known as the Women’s Revolutionary Law (see page 25 for the list of demands). As much of the statistically-based research shows, there was good reason for such demands. At the beginning of the Zapatista movement, Chiapas had the highest maternal mortality rate in Mexico: 117 out of every 100,000 women died in child birth because of a lack of adequate female health services (Speed, Hernández Castillo, and Stephen 2006). With 60% of the population under the age of 20, most adolescent girls were sold into marriage by their parents and gave birth to an average of 7 children (Ross 1995). In the state of Chiapas, 67% of the population was malnourished, with 33% classified as extremely malnourished (Ross 1995).

In addition to lack of appropriate female health care and nutrition, women have been kept under the control of men by their lack of education. Approximately 60% of women in Chiapas in 1995 were illiterate (Eber and Kovic 2003). At least another 40% were monolingual- meaning that they only spoke the native language of the village, and not Spanish (Ross 1995). Since indigenous women lacked the accessibility to an adequate education, they never learned to become literate in Spanish, which is the language of business and self sufficiency in Mexico. As a result, keeping women monolingual has long prevented them from rebelling against traditional expectations and dependency on men in order to become independent (Eber 1999).

The multiple researchers’ use of statistical data to demonstrate the women’s rights situation in Chiapas prior to and during the beginning of the Zapatista Movement allows the reader to understand that the basis for the Women’s Revolutionary Law was a result of the undeniably oppressive gender roles and cultural implications of being a woman in Chiapas. A major part of the debate between the two major schools of thought is a question of how much this declaration actually impacted indigenous women’s lives. In order to determine an impact, statistical information involving both the women directly involved in the EZLN and the common indigenous women of the Chiapas is crucial to compare and analyze. The researchers from the perspective of the Indirect Involvement school of thought commonly employed various statistical data and changes (or lack there of) in maternal mortality rates, the availability or usage of birth control, average number of children, literacy rates, among others to demonstrate that the Zapatista movement has largely not benefited the majority of the female population (Munoz Ramirez 2003). In contrast, the Direct Enlistment school of thought uses such statistics to demonstrate the initial need for change and how the successful women have beaten the
odds (Munoz Ramirez 2003). By focusing on the very small percentage of women who have beaten the odds and directly benefited from the Zapatista Movement, this school of thought does not adequately address the broader population, making the subsequent research much less statistically significant.

However, in order to more completely portray the impact of the Zapatista Movement on women’s rights, researchers from both schools of thought commonly employed more qualitative research methods, perhaps to determine the real-life implications of these numbers. By integrating qualitative methods, both schools of thought were able to more completely develop their respective argument, often by integrating personal experiences of indigenous women from the region. By far the most common qualitative method to be used in the literature on this topic was the interview. Not quite as popular, but none-the-less common, were the observational study, another qualitative method. Along with ethnography, such methods are used in both schools of thought about women involved in the movement in order to better understand their experience in the EZLN. All of the researchers traveled to Chiapas and many stayed for an extended period of time, interviewing, observing, and living alongside of women both directly in the EZLN and those who are not.

By including personal experiences, both the researcher and the reader are able to understand the motivation that many women experienced to join the revolution when opportunity presented itself. Christine Eber, the author of the article “Seeking Our Own Food: Indigenous Women’s Power and Autonomy in San Pedro, Chiapas,” chose to live with an indigenous women named Antonia (who spoke Spanish as well her native language) and her husband for multiple extended stays. Throughout her research, she includes anecdotes and commentary Antonia’s personal experiences with the Zapatista movement and uses these experiences to demonstrate the individual improvements Antonia has enjoyed as a result of her involvement in the movement. Eber uses these anecdotes to demonstrate that there is not only validity in the numerical statistics, but personal interviews and experiences also add insight into cultural norms and traditions that explain these statistics, rather than just recording them for their numerical significance.

This type of qualitative methodology, such as ethnography, interviews, and observations are similarly employed in the Indirect Involvement school of thought, though in these cases such personal experiences are used to demonstrate the opposite point – how the common woman still suffers despite the goals of the EZLN and the real-life drawbacks that prevent all women from being able to join the EZLN. As a result, the qualitative methods of research demonstrated the inherent differences between the two main schools of thought that statistics alone could not portray. For example, an important theme that many of the interviews and ethnographic research uncovered was the question of traditional indigenous values and roles of women and how these values conflict directly with the new Zapatista ideology (Millan Moncayo 2006). Most researchers found that according to many of the indigenous women, there was a need for a change from traditional beliefs (Harcourt and Escobar 2005). In other words, the combination of crippling domestic and sexual violence, the lack of education, resources, and adequate nutrition, have long since worked to keep women submissive to men and stuck in a position of slave-like dependence, with no hope of advancement (Ross 2000). With the changes and arising opportunities that the Zapatista army had to offer, more and more women began (and are still beginning) to realize that their right to be respected as a human being is more valuable than traditional, yet personally detrimental customs (Millan Moncayo 2006).
Through a careful combination of both qualitative research methods and intensive statistical collection and analysis, the research about the impact of the Zapatista Movement on women’s rights in Chiapas explores the experiences of both women directly in the EZLN and the common indigenous women from Chiapas, Mexico. Within the two dominating schools of thought, several debates center on the women’s struggle to remain true to their indigenous roots and traditions, while still demanding respect and seeking better lives for them and their children. Another frequently discussed point in the literature was the concept that the Zapatista movement is multifaceted. It is as much a women’s movement as an indigenous one and the women’s strife within the group mirrors larger indigenous struggle against Mexico. Another universal theme is that it is up to the individual women work for change rather than waiting for society to transform. The Indirect Involvement school of thought is more effective than the Direct Enlistment school in providing possible answers to the question of how the whole population of women in Chiapas has been affected by the Zapatista Movement. The wide variety of literature on this topic reflects the ever-changing and controversial atmosphere that has existed in Chiapas since the start of the Zapatista Movement nearly eighteen years ago.

**Research Design**

For this study, I chose to focus on the Indirect Involvement school of thought that centers on the impact of the Zapatista Movement on the broader female population of Chiapas. The existing scholarship in this school of thought frequently discusses other possible ways the movement has less-directly improved women’s rights in the region and some reference a variety of independent pro-women’s rights organizations that have developed since 1994 when the EZLN first took action. I predicted that the movement brought awareness to the local, national, and international spectrum and therefore indirectly caused a substantial number of pro-women’s rights organizations to start work in Chiapas, with the goal of helping the women of the region improve their human right’s status. Though there is always a limit to how much an organization can help a large population, there are multiple non-governmental organizations that seem to carry out the pro-equality values that the Zapatistas expressed in their Declaration. I hypothesized that the Zapatista Movement has positively impacted the women’s rights status in Chiapas, Mexico. With the Zapatista Movement as the independent variable and the subsequent human rights organizations as the dependent variable, an improvement in women’s rights would result if it holds true that the movement caused an increase in local women’s rights organizations.

In order to study the effect of the Zapatista Movement on the creation of pro-women’s rights organizations in Chiapas, I originally intended to primarily use a process tracing methodology in order to follow the impact of the movement as an influence in the founding of these organizations through a series of personal interviews and website analysis in order to discover the histories of certain organizations. Process tracing is a method social science research which uses historical context to trace the progression of an event over time in order to form a theory (Falleti 2007). However, as will be explained shortly, I had to adjust the methodology to primarily content analysis due to a lack of adequate responses in obtaining interviews. Content analysis in social science is a research approach in which the context of the “text data” is categorized or coded in order to determine a theory (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). Content analysis was applied by analyzing the information on the websites of specific NGOs in order to determine whether or not the organizations had Zapatista ties in their founding.
The selected organizations were chosen because each adhered to several requirements that sought to eliminate external bias in the study. Twelve organizations were selected for analysis and all have offices directly in Chiapas, Mexico, though some may have additional offices in other parts of the world. All organizations are independent, non-governmental organizations, not-for-profit and also unaffiliated with any political party or religious group. These organizations were selected based on these credentials to eliminate possible ulterior motives for their aid, such as increased political support, religious conversion missions, or certain government requirements. In order to further eliminate possible bias and ensure that none of these organizations had hidden political or religious ties, all of the selected organizations explicitly stated that they were not affiliated at some point on their website. All of the selected organizations were either specifically women’s rights organizations or human rights organization with unique programs designed specifically for women. The women’s programs offered in the variety of organizations differed greatly and included a range of aid from gynecological and maternal care to educational services and microfinance opportunities specifically for women to help them become financially independent.

A primarily qualitative study, the original goal was to utilize interviews as the main source for data collection in order to discover the history of the founding of the twelve elected pro-women’s rights organizations. By investigating the organizations’ founding history, I sought to uncover their motivations to starting women’s work in Chiapas and thus determine if they had any links to the Zapatistas. Unfortunately, though several of the organizations responded after some prompting, only one followed through with a legitimate interview. Though several asked for questions via email, none actually sent back responses to the questions and others simply referred me to certain sections on their web pages. Fortunately, all of the selected organizations do have extensive websites with in-dept founding history and mission sections. Instead of relying on interviews with the organizers, I collected data that was provided on the organizations’ various web pages to see which ones identify with the Zapatista Movement, or if they cite another reason as a cause for their organization, by analyzing the “History,” “About Us,” and “Mission” sections of their websites.

The analysis of these organizations and their founding demonstrates how a social movement can be successful for a population, other than the people directly involved, by spreading awareness and subsequently causing more activism. Though some organizations have other motivations for initiating their work, analyzing each organization’s background determines to what extent the movement has indirectly aided the larger population of women in Chiapas.

Findings

Before investigating the 12 human rights organizations, I hypothesized that the Zapatista Movement caused women’s rights organizations to open in Chiapas, Mexico and in this way, indirectly improved women’s rights in the region. The 12 organizations in Chiapas that were focused on were both foreign-based and locally based (meaning within the state of Chiapas specifically). The there were five foreign-based organizations. These included:

1. Marie Stopes International
2. Chiapas International
3. ProMujer
4. The Chiapas Project (1)
5. The Chiapas Project (2)

The two Chiapas Project organizations are completely separate, but will be distinguished by use of a (1) and (2). The remaining seven organizations are all based locally in Chiapas, Mexico. They are as follows:

1. The Center of Women’s Rights of Chiapas
2. Father Bartholomé de las Casas: Center of Human Rights
3. Alsol Contigo
4. CIAM (Center of Research and Action for the Latin American Woman)
5. CIEPAC (Center of Economic and Political Research of Community Action),
6. SiPaz: International Service for Peace
7. Committee of Human Rights: Saint Pedro Lorenzo de la Nada

Though several of the organizations returned messages, only Dr. Joanne Leigner from The Chiapas Project (1) followed through with a legitimate phone interview. However, the remainder all provided useful information for analysis about their founding on certain sections of their websites.

After carefully reviewing each website and directly questioning Dr. Leigner, each organization was put in to one of four categories to determine its relationship with the Zapatista Movement. These categories are as follows:

1. No Mention of Specific Influences
2. Clear Zapatista Influence
3. Other Specific Influence Mentioned (but no mention of Zapatista support)
4. Other Reason for Founding Mentioned (but express clear support of Zapatista Movement)

As demonstrated in Table 1, the majority of the reviewed organizations showed some kind of Zapatista influence or support with seven of the twelve in the “Clear Zapatista Influence” category and the remaining organization in the “Other Reason for Founding (but express clear support of movement)” group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>No Specific Influences</th>
<th>Clear Zapatista Influence</th>
<th>Other Specific Influence</th>
<th>Other Reason for Founding but express clear support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Totals:</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Results

However, within the “Clear Zapatista Influence” category, there was some variation between to what extent the Zapatista connection was emphasized. CIEPAC and the Center for Women’s Rights of Chiapas both include images of Zapatistas and direct references to the movements of the group on
their web pages (Centro de Derechos de la Mujer de Chiapas A.C.; CIEPAC). For example, the Center of Women’s Rights of Chiapas cites the 1999 meeting in the EZLN center of San Cristobal de las Casas of a group of Zapatista women who were rallying against violence against women as an influential moment before their organization officially opened (Centro de Derechos de la Mujer de Chiapas A.C.). The Center explains that at this point, and along with other instances, the founders saw a need for a more organized and official center for pro-women’s rights activism (Centro de Derechos de la Mujer de Chiapas A.C.).

It is clear from both of these websites that the people creating these organizations are either Zapatistas themselves or loyal sympathizers. Both CIEPAC and the Center describe how they saw a need within the social and political changes that were going on for organized centers for research and the emerging women’s sub-movement (Centro de Derechos de la Mujer de Chiapas A.C.; CIEPAC).

Also included in the “Clear Zapatista Influence” category were several organizations that mention the Zapatistas as an influential factor, but from a more neutral perspective. It is unclear whether individual members from The Chiapas Project (2) or the CIAM have actual Zapatistas working in the organizations, but it seems unlikely that they were founded by people directly involved in the movement (The Chiapas Project; CIAM, AC). However, both groups mention the EZLN by name as a factor that brought awareness to the issues at hand and even include links to exterior web pages about the Zapatistas, though with more neutral discussion of the group on their actual website (CIAM, AC; The Chiapas Project). Also, SiPaz, an international organization for peace mentions that they saw the Zapatista Movement as reason to work in Chiapas, not necessarily because they supported what the EZLN was trying to accomplish, but because they wanted to help bring about changes in a peaceful way. Finally, neither the Committee for Human Rights: Saint Pedro Lorenzo de la Nada nor Chiapas International cite the Zapatista Movement explicitly by name as a factor for starting their organizations, but both cite “the social and political unrest and the human rights violations in Chiapas, Mexico” (Comité de Derechos Humanos Fray Pedro Lorenzo de la Nada A.C.; Chiapas International) at the time of the height of the Zapatista Movement as direct influences for starting their organizations.

Though neither the Committee for Human Rights nor Chiapas International explicitly say the word Zapatista in describing the situations that influenced their founding, it is clear by the descriptions of the situation they heard about or experienced in Chiapas was referring to the strife of the Zapatistas. Though some of the other organizations within the “Clear Zapatista Influence” category did not have qualms about mentioning their allegiance with the movement, it is understandable why some of the Zapatista-influenced organizations were more hesitant to speak too extensively about the EZLN or outwardly express support or influence for the movement. Since all of these organizations are non-governmental organizations that claim to have no political affiliation, they may not want the readers of their web pages to think that they are too closely involved with the Zapatistas, since the group is notoriously leftist and it would be difficult to claim no political affiliation or bias with too many apparent leftist tendencies.

In addition to the seven organizations that describe some level of Zapatista influence on their foundations, The Chiapas Project (1) represents an important distinction. This organization is the sole member of the “Other Reason for Founding (but express clear support of movement)” group. In an interview, Dr. Joanne Leigner, co-founder of the organization, admitted that before her son Nick went to Chiapas to volunteer in an orphanage, she knew very little about the women’s rights issues
in the region, nor about the Zapatista Movement (Leigner 2011). However, when the nuns working at the orphanage discovered that Nick’s parents are a gynecologist (Dr. Leigner) and a dentist (Dr. Dave Brody), they asked if they would come down to Chiapas to give medical assistance to the children (Leigner 2011). Several years later, the family has now set up a medical care center that specializes in women’s health and reproductive services in a small village in Chiapas (Leigner 2011). Dr. Leigner explained that after treating several EZLN members, living among the Zapatistas and witnessing their strife, she and the members of the Chiapas Project (1) absolutely support and sympathize with the group’s motives, especially as they pertain to women’s rights, even though The Chiapas Project (1) is not directly affiliated with the EZLN (Leigner 2011). It is important to note that no mention of the Zapatistas or their goals were present on the Chiapas Project’s (1) website.

As a result, this presents the possibility that other organizations who do not have mention of the Zapatistas on their websites do in fact sympathize with the group, even if the EZLN was not one of their initial influences. Had more organizations followed through on an official interview, there may have been even more evidence of at least removed support for the movement, if not outright influence in their founding. Since three of the organizations only stated their goals as an activist group in their foundation backgrounds and did not include specific or individual influences, it is possible that organizations such as these may have also revealed similar tendencies with more personal contact.

Because the majority of the organizations studied demonstrated clear influence from the Zapatista Movement as part of the reason for their founding, I argue that the Zapatista Movement did cause women’s rights organizations to initiate work in Chiapas, Mexico and through these organizations the Movement has indirectly benefited women’s rights in the region. However, the way in which the Zapatista Movement influenced the creators of these organizations must be divided into two categories. While some of these organizations are direct results from members of Zapatista communities who wanted to take the women’s movement and initiatives within the EZLN further, a substantial few seem to have been influenced not by the movement itself, but by the deplorable women’s rights conditions in the region that the Zapatistas were successful in bringing to the national and international forefront. This distinction is crucial because though groups such as Chiapas International and the Committee for Human Rights: Father Pedro Lorenzo de la Nada both credit the Zapatista strife for how they found out about the issues, the movement itself was not the reason the two groups chose to work in Chiapas (Chiapas International; Comité de Derechos Humanos Fray Pedro Lorenzo de la Nada A.C.). Nonetheless, the Zapatista Movement did undeniably yet indirectly cause the creation of these specific organizations because without the increased international attention on region and the issues the group exposed to the larger national and international community, organizations such of these would have most likely remained unaware of the deplorable conditions for women in the state and perhaps chosen to work elsewhere.

Though some of the organizations, namely CIEPAC and the Center of Women’s Rights of Chiapas have more obvious Zapatista roots, it is still important not to mistake these are “Zapatista organizations” as one might assume. Organizations such as these are influenced by the movement to form autonomous aid organizations, but are not branches of the Zapatista Movement itself. Though both organizations clearly credit their roots to the initiatives and ideology of the EZLN, each group has taken on aspects that are not entirely Zapatista goals by choosing to focus solely on research and women’s rights to improve social justice, rather than directly working for indigenous autonomy –
the primary goal of the movement. As a result, such organizations should not be considered simply part the larger Zapatista movement. Organizations such as these have taken Zapatista initiatives, as stated in the Women’s Revolutionary Law, to a level past those of the Zapatista Army and became independent organizations that are living out Zapatista ideals.

Though these results indicate that the Zapatista Movement did influence the founding of the majority of the women’s rights organizations that were studied, a substantial minority credited a specific other motivation for starting their organization (two out of twelve) or did not provide enough specific information to really determine what the influencing factors were (three out of twelve). Since all of the organizations that were studied were founded after the start of the Zapatista Movement in 1994, it if safe to assume that even these ambiguous or otherwise motivated organizations had most likely heard of the EZLN in Chiapas at the time of their founding. However, it remains unclear based on the attained data whether the founders did experience any direct or indirect influence from the Zapatista Movement, such as newly acquired awareness of women’s rights issues in the region due to increased media coverage of the goals and conditions in the region as well as the actions of the Zapatista Army. Further research into the backgrounds of these organizations, perhaps through personal interviews with the founders, could be extremely useful in determining further the extent of influence the Zapatista Movement had on these organizations.

Though there was substantial variety within the organizations that fell into the “Clear Zapatista Influence” category, the data collected from the twelve prominent women’s rights organizations in Chiapas indicated that the majority of these women’s aid and development organizations were influenced either directly or indirectly by the Zapatista Movement.

Conclusion

Since the majority of the research on the impact of the Zapatista Movement on women’s rights in Chiapas has focused on the women directly involved in the EZLN, I elected to discover if there was a less obvious way in which the Zapatista Movement has benefited the common women of Chiapas, since only a small minority of the female population actually benefits from the substantial advancements the EZLN offers women directly involved in the movement. After extensive reading, it became apparent that a surprisingly large number of non-governmental aid organizations that specialize in human (and specifically women’s) rights protection and aid have cropped up in Chiapas since the Zapatistas officially became active in the region in 1994. In order to discover how these organizations might connect the goals and ideologies of the Zapatistas with real-life improvement in women’s rights, I hypothesized that the Zapatista Movement caused an increase in women’s rights organizations to become active in Chiapas. Through a combination of website content analysis and one successful interview, I used process tracing to determine the historical backgrounds of each organization and look for trends in Zapatista ties. Process tracing applies historical contexts to track an event, or in this case, organization, as it progresses in order to form a broader theory or trend in social science research (Falleti 2007). The data collected from twelve non-governmental aid and development organizations supported this hypothesis, but also demonstrated that the Zapatista influence is prevalent in various definable forms and that there are possible implications for the organizations to communicate Zapatista ties or influences – which may have skewed the results.
The hypothesis answered the original research question about the impact of the Zapatista Movement on women’s rights in Chiapas by explaining that the actual extent of the movement has been much more widespread than the impact that was restricted to women directly enlisted in the EZLN. I argue that the majority of the indigenous women in Chiapas who are actually benefitting from the Zapatista Movement have profited through indirect results because of the multiple women’s aid and development organizations that have cropped up in the region. This research demonstrates that the impact of a social movement such as the Zapatista Movement has larger implications than the most obvious. Unlike other social movement research, this study demonstrates how a singular movement can spawn other movements that are in fact, very separate from the original. The question here is not simply whether a social movement causes more activism, but to what extent other, separate entities become influenced, either directly or indirectly, by such a movement in their own foundation. In this case, the goals of the Zapatista Movement are actually achieved or striven for in these resulting organizations, even though they are no longer considered to be a direct part of the movement.

This study sought to bridge the gap between traditional social movement research and political science. Classical social movement research tends to revolve around two opposite schools of thought which, in short, focus on either resource mobilization, or “the mechanisms by which movements recruit participation” and a structural approach which focuses on how “social problems become social movements” (Peterson 1999). This study connects traditional social movement research with political or social science by focusing not only on how it was initiated, but how a movement affects institutions, how one movement can spawn other movements, and the implications for the populations that are affected by these changes. The success of a movement such as this can not be measured solely by the immediate and obvious realization of its goals by the members directly involved in the group. Rather, the arguably more significant impact of such a movement may be carried out indirectly by the people and groups it impacts nationally and internationally by bringing awareness to certain issues and subsequently spurring on separate social activism. ✗
Appendix

Women’s Revolutionary Law:

1. Women, regardless of their race, creed, color or political affiliation, have the right to participate in the revolutionary struggle in any way that their desire and capacity determine.

2. Women have the right to work and receive a just salary.

3. Women have the right to decide the number of children they have and care for.

4. Women have the right to participate in the matters of the community and have charge if they are free and democratically elected.

5. Women and their children have the right to Primary Attention in their health and nutrition.

6. Women have the right to education.

7. Women have the right to choose their partner and are not obliged to enter into marriage.

8. Women have the right to be free of violence from both relatives and strangers. Rape and attempted rape will be severely punished.

9. Women will be able to occupy positions of leadership in the organization and hold military ranks in the revolutionary armed forces.

10. Women will have all the rights and obligations which the revolutionary laws and regulations give. (Anon. 1996)
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Clocks and Clouds is an American University undergraduate research journal that publishes articles on the cutting edge of political science, international studies, and public policy. The journal is meant to add a voice to the intellectual dialogue both within the American University community and in broader academia. Our name comes from the work of philosopher Karl Popper, where clouds are a metaphor for the disorderly and irregular in social science while clocks represent the predictable and rational. By providing a venue for top undergraduate research, Clocks and Clouds aims to find the clocks amidst the clouds.

The journal is organized as an independent student-run joint venture between the School of Public Affairs, the School of International Service, the School of Public Affairs Undergraduate Council, and the School of International Service Undergraduate Council. American University undergraduates of any major may submit work for publication and will have their work assessed through a blind peer review and revision process. Clocks and Clouds publishes one issue per semester in print and electronic formats and appoints staff and editorial reviewers for one-year terms.

For more information, or to learn about participating in the journal as an author, staff member, or editorial reviewer, contact the editor at clocksandclouds@american.edu or visit www.american.edu/clocksandclouds.
This issue of Clocks and Clouds has been a collaborative project among dozens of vital participants, and the journal owes a great debt to everyone involved. Among these collaborators, several deserve particular recognition for their role in laying the ground for the journal. Professor Kimberly Cowell-Meyers and Professor Dylan Craig deserve singular recognition for their role in envisioning Clocks and Clouds and realizing its potential. Associate Dean Meg Weekes, Associate Dean Maria Cowles, and Professor Elizabeth Cohn have been particularly vital advocates in the administration and faculty. Kevin Ralph, Sean Gisonda, Jenny Sue Ross, and the SPA and SIS Undergraduate Councils have done remarkable work to build support among the student body.

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Finally, the nearly thirty students who submitted work to Clocks and Clouds deserve recognition. The articles we are able to publish represent only a small portion of the excellent research conducted by American University undergraduates, and we believe the response to the inaugural issue of the journal strongly demonstrates the importance of its mission.