# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Staff List</strong></td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fiona Corcoran</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective Engineering: Creating a Parallel Electoral System to Address Old Divisions in New Bosnia</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Noah Genovese-Mester</strong></td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventing Civil War Recurrence Through Authoritarian Consolidation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Theodora Mattei</strong></td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contesting the velina: The emergence and reproduction of a feminized body politic in contemporary Italy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jeremy McLane</strong></td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Numbers Numb: The Significance and Shortcomings of Imagery within the Immigration Debate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Michaila Peters</strong></td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determining Disengagement Methods: Deciphering the relationship between engagement pathways of U.S. identity-motivated domestic terrorists and the most effective disengagement method</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dhanya Rao</strong></td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development and Destruction: Representations of International Development During the Narmada Valley Development Projects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marissa Zupancic</strong></td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation and Income in Predicting Abortion Attitudes in the American Electorate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This year, Clocks and Clouds celebrates its first decade. Over the last ten years, the journal has grown and changed immensely, and it has been our honor to be a part of its continued legacy. The journal’s ongoing mission is to provide an outlet for premiere undergraduate research in political science and international relations, and to connect students, faculty, and administrators across our university. This year has been no different. As always, we are impressed by the quality of research that American University students submitted to the journal, and we were faced with difficult decisions with respect to publication.

This year, we are proud to highlight seven pieces of stellar undergraduate research, representing diverse methodologies and topics. Theodora Mattei explores the history of the Italian term, Veline, as well as its relevance to contemporary politics. Michalia Peters investigates identity-motivated terrorism, and disengagement strategies. Fiona Corcoran explores the ethnic based politics of Bosnia following the Dayton Accords, and suggests an alternative electoral system. Dhanya Rao examines the dominant discourses surrounding the controversial Narmada Valley Development Project. Marissa Zupancic investigates the impact of generational difference on individual’s views surrounding abortion. Jeremy McLane examines the impact of imagery on policy development in the context of US-Mexico immigration. And finally, Noah Genovese-Mester investigates the effect that authoritarian regime consolidation has on the likelihood of civil war recurrence.

The diversity of perspectives, topics, and methodologies in the journal you now hold is a testament to the thriving undergraduate research environment at American University. We are immensely grateful to the administrators and faculty in the School of Public Affairs and the School of International Service who have made research such a strong presence and valuable tool for learning on our campus. Clocks and Clouds is based on the premise that undergraduate students have ideas that matter. Join us in reading and listening to what these students have to say.

Alexander Csanadi  Daniel Herschlag, Heather Hardee
EDITOR IN CHIEF  MANAGING EDITORS
Tammy (Dan) Nguyen
MARKETING AND PRODUCTION MANAGER
CLOCKS AND CLOUDS 2019-2020 STAFF

FACULTY ADVISOR
Professor Kimberly Cowell-Meyers
Professor David Mislan

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
Alex Csanadi

MANAGING EDITORS
Daniel Herschlag
Heather Hardee

ASSISTANT MANAGING EDITORS
Emily Hilberer
Gabrielle Moran
Nilo Siddiqi
David Wilbourne

REVIEWERS
Aylar Banafshe
Sophia Bojorque
Hannah Farley
Stacey Friedman
Alexia Gardner
Katelyn Haas
Breanna Hill
Lukas Lehmann
Theodora Mattei
Paroma Mehta
Kalina Mesrobian
Annabronia Ospeck
Jordan Park
Paolo Pergami-Peries
Michaïla Peters
Kira Pyne
Macy Rooney
Avery Sheriffus
Margaret Willis
Lori Younissess
Marissa Zupancic
EFFECTIVE ENGINEERING: CREATING A PARALLEL ELECTORAL SYSTEM TO ADDRESS OLD DIVISIONS IN NEW BOSNIA

Fiona Corcoran

Abstract
The Dayton Accords, created in 1995 as a result of three-party negotiations to end the war in Bosnia, established a rigid system of consociational government that enshrined the political representation of ethnic Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs at every level. While this arrangement was essential for convincing the leaders of the ethnic factions to transition from armed conflict to politics, it has also created gridlock in the national legislature, virtually barred multiethnic parties from gaining a significant voice in parliament, and guaranteed a slow drift towards the devolution of power to two ethnically-circumscribed federal entities. Bosnia and Herzegovina was the target of several waves of internationally-imposed electoral reform that sought to remedy the failures of the Dayton system through the centripetal logic of the alternative vote and other last-minute adjustments transparently designed to favor multiethnic parties and disadvantage the dominant ethnic nationalist coalition. These interventions have been unsuccessful, in part because the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina are aware of and resentful towards what they perceive as attempts to undermine their political will. This paper suggests a parallel electoral system that can address the failings of the current consociational system and challenge the dominance of ethnic nationalist parties while still respecting the will of the Bosnian people.

List of Abbreviations

BiH    Bosnia and Herzegovina
RS     Republika Srpska
FBIH   Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
OSCE   Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PR     Proportional Representation
SNTV   Single Non-Transferable Vote
AV     Alternative Vote

FIONA CORCORAN is a student of Political Science. 
School of Public Affairs, American University
Email: fc6337a@student.american.edu
STV Single Transferable Vote

Major Bosniak Political Parties
SDA Party of Democratic Action
SBB Union for a Better Future

Major Croat Political Parties
HDZ Croatian Democratic Union
HDZ 1990 Croatian Democratic Union 1990

Major Serb Political Parties
SNSD
Alliance of Independent Social Democrats
SDS
Serbian Democratic Party
PDP
Party of Democratic Progress

Major Multiethnic Political Parties
DF
Democratic Front
SDP
Social Democratic Party
SP
Socialist Party

**Introduction**

Bosnia and Herzegovina is perhaps the most electorally engineered country in the world. Its government has operated based on a complex system of ethnic checks and balances since the establishment of the war-ending Dayton Accords in 1995. Provisions within Dayton that instituted ethnic power-sharing and devolved state authority to two federal entities—Republika Srpska (RS) and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH)—were essential to convincing the various armed ethnic factions to disarm. Bosnian politics today are crippled by the very systems that brought the nation out of violent conflict. The Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is broadly representative of the three major ethnic groups within the country: Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats. However, this representation comes at the cost of any progress within
the legislature, as the coalition government in the House of Representatives usually consists of the three major ethnic nationalist parties despite their vastly different visions for Bosnia’s future. Gridlock and dysfunction are inherent in this static arrangement. In 2017, the Bosnian parliament was unable to pass a single piece of new legislation (Ruge 2018). At the same time, Serb and Croat leaders in Bosnia have called for greater ethnic autonomy and, in the case of Republika Srpska, for complete independence (Kovacevic 2018).

The bulk of interventions by international organizations such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in post-war Bosnia have had the aim of weakening the ethnic nationalist hold on political power and advantaging civic and multiethnic parties, which face both institutional and indigenous barriers to entering parliament. These interventions, mostly conducted from 1996 to 2002, either had little substantive effect or backfired, causing ethnic communities in Bosnia to rally around nationalist parties in the face of unwanted foreign interference (Belloni 2004). Some have argued that electoral engineering is a lost cause in Bosnia, causing more harm to the ethnic balance in the country than good. However, maintaining the current consociationalist holding pattern in the Bosnian parliament is not a viable option as decades of political paralysis have sparked violent protests in major Bosnian cities as recently as 2014 (Cook, Jukic, and Jahic 2014).

What changes could be made to the Bosnian electoral system in order to ease political gridlock and promote functional governance? The current system of open-list PR allows ethnic nationalist parties to easily gain seats in the House of Representatives without making cross-ethnic appeals or seeking votes outside of their core ethnic base (Belloni 2004; Reilly 2006). A successful replacement would have to challenge this stranglehold on political power while still respecting the democratic will of the Bosnian people. A parallel system for electing representatives to the Bosnian House of Representatives—half in multi-member constituencies by means of the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) and half in a nationwide district by list PR—would both respect the territorial and ethnic makeup of Bosnia and promote the formation of less fragmented and potentially more moderate coalition governments.

This paper is organized into four sections. First, I will provide an overview of the various schools of thought on electoral engineering and which electoral systems are best suited for promoting cooperation in deeply divided societies. Second, I will discuss some of the previous attempts that have been made to amend the Bosnian system and why these attempts have been largely unsuccessful. Third, I will address the various obstacles to the success of civic and multiethnic political parties in Bosnia under the current electoral
Lastly, I will explain the benefits of a parallel electoral system and how it ameliorates the deficiencies of the current system.

**Electoral Engineering**

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the third wave of democracy that saw new nations emerge in Latin America, Asia, Europe, and sub-Saharan Africa in the last decades of the 20th century also gave rise to an academic interest in institution building. Many of the dozens of countries that gained independence during this period fell back under repressive regimes because the fledgling democratic systems they had put in place could not function in their unique political landscapes. These countries often had deep-seated ethnic, religious, or linguistic divisions that did not easily translate into inclusive policy-oriented debate. Organizations and individuals seeking to bolster these new democracies began to focus on the choice of electoral system as a tool for promoting stable governance and political strategies that crossed community lines. Electoral systems have a direct effect on the behavior of politicians before and after they enter government. Certain systems are thought to provide incentives for broad political appeals while others advantage ethnic entrepreneurs who can rally their narrow base around a single issue. A central debate in the literature is which type of electoral system can reduce the potential for both violent and nonviolent ethnic conflict in deeply divided societies.

Arend Lijphart (1977) is one of the main proponents of consociationalism in this context. Consociationalists argue that the collective rights of ethnic groups must be enshrined in design of electoral and governmental systems in places that have seen ethnic conflict. By guaranteeing that all groups will have representation, the burden of resolving ethnic differences is left to the elites. Violence is avoided by elite cooperation and the guarantee of a permanent share of power for each ethnic group. Lijphart identifies four institutional components that consociational systems must have in order to promote elite compromise: segmental autonomy, mutual or minority veto power, a grand coalition government, and proportional distribution of resources and administration positions (1977, 25). Stemming from this idea is the claim that proportional representation is the best system for divided societies since it gives elites a significant amount of autonomy and ensures representation for groups equal to their relative size. Reilly (2002, 132) disagrees, arguing that “the surest route to electoral victory under PR is to play the ethnic card- with disastrous consequences for the longer-term process of democratization.” Reilly’s prediction has held water in Bosnia, where PR has reified physical and political ethnic boundaries.

Electoral systems can either translate social cleavages into political
cleavages, as in consociationalism, or they can alter the aggregation of interests so that competition crystallizes around policy differences rather than ethnic lines (Bogaards 2004). A major criticism of consociationalism is that even though consociational systems can shift ethnic dynamics from violence to politics, politics become inextricably linked to ethnic conflict. There is no incentive for interethnic cooperation if ethnic representation is guaranteed. Centripetalism advocates for the use of electoral rules that reward moderation by making cross-ethnic appeals a necessary element of any campaign. It is so named because of the centripetal force towards the political center that strategically applied electoral changes are believed to have on contentious and divided polities. Horowitz (1990) specifically champions the alternative vote (AV) as the system most likely to have a moderating effect on ethnic political leaders because it is a majoritarian system with a preferential mechanism. Unless one ethnic group is overwhelmingly numerically dominant within a state, parties and candidates need to campaign for second and third preference votes in order to secure a majority. Parties with a broader, more moderate platform will have an inbuilt advantage since their policies have greater appeal across groups. The single transferable vote system (STV) is another favorite of centripetalists since it has the same vote-pooling incentive but provides more proportionate outcomes than AV since it uses quotas to distribute seats rather than the majoritarian principle (Bogaards 2004).

Horowitz’s claims about the alternative vote have been challenged by a multitude of authors (Coakley and Fraenkel 2017; Fraenkel and Grofman 2004, 2007; McCulloch 2013a) on the grounds that the opposite effect, a centrifugal push towards radical politics, is also possible when AV is implemented in ethnically divided states. Echoing Horowitz’s own critique of consociationalism, Fraenkel and Grofman (2007) argue that centripetalism can only encourage moderation where a certain level of moderation is already present. When the first preference vote for radical ethnic parties is high enough, they will not need to appeal to the center (McCulloch 2013b). STV has similar shortcomings according to Coakley and Frankel (2017), who draw on evidence from the 1990 general elections in Estonia. Estonian citizens overwhelmingly voted along ethnic lines for their first preference and often gave their second preferences to ethnic parties with more radical politics rather than parties representing other ethnicities that more closely matched their ideology.

Pure plurality systems are generally disfavored in the argument over the best electoral system for divided societies. Plurality elections lend themselves to two-party competition and, inevitably, single-party government
whereas proportional representation systems lead to the formation of many parties across the political spectrum (Lardeyret 1991). Although a multiparty system is often seen as ideal for mediating tensions in countries with multiple identity groups, party fractionalization can be highly detrimental to achieving functional governance. Lardeyret (1991, 32) illustrates how PR can lead to greater division with the example of Belgium, where he claims “politics became little more than a feud between the Flemings and the French-speaking Walloons” after a multitude of linguistic parties sprang up under the new proportional system.

A potential balance has been struck between the party consolidation that is achieved under plurality and majoritarian systems and the proportionality that is inherent to PR. Mixed electoral systems are thought by many in the field to combine the “best of both worlds.” Under mixed systems, both the “proportionality principle” and the “plurality principle” are used to elect members of the same chamber (Shugart and Wattenberg 2005). This can take on a number of forms. Lithuania uses a combination of two-round majority voting in single-member constituencies and PR in a nationwide district to elect members of its parliament, essentially conducting two elections at once. Japan uses a combination of the single non-transferable vote, a semi-proportional system in itself, and PR to elect its upper house. Other states use different systems concurrently in different parts of the country. Under Shugart and Wattenberg’s (2005) typology, the common element that links this variety of systems together is that they feature both a nominal tier and a list tier. Mixed systems have been found to produce less fractionalization than pure PR systems, producing “fewer and bigger effective winners” while also guaranteeing greater proportionality than pure plurality systems (Kostadinova 2002, 31). Kostadinova (2002) argues that since Eastern European countries struggled to avoid fragmented legislatures while still providing representation for a fragmented citizenry, it is unsurprising that many of these states chose to use mixed systems. Bochsler (2009) takes a more cynical view of mixed systems in his own analysis of Central and Eastern Europe, highlighting the higher disproportionality of outcomes and finding no clear evidence that party systems consistently consolidated. The success of mixed electoral systems seem to be highly contingent on their specific political and demographic contexts.

The Bosnian Experiment

With this in mind, any new electoral system implemented in Bosnia would have to be suited to its particular circumstances. Bosnia currently meets all four of Lijphart’s criteria for a successful consociational system, and yet Bosnian
elites are unwilling to compromise their radical ethnic platforms. Segmental autonomy is ensured by the internal division of the country into the Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The use of open-list proportional representation to elect delegates to the House of Representatives and the reservation of ethnic seats within municipal governments fulfills the proportionality requirement (Manning and Antic 2003). Minority veto powers are also enshrined in the constitution of BiH; proposed legislation in the Parliamentary Assembly can be declared “destructive of a vital interest of the Bosniak, Croat, or Serb people” and must be approved by a majority of the affected group’s delegates (“Constitution of Bosnia” 2009, 10). Lastly, and perhaps most central to Bosnia’s political dysfunction, the House of Representatives fosters a grand coalition government between the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), and the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ), which represent ethnic Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats, respectively. The grand coalition is not formed after a compromise is reached by the elites of each of these aggressively nationalist parties but instead is considered a foregone and unchallenged conclusion. The Dayton Accords ensured that Bosnia would operate according to a blueprint of consociationalism, but did not look past the immediate conditions of post-war Bosnia to whether this system would be viable in the future. Consociationalism has been tried and has failed in Bosnia.

The 2000 elections in Bosnia were the site of multiple international interventions. Previously, all elections in Bosnia used a closed-list PR system where voters could choose their preferred party but had no input on the order in which that party’s candidates would be elected (Belloni 2004). In 2000 and every parliamentary election afterwards, open-list PR allowed voters to indicate a candidate preference and a party preference. This nominally allows voters more flexibility and ameliorates the categorical nature of the PR system. However, since Bosnia is a country whose politics are characterized by ethnic affiliation, voters were able to use this new mechanism to limit their choice of representative to their own ethnic group more efficiently.

The alternative vote was used for the 2000 election of the presidency of Republika Srpska. It was imposed by the OSCE Provisional Electoral Committee in order to position moderate candidates as a legitimate challenge to the office that had long been held by nationalist SDS candidates. Milorad Dodik of SNSD was the preferred candidate of the OSCE and it was hoped that he would be able to triumph over SDS candidate Mirko Šarović by collecting second preference votes from supporters of smaller parties opposed to SDS (Coakley and Fraenkel 2017). The SDS received 49.8% of first preference votes
and easily gained a majority after second preferences were distributed. Dodik and the SNSD received 25.7% in the first round and only 25.9% in the second (McCulloch 2013b). In fact, ethnic Serb voters in RS gave a greater share of their vote to SNSD in the presidential election than in the election for the RS Assembly. Bosniaks in the Republika Srpska also did not behave according to centripetalist predictions. For the most part, Bosniaks gave their first and subsequent preferences to ethnic Bosniak parties, opting to “exhaust” the ethnic ballot with little chance of success rather than give preferences to Serb moderates (McCulloch 2013b, 97). The new incentives for cross-ethnic voting proved weaker than the long-established preference for nationalist candidates and Serb outrage at what they perceived as an international attempt to undermine their ethnic interests.

Again in 2000, the OSCE attempted to change the voting rules for the House of Peoples, the upper house of the Federation’s parliament. Instead of being limited to electing only candidates from their own ethnic groups, electors in the cantonal assemblies would be allowed to give their input on all of the chosen delegates (Manning and Antic 2003). The OSCE intended this alteration to benefit multiethnic parties which had previously had little say in the election of delegates to the upper house. This rule change drew outrage from ethnic Croat representatives and elected HDZ officials refused to take their seats in the Federation and central government in response. They saw the institution of cross-ethnic voting as infringing on their rights as an ethnic minority within the Federation. In the direct aftermath of the rule change, an HDZ-led “Croatian National Assembly” was created in Mostar and began to organize parallel government structures in Croat-dominated cantons in the Federation (Bieber 2001). The HDZ members of parliament were replaced by ethnic Croats from multiethnic parties such as the SDP. The rule change has since been repealed, but the overwhelmingly negative response from the majority of Croats and HDZ’s withdrawal illustrated how fragile Bosnia’s governmental coalition was and continues to be.

**Obstacles to Success for Multiethnic Parties**

Non-ethnic and multiethnic parties have a difficult path to gaining political power in BiH. Some of the obstacles they face are due to institutional design, but others arise from the genuine desire of Bosnians for nationalist representation. The staunch support for major ethnic parties may be due in part to the patronage networks that ethnic factions have controlled since the Bosnian War. The factions that were strongest during the war were able to seize major economic assets, easing their way into political dominance after the conflict ended (Manning and Antic 2003). Manning (2004, 68) asserts that the international community’s belief that elections are the key to solving Bosnia’s problems “confuses what
may be collectively rational (eject the ethnonationalist parties) with what is individually rational.” Since the nationalist parties have significant control over regional resources, Bosnians continue to put them in power. However, this alone cannot entirely explain the popularity of nationalist parties. The geographical distribution of ethnic groups, the fragmentation of the electoral system, and the perceived tension between cross-ethnic voting and the ethnic rights guaranteed by Dayton are a few of the barriers to the growth of moderate politics and multiethnic parties.

Bosnia’s current political landscape cannot be separated from the interethnic violence of the Bosnian War. The boundaries of the various electoral districts and cantons within Bosnia are congruent with the front lines of the war and the districts themselves are largely homogeneous due to the ethnic cleansing perpetrated on all sides of the conflict (Hulsey 2015). The two constituent entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina were not a creation of the Dayton Accords; they formed during the war years as Bosniaks and Croats allied to form the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in opposition to the Republika Srpska (Washington Agreement 1994). Two-thirds of Bosnian Croats live in four cantons in the Federation that border Croatia while the remaining third are spread across the other six cantons (Ruge 2018). Croats that live in the six cantons of Central Bosnia tend to have more moderate politics and are more open to the idea of a shared multiethnic Bosnia, an interesting reversal of Bochsler’s (2012) finding that candidates with radical ethnic positions fared better in ethnically mixed environments in Serbia. However, these citizens are in the minority of opinion, as Bosnians living in ethnically homogenous territories are far more likely to support nationalist parties. According to a 2013 census, Bosniaks comprise 50% of the population, Serbs 31%, and Croats 15%. Ninety-two percent of all Bosnian Serbs live in the Republika Srpska and 91% and 88% of Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks, respectively, live in the Federation (“Census of Population” 2013).

Due to this configuration, competition more often occurs between parties representing the same ethnic community than between different ethnic blocs. In the Federation, SDA competes with Union for a Better Future (SBB) and smaller parties for Bosniak votes and HDZ competes with its breakaway opponent Croatian Democratic Union 1990 (HDZ 1990). The situation is parallel in the Republika Srpska: SNSD fends off challenges from the previously dominant Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and the Party for Democratic Progress (PDP). A handful of multiethnic parties, including the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Democratic Front (DF), have been able to make headway in the Federation (OSCE Report, 2019). In the Republika Srpska, the Socialist Party
is the primary multiethnic party and sees middling results in most elections, garnering seven seats in the RS Assembly and one in the federal House of Representatives in the 2018 general election (“General Elections” 2018).

According to Hulsey (2015, 42), “there is no election in Bosnia in which all voters are choosing from the same candidates for the same seat or set of seats.” Voters in the Republika Srpska participate in the election of the Serb seat of the tripartite BiH presidency, the presidency of the Republika Srpska, and the RS Assembly. Voters in the Federation elect the Croat and Bosniak members of the BiH presidency, the Federation Parliament, and the assembly of their canton. All Bosnians elect members of the state-wide parliament, but voters in the two entities are presented with two entirely different slates of candidates and parties. Figure 1 illustrates the complexity of the electoral fragmentation in BiH; each of the arrows represents a different election that one or both of the two entities participate in. The campaign processes in the entities are almost completely unlinked even during the same election. Smaller parties are unable to

Figure 1: Bosnia-Herzegovina Governmental Structure (GlobalSecurity.org, 2000)

expend the resources necessary to contest elections in both entities and instead concentrate on one, leading to multiple parties with similar platforms and a tiny share of the vote. There is never a single nationwide political conversation. When cross-ethnic voting does occur, as in the recent presidential election, it is seen as a betrayal of the consociational promise of Dayton. The electoral rules for the BiH presidency have been the center of controversy after Željko Komšić
of the Democratic Front won the 2018 contest for the ethnic Croat seat. Although Komšić was eligible to run for the seat since he is a Bosnian Croat, many Croats view his presidency as illegitimate because the majority of his support came from Bosniaks (Vladisavljevic 2018). Although candidacy is restricted by respective ethnicity for the Bosniak, Croat, and Serb seats of the presidency, there is no ethnic restriction on who can vote for each seat. Any citizen of the Federation can cast their vote for both the Bosniak and Croat seats. Bosniaks, being a much larger group numerically than the Croats, are able to elect a candidate they favor for the Bosniak and Croat seats. Bosniaks are the largest supporters of multiethnic parties like the SDP and a significant proportion of the community supports moderate candidates at the polls (Manning and Antic 2003; Touquet 2011). The Croat nationalist HDZ have recently introduced a proposal to eliminate the mechanism that allows cross-ethnic voting for the Bosniak and Croat seats, claiming that it is a violation of the rights of Croats as a constitutive people of Bosnia (Ruge 2018). This situation encapsulates the dilemma facing those who seek electoral rule changes in Bosnia: how to balance a desire to encourage moderation with respect for the Bosnian desire for descriptive and substantive ethnic representation.

A Complex System for a Complex Problem

Past electoral interventions in Bosnia have suffered from a mismatch between the intended effect of rule changes and the context in which they were made. The alternative vote cannot have a centripetal effect in a society where support for nationalist parties is so widespread and deeply ingrained. Open-list PR may increase accountability between voters and their representatives but it cannot create moderation where none exists among voters, especially in a country still recovering from brutal ethnic war. Essentially, electoral rule changes must be made with the goal of creating an environment conducive to functional government, not with the aim of rigging the competition for moderate parties. In addition, the consociational element of Bosnian politics cannot be wholly done away with without creating insecurity and feelings of victimization among the ethnic groups, especially the relatively small Croat population. It is important for elections to be somewhat territorially based to ease these fears. Fractionalization is also a core issue, as both the coalition government and the opposition within the House of Representatives are splintered and ineffective. A parallel system is best suited to meet these needs, combining translation of ethnic issues through PR and the party consolidation of plurality.

The combination of SNTV and closed-list PR that I am proposing is uncommon in the world of electoral systems, mainly due to the underuse of SNTV globally.
SNTV is technically a semi-proportional system, as it tends to deliver more proportional outcomes than other plurality systems. Each person casts a single vote for a candidate in a multi-member district and the threshold of exclusion is \(1/(\text{seats}+1)\). The top vote-getting candidates are elected. In a five-member district, any candidate that wins upwards of 17% of the vote is guaranteed a seat. Under a strictly proportional system, a party that wins 40% of the overall vote in a district could expect to receive 40% of the seats, or two out of five. With SNTV, that same party could put forward two candidates and only win one seat due to vote splitting (Reilly and Reynolds 2002). This creates an environment in which large parties must efficiently coordinate their supporters in order to win more than one seat and candidates must distinguish themselves to voters. There is evidence from South Korean legislative elections that SNTV increases representation for minority parties and encourages independent candidacies (Grofman et al. 2014, 242).

The 2014 statewide parliamentary elections provide a perfect example of how SNTV could shift long-established political dynamics in Bosnia. Table 1 shows the district-level results from Republika Srpska. In each of the three contests, SNSD received two electoral mandates and SDS received one. In a three-member district, the threshold for SNTV would be 25%. In districts 1 and 3, SNSD could possibly organize its base to split their votes between two candidates and still receive two mandates. Given the amount of coordination this would entail, it is likely that in at least one of these districts the third mandate would be won by the more centrist PDP. SNSD and SDS usually dominate parliamentary elections in the RS and attempt to outplay the other by making increasingly hardline appeals to ethnic Serbs. In order to gain votes from smaller parties and ensure their ability to win more than one seat, candidates from these parties may find it in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>% of Vote</th>
<th>Direct Mandates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD)</td>
<td>41.129</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SerbianDemocratic Party (SDS)</td>
<td>26.914</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Democratic Progress (PDP)</td>
<td>8.911</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: BiH 2014 Parliamentary Election Results- Republika Srpska (data from Central Electoral Commission B&H, 2014)
their best interest to tone down their rhetoric and appeal to voters outside their typical base. SNTV is the nominal tier of the parallel system and maintains in part the territorial base of party politics in Bosnia. The second part of my proposal is to create a single nationwide district from which the list tier, elected by closed-list PR, can be drawn. A nationwide electoral district would have several benefits, not least of which is that the entire voting population of Bosnia will choose between the same set of parties and platforms. Bosniaks and Croats in Republika Srpska would be able vote for parties that usually only contest elections in the Federation, and Serbs in the Federation would be able to do the same in Republika Srpska. In addition, this change creates an opportunity for multiethnic parties to coordinate across entities in order to collectively gain more seats in the House of Representatives. This could take the form of a joint list alliance for a single election or even a more permanent merger. Parties like the Democratic Front are able to gain multiple seats on their own, but the Socialist Party and other struggling multiethnic groups may see the advantage in joining up in order to minimize wasted votes.

The balance between the nominal and list tiers varies across parallel systems,
with some using plurality rules to elect the majority of their representatives and others weighing proportional representation more heavily (Shugart and Wattenberg 2005). To somewhat simplify this complex system, each method will be used to elect half of the total seats in the House of Representatives. Currently, 28 seats of the 42 seats in the House of Representatives are elected from FBiH and 14 from RS. FBiH elects twice as many representatives as RS because of its much larger population. In FBiH, 21 out of 28 seats are elected from five multi-member districts and the remaining seven seats are filled from compensatory party lists. In RS, nine out of 14 seats are elected from three multi-member districts and the remaining five seats are compensatory. These districts would still exist under the parallel system, but the compensatory mechanism would be removed. There are two possibilities in this regard: either the compensatory seats are eliminated completely or they are added to the existing multi-member districts to be awarded based on district vote totals. The first option would result in 10 members being elected from RS and 20 from FBiH in order to maintain the formula currently in use. The second option would see multiple seats added to each constituency, possibly increasing fractionalization.

Getting rid of compensatory seats does not unfairly favor either moderate or radical parties; some multiethnic parties receive all of their seats from compensatory lists and some ethnic parties do as well. Tables 2 and 3 show the results of the statewide parliamentary elections of 2018 in the Federation and the Republika Srpska, respectively. SBB, a Bosniak ethnic party, would not have won any seats in the House of Representatives without compensation. The Socialist Party in RS would also have been blocked from parliament since its single seat was compensatory. By reducing the amount of seats elected from the nominal tier from 42 to 30, small parties that would have barely eked out a win under the previous system and entered parliament under conditions of extreme fragmentation will need to seek out allies in order to win representation.

To sum up the various elements of this new parallel system: 30 of the 60 seats in the House of Representatives will be elected by means of the single non-transferable vote in multimember districts and the remaining 30 by means of closed-list proportional representation. Elements of plurality and proportional systems will be combined to produce a result that is not as strictly proportional as the current system, but one that reduces fractionalization and makes the domination of large ethnic nationalist parties less certain.
Conclusion

The Dayton Accords put an end to the Bosnian War and laid out the regional balance of power and structure of government that exists in Bosnia and Herzegovina today. Its consociationalist philosophy led to the translation of ethnic conflict into ethnic politics, and the

Table 2: Parties elected from the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2018 (data from Central Electoral Commission B&H, 2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>BIH Parliament (Total, compensatory)</th>
<th>Federation Parliament</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party of Democratic Action (SDA)</td>
<td>Bosniak ethnic party</td>
<td>25.48% (6, 2C)</td>
<td>25.25% (27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)</td>
<td>Croat ethnic party</td>
<td>14.71% (5, 0C)</td>
<td>14.35% (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party (SDP)</td>
<td>Multiethnic party</td>
<td>14.23% (5, 2C)</td>
<td>14.53% (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Front (DF)</td>
<td>Multiethnic party</td>
<td>9.72% (3, 0C)</td>
<td>9.36% (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union for a Better Future (SBB)</td>
<td>Bosniak ethnic party</td>
<td>6.83% (2, 2C)</td>
<td>7.05% (8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our Party (NS)</td>
<td>Multiethnic party</td>
<td>4.89% (2, 1C)</td>
<td>5.09% (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Block</td>
<td>Bosniak ethnic party</td>
<td>4.20% (1, 0C)</td>
<td>3.49% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement of Democratic Action (PDA)</td>
<td>Bosniak ethnic party</td>
<td>3.88% (1, 0C)</td>
<td>3.77% (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-SDA for European Bosnia and Herzegovina-Together</td>
<td>Bosniak ethnic party</td>
<td>3.01% (1, 0C)</td>
<td>2.74% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatian Democratic Union 1990 (HDZ 1990)</td>
<td>Croat ethnic party</td>
<td>2.93%</td>
<td>2.56% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation and Justice</td>
<td>Bosniak ethnic party</td>
<td>2.36%</td>
<td>2.32% (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Corcoran, “Effective engineering: Creating a Parallel Electoral System to Address Old Divisions in New Bosnia”

Table 3: Parties elected from the Republika Srpska in 2018 (data from Central Electoral Commission B&H, 2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>BIH Parliament (Total, compensatory)</th>
<th>RS Assembly</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNDS)</td>
<td>Serb ethnic party</td>
<td>39.10% (6, 2C)</td>
<td>31.87% (28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbian Democratic Party (SDS)</td>
<td>Serb ethnic party</td>
<td>24.34% (3, 0C)</td>
<td>18.04% (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Democratic Progress (FDP)</td>
<td>Serb ethnic party</td>
<td>12.56% (2, 1C)</td>
<td>10.22% (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic People’s Alliance (DNS)</td>
<td>Serb ethnic party</td>
<td>10.29% (1, 0C)</td>
<td>14.44% (12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party (SP)</td>
<td>Multiethnic party</td>
<td>4.69% (1, 1C)</td>
<td>8.19% (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party of Democratic Action (SDA)</td>
<td>Bosniak ethnic party</td>
<td>4.45% (1, 1C)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party (SDP)</td>
<td>Multiethnic party</td>
<td>1.45%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Serbian Democratic Party (First SDS)</td>
<td>Serb ethnic party</td>
<td>1.13%</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Together for BiH</td>
<td>Coalition party</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>4.32% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Democratic Movement (NDP)</td>
<td>Serb ethnic party</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>4.12% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Srpska</td>
<td>Serb ethnic party</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>3.09% (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regional entities which currently shape Bosnian politics were the products of ethnic cleansing and factionalism during the war. This arrangement has outlived its usefulness, doing more to stymie cooperation and efficiency in the statewide parliament than to promote it. Ethnic nationalist juggernauts dominate the coalition government year after year, diametrically opposed in policy but united in their opposition to a potent central government. It is clear to observers both within and without that reform is needed.

Previous international undertakings in this area have fallen short of their goal, mostly because their goal has been to advantage specific political parties in specific elections. Not only is this approach shortsighted, it fundamentally misunderstands the problem it seeks to address. It is not sustainable to alter electoral rules to favor a moderate party in a certain region, as the OSCE attempted with its imposition of the alternative vote in the Republika Srpska. Bosnians are aware of the intentions behind international interventions and will resist those changes they see as being made in bad faith. Rather than rigging the system for moderate and multiethnic parties, those seeking to make change in Bosnia should ensure that their proposals address the deeply-rooted barriers to the success of these parties.

The parallel system proposed in this paper aims to do just that. SNTV removes the assurance of electoral domination for large and regionally concentrated parties. PR in a single nationwide district creates an opportunity for parties to present their
to the nation as a whole and for smaller parties to contest elections in more than one entity. Although some small parties will not be able to reach the current threshold of 3%, the subsequent reduction in fractionalization will benefit parliament more than a scattered and divided array of moderate voices. Conversely, some small multiethnic parties may recognize that it is in their best interest to form electoral alliances with like-minded groups.

Any specific predictions about the effect of this new system on the Bosnian political scene are conditional on the idea that the old parties will remain as they are and that no new parties will form. Given that this system would create an election in which all segments of Bosnian society will for the first time vote for the same parties and platforms, it is more than likely that the political configuration will be altered as well. It is not within the scope of this paper to make conjectures on that scale.

It is likely that there would be resistance to an electoral change of this magnitude from the major nationalist parties in Bosnia. Unless established externally by the OSCE or another international organization with the authority to do so, the parallel system would have to be approved by those who hold political power—in other words, those who have profited under the current dysfunctional system. However, even dominant parties may have an incentive to support electoral change. The Bosnian people have demonstrated that they are unhappy with the inability of the parliament to pass meaningful legislation and the resultant economic downturn that has seized the country (Cook, Jukic, and Jahic 2014). A system that does not wholly threaten the position of the ruling coalition but that would meet some of the public’s demands may be compelling under the current political conditions.

The evidence in Bosnia points to the ineffectiveness of externally imposed electoral reforms that are made with the intention of advantaging certain parties and raises the question of whether such interventions are ever productive. Future research could examine this topic in more depth and investigate the effect of transparent partiality on the success of electoral intervention. Based on the findings in this paper alone, international organizations should rethink their broadly paternalistic attitude towards intervention. Reforms imposed without the input of the people they will actually affect may inculcate resentment and even reinforce the political behavior the reforms are designed to discourage. In Lebanon, Corstange and Marinov (2012) found that partisan interventions led to greater partisan polarization while democratic process-oriented interventions had a moderating effect on voting behavior. The SNTV and closed-list PR parallel system proposed in this paper falls into the category of process-oriented reform, given that the suggested changes would encourage competition and a national political dialogue and do not advantage a specific actor.
Lebanon provides another interesting case study of a country where consociationalism failed to achieve its goals. Like Bosnia, Lebanon is deeply divided—along religious rather than ethnic lines—and has been subject to a barrage of electoral interventions in the 21st century. Proposed solutions to the persistent sectarian political divide include secularization, which would be nearly impossible, and cantonization, which has little support among Lebanese citizens and would be logistically daunting given the level of sectarian intermixing in major cities. The most realistic option with regards to Lebanon appears to be improving on the existing consociational system. The National Electoral Commission in Lebanon proposed the establishment of a mixed electoral system in 2006 that included both local sectarian representation in plurality districts and national proportional representation in large multi-member districts (Salamey 2009, 95). The recommendations were rejected by elites in favor of small majoritarian districts divided on sectarian lines. The 2006 proposal’s attempt at encouraging cross-cleavage political alliances at a national level is similar to the logic of the parallel system, presenting a dilemma regarding its possible success in Bosnia.

However, enshrining sectarian representation even at a local level undermines the purpose of reform in failed consociationalist projects. A key difference between this paper’s proposal and attempts at “integrative consociationalism” is that while the Bosnian parallel system maintains a territorial base to electoral politics, it does not specifically maintain ethnic representation at the district level. In order to address the failings of the consociational model in deeply divided societies, it is necessary to undertake a serious shift away from the political assumptions inherent to that model. If an electoral system is designed to uphold cleavages within society, those cleavages will widen and deepen.
Works Cited


PREVENTING CIVIL WAR RECURRENCE THROUGH AUTHORITARIAN CONSOLIDATION

Noah Genovese-Mester

Abstract

Civil wars do not always end neatly, often ceasefires fail, regimes collapse, and combatants retake their arms. While there are a variety of competing explanations for civil war recurrence, this paper seeks to explain the success and failure of authoritarian regime consolidation during periods of recurrent civil war, looking at the path that leads to an end to conflict rather than a return to civil war. This process of authoritarian consolidation has three steps. First, the nascent regime must form a broad winning coalition consisting of potential belligerents. Then, this coalition must be maintained through the distribution of spoils. Finally, future spoils must be signaled, which must then be followed up on in a cyclical return to the second step. This process ensures that potential belligerents are invested in the future of the new regime, discouraging civil war reignition. But, if it fails belligerent factions will have more incentive to return to arms than maintaining the peace. Two case studies explore the success of this process in the Somoza Regime of Nicaragua and its failure in the Huerta Regime of Mexico. While the process succeeded in Nicaragua for over forty years, it is an imperfect and ongoing process requiring vigilant leadership and constant maintenance, which may make it prone to failure in the long term.

Keywords: Civil War, Civil War Recurrence, Conflict Theory, Peace Theory, Authoritarianism, Democracy

Noah Genovese-Mester was a student of International Studies and graduated in December of 2019: School of International Service, American University
Email: ng3703a@student.american.edu
**Introduction**

When civil wars end, they leave behind decimated and divided nations that may spend years or decades picking up the pieces. Divisions and violence from civil wars can take generations to mend, as previous combatants struggle to reconcile, but this difficult process of peace and reconciliation after the end of a civil war is a much more positive path than the alternative. While in some instances civil wars can be ended conclusively, others drag on for decades or reignite when ceasefires fail. These recurring civil wars can seemingly never end, with the process of reconciliation and peace never truly progressing beyond the beginning stages before a reignition of conflict. Civil wars that recur must have some factor that prevents them from concluding, differentiating them from civil wars that can come to an end. This begs the question, why do some civil wars recur, while others do not? Answering this question is vital for governments across the globe currently struggling with insurgencies. In the past, Dr. Barbara Walter has explored the process of civil war recurrence and its prevention through the building of democratic institutions. I will be looking at civil war recurrence and its relationship with authoritarian regimes, rather than democracies, and how such regimes can use coalition building and credibility mechanisms to maintain peace following a civil war and prevent civil war recurrence.

**Literature Review**

**Identity**

Many explanations for civil war revolve around identity cleavages, specifically ethnic divides, which are often the most salient types of divisions. Posen views ethnic conflict as a security dilemma. Ethnic groups may see other groups as threats and rivals for resources. They then seek to protect themselves by pursuing ethnic cohesion through building a strong and salient ethnic identity. They do this because a high level of ethnic cohesion allows for better organized and more dedicated militaries. However, this behavior can lead to a kind of arms race between two groups looking to defend against each other (Posen 1993, 31). Furthermore, in a conflict, there is often a first-mover advantage, where the side that begins the conflict can choose to begin at the most optimal time when the opponent is vulnerable (Ibid, 32-33). Thus, ethnic civil war is in many ways a self-fulfilling prophecy. Ethnic groups fear that other groups will attack them, so they attack first when they have an advantage, using offense as a kind of defense. While the idea of a first-mover advantage in a conflict is useful in explaining the outbreak of conflict, Posen’s work is not useful...
in explaining non-ethnic civil wars. Groups that are not ethnically divided may not see each other as intrinsic rivals, thus they will not seek greater cohesion to prepare militarily, meaning that the security dilemma caused by ethnic cohesion will not exist. Furthermore, since rival ethnic groups can only be eliminated through genocide, this would imply that ethnic civil wars would continuously recur until one group is wiped out due to the security dilemma.

Another explanation points to certain types of conflict being prone to repetition. If combatants are unable to decisively win, the clearest path to peace is a power-sharing agreement. However, some types of conflicts are difficult to resolve this way due to the nature of what is being fought over, and how important that is to belligerents. Kreutz views conflicts as vulnerable to this kind of repetition when “belligerents are mobilized along ethnic lines or when they are fighting for non-divisible goals rather than limited reform,” (Kreutz 2010, 248). Conflicts over identity cleavages are particularly prone to this, as identity is not always divisible. The goals of such conflicts are incompatible with power-sharing, as they explicitly exclude other belligerents. This is a sort of bargaining problem, where compromise is not possible due to a sharp divide on priorities of negotiating countries.

**Conflict Trap**

One other possible explanation for civil war recurrence is that civil wars are conflict traps. Civil war fundamentally changes society, causing deep economic and human devastation. Conflict leads to greater social cleavages and hatred, which can push a society bitter about an old conflict towards a new conflict (Collier and Sambanis 2002, 5). The economic devastation caused by an ongoing rebellion makes resource motivated conflict more lucrative than legitimate industries in a nation and drives opportunistic individuals to join rebel groups (Ibid). As the conflict drags on, violent politics becomes normalized and economic opportunities dry up, leading to “low quality of life and barriers to political participation,” which lead to more recruitment into rebel armies (Walter 2004, 385). This is a conflict trap, with a civil war feeding itself, creating an inescapable spiral of violence, as violence becomes the most attractive opportunity for individuals to pursue. This explanation does not preclude ethnic conflict, as armed groups may form along ethnic lines, but can also explain conflicts without an ethnic component.

All these explanations lack a fundamental feature, they do not provide a true solution to civil war recurrence. If civil war is truly a conflict trap, or if factions are unable to truly make peace due to bargaining problems, then there is no escape from civil war recurrence. But, this is observably untrue, with
some cases of recurring civil wars eventually coming to lasting peace. Thus, while these factors may contribute, there needs to be a variable that allows peace to be reached, with its absence preventing peace.

**Difficulty in Peacemaking**

Walter introduces a new explanation for civil war recurrence that fits this need, the difficulty of negotiating settlements between adversaries, and then maintaining those settlements through the construction of institutions. Negotiated settlements require belligerents to disarm and demobilize while also trusting their adversaries to do the same, which is difficult in situations of active violence. This causes “negotiations [to] fail because civil war adversaries cannot credibly promise to abide by such dangerous terms. Only when an outside enforcer steps in to guarantee the terms do commitments to disarm and share political power become believable,” (Walter 1997, 336). The problem posed by the lack of trust in negotiations is a major factor in civil war recurrence, but there are alternative solutions that do not require an outside guarantor.

Walter argues that civil war recurrence can be prevented through a process of democratic consolidation, in which belligerents can engage in electoral rather than violent competition. In this scenario, there is an internal rather than external guarantor, with the institutions of a state guaranteeing cooperation. She names three primary factors for the recurrence of civil wars, saying that it tends to occur “where government elites are unaccountable to the public, where the public does not participate in political life, and where information is not transparent,” (Walter 2014, 1243). However, these three challenges can be overcome through features of democratic institutionalization. Institutions provide nonviolent avenues for potential belligerents to pursue change through a government that “serve[s] the interests of a wider population,” (Ibid). Institutions also “help incumbent elites credibly commit to the political terms of a peace settlement” and check power through means other than rebellion (Ibid).

Where Walter’s framework fails is that it explicitly only applies to democracies. There are certainly historical instances where recurrent civil war is brought to the end by the emergence of an authoritarian state, and Walter’s theory cannot explain this outcome. Without the institutions that democracies wield, authoritarian regimes should not be able to achieve lasting peace. Therefore, there must be some other factor that explains such an outcome.
Theory

I seek to explain how an outcome of peace without democracy is possible by expanding on Walter’s existing theory on democratic institutionalization. Though Walter’s theory is largely sound within the framework of modern liberal democracy, it has a major flaw while looking at nondemocratic and authoritarian states. Walter ties civil war recurrence to the government’s lack of accountability to the public, but a government doesn’t need to be accountable to the public to prevent a civil war, it needs to be accountable to the potential belligerents who compose the selectorate. The selectorate is “the set of people whose endowments include the qualities or characteristics institutionally required to choose the government’s leadership and necessary for gaining access to private benefits doled out by the government’s leadership,” (de Mesquita et al. 2003, 42). Part of the selectorate forms the winning coalition, which “endows the leadership with political power over the remaining selectorate as well as over disenfranchised members of society,” (Ibid, 51). In a democratic state, the selectorate largely includes the public, but it also includes potential belligerents who may have motivations at odds with the will of the public. In periods of repeat civil war, potential belligerents make up the key portion of the selectorate that must be brought into the winning coalition, or they will resume belligerence.

I define authoritarian regimes or dictatorships as governments that derive their authority to rule from a narrow winning coalition encompassing influential elites who signal their preferences informally. In contrast, democratic regimes have wide winning coalitions that often make up the majority of society. This is not by any means a perfect definition of democracy and authoritarianism, but it will work for the purposes of this paper due to the nature of the theory. Walter’s theory explicitly looks at a government accountable to the public, indicating a wide winning coalition, therefore I will be looking in instances where such a wide coalition does not exist, looking instead at regimes that rely on the support of narrow elite coalitions.

Authoritarian states do not have the same kind of institutions as democracies, but they can prevent recurrent civil wars in similar ways. Assuming a lack of an outside guarantor, authoritarian regimes must build a framework for trust and cooperation similar to the process undergone by democratic states. Authoritarian states have narrow winning coalitions, meaning that building democratic institutions that represent the will of the public is dangerous to them. Instead, they can build elite institutions. First, deliberative institutions, such as cabinets, legislatures, and councils, allow a dictator to hear the input of allies and allow greater transparency...
in decision-making for groups included in the deliberative process. Critically, such institutions give the regime a chance to signal its intentions, meaning that potential belligerents are less likely to misinterpret a regime’s actions as violations of power-sharing agreements (Boix and Svolik 2013, 301). These institutions can also act as a means for a regime’s coalition to signal what actions they consider unacceptable, allowing the regime to avoid igniting conflict through awareness of existing red lines. Secondly, power-sharing agreements that form elite institutions set specific rules for such institutions; “the dictator’s compliance with these rules constitutes a publicly observable signal of the dictator’s commitment to sharing power,” (Ibid).

However, these institutions are weak because there is no central authority to enforce their decisions, and elites have few options for redress if they are ignored or passed over, with their power largely dependent on their ability to threaten rebellion (Ibid, 300). Thus, authoritarian institutions lack a fundamental component of democratic institutions; potential belligerents can be given a voice and brought into a winning coalition, but the threat of a return to arms is necessary for true accountability.

Outside of formal institutions, authoritarian regimes can also be pressured by elites through audience costs. Because the selectorate decides who rules, the selectorate can choose to exercise its power and dismantle the regime’s winning coalition if necessary. Therefore, authoritarian leaders suffer from audience costs, “the domestic punishment that leaders would incur for backing down from public threats, [which] are thought to increase leaders’ ability to convey their preferences credibly during military crises,” (Weeks 2008, 35). Though audience costs are usually associated with democracies, authoritarian regimes face them under three conditions, if “domestic actors have the means and desire to coordinate to oust the leader... [if] outsiders can observe that an audience can punish the leader; and whether the audience views backing down negatively,” (Ibid, 44). Although audience costs are usually thought of in terms of international crises, potential belligerents may be able to observe such costs during a domestic crisis. Although audience costs are theoretically part of accountability mechanisms, they do not seem to play a major direct role in either case in this paper, though they may be meaningful in other cases.

Authoritarian regimes, like democracies, can bring potential belligerents into their regime’s winning coalition. Furthermore, they can use institutions and audience costs to signal commitment and credibility. This allows them to mimic Walter’s solutions to civil war recurrence provided by institutionalization. However, the selectorate still must be able to threaten violence to punish the government if necessary, which is what truly differentiates democracy and
I hypothesize that if an authoritarian regime builds and maintains a broad winning coalition then civil war recurrence can be prevented, but failure to maintain that coalition may incite previous belligerents to return to war. Preventing civil war recurrence through this framework, which I call authoritarian consolidation, has three steps. First, a broad winning coalition inclusive of potential belligerents within the selectorate must be established. This occurs largely through informal elite negotiation and the promise of concessions. Then, this coalition must be maintained by distributing adequate influence to affect policy to the winning coalition. In most cases within authoritarian regimes, the policy being influenced is the distribution of wealth among a small clique of elites within the winning coalition. Finally, the regime must be able to signal credibility and commitment to distributing influence. Signaling a commitment to distribute influence allows the building of some level of trust between the regime and its winning coalition by committing the regime to the agreed-upon path. Without signaling, members of the winning coalition cannot know if the regime plans on keeping its promises. Distribution and signaling are cyclical; maintaining a winning coalition requires the distribution of goods alongside promises of future spoils, thus ensuring that key coalition members remain loyal until their next bribe. These steps are an ongoing process, a coalition cannot be maintained if it cannot be initially built, and signaling future actions will be of little value if elites are ignored in the present, and once wealth is distributed, the next bribe must be signaled to ensure that the coalition has reason to stay with the regime. Furthermore, society is not static and so coalitions are not static. Therefore, in some cases the coalition’s composition must be altered, bringing in rising classes and ejecting declining ones, in order to maintain control over the rest of society.

An important contrast between authoritarian consolidation and the selectorate theory of de Mesquita is the necessity of broad coalitions during processes of civil war recurrence. It is usually in the interest of the regime to keep the winning coalition as small as possible, as a smaller coalition means that wealth is distributed among fewer members of the coalition, hence there is more wealth for everyone in the coalition (de Mesquita et al. 2003, 225). However, during instances of civil war recurrence, there are inherently multiple armed groups within a state capable of contesting one another. It only takes one of those groups choosing to move against the regime to return the
state to civil war. Therefore, the coalition must be broad and inclusive to prevent any of the remaining factions from choosing to rebel. The need for a broad coalition is in tension with selectorate theory’s requirement for a narrow coalition, which creates a difficult incentive structure for regimes and members of the selectorate. Ultimately, the regime must be able to build an inclusive coalition, but purging opposition is also part of coalition-building, narrowing the selectorate so a coalition may be built.

Research Design and Case Selection

I will be conducting a small-n qualitative comparative case study largely because my hypothesis relies on the formation of informal coalitions, which are difficult to measure quantitatively. Qualitative analysis allows me to look in-depth into the success or failure of cases of authoritarian consolidation, and how that impacted civil war recurrence.

I will be looking at two cases, the Victoriano Huerta regime in Mexico and the Anastasio Somoza Garcia regime in Nicaragua. These are most similar case studies as both were Latin American autocrats who assumed power via military coups during or following a civil war ruling divided states with multiple potential belligerent groups. Neither has a significant ethnic component. The Huerta regime assumed power during the Mexican Revolution in 1913, backed by a broad coalition of liberals dissatisfied with the incumbent Madero government and conservatives hoping to restore the Porfiriato regime. However, Huerta’s coalition collapsed as he reneged on promises to elites, ruling violently and autocratically (Knight 1986b, 63-64). Similarly, Somoza assumed power in 1936 with the backing of the Liberal Party and some Conservative Party-aligned elites, following twenty-seven years of recurring civil war between the factions (Clark 1992, 22). Unlike Huerta, Somoza’s winning coalition endured for decades. I have chosen these cases because they provide a clear contrast between a fledgling authoritarian regime that succeeded in establishing itself, with one that collapsed quickly.

This case selection controls for major alternative explanations. First, both cases can be considered part of a conflict trap. When Huerta seized power, Mexico was in the midst of its revolution and the government that preceded the Huerta regime was engaged in an active civil war against various insurgencies. The situation with the Somoza regime was a bit more complicated, given that the last civil war ended around two years before Somoza’s coup. However, Somoza’s seizure of power was relatively gradual, beginning before the civil war ended. Two years is not enough time to rebuild from a nearly eight-year conflict during a period in which four civil wars occurred in twenty-seven years. Thus, many of the elements of a conflict trap apply to Nicaragua during the inception of the Somoza regime.
Despite these similarities, there are variations between the cases worth noting. Primarily, the United States could intervene during the Mexican Revolution, which it did with the occupation of Veracruz, but Somoza rose to power while America was crippled by the Great Depression. However, Mexico is also much larger than Nicaragua, and the United States did not have the will or capability to truly act as an outside guarantor in this case. Therefore, none of these variations impact rival explanations and so they will likely not be problematic.

There is also one overarching commonality between the two cases; both Victoriano Huerta and Anastasio Somoza were caudillos. Caudillos were a variety of personalist military rulers, similar to warlords, who relied on a strongman model of politics and vast informal networks of clientelism and patronage to maintain their rule (de Riz 2014). Caudillos extended to all levels of politics, often operating regionally or locally, so caudillo regimes common to Latin America had to both cooperate with and compete with lesser caudillos who wielded independent power bases (Ibid). By using two caudillo regimes, regime type is controlled in this research.

When individuals are described as liberal or conservative this cannot be understood in a traditional western sense. Caudillo politics was dominated by personalism rather than ideology, meaning that the line between liberal and conservative was often unclear (Rivera 2016). Objectives of different caudillos tended to be “local and concrete,” and while they sometimes fit ideological molds, those were only applied to specific local circumstances rather than national ones (Knight 1986b, 5). In general, conservatives tended to be authoritarian defenders of traditional order. Liberals tended to be anti-clerical and often sought economic and political modernization under strong and efficient states (Rivera 2016). This is a general pattern rather than a concrete rule, as caudillos often focused on concrete local concerns over concepts like national economic change (Ibid). Liberals were at times committed to the rule of law and democracy, but liberal affiliated caudillos and positivist liberal aligned intellectuals were often authoritarian (Ibid). Thus, caudillo politics is fundamentally personalist rather than ideological, partisan labels should be understood as broad political alignments, rather than as any sort of ideological commitment.
Case Study: Somoza Regime

Historical Background:
Nationalistic Liberal dictator Jose Zelaya ruled Nicaragua from 1893 to 1909 and was eventually overthrown by an anti-nationalist Conservative military revolt backed by the United States (Walter 1993, 10). The overthrow of Zelaya would create an era of instability, which saw four civil wars between the Liberals and Conservatives between 1909 and 1936, as well as multiple American interventions (“Nicaragua - Foreign Intervention,” n.d.).

The Constitutionalist War began in 1926 when a coalition government of moderate Conservatives and Liberals under President Carlos Solorzano was overthrown in a Conservative military coup (Walter 1993, 16-17). Following a Liberal uprising, the United States would begin a new occupation, ending the initial phase of the civil war and forcing out the military government (Ibid. Unlike the previous occupation, the Liberals were divided, and while some more moderate Liberals accepted the occupation, rogue nationalist Liberal caudillo Augusto Sandino’s Ejército Defensor de la Soberanía Nacional (EDSN) would wage a guerrilla war against the American occupation (Ibid, 18).

Coalition Formation:
The selectorate of Nicaragua at the outset of the war had six broad factions: the radical Liberals of Sandino’s EDSN, the Liberal Party, moderate Conservatives like Solorzano, radical Conservatives unwilling to work with Liberals, the United States, and the newly formed American-backed National Guard, Nicaragua’s new military. Anastasio Somoza would emerge from the ranks of the Liberal caudillos, uniquely positioned to dominate the nation. Somoza served in the National Guard, earning favor with the United States and Liberal Party until he was appointed the Guard’s Chief by a moderate Liberal government (Ibid, 29). The National Guard quickly became Somoza’s base of power, interfering in political campaigns and repressing his domestic political rivals (Ibid, 43). Somoza’s existing base of power within the National Guard played well within the personalist caudillo politics of Nicaragua, as old personal friends and other Liberals who saw Somoza as a rising political star backed him vigorously (Ibid, 42).

Finally, Conservatives who were excluded from the incumbent Liberal government and believed that the Conservative Party was unlikely to win power electorally also supported Somozo, hoping to access his patronage networks (Ibid, 42-43). Cementing this alliance of Liberals and Conservatives was a new ideology of Somocismo, a “third way” merging Nicaraguan Liberal tradition with statism and a commitment to order (Ibid, 45). Somoza’s political coalition formed the
basis of the winning coalition that would govern Nicaragua following his rise to power.

Although Somoza wielded considerable political power, the existence of the EDSN was unacceptable, as its uncompromising nationalism meant that it could not be brought into the American-friendly Somocista coalition, and its force of arms was too significant to ignore. By 1933, Liberal Juan Bautista Sacasa had been elected President of Nicaragua, and the United States Marines were unable to continue the occupation of Nicaragua due to the Great Depression. With the Americans gone and a Liberal in power, Sandino was willing to negotiate peace and end his protracted guerrilla war (Ibid, 30). However, peace on Sandino’s terms would be unacceptable to Somoza, who “strongly maintained the view that Sandino should now turn over all his arms and munitions,” which Sandino refused to do (Lane 1934a). Sandino would tell the Nicaraguan press on February 20th, 1934 that “the United States would like to get him out of the Rio Coco region in order that the land there might fall into American hands and serve as a source of food supply in the event of a war. No indication was given as to what may have prompted him to make such a statement,” (Ibid). This mention of a possible war combined with a refusal to give up his weapons would prompt action by Somoza the next day, February 21st, as the National Guard murdered Sandino and attacked the EDSN against orders from the President (Walter 1993, 33). This attack greatly shifted the balance of power in Nicaragua, as the EDSN could no longer act as a check on the National Guard. The day after Sandino was murdered, the Vice-President of Nicaragua told the American Minister to Nicaragua that he believed his “life in danger as in the event of retirement of President Sacasa he... would be the chief obstacle to Somoza’s ambitions being realized,” (Lane 1934b).

The Somoza coalition was not unopposed, it did face resistance from traditional Liberal and Conservative elites. Somoza was looking to be elected President in 1936, but Liberal and Conservative Party elites plotted to unite behind a single anti-Somoza presidential candidate, spurring Somoza to launch a military coup, purging anti-Somocista military units, and replacing Sacasa with a puppet until the election (Walter 1993, 50-51). A coalition of anti-Somoza Liberals and Conservatives supported a unity ticket against Somoza in 1936, but it was a fruitless effort and he was swept into power (Ibid, 58). Following his election, Somoza continued to institute oppressive measures against political rivals, using military courts against dissidents, placing restrictions on political party formation, and using political spies (Ibid, 112). The Somoza regime would keep opposition deeply repressed and divided.
Coalition Maintenance:

Somoza used the distribution of spoils through a vast patronage network to maintain his coalition. Jobs within the government were highly paid, and only available to Liberal Somocistas, who formed an influential pro-Somoza bloc (Ibid, 90). Similarly, he appointed National Guard officers to influential positions (Ibid, 81). Somocista control of Nicaragua’s national bank also ensured Somoza’s control over the availability of loans and enabled him to give favorable terms to his allies (Ibid, 77-78). He also made great efforts to maintain and strengthen his coalition by bringing in previously dissident Liberals. Political exiles were invited back to Nicaragua, and Somoza attempted to reunify the now divided Liberal Party around him (Ibid, 94-95). Coalition maintenance also included the distribution of spoils, which Somoza did with an open hand, holding parades with political officials and providing free transportation and food to common people (Ibid, 95). By parading with officials, Somoza tied them to him politically and ensured those officials would benefit from the goodwill and support built by his generous handouts.

With these changes also came a tightening of control over his coalition, as Somoza centralized Liberal party committee assignments, which now would be centrally appointed rather than elected. These Somocista party committees were in charge of distributing patronage to Somoza allies and party members (Ibid, 97). This was a key tool for coalition maintenance, allowing Somoza greater control of the distribution of spoils. Somoza’s Conservative allies, the National Conservatives, were similarly “completely subordinate to Somoza and his political line,” (Ibid, 99). Of the remaining Conservatives, Somoza kept them divided by cooperating with them, splitting the party between the Genuinos, Conservatives willing to work with the Somocistas to gain access to the spoils of rule, and Chamorristas, who were more hardline anti-Somoza (Ibid). Somoza transformed the Nicaraguan state and Liberal Party into a patronage network and political machine, a powerful tool of coalition maintenance while keeping Conservative opposition divided and unable to put up an anti-Somoza united front.

Nicaragua in the 1930s was a society going through massive change, and the initial Somocista coalition of Liberals and Conservatives would not do in an urbanizing and industrializing republic. Thus, Somoza expanded his coalition to include both labor and business, balancing between the two with limited labor reform, enough to please organized labor but avoiding radical change that would be unacceptable to the business community (Ibid, 101). As Latin America’s urban population swelled, it brought a great political change in countries like Guatemala, where an urban revolution overthrew a military regime, but no such change was seen in Nicaragua, where Somoza had brought the rising classes into his winning
Signaling and Institutionalization:

The Somoza regime in many ways appeared personalist from the outside, but internally Somoza used institutions to govern, seeking to form consensus rather than unilaterally implementing his will (Ibid, 240). A small number of anti-Somoza Conservatives in the legislature were tolerated, and while they held little power, they did receive some representation (Ibid, 92). Somoza would replace the previous Nicaraguan constitution with one in his image in 1939, continuing the trend of institutionalization and ensuring that a legislature remained in place, albeit an authoritarian and toothless one (Constituent Assembly 1939). The existence of these institutions provided a platform for elite negotiation and signaling within Nicaragua. By continuing to strive for consensus through institutions like the legislature, Somoza signaled that he was committed to his coalition and intended to continue his patronage relationship with it.

The institutions defined by the Somoza constitution created a path for Somoza to signal to both allies and enemies his intentions. While direct promises of appointments and spoils were important tools, the real utility of these institutions can be seen in the crisis of 1944. Somoza aimed to be reelected in 1947, which would be unconstitutional, so he proposed a constitutional amendment to the Constituent Assembly that would allow him to do so (Walter 1993, 130).

However, the Liberal Party was hesitant to accept this. Prominent members spoke out and were then jailed for their troublemaking. After this, Liberals within the Constituent Assembly unanimously called for Somoza to release the imprisoned, which he acquiesced to (Ibid). The Constituent Assembly had become essentially a ground for negotiation, with Somoza signaling his intentions, and the Constituent Assembly signaling that his coalition refused to accept heavy-handed tactics against the protestors, while the prominent Liberals who were arrested signaled that parts of his coalition were unhappy with his reelection. Somoza listened to the signals of his coalition and responded softly to protests against the amendment and eventually vetoed the amendment altogether (Ibid, 131-133). Somoza’s institutions allowed him to communicate with his coalition and avoid taking actions that would reopen the door to civil war, although it forced Somoza to back down.

Somoza aimed to shore up his coalition, so he could continue wielding influence after the election. Between the 1944 crisis and the 1947 election, Somoza strengthened his coalition by building goodwill with opposition
 Conservatives and giving concessions to the labor movement, working to “recreate the consensus of the previous decade,” (Ibid, 162). Somoza would keep his word in 1947, and formerly dissident Liberal Leonardo Arguello was nominated with his approval. Arguello had been a member of the opposition in the 1944 crisis and ran as a unity candidate between the Somocistas and Somoza-skeptical Liberals (Ibid, 153). Arguello was intended by Somoza to be a puppet, but instead acted independently, trying to undermine the power of the Somocista National Guard, and appointing people to influential positions without Somoza’s approval (Ibid, 159-160). Somoza would come to Arguello after his inauguration to “intimidate him by a display of military force,” but Arguello would resist his demands (Bernbaum 1947a).

Arguello would attempt to remove Somoza as the Chief of the National Guard as it became clear that Somoza intended to continue wielding influence, but a swift coup by the National Guard removed Arguello, returning Somoza to power (Bernbaum 1947b, 1947c). After the coup, it was clear that Somoza’s attempts to shore up his coalition had succeeded, as the National Assembly affirmed Arguello’s overthrow and re-embraced Somoza (Bernbaum 1947d).

Somoza’s institutional apparatus allowed him to signal his intentions to his allies, who responded with their own signaling in regards to their own opinions. Somoza listened to this information and backed down at first, aware of the weakness of his position. Then, Somoza worked to rebuild his coalition’s strength before seizing power once again, this time with approval from his coalition. This reflects the toothlessness of authoritarian institutions, where institutions cannot hold the government accountable and are instead reliant on a willingness by the regime to listen to them. The outcome of Somoza’s coup d’etat and rise to power was a regime that lasted for over a generation through the use of patronage and signaling mechanics to complete the process of authoritarian consolidation and maintain a broad winning coalition, ending decades of recurrent civil war in Nicaragua.

Case Study: Huerta Regime

Historical Background

The Mexican Revolution began in 1910 as a revolt against long-time dictator Porfirio Diaz to install liberal Francisco Madero as President. The original revolt was composed of a diverse array of dissident groups, such as idealistic liberals aiming to establish a democracy, peasants seeking land reform, and anti-Diaz caudillos seeking personal gain (“Mexican Revolution,” n.d.). The revolution proved initially successful, with Diaz being forced to flee the country. As Diaz left, he famously said “Madero has unleashed a tiger, let us see if he can control it,”
predicting that Madero would be unable to keep Mexico at peace (Duncan 2018a). Diaz’s prediction proved correct, as the diverse interest groups in Mexico had competing demands, leading to previous allies becoming enemies in a new phase of the civil war.

**Coalition Formation**

President Madero was ill-equipped to govern the revolutionary state and unable to control the tiger. He immediately felt the weight of the Presidency, being forced to make difficult decisions on which factions to work with and which to reject, trying to thread a middle ground between the old Porfirian elite and his liberal allies, but in doing so alienating both. His former revolutionary allies Pascual Orozco and Emiliano Zapata turned against him as he failed to meet their demands. Orozco was denied a prestigious appointment while Zapata was denied extensive land reform (Duncan 2018b). These challenges from the left were met with similar ones on the right, with an uprising by former Porfirian General Bernardo Reyes, and a revolt in Veracruz by Felix Diaz, a relative of Porfirio Diaz (Knight 1986a, 253, 474). Madero relied increasingly on General Victoriano Huerta against these rebels, and Huerta proved decisive in the war against Orozco, though Huerta held presidential ambitions of his own (Duncan 2018d). While Madero was able initially to keep the revolts suppressed, the pressure the regime faced inspired a belief that he was too weak to govern Mexico in the long term, particularly among some within the military (Duncan 2018c). Unlike the Somoza coalition, the anti-Madero coalition, composed of Orozquistas, Zapatistas, Reyistas, Felicistas, and Huertistas was not a unified force, but a motley array of dissidents unhappy with Madero that had more or less assembled itself among those who felt excluded.

The Reyistas and Felicistas would launch a counter-revolutionary military coup against Madero known as the Ten Tragic Days. Initially, the coup went wrong as Reyes was killed and the coup’s forces were put under siege (Duncan 2018d). Luckily for the coup plotters, General Victoriano Huerta was in charge of fighting off the coup but instead moved against Madero, arresting and killing him (Ibid). After the counter-revolutionary victory, the leaders of the coup drafted a power-sharing agreement, which made Huerta Provisional President but also created a diverse cabinet of other counter-revolutionaries, including Bernardo Reyes’s son (Huerta et al. 1913). Implied within this agreement was that after new elections were held Huerta would step down and Felix Diaz would become President (Knight 1986b, 64). Although Huerta was not the initiator of the coup, he found himself the main beneficiary as the new President, leading a new counter-revolutionary winning coalition.
Coalition Maintenance

Though Huerta came to power backed by a broad coalition, he would prove unable to maintain it as it broke apart. First and foremost, his seizure of power was supported by Mexico’s elite, but seen as illegitimate by the lower classes. The peasantry was usually excluded from the selectorate, but during the Mexican Revolution peasant military leaders like Emiliano Zapata had the force of arms to challenge the government (Ibid, 2). While Somoza spent two years between the purge of Sandino and his coup laying a groundwork of support and building patronage networks, Huerta had comparatively stumbled into power. Somoza’s coup was in many ways a way of unifying the country, creating a new cross-cutting coalition that included Liberals and Conservatives, but Huerta’s coup had polarized Mexico further than it had already been and radicalized much of the nation against him (Ibid, 3).

Huerta would find himself unable to maintain or expand his initial coalition. Huerta attempted to offer amnesty to active rebels and succeeded in winning the support of the Orozquistas in exchange for a large bribe (Ibid, 4). The Zapatistas had initially sworn to fight under the banner of Pascual Orozco in their Plan of Ayala (Zapata 1911). However, Zapata had fought a brutal guerrilla war against Huerta and had no desire to cooperate with him (Knight 1986b, 5, 8). After it became clear that Zapata intended to continue fighting, Huerta drunkenly asked representatives from Chile and the United Kingdom for “eighteen centavos to buy a rope to kill Zapata,” during a party, slurring and incomprehensible to the representatives (Ibid, 9). This was more than a poorly told joke, it would reflect the arbitrary and cruel nature of the Huerta regime, as well as his own inability to govern effectively.

Huerta’s brutal rule would undermine any chance he had at providing stability. Huerta murdered Madero and his allies shortly after the coup, rather than sending them into exile as promised (Duncan 2018d). Similarly, Huerta would also have the Maderista Governor of Chihuahua arrested and murdered (Knight 1986b, 11). But rather than suppressing anti-Huertistas, this heavy-handed approach “proved wantonly provocative,” alienating potential allies (Ibid, 14). Maderista Governor of Coahuila Venustiano Carranza had initially declared resistance against Huerta (Carranza 1913). Despite this declaration, in the days following the coup Carranza backtracked and indicated to the American consul he intended to comply with Huerta (Holland 1913). However, the murder of Madero changed Carranza’s stance, causing him to ignite the Constitutionalist revolt (Knight 1986b, 15). Huerta’s attempts at repression only spurred the northern states of Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Sonora to rise in rebellion, when they could have potentially solidified his coalition (Ibid, 11).
One of the strongest contrasts between Somoza and Huerta was the role of the military. While Somoza was the Chief of the National Guard and made use of his guardsmen for political ends, the Somoza regime favored political solutions and negotiation over raw coercion. On the other hand, “the consistent thread which ran through the Huerta regime, from start to finish, was militarization,” (Ibid, 62). Military solutions of all kinds were favored by Huerta, and his appointees tended to be military officers, rather than civilian allies (Ibid, 63). Unlike the broad array of interest groups included in the Somocista political machine, the Huerta government was a government by the Federal Army. Huerta would go on to betray his original Felicista allies outright. Huerta had no plans of actually giving up power as agreed to and pushed the Felicistas out of government (Ibid, 64-65). Felix Diaz did not join the Constitutionalists, but moved into exile, leaving Huerta to his fate as revolution swept Mexico once again (Ibid, 76-78).

After his rise, Huerta alienated many of his former allies as his winning coalition collapsed. Huerta made no real attempt to maintain the initial coalition that brought him into power. His betrayal of the Felicistas and heavy-handed repression of Maderistas only created more enemies for himself. Instead of building patronage networks and expanding his coalition like Somoza, the only coalition Huerta built would be the anti-Huerta Constitutionalists.

**Failure of Signaling and Institutionalization:**

Tied into Huerta’s failure to maintain the winning coalition was also a failure of signaling. The Somocista institutions gave the Nicaraguan winning coalition a mechanism to express their preferences, and while Somoza was in no way bound to the expression of Nicaragua’s institutions, they acted as a way for the regime and its backers to communicate and signal a commitment to each other. Huerta did have access to similar institutions, such as Mexico’s legislature and his cabinet. Yet he more or less ignored his cabinet, instead preferring to rule autocratically, leaving the important advice and concerns of his allies unheard, until eventually he ran out of allies to ignore (Ibid, 64). Similarly, while Mexico’s Maderista-dominated legislature had initially recognized Huerta’s Presidency, when it voiced disapproval Huerta, in sharp contrast to when Somoza heeded his legislature’s calls to free arrested citizens, responded with repression, arresting or murdering many deputies (Ibid, 75). Instead of using the legislature and cabinet to signal a commitment to power-sharing, Huerta only showed his hand as a dangerous autocrat.

One final point of speculation on the fate of Victoriano Huerta is the role of audience costs in his regime. There is little information available about the internal dynamics of the Mexican Federal Army during the Huerta regime, but
it is conceivable that Huerta faced a kind of audience cost from the army’s elite. Huerta’s repression may not have been entirely his decision, but the result of an authoritarian military culture and an audience of officers that expected it, though it is difficult to say with certainty.

The Huerta regime, like the Somoza regime, came to power riding the wave of a civil war by working with various belligerents and forming a diverse winning coalition. However, Huerta fundamentally failed at maintaining or expanding the coalition that brought him to power, refusing to distribute power and influence. Thus, those that overthrew Porfirio Diaz simply picked up their rifles and overthrew another dictator, in a repeat of the last civil war.

**Conclusion**

My theory holds in both of these cases. The Somoza regime followed the process of authoritarian consolidation exactly, beginning by building a broad and cross-cutting coalition of Liberals and Conservatives, maintaining that coalition through the distribution of spoils, and using institutions to signal a commitment to continued patronage. In contrast, the Huerta regime largely stumbled into power with the support of the anti-Madero bloc then failed to consolidate that alliance into a true winning coalition, building an autocratic military regime that drove away potential allies through its brutality and lack of commitment to power-sharing. The biggest takeaway from this paper is that civil war recurrence can be prevented in both democratic and authoritarian frameworks. The fundamental key is accountability to potential belligerents, in one case achieved through the rule of law and powerful institutions, and the other through patronage networks and elite signaling. Applying Walter’s theory to informal authoritarian consolidation can reveal how democratic and authoritarian regimes use different mechanisms to produce similar outcomes.

Although this research can be interpreted to suggest that authoritarian consolidation is a preferable path to stability in cases of recurrent civil war, this is not necessarily the case. More research into the likelihood of civil war recurrence under conditions of democratic or authoritarian consolidation is necessary to truly determine which is more effective. While there are clear weaknesses with the democratic institutional model, namely the difficulty of building functioning independent institutions, there is reason to believe that such a model may be more effective in the long term than authoritarian consolidation. The weakness of this model is apparent in looking at both the struggles of the Somoza regime and the circumstances that brought down Huerta. In Walter’s democratic institutional model, independent institutions hold actors accountable. In the authoritarian consolidation model, fundamentally the only thing that can hold actors accountable
is the threat of a return to civil war. Somoza did not listen to his winning coalition because of institutional restraints, he listened to them because they could reignite civil war and overthrow him. Had Somoza misinterpreted the signals of his coalition, particularly in the case of the 1944 crisis, he may have met the same fate as Huerta, and Nicaragua would have descended back into civil war.

The necessity of the threat of political violence does not make for a stable long term political system. The next step in analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of democratic and authoritarian consolidation would be to compare the long term outcomes of civil wars that end in democratic and authoritarian consolidation, to see if one proves meaningfully more stable than the other over many years. It cannot be forgotten that the Somoza regime would fall to civil war, a war against rebels that named themselves after Sandino. While this was not a recurrence of a previous civil war as the Sandinistas represented a new Marxist force rather than the old Liberal-Conservative split, it shows that the model of authoritarian consolidation is not necessarily the most stable long term. Authoritarian consolidation is not a process with a clear end, and while Somoza would successfully manage Nicaragua’s selectorate, his sons would fail at that task. It must be remembered that dictators die while institutions do not.
Genovese-Mester, “U Preventing Civil War Recurrence Through Authoritarian Consolidation”

Works Cited


CONTESTING THE VELINA: THE EMERGENCE AND REPRODUCTION OF A FEMINIZED BODY POLITIC IN CONTEMPORARY ITALY

Theodora Mattei

Abstract

Veline are showgirls present in Italian contemporary media who, dating back to the 1980s, became an enduring symbol of femininity in Italian society through increasing commercialism and privatization. Veline both engender a moral panic about traditional values and are considered postfeminist actors who defend and promote their sexuality for personal liberation. Past studies have limited velina research to the notion that she is a byproduct of external political factors; however I begin at the margins to demonstrate how femininity conceptualized through veline is central to Italian politics. Conducting a genealogical analysis using a reflexivist methodology, this study seeks to understand the tacit codes involved in both performing and processing female sexuality in Italy. Veline are both a fetishized image created for consumption, and evidence of rigid power dynamics which produce norms for how women ought to behave in Italian society. I suggest that veline are emblematic of a culture of violence towards women in the broadest sense.

Keywords: gender, sexuality, power, labor, politics

Introduction

Picture the briefcase models from Deal or No Deal. In Italy they are called veline and they perform, dance, dramatically read cue cards, and entertain male hosts. Veline are cited as an act of oppression, and as a framework for women’s agency alike (see endnote 1). While veline have existed since the dawn of Italian television in 1955, modern veline indicate:

Theodora Mattei is a student of International Studies. School of International Service/SIS Honors, American University Email: tm0508a@student.american.edu
The silent, scantily-clad showgirls who were tasked with presenting the hosts with the veline (journalistic jargon for news of the day) on a popular satirical show broadcast on one of Berlusconi’s TV channels (see endnote 2).

The satirical television show is Striscia la Notizia, a parody news program in which two veline perform while assisting male presenters, the nominal protagonists of the show (see endnote 3). Veline are tasked with providing “laughter, joy, and curiosity” to their audience (L’eredita 2019). Their duties specifically include dancing to a loud pop song among flashing lights while the camera crew linger on the legs, chest, and faces of the veline. She is designed to seduce, and ratings demonstrate that she succeeds in her duties. Since the show’s inception in 1988, shares have bolstered beyond 20% (Hipkins 2011, 414). However veline were not always the fetishized hypersexual imagery they are today. A post-World War II phenomenon in Italian culture, the velina first appeared on television in 1955 with Edy Campagnoli, the heavily chastised “mute woman” who stood alongside presenter Mike Bongiorno on Italy’s first quiz show (Bandettini 1995). Veline have been reproduced under different titles and in almost all Italian programming, thus becoming a nationwide phenomenon that has endured upwards of three decades. Women from all over Italy migrate to the city Milan to work for Mediaset as veline. Velinismo, or the constant reproduction of veline, is evidence of the feminization of labor.

This study employs genealogic methods to contextualize the velina through her politically rich history, so as to explain why she emerged and continues to appear across television networks today, despite backlash against her assumed connection to prostitution, criminality, and violence. Genealogy, as described by Lisa Lowe, “does not accept given categories and concepts as fixed or constant, but rather takes as its work the inquiry into how those categories became established as given, and with what effects (Lowe 2015, 3).” Genealogy entails a process of questioning the previous closure of our understanding of historical progress (Lowe). In fact, borrowing from Butler, a critical genealogy must be supplemented by “a politics of performative gender acts,” which “offers a prescriptive view about the kind of gender reality there ought to be (Butler 1988, 530).”

I seek to understand the arguments that claim the velina is a role of agency, of choice, and those who believe the velina is evidence of a backward, paternalistic Italian culture. Specifically this project examines the “rules” of performing female sexuality by analyzing the phenomenon of the velina through popular and scholarly debates of velinismo. In other words, what does the velina mean in contemporary Italian discussions and practices: in effect, what are the “velina rules”?
Literature review

This study builds off of Judith Butler’s premise that gender is performative rather than corporeal. Rather, gender results from a series of tacit codes as opposed to that which is deemed natural. Butler argues that “gender is, thus, a construction that regularly conceals its genesis” and so only through a “series of acts which are renewed, revised, and consolidated through time” does gender become real in context (Butler 1988, 273 and 274). Butler’s idea of a gendered hegemony draws upon historical elements of gender “rules” which correlate not only to the content of this study, but to its genealogical methods as well. I rely on three epistemological approaches: poststructuralism, postfeminism, and visuality theory as a whole.

Visuality

Visual reality is a unit of political economy that enforces hegemonic power dynamics which “do not exploit but conduct” (Foucault 2007). Therefore scholars argue the images of women in popular media are equally linked to the conduct of political power and capital production (Tagliavia 2018, 174). Foucault describes the “docile bodies” idea as a system of disciplinary practices producing a recognizably feminine body that employs traditionally and stereotypically feminine practices (Foucault 2007). This constructs which labor is available to women by identifying which roles performed by women are most lucrative for capitalists. In so doing the “docile bodies” phenomenon becomes a general model for female exploitation. It seems as if feminist scholar Danielle Hipkins’ picks up her argument at this exact point. Hipkins develops the idea of the beauty trade-off which argues that a youthful, “beautiful” appearance is central to neoliberal capitalism, and how damaging this standard is to women. Hipkins relates this notion to contemporary Italian context, wherein women are meant to look and behave as “beautiful women” do. Should one aspire to possess such an appearance or indeed possess it, they are subject to intense scrutiny: they become “bad, stupid, or a whore (Hipkins 2011, 419).”

Postfeminism

Media expert Francesca Tagliavia constructs a postfeminist argument in support of the velina as an agent. Tagliavia interviews a former velina, Giulia X (who upon further investigations I have identified as Giulia Calcaterra). Calcaterra describes her role as “the articulated doll.” Calcaterra “can articulate herself, showing no emotions, because I am a doll.” She goes on to describe her work, not on Striscia, but as a socialite. She asks club owners “what are we up to tonight, what do you offer me (Tagliavia 177)?” She claims these men are “idiots:” “He doesn’t know it, because he feels like he’s the master of the situation, because he is the club owner. As for you, well you are here and you grab his money (Tagliavia 177)!”. Calcaterra finds the velina within a system of oppression where women only gain power through physicality (Gribaldo, Hipkins).
Tagliavia cites a sexual-economic continuum, where women of the feminized labor force exchange sexual favors for professional gain (Tagliavia, 175). This argument is framed as an act of agency, where young women like Calcaterra conform to what men in power ask of them in order to receive financial or social benefits. Though male capitalists believe themselves to be in power, Tagliavia argues women are actually in control of velinismo.

**Poststructuralism**

In The Curious Feminist, Cynthia Enloe studies the intersection between gender and globalization (Enloe 2004, 59). She argues that the politics of women within globalized spaces cannot be understood by analyzing only the impact globalization has on women, rather how women have shaped globalization. She cites South Korean women who during the 1970s were encouraged to migrate to cities in order to participate in industrialization as factory workers (Ibid, 61). Young women have historically left their parents’ home to compete in the market for female labor, but especially “cheapened labor.” The female body therefore becomes an optimal “site of capitalist accumulation (Harvey 1996).”

These young women leave their parents’ home for the first time, once defined by being “respectable daughters,” to abandon conservative demeanors for exclusively selling sex, or selling a performance of gender and what it means to be a young woman in a given society. Enloe discovered that companies competing in a global market depend on these women framing themselves as innocent potential fiancées, and as sexually deviant. Without women there would be no product. Female bodies, whether workers in an assembly line or veline on Italian programs, are targeted as ideal laborers to accrue profit for capitalists within a market that depends on docility and obedience for optimal production, thus leading to the feminization of labor (Wright, 2006).

The impending consequences or outcomes of this study are not an accidental impact but are wrapped in its very production, as I reflexively seek to direct the knowledge I produce along paths that can lead to emancipatory gender and sexuality power relations in Italian society in order to overcome these gendered social hierarchies that may be reproduced in the future as means of oppressing Italian women.

**Methodology and Outline**

As defined by Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, a critical reflexivist methodology requires “a detailed self-examination of the social and historical conditions under which knowledge is produced (Jackson, 2016).” As determined by the reflexivist methodology I employ, the knowledge I generate in this study is rooted in my own concrete position in social relations by gender, race, class, and the like. Recognizing my positionality through reflexivity makes this methodology most apt for this project. Though I myself am an Italian woman, I have mostly lived in the United
places, they also connect places into relationships with each other and with non-contiguous places (Gilmore 2007).”

Knowledge-production not only expresses social category but is able to reinforce or challenge these markers of female sexuality and agency that I identify. I bring historical factors to light in the present to later deconstruct these aforementioned discriminatory social arrangements. Through a reflexivist approach I take into account the conceptual vocabulary I will use to interrogate the social world which is continuously processed and reproduced.

Michel Foucault notes that discourse produces material effects, “practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak,” and is therefore concurrently recursive (Foucault 1972, 121). Foucault acknowledges that discourse is controlled and manipulated, a phenomenon reproduced in every society where those in power control the narrative. I unpack the meanings produced by the actors within the media and popular discourses, in order to understand the power relations, construction of the conversations, and therefore the phenomenon itself. A review of alternative debates is also necessary, to understand various feminist voices. Some claim the agency of the velina; others relate velinismo to prostitution and aspiration for notoriety which is claimed to be contradictory with Italian values and therefore with the Italian state. This argument draws upon definitions of statehood and what it means to be Italian. Throughout this study I will refer to the velina using several terms, as dictated by historical context. The following are variations of the term velina of which the reader should be aware:

1. Veline: the slips of paper that dispatched instructions within the Italian Fascist Ministry of Information, which has been perceived as ironic now that “velina” has become a byword for right-wing cultural monopoly. Since 1988 Berlusconi’s Striscia la Notizia has used “veline” to refer to the women who provide slips of paper to television hosts
2. Soubrette: generic term for female television assistants, dancers, and models
3. Valletta: as predecessor to the modern velina, vallette were “giovani assistenti” [young assistants] whose role included standing beside the male television presenter in order to appeal to their male audience and increase shares (Quelle Brave Ragazze 2018)

Below I concretely outline the methods used, the material steps I take to conduct this genealogy.

In the first part of this study I seek to understand the role of the velina in contemporary Italy through an analysis of her performance. I examine her role in the television programs themselves. I include Striscia la Notizia, L’Eredita, Lascia
In the second part of this study I discuss the vehicles that make the velina meaningful in historical context: national newspapers with the largest historical circulations. I include Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica. I also analyze contemporary media including articles from La Stampa, Il Fatto Quotidiano, Il Messaggero, and international papers including the New York Times and the Financial Times. The newspapers document the velina in relation to historical periods and give the velina a place in context throughout this sixty year period.

Lastly I examine the conversation about the role of veline. These texts derive from blogs, daytime shows, and posts on gossip sites like Lettera Donna, Oggi, and Juve News (see endnote 5). Quelle Brave Ragazze, a daytime talk show whose title directly translates to “Those Good Girls,” featured Sabina Ciuffini, the first valletta (assistant) with a speaking role. This show provides both a statement from Ciuffini herself and conversation surrounding her role. This show is therefore a bridge between the second part of the study which seeks to understand the performance of the velina, and the third section which understands the role of the velina in contemporary discussion.

To understand the language used in videos, I took note when veline like Ciuffini and hosts like Bongiorno were mentioned, and the intonation and connotation the hosts used in their discussions. The discussions I analyzed informed the historical shifts I identified (see endnote 6).

In reading the blog Il Corpo Delle Donne (The Bodies of Women) I began searching for keywords “veline,” “velina,” some of whom I knew by name, such as Giulia Calcaterra. From these searches I came upon posts about the predecessor of the velina, or the valletta (assistant). I began investigating what they wore, how they spoke, how they acted, how they were filmed (camera angles), and what their daily tasks on their respective programs included.

Within my reading of Corriere della Sera I had to be far more precise with my keywords due to the breadth of issues through which I searched. As such I searched within timeframes that I had already established were of importance within the velina’s history: 1955, 1988, and 2011. From there I searched the same original keywords but added the terms “soubrette,” “vallette,” and “valletta” as appropriate alternatives for the term velina. I then scraped sites for word mentions of the velina’s counterpart, the male presenters. I included “Mike Bongiorno,” and his programs “Rischiatutto” and “Lascia o Raddoppia,” and scraped for media conglomerate “Berlusconi” and his network “Mediaset.” I specifically targeted language or phrasing was used to describe her body, her appeal to an audience, and her performance, such as dance, singing, or fashion.

Alongside Corriere della Sera, I analyzed articles from la Repubblica, another widely circulated paper that was instituted in 1976. As la Repubblica does not archive their newspapers prior to 1984, I made contact with the company itself who graciously digitized editions beginning in 1976 that related to veline specifi-
cally and to women in television broadly. I then coded for mentions of “vallette” and “veline” to understand how these women were historically perceived. From here I read every article that resulted which allowed me to form both a broad idea as to the perception and the production of velinismo, and particular aspects of this phenomenon according to various audiences: from feminist blogs to machista sports news websites. I developed a more holistic view after gaining access to archived historical articles through Corriere della Sera and La Repubblica.

In every article I highlighted images of veline and usage of the term. As a feminist I was appalled by apparent sexism. However as an Italian, black and white footage of vallette felt nostalgic. That nostalgic feeling is typical of Italians, who cannot move past the “foxy mama” image (Babington 2008). Here, despite my own feminist ideology, classic images ridden with stereotypes and blatant objectification evoked a sense of nostalgia enmeshed within my own culture. Such a sentiment is true for everyday Italians who compose the viewership of shows like Striscia. This nostalgic feeling is one Italians cannot shake, and therefore becomes a cultural condition that permits the reproduction of such visual images.

After concentrating on such widely circulated newspapers, I again sought to contextualize the velina in modern day, and so I continued discovering new blogs and media coverage of the phenomenon. I watched Striscia la Notizia, from November 7 1988 pilot episode to its most recent broadcast. I obtained episodes from various periods throughout its 30 year tenure, from the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, late ‘90s, mid 2000s (after its sabbatical), and episodes from 2011 until present day. When watching the footage I took field notes of how the veline moved, what their tasks were, camera angle useds, and comments given by the two presenters, most notably Antonio Ricci and Ezio Greggio. I analyzed how the veline physically moved within a space not in an attempt to scrutinize the use of female sexuality, but to identify what that usage is, what it entails, and the reaction it garners.

From this analysis I created three distinct rules for velina behavior and therefore of gender performativity in this specific field of labor (to echo Butler). Understanding such rules guides the reader along a path to understanding behavior of this role throughout time, points of change, and how this relates to broader changes across the Italian political landscape from 1955 to present day. This then answers the question, the main purpose of this study, which is to understand what are the rules of performing acts of femininity, what the velina means in contemporary Italian discussions, and how velinismo has informed/transformed Italian perception of the feminine.
Evidence and analysis

In this section I will analyze video footage of veline, blog posts, talk shows, and newspaper articles in order to identify time shifts in the velina’s history, and rules of performing velinismo. Considering modifications in veline behavior through time in relation to changes in reception and critique, I have pinpointed four shifts in velina discourse.

1. 1955: introduction of vallette
2. 1968: first valletta with a speaking role
3. 1988: introduction of veline on Striscia
4. 2011: international backlash against veline following the Berlusconi trials.

First, a brief history of the velina:

It is important to discuss the influence of World War II on Italian television, and on women in society. In fact the term “velina” derives from the slips of paper officials within Benito Mussolini’s regime would use to communicate. Fascist Italy expanded the scope of media especially in 1944 when the regime founded the government-syndicated network, RAI (Noam 1987). RAI’s programs in the 1950s were “relatively straight-laced, a tradition which explains, in part, the later success of sexually explicit programs on private television (Noam).” During fascist Italy, women’s roles in Italian society were incrementally restricted, as Mussolini’s regime was inextricably linked to the Catholic Church. Mussolini’s politics directly influenced women’s lives his regime aimed to augment the Italian population in order to strengthen the state. Women were solely childbearers as a part of his vision to return Italy to its former glory under the Roman Empire. During this period the fascist government controlled radio broadcasters, particularly the RAI network. Despite the change of Italian government under the republic, when RAI expanded into producing the first Italian television networks in 1952, the government was still under the influence of the Church, specifically the Christian Democrats, and so all programs were proportionately conservative (Noam).

In 1954 the Christian Democratic Party was the dominating conservative political force during the original era of vallette. As the party is attributed for its rigidity and traditionalism, television was legally bound to the party as well. In fact until 1975 RAI was under the control of the cabinet, and therefore all programming was subject to review by the Christian Democrats. In 1955 Edy Campagnoli, the first valletta, appeared on Italy’s first quiz show, Lascia o Raddoppia. Today she is still sneeringly referred to as the “mute woman,” as she never spoke during her tenure (Parodi 1995). Contemporary discourse surrounding Edy cites her agency through her choice to remain silent, and her refusal to remove her high heels (Bandettini 1995). Bongiorno, the host, had refused to work with a woman taller than he, and so asked her to walk flat footed. When she refused he made a rule that they could never be within the same frame. Despite her attempts at agency, including interviews in which she reiterated her choice to be stereotypi-
cally feminine, she is mostly remembered for her “beauty to show off, like a mannequin (Bandettini).” Specifically, upon her passing she was referred to as the “sweet mute Valletta (Parodi).”

Vallette are instructed to be “pretty women.” Lilli Gruber, former left-wing member of the European Parliament, cites a survey showing that working women account for a mere 16 percent of female figures on Italian advertisements. She explains that “we” Italians cannot disentangle ourselves from the “foxy mama” image (Babington 2008). The notion that “we” Italians cannot remove ourselves from this stereotype is evidenced by a sexualization of labor sustained by high and consistent viewership shares. Shares garner profit which allows media conglomerates and state media alike to continue to accrue capital based on a feminized, sexualized labor force.

In 1968 Sabina Ciuffini became the first valletta with a speaking role. Though her notoriety mainly came from her relationship with quiz show host Mike Bongiorno on Rischiatutto, she was limited to working as his subordinate. Though Ciuffini was objectified as Bongiorno’s subordinate, today she is hailed as his counterpart. Still, contemporary media posthumously applauds Bongiorno on his generosity (Quelle Brave Ragazze 2019). Ciuffini however remains an anomaly of the vallette as she was not hypersexualized. She and her predecessor Edy Campagnoli were to remain sweet and simple. Campagnoli was filmed in order that she did not appear taller than Bongiorno, as this would emasculate him. While Ciuffini crossed those preset boundaries through her friendship with Bongiorno, inching closer to becoming an equal through their rapport, she was nevertheless limited to an ornamental role. Herein lays the first implicit rule of performing sexualized labor: maintain subordination to the presenter; be shorter, quieter, display the beauty standard of the time.

Shifts in discourse relate to the moral panics experienced and documented since the 1950s concerning women’s role in media. In 1976 following a slew of court cases liberalized private Italian media, severing the influence government had maintained on all media predating the Second World War (Noam 1987). The following decade would nevertheless maintain vallette as sexualized objects, but require a greater number and more hypersexualized activities in order to accrue capital for network investors.

In 1980 it was found that five of the 30 available television stations carried pornography, shown for 45 minutes per day after midnight. During the 1970s, “soft-core pornography” was legalized in parts of Italy if broadcast after midnight, catering to its male viewership, who was traditionally believed to return home from work late in the day. However it was found that privatized television instead diluted the popularity of late-night pornography, and brought scandalized images to the light of day. This was due to television’s liberalization from the control of the Christian Democrat party, Italy’s conservative, neo-religious government. During the 1980s the government enforced the illegality of pornographic materials through the Italian penal code. Nevertheless pornographic material engendered a “moral panic,” a backlash against the supposed pornographic nature of Italian television, especially in comparison to the rest of Europe, while contemporary
She and vallette in general are commemorated as having originated “qui su la RAI,” or “right here on our network” (Quelle Brave Ragazze 2018). What first appears to be a depiction of agency develops into a celebration of her role within Italian society, only in relation Mike Bongiorno and other male presenters who permit them to have a greater role on the programs. The women hosts of the talk show invited Ciuffini and another contemporary presenter, to celebrate Bongiorno’s generosity, and the beauty and grace that Ciuffini and their relationship brought to Italian viewers during the 1960s. She too beams from ear to ear remembering Bongiorno and their time together on the quiz show; she, and vallette in general, have become emblems of their decade, a positive attribute associated with Italian identity and what it means to be Italian. Therefore the second rule of performing female sexuality is always maintaining pride.

In 1988 the discourse shifted with the emergence of the veline on Striscia la Notizia. With the liberalization of media, conglomerates, privates, were now given the power to make decisions for this existing labor force of vallette, but transformed the daily tasks into overtly sexual ones. During the first few seconds of Striscia’s pilot episode, four women slide down pneumatic tubes carrying “veline,” or physical copies of the news (RAI- Striscia La Notizia 1988). This was not their primary nor their intended purpose, as the presenters read off of cue cards during most of the program. As the veline rushed down the tubes, a gust of wind lifts rushes to greet them with cameras positioned underneath of their skirts, and as the wind blows their skirts lift and the camera catches a glimpse of their undergarments (Ibid). Next they walk behind the journalists and hand them the sheets of paper in a dramatic fashion, then waltz away in silence. In 1988 the veline were still mostly silent, however for the next few decades veline sang, dances, performed gymnastics routines. The requirements for veline are simple: one blonde, and one brunette. The other deciding factors such as youth and physical ability are determined by the competition show “Veline.” Thus, the next rule for performing female sexuality is that women must act overtly sexual, and at all times. Veline are no longer framed as daughters, not as mothers, and not as partners, but as free and openly sexual young women in their supposed prime.

Here, the rules changed. While veline still must be prideful and always portray the contemporary standard of beauty, veline are now hypersexualized for the post-dinner time slot created for working men. Veline are examples of the beauty trade-off, as though their job description lists them as technical assistants, veline are mainly tasked with upholding dumb-blonde personas, cameras panned under their skirts while they shoot out of pneumatic tubes as the objects they are designed to be, symbols of beauty and nothing more. The beauty trade-off then transcends to national and international discourse, where they are seen as acting against Italian values, as undignified.
A study found that in most cases, Italian television features male hosts (58%) and that programs are “a bit aggressive” at 21.6% (Censis 2019). The survey cites only 15.7% of entertainment programs as showcasing women’s artistic talents (Censis). However, as veline have backgrounds in dance and gymnastics, and often perform dances on their respective programs, it is important to understand that the Italian public does not consider this “artistic” or “talent” (Censis). Despite claims by veline that as children they hoped to become veline to showcase their history as performers (Veline- Striscia la Notizia), Italy’s main narrative depicts velinismo as a deplorable role, used only for sexual purposes without any intellectual or physical ability or talent. This stems from the role of the Church, where in 1984 two soubrette, the sisters Kessler, were ridiculed by Pope Pius XII and caused a moral panic in Italy for being televised in leotards and fishnet stockings. Pius ordered that Italian television return to ethnic and moral standards set by the Church (Colli Delli 1985).

Feminist scholar Millicent Marcus notes how in the film Bitter Rice there is evidence of the longstanding tradition of using the female body to stand-in for the vulnerable Italian body politic. Today in Italy young women are encouraged to audition for the audacious competition show “Veline,” the televised process where the victors, one with brown hair and the other blonde, become the two veline for Striscia la Notizia the following year. Women in their early twenties or late teens even leave their native towns to Norcia, a city north east of Rome, to compete in the program. “Veline” requires young women to perform various tasks, including answering questions while jumping on a trampoline, singing while being doused with water from a kettle, or lapping up milk squirted from a baby bottle.

These events demonstrate the intersection of gender and globalization as explained by Cynthia Enloe and her idea of female labor as “cheapened labor.” Young women leave their parents’ home to compete in the market for female labor as competitive markets in Italy are searching for such forms of cheapened labor. Due to the economic crises of 2013, the unemployment rate among youth in 2014 reached a record high of 43.4% (Trading Economics 2019). During Italy’s initial economic downturn in 2011, it was reported Italy basically has a split job market: one for youths and one for seniors. “Senior workers are protected by inflexible employment laws that make them hard to fire. Meanwhile, young Italians... are relegated to short-term contracts that leave them hopping job to job,” resulting in an unstable market force with youths migrating in search of employment (Weissmann 2011). This migration of circa five thousand women per year who attempt to become veline has been a secondary factor of the velina phenomenon.

Similarly to Marcus’s description of the fetishized, sexualized woman as a replacement for Italian politics, the overly sexualized image of the velina was a substitute for criticism against American capitalism in the film, criticism of the
velina has been used by those of the left to make political statements in opposition of Berlusconi. Such criticisms stemmed from the notion that velina at the time engendered a moral panic amongst Italian society after his trials and sex scandals for abuse of power and sex with a minor at his bunga bunga parties. Berlusconi had been accused of paying for sex with a minor, a 17-year old from Morocco, at his infamous bunga bunga parties, a case which became known as Rubygate. Veline, paid guests, have testified against him after he and his associates contested the accusations, stating that no illicit or sexual activities took place during these documented occasions. Due to the relationship between veline and criminal activity (despite Berlusconi having been acquitted) a once alternative discourse condemning veline as undignified, wild women denigrating the international face of Italy came to the forefront in Italian media.

The framework of women’s issues as moral panics demonstrate the fact that, internationally, issues of representation, of labor, of economic insufficiency, and of politics are constrained to an ethical framework that keeps the velina phenomenon subordinate to other issues like security. In fact, researcher Katherine H.S. Moon described and debunked this very notion, relating national security to women’s issues of prostitution. Her book, Sex among Allies, demonstrates that despite construction of “moral panics,” debates about women’s issue, like velinismo, for example, are not “soft issues,” and that their portrayal as such begets ignorance and inaction.

From concerns of their dignity, veline then become automatically attributed to prostitution, and, in broader terms, to violence against women. This linkage from sex object to opposing Italian values (as a dishonorable woman and/or a prostitute) derives from an immediate assumption of the relationship between a woman exerting sexuality, and violence. Such correlation is evidence of the beauty trade-off. This highlights the relationship between sexuality (veline), politics (power dynamics as to who sets implicit “codes), and economics (selling of feminized labor) as capital labor. Scholars have also identified a connection between the objectification of women and international law. Both private and government-issued television are noncompliant with the current ethical standards of women’s representation. Power which privileges certain forms of masculinities, subjugating all forms of femininity, is created and sustained. Following Berlusconi’s popularization of veline, a variety of replicas of this original program emerged for the benefit of capitalists: to attain high viewership and accrue capital.

Much like the myth of disposable women as described by Melissa Wright, veline have a speedy turnover, employed for roughly one year (Wright 2006). Veline strive to work in the field to augment their social status, leading to deals for club appearances, magazine features, and general fame which offers financial gains. Once their term expires, they become headlines in gossip columns, com-
menting on their relationships, their marriages to soccer players, their subsequent motherhood.

Although articles in La Stampa, for example, examine sexualized labor as percentages of women’s roles on television, the issue is still not framed as one of rights or of social progress. Velina are constructed as a mirror of Italian perception of women. Postfeminist scholars claim that the role of the velina demonstrates opportunity for women socially and economically as a means of empowerment to climb the rungs of bureaucracy and secure a position as an actress, socialite, or even political figure. In fact, an article published in Vogue Italia in 2011 claimed that the solution for velinismo is the “curvy revolution,” or celebrating women who do not have thin bodies. The article makes an automatic link between the body and intelligence. Curvy women become the antidote to velinismo. The fascination with Italy’s beauty standard embodied by veline, as curvy women are seen as more intelligent, reinforces a “dumb blonde” persona whose only value is their body. Meanwhile curvy women do not have value in their bodies, but in their powers as “seductresses.” Despite the fact that veline are allegedly deviant, the supposed solution is to ignore veline entirely and replace them with women with curves. This idea reinforces the notion that women, whether scantily clad or fully dressed, must be objectified and desired sexually by men of all ages, and aspired to by young women (Liverani 2010).

In 2014 others followed. They cited women’s low labor force percentages in contrast to other EU nations, and percentages of women on television as sex objects—something that can be measured by averaging the occasions in which women appear on advertisements or in television shows with little clothing, while the camera pans to male viewers’ favorite parts of her body. This tradition stems from early Italian television, which was meant to serve working men who returned home late at night and would watch quiz shows. After midnight, pornographic material became the battleground of the first moral panic about the role of women in television. Nonetheless veline have always had a deeper role in society than just television. Former veline use gain notoriety in the film industry as performers or actresses, case in point, Sabina Ciuffini. Berlusconi even hired women from his networks to work in his government, specifically Barbara Matera, Lara Comi, and Licia Ronzulli (European Parliament, 2019).

Possibly more significant than their assumption to the European Parliament, however, is the backlash against their past connections and work for Berlusconi used against them in attempts to belittle their political power, to strip them of their agency (Blogo 2009) (Mora, 2009). In 2002 veline were compared to Miss Italia under the headline “the competition of beauty: veline versus Miss Italia.” This pins women against each other, and describes merely the women’s sexuality and beauty. The article was written in response to criticism of the veline from The
New York Times. In fact the New York Times, the Financial Times, and Reuters had been reporting of Italy’s representation of women especially in comparison to fellow EU states, relating low labor force percentages with the sexualized labor force.

**Conclusion**

The velina is emblematic of creating space within confinement, where due to hegemonic social structures women are given a false choice in regards to employment, where contemporary arguments portray the phenomenon as a role of agency, and therefore of job security. The velina has been hotly contested as scholars pinpoint a “moral panic” in Italian popular and political sects as erupting from former-premier Silvio Berlusconi’s sex scandal and abuse of power trials. However, the visibility of the Italian showgirl has been demoralized since its creation in 1955. These “moral panics,” articulated as such both by scholars and news sources limit the issue of women’s roles in Italian television from its economic, political, and legal nature, rather constricting the feminized body politic into an ethical framework.

The velina is therefore, as demonstrated in the above sections, both oppressive and empowering. Women are able to climb the rungs of social status and achieve notoriety and financial success, however they are only able to do so within the predetermined “rules” of performativity of the feminized labor force. Veline are constructed by historically produced gender roles and power dynamics, most recently those developed and reinforced by former premier Silvio Berlusconi. Veline are linked to violence, prostitution, a lack of morals, and are seen as contradictory to Italian values, and what it means to be Italian, to identify oneself with the Italian state.

Oftentimes research is trapped within the upper echelon of academia, a hindrance that restricts who is privy to studies that may affect people’s very own lives. The purpose of this study is to bring to light a phenomenon that has not been widely discussed, especially by the international community, in order to engender adjustments to the current and steadfast social hierarchy in Italy. As such this study therefore was conducted with an emancipatory goal in mind, seeking possibilities for change by understanding gender from the perspective of the margins: I seek to understand phenomenon from those within the margins outside political power, in order to reconstruct power as a more equal force for the benefit of women.

There has been little research as of yet relating violence against women to visuality, particularly the skewed gender representations within Italian television. Therefore I argue that future research must not dismiss the relevance of sexualized representations of women in Italian media and the connection of such visuality not only with femicide itself, but with local Italian courts’ failure to penalize domestic abusers and killers. Rather I recommend future research take a neo-postivist approach to establish a relationship between women’s presence in media with criminality and violence against women.

Despite the contestation regarding her oppressive nature, or her ability for
liberation, veline nonetheless represent an ongoing culture of violence against women and oppression of women, and so I claim that the figure of velina is a tool with which to navigate this historical and contemporary terrain. In order to understand phenomenon of violence against women, we must first understand these established traditions. To combat this violence it is necessary to map the cultural terrain of the feminized body politic that permits it.
Endnotes


3. Silvio Berlusconi was prime minister of Italy during four governments from 1994-2011. Prior to his career in politics he was a billionaire media conglomerate who owned Mediaset and Canale 5 through his company, Fininvest. Beginning in 1980 Canale 5 (Channel 5) was broadcast in Milano, Italy, and shortly became the nation’s most popular private television network. As such, Berlusconi was the first to take full advantage of the 1975 Italian law that opened doors for privatized television.


Works Cited


Jackson, Patrick Thaddeus. The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and Its Implications for the Study of World Politics, Routledge, 2016.

Lalli, Pina, and Chiara Gius. “‘I Loved Her so Much, but I Killed Her’ Romantic Love as a Representational Frame for Intimate Partner Femicide in Three Italian Newspapers.” ESSACHESS - Journal for Communication Studies, 7 (December 1, 2014).

“L’Eredità - RaiPlay.” //www.raiplay.it/programmi/leredita


unemployment-rate


NUMBERS NUMB: THE SIGNIFICANCE AND SHORTCOMINGS OF IMAGERY WITHIN THE IMMIGRATION DEBATE

Jeremy McLane

Abstract

This paper examines the impact that the iconic image of the ‘Crying Girl on the Border’ had on U.S. immigration policy as well as on the treatment of migrants at the Southern Border. The paper traces the circulation of the image in the days following its original publishing and finds a connection between the publication of the image, the public discourse that followed, and the end of the Trump Administration’s family separation policy. Utilizing research methods employed by researchers who studied other historically iconic images, this paper examines the true impact this particular image had on the family separation policy. The publication of this image led to an outpouring of support for the lives and wellbeing of migrants and—in the form of online donations—helped deliver crucial aid in the form of humanitarian assistance and monetary support. However, despite the family separation policy having been formally reversed, immigrant families have continued to be separated at the Southern Border, leading to questions about the effectiveness of imagery and its ability to bring about structural change. These conclusions are in line with the impact, or lack thereof, that other iconic images have had on official policy, while still being able to bring important attention and aid to human rights crises around the world.

Keywords: Immigration, family separation, photography, iconic imagery.

Introduction

“...you cannot change the politics of immigration until you change the culture in which immigrants are seen.”

-Jose Antonio Vargas, Dear America: Notes of An Undocumented Citizen

396,579 migrants were apprehended by U.S. Customs & Border Patrol on the Southwest border in FY2018 (United States Border Patrol

JEREMY MCLANE  Jeremy McLane is a student of International Studies with a minor in Latin American Area Studies
School of International Service/College of Arts & Sciences, American University
Email: jm0851a@student.american.edu
2018). 107,212 made up family units (United States Border Patrol 2018). 50,036 were unaccompanied minors (United States Border Patrol 2018). Nearly 7,000 migrants made up a caravan to travel together to the United States in October 2018, and another 2,000 followed in their steps in January 2019 (Kinosian 2019). Approximately 11 million undocumented immigrants resided in the United States as of 2016 (Passel and Cohn 2018). Each of these statistics provides insight into migration from Latin America to the United States. However, in grouping many individuals into broad categories, these numbers fail to represent the stories, experiences, and lives of those immigrating to the United States. Oftentimes, this gap in representation is filled by images and videos from the border region, that document the lives and struggles of migrants as they attempt to navigate the dangerous and complicated journey to the United States, and further through the immigration detention and asylum system. These images dictate how non-immigrants and American citizens understand the border, and unless one lives or works in the region, these images shape understandings of the immigration process and day to day life on the border. One specific image, published on June 12th, 2018, went on to become the face of the Trump Administration’s family separation policy. It has been credited with creating a level of outrage towards the policy that the Trump Administration could ultimately no longer defend, thus leading to the policy being formally rescinded on June 20th, 2018. However, further analysis is needed to understand its impact on the specific family separation policy, as well as the broader immigration system, most notably during, but not exclusive to the Trump Administration. With respect to both formal policy and the lived experiences of migrants, I propose following question: What was the impact of the iconic image of the ‘Crying Girl on the Border’ and the following discourse regarding the treatment of migrants on the border, and crucially, what can this image tell us about the successes and failures of imagery as a method of political change?

**Literature Review**

Photography is a part of our everyday lives, used nearly obsessively as a means of communication. In order to begin to analyze its usage, it is important to discuss literature about photography theory, as that is what underpins any critical analysis of photography. In her book, On Photography, Susan Sontag speaks at length about what it means to be an observer of photographs that display war and trauma, as well as how these photographs are often catered towards protected middle class families, creating the potential for emotional distress (Sontag 1977, 85). Photographs of war and other potentially traumatic events, like refugees fleeing conflict, are events that nobody wants to experience, yet photography
McLane, “Numbers Numb: The Significance and Shortcomings of Imagery within the Immigration Debate”

gives the opportunity to create both curiosity in what is being portrayed and affect our emotions in a profound way (Sontag 1977, 131). The ability of a photograph to transcend borders and evoke moral obligations is powerful. In her analysis of war photography, Judith Butler—drawing from many of Sontag’s pieces—argues that in order for a photograph to evoke a moral response, it must “maintain the capacity to shock but also appeal to our sense of moral obligation” (Butler 2005, 824). Essentially, in order for the photograph to successfully transcend borders, it must show human suffering, while at the same time keep the viewer alert to the true human cost of war, famine, and destruction (Butler 2005, 824). The arguments by Sontag and Butler are supported by research by Robert Hariman and John Louis Lucaites, who studied the iconic photograph of the naked Vietnamese girl fleeing after a napalm attack. They argue that iconic photographs are calls to action and can “articulate patterns of moral intelligence that run deeper than pragmatic deliberation about matters of policy...” (Hariman and Lucaites 2003, 54), primarily due to their ability to incorporate both “overexposure and ideological rupture” (Hariman and Lucaites 2003, 55). To add to this discussion, researchers in Spain who studied the iconic image of Aylan, the Syrian child that washed up on a beach in Turkey while attempting to flee the civil war, were able to categorize the image as “transformative,” due to its creation of a new discourse and ability to “arise solidarity on an issue that is not new...” (de-Andrés, Nos-Aldás, and García-Matilla 2016, 35). As this research suggests, iconic or transformative photographs have the ability to lead to a moral reckoning that transcend usual political debates, in a way that most day to day news or statistics are not able to. When these ideas are applied to the photograph of the ‘Crying Girl on the Border,’ it becomes possible to analyze both its political impact, as well as the broader messages and emotions that the image evokes. The image shows a reality that is often unrepresented through complex immigration policy, framing a moment that evokes intense emotional and potential moral obligation. However, while many people loosely use the term “iconic image,” especially when speaking about the ‘Crying Girl at the Border,’ it is important to define what exactly makes an image “iconic,” and what it requires for the image to evoke the moral obligation that Sontag speaks about.

Many photographs that end up being categorized as “iconic” will have one thing in common: the identifiable victim effect, or IVE. The IVE refers to cases in which society is willing to spend far more money or elicit far stronger emotional responses when a victim is identified, versus when they are merely a statistic (Jenni and Loewenstein 1997, 235). The IVE is backed up by numerous behavioral and psychological studies, including one by Tehila Kogut and Ilana Ritov, who found that when a single victim is identified, people will donate or express increased care versus when there is a single unidentified victim, or a group of victims (Kogut
and Ritov 2005, 165). This is supported by an additional study which compared how the brain reacts to a photograph of an identifiable victim versus one who is silhouetted. It found similar results: a photograph with an identifiable victim would lead to higher donations versus a silhouette or otherwise unidentified person (Genevsky et al. 2013, 17194). The identifiable victim effect is subsequently confirmed in an additional study regarding the photograph of Aylan. This study found that the photograph itself created far more attention and empathy towards the refugees fleeing Syria than the continuous flow of raw statistics that relayed a far more gruesome picture, confirming that when a victim is identified, humans have an innate psychological reaction to care more (Slovic et al. 2017, 2). However, despite a general consensus on identifiable victims leading to positive outcomes, it is important to define stricter parameters for what exactly makes up the IVE. The IVE is most reliable when there is a single, identified victim, as well as when the victim is a child and can be deemed not responsible for their observed condition (Lee and Feeley 2016, 210–11). In a different paper, Tehila Kogut argues that in certain situations, identifying the victim can cause more harm than good, especially when the possibility exists that the identified victim is or could be responsible for their present condition (Kogut 2011, 754). Indeed, some of the last defenders of the Trump Administration’s family separation policy attempted to classify the child in the image that is studied here as a “child actor,” and that the President shouldn’t be fooled by what he may be seeing on TV (Rosenberg 2018). By attempting to portray the image as staged, these critics are trying to fight back against and minimize the IVE as it was playing out in the days after publication.

Finally, it is important to discuss literature that focuses on U.S. border politics and immigration policy, and more specifically, the conditions immigrants are subjected to, because at its core, that is what the photograph of the ‘Crying Girl on the Border’ is about. Analyzing U.S. border politics and U.S. immigration policy by looking into the conditions that migrants are subjected to allows the image to be properly contextualized within the broader discourse of U.S. immigration politics. Currently, the U.S.-Mexico border is treated as a type of “low-intensity warfare,” thus justifying the never-ending perceived state of emergency that America faces when it comes to undocumented immigration (Pope and Garrett 2013, 168). Often, the U.S. immigration system is defined in the news and public discourses as either a complex policy matter or as a battleground, as documented by Pope and Garrett. However, while the existence of an immensely complex immigration system is indeed true, the academic discussion regarding the development of U.S. immigration policy in the past 2-3 decades often takes a different path than the media would generally represent. This research usually circles back to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, or IIRIRA, as the
starting point for many of today’s immigration policies. In many ways, the IIRIRA made way for “attack(s) on due process, immigrant families, and asylum seekers” (Kerwin 2018, 10). These attacks have only been amplified under the Trump administration, and as author Donald Kerwin argues, the deeply rooted idea of “rule of law” in America is no longer being applied in human and effective ways and is instead being used as “an instrument of exclusion and marginalization” on the border (Kerwin 2018, 11). The experiences that are outlined by Kerwin are backed up by a 2017 piece which documents the traumatizing experiences within various facets of the U.S. immigration system. The researchers found a deeply rooted and institutionalized process of psychosocial dehumanization and categorization of migrants as “disposable, threatening, and...excludable” (Saba, Appelbaum, and Jordan 2017, 214). This is most commonly seen through the usage of broad categories for migrants, identifying them as either a criminal or human. This binary was supported by President Barack Obama, when in 2014 he stated, in reference to an executive order regarding the how his administration would prioritize deportations, “Felons, not families.” (Saba, Appelbaum, and Jordan 2017, 214). Understanding how the themes of cruelty are intertwined with the idea of the criminal immigrant and pitted against the idea of humanization is important to understand, because it aids in contextualizing the image into current immigration discourses, as well as understanding why it was so impactful.

Methodology and Data Collection

In order to conduct my research on the impact of the image of the ‘Crying Girl on the Border,’ I conducted a discourse analysis of relevant print media sources. This included looking at newspaper front pages via kiosko.net and adjusting the date to find where the image appeared on U.S. front pages for the duration of June 12th, 2018 (publishing date) to June 20th, 2018 (end of policy). The results of this search can be found in Image 2, in which the New York Times, New York Daily News, and Dallas Morning News all published the image on their respective front pages. (Note: This does not take into account instances where the image may have been embedded into digital articles or within articles that appeared after the front page). Additionally, I’ve selected high impact appearances of the image to include in the analysis and discussion, which, in addition to the above-mentioned newspapers, include the following: the Facebook Fundraiser for RAICES which raised close to $21 million (see Image 3) (Willner and Willner 2018), and the TIME Magazine cover that featured an edited version of the original image (see Image 4). Because it is not possible for an image to single-handedly change immigration politics, I have also chosen two high impact events that add additional context and reasoning for the policy being reversed: the ProPublica audio tapes of children
crying in detention and the letter to then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions by 13 Republican Senators, asking to end the policy. While the decision to choose which appearances of the image and other significant events is subjective, I have attempted to select the most impactful, instead of attempting to categorize every appearance of the image on cable news, social media, or online articles. In order to trace the correlation between the image, significant events that took place after publication, and the policy being discontinued, I have utilized Google Trends. This method was modelled after a number of studies on the photograph of Aylan, including Slovic et al. (2017) and de-Andrés et al (2016). Specifically, I have chosen relevant keywords with respect to the image and broader theme of immigration and tracked the search popularity from when the policy was originally announced to after it was formally ended (Figure 1.1), as well as two weeks before and one week after the image was published (Figure 1.2). These terms were chosen based on my best understanding of words that people may have associated with immigration from Latin America and this specific policy. It is important to note that Google Trends does not provide the number of searches performed in a given time period, but instead creates a scale of 0-100, and ranks each search term based its popularity in relation to the other search terms. Finally, in order to understand the image in an in-depth way, and further relate this understanding to the political implications, an iconographic analysis was conducted and modelled after the study by de-Andrés et al. (2016). While I have chosen to analyze the image seen below (Image 1), other iterations of this image were published by John Moore (Image 2, New York Times front page for June 14th, 2018). Image 1 is the original image that was published on Twitter and Instagram by Moore, however, the greater analysis encompasses all of the images as the same, because they depict the same moment on the border.

The Family Separation Policy & ‘The Crying Girl on the Border’

On April 6th, 2018, in an effort to stem migration from Central America, the Trump Administration instituted a “zero-tolerance” policy for undocumented immigrants crossing the border. The memorandum, issued by then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions was titled “Zero-Tolerance for Offenses Under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a),” and instructed all prosecutors to charge all improper entry cases to the United States as a felony, instead of as a misdemeanor (Sessions 2018). Because the memorandum’s goal was criminal prosecution, if a parent crossed the border with a child, they would be immediately separated in order for the adult to be transferred to federal prison. The child was effectively considered unaccompanied and sent to the Department of Health and Human Service’s Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) (Schoggen 2019, 3–4). This policy continued until two actions took place, the first being Executive Order 13841, which was issued on June 20th,
2018, and directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to detain families together when possible. The second action was an order from District Court Judge Dana Sabraw on June 26th, 2018, which ordered the federal government to stop separating families unless the parent has a criminal history or a communicable disease when they are detained at the border (Schoggen 2019, 4). According to a report by the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (HHS OIG), which investigated the family separation policy, the final number of children who were separated from their parents between April 6th and July 20th of 2018 stood at 2,654 (Schoggen 2019, 8).

However, as the timeline within the HHS OIG report reveals, the family separation policy is much more complicated. The family separation policy did not start on April 6th, 2018, nor did it end on July 20th, 2018 with Executive Order 13841, or on July 26th, 2018 with the court order from Judge Sabraw. Rather, a version of the family separation policy was tested as early as July 2017 in the El Paso sector of U.S. Customs and Border Patrol, which resulted in 281 families being separated through November 2017 (Schoggen 2019, 3). Between October and December 2018, for nearly 6 months after the policy was formally ended, 162 additional children were added to the final count of separated children, and 79 were removed due to an error on the part of ORR, which brought the final count of children who were separated from their parents to 2,737 (Schoggen 2019, 8). Additionally, the New York Times reported on March 9th, 2019, that family separations are still taking place, citing the stories of two parents who had their children taken from them in December 2018 and January 2019 (Jordan and Dickerson 2019). Finally, it is important to contextualize the idea of family separation in the United States and understand that these initiatives have taken place in the United States for decades and have never been limited to the southern border. This can be seen in the normalized process of deportations and aggressive enforcement of immigration law, in which families are often split apart, “creating single-parent households or leaving children without a parent or adults without a spouse” (Abrego et al. 2017, 708). While the uncertainty of the start and end dates of the family separation policy makes it difficult to analyze political implications of the image, it is important to acknowledge in order to provide a holistic understanding of the policy in all of its forms.

On June 12th, 2018, an image was published that would go on to define the Trump Administration’s family separation policy. John Moore, an award-winning photographer for Getty Images, was spending the night on the banks of the Rio Grande with U.S. Border Patrol agents when they came upon a large group of families that had just crossed the border. In an interview with the Washington Post, Moore recalled seeing numerous children and teenagers in the group who
appeared to be visibly terrified. As Border Patrol agents began to search one child’s mother, who accompanied her for the nearly 1,500-mile journey from Honduras, the girl began to cry (Selk 2018). Given that this was near the height of the family separation policy, Moore, and the millions of people who would go on to see the image, had every reason to believe that this image was depicting a family separation in progress.

The image of the ‘Crying Girl on the Border’ instantly went viral, garnering nearly 10,000 retweets and 12,000 likes on the original tweet from Moore (Moore 2018b), 5,000 likes on Instagram (Moore 2018c), and nearly 12,000 likes on a follow-up Instagram post six days later that included additional images of the crying girl (Moore 2018d). Additionally, the image won the World Press Photograph of the Year (Estrin 2019), an award that honors the best professional photographers for their impactful contributions to visual journalism. Not only did this image become the face of the Trump administration’s family separation policy, but it contributed to and existed within a critical discourse around immigration politics and an understanding of what occurs on the border. As such, the image offers both an opportunity to analyze how it impacted the family separation policy and opens the door to discuss how migrants are treated at the border.

**Political Implications of the ‘Crying Girl on the Border’**

In order to measure the potential political impacts or impact on the conversations surrounding the family separations, I have turned to methods employed by other researchers in similar situations, namely surrounding the image of Aylan (de-Andrés, Nos-Aldás, and García-Matilla 2016). To measure public interest, and to look for a correlation between the image being published and the policy ending, I ran searches on Google Trends for the terms “immigration,” “refugee,” “border,” and “family separation.” The images below show a spike in interest in the topics starting around the time the image was published on June 12th, 2018, and the formal “end” of the policy on June 20th, 2018. Each image is annotated with significant events to show how interest in these topics changed over time with different events occurring, with the longer version beginning in April 6th, 2018, when the policy was formally announced, and the shorter version only encompassing the month in which the image was published and the policy being rescinded.

(Note: Google Trends measures search terms in relation to the most popular term, and not in number of searches).
As shown in the Google Trends graph, after nearly no variation for 3 months in the popularity of related search terms, there is a sharp spike after the image was published, which peaks and immediately declines once the policy was formally reversed. This shows that the image of the ‘Crying Girl on the Border’ was one of the primary factors in this increased interest (measured in Google searches) in the subject and policy itself. However, a more detailed look (Figure 1.2) makes
it possible to map the additional events that contributed to and supported this increase. As the image continued to be circulated over the next week, on the front pages of the New York Times, New York Daily News, and Dallas Morning News, its visibility and impact on the family separation policy became increasingly clearer.

Image 2: Front pages of the New York Times (June 14th, 2018), New York Daily News (June 16th, 2018), and the Dallas Morning News (June 17th, 2018).
However, the image wasn’t just constrained to the front pages of a few newspapers. It became the cover image of a viral Facebook Fundraiser (Willner and Willner 2018), raising nearly $21 million dollars for RAICES, an immigration legal aid organization based in Texas, with the goal of reuniting separated families by paying their often-expensive bond. In fact, this fundraiser became the largest individual fundraiser in Facebook’s history (Cunha and Selk 2018), and the speed at which money was raised (see Figure 2.1 and 2.2) matches the exponential growth in both interest and money donated after an iconic image, like the image of Aylan, is published (Slovic et al. 2017).


Figure 2.1: Graphs published by the creators of the Facebook fundraiser show ~$17M donated within ~5 days (Willner and Willner 2018).
Ultimately, the photograph allowed everyday people, who may not be interested in immigration politics or who had only heard about the policy in a short news clip, to visualize the policy and relate it to their own families and children. The policy was in place for over two months before the photograph was published, and while widely condemned, nothing was able to trigger a reaction to the policy as strong as the photograph did. These condemnations included the editorial board at the Washington Post which called it cruel and inhumane (Editorial Board 2018), the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, who called the policy “unconscionable” (Ra‘ad Al Hussein 2018), and among others, the President of the American Academy of Pediatrics who stated that family separation can “cause irreparable harm, [disrupt] a child’s brain architecture and affect [their] short- and long-term health” (Kraft 2018). However, it would not be proper to characterize the photograph as the sole factor of ending the policy. While there’s no doubt that it acted as a starting point for the overwhelming public backlash, ultimately resulting in the official “end” of the family separation policy, it is important to highlight two additional events (see Figure 1.2) that took place in the final days of the family separation policy.

The first, published on June 18th, 2018, was a 7-minute audio recording from inside a child detention center, in which separated children can be heard crying for their parents and briefly conversing with social workers, while Border
Patrol agents occasionally joke about the situation in the background (ProPublica 2018). It was quickly shared thousands of times and was played aloud on the Senate floor during a speech opposing the family separation policy by Senator Bob Menendez of New Jersey (Menendez 2018). When combined with the photograph of the ‘Crying Girl on the Border,’ the audio recording resulted in an emotional and moral reckoning that proved to be too much for the Trump Administration to continue fighting back against. Second, on June 19th, 2019, 13 Republican Senators wrote to then Attorney General Jeff Sessions demanding that the policy be reversed (Carney 2018). Due to the reality that much of politics is partisan, when President Trump’s own party turned on him, combined with the growing emotional outrage over the policy, it was no longer feasible to continue to uphold the policy.

However, as previously described, the family separation policy did not start on April 6th, 2018, nor did it truly end on June 20th, 2018. It is important to understand that while these may have been the official starting and ending dates of this policy, hundreds of families were separated outside of those two dates, through a variety of policy initiatives. Family separation existed as an unofficial policy up until the April 6th, 2018 memorandum, and simply took a new form after the June 20th, 2018 executive order. Unfortunately, it’s not clear what is driving these new family separations. The New York Times reported that new separations have continued to take place on the border, and are the result of “fraud, a communicable disease, or past criminal history” (Jordan and Dickerson 2019) on the part of the parent or guardian, but in the past, this would rarely lead to a separation. The New York Times report from March 2019 was confirmed by a separate investigation by the Houston Chronicle, published June 22nd, 2019, and found that over 700 additional children have been separated from their parents or guardians at the border, between the June 2018 executive order and May 2019 (Kriel and Begley 2019). This underscores the reality of uncertainty when it comes to the impact of immigration policies on the ground and what their true impact is. While the most explicit form of the policy was in place for over a year unofficially and three months officially, families have been and likely will continue to be separated under a variety of immigration policies or initiatives moving into the future.

As such, the political implications of the image must be restricted to the policy as it existed from April 6th, 2018 to June 20th, 2018, due to the fact that the family separation policy is both extremely fluid and is only one policy out of many that the Trump administration has implemented or attempted to implement that target immigrants and asylum seekers alike. For example, despite serious concerns about the safety and security of migrants, the “Remain in Mexico” policy has resulted in over 10,000 potential asylum seekers being sent back to Mexico
while their claims go through the court system (Montoya-Galvez and Canales 2019). Additionally, the drastic reduction of the number of refugees that will be accepted by the United States each year (Center for Migration Studies 2019) only proves that the family separation policy is only one of countless other policies that have targeted the immigrant community, illustrating why it is difficult to measure the larger political implications from the image. While one might turn to Democratic politicians who could shine a new light on the lack of humanitarianism within the United States’ immigration policies, many have only offered a reversal of many of the Trump Administration’s policies, in addition to some version of “comprehensive immigration reform.” It’s impossible to know at this point in time if the United States will institute humanitarian immigration reform, or if the image would be cited should that happen. While the long-term political implications are difficult to know, it is clear that with respect to the primary and most aggressive form of the policy, the photograph of the ‘Crying Girl on the Border’ was able to influence the public’s understanding of the policy, which in turn led to the reversal of the publicly defined family separation policy.

Finally, in order to provide a holistic analysis of the political impact that the image had, it is important to understand that the response to the image wasn’t entirely critical of the policy. Two days after the policy ended, on June 22nd, 2018, the White House Press Secretary tweeted, in response to a TIME Magazine cover from the previous day (see Image 4), that “...[Democrats] and the media exploited this photo of a little girl to push their agenda. She was not separated from her mom” (Sanders 2018). TIME Magazine received backlash for their cover, and were accused, like Sanders said, of using the image to push a false narrative, given that the family was never separated (Schmidt and Phillips 2018). However, based on the original caption and context provided by the photographer, and the understanding at the time of how the policy was playing out on the ground, the reaction to the photograph was warranted. If this image caused a level of emotional despair that contributed to the end of the family separation policy, yet it is a seemingly normal occurrence on the border, like critics of the image argue, does that justify what is seen? This is precisely what TIME author Karl Vick argues in the article that accompanies the cover, in an attempt to start a discussion about ethics and morals in immigration policy (Vick 2018). The image of the ‘Crying Girl on the Border’ allowed for both an insight into everyday occurrences on the border, but also a look into what many believed to be the moment before a family separation was to take place. An iconographic analysis can help us understand why this image was so powerful, but in light of the family not being separated, and the photograph debatably causing a misled reaction, questions should be asked if this image represents appropriate treatment of immigrants – at the border, in detention, or
at another stage of the immigration or asylum process.

Image 4: Time Magazine cover for June 21st, 2018

**Iconographic Analysis**

In order to understand the broader messages that this image carries, it is important to conduct an iconographic analysis to understand what is seen in the image, as well as the broader implications that this image carries regarding the treatment of immigrants on the border. The unidentified girl is centered in the
image, illuminated by what appears to be a spotlight. She is the only one that we are able to see clearly – half of her mother is hidden by a Border Patrol agent who towers over both of them. The Border Patrol agent encompasses nearly 1/3 of the photograph, which sends a message about the power that the agent holds in this situation. A vehicle makes up most of the background, and there is little context for what has happened or what is about to happen. The girl looks up towards her mother, who is positioned to be patted down, an occurrence that is likely customary during detention at the border. Her mouth is open, and we can only imagine the sound of her crying, as even a moments separation from her mother’s arms results in the fear and uncertainty from migrating hundreds of miles being let go. The decision to frame the image at the level of the girl is critical, not only because it conceals additional context that the girl might not know of, but it allows us to align ourselves with the girl, at the level of her immediate experience, fear, and cries. We do not know what will happen next, and neither does the mother or her distraught child. The images force us to confront the question that nobody wants to ask, or let alone experience: Is this the last moment in which the child will see her mother?

Conclusions & Possibilities for Further Research

In the short term, it is possible to understand why the image of the ‘Crying Girl on the Border’ was able to impact the family separation policy as it existed from April 12th, 2018 through June 20th, 2018. This understanding is aided by returning to the original texts from the literature review on photography theory in the context of war and other traumatic moments. The consumers of the image, who in many cases, would end up being the sheltered middle-class families that Susan Sontag speaks about (Sontag 1977, 85), and the heartbreaking image of the ‘Crying Girl on the Border’ subjects them to the “overexposure and ideological rupture” that Robert Hariman and John Louis Lucaites speak about in their article that analyzes the image of the Napalm Girl from the Vietnam War (Hariman and Lucaites 2003, 55). These people will never have to experience what migrants do at the border and are instead are only witnesses to it. While the border remains a distant and abstract concept for most people, the photograph of the ‘Crying Girl on the Border’ brought that idea closer to them, and in many ways, acts as a mediator for the “stranger relationship” (Hariman and Lucaites 2003, 58) that exists between immigrants and the broader audience of the image. This effect was able to cultivate an emotional appeal while providing an understanding to the idea of the border and the experiences that migrants are subjected to.

The exposure to the fear and on-going trauma displayed in the image caused an immense backlash to the policy, in a way that no other critique of the policy was able to. In combination with the publication of the ProPublica
recording, and a sizeable portion of Republican senators turning against President Trump, the family separation policy could no longer be justified. However, as the timeline of what many understood to be the family separation policy is expanded, it becomes clear that families were separated at the border prior to the official announcement regarding the change in prosecution for illegal entry, and despite the executive order on June 20th, 2018 that formally ended this specific policy, families have continued to be separated for months under the new guidelines that are unclear. The difficulty of making long-term conclusions related to the image can be attributed to two reasons: the image was published recently, in June 2018, and second, the family separation policy is only one of many policies that has come from the Trump Administration with the goal of targeting immigrants and refugees from all parts of the world, including from Central America. It is impossible to expect that the image of the ‘Crying Girl on the Border,’ while it led to the reversal of a specific policy, would lead to a broader change in immigration policies, given the political climate that it was introduced in. While it is entirely possible that the image could be cited in the future if the U.S. government were to approach immigration policy in a new way, as it stands now, the image’s impact must be limited to the specific policy that official lasted from April 6th, 2018 to June 20th, 2018.

However, that is not to say that the image did not help families in need, or that the outrage against the policy should not be accounted for because it only lasted between 8-10 days. RAICES, the benefactor of the Facebook fundraiser, stated that in 2018, they were able to pay out $2 million in immigration detention bonds, hire 80 attorneys and legal assistants, increase legal services provided to unaccompanied children and families, among other robust improvements to their day to day operations (Maria Rea 2018). While RAICES was not the sole recipient of donations made in response to the image of the ‘Crying Girl on the Border,’ the point is clear. Even though the outrage was short-lived, it resulted in a surge of monetary donations and other assistance that significantly changed the lives of thousands of migrants. If this image was never published, it would be impossible to know when the family separation policy would have ended, or if the critical assistance sent to migrants and refugees would have ever been received.

Ultimately, this is important because it underscores the importance of imagery. Iconic images of all types often fall short of long-term expectations or desires. In the short-term however, they play the unique role of being able to shine a light on a crisis, be it in Syria with the photograph of Aylan or on the U.S.-Mexico border with the photograph of the ‘Crying Girl on the Border.’ They have the ability to deliver critical aid and attention to international conflicts or refugee crises that may be plagued by the numbing quality of death counts, injuries, or another type
of statistic, which helps people on the ground. While images can lead to critical assistance being delivered to those in need, they often struggle when it comes reforming the structural and systemic causes of the conflict or refugee crisis at hand. This was the case with the image of Aylan, and this paper has demonstrated it to be the case with the ‘Crying Girl on the Border’ as well.

Moving forward, future research must focus on breaking through the rapid decline in interest after an iconic image is published, as displayed in the Google Trends graphs (see Figures 1.1 and 1.2). The impact that iconic images can have has been well-documented, especially when it comes to raising awareness and short-term fundraising in the cases of Aylan or of the ‘Crying Girl on the Border.’ Past research has clearly defined the parameters for what an iconic image is and the psychological significance to the importance of an image in comparison to statistics, but can these images do more? This gap in research begs the question of if humans, or society as a whole, are even capable of expressing the empathy seen in the aftermath of an iconic image for a sustained period of time, and if the political will exists to reform the very structures that created the conditions in which the iconic image was captured. As such, in order for iconic images to be truly transformative and impactful, the effect must be more than the millions of dollars donated and countless volunteer hours that are logged in the immediate aftermath of the publication.
McLane, "Numbers Numb: The Significance and Shortcomings of Imagery within the Immigration Debate"

Works Cited:


McLane, “Numbers Numb: The Significance and Shortcomings of Imagery within the Immigration Debate”


ProPublica. 2018. Listen to children who’ve just been separated from their parents at the border. Youtube Video. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PoncXfYBAVI.


DETERMINING DISENGAGEMENT METHODS: DECIPHERING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENGAGEMENT PATHWAYS OF U.S. IDENTITY-MOTIVATED DOMESTIC TERRORISTS AND THE MOST EFFECTIVE DISENGAGEMENT METHOD

Abstract

This study aims to identify broad conceptual gaps in the field of terrorism studies, beginning with those of government motivated research, that have prevented the establishment of a unified, efficient system of achieving the disengagement of U.S. identity-motivated violent terrorists. Current government motivated research categorizes terrorists either by ideology or a dominant weakness (e.g. lack of employment), assuming they have a causal relationship with engagement, and therefore, help us understand disengagement. This research informs the development of counter-terror programs. However, current academic (non-government) research shows that this causal relationship does not exist. This has resulted in extremely inefficient and unsustainable counter-terror government programs. This study suggests three key methodological changes for future studies working to understand how to achieve disengagement: Measure engagement and disengagement as developmental pathways, not discrete decisions; consider the context they are embedded in, and statistically analyze the new data for causal relationships between engagement and disengagement. Such relationships could serve as new characterizations of terrorists, and more accurately determine what resources are appropriate for each individual to achieve disengagement, improving counter-terror programs. These methodological changes are demonstrated in this paper through the examination of three case studies, but hold limited validity without a future large-n study.

Keywords: Immigration, family separation, photography, iconic imagery.
Introduction

This study aims to identify broad conceptual gaps in the field of terrorism studies and the misdirection of government funded research that have prevented the establishment of a unified, efficient system of achieving the disengagement of U.S. identity-motivated violent terrorists. Currently, government motivated or funded research of both engagement and disengagement is divided in two competing theories. One school of thought has worked to generally understand which methods are most effective for influencing disengagement for each motivating ideology of violence (e.g. providing engaged violent actors with employment, relationship stability, an education program, etc.). These ideologies (Neo-Nazi, Alt-Right, Alt-Left, etc.) are often loosely defined, or misunderstood, leading to mislabeling of terrorists, and poor targeting of programs. The other school of thought categorizes identity-motivated violent domestic terrorists based on what primary need violent engagement fulfilled for them (e.g. lack of employment) and tries to understand the most effective disengagement pathways accordingly. Both of these studies are based on prominent present threats, not allowing room for how to address inevitable new threats. They also focus on the individual alone, not on the individual within the context of their community, which could determine just how influential both of these factors are in promoting and sustaining violent behavior (Borum, 2012) (Simi & Sporer, 2016).

Government programs designed to encourage disengagement are based on this current research. Thus, the tactics being used are not designed to fit the individuals they are implemented upon, but rather, a generalization of which ideology or need in the name of they are committing acts. This results in extreme inefficiency and unsustainability of government efforts to counter violent extremism, as disengagement methods often are not appropriately matched, leading to a lack of disengagement, or re-engagement after the fact (Koehler, 2016; Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez & Boucek, 2010). There has been little incentive to change the research organization, however, because Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) programs are collaborative with lawmakers, local law enforcement, and community groups. Thus, money invested into research for them is often directed towards their priorities, or the prominent current threats, most often described by the publicized ideology.
This study, therefore, will provide three key suggestions for methodological changes to be made in future terrorism research as an introduction to a viable method for better evaluating the disengagement and engagement motivators for such violent actors. First, this study will introduce a different way of conceptualizing engagement and disengagement as developmental pathways as opposed to discrete decisions. Second, the engagement pathway of the actor will be contextualized by the surrounding socioeconomic community. Finally, it suggests that patterns in engagement and disengagement pathways occurring together be statistically analyzed for causality of their relationship to determine some common experience sequences or trajectories that could serve as new characterizations of terrorists which suggest something about what disengagement methods are appropriate for those individuals, allowing government programs, designed based on such future studies from this better methodology, to be more successful and affordable. These methodological changes are demonstrated in this paper through the examination of three case studies, but hold limited validity without a future large-n study.

**Literature Review**

**Current Engagement Typologies**

The currently existing literature developing typologies of engagement that are independent of purely ideological or need identifiers is replacing that organization system by classifying terrorists via two variables; personality type and the pathway they took to engagement (Post, 1984) (Hacker, 1976). Personality, in this case, describes the motivation of engagement, whereas the pathway describes the pattern of transformation. The relationship between the two is typically unexamined (McCormick, 2003), (Knutson, 1981), (Jenkins, 1982), (Braungart, 1982).
1983, 1989, 1992), (Sayari, 1985), (Crenshaw, 1986), (Bandura, 1990), (Sprinzak, 1990, 1991, 1995, 1992). Under this theory, the ideology that the engagement takes place within, or in service to, is viewed as the rationalization for the behavior, not the literal motivation of the violent actor (Post, 1990). The ideologically labeled body, or the system through which the actor serves the ideology during engagement, is the opportunity for pursuing the behavior, and the ideology is an excuse for participating. The ideology is often not the real reason why actors are influenced to join such violent groups. The vulnerabilities of the actor that the violent group exploits are much more often the cause of the behavior (Crenshaw, 1985). This will be clearly illustrated by the three case studies analyzed as a way to demonstrate the new methodological changes proposed by this study, where for all three actors, ideology was often the barrier to engagement in some way, as it was not learned or adopted prior to violence (See Appendix 1). From this concept came studies like John Horgan’s in the early 2000s, in which he conducted a “search for the terrorist personality,” testing the “hypothesis that terrorism is the result of pathology or psychopathy personality structure,” given trends in a terrorist’s social and emotional behaviors (e.g. lack of empathy, antisocial, etc.) Psychological forms such as ego, narcissism, Edipus complexes, and other aspects of identity were all evaluated to seek correlation with terrorist behaviors, both with and without other agitators such as substance abuse (Horgan, 2003).

This movement towards explaining engagement largely with pre-existing psychological tendencies or conditions, rather than ideology, has led to a wide search on what vulnerabilities could signify risk for motivation, such as mental health, belonging to an oppressed group, responding to instinct, etc. (Sageman, 20014). Some have been ruled out, and others seen as moderately influential, but the indicators have been looked at on an individual basis, not how they relate to each other to be more or less powerful (Victoroff, 2005). The idea was to come up with a list of individually significant indicators to determine a scoring system by which to determine whether someone was at risk for engagement, or what influences led those already engaged to their behavior. One example was the Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol, or TRAP-18, developed by terror researchers Meloy and Gill in a 2016 study to seek correlation of lone-actor terror with certain risk variables, such as failure to sustain relationships. However, most studies of this nature, including the TRAP-18, result in vague or negligible conclusions, which indicate a larger story. Crenshaw and others argued in earlier research that this is because to the individual actor being influenced, these variables function as varying aggregates (different arrangements of risk factors) within context, not as individual factors that do or do not discretely lead to engagement. The arrangement of which variables are included in each actor’s experience could be influential,
which says that there is a need for a study which evaluates this effect, not just that of one risk factor individually across case studies. Further, most risk factors for engagement are strains on the development of a stable identity, (resulting from social pressures), which leads to an inability to maintain a personality (Crenshaw, 1986). Social status and these other indicative pressures are determined by environmental context (Talor and Louis, 2004), (Della Porta, 1992), (Knutson, 1981). The failure of individually analyzed indicator studies and this prior research suggest a distinct need to contextualize the typologies of engagement beyond just the individual in order to determine the correct methods for disengagement.

**Current Disengagement Typologies**

Several of the above discussed studies, including Horgan’s in 2003, attempted to evaluate what disengagement methods would be most useful for each personality type or common engagement pathway. Mental health resources appeared to be one of the most helpful, followed by education, vocational training and social networks (Horgan & Braddock, 2010) (Neumann, 2010). However, perhaps the most useful previous literature to serve as a basis by which to understand how to prescribe the ideal resources to achieve disengagement is a literature review conducted in 2016 by Windisch, Simi, Ligon and McNeel in 2016, which reviewed 114 studies on disengagement. Included studies motivated by government resources were often organized by the conceptually lacking ideological or primary need system. However, by aggregating the studies’ conclusions, researchers were able to look at terrorist experiences across all of these different groupings through a more holistic schematic. These researchers found two primary exit themes across the 114 studies; Disillusionment and Relationships. Disillusionment was defined by this 2016 study as when actors within ideologically-motivated violent groups, because of a series of influences, become dissatisfied with engagement. Major influences include a lack of relationships outside engagement, struggle to adapt to the extreme level of violence, victimization of the actor, hypocrisy of the group, a poor lifestyle or meeting of physical needs, and a negative reputation resulting from participation, either of the group or the actor. In this case, this dissatisfaction causes the actor to disengage on their own. In the case of relationships, it is the influence of a person, rather than conditions, that cause the actor to disengage. Within the 2016 review, immediate relatives were determined to be the most “pervasive” influence of disengagement. Children, spouses and religious communities were also prominent influences.
Methodology

Primary Proposal

On the basis of this review, to restate, this study makes three broad, key suggestions for methodological changes in the field of terrorism research to fill current conceptual gaps:

1. Engagement and disengagement should be measured as developmental pathways as opposed to discrete decisions.
2. The engagement pathway of the actor should be contextualized by the surrounding socioeconomic community.
3. Patterns in engagement and disengagement pathways occurring together should be statistically analyzed for causality of their relationship to determine some common experience sequences or trajectories that could serve as new characterizations of terrorists which suggest something about what disengagement methods are appropriate for those individuals.

In reference to the first suggestion, the earlier reviewed studies of engagement and disengagement have shown that the movement of both pathways is heavily related to psychological and social development, which takes place over time and is irrelevant to a discrete moment of joining an ideological group (Horgan, 2003), (Windisch, Simi, Ligon, McNeel, 2016). Thus, measuring it as such is imperative to obtaining more insightful conclusions. Both psychological and social development over time are affected by the context, or space of the pathway, so the second suggestion is necessary to include in any such measurement. Finally, the movement of researchers like Horgan and Silke in these past studies, have found the strongest patterns of achieving disengagement by analyzing the relationship between engagement experiences and subsequent needs to disengage. Thus, it makes the most sense to build on this direction.

Demonstration of Primary Proposal

Data Identification and Acquisition: Biographical Case Studies

To demonstrate the plausibility of these methodological changes, this study has applied them to an examination of three case studies. Ideally, they would be applied automatically to a large-n study. However, as most quantitative data sources of recorded domestic terrorist incidents are constructed with the assumption that terrorist engagement can be measured as a discrete decision when the behavior is initiated, or they become a member of a violent group, they do not provide extensive detail on the developmental process of engagement. There are no descriptions of the type of propaganda used, or the actors who acted as initiation influences. This allows very little understanding of the psychological transition of the violent actor, particularly within the context of the socioeconomic
and political norms of the surrounding environment. Biographies written in a narrative format about a particular case are much rarer than these empirical data listings of the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) or other groups. While they provide more of the information type valuable to this study, there are fewer available than ideal for an empirical study. Further, they are often written with the purpose of editorializing, which creates an issue of data bias. Thus, the researcher is faced with the choice of either having less, not as reliable information more suited to the study, or plenty of less appropriately focused reliable data cases.

In other words, a new study needs to be completed to build a data bank that includes the details necessary to make these methodological changes in a large scale study. The ideal system for this study would be to conduct in-person interviews, addressing the exact questions of interest in a non-biased, unified system (Simi, 2015). However, this was not possible with the time restraints of this project. Thus, this particular study works to demonstrate how the information from such interviews could be used to illustrate on a small scale the plausibility and value of moving forward in this methodological direction.

The three biographical case studies used to illustrate these methodological changes were developed through a compilation of news and media sources, as well as personal interviews and biographies describing the violent actor’s evolution. The snowball convenience sampling system, as common through other studies of this topical range (used, for example, in Pete Simi’s work in 2017), was used to identify cases. This system starts with one publicized case that fits the operational definitions of data inclusion for the study, as defined below, and then tracks stories related to this one, collecting a series of cases that all provide the same sort of insight of the engagement and disengagement pathways, from the perspective of different ideologies and actors within varying community types. By using a variety of the most reliable media, autobiographical and biographical sources and checking the data across them, bias from any one source was dissuaded for a more reliable set of case studies which contained the data imperative to making this methodological demonstration.

Data Identification and Acquisition: Comparative Community Descriptive Statistics

In order to integrate the previously unconsidered influence of the socioeconomic context of the environment(s) which engagement and disengagement pathways take place within, this study needed to consider what type of data would be most universally comparable, yet relevant to changes in psychological development. Variables were selected as they were relevant to the most common vulnerabilities
exploited when engaging an identity-motivated terrorist. For example, previous studies, as listed above, found trends of unemployment, unstable relationships, and broken homes across all U.S. identity-motivated terrorists (Meloy, Gill, 2016). Taking unemployment as an example, the relative deprivation of the actor, as in whether the entire community is struggling with unemployment, or the actor is an anomaly, would change the psychological experience, and therefore influence, of this particular vulnerability on both engagement and disengagement transitions. Similarly, the rate at which the unemployment rate is changing, or how it compares to the nation as a whole, could also have an effect (Walker, Pettigrew, 1984). Thus, the community context variables selected here would be the unemployment rate of the community, the unemployment rate of the nation, and a stability rating for each of these levels— are they increasing, decreasing, very unstable across time, or very stable across time? The same logic process is carried out for each of the major vulnerabilities recorded for the actor sample. The entire set of community variables included may not be relevant to each actor, but should cover the complete set of vulnerabilities across the sample of actors.

In order to obtain a systematic, accurately comparable and reliable data set relating to each actor in a sample’s surrounding community during each stage of engagement and disengagement, this study suggests making use of geospatial information systems data, which offer census compilations over a multitude of geographic breakdowns. One key source to obtain such data is the National Historical Geographic Information System (NHGIS) database, which compiles census information from the local through the federal level from the early 19th century through present day. Visualizations and summaries of NHGIS data can also be gathered from the database DataUSA, which is ideal for ease of collection, and accurate comparison between communities, as well as tracking of community stability, growth and decline patterns for different variables of interest. Other academic sources compile more limited collections of this information, such as Social Explorer. For the case studies evaluated in this study, NHGIS and DataUSA were primarily utilized and processed in American University’s Geospatial Research Lab.

Data Inclusion: Operational Definitions

The following definitions and parameters were used to determine what data would be used as the sample for this study.

Biographical Case Studies

The three case studies included were all stably disengaged from all identity-motivated violence at the time of the study, participated in violence under the
motivation banner of the Neo-Nazi identity, and were from different community types (rural, suburban and urban) for comparison of the community’s influence.

Identity-Motivated Violence

Identity-Motivated violence consists of any violence that was incited or carried out with the direct intention of seriously harming another individual due to their contradiction of the ideology which constructed the violent actor’s identity. Ideology, according to the 2016 literature review by Windisch, Simi, Ligon and McNeel, can be defined as:

“A set of ideas based on beliefs, experiences, and education that aim to delineate an issue and offer solutions to any associated problems (Snow, 2004; Freeden, 1998, 2007). Ideologies are biased, illusory, or misleading because they present partial or incomplete realities, and those versions of reality represent some societal interests while obscuring others (Xiaobo, 2011).”

Violence must be constituting of intending to cause immediate harm. As an example, an actor of a racist ideology beating a person of a racial minority up to the point of long-term physical harm will be included. An actor who posts a violent meme or incites violence online but makes no effort to fulfill it and targets no particular group based on ideology (i.e. “internet troll”) will not be included.

Neo-Nazi

Neo-Nazi, while in society has become a very loosely defined term to include a number of nuanced sub-groups, for the purpose of this study, refers to self-identified actors who

1. Express racist sentiment towards minorities including, but not restricted to, Blacks, Hispanics, and Arabs, etc. Support white-supremacy, specifically of an ideal, Aryan race

2. Prominently display anti-Semitism, and other religious/spiritual prejudices including towards gypsies, and other orientations that are non-Christian

3. Can, but don’t necessarily subscribe to the previously popularized Third-Reich Nazi ideology

Stably Disengaged

Actors who have stopped participating in violence and left the group within which the violence took place or was organized are considered to be disengaged. To be included in the study, they must be stably disengaged, meaning they have disengaged for at least 5 years and have developed a new identity and lifestyle, or purpose, which is in contradiction to rejoining participation in violence.
De-radicalized vs. Disengaged

It is important to make the distinction that the focus of this study is on influences of disengagement, not de-radicalization. These terms are often confused conceptually by being improperly used interchangeably (Horgan, 2009). Within the field of counterterrorism research, disengagement refers to leaving violent behavior championed by or motivated by extremist ideology. It does not require that the actor reject their radical ideology. De-radicalization, on the other hand, does not refer to a change in behavior, but to a psychological change in the actor’s beliefs, where they no longer support the ideology motivating their violence. Thus, it is less measurable than a clear change in behavior. De-radicalization can be related to disengagement. Often with CVE programs, which fill what they view as the need of the actor that brought them to an extremist group, without making efforts to undo the ideology that they have been exposed to through varying forms of propaganda and essentially programed to believe, actors are at risk to re-engage if they lose stability in their new life, because they will go back to the people who make them feel stable as a community sharing a set of values and beliefs. Thus, while disengagement is easier to measure, and thus, a better central question for the study, estimated de-radicalization will be included as a variable which indicates a better, stronger disengagement path, and a better match for the engagement pathway types with which it aligns, over other disengagement paths without the de-radicalization component.

Community Stability Type

For the data concerning communities surrounding the engagement pathways of the former identity-motivated violent actors, it is important to consider how often the variables recorded as comparative to the actor’s experience tend to change. If the actor has been living in a place that has been economically destitute or politically inactive for decades, for example, that is a different psychological experience for a developing person than a community that has been stable in these ways for many years, and then suddenly, experiences a business close, an economy crash, or a drop in political involvement (Walker, Pettigrew, 1984). Thus, each aspect of a community will be scored as stable, growing or declining.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect</th>
<th>Stable=0</th>
<th>Growing=1</th>
<th>Declining=-1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>On average, aspect doesn’t change from 1940 on</td>
<td>On average, aspect increases from 1940 on</td>
<td>On average, aspect decreases from 1940 on</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The community will then receive an overall stability score based on how many of these variables are changing and to what degree, over time. If most variables are 1, the score shall be listed as 1. If most are -1, then -1, and most 0, then 0.
The community will then receive an overall stability score based on how many of these variables are changing and to what degree, over time. If most variables are 1, the score shall be listed as 1. If most are -1, then -1, and most 0, then 0.

Hypotheses

The motivation of this study is two part, as described above. In the short term, it aims to identify what conceptual gaps exist in the field of terrorism studies, and motivate a longer study to obtain data suited to the application of a better methodology to fill those gaps. The second is that this longer study then motivate this better methodology to continue to develop in future terrorism studies, and work to build an understanding of the relationship between engagement and disengagement pathways in a way that can inform better government CVE practices. The idea here is that the relationship between both pathways would produce a new way by which to categorize terrorists and more efficiently determine their needs for achieving disengagement.

Figure 3: Long Term Question of Terrorism Studies to Inform Better CVE Practices

The proposition of the Step 1 Hypotheses of this paper are intended to serve in the short term study as a validation of the need of a new paradigm or conceptual model of disengagement studies, empirically illustrating the gaps of current studies. The Hypotheses of Step 2 aim to act as useful starting points for the building of better methodology for long term future studies. Conclusions included in the analysis of this paper are not meant to be taken as complete, but as illustrations of those that would be pulled from these future studies on a larger sample, more reliable scale.
Hypotheses Step 1: Evidencing the Need for this study

The major conceptual gaps identified above that demonstrate a need for methodological changes in terrorism studies included the organization of data and characterization of terrorists, and the subsequently incomplete measurement or evaluation of their experiences (Horgan, 2003). Below are a series of hypotheses that could work to measure these gaps and validate a change in future studies.

**H1:** The fundamental reasons for engagement and disengagement are independent of ideology and often dependent on more than a single primary weakness

**H1a.** Within one ideology, there is variability in engagement processes

**H1b.** Within one ideology, there is variability in disengagement processes

**H1c.** Ideology often creates barriers to disengagement

**H1d.** Ideology is often not acquired or retained from life pre-engagement (is learned through disengagement)

**H2:** Engagement is not influenced by 1 primary practical vulnerability or lack, but by an aggregate of weaknesses created from or leading to gaps in the anatomy or stability of the actor’s personality or identity, as defined by Figure 4 below: In terms of the current universal theories of disengagement, if the success of the two methods; disillusionment and relationships- are directly linked to fulfilling gaps in the anatomy of the personality, then we can think about this anatomy as described through the schematic in Figure 4. Consider the self as a sort of satisfaction with our identity in having a purpose, or illusionment, and self within world as how we build our identities through relationships (Windisch, Simi, Ligon, McNeel, 2016). The furthest two rows right of Figure 4 are the six variables that serve as measurements for vulnerabilities being tracked in the coding of engagement and disengagement pathways later in the paper.

**Figure 4: Anatomy of Personality/Identity**
Hypotheses Step 2: Executing the Aim of the Study: What questions should be included in long term analysis to determine universal typologies of engagement and disengagement?

There are several ways by which this step can and likely will evolve over the course of future studies. For example, once a new data bank is established, statistical methods could be used to find patterns in aggregate data measuring engagement and disengagement pathways to understand the relationship between them. For example, a random forest is a popular data science method that uses a series of decision trees to seek dependence relationships in an aggregated pool of variables (Deng, 2018). However, with that data not yet available, these questions provide a starting point by which to analytically seek patterns in the relationship between engagement and disengagement, and create comparable measurement variables with which to record these pathways in building this new data bank to fuel future studies which will continue to build on these questions to a full new methodology.

**H3:** Disengagement will occur when all vulnerabilities exploited during the total engagement pathway are soothed.

**H3a:** Disengagement will occur when all vulnerabilities exploited during the total engagement pathway are soothed, independently of the magnitude of the vulnerability or the soothing relative to the surrounding community during the corresponding engagement and disengagement processes

**H3b:** Disengagement will occur when all vulnerabilities exploited during the total engagement pathway are soothed at the magnitude they were exploited, but independently of the magnitude of the vulnerability or the soothing relative to the surrounding community during the corresponding engagement and disengagement processes.

**H3c:** Disengagement will occur when all of the vulnerabilities exploited during the total engagement pathway are soothed, relative to the level they were ingrained in the context of the surrounding community (i.e. engagement within community of = or – vulnerabilities will make the vulnerabilities stronger in the actor, thus requiring stronger disengagement influences) The magnitude of exploitation, and thus, soothing required, is impacted by the stability level of the community.

**H4:** The closer the disengagement-influencing actor or community is to the demographic targeted by the engagement ideology of the violent actor, the greater the influence they will have in influencing disengagement.

Artifact Assessment and Quantification: Codebook Structure

The data for this study was recorded using the following method, which could be
adopted in a future study of a larger sample: First, it was arranged into four broad areas of transition; Pre-Engagement, Engagement, Disengagement, and Post-Engagement, with engagement and disengagement containing sub-processes, or sequential steps, in order to implement the first suggestion of the paper, measuring them as developmental pathways. Then, within each of these areas, the data was organized by separating actors involved and their specific actions and responses into a parallel track to the community data, implementing the second suggestion of considering context. This parallel path arrangement allows for easy comparative analysis across related demographic values, so that it can be determined how such differences could have held a psychological influence in the movement from one main area to the next (i.e. into engagement, from engagement to disengagement, or from disengagement to post-disengagement.) It also allowed for comparative statics to be interpreted from the pre-and post- areas capping the entire pathway, or pre-engagement stability vs. post-disengagement stability, allowing for analysis of the relationship between them, in accordance with the third key suggestion of this paper.

For clarification, the mechanics of this overall system are broken down by section below. Snapshots of the coding itself are available in Appendix 2.

Section 1: Background

This section of data aims to provide background context to the roots of vulnerabilities available to be exploited by the engagement process for each of the three actors, pertaining both to their individual and home lives, and the community that life was embedded in. As seen in Figure 5 below, they are coded using as similar of variables as possible so as to make the data most easily and accurately comparable.
Section 2: Engagement Process

This section of data aims to store information on the structure and nature of the engagement process of each of the three actors. Figure 6, below, depicts how this is organized. First, the total, overall engagement process is described by its length, initiation time, and the overall cause or ideology which it takes place in service to. Then, each sub-engagement process is coded in two parallel processes. First, the engagement process of the actor is described by length and initiation time as well, but also in what vulnerabilities were exploited and by what mode of propaganda. Behavior of engagement is described by level of involvement and participation. In parallel, the surrounding community context is described by demographics, outlined in the same structure as the background data.

Figure 6: Section 2: Coding Structure
Section 3: Disengagement Process

This section of data aims to store information on the structure and nature of the disengagement process of each of the three actors. Figure 7, below, depicts how this is organized. First, the total, overall disengagement process is described by its length, initiation time, and an estimation of whether de-radicalization took place before, in parallel with, or after disengagement. This is followed, immediately, with a breakdown of what influence initiated disengagement, including which vulnerabilities were soothed, what action(s) were taken, where this happened, and demographics describing the actor(s)/community(ies) were responsible. It includes how the actor targeted responded practically, as well as psychologically/through action. This is finalized with what overall engagement changes took place.

After this introduction, this section follows a similar structure to the engagement pathway coding system, by breaking down the length and nature of each disengagement sub-process, and in parallel, the demographics of the actor/community influencing disengagement. To expand, because disengagement is often influenced through a human connection of actor(s)/community(ies), the community context is included by the demographics of these human actor(s)/more specific community(ies), rather than the location of the process. For instance, where a locational community might be the name of a town or county where this process took place, where a human community could be a church congregation or customer base. Aspects pertaining to the violent actor of interest are recorded by what disengagement influences took place in the form of specific actions, what vulnerabilities were soothed, and what responses/changes in engagement took place via this disengagement sub-process. This process is repeated for each disengagement sub-process until disengagement is complete.
**Repeat yellow process for Processes 1-n for each actor, distinction visible through changing colors and labeling of each Engagement Process #.

**Repeat “IF Actor(s)/Community(ies) Involved...” center section for total number of new actors/community(ies), 0-n for sub-process iteration

**Section 4: Post Engagement

This section replicates the background section, but post-engagement, to see comparatively, what changes occurred. It covers the new community location, demographics, and stability of happiness, relationships, social relations and identity. It does not, however, compare to a community, as it is assumed this is a stable end, and the community need not influence movement in or out of it.

An outline of the coding structure can be seen in Figure 8 below:
Data Analysis

As discussed above, the analysis testing shown here is just one method by which these new measurements for engagement and disengagement can be compared to seek patterns relevant to validating a need for methodological changes and understanding the relationship between these pathways. With a large-n study, statistical methods would be more useful and appropriate. However, for the case of comparing this small sample, and to establish a starting place to do comparative analysis, even in the short term of this field of study before such a data pool is established, it is useful to look more closely using analytical tables.

The following are not complete conclusions, but simply demonstrations of how these new variables can be used to build stronger research. The conclusions included with these tables are to indicate the types of patterns that should be sought through their use as a tool in future studies, or at the very least, sought through the data in continuing research. The variables on the left columns of these tables are recorded as they would be in the actual data bank, as illustrated by the snapshot in Appendix 2 of the coding done for these three case studies. The organization of the variables in the code snapshot corresponds directly with the codebook overview above, which can be understood as a schematic for how the variables were organized and developed.

As this is not meant to provide conclusive analysis, but rather, an analytical tool, just one test is available here. The rest are included in Appendix 1 for further review and suggestions of other possible analytical methods. Their purpose here is to demonstrate such analysis is plausible.

Example of Analytical Test:

Hypotheses Step 1 Analysis: Evidencing Significance/Need for this study

H1: The fundamental reasons for engagement and disengagement are independent of ideology

H1a. Within one ideology, there is variability in engagement processes

Figure 9: Test of H1a
Figure 9 and the above listed hypotheses illustrate how the data was able to successfully implement all three methodological changes discussed previously, and easily, through a simple table, produce valuable analysis of this new data that quickly illustrates a conclusion that would have been impossible to reach with the conceptual gaps of the current field of terrorism studies. According to the results of this test, which compares simple overview variables of each actor’s engagement pathway, while there can often be patterns within subsets of an ideology, there is no continuity across a sample, even as small as n=3, for a variable of engagement. Thus, it is reasonable to assume variability exists across all aspects of engagement between violent actors of the same ideology. This variability suggests that ideology cannot be the sole reason for engagement, and therefore, cannot be the sole influence of it. If performed on a larger scale, this sort of analysis would change the game for current disengagement. Simply by adjusting the way engagement was measured and expanding contextual details, an entirely deeper story emerged which completely contradicts current CVE practices and government motivated research informing them.

Conclusions and Limitations

As discussed in the literature review above, better understanding of the relationship between engagement and disengagement pathways to inform more efficient and successful CVE practices cannot be achieved without making some key methodological changes to the field of terrorism studies. While this study is unable to establish the full, evidence-based methodology and validation of the need for these changes on a large n scale, it is clear both by the codebook established here and success in being able to interpret patterns from these new styles of measurement, demonstrated in the analytical tables of this paper, that establishing such changes is both plausible and could be immediately valuable.

As the conceptual gaps of the field identified here begin to be erased with the implementation of these new suggestions over time, the body of relevant data will continue to grow, allowing for more sophisticated statistical analysis that can allow us to understand legitimate causal relationships between engagement and disengagement. This would enable the development of a completely new way to characterize identity-motivated violent terrorists, and understand any individual’s needs to sustainably achieve disengagement. However, even in the short term, we can see more clear patterns in the data. Therefore, it is reasonable to support the need for a future study which works to develop such a larger data set through the practices outlined above, validating ongoing work in adopting similar methodological changes, and continuing to develop them further in this direction.
Peters, “Determining Disengagement Methods: Deciphering the relationship between engagement pathways of U.S. identity-motivated domestic terrorists and the most effective disengagement method”

Works Cited:


107


Appendix 1

*The following are the remainder of analytical tests used to demonstrate how the new coding structure proposed by this study can be analyzed and interpreted for better results under these new methodological changes:

H1b. Within one ideology, there is variability in disengagement processes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect of Disengagement</th>
<th>Actor 1</th>
<th>Actor 2</th>
<th>Actor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Length of total process</td>
<td>1 year</td>
<td>&lt;3 years</td>
<td>10-11 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age/Time Initiated</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>24*</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of Sub-processes</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions Taken (of Initiation)</td>
<td>Checked on violent actor’s physical health-check on well-being</td>
<td>Told actor they weren’t a bad person, and were better than hate</td>
<td>Fell in love (provided actor with opportunity to date bond)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This simple table can demonstrate that while there can often be patterns within subsets of an ideology, there is no continuity across a sample, even as small as n=3, for a variable of disengagement. Thus, it is reasonable to assume variability exists across all aspects of disengagement between violent actors of the same ideology. This variability suggests that if actors with the same motivating ideology are all treated with the same disengagement resources, it likely won’t work for everyone, or would cause failures in total disengagement.

H1c. Ideology often creates barriers to disengagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barriers to Initial Engagement</th>
<th>Actor 1</th>
<th>Actor 2</th>
<th>Actor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reconciling</td>
<td>Anti-Semitism</td>
<td>Racism (excluding Anti-Semitism, which was not a barrier)</td>
<td>Lack of former exposure to racism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While they aren’t all exactly the same, this test shows that all three case studies experienced barriers to initial engagement that were directly caused by the ideology. This suggests that not only is ideology not the primary motivation for all engagement, but it can often hinder it, and needs to be persuaded or rationalized in order to serve as an excuse for engagement. In other words, the ideology did not exist prior to engagement, and therefore, couldn’t have been the influence of it.
H1d. Ideology is often not acquired or retained from life pre-engagement (is learned through disengagement)

This test further suggests that ideology is often not present before engagement, but is a byproduct of it. Therefore, it cannot be the cause of engagement. Thus, by addressing ideology, government programs are not addressing the causes of engagement to properly influence disengagement.

H2: Engagement is not influenced by 1 primary practical vulnerability or lack, but by an aggregate of weaknesses created from gaps in the anatomy or stability of the actor’s personality or identity.

In all of these cases, this test shows that no singular practical vulnerability was exploited to influence engagement, and all related at least one or more times to a lack or gap in identity/personality stability. This suggests that not all actors who hold a particular practical vulnerability can be treated the same way to influence disengagement, nor is there a primary vulnerability that would be appropriate to categorize by.

Hypotheses Step 2: Executing the Aim of the Study: What questions should be included in long term analysis to determine universal typologies of engagement
and disengagement?

**H3**: Disengagement will occur when all vulnerabilities exploited during the total engagement pathway are soothed

**H3a**: Disengagement will occur when all vulnerabilities exploited during the total engagement pathway are soothed, independently of the magnitude they were exploited, or their magnitude relative to the context of the surrounding community.

The test above suggests that the last disengagement pathway tends to occur when the last vulnerabilities exploited are soothed. In the case of Actor 3, one of these final vulnerabilities, Stability, wasn’t exploited originally, but was a vulnerability that occurred during a previous pathway, perhaps engagement but maybe even disengagement, when their engagement and failure to disengage faster led to a dissolution of their romantic relationship and family stability, leaving them depressed and unemployed, and thus, unstable. In response, it seems practical to, in a future study, leave more room for evolving vulnerabilities as a result of the tumultuous transition that is disengagement. However, the theory that disengagement length directly corresponds to the speed of fulfillment of these vulnerabilities seems to be preliminarily promising, and worthy of future investigation.
Peters, “Determining Disengagement Methods: Deciphering the relationship between engagement pathways of U.S. identity-motivated domestic terrorists and the most effective disengagement method”

H3b: Disengagement will occur when all vulnerabilities exploited during the total engagement pathway are soothed at the magnitude they were exploited, but independently of the magnitude of the vulnerability or the soothing relative to the surrounding community during the corresponding engagement and disengagement processes.

**Figure 15: Test of H3b Part 1: Total Engagement Pathway: Vulnerabilities Exploited**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anatomical Part of Personality/Identity</th>
<th>Practical Interpretation</th>
<th>Number of times exploited through engagement pathway of Actor 1</th>
<th>Number of times exploited through engagement pathway of Actor 2</th>
<th>Number of times exploited through engagement pathway of Actor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self: 1a</td>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self within world: 2a</td>
<td>Isolation (Personal)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self within world: 2a</td>
<td>Isolation (Community)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self within world: 2a</td>
<td>Isolation (Romantic)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self within world: 2b</td>
<td>Respect</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of life based on Personality/Identity: 3a</td>
<td>Happiness Level</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of life based on Personality/Identity: 3b</td>
<td>Stability</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Argument to be made</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to H₃b, the length of the total pathway of disengagement directly corresponds to the soothing of vulnerabilities at an equal or greater magnitude than that of their exploitation. In H₃a it was determined that, generally across the small sample, the total pathway ended when the last vulnerability was fulfilled. In this test, the magnitudes are compared to see if the soothing was the same or greater than the exploitation at that point. This test shows that there is some evidence to suggest that the magnitude of exploitation may have influenced seeking soothing until an equal or greater point, as the magnitude of soothing is often greater or equal to the exploitation. However, we cannot assume causation, as it is unclear whether it was the influence of fulfilling the last vulnerability or the magnitude, or combined influence of these factors, that ended the disengagement path, or some other factor. However, the fact that there is no distinct skew in the evidence from the theory suggests that this is a valuable question to incorporate into the long term ideal study and formulation of disengagement typologies rela-
tive to universal engagement typologies.

**H3c**: Disengagement will occur when all of the vulnerabilities exploited during the total engagement pathway are soothed, relative to the level they were ingrained in the context of the surrounding community (i.e. engagement within community of = or – vulnerabilities will make the vulnerabilities stronger in the actor, thus requiring stronger disengagement influences) The magnitude of exploitation, and thus, soothing required, is impacted by the stability level of the community.

**Figure 17: Roots of Vulnerabilities comparative to Surrounding Community**

**Key:**
- “ in opposition with tendency of community
- “ in accordance with tendency and severity of condition of community
- “ in accordance with tendency of community, but surpasses its severity of condition

**Actor 1:**

**Figure 17a,: Actor 1; Engagement Path 1:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerabilities</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>=</th>
<th>+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing Marriage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of former camaraderie</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of former structure</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of power (mobility)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger (Looking for scapegoat)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note on Anger (Looking for Scapegoat): could relate to overall community resentment from cond need new analytical method to measure and compare this aspect in new study**

Community 1 Stability Score: -1

**Figure 17a,: Actor 1; Engagement Path 2:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerabilities</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>=</th>
<th>+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failing Marriage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of former camaraderie</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of former structure</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of power (mobility)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger (Looking for scapegoat)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Community 2 Stability Score: +1
### Actor 2:

**Figure 17b, Actor 2; Engagement Path 1:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerabilities</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>=</th>
<th>+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parental Abuse</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History as bully at school</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History as vandal at school</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Community 1 Stability Score: 0

**Figure 17b, Actor 2; Engagement Path 2:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerabilities</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>=</th>
<th>+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parental Abuse</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History as bully at school</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History as vandal at school</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger stirred from Church of the Creator</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcoholism/Addiction / Inability to cope with violence</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Community 2 Stability Score: 0

**Figure 17b, Actor 2; Engagement Path 3:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerabilities</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>=</th>
<th>+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parental Abuse</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History as bully at school</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History as vandal at school</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger stirred from Church of the Creator</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcoholism/Addiction / Inability to cope with violence</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger not satisfied from music</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Community 3 Stability Score: 0

**Figure 17b, Actor 2; Engagement Path 4:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerabilities</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>=</th>
<th>+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parental Abuse</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History as bully at school</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History as vandal at school</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger stirred from Church of the Creator</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alcoholism/Addiction / Inability to cope with violence</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger not satisfied from music</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anger not satisfied with smaller group</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Community 4 Stability Score: 0
This test surprisingly, did not just reveal a pattern with disengagement length or needs, but engagement. It seems that the more opposite the actor’s condition to their community, the longer and deeper their engagement pathway tended to be. This would pose an interesting question to analyze in the future study. In reference to the original hypothesis, this seemed to play out as, given the lengthened engagement pathway, those actors with more opposite conditions to their community had higher magnitudes of exploitation, and therefore, quite possibly, as related to the conclusions of the previous sub-hypothesis, greater needs of vulnerability soothing. It is unclear, but possible that the stagnation of a community, or stability, with an actor of opposite conditions, also could have exacerbated frustration and resentment, lengthening engagement. This question has sufficient evidence to be valuable to review in the lengthened study.

**While above is a workable method for reaching conclusions using the new data set, future relevant analytical methods that could also be applied in future studies can be found in the psychological theory of relative deprivation, in which researchers have worked to develop ways to quantify this in a more sophisticated manner, having access to wider data.**
**H4:** The closer the disengagement-influencing actor or community is to the demographic targeted by the engagement ideology of the violent actor, the greater the influence they will have in influencing disengagement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Demographics of Prejudice</th>
<th>Number of Disengagement Influencing Actors</th>
<th>Number of Disengagement Influencing Actors who fit demographic(s) of Prejudice</th>
<th>Number of Disengagement Influencing Communities</th>
<th>Number of Disengagement Influencing Communities who fit demographic(s) of Prejudice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actor 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Muslim</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Black</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Mexican Immigrant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Other racial minority*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Other religious minority*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Jew</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Black (eventually)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Muslim</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Other racial minority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Other religious minority</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actor 3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2 unknown, +1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Jew</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Nonwhite racial minorities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Immigrant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Of those who went influenced disengagement but did not fit the demographics of prejudice, all were family members (children or spouses)**

This test provides strong evidence that the actors and communities that successfully influence disengagement, when not direct relatives, tend to come from the demographic targeted by the ideology motivating violence. In other words, direct interaction with the target of their violent behavior tends to influence actors to end the behavior. This question should be deeply investigated in future studies, particularly in reference to understanding how such relationships can be developed in healthy and safe ways for both parties, or simulated without the risk of involving a real second party with the actor pre-disengagement.
Peters, "Determining Disengagement Methods: Deciphering the relationship between engagement pathways of U.S. identity-motivated domestic terrorists and the most effective disengagement method."

Figure 18: Snapshot of Coded Data As Compared to Codebook Diagram to Demonstrate Practical Implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Background</th>
<th>Actor 1</th>
<th>Actor 2</th>
<th>Actor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Childhood/Family:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Affiliation</td>
<td>Christian, Baptist</td>
<td>Church of the Creator</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Religious Participation</td>
<td>Active Churchgoer</td>
<td>Active (camp-goer)</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Affiliations</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Political Participation</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Level</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Working Class (Lower or lower middle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Abuse</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Probable</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotional Abuse</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Parent, Both Parents, or Guardian</td>
<td>Both Parents</td>
<td>Both Parents</td>
<td>Both Parents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siblings</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial Prejudices</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Prejudices</td>
<td>None Indicated</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability of Home</td>
<td>Stable</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Stable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education Access</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Access available</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Behavior</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Bullied in school; vandalism</td>
<td>Acted out for attention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Life</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Marginalized (Bailled (Immigrant))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity/Interests</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Abandoned son of immigrants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happiness Level</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental Health Disorder History</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treatment?</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
<td>Not Indicated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community Raised In:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data From:</strong></td>
<td>Cook County, 2000</td>
<td>Ozaukee County, 2000</td>
<td>Cook County, 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location of county</strong></td>
<td>Suburbs of Chicago</td>
<td>Mequon, WI (north of Milwaukee)</td>
<td>Chicago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Population Level (Rural, Suburban, Urban) of town</strong></td>
<td>Suburban (0.00084% of county rural)</td>
<td>Rural (25% of county pop is rural)</td>
<td>Urban (over 2M, 0.00084% of county rural)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Diversity of town</strong></td>
<td>High Diversity (mostly white, just slightly more than white, with comparable Hispanic populations and 5% Asian, 10% other)</td>
<td>High Diversity (mostly white, just slightly more than black with comparable Hispanic populations and 5% Asian, 10% other)</td>
<td>92.35% white</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Blue Relates to Section 1: Background outlined in the manner above**
DEVELOPMENT AND DESTRUCTION: REPRESENTATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT DURING THE NARMADA VALLEY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

Dhanya Rao

Abstract

The Narmada Valley Development Project was one of the most ambitious yet contested projects financed by the World Bank. Over the course of this project, different discourses of development emerged and were reinforced by different actors. On the one hand, the World Bank aligned itself with the hegemonic modernization paradigm while the Narmada Bachao Andolan, a subaltern protest movement, rejected this paradigm altogether. This research questions how these incompatible discourses are able to simultaneously occupy the landscape of the Narmada Valley. This research employs a discourse analysis of official sources linked with the Indian Government, the World Bank, and the Narmada Bachao Andolan, and questions how these antithetical representations are both able to occupy the Narmada Valley. This occupation is made possible by international development’s status as an empty signifier, or a process stripped of any meaning. This article additionally argues that the Narmada Bachao Andolan’s discursive process of interweaving discourses on human and environmental costs empowered the group to gain similar legitimacy to that of the Indian Government. Development as an empty signifier allows for the existence of a power and knowledge vacuum, creating space for the questioning of conventional development authority. Ultimately, this article contends that development as an empty signifier allows for unjust regimes of dominance to flourish at the expense of the subaltern, or those often disregarded in the development process.

Introduction:

Arundhati Roy, celebrated Indian author and activist, in her essay The Greater Common Good says, “I’m not an anti-development junkie, nor a proselytizer for the eternal upholding of custom and tradition. What I am, however, is curious. Curiosity took me to the Narmada Valley” (Roy 1999). The Narmada
Valley Development Project (NVDP) is a series of hydroelectric dams built in the Indian states of Gujarat and Madya Pradesh to bring water and electricity to people living in these characteristically dry and drought-prone states (Singh and Kavaljit 1989). Originally supported and financed by the World Bank in 1985, the series of dams were completed and inaugurated by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2017 (The World Bank 1985; Modi 2017).

This project was met with considerable opposition in the form of a social movement—the Narmada Bachao Andolan, translating to “Save the River Narmada” in English. In order for the dam to provide electricity and water to the states of Gujarat and Madya Pradesh, it required 200,000 people to be displaced from the valley, many of them Adivasis—an indigenous group of India (Nilsen 2013, 461). The Adivasi people and Indian activists, such as Arundhati Roy and Medha Patkar, organized into the Narmada Bachao Andolan (NBA) to fight against the NVDP, specifically the Sardar Sarovar Dam (Friends of the River Narmada, n.d.).

Despite the hegemonic presence of the World Bank in this project, the Narmada Bachao Andolan’s rhetoric disputed the development paradigm the Indian government and the World Bank championed. Instead of a uniform understanding, there existed a schism in the meaning of development in the Narmada Valley. Actors such as the Indian Government and the World Bank had come to understand development differently from the NBA.

The central question of this research is how two antithetical discourses of development were able to simultaneously inhabit the spatial landscape of the Narmada Valley Development Project. On the one hand, the Indian government and World Bank advance the idea of development as the sole path to modernization while the Narmada Bachao Andolan put forward the idea of development as a tool of erasure of the subaltern. To understand these antithetical discourses of development as both erasure and modernization, I have substantiated each with key nodal points which will be explained in the section entitled Evidence Generation.

This article proceeds in three key stages. The following section details three fundamental understandings of development theory that work to establish theoretical frameworks for this research: neoliberalism, modernization, and postcolonial theory. The methodology section further details and justifies the representations of development I have mapped, the contextual landscape informing the NVDP and the many actors involved in the project, as well as steps taken for selection and analysis of primary source documents. The remainder then unpacks the ways in which these two antithetical discourses of development are able to occupy the same spatial landscape. I contend that international development itself has been stripped of its any meaning, and that the Narmada Bachao Andolan’s discursive strategy of interweaving selected discourses resulted in the movement gaining equal footing.
with the Indian Government and the World Bank’s reproduction of development as modernization. These claims are based on a discourse analysis of 38 selected official documents using NVivo software as a means of analysis to code for specific discourses within each group of actors.

**Theoretical Frameworks**

The schools of thought relating to my research question inform strategies for development. These schools of thought are concerned with economic development, social policy, and specific actors in international development. The two schools of thought I will be including in this section are neoliberal/modernization theory and postcolonial theory. Each inform my pursuit of understanding the meanings and representations of international development, especially in the rhetoric seen in the NVDP.

A. *Modernization and Neoliberal Scholarship:*

Neoliberalism came about in the 1980s with Reagan-Thatcher supply-side economics and later became classified as the Washington Consensus (Fine 2009, 888). The neoliberal paradigm emerged as a response to the dominant development theory at the time – structuralism which advocated for large, institutional change, rather than a strict emphasis on capitalistic economic growth (Fine, 889). This paradigm, according to Munck, facilitated the rise of a utilitarian understanding of development, emphasizing the greatest good for the greatest number of people (Munck, 63).

Neoliberal scholarship also emphasizes the role of international development agencies in the development establishment. According to Munck, no other actor was more notorious in this depoliticization of civil society than the World Bank (Munck, 66). Fine adds on Munck’s claim by contending that international organizations, like the World Bank, set the development agenda during the Washington Consensus era (Fine, 894). Arising out of the monopolization of the World Bank in the development agenda came what Munck names the TINA model (“there is no alternative to neoliberalism”) (Munck, 60).

These utilitarian views advanced by neoliberalism have in turn informed the development practices I am studying as well. This application of neoliberal scholarship to my research regarding the Narmada Valley Development Projects provides an understanding of the prevalent utilitarian developmental tendencies during the time period. The neoliberal tendencies of the World Bank can also be applied to my research question, as the NVDP was initially financed by the World Bank. Additionally, this framework adds perspective to the Indian government’s echo of the “TINA” approach to the NVDP.
Predating neoliberal theory is modernization theory, a classical developmental school of thought, which emphasizes set patterns of growth (Martinussen 1997, 73; Hout 2016, 21). Some of the first articulations of modernization theory emphasize linear patterns to growth, such as that of W.W. Rostow. Rostow contends that every society exists in one of the five stages, one being a traditional society defined by its limited technology and five being a high-consumption society (Rostow 2008, 173-174).

Diverging somewhat from Rostow’s discipline in neoclassical economics is Lewis in his dual economy model (Ghosh 2007, 6). While Lewis is a modernization theorist, he diverges from Rostow in that he does not advance a linear model of growth. Rather, Lewis envisions the economies of less developed countries being separated into two sectors: modern (capitalist) and traditional (subsistence). Lewis advocated for massive state-led initiatives that facilitated the transfer of the “traditional” peasants to work in the modern sector where there were high wages and unattained potential (Ghosh, 9).

Modernization theory provides the conceptual framework for understanding the Indian government’s drive for industrialization by means of the NVDP and can provide an explanation to the fervor seen in government actors. Additionally, modernization theory allows for insight into the role of agricultural or subsistence workers. According to the Lewis Model, peasants are seen as an unproductive population that must be moved to cities to enhance the capitalist system of labor. This same paradigm can be seen in the Sardar Sarovar Dam through the removal of agriculturalist Adivasis from their lands. Arguably the most important contribution of modernization theorists to my research is their contestation with critical theorists. For example, in his piece on post-development in South and Central America, Eduardo Gudynas discusses the concept of “Buen Vivir,” an indigenous alternative to classical Western development theory; this reference to “classical Western development theory” highlights the contestation between critical theorists and modernization theorists and will be detailed in the following section (Gudynas 2001, 441).

**Postcolonial Theory:**

The second and final body of literature I have included is postcolonial theory; in this school of thought, scholars emphasize subaltern populations and choose to focus on global inequality rather than global poverty (Noxolo 2016, 41). Falling within the larger school of thought of critical theory, postcolonial theorists work to understand development through the eyes of the disenfranchised, or subaltern (Noxolo, 45). For example, Briggs and Sharp research the role of indigenous knowledge in informing development projects. They explain that
development has historically emphasized the truth of “science” in determining development interventions while undermining indigenous knowledge (Briggs and Sharp 2004, 661-662). This emphasis on the subaltern, according to Noxolo, focuses on what is left unsaid in the development process – simply summarized as acknowledging the presence of the subaltern in development (Noxolo, 45).

A further unifying feature of this school of thought is its mission in decentralizing the Western development establishment from development scholarship. For example, Briggs and Sharp detail the intimate relationship between power and knowledge in development studies by contending that Western knowledge has most significantly influenced development studies (Briggs and Sharp, 662). Postcolonial scholars take issue with this Western-centered development model because it inherently others non-Western groups, pointing to Said’s Orientalism as a theory-based example (Briggs and Sharp, 663). Furthermore, Noxolo points out the role of reflexivity in development studies by advancing the idea that the Global South is not a case study in which to apply Western-centered development knowledge. Rather, the Global South is unique in its postcolonial landscape and cannot be understood through the application of Western-centered development scholarship (Noxolo, 47).

Many features of postcolonial theory are relevant to understanding my research. Primarily, postcolonial theory’s emphasis on decentralizing the Western development establishment informs my analysis of the Narmada Bachao Andolan’s representation of international development versus that of the Indian government or even IOs, like the World Bank. This school of thought also contends with modernization theory as postcolonial theorists claim that modernization undercuts the role of colonialism in a less developed country’s development trajectory (Noxolo, 45-46). Finally, postcolonial methodology heavily mirrors the principles of discourse analysis: the critical reading of texts, the importance of reflexivity in research, and the integrated role of the researcher in their own research (Noxolo, 49).

III. Methodology

This research employs a discourse analysis to understand the various representations of international development seen during the NVDP and the NBA movement. In this section, I will explain the representations I have mapped, the historical context of development in India, steps taken for evidence generation, as well as an explanation of cases and key nodal points, or discourses.

A. Mapping Representations:
In my puzzle, I have outlined two opposing discourses competing to define international development. First is the discourse of international development as a symbol of modernization to achieve standing and respect in the world economy, especially in the post-Independence era. The second discourse represents international development as a tool of erasure, specifically economic and ethnic erasure. Each of these discourses serve as foundational nodal points in the construction of the shared identities that surface in this research.

The representations of development reproduced by official Indian government documents and statements echo the larger discourse of development as the path to modernization. On the other hand, representations of development reproduced by the Narmada Bachao Andolan echo the larger discourse of development as a tool of erasure. Interestingly, the World Bank reproduces both the discourses of erasure and modernization. This simultaneous reproduction of discourse cannot be understood without the prior knowledge of World Bank withdrawal from the project in 1993 and its Independent Review (The World Bank, 1992). After an intense wave of NBA protests, the World Bank eventually withdrew its institutional and financial support from the project in 1993. I will explain my process of including this time period in the section “Evidence Generation.”

Throughout the process of constructing truth regimes, specific representations of international development act as signifiers for regimes of dominance among actors. Certain representations echoing themes of neocolonialism and violence act as explicit identifiers for power relationships between both the Indian Government and the Narmada Bachao Andolan (Rushdie, 2001). However, themes of modernization, prosperity, and the use of a cost-benefit analysis reproduced by the World Bank and government actors act as implicit power signifiers. Themes of patriotism operationalized by the Indian Government, for example, reconceptualize the concept of the Indian identity through statements such as “Future generations of India should be proud of our tribals” (Modi, 2017). This distinction between Indians and “tribals” implicitly contributes to regimes of dominance seen in the NVDP.

Regimes of power observed in this research are also further constructed through the Foucauldian concept of discipline – the use of knowledge native to an epistemic community to create regimes of power (Foucault 1981, 105). This disciplinary concept can especially be seen in World Bank documents and government documents drawing extensively on economic concepts, such as marginal costs and opportunity cost of capital, to further advance the discourse of development as a symbol of hope (The World Bank, 1985). Regimes of power can moreover be understood through an understanding of the Indian government’s history with its colonial past and its treatment of its indigenous peoples; this power
relation will be explained further in the following section.

B. Context:

Contextuality is an important aspect of this methodology because it serves as a critical evaluative standard in this research. Contextuality isolates the chosen discourses to a localized context to avoid generalizing meaning across contexts (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 48). Each of the policies, theories, and historical junctures I detail in this section contextualize and historicize the NVDP because they foster understanding of the shared beliefs of the actors I am studying.

One of the most influential contexts shaping this phenomenon is the Indian Independence Movement. Led by individuals like Gandhi and Nehru, this movement pushed for the end to the British presence in India by revolutionizing peaceful protest paradigms, such as satyagraha, literally meaning holding onto truth (Boissoneault 2018). This peaceful protest paradigm has heavily influenced the protest strategies of the Narmada Bachao Andolan in their mobilization (Palit et al. 1999).

Another context influencing the discourses of the NVDP is the rise of international organization financed infrastructure projects (Park 2009, 112). In his first few years as Prime Minister, Nehru declared dams “the temples of modern India” in 1954 (Editorial Board, 2017). Dam building is not isolated to post-Independence. Under the British Raj, dam building became common practice in India. Leaders, like Nehru, sought to continue the dam campaigns with the inclusion of international organizations to demonstrate that India could be self-reliant economically, echoing principles of modernization theory (Ward 2003).

This internalization of colonial policy by government officials also affects the contextuality through which I will understand the Narmada Bachao Andolan. The British Raj exemplified the Foucauldian principles of power-knowledge relationships by consolidating knowledge and power to the colonial government and specific populations of India (Ludden 1993, 253; Foucault, 93). This concentration of knowledge was then internalized by newly elected leaders to maintain relationships of dominance, adversely impacting the relationship between the state and its already disenfranchised indigenous groups (St. Germaine 2014, 3).

Contextuality has further informed my exposure to and selection of various primary sources. Understanding that the NBA Movement and the construction of this project has lasted up to fifty years, contextualizing each and every primary source has a large role in my own analysis of the source type. For example, documents from the Narmada Bachao Andolan website that span the years of 1998-2006 tend to focus on themes of compensation, resettlement, and elitism.
However, documents released beyond 2017 focus on themes of mobilization (National Herald Web Desk 2017; Sengupta 2018). With an understanding of the rich contextuality of this movement as well as development projects in India, I am able to attribute this shift in discourse to the inauguration of the completed Sardar Sarovar dam (Modi, 2017). Analyzing the selected primary sources with the larger contextual frameworks in mind has also fostered a prioritization of intertextual reading of primary source texts.

C. Evidence Generation:

To begin with evidence generation, I first prioritized exposure, or the belief in the existence of multiple interpretations of the phenomenon of study, in my search for primary sources. To do so, I decided to expand my search for sources to include media. After having searched the Indian Water Ministry’s website as well as the Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh state government sites, I came to the understanding that official statements by government officials were not available in the most conventional channels (Ministry of Water Resources, River Development, and Ganga Rejuvenation, n.d.; Gujarat- The Land of Legends, n.d.; Government of Madhya Pradesh, n.d.). For this reason, I decided to open up my research to include media, gray literature, and scholarly sources that included direct quotes from government officials. In order to maintain my focus on official discourses, I only analyzed direct quotes that came from the aforementioned sources. Similarly, I also became cognizant that I was relying heavily on the Narmada Bachao Andolan website for official primary source texts associated with the Narmada Bachao Andolan; gaining exposure via media, gray literature, and scholarly sources including direct quotes from NBA leaders also allowed for heightened exposure.

After having gathered primary sources for analysis, I systematically read each at minimum three times to gain maximum understanding from each piece. I began by reading each source for signifiers of attitudes; within this node were more specific attitudes including cynical, emotional, and sarcastic. This was a preliminary reading to understand contexts and meanings on the most basic level before proceeding with understanding more nuanced representations of international development. This preliminary coding for documents associated with the Narmada Bachao Andolan resulted in differing attitudes based on the specific leader producing the representation of development; for example, representations of development described using cynical language are more frequently associated with Arundhati Roy while representations of development described using emotional language is more frequently associated with Medha Patkar. Representations of development advanced by the Indian Government are,
in contrast, exclusively associated with emotional language.

I treated the second reading of each source for signifiers for representations of development associated with the project’s relationship to humans and the environment. This reading elaborated upon the interconnections between the human and the environmental costs and benefits in this project. Sources associated with each case referenced both humans and the environment in the reproduction of either larger discourse (erasure or hope). This reading serves great importance because it seeks to understand the implications of the two representations of development in the NVDP on both people and the environment. The third reading focused on understanding the components of government and civil society present in the representations of development. This reading yielded the creation of thirteen nodes ranging from erasure and violence to modernization and prosperity. This reading is crucial to evidence generation because it further substantiates the two larger discourses of erasure and hope, respectively.

Deviating from the systematic process of reading each primary source document is my emphasis of intertextuality, or the way in which meaning is evoked through a conversation between many texts by way of repetition of a key phrase or reference to another text (Scwartz-Shea and Yanow, 86). For example, in my second reading relating to humans and the environment, I coded for themes of compensation. Through this coding, I came to realize that different sets of actors would make either explicit or passing reference to the Land Acquisition Act of 1894, which laid the foundation for cash compensation for land acquisition (Roy, 1999; National Herald Web Desk, 2017; The Land Acquisition Act, 1894, 1894). Understanding this foundational text is crucial to understanding the implications and meanings that are made possible through the compensation discourse. Additionally, during my second and third reading, I coded for nodes of democracy and human rights. In this segment of coding, I realized that different actors would reference the Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal (NWDT), a hearing that decided the height of the Sardar Sarovar Dam (Mujumdar, 2018; Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal, 1969).

Upon primary source collection, I created cases, or concrete units of analysis, to better organize and visualize my data. Data analysis was done through NVivo software, and I classified cases by both time periods and actors reproducing each specific discourse. I chose to create cases by actor because of the great diversity in reproductions of development. Organizing cases by actor allowed me to organize a wide variety of sources and trace them back to specific actors. I also made the decision to organize my cases by time period to better follow the potential shifts in discourse that may have occurred before and after the World Bank withdrew from the project (Dunn 2008, 86). The case composition can be visualized below:
While there are a total of twenty nodes in my research, I have elected to analyze nine in particular. I chose to select these nodes because of the time rationale in creating a meaningful analysis and also because of the diverse ways all three actors employ these discourses. The key nodes can be visualized below in Figure 2:

**IV. Analysis:**

Within the larger discourses of development during the NVDP and specifically the Sardar Sarovar Dam, I have noted two key representations that underpin the larger discourses of development. First, I will begin by detailing my claim of the term international development having no intrinsic meaning and thereby enabling specific actors to operationalize the term to further their...
stake on a specific representation of development. I have used the utilitarianism discourse to further substantiate this argument. Finally, I will explain how the NVDP went on to influence development as having both costs to humans and the environment, leading to a shift in the discourse on development in India.

A. International Development as an Empty Signifier:

The central puzzle of this research asks how the diametrically opposed discourses of development as erasure and modernization can exist in the same spatial landscape; in this section, I claim that the two discourses are able to exist in the same space because international development has itself been stripped of any meaning as shown through the discursive overlap in specific key nodes and divergence in other key nodes, seen in Figure 3. (Bergström, Ekström, and Boréus 2017, 217). To contextualize this overlap of discourses, both actors heavily echo the Compensation discourse. For example, the Madya Pradesh Chief Minister conceded that rehabilitation of the displaced was the biggest hurdle to completing the project (Desai, 1993). Simultaneously in 1999, the NBA was also advancing the discourse of development ignoring compensation efforts (Sangvai, 1999). This overlap is also seen in the Patriotism discourse seen through Modi and Patkar’s discursive strategy in appealing to patriotic tendencies in advancing each respective discourse (Patkar, 2018; Modi, 2017).

Figure 3: Project Map comparing key nodes between the Indian Government and the NBA.

While there is much overlap seen in Figure 3, there are clear divergences in the key nodal points of this research. For example, the discourses of development as Degradation and Disenfranchisement is unique to the NBA while the discourses of development as Modernization and Prosperity is unique to the Indian Government. However, this simultaneous convergence and divergence of representations of
development points to the idea that the term “international development” has been harnessed by each actor group to best fit their own interests, solidifying development’s status as an empty signifier. The two discourses are ultimately able to occupy the same spatial geography because each defines international development through the conceptualization of key nodal points to best fit their respective desired end result of the NVDP – either construction and modernization or abandoning the project and prioritizing indigenous land and people.

**Utilitarianism: The Key Tool to the Construction of an Empty Signifier:**

While there are many nodal points that articulate international development as an empty signifier, I have chosen to dedicate this section toward the utilitarianism discourse because of the diverging ways all three actors advance it. In this research, I have chosen to define utilitarianism according to the classical framework, advanced by philosophers like Bentham and Mill. In this classical approach, utilitarianism is defined as “the greatest amount of good for the greatest number” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2009). Utilitarianism as a discourse in this research can be understood as an empty signifier in the same way that international development can be understood.

As with international development, different actors harness Utilitarianism in fashions that benefit their agendas in the NVDP. For example, Indian government actors harness the Utilitarianism discourse to point to the benefits of the NVDP in bringing water to those in cities in Gujarat and Madya Pradesh as well as the economic benefits of modernization (Alvares and Billorey 1999, 18; Editorial Board, 2017; Our Special Correspondent, 1999). For example, S.C. Varma, the former chairman of the Narmada Valley Development Authority (the governing body of the NVDP) stated that, “The family getting displaced thus makes a sacrifice for the sake of the community. It undergoes hardship and distress and faces an uncertain future so that others may live in happiness and be economically better off” (Alvares and Billorey, 18). The Utilitarian discourse employed here and by other government actors highlight the “greater good” component of Utilitarianism to contend that the project yields hope of modernization.

In contrast, the Narmada Bachao Andolan reproduces the Utilitarianism discourse to advance the discourse of development as erasure by pointing to Utilitarianism as the key problem with the development paradigm of the NVDP (Friends of the River Narmada, 1995; Patkar, 1991; Roy, 1999; Rushdie, 2001; Barsamian, 2007). Illustrating this discourse in action is Medha Patkar: when asked about the benefits of large infrastructure projects, like the NVDP, Patkar states that while dams have benefits, much of the benefit is confined to a small and much more elite section of the population (Friends of the River Narmada, 1995).
Patkar then goes on to say that because of inequality in benefits, there must be an “alternative approach to development” (Friends of the River Narmada, 1995). The utilitarian discourse employed by the NBA singles out Utilitarianism as the key fault to international development and uses the empty signifier of Utilitarianism to call for a paradigm shift in international development.

Figure 4: Word Cloud representing frequent words associated with Indian Government usage of Utilitarianism

Figure 5: Word Cloud depicting frequent words associated with NBA usage of Utilitarianism

These two conceptualizations of Utilitarianism can also be visually represented to highlight the degree to which Utilitarianism is used as an empty signifier in this research. According to Figure 4, the Indian Government most frequently uses words such as “Gujarat,” “Authority,” and “Government” when advancing the discourse of utilitarianism. According to Figure 5, the NBA uses words like “People,” “Government,” “Displaced,” and “Rehabilitation” when advancing the Utilitarianism discourse. The degree of difference to which these actors harness the Utilitarian discourse, therefore, heightens its status as an empty signifier.

Diverging from the binaries of the ways in which Utilitarianism is advanced by the Indian Government and the NBA is the World Bank’s reproduction of this discourse. As a main benefactor to the NVDP, the World Bank initially began to echo the Utilitarian discourse more similarly to the ways the Indian Government did – pointing to the benefits to a larger portion of society if implemented (The World Bank, 1985). However, upon withdrawal, the Bank is shown to reproduce the discourse of Utilitarianism as a major downfall of the
project, especially in critiquing the “pari passu” method (ongoing construction while simultaneously conducting environmental impact studies and resettlement deals) (Morse and Berger, 1992). This shift in the discourse carries even further implications to international development’s status as an empty signifier if the largest multilateral development agency alters its understanding of the concept.

The Interwoven Nature of Degradation and Disenfranchisement

My second claim relates to the discourses of development as a process that induces Degradation and Disenfranchisement, or both environmental and human costs, respectively. I claim that another reason the two opposing discourses of development as erasure and modernization are able to occupy the same spatial geography in spite of power differentials is due to the NBA’s conceptualization of development as having both human and environmental costs as seen through the interwoven usage of the Disenfranchisement and Degradation discourses. The interwoven use of these two discourses also holds implications for development practice and study. I advance this claim because, contextually, this usage of both Degradation and Disenfranchisement is a shift in the larger discourse of development. For example, during his tenure of Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru wrote a letter to the Chief Ministers of India in 1952 and emphasized the need to balance development with nature (Sahu, 2018). In his letter, however, there is no mention of the need to consider human costs in the development process. The Narmada Bachao Andolan’s act of simultaneously harnessing the Disenfranchisement and Degradation discourses, therefore, acts as a shift in the larger discourses of development and its relation to the environment.

Figure 6: World Cloud depicting frequent words associated with the Narmada Bachao Andolan’s usage of Degradation and Disenfranchisement.
This interconnected usage of the Degradation and Disenfranchisement discourse can be visualized further through Figure 6 and Figure 7. Figure 6 clearly points to the doubled usage of Degradation and Disenfranchisement in conceptualizing development. According to this figure, the Narmada Bachao Andolan most frequently uses the words “Human” and “Environment” when advancing the Disenfranchisement and Degradation discourse, respectively, to explain development. In a press release from March 1999, the Narmada Bachao Andolan points to the impacts the dam will have on both indigenous land and health (Sangvai, 1999). In the same press release, the NBA claims that the Sardar Sarovar Dam is a “violation of the tribals’ right to life and other democratic, human rights” (Sangvai, 1999). Similarly, Arundhati Roy expresses both discourses in her Greater Common Good through a discussion of human health and environmental impacts of the NVDP on the Narmada Valley (Roy, 1999). The articulation of development as a process that affects livelihoods tied to the environment as well as one that strips people of their human rights and democracy is a shift from the unilateral environmental discourse of development.

This reconceptualization of development to include both human and environmental costs is not limited to the Narmada Bachao Andolan, however; the World Bank also reproduces this discourse after withdrawing from the project. The Bank’s Morse Report, for example, points to the fault of the Bank proceeding with the project despite a limited comprehension of both human and environmental harm (Morse and Berger, 2, 6-7, 11-13). Figure 7 visually represents this rhetoric more broadly than Figure 6 because this figure is not confined to any actor. The World Bank’s interwoven usage of the Degradation and Disenfranchisement discourse speaks to the reconceptualization of development as having costs to both humans and the environment, as Figure 6 depicts.

This interwoven discourse is able to contribute to the central research question, or how the discourses of erasure and modernization are able to occupy the same space. I claim that the interwoven reproduction of Degradation and
Disenfranchisement by the NBA contributed to the minimization of the power differential between the Indian Government and the NBA. This effect on the power differential thereby allowed the discourse of development as erasure to occupy the same spatial geography as the discourse of modernization with similar legitimacy. Contextually, the power differential between the Adivasis and the Indian Government has existed since British colonial rule and was further perpetuated through the model of internalized colonial policy and the eventual consolidation of knowledge (St. Germaine, 2014). After having established the relationship between the environment and humans in development, the NBA was able to catch the attention of the international community. As such, Patkar accepted the Right Livelihood Award, the Right Livelihood Award published a report in its support of the NBA, and the United Nations High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) published a press release critiquing the human rights abuses of the Narmada Valley (Parkar, 1999; The Right Livelihood Award, 1997; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2006). Concurrent usage of the Degradation and Disenfranchisement discourse to elaborate upon the human and environmental costs of development allowed the NBA to garner attention from the international community. This strategy of linking environmental collapse to human rights violations allowed the discourse of development as erasure to occupy the same spatial geography with the same validity as the Indian Government’s reproduction of the Modernization discourse.

The reproduction of the Degradation and Disenfranchisement discourses carries considerable implications for development interventions in rural India as well as the Global South. By demonstrating that livelihood is tied to human and environmental relationships seen in rural India, this research points to the need for a rewiring of development interventions that affect land tenure. The undeniable attention placed on the roles of the Narmada Bachao Andolan, the Indian Government, and the World Bank in the NVDP points to a fundamental misunderstanding of the needs of a diverse community of people from development. While catering to the needs of people living in urban areas of Gujarat and Madya Pradesh, the NVDP fundamentally neglects the needs of the Adivasis living in the region, or the subaltern.

V. Conclusion

This research seeks to understand how the discourses of development as modernization and erasure can occupy the same spatial geography during the Narmada Valley Development Projects in Gujarat and Madya Pradesh. Analysis through multiple readings of each text in NVivo and the creation of visualizations suggests that these divergent discourses are able to occupy the same spatial geography because international development is an empty signifier substantiated through the empty signifier of utilitarianism. Moreover, the two discourses were able to inhabit
the same spatial environment because of the NBA’s simultaneous usage of the Degradation and Disenfranchisement discourses. This usage led to international acclaim and the ability to occupy the same spatial landscape as the discourse of modernization with similar legitimacy.

International development’s status as an empty signifier creates a vacuum for development monitoring and evaluation. This knowledge vacuum also allows for the creation and reinforcement of regimes of dominance while allowing for injustice in the name of development to flourish. Moreover, development’s status as an empty signifier calls into question the truth and governmentality of conventional development authorities. For example, the World Bank’s shift in discourse upon withdrawal points to its own uncertainty regarding the meaning of development. For an organization as influential as the World Bank to hesitate on the meaning of development, there must exist widespread misunderstanding and articulations of development.

In my pursuit of unpacking this research question, this research also connects and contributes to the theoretical frameworks informing it. First is this research’s implication on neoliberal critiques of the World Bank; the use of Utilitarianism to point to the positive impacts of development is associated with the neoliberal paradigm of development (Munck, 63). Many scholars are intrigued by the “stickiness” of the neoliberalism paradigm of development, or the idea that the World Bank has legitimized the Utilitarianism discourse and continues to advance it beyond the Washington Consensus era (Fine, 894; Nielson, 57). This research, however, points to the shift in the World Bank’s discourses on development from modernization to erasure taking place after withdrawing from the project. This specific shift in the discourse has implications on the perceived “stickiness” of the Bank’s reproduction of Utilitarianism and its ability to reconcile with its past. Moreover, this research contributes to the postcolonial frameworks of development through its emphasis on the subaltern. This research, however, goes beyond acknowledging the subaltern but centralizes the subaltern in the development process. Echoing the “Buen Vivir” framework advanced by Gudynas, this research contends that indigenous knowledge and needs must be met in the development process, surpassing simply acknowledging the subaltern (Gudynas, 441).

As I have chosen to pursue an interpretive research methodology, replication in terms of neo-positivist research can be challenged. However, in keeping with interpretive research standards, reflexivity has been a critical evaluative standard in my research (Scwartz-Shea and Yanow, 100). A prominent feature of critical theory research is the notion of “hyper-reflexivity,” or questioning what gives the researcher the right to even conduct this research (Noxolo, 48). My
identity has a large role in my research in connection with the actors I am researching. Due to my diasporic identity and private educational background, researching subaltern groups in India does not come without its tensions. Ultimately, this research process has not come without self-reflection and introspection.

This research does come with its own shortcomings, and researchers interested in furthering this work should be conscious of them. First, I am not fluent and/or able to translate documents from either Hindi, Guajarati, or the many languages spoken by the Adivasi people. Due to this, I was only able to access pre-translated versions of the sources I used for analysis, allowing much of the content to be lost in translation. I imagine that if I were better equipped to translate these documents on my own, I could ensure greater transparency and reliability in the translation process itself. Additionally, my decision to conduct an official discourse analysis isolates the many unofficial accounts of the NVDP. While the Narmada Bachao Andolan was formally organized, there are many fringe groups that were not formally organized and whose contribution toward resistance went undocumented in this research. Confronted with the trade-off of incorporating a wider array of sources or narrowing the scope of my research, I chose the latter.

In furthering my research, I believe it would be interesting to understand the discourses of development on a larger scale than a regionally specific study like my own. For example, tracing representations of development reproduced by multilateral development organizations, like the World Bank or the IMF, and aid agencies, like Oxfam International or World Food Programme, would provide an interesting insight on potential discursive shifts similar to the shifts I observed in my own research. Another potential area of study can include case comparisons of large hydroelectric dam projects within India, such as the Tehri Dam in Uttarakhand, and even beyond India, such as the Akosombo Dam in Ghana (Environmental Justice Atlas, n.d.). These two hydroelectric dams also resulted in mass social movements protesting the construction of the respective dams. A discourse analysis of these other movements would add to both social movement literature as well as postcolonial development literature.

As a starting point, this research highlights the idea that without a cohesive and collective understanding of the purpose, goals, and impact analysis of international development, international development will continue to be used as an empty signifier, resulting in the perpetuation of the discourses of erasure and modernization. This incoherence points to the zombie status of development in that the modernity platform has come back time and time again to impose its tired will on the development process. The failure of the development community to articulate its vision for development beyond the zombie of modernization must be rectified in order for inclusive development to ensue.
Works Cited


Editorial Board. “It is time to rethink the ‘big dams’ model of development.” The Hindustan Times (Sept. 19, 2017).


Rao, “Playing Both Sides: Development and Destruction: Representations of International Development During the Narmada Valley Development Projects”


Mujumdar, Soudamini. “Medha Patkar was arrested to maintain peace: Government,” The Times of India (June 21, 2018) DOW Jones Factiva (Last Accessed: April 27, 2019).


Operations Evaluation Department Précis. “Learning from Narmada,” The World Bank Group,
Rao, “Playing Both Sides: Development and Destruction: Representations of International Development During the Narmada Valley Development Projects”


Rao, “Playing Both Sides: Development and Destruction: Representations of International Development During the Narmada Valley Development Projects”
GENERATION AND INCOME IN PREDICTING ABORTION ATTITUDES IN THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE

Marissa Zupancic:

Abstract

This research project seeks to identify if an American voter’s generation or income is helpful in predicting his or her views on abortion. Although there is much discourse that exists on the topic of perceptions of abortion, I hope to pursue something more specific: the correlation between the generation that a person belongs to and their view on abortion. Additionally, more recent data is available from the 2016 election year regarding incomes. I hypothesize that in comparing voters, those belonging to older generations will be more likely to oppose abortion than younger generations, and that those belonging to higher income groups will be more likely to oppose abortion than lower income groups. To test my hypotheses, I used the American National Election Survey Data from 2016. I separated income into three groups, from less than $50,000, $50,000 to $100,000, and greater than $100,000. Generation is split up into Generation Z, Millennial, Generation X, and Baby Boomer. I controlled for party registration, gender, religiosity, and whether or not a person was Catholic and attended church. In my final tests, I used a chi square crosstab with a Somer’s d proportional reduction in error. In conclusion, as generation grows older and as income increases, a person is more likely to be pro-choice than pro-life, maintaining the same result with controls. More research should be done on predicting American voters’ abortion attitudes with additional controls, like race, but the trends for income and abortion are clear and statistically significant with positive correlation within the bounds of this study.

Purpose and Overview

For this research, I studied how generation and income correlate to whether a voter favors or opposes abortion in the United States. Research currently concludes that voters with a higher income and older generation tend
to favor the Republican Party whose platform includes opposing abortion in varying degrees (Gelman et al. 2010, 46 and Day 1990, 40). Previous research has been conducted analyzing the determinants of views on abortion, with past literature finding links between religious leanings, generation, and to different views on abortion. However, I specifically looked at whether income and age directly affect a voter’s view on abortion. Essentially, people with higher incomes would be less likely to favor abortion because they would have the funds to care for a child if they found themselves in a relevant situation. Additionally, a person with a higher age would be less likely to favor abortion because the individual would probably be in a later phase of life that would not require a major family planning decision.

This paper analyzes two hypotheses. The first is in comparing voters, those belonging to older generations will be more likely to oppose abortion than those belonging to newly emerging generations in the American electorate. The second hypothesis is in comparing voters, those having a higher income will be more likely to oppose abortion than will those having a lower income.

I used the American National Election Survey from 2016 as my data. As 2016 is the most recent general election in the United States, this data is the most relevant to build on existing research. Also, it included all of my main and control variables in one study across the entire United States. My independent variables were ordinal, analyzing generations from Generation Z to Baby Boomer and income from low at less than $49,999 to high at greater than $100,000. Abortion attitudes were ranked ranging from never to exceptions for rape, incest, and when the woman’s life is in danger to a matter of personal choice. I controlled for religion, religiosity, gender, and party identification. For the test, I ran a crosstab with chi square and a proportion reduction in error of Somer’s d.

Through this research, I established that I was able to reject my null for both hypotheses. Generation and abortion attitude had a significant but weak relationship, where as generation increased, those favoring abortion as a matter of personal choice increased. The results occurred in the same direction for income, but the relationship was moderate.

**Literature Review**

Abortion encompasses a wide range of views going far beyond a simple yes or no answer as to whether abortion should remain legal. While strong links have been previously established between party identification and religion predicting abortion attitudes, much debate remains as to which factor is the strongest predictor. However, not much analysis has been conducted isolating
the variables of income and age in predicting a voter’s attitude towards abortion. When stripping away party identity, individual factors vary related to abortion attitudes, especially among emerging Millennial and Gen Z voters, that has yet to be studied closely with other generations and varying incomes. An analysis using the American National Election Survey (ANES) results from 2016 will provide a large sample of rankings of individuals’ views on abortion on a wide scale, as well as respondents’ age, gender, party identification, income, and religion.

Varying Viewpoints

Abortion views vary on both sides of the argument, with many different answers to the same question of how one feels about abortion. In light of this, Skitka and Morgan (2014) discuss the many different domains of attitudes towards abortion to identify how someone may view the abortion question. These researchers recognize that polarizing issues with moral convictions have very strong ties to emotion, making abortion more often-than-not a moral issue (Skitka and Morgan 2014, 105). In their discussion of abortion, they define it in terms of a moral imperative, preference, or normative conception (Skitka and Morgan 2014, 96). Personal preferences refer to if a person would like the option of having an abortion due to issues like financial struggles (Skitka and Morgan 2014, 96). A normative conception consists of a person who believes abortion should not occur due to religious beliefs but would change his or her opinion if the religion’s stance also changed (Skitka and Morgan 2014, 96). Finally, a moral conception means that in some cases individuals firmly believe abortion should not occur and their opinions would not be swayed by a changing public acceptance of abortion (Skitka and Morgan 2014, 96-97). Because many different factors play into the issue of abortion, it is hard to pinpoint which voter factors are the strongest predictor of a person’s view on abortion, like race, religion, age, etc., when added onto Skitka and Morgan’s (2014) different ways of viewing abortion.

Religion

Shortly after the landmark Roe v. Wade (1973) decision, many political scientists began trying to determine the most telling factor of a voter’s profile for determining abortion attitude. A study done by Legge (1983) that used a discriminant analysis with the 1980 Survey Research Center Election Survey to identify what variables best describe abortion attitudes concluded that while few consistent predictors in abortion were known, religion was the most reliable factor, especially among Catholics (Legge 1983, 481-482). Specifically looking at Catholics in data will provide an update on this literature from the ‘80s to see if the trend continues. Seeing as this study took place more than 30 years ago and given that
the United States has become increasingly more secular, especially among younger generations, this data must be analyzed from a recent perspective to ensure trends remain the same. Achen and Bartels (2017) reaffirmed Legge’s original argument focusing mainly on a Southern perspective but noted that Evangelical Christians have increased in number in the Republican Party while other religious groups have become less politically distinctive over the years. Thus, they establish that Evangelicals are the most telling religious group linked with abortion attitudes today. While religion remains a key influence in abortion attitudes, Achen and Bartels (2017) concluded that identifying as a woman trumped religious identity when predicting for views on abortion.

Chaves (2017) made the argument, through regression analysis with the General Social Survey results from 1974-2014, that religion is not the best predictor of a person’s views on abortion because these attitudes vary depending on how actively a person attends religious services (104-105). While there is a connection between frequently attending church and a stronger likelihood to oppose abortion, it is increasingly more common to change religions to marry a person, which will not inherently alter a person’s abortion views (Chaves 2017, 111-112). Chaves (2017) also points out that in terms of religious service attendance, this predictor has only grown stronger where people regularly attending church are more likely to oppose abortion in cases of rape and serious fetal defects. This is especially evident in the growing Evangelical population in the Republican party (105-106). Thus, although much research has been conducted on religion’s ties to abortion, many studies have contradicted each other on how accurate this variable is in predicting a voter’s views on abortion with Evangelical voters as the exception.

**Income, Gender, and Age**

Not much discussion exists focusing specifically on how a person’s income affects their views on abortion. Most of this analysis is closely linked to partisanship or other factors that may depend on a person’s income. However, some progress has been made in specifically analyzing generational differences when determining a voter’s view on abortion. One study explained that abortion views have been continuously stable since Roe v. Wade (1973) on an individual level, closely linked with partisanship, and on an overall level, using aggregate General Social Survey data (Jelen and Wilcox 2003, 489). Jelen and Wilcox’s study is about 15 years old, making their data less relevant to the current political climate. Their study does include generational differences in how those growing up before the 1960s are less supportive of abortion than those who are just now becoming adults, but it is essential to look at new generations coming of age, like Millennials and Generation Z.
While Jelen and Wilcox (2003) suggest that partisanship is closely linked to a voter’s abortion attitude, a study done around the same time explains that women may be likely to shift to the Democratic Party to match their pro-choice views (Edlund and Pande 2002, 921). Researchers explained this was likely due to conservatives being against abortion which causes women to switch their party to Democrat (Edlund and Pande 2002, 921). However, this was debunked when data demonstrated that abortion rights did not affect men and women’s party identifications equally (Edlund and Pande 2002, 921). While partisanship does play an important role in determining one’s attitudes toward abortion, consensus is lacking in how much of a part it actually plays in influencing abortion attitudes.

Going further on the question of age that Jelen and Wilcox (2003) highlight, Rouse and Ross (2018) detailed that, based on a 2015 study with roughly 1,000 participants, Millennials are more likely to be pro-choice on the abortion issue, while older individuals sticking to “traditional family values” prefer abortion restrictions (Ross and Rouse 2018, 175). However, these researchers made a discovery in that Millennials are not statistically distinct from older generations on abortion, based on a regression analysis, but do differ significantly on other issues like guns and marijuana (Ross and Rouse 2018, 186). While young adults are more conservative on abortion, the study explained that Millennials most favor abortion rights when they have a “positive government worldview” (Rouse and Ross 2018, 187-188). Across all age groups, women and those with higher incomes are more likely to be pro-choice, but this study was relatively small, so more research is necessary to verify these findings (Rouse and Ross 2018, 189). The American National Election Survey of 2016 has about 4,000 participants, much larger than Rouse and Ross’.

With the emerging voter groups of Millennials and Generation Z, the factors of age and income have less consensus within the literature describing the attitudes of voters. While there is merit in researchers relating partisanship and religion to one’s abortion attitudes, these studies fail to recognize the multitude of other factors that affect abortion attitudes and are not as reliable as recent research has shown. Additionally, past research looking specifically at age and abortion attitudes is outdated, failing to analyze new generations. Across most of the articles discussed, researchers determined that much more research is needed to determine which factors most heavily influence abortion attitudes. Most of the studies utilized a study design that allowed individuals to rank their views on abortion, ranging from always allow, to only when the mother’s life is in danger. By organizing opinions in this way, voters had more opportunity to exhibit the wide range of views on such a divisive issue. A larger sample is needed, provided by the
ANES 2016 results, to analyze the variables of age and income specifically.

**Study Design**

*Theory and Expectations*

The first hypothesis is that in comparing voters, those belonging to older generations will be more likely to oppose abortion than will those belonging to newly emerging generations in the American electorate. Thus, the null hypothesis is that in comparing voters, those belonging to older generations will be as likely to oppose abortion than will those belonging to newly emerging generations in the American electorate. Rouse and Ross (2018) established that Millennials were more likely than older generations to favor abortion but found that Millennials were surprisingly more conservative on abortion than other issues, like guns or marijuana. In testing this research hypothesis, I expect this relationship to continue, but I also expect to see more liberal views on abortion in younger generations than older ones because young people are more likely to be left-leaning (Rouse and Ross 2018, 196-198). Because younger people are biologically capable of having children opposed to those past the age of childbearing, this issue will most likely be more pressing to younger generations. Additionally, the age in which people were socialized may have an impact on their abortion views. Similar to the first hypothesis, I expect to see an inverse relationship between age and abortion attitudes where as age increases, support for abortion decreases.

The second hypothesis of this study is that in comparing voters, those having a higher income will be more likely to oppose abortion than will those having a lower income. This null hypothesis would then be in comparing voters, those having a higher income will be as likely to oppose abortion than will those having a lower income. I expect the research hypothesis to be true because those with more money tend to vote Republican, and the Republican Party supports at a minimum, abortion restrictions, and at most, banning abortion in all cases. Rouse and Ross (2018) established that women and those with higher incomes were more likely to be pro-choice, but this link to income was only found in one study. Thus, people with higher incomes would likely be in the position to oppose abortions because they have the means to access abortions out of the country, while lower income people lack those opportunities and would not be able to afford caring for a child. Therefore, I expect these variables to have an inverse relationship where, as income increases, support for abortion is likely to decrease.

*Operationalization and Measurement of Concepts*

The two independent variables in this study are generation and income. The American National Election Study of 2016 uses V161267, which I have renamed
as generation, to gauge respondents’ age with codes matching the respondents’ ages ranging from 18 to 67, which respondents identify. To better fit my analysis, I will group ages based on their generational name, beginning with Generation Z (born between 1997 and 2012) coding as 0, Millennials (born between 1981 and 1996) coding as 1, Generation X (born between 1965 and 1980) coding as 2, and Baby Boomers (born between 1946 and 1964) coding as 3. The concept of income as variable V161361X, which I have renamed as income, has values ranging from 1 to 28, which respondents identify, from less than $5,000 to more than $250,000. These income brackets are not broken up evenly, with categories varying from increasing by $3,500 to $25,000 up the values. I will simplify these values, collapsing the variables into three categories for those making $49,999 or less at 0, $50,000 to $99,999 as 1, and those making more than $100,000 as 2, with the last category matching Rouse and Ross’ (2018) income category. I used the lower income categories because the ANES study has much more participants from lower income groups. From the same study, a higher income was linked with supporting abortion (Rouse and Ross 2018, 189).

Abortion views is variable V161232, which I have renamed abortionview, is rated on a scale of self-placement ranging from 1 to 5, coding for abortion should never be permitted as 1, only in cases of rape, incest, or the woman’s life is in danger as 2, for reasons other than rape, incest, or the woman’s life is in danger if the need is established as 3, abortion as a matter of personal choice as 4, and other as 5. This coding matches the way the ANES data rated abortion views. Because abortion views vary significantly across factors like religion and age in individuals across more than just the pro-choice/pro-life binary, (Rouse and Ross 2018; Chaves 2017).

The final concepts are the variables I will control for across the study, which are gender, religion, religiosity, and party registration, all self-identified by respondents. The concept of gender as variable V161342, which I have renamed gender, is coded as 1 for males and 2 for females, where research has shown that women tend to be more supportive of abortion rights (Rouse and Ross 2018, 189). Religion is coded for attending church, as V161247A, which I have renamed as church, and not attending church as V161247B, which I have renamed as nochurch, where each variable has categories of Catholic as 1 and Non-Catholic as 2. Legge (1983) established a link between religion predicting abortion attitude, but more recent studies by Achen and Bartels (2017) established that identifying as a woman was the most telling predictor of abortion attitude (260). Additionally, Chaves (2017) indicated that those who attend church more often are more likely to oppose abortion in cases of rape and serious fetal defects (105-106). Finally, party registration is variable V161019, which I have renamed partyreg, and codes
from as 1 for Democratic Party, 2 for Republican Party, 4 for none or independent, and 5 for other. Those registered as Democrats would be most likely to be pro-choice among all registration groups, but Edlund and Pande (2002) have shown that one does not only switch parties due to abortion attitude.

Research Design:

The data set this study will examine is the American National Election Study 2016 Times Series Study which has a total of 4,271 respondents. I will be running tests on the control variables of party registration, gender, and religion when looking at how abortion attitudes are affected by the independent variables of age and income. Generation, income, and abortion views are all ordinal variables.

I will run the main study tests looking at generation and income related to views on abortion. The tests I will use are a chi square test with crosstabs with a proportional reduction in error measurement of Somer’s d because my variables are ordinal. The independent variables in the two separate tests will be generation and income, with the constant dependent variable of views on abortion.

For the control variables, I will add these into my crosstabs with chi square values and a Somer’s d measurement. Those who identify with a religion and who attend religious services more frequently, or who have a higher religiosity, are more likely to oppose abortion than those who do not, which has held up in studies by Legge (1983) and Chaves (2017). Because of the strong link Legge identified with Catholics, Catholics who attend church and those who do not will be studied separately. Gender will be controlled for because Rouse and Ross (2018) determined that women are more likely to favor abortion. Finally, I will control for party registration because Democrats are more likely to favor abortion because the party’s platform has less restrictive views on abortion.

These tests will hopefully lead me to reject my null hypothesis and support that there is likely a link between both increased age and income in opposing abortion.

Analysis and Conclusion

Results and Analysis

After running descriptives on my independent variables of age and income and my dependent variable of abortion attitude, I determined mode of each. Based off of this analysis, the most common abortion attitude is a matter of personal choice, which codes for 4. The most frequent income answer is making less than $49,999 which codes as 1. The final variable, generation, has the most common response as those in the Baby Boomer generation, or those born between 1946 and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Descriptives (Main Variables)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For my control variables, there were about 300 more female respondents than males. There were about 350 more Catholics who attend church than Cultural Catholics, or Catholics who do not attend church. Additionally, the most frequent response on the religiosity question was attending church every week. The most frequent response for party registration was Democrat.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Descriptives (Controls)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religiousity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main test for this study is a chi square test to measure the relationships between age and income on abortion attitudes while controlling for party registration, gender, how frequently an individual attends religious services, and religious identification. I ran two separate tests on each independent variable with the same controls. All tests are judged on a significance level of rejecting the null with a p-value of less than or equal to 0.10. Because all variables are ordinal, the proportional reduction in error (PRE) measurement is Somer’s d. This PRE measures the strength of the relationships I have tested, telling how much the independent variable values predict the dependent variable values.

Beginning with the test of generation on abortion attitudes, the crosstab does not show a directional relationship across any of the categories.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is R’s abortion attitude?</th>
<th>Never</th>
<th>Rape/Incest/Woman’s life in danger</th>
<th>Reasons other than Rape/Incest/Woman’s life in danger</th>
<th>Personal Choice</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What generation does R belong to?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What generation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen Z</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millennial</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>496</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen X</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baby Boomer</td>
<td></td>
<td>394</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>1607</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% within What generation does R belong to?

- Gen Z: 70.9%, 13.1%
- Millennial: 15.7%, 13.0%
- Gen X: 13.1%, 13.0%
- Baby Boomer: 13.4%, 13.4%

% within What generation does R belong to?

- Gen Z: 34.4%, 25.0%
- Millennial: 24.5%, 25.7%
- Gen X: 13.4%, 14.9%
- Baby Boomer: 13.4%, 14.0%

% within What generation does R belong to?

- Personal Choice: 31.3%, 49.0%
- Other: 0.0%, 0.0%

% within What generation does R belong to?

- Personal Choice: 47.0%, 46.0%
- Other: 0.0%, 0.3%

% within What generation does R belong to?

- Personal Choice: 47.1%
- Other: 0.1%
The initial chi square test had a value of 18.604 with a p-value of 0.099. Because the p-value met the threshold of being less than 0.10, I can reject the null hypothesis. The PRE statistic is very weak at only 0.007, so I can improve prediction on abortion attitudes 0.7% by knowing their generation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model 1A: Generation and Abortion Attitude</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi Square</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRE (Somer’s d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^P-value is significant at less than or equal to 0.10.
*Somer’s d is moderate at values between 0.1 and 0.2.

When controlling for religiosity, which determines how often one attends a religious service, a significant but weak relationship occurs for those attending church a few times per year. Therefore, generation matters more for people attending church a few times per year.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 4 (Control)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Model 2A: Model 1A + Religiosity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRE (Somer’s d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^P-value is significant at less than or equal to 0.10.
*Somer’s d is moderate at values between 0.1 and 0.2.

When controlling for Catholics who do and do not attend church, no p-values met the threshold of being less than or equal to 0.10.
Controlling for gender yielded a significant relationship for men, with a chi square value of 23.510 and a p-value of 0.024. Because the value based on the degrees of freedom is 21.026 which is less than the chi square value, I can reject the null in this instance, demonstrating that generation affects abortion attitudes in males. Gender, specifically for men, is the only control variable that demonstrates a relationship. However, the Somer’s d statistic is only -0.018 which only demonstrates a weak relationship.

For party registration, a significant but weak relationship occurred for those who are registered as None or Independent. Generation matters more for those whose party registration is None/Independent.
The results from the test of income on abortion attitudes yielded more telling results. The crosstab shows that as income increases, the percent saying abortion should never be permitted decreases and the percent saying abortion is a matter of personal choice increases.

![Table 8 (Control)](image)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>What is R's income?</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% within What is R's income?</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within What is R's income?</td>
<td>71.1%</td>
<td>79.0%</td>
<td>50.4%</td>
<td>76.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within What is R's income?</td>
<td>15.1%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within What is R's income?</td>
<td>41.0%</td>
<td>44.1%</td>
<td>57.5%</td>
<td>46.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within What is R's income?</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8 (Control)
Model 6A: Model 1A + Party Registration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chi Square</th>
<th>13.774</th>
<th>15.508</th>
<th>19.204</th>
<th>19.546</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P-value</td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td>0.333</td>
<td>0.084^</td>
<td>0.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRE (Somer’s d)</td>
<td>0.084^</td>
<td>0.033</td>
<td>0.084^</td>
<td>0.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1625</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^P-value is significant at less than or equal to 0.10.
^Somer’s d is moderate at values between 0.1 and 0.2.
For the initial test of income on abortion attitudes, the chi square value is 85.617 with a p-value of 0.000. The value based on the degrees of freedom is 15.507, which is less than the chi square value, so I can reject the null and state that there is a significant relationship between the two variables. Somer’s d is 0.115 indicating that there is a moderate relationship where one can improve his or her predictions on abortion attitudes by 11.5% by knowing respondents’ income.

When controlling for religiosity, the chi square value is 32.844 total with a p-value of 0.000, where the chi square value is greater than 15.507 based on the degrees of freedom. The Somer’s d statistic is low at 0.080 total demonstrating a weak relationship. The relationship is strongest for those attending religious services a few times a year, where the chi square value is 16.893 with a p-value of 0.010, where the chi square value is greater than 12.592 on the degrees of freedom chart. With the Somer’s d statistic of 0.114 indicating a moderate relationship, one can improve his or her predictions on abortion attitudes by 11.4% by knowing respondents’ income for those attending religious services a few times per year. Income matters most for people attending church a few times per year.

Both Catholic variables have significant relationships in total, so it is possible to reject the null for both variables. The only relationship across all values of both variables that is not significant is Catholics who do not attend church because the p-value of 0.222 is greater than 0.05. For the variable describing Catholics attending church, the only Somer’s d statistic that demonstrates a relationship, which is moderate, is for Catholics at 0.122, so one can improve his or her predictions on abortion attitudes by 12.2% by knowing respondents’ income.
for Catholics attending church. For the variable describing those who do not attend church, the Somer’s d statistic demonstrate moderate relationships for those who are not Catholic and the total categories. Predictions of abortion attitudes can improve 18.2% by knowing respondents’ income for those who are not Catholic who do not attend Church. Additionally, predictions of abortion attitudes can improve 16.2% by knowing respondents’ income for those who are religious who do not attend church. Thus, income matters for both Catholics and Non-Catholics who attend church, but more so for Catholics. Income matters for those who are not Catholic who do not attend church, as well. This may be due to the fact that Catholics make up only one religion, whereas the Not Catholic category in the ANES includes all religions other than Catholic allowing for a wider range of religious beliefs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 11 (Control)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 3B: Model 1B + Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi Square</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRE (Somer’s d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^P-value is significant at less than or equal to 0.10.
*Somer’s d is moderate at values between 0.1 and 0.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 12 (Control)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Model 4B: Model 1B + No Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi Square</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRE (Somer’s d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

^P-value is significant at less than or equal to 0.10.
*Somer’s d is moderate at values between 0.1 and 0.2.

Income affects all values of gender because each value has a p-value of 0.000. Therefore, income matters for all values of gender. Income matters for females, where one can improve his or her predictions on abortion attitudes by 14.1% by knowing respondents’ income when they are female.
For the final control test, party of registration, all values of the test are significant. Therefore, income matters for all values of party registration at about the same strength. The relationships are moderate and are strongest for the “None/Independent” category with a Somer’s d statistic of 0.188, then for Democrats at 0.166, and Republicans at 0.140.

Each control variable when testing for income on abortion attitudes has an interactive relationship. For gender, the relationship is stronger for women. Religiosity only has a relationship, although still moderate, for attending church a few times per year. Catholics who attend church have a stronger relationship than those who are not Catholic and do attend church. The opposite is true for the Catholic variable that does not include church, where those who are not Catholic and do not attend church have a stronger relationship than those who are Catholic. Finally, party registration is the strongest for None/Independents, less strong for Democrats, then weakest for Republicans.
Conclusion

Through this research, I conclude that the analyses performed support a statistically significant relationship between both age and income in predicting abortion attitudes. Rouse and Ross (2018) report a link in income and supporting women’s rights to abortions with a positive, statistically significant P-value (183). My research supports this paper by Rouse and Ross (2018), even though it contradicts my initial research hypothesis regarding income. I expected that the relationship would be negative where, as income decreased, support for abortion would increase because those from poorer households would have less means to care for a child. This suggests that abortion attitudes are not about affording children, which was my initial rationale. Rather, this may be due to other factors like political party or views from one’s community on abortion.

For the test of generational views on abortion, a statistically significant relationship occurred and held with generation mattering more for males, those who attend church a few times per year, and those who are registered with no party or as Independent.

Based on the tests I ran, I concluded that generation matters more for predicting male attitude and income matters more when predicting female attitudes. The real-world implications for this study are that it will help future surveyors in predicting what issues voters prioritize by sex, as well as what factors play into their views on abortion. So, my research builds off of this study and helps explain that other factors, like income, influence how women’s abortion attitudes can be predicted.

Rouse and Ross’ (2018) study supports that Millennials and Baby Boomers are equally likely to have the same views on abortion with no statistical difference. Through my own analysis, I found the opposite to be true by rejecting my null hypothesis.

When controlling for religiosity no relationship appeared except that generation matters more for those attending church a few times per year, while Chaves (2017) found that attending church more frequently mattered.

My own analysis, when compared to Legge’s (1983) study, found that income mattered for Catholics and Non-Catholics who attend church, as well as for Non-Catholics who do not attend church. However, the Somer’s d statistic for Catholics who attend church is 0.122, supporting Legge’s (1983) research that Catholicism helps to predict abortion attitudes, even though the relationship is not as strong as his findings.

One of the limitations of this study is that the ANES 2016 data only had 67 respondents from Generation Z. In order to provide a more encompassing view of Generation Z’s viewpoints on abortion, further research should look at
data with a more equal distribution across all generations. Upcoming data from the 2020 election should provide a more robust analysis to better understand the abortion attitudes of Generation Z as more begin reaching the age eligible to vote. Additionally, I ultimately decided not to control for race because the prior research in my literature review did not focus enough on this variable. Future research should establish a baseline for the control variable of race when looking at other variables impacting an American’s attitudes on abortion. Finally, response bias occurred throughout certain questions analyzed in this study. For the party registration question on the ANES, only 2,099 out of the 4,271 answered that question. Therefore, the study does not define who did and did not answer that specific question, so some opinions were counted more than others. The same reasoning applies for the other questions analyzed, especially with those attending versus not attending church when looking at Catholics.

My research supports past hypotheses that income and abortion attitudes are most likely linked, and contradicts research that suggests generation and abortion attitudes are not statistically significant. It also detracts from past research by suggesting that how frequently one attends religious services, or religiosity, does not help to predict one’s abortion attitude. Because my research differed from Chaves (2017) study on how frequently people attend religious services, further research should analyze this variable more in-depth. Additionally, the religious denominations of Catholic and Evangelical should be evaluated exclusively because these two religious groups have the most direct opposition to abortion. Finally, I think the most compelling research lies in analyzing Generation Z’s upcoming voter behavior and attitudes towards abortion.

By continuing to analyze what factors are the most effective in predicting abortion attitudes, especially with the current Supreme Court having a pro-life leaning, election predictions will be more accurate when judging how important abortion rights are in an election cycle. The 2020 election is likely to have health care as the main driver of which candidates’ voters choose, and reproductive rights fall under this encompassing umbrella. Improving how researchers predict abortion attitudes to make them more accurate will help in predicting the outcomes of elections where reproductive rights are a major deciding factor for voters.
Works Cited


ABOUT THE JOURNAL

*Clocks and Clouds* is an American University undergraduate research journal that publishes articles on the cutting edge of political science, international studies, and public policy. The journal is meant to add a voice to the intellectual dialogue both within the American University community and in broader academia. Our name comes from the work of philosopher Karl Popper, where clouds are a metaphor for the disorderly and irregular in social science while clocks represent the predictable and rational. By providing a venue for top undergraduate research, *Clocks and Clouds* aims to find the clocks amidst the clouds.

The journal is organized as an independent student-run joint venture between the School of Public Affairs, the School of International Service, the School of Public Affairs Undergraduate Council, and the School of International Service Undergraduate Council. American University undergraduates of any major may submit work for publication and will have their work assessed through a blind peer review and revision process. *Clocks and Clouds* publishes in print and electronic formats and appoints staff and editorial reviewers for one-year terms.

For more information, or to learn about participating in the journal as an author, staff member, or reviewer, contact the editor at clocksandcloudau@gmail.com or visit edspace.american.edu/clocksandclouds.
Clocks and Clouds is a highly collaborative effort. The journal is published with the support of the School of Public Affairs (SPA) and the School of International Service (SIS). Without their continued support, this journal would not be possible.

We also owe particular gratitude to members of the American University community who have furnished valuable advice and support for the journal over the past eight years. Professor Aaron Boesenecker has worked to create greater opportunities for undergraduate researchers at the university and has been a continuous supported of the journal. James Helms has kept us on schedule and organized. Sheila Fortune and Amanda Twyman ensured financing for the journal and advised our budget.

Finally, all our staff and student authors, whether published or not, deserve special recognition for the unbounded energy with which they have approached this experiment. The articles we publish represent only a small portion of the excellent research conducted by American University students. In the years to come, we hope the tremendous response the journal has received thus far continues to validate our mission and push use forward.