BELONGING IN A NEW HOME: DISCURSIVE OTHERING OF LATIN AMERICAN IMMIGRANTS IN U.S. PRINT MEDIA†

Bill Kakenmaster

Abstract

The year 2015 saw heightened racial and ethnic tension in the United States, with particular regard to Latin American immigrants and the U.S. presidential election. Discourse theory assumes that identity (re)production serves to legitimize, institutionalize, and eventually internalize hegemonic and resistant discursive portrayals of political actors and actor groups. Some discourse analysts attempt to “reveal racism” in society and combat that racism. Yet, to the extent that “racism” represents a series of systemic and systematically oppressive power structures, highlighting racist prejudices in media, policy, popular, or other discourses only scratches the surface of discriminatory identity construction. This study (1) employs Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to analyze the seven most widely circulated U.S. print newspapers’ (re)presentations of Latin American immigrants in 2015, (2) challenges the popular notion of discourse’s non-quantifiability in CDA research, and (3) ruminates on the implications of media (re)presentations of actors for their political agency.

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Introduction

Anyone paying attention to the 2016 U.S. presidential election undoubtedly noticed intensified rhetoric charged at the country’s Latin American population, indicating, for some, a potential regression into visceral and inflamed racial and ethnic relations (Milligan 2016). In fact, some reports indicate that members of the U.S. Latino population have been targeted specifically for their ethnicity, with their attackers citing Donald Trump’s views on immigration as motivation (Berman 2015). According to the Boston Globe, one of the attackers told police, “Donald Trump was right, all these illegals need to be deported” (Ibid). Moreover, such violence does not represent an isolated incident; America’s Voice—an immigration reform advocacy group—has mapped “documented instances where Donald Trump, his supporters, or his staff harassed or attacked Latinos and immigrants” across the country (America’s Voice 2016). Representations of Latin Americans as illegal immigrants, job-stealers, and so on thus permeate into popular discourse, likely leading to disastrous effects on their human rights.

But how are Latin Americans portrayed in other societal contexts? Considering that socially constructed identities consist of multiple, layered discourses, we should remain skeptical that the above popular representation necessarily characterizes the dominant U.S. discourse on Latin American identity. Indeed, it is unclear if the popular discourse simply receives disproportionate representation relative to other discourses’ share of the total U.S. political debate. For example, how do dominant U.S. media discourses represent Latin Americans? Scholars have shown awareness of media’s role in (re)producing the language, symbols, meanings, concepts, knowledge, and so on of a particular discourse in addition to (re)producing the language, symbols, meanings, concepts, knowledge, and so on developed within media discourses themselves (O’Keefe 2011). I seek to investigate discursive representations of Latin Americans within the seven most widely circulated U.S. newspapers in 2015 through the lens of critical discourse analysis (CDA). I further adopt CDA with the assumption that it can employ a mixed-methods analysis, bridging the traditional dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative research (Wetherell, Taylor, and Yates 2011, 10). Ultimately, I argue that dominant U.S. media discourses present a two-tiered image of Latin Americans. On one level, Latin Americans are portrayed overwhelmingly positively, particularly in regard to hard work. On a second level, however, these surface-level positives obscure deeper, tokenizing, paternalistic, and victimizing themes that other Latin Americans and endanger their political agency.
Discursive and Institutional Perspectives on Othering: A Review of Contemporary Scholarship on Ethnicity, Immigration, and Discrimination

Two significant schools of thought attempt to address the question of Latin American immigration and integration: one discursive and one institutional. Although innumerable approaches to migration questions exist, from economics to national security and beyond, both schools of thought do so in terms of human rights. This paper similarly adopts a human rights-based approach, interpreting the primary purpose of migration and migration law as the protection of the rights of migrants, not vague notions of national security or economics. The theoretical inviolability of human rights thus renders such former concerns largely inapposite for all present intents and purposes.

The discursive school of thought attempts to advance theoretical claims about how different societal actors use language to give meaning to different ethnicities in society, thus attempting to “reveal racism” in myriad different discursive regimes (Herzog et al. 2009). Scholars in this school of thought propose that nativist discourses marginalize Latin American immigrants by constructing their identities as an intrinsically different “other” to the national “self” (Otazu 2002, Marshall 2007, van Dijk 2005). For example, Herzog et al. (2009) claim that Spanish nativist discourses use drug and alcohol consumption as a scapegoat for ethnic discrimination, casting all or most Latin American immigrants in the same light. According to Herzog et al. (2009), this discursive othering results in less successful integration on the part of the othered community—in this case, Latin American immigrants. Not all of these assumed differences are inherently negative, however. According to Fernández-Lasquetty (2010, 58), problems confronting immigrants do not comprise “reception, idiomatic difficulties, or adapting to the [the host country’s] way of life” so much as they comprise the same concerns as natives, such as unemployment and local politics. Discourse analysts challenge these assumptions and ultimately claim that nativist discourses that assume immigrants to possess inherent or irreconcilable differences from native populations lead to racism and marginalization.

Most discourse analysts assume that the rhetorical and discursive othering they interrogate translates into material oppression for othered communities. It is, however, unclear whether or not oppressive discourses translate into “real-world” discrimination. Certainly discourse analysis can reveal prejudices, but to claim that it reveals racism in terms of a systemic, collective, and ongoing cycle of oppression may exceed what available evidence concedes. Furthermore, that discourse analysts have largely focused exclusively on nativist discourses contra-
dicts their own central tenet—leaving an oppressed community’s voice out of a conversation about that community’s experience is itself a form of meta-oppression. This study does not index Latin Americans self-construction of identity, but it interrogates the social construction of Latin American identity by popular print media sources and assumes that media discourses factor into identity construction as only one layer of a multi-layered discursive regime.

Institutionalists, by contrast, explicate Latin American marginalization in terms of the tensions and contradictions within official government policy (Ivan 2009). On the one hand, for example, Latin American immigration in Spain is unsurprising because of close “linguistic and cultural-colonial ties” (Calavita, Garzón, and Cachón 2006, 191). Yet, on the other hand, institutionalists claim that Spanish law itself “produced [irregular migration]” by criminalizing some forms of immigration but not others, thus resulting in fear and lack of integration due to the threat of deportation and other penal factors for migrants (Ibid). Some institutionalist scholars propose a “feed-back” model of immigration, whereby local populations’ interactions with immigrant populations and their perceptions of immigrants from mass media and political discourse influence their interactions with immigrants in a certain way (Solé et al. 2000, 133-134). If an “attitude of rejection” presides among the local population, then it can “promote labor and economic exclusion” and “legitimize the institutional mechanisms of discrimination themselves” (Ibid, 135). In other words, immigrants’ lack of integration into the host country’s society reinforces negative stereotypes of immigrant populations, thereby furthering the notion of immigrants’ intrinsic differences compared to native populations.

The principal criticism of institutionalism is that it overemphasizes the relevance of top-down structures (Herrigel 2005). In fact, precisely because institutions consist of people and depend on them to construct their rules, values, and norms, the discrimination that results from any institution ultimately results from the social construction of institutions in the first place. Institutions dealing with migration are no different; that the Spanish law “produced [irregular migration]” where none such existed previously means that the type of migration subsequently classified as irregular could not have been so were it not for the particular values determinant of that distinction (Calavita, Garzón, and Cachón 2006, 191).

In this paper, I adopt both the general disposition of the discursive school and that of its critics. Studies like Herzog et al.’s that employ Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) adopt, on one level, a post-structural conception of discourse as any social practice that communicates meaning from one actor to
another. However, the claim that simply identifying prejudices in nativist discourses reveals racism implicitly assumes a Foucauldian-Derridean logic of discourse, in supposing that language is "constitutive of consciousness from the outset," and that discursive prejudices are "real-world" forms of discrimination (Derrida 1973, 6-7; Howells 1998, 43-44; Foucault 2002). The value-added of this logic of discourse lies in its analysis of discursive structures. I do not deny the bitter cruelty of discursive prejudices; however, I assume that the discursive representation of the world does not necessarily fully reflect life or the state of the world’s affairs. Whereas a Foucauldian-Derridean logic assumes that humans are subjectified by myriad discursive structures, I assume that all discursive actors have agency, and are “(re)produc[e] shared meanings, related interests, [potentially] aiming to impose them on others” (Leipold and Winkel 2013, 7). Hence, making claims about a way of life that rely exclusively on others’ claims about that way of life for evidentiary support reflects a certain tautological reasoning, lending itself more than anything to confirmation bias and conceptual obscurity.

I concede that discourse consists of any social practice that communicates meaning from one actor to another, but I deny that language constitutes actors’ relations from the outset, or as Alexander Wendt puts it, that the world is made up of “discourses all the way down” (Wendt 1999, 110). By maintaining the distinction between language and an independent, physical reality, this paper’s logic of discourse raises the threshold level of evidentiary support for oppression claims. In order to demonstrate that discrimination exists as a structural or systemic societal problem, it is not sufficient to show that prejudices exist. Rather, one must explain how those prejudices translate into negative consequences for oppressed persons and communities, however the latter may be defined. Here, I focus only on media discourses in a similar style as Herzog et al., but I refrain from claiming that this paper reveals any racism or oppression in practice—only in discourse. This study therefore adopts the discursive school of thought’s methodological premises, but seeks to improve its conceptual assumptions.

A Theoretical Framework of Othering and Discursive Identity Construction

This paper deals heavily with culture, its construction, and intercultural relations. Therefore, referring to culture necessitates some definition. Most basically, culture is the “way of life of a group of people—the behaviors, beliefs, values, and symbols that they accept, generally without thinking about them” (Hall 1976, 17; Weaver 2013). Practically, discursive identity construction involves establishing cultural in- and out-groups by fixing the identities of members of each group
to various nodal meanings. These identities are layered and may have multiple meanings constructed by various, different discourses. Figure 1 demonstrates the theoretical identity construction of Signifier A by two different discourses 1 and N.

Figure 1: Theoretical Identity Construction and Layered Nodal Meanings

Othering represents a specific kind of identity construction, whereby a cultural in-group—when presented with a new set of behaviors, beliefs, values, and symbols—establishes a self-other dichotomy in order to legitimize their own set of behaviors, beliefs, values, and symbols. For example, a report by the Open Society Foundations found that one principal source of immigrant marginalization in Manchester, England was the “strong sense of community” that simultaneously engendered “supportive conditions” for insiders, while also worsening integration conditions for “people perceived as ‘outsiders’” (Open Society Foundations 2014, 11). Social identities consisting of the self and the other are relational—there is no clear “self” without an “other,” since groups “define themselves in relation to others” (Okolie, 2). In terms of discourse analysis, othering entails the use of language and symbols to construct the identities of members of a cultural out-group as an intrinsically different other when compared to the cultural self (Hülsse 2006; For another example of identity construction in Europe, see Said 1978). The relationship between self and other is also one of “power, of domination, [and] of varying degrees of a complex hegemony” (Said 1978, 5). However, at the same time as the dominant in-group constructs the out-group in one way, so too does the out-group imbue their own cultural practices with different meanings, constituting itself as its own in-group. In short, members of both in- and out-groups retain discursive agency and the ability “to get their message across by producing, distributing, and interpreting text” (Leipold and Winkel 2013, 5, 2016). Figure 2 demonstrates the hypothetical othering of population B by population A in
Moreover, the production, reproduction, and outcomes of discursive identity construction stem from—and oftentimes reinforce—historical structures, institutions, and social norms. As meanings that characterize discursive agents’ linguistic and social practices become normalized over time by historical narratives, institutionalized in formal rules, and internalized in ordinary social norms and relations, those meanings then lead to one or another production of identity. For example, Sarah Léonard argues that securitizing discourses and practices in the European Union—institutionalized in Frontex—created an internal logic that lead to the presentation of migration and migrants as a security threat, resulting in “a negative impact on the status of asylum-seekers and migrants, including the protection of their human rights” (Léonard 2011, 2). In other words, the discursive
production and reproduction (securitization) of migrants’ identities’ resulted in tangible outcomes (negative impact on human rights) and reinforced institutional norms (aversion to migrants and denial of asylum). Recall, however, that while these types of macro social structures are important for discursive identity construction, all discursive actors retain some modicum of autonomy. Individuals are not simply defined by discursive structures, but rather input their own meanings to construct their identities as well. Figure 3 outlines the layered process of identity (re)production and outcome in relation to historical structures, institutions, and social norms, using the hypothetical immigrant example. Importantly, this implies that measuring any given discourse’s power grows with its production and reproduction, meaning that at least one element of a discourse’s power entails is quantitative in nature.

**Figure 3: Identity (Re)production and Outcomes with Relation to Historical Structures, Institutions, and Social Norms**

Thus, this paper’s theoretical framework adopts two key assumptions, the first from discursive institutionalism, and the second from critical discourse theory. First, discourse—and the relations within any given discourse—deal “not only [with] the communication of ideas or ‘text’ but also [with] the institutional context in which and through which ideas are communicated” (Schmidt 2010, 4). In other words, this paper theoretically assumes that identities are produced and reproduced through and under the auspices of collective sets of institutions. Therefore, institutions are both “constraining structures and enabling constructs of meaning,” and are neither fixed nor given once created, but are rather always changing with the influx of new norms and ideas (Ibid; Schmidt 2008, 314).

Second, although institutions may enable meaning-making processes, agency resides within subjects as well, not just the institutions they construct.
Rather than a unidirectional top-down model of discourse whereby identities and meanings are constructed via discursive institutions created by an assumedly exogenous force, discourse inherently implies a series of “dialectical relations between discourse and power” (Fairclough 2010, 8). Therefore, as individuals fill institutions with meaning (constructing political issues and identities one way or another), they create power imbalances, causing other individuals to resist the constructed meanings in question. Essentially, discursive identity construction consists of a give-and-take relationship between individuals, who retain discursive agency, and institutions, through which meanings are produced and reproduced, leading to inequality and power struggles within any given discourse.

**Interpretive Methodology and CDA**

This study is an interpretive CDA insofar as it deals with the power relations between different discursive actors’ representations of Latin American immigrants’ identities (Fairclough 2001, 232). While sympathetic to postmodern conceptualizations of discourse that do not rely on spoken or written language, this paper only includes written language in its dataset. This methodological choice does not exclude the possible existence of other forms of linguistic identity construction. It does, however, consider those forms extraneous to this study’s data and purpose. Furthermore, this study is a CDA insofar as it “brings a normative element into [its] analysis” (Fairclough 2010, 6). Social science research assumes an implicit normative focus; we would not research discrimination if we did not perceive such research as somehow beneficial to society. In interpretive social scientific research, the principle of contextuality dictates that the meanings produced and reproduced by different actors in any discursive regime do not, and likely cannot, exist except in that specific context (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 49; Fairclough 2001). In other words, the specific time, place, political moment, and so on serve as enabling conditions for people’s meaning-making processes. The central concept considered in this study is “Latin American,” or rather, what it means to be Latin American within the current U.S. political climate.

This study also considers the role of othering discourses in constructing Latin American identities from a U.S. print media perspective. One previous discourse analysis of Spanish print media highlights othering of Latin Americans in a 2000 article in *La Vanguardia*, which states: “Pickpockets and thieves comb Barcelona looking for tourists. Latin Americans are the best prepared pickpockets and North Africans dominate the art of robbing cars with their owner inside” (van Dijk 2004, 22). Linking Latin Americans to illicit or illegal activity implies their illegitimate place in Spanish society. In other words, oppressive and othering
discourses imply that Latin American immigrants do not belong in Spain because they behave illegally upon arrival, even if they immigrated legally. Similarly, in the United States, Donald Trump disparaged Latin American—specifically Mexican—immigrants in announcing his bid for the 2016 U.S. presidential election, stating, “When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. [...] They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people” (TIME Staff 2015). Although no significant work on U.S. print media has been conducted so far, Spanish print media sources have cast Latin American immigrants’ identities negatively, and primarily in terms of the law.

Interpretive social scientific research further assumes the principle of reflexivity. Reflexivity refers to the notion that “separation [of the researcher from the data] is impossible,” and “considers the implications of the identity of the researcher for data collection and analysis” (Taylor 2001, 16). To that end, I am not Latin American, nor do I experience life day-to-day as an immigrant, and can therefore only make knowledge claims with the explicit recognition that my interpretation of U.S. media portrayals of Latin Americans invariably differs from interpretations of Latin Americans themselves, as well as the interpretations of any other ethnic or social group for that matter. The principle of reflexivity renders hypothesis testing impracticable and ineffective for making knowledge claims, according to the interpretivist tradition; therefore, in this paper, I refrain from hypothesizing about why U.S. media portrayals of Latin American immigrants exist the way they do, and instead seek to explain how media sources construct Latin American immigrants’ identities.

In order to understand media representations of Latin American immigrants, I used the LexisNexis database to collect all news articles related to Latin American immigration between 2015 and 2016 from the seven most widely circulated newspapers in the United States. These included USA Today, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Los Angeles Times, Daily News, the New York Post, and the Washington Post. In addition to their mass circulation, these papers demonstrate significant influence on political discourse and variation in political standpoint. As some scholars note, for example, the New York Times is the U.S.’s “‘paper of record’ and the Washington Post is often considered the official newspaper of Washington, DC” (Bachman 2015, 2).

In order to ensure sufficient textual exposure, I sought to limit the articles collected to those explicitly related to Latin American immigration. To achieve this, I limited textual samples to those news articles with one or more references to a Latin American ethnicities and nationalities in their headlines,
and migration in the body. The search terms were based on Spanish-speaking countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, and they constitute this study’s 23 “empty signifiers.”

I then used QSR NVivo 11 to code all references to Latin American immigrants based on six popular media conceptualizations of Latin American immigrants. I ran several tests on the data to determine word associations and frequency. First, I coded all references to Latin American immigrants defined by the first bulleted list given in Appendix A, including stemmed words such as—for example—Paraguay and Paraguayans with Paraguayan. Second, I coded for the following three positive and negative societal criteria (including their synonyms and stemmed words, such as ambition and hard working with hard work):

- Negative
  - Drugs (Node 1)
  - Theft (Node 2)
  - Assault (Node 3)
- Positive
  - Education (Node 4)
  - Success (Node 5)
  - Hard work (Node 6)

Third, I ran a compound search that cross-referenced both sets of terms to determine how many times each media source referred to Latin American immigrants in relation to those criteria within the same context. This, however, presents an imprecise test if the goal is to determine each media source’s understanding and portrayal of Latin American immigrants; for example, this test would count the two following hypothetical phrases within the same result.

- All Latin American immigrants are drug-dealers.
- Not all Latin American immigrants are drug-dealers.

Therefore, my fourth test consisted of coding each cross-referenced result based on its positive or negative association of each empty signifier to each node. In analyzing the data, I quantified the total number of coded references and mapped the power relations between the two hypothetical representations of Latin

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1 See Appendix A for a complete list of search terms.
2 Discourse theory considers linguistic signifiers “empty” until filled with meaning by different discursive actors. For an example of this, see (Ziai 2009).
3 See Appendix A for a full coding rubric.
American immigrants in each source.

Findings and Results
The sample included 531 news articles—as Table 1 shows—with a total of 8355 references to empty signifiers 1-23 and 3276 references to nodes 1-6 (shown in Tables 2 and 3). In general, dominant U.S. media representations of Latin Americans displayed more positivity in relation to hard work, drugs, and education than their negative counterparts. In other words, these representations generally suggested that, ceteris paribus, Latin Americans do work hard, do not use drugs, and are well-educated. Overall, positive associations with nodes 4-6 and negative associations with nodes 1-3 comprise over 75% percent of the total discourse. This descriptive portrait contrasts prevailing U.S. public opinion, where only 45% of people believe that immigrants better American society, and where 50% believe that immigrants worsen American society in terms of crime and the economy (Pew Research Center 2015).

Table 1: Total Stories per Source and Approximate Percent of Total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Total Stories</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wall Street Journal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Today</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily News</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Post</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>67.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Total References to Empty Signifiers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Empty Signifier</th>
<th>Number of References</th>
<th>Number of Items Coded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: Argentine</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: Argentinian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: Bolivian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Chilean</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: Colombian</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6: Costa Rican</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7: Cuban</td>
<td>1789</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8: Dominican</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9: Ecuadorian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Total References to Nodes 1-6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nodes</th>
<th>Number of Coding References</th>
<th>Number of Items Coded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: Drugs</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: Theft</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: Crime</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Education</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: Success</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6: Hard Work</td>
<td>2098</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7: TOTAL</td>
<td>3276</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4: Number of Coding References vs. Empty Signifiers 1-23
To the extent, however, that this study concerns how the media represents the U.S. Latin American population—not whether one element of that diaspora is more or less represented than another—we can use a word association test to determine which ideas, concepts, or social practices are generally associated with media portrayals of different elements of Latin Americans in the U.S. Figure 5 demonstrates that the dominant association is with hard work. Indeed, associations between Latin Americans and hard work represent the majority of nodal associations (>50%) in all but one category of empty signifiers: Salvadorans (28.6%). Indexing these six nodes by their average percent share of associations with empty signifiers 1-23, finds the following:

1. Hard work (54.97%)
2. Assault (8.49%)
3. Drugs (8.44%)
   –
4. Education (7.05%)
5. Success (3.53%)
6. Theft (0.14%)

Therefore, judging by an initial word association test, the dominant portrayal of Latin Americans by U.S. print media discourses is in terms of hard work, assault, and drugs, despite the enormous gap between the first and second associations. Education, success, and theft represent less dominant representations, as measured by the frequency of associations between empty signifiers 1-23 and nodes 1-6.
However, as discussed earlier, this initial test is somewhat inaccurate as it cannot distinguish between positive and negative associations within those categories. Figure 6 therefore disaggregates these data accordingly. Indexing these modified categories yields the following:

1. Hard work positive (51.82%)
2. Hard work negative (42.1%)
3. Assault negative (11.9%)
4. Drugs positive (9.67%)
5. Education positive (7.27%)
6. Education negative (6.44%)
7. Assault positive (5.07%)
8. Success negative (4.57%)
9. Success positive (4.39%)
10. Theft negative (0.53%)
11. Drugs negative (4.03%)
12. Theft positive (0.03%)

See Appendix B for tabulated data.
Crucially, here, “positive” and “negative” refers to the explicit or implicit value given to word associations. Essentially, a positive representation of Latin Americans in terms of drugs might imply that most Latin Americans do not consume, produce, sell, distribute, etc. drugs. In the first index, two-thirds of the dominant media portrayals of the U.S. Latin American diaspora held socially negative connotations. (In other words, if we accept the top half of the index as the dominant media portrayal of Latin Americans, then the first word association test results in two negatively connoted categories out of three total categories: assault and drugs.) In the second index, though, negatively connoted associations comprised only one-half of the dominant media portrayals. Furthermore, even if we accept just the top three categories as the dominant media portrayals, only one-third of those categories hold socially negative connotations in the second index.

Excluding results that returned a value of “0” for any given cross-reference, Table 4 below provides a breakdown of the largest and smallest percent share of each nodal association within each empty signifier. The dominant discourse (as measured by a descriptive statistical portrait) of U.S. print media’s representations thus primarily associates Latin Americans positively with hard work (which claims the highest percent share in 12 out of 19 nodes).

Before moving on to the next section, it is important to discuss the relative representation of some Latin American identities compared to others. That the sampling returned no results from the first (Wall Street Journal) and fourth (Los Angeles Times) most widely circulated newspapers in the U.S. seems problematic from the outset. This indicates either (1) a measurement error within this study, or (2) a distorted discursive reality that does not match the “real-world” U.S. ethnic composition. Yet even within the news sources for which the sampling did return results, representational errors occur. For example, Venezuelans were covered 72 times (approximately 1.9% of the total references to a specific group when excluding non-specific signifiers such as Hispanic, Latin American, Latino, and Immigrant). At the same time, however, Venezuelans only comprise around 0.5% of the total U.S. Hispanic population according to a 2015 Pew Research Center report (López 2015, 1). Compare this to, for example, Mexicans who were covered 901 (23.5%) times, yet comprised approximately 63% of the U.S. Hispanic population in 2010 (Lopez and Dockterman 2011, 1). Some signifiers essentially received disproportionately more or less media representation than others when compared to their relative makeup of the Hispanic population in the U.S.
Figure 6: Number of Positive and Negative References to Nodes 1-6 vs. Number of References to Empty Signifiers 1-23
Table 4: Highest and Lowest Percent Share Nodes by Empty Signifiers 1-23

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Empty Signifier</th>
<th>Highest Percent Share Node</th>
<th>Lowest Percent Share Node</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: Argentine</td>
<td>Hard work negative (66.7%)</td>
<td>Drugs positive (8.33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Education positive (8.33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: Argentinian</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: Bolivian</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Chilean</td>
<td>Drugs positive (100%)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: Colombian</td>
<td>Hard work positive (53.6%)</td>
<td>Drugs positive (3.57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Drugs negative (3.57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Education positive (3.57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hard work negative (3.57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Hard work positive (100%)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Hard work positive (60.2%)</td>
<td>Theft negative (0.21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8: Dominican</td>
<td>Hard work negative (59.4%)</td>
<td>Theft negative (0.94%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td>Hard work positive (50%)</td>
<td>Assault positive (16.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assault negative (16.7%)</td>
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<td>14: Latin American</td>
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<td>Drugs negative (4.35%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
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Discussion

If the former section meant to provide a descriptive portrait of the U.S. print media’s representations of Latin Americans in 2015, this section is more akin to a traditional, qualitatively oriented discourses analysis, where I attempt to describe, analyze, and contextualize several themes that appear within the discourse of study. In that spirit, several themes arise out of the texts that do not necessarily give negative portrayals of Latin Americans, but nonetheless represent problematic findings. Those themes include tokenism, patronizing and paternalistic representations, and victimization.

Tokenism

Much of the media’s discursive representation of Latin Americans in the U.S. involves using Latinos, immigrants, and Latin Americans as tokens to achieve a symbolic or contrived idea of ethno-racial equality, empowering the tokenizing group and oppressing the tokenized. Consider the following passage:

Starting in the 1980s, as civil war tore the country apart, thousands of Salvadorans uprooted their families to start life anew in the Maryland and Virginia suburbs around Washington. As their numbers swelled over the years, so did their restaurants, which introduced many of us to the masa cake at the center of Salvadoran life: the pupusa, a handmade round dedicated to frugality and deep corn fragrance.

Often compared to a gordita or an arepa, the pupusa has a personality all its own, less flashy and more workmanlike. At least it is in Washington, where the masa pocket has proved immune to fashion, its flavors and ingredients seemingly locked in place, as if Salvadoran immigrants decided long ago that one thing would remain constant in their chaotic exodus from the mother country (Carman 2015).

This reference to the Salvadoran Civil War—and the reference to “their restaurants”—tokenizes Salvadoran Americans. In other words, mentioning the country’s civil war does not pertain to the article’s context—a culinary review. Moreover, after mentioning this complex historical event, the article quickly devolves into a traditionally stereotypical representation of Latinos and Hispanics in the U.S., namely that of the hard working cook or restaurateur. Other articles
similarly represent Latin Americans’ hard work in relation to traditionally stereotypical careers in manual labor. For example:

The new residents, crucially, were not from East Los Angeles, where Mexican-Americans had developed an activist political tradition since the 1960s. Instead, they were Mexican, straight from the ranchos – small villages on Mexico’s frontiers, far from the center and from government. Most came here to work in jobs they believed, even after decades, would be temporary. They focused their lives on returning home someday. They packed into cheap housing and spent their savings on building homes back in Mexico (Quinones 2015).

The following passage interestingly employs two distinct strategies in its discursive representation of Puerto Ricans.

But the surge of Puerto Ricans does not always make for an easy transition. Increasingly, it is also having an impact on schools and government service agencies, both of which are working to help absorb the latest arrivals, particularly those with children in schools.

As a result, schools are scrambling to hire more bilingual teachers (some of them also from Puerto Rico) and expand dual-language programs that can best suit Puerto Ricans. In the last month alone, the Osceola County School District [...] registered more than 1,000 new students, many of them Puerto Ricans, said Dalia Medina, the director of the multicultural department for the school district.

“We are a mini-Puerto Rico here,” she said. “We are now 58 percent Hispanic in the schools, and every year we have increased” (Alvarez 2015).

On the one hand, this passage tokenizes Puerto Ricans in a manner similar to the previous two articles; it uses Puerto Rican nationality to provide a surface level example of the school’s diversity. On the other hand, however, it appropriates Puerto Rican nationality, claiming that the school itself represents “a mini-Puerto Rico.”
Moving beyond the initial analysis of media portrayals of Latin Americans thus reveals the nuances behind both positive and negative results. These three passages returned positive results—they imply that Salvadorans, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans do work hard. However, presenting their hard work in stereotypical and tokenizing ways represents a superficially positive portrayal of Latin Americans that nonetheless maintains the previously existing stratified social structure. Tokenism maintains unequal social hierarchies by expanding diversity and inclusion on a surface level, thereby trivializing them. In other words, claiming that a school in Florida is a “mini-Puerto Rico,” or that Salvadorans contribute to the United States’ ethnic and culinary traditions speak past concerns over the substantive nature of intercultural relations, such as discrimination, intolerance, bigotry, and so on. This representation of the hard-working Latin American is, furthermore, intertextual in that it calls to mind historic, racist U.S. government policies such as Operation Wetback, which sought to forcibly deport mass numbers of Mexican and Latin American immigrants (Korte 2013). It is also self-referential in that it perpetuates problematic media discourses. The term “wetback”—meant to refer to Mexican and Latin American immigrants who crossed the Rio Grande River to find work in the Southwest U.S.—first appeared in the *New York Times* in 1920, indicating how extensively the hard working Latino trope has been (re)produced, legitimized, and internalized in media discourses (Breitigam 1920).

Furthermore, if Latin Americans’ identities have been fixed to the concept of hard work for the better part of a century, then abandoning any negative connotation with Latin Americans’ ambition does little to fundamentally alter the representation of those identities. Essentially, not disparaging Latin Americans while still linking them to traditionally discriminatory identity features maintains the current discursive balance of power between Latin Americans and non-Latin Americans while absolving any culpability by powerful discursive actors—like dominant U.S. media sources—to problematize that balance of power. Within this paradigm, Latin Americans are implicitly, perhaps unconsciously, portrayed as hard working, but only in making arepas, on the rancho, and in assimilating to U.S. culture, suggesting little change in media (re)presentations of their identities.

The point, lastly, is not that diversity does not exist in the previous three passages, nor that those passages necessarily represent consciously prejudiced depictions of Latin Americans. Rather, these three passages represent an unconscious, internalized sense of cultural dominance, which feeds into the dominant media portrayal of Latin Americans that typifies them according to their ambition in the manual labor and service industries instead of resisting such a discourse. While tokenism appears as one problematic theme in media representations of Latin Americans in the U.S., patronizing and paternalistic themes also arise out of
Patronizing and Paternalistic Representations

Common among U.S. media’s discursive representation of Latin Americans is a patronizing, and oftentimes paternalistic, sense of superiority. Patronizing representations of Latin Americans may seek to expose bad government policies or facilitate acculturation, but they nonetheless establish a hierarchical power structure where Latin Americans are subordinated to other U.S. citizens. On the one hand, this discursive strategy differs from the above in that more directly defines the identities of Latin Americans in relation to U.S. culture, whereas tokenism only co-opts Latin Americans’ identities without necessarily requiring their relative cultural definition. In a *New York Post* feature on Cuban-American baseball player Yoenis Céspedes, for example, the author describes how

Céspedes [sic] was completely enamored with the new technology, experiencing unfamiliar luxuries while training in the Dominican Republic with former Packers running back Ahman Green.

“He was like a kid in a candy store,” said Green, who connected with Céspedes [sic] through mutual friends. “He was really drawn to my iPhone, with all the games and apps. He was censored from a lot of stuff, so just going online and going on Facebook, it was all brand new. He was eager to know about adapting to everything in the United States” (Kussoy 2015).

Similar to above, the point is not so much that this representation of Céspedes is divorced from his “true” identity. Perhaps, as this passage suggests, he had never seen or used an iPhone before. However, this nonetheless reinforces the dominant understanding of Cuba as “a society so closed, full of prejudice and discrimination, [and] with state control over every step of its citizens’ lives],” including limiting their access to technology (Masjuán 2010, 108). Of course, governments should not prohibit their citizens’ reasonable use of technology, but this subtle commentary on Cuba’s lack of technological freedom essentially politicizes Céspedes’ identity, and subjugates him to an oppressive dictatorial regime, which itself appears subjugated to a supposedly freer and morally superior United States.

This association of Latin Americans with technological or cultural il-
literacy extends beyond Cubans. Consider a *Washington Post* article, which describes the history of the Spanish language TV show *Línea Directa* in Washington, D.C.:

The earliest version of the program took two years to come to fruition. Working with a young Colombian broadcaster, Arturo Salcedo, and using borrowed equipment and family members as actors, the partners began recording 30-second public service announcements in Spanish on everything from fire prevention to counseling for alcoholism.

The spots covered how to use seat belts, enroll children in school and access publicly funded health care – information that was hard for new immigrants to obtain in an era when government agencies rarely had materials written in Spanish, or employees fluent in the language. The spots eventually were broadened into a half-hour news show that the local Univision station included in its prime-time lineup on Wednesdays and Saturdays (Hernández 2015).

If the passage referring to Cespedes represents the paternalism of the discourse, to the extent that highlighting his technological illiteracy as a product of his nationality establishes a power structure that subordinates Cubans to other nationalities, then the *Washington Post* passage similarly patronizes Latinos generally. Implicitly, the identities of Latinos are constructed as inferior both in terms of technological literacy and cultural competence given their status as immigrants. However—and with specific regard to technological literacy—these identity constructions contribute to a dominant discourse in which Latin America “has been seen as dependent, exploited, and institutionally weak” (López-Alves 2011, 243). Even if patronizing elements of the media discourse have good intentions to help correct perceived deficiencies in Latin American immigrants’ technological literacy and cultural competence, they betray a distinct air of superiority that nonetheless casts the role of immigrants as consumers of technological and cultural knowledge, and non-Latino residents of the U.S. as either knowledge producers or gatekeepers.

**Victimization and Politics**

The representation of Latin Americans in relation to ethnic and identity politics is somewhat unsurprising given the increasing convergence of ethnic-
ity and politics in contemporary U.S. political discourse. As observed earlier, 2016 U.S. presidential candidate Donald Trump stated: “When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. [...] They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people” (TIME Staff 2015). Perhaps unsurprisingly, 66% of prospective Hispanic and Latino voters said they would vote for Hillary Clinton in a Pew Research Center poll, while only 24% would support Donald Trump (Pew Research Center 2016, 49). Other polls indicate an even more apparent convergence between ethnicity and political preference; a Wall Street Journal and NBC News poll suggests 82% of registered Hispanic voters would vote for Clinton, while only 14% would vote for Trump (O’Connor 2016). Therefore, the connection between Latin American identity and politics in media discourses is unsurprising. It does, however, present a pervasive and problematic view of Latin Americans as victims of a corrupt political system, which ironically places their political identities outside that system and degrades their political agency.

The primary point of departure for connecting Latin American identity to U.S. politics seems, unsurprisingly, to be Donald Trump. Two discursive strategies characterize the U.S. media discourse surrounding the country’s Latin American diaspora. First, it produces and reproduces the same or similar politically charged narratives of Latin Americans. The Washington Post alone reprinted the sound bite of Trump labelling Latin Americans as “rapists” a total of 92 times. For reference, the Daily News and New York Times reprinted it nine times each, and USA Today reprinted it three times. At first glance, this finding helps orient the papers’ political perspectives. At the one end of the spectrum, the New York Post did not reprint the “rapists” sound bite whatsoever, which seems easily explainable. If the “guilt by association theory” of Trump’s politically damaging rhetoric is believed, then we should not react with shock when right-leaning sources like the New York Post fail to reproduce such rhetoric (Clement 2015). At the other end of the spectrum, meanwhile, that the Washington Post reprinted rhetoric that would clearly damage Trump’s standing with U.S. Latinos by a factor of 10 times the next highest figure likely indicates the Post’s left-leaning stance (Blake 2016). Of course, none of this suggests that either side is wrong for distancing themselves from beliefs they do not necessarily hold, or for holding Trump to account for his inflammatory and racist rhetoric. However, the scale of discursive reproduction employed by certain media sources serves to clarify their political leanings.

At the same time, such identity reproduction normalizes destructive representations of Latin Americans’ identities, paradoxically empowering such representations while attempting to resist them. In a deeply ironic mo-
ment of self-reflection, the *Huffington Post* asks: “Has The Media Become Comfortably Numb to Donald Trump?” (Linkins 2016). Indeed, a fine line exists between supposedly honest reporting and reproducing “divisive and hateful rhetoric toward Mexicans and Latinos” ad nauseum (Parker 2015). Recall Figure 3, which theorizes that as identities are (re)produced, they reinforce and reify the specific historical structures, institutions, and social norms of any given discourse. Paradoxically, then, attempts to expose negative representations of Latin Americans render themselves ineffectual past a certain threshold where they simply contribute to a seemingly endless stream of hate-fueled rhetoric.

If, in the first place, the constant reproduction of Latin American identities involves determining their position relative to non-Latin Americans, then it secondarily involves an oftentimes implicit normative bias against perceived injustices against Latin Americans. The *Daily News*, for example, called Trump’s suggestion that he would win the Latino vote “loco,” going on to state:

> Even as he slimed Mexican immigrants as “rapists” and drug pushers, Oval Office hopeful Donald Trump says he’s still confident he’ll carry the Latino vote – because Hispanics just “love” him.

> “I’ll create jobs and the Latinos will have jobs they didn’t have, I’ll do better on that vote than anybody,” The Donald boasted Wednesday on NBC News.

> But on CNN, the mouthy mogul admitted he “can’t guarantee” there are no illegal immigrants in the ranks of his own workforce – and if there are he’d fire them.

> Trump has sparked outrage – and won himself some supporters – with a series of screeds on immigration and Mexico that began the very first day of his campaign for the GOP nomination last month. A backlash ensued, with NBC, Macy’s and a parade of others soon refusing to do business with him.

> [...]

> Nonetheless, Trump said of Latinos, “They love me. I love them” (Hastings, Katz, and Fermino 2015).
Labelling Trump as a “mouthy mogul,” the sarcastic scare quotes in the first paragraph, and the characterization of his remarks as having “slimed” Mexican immigrants suggests a negative stance towards Trump and a positive stance towards Mexican immigrants. The victimization extends beyond the discursive realm, however, with articles from the *Washington Post* detailing how Trump’s rhetoric affects business interests and legal rapport with Latin Americans:

During one of the two news conferences Trump held in Texas, [Telemundo anchor] Diaz-Balart reminded the candidate that 53,000 Hispanics turn 18 each month and that many are offended by his suggestion that Mexicans crossing the border are rapists or criminals.

“No, no, no, we’re talking about illegal immigration and everybody understands that. And you know what? That’s a typical case – wait – that’s a typical case of the press with misinterpretation,” Trump shot back in response. [...] And I tell you what – what’s really going to be fun? I’m suing Univision for $500 million and I’m gonna tell ya – we’re going to win a lot of money because of what they’ve done.”

“You’re finished,” Trump told Diaz-Balart.

“He never allowed me to finish asking my question,” Diaz-Balart told his viewers.

Notably, neither network included Trump’s reminder to supporters that he’s suing Univision. The network dropped plans to air the Miss Universe pageant – one of Trump’s dozens of business interests – because of his comments about illegal immigrants. In response, Trump has said he will sue the network for breach of contract (O’Keefe 2015).

The victim narrative further extends beyond Trump (whom we might identify as the lynchpin for this narrative). For instance, following a gathering of “Democratic Hispanic Leaders” in Nevada, the *Washington Post* reports:

[A]head of tonight’s GOP debate in Las Vegas, photos of
Cruz and Rubio were plastered alongside Trump’s picture, as all three were criticized as anti-Latino. A press release noted, “While Trump continues to grab headlines with his hateful anti-Latino, anti-immigrant language, the positions and records of the two Latino presidential candidates in the race are equally dangerous for Nevada communities.”

Dolores Huerta, an influential labor leader and civil rights activist, called Cruz and Rubio “sellouts” and “traitors” at the gathering and said the Hispanic candidates “are turning their backs on the Latino community” (Jordan 2015).

In what can only be considered supreme irony, this Post article reproduces the identities of Latin Americans as victims of themselves. Or, rather, that Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio betray the U.S. Latin American community and show their true natures as “anti-Latino” candidates, as if the Latino experience and political identity could be so reductively and singularly defined.

The problem with this bully narrative of Trump does not lie in its falsity. Again, this paper is not concerned with media constructions of politicians’ identities, so discursive representations of candidates are irrelevant. The problem, rather, lies in the necessary opposite role the media constructs for Latin Americans—namely, that of the victim. Constantly reproducing Latin Americans as victims defined by their relation to a political bully accomplishes the singularly important function of legitimizing the role of the media in exposing perceived injustices against Latin Americans, and thereby reducing their ability to define and address social problems themselves. In other words, reproducing Latin Americans as victims within a corrupt system of elite politics disregards their role as political agents, and helps keep U.S. newspapers in business.

Othering and Problem Definition

These three themes serve both to other Latin Americans and degrade their political agency. Recall from the section 3 that othering consists of establishing an “in-group/out-group distinction” through the conscious or unconscious manipulation of discourse, which both validates a group’s own sets of beliefs, practices, values, and symbols and “becomes clearer as we try to eliminate the ambiguities” between groups (Weaver 2013, 203). To the extent that media discourses fix Latin Americans’ identities to certain nodes—whether drugs, theft, assault, education, success, or hard work—those reproductions reinforce either dominant or alternative discursive representations of Latin Americans and clarify any potentially
extant in-group/out-group distinctions contained therein. Furthermore, in clarifying these intercultural boundaries, the extent to which the nodes fixed to Latin Americans agree with the nodes fixed to the dominant U.S. culture is irrelevant. In other words, perhaps fixing Latin Americans positively to hard work agrees with the dominant American work ethic, but that does not necessarily suggest agreement between the types of ambition conceptualized and subsequently valued. Therefore, the media discourses investigated in this paper serve to other Latin Americans in relation to the dominant U.S. culture.

Beyond simply othering Latin Americans in the U.S., media discourses also degrade Latin Americans’ political agency. In The Politics of Problem Definition, David Rochefort and Roger Cobb outline how political conflicts can arise from disputes over “(1) whether a problem exists, (2) what the best solution is, and (3) what the best means of implementation are,” with the definers of any given socio-political problem invariably influencing these three steps in the problem definition process (1994, 5). If we apply othering theory to The Politics of Problem Definition, we can begin thinking about the ways in which those with the greatest amount of cultural capital—the in-group—come to dominate certain discourses, thereby framing any given problem one way or another. Simply by defining the problem of, for example, Donald Trump’s racist rhetoric against Latin Americans, the existence, potential solution, and implementation of that solution becomes laden with the values, symbols, and meanings inserted by the dominant U.S. media culture. Thus, no matter how the problem of Latin American immigration comes to be defined, the dominant U.S. media definition of that problem excludes and diminishes the ability of the Latin American diaspora itself to define the problem and manipulate the discourse according to that definition.

Within the dominant U.S. media discourse, Latin Americans are othered by tokenism, patronizing and paternalistic representations, and victimizing definitions of Latin Americans in relation to their political positions and contemporary U.S. politicians. The dominant discourse further degrades Latin Americans political agency by defining the problem of their immigration for them, rather than allowing the community to define the problem itself.

Conclusions and Avenues for Further Research

How does so much inflammatory, prejudiced rhetoric exist in the U.S.,

5 Recall the “Tokenism” section, where Latin Americans’ ambitions were fixed to manual and service labor industries. Cf. (Camarota and Zeigler 2009). Furthermore, empirical evidence exists to suggest that U.S. culture does value hard work. On this, see (Weaver 2013, 135).
while the dominant media discourse seemingly give an overwhelmingly positive representation of Latin Americans? This study offers as a solution that symbolically and surface-level positive representations obfuscate more nuanced discursive themes that tokenize, paternalize, and victimize Latin Americans on a deeper level. At an abstract level, these themes other Latin Americans and degrading their political agency. Superficially positive representations of Latin Americans help clarify the distinction between immigrants and the dominant U.S. culture and shift the ability to define the socio-political problem of their immigration from the Latin American population to the dominant U.S. cultural agents, such as print media.

Exposing false-positive representations of Latin Americans in media discourses is a product of this study’s partial employment of quantitative data. Critical discourse analysts often assume discourse is essentially non-quantifiable, but in mapping the power relations between one or more discursive representations of any given group, problem, or practice, quantifying discourse offers equal—if not necessarily greater—concrete evidence. Moreover, quantitative data acts as a bulwark against attempts to take CDA too far and “reveal racism,” using only a few select examples. I maintain CDA’s normative mission in this study, but challenge its methodologists to reflect critically on both their reliance on qualitative data and assumptions regarding the extent to which CDA can address certain normative questions.

Further research could follow two paths. First, future research could apply alternative methodologies to the study of Latin American identity construction in media discourses. While this paper avoided hypothesis testing, neo-positivist research might advance several hypotheses to understand if, for instance, media sources disproportionately index prejudiced, anti-immigrant policymakers compared to non-prejudiced, pro-immigration policymakers. This would broaden subject-area knowledge on several theoretical and methodological levels too lengthy to discuss here. Second, future research could follow from this study and investigate the practical effects of othering and political agency degradation on Latin Americans’ success at political, economic, and social integration. Such research would broaden subject-area knowledge across disciplines, perhaps influencing media practices, social justice activism, and so on.

In all of this, we must reflect critically on the specific discourses, narratives, and worldviews that enable oppression. Media discursive othering practices can reflect serious and disguised senses of cultural dominance, and—whether or not these translate into “real-world” oppression—I remain wary of the ways in which non-dominant cultural groups are constructed as tokens, patrons, or victims. Nonetheless, the tension between constructing Latin Americans as hard working model citizens in one sense, and belittling them in another, underscores
the importance of the media’s self-legitimation mechanism. As exposing hardships that befall U.S. Latinos’ cultural, political, economic, and social integration, then, the major newspapers in America authorize themselves as reporters. Doing so degrades the ability of Latin Americans as political agents to define the problem of their immigration themselves. The self-legitimation of the dominant U.S. media sources creates discourses on immigrant communities that are—on the one hand—superficially positive, but frankly disempowering on the other hand.
Appendix A: Search Terms and Coding Rubric

Search terms:

I. Headline
   • Latin America/Latin American/Latin Americans
   • Latino/Latina/Latinos/Latinas
   • Hispanic/Hispanics
   • Mexico/Mexican/Mexicans
   • Puerto Rico/Puerto Rican/Puerto Ricans
   • Cuba/Cuban/Cubans
   • El Salvador/Salvadoran/Salvadorans
   • Dominican Republic/Dominican/Dominicans
   • Guatemala/Guatemalan/Guatemalans
   • Colombia/Colombian/Colombians
   • Honduras/Honduran/Hondurans
   • Ecuador/Ecuadorian/Ecuadorians
   • Peru/Peruvian/Peruvians
   • Argentina/Argentinian/Argentinians/Argentine/Argentines
   • Chile/Chilean/Chileans
   • Uruguay/Uruguayan/Uruguayans
   • Paraguay/Paraguayan/Paraguayans
   • Venezuela/Venezuelan/Venezuelans
   • Bolivia/Bolivian/Bolivians
   • Costa Rica/Costa Rican/Costa Ricans
   • Nicaragua/Nicaraguan/Nicaraguans

II. Body
   • Immigration/Migration/Emigration
   • Migrant/Migrants
   • Immigrant/Immigrants
   • Emigrant/Emigrants

Coding rubric:

I. Code 1 (=including stemmed words, =narrow coding context)
   • Latin American
   • Latino
   • Latina
• Hispanic
• Mexican
• Puerto Rican
• Cuban
• Salvadoran
• Dominican
• Guatemalan
• Colombian
• Honduran
• Ecuadorian
• Peruvian
• Argentinian
• Argentine
• Chilean
• Uruguayan
• Paraguayan
• Venezuelan
• Bolivian
• Costa Rican
• Nicaraguan

II. Code 2 (=including stemmed words, synonyms, =broad coding context)
• Drugs
• Theft
• Assault
• Education
• Success
• Hard work
Table 5: Number of References to Nodes 1-6 vs. Number of References to Empty Signifiers 1-23

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Table 6: Number of Positive and Negative References to Nodes 1-6 vs. Number of References to Empty Spaces 1-23.
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