All clouds are clocks—
even the most cloudy
of clouds.

-KARL POPPER
DAN FITZGERALD
Reevaluating Military Strategy: The Effectiveness of Conventional Deterrence

ADAM GOLDSTEIN
New Methods of Democratic Consolidation: The Application of Citizenship Laws in Ethnically Fractured States

BAILEY WONG
Understanding the Potential for Conflict in the South China Sea

BILL KAKENMASTER
Belonging in a New Home: Discursive Othering of Latin American Immigrants in U.S. Print Media

GRETCHEN CLOUTIER
Latin America’s Female Prisoner Problem: How the War on Drugs, Feminization of Poverty, and Female Liberation Contribute to Mass Incarceration of Women

AUSTIN KRUG
The China Dilemma: A Study of the Ideological Roots of U.S. Foreign Policy towards China during the Cold War

CELIA LOHR
"Solidarity of the Colonized:" A Critical Discourse Analysis of Sinn Féin’s Connection to Palestine
Clocks and Clouds

A JOURNAL OF NATIONAL AND GLOBAL AFFAIRS

Volume VII | Issue 1 | FALL 2016
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Introduction</th>
<th>i</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Staff List</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dan Fitzgerald</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Reevaluating Military Strategy: The Effectiveness of Conventional Deterrence</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adam Goldstein</strong></td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>New Methods of Democratic Consolidation: The Application of Citizenship Laws in Ethnically Fractured States</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bailey Wong</strong></td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Understanding the Potential for Conflict in the South China Sea</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bill Kakenmaster</strong></td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Belonging in a New Home: Discursive Othering of Latin American Immigrants in U.S. Print Media</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gretchen Cloutier</strong></td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Latin America’s Female Prisoner Problem: How the War on Drugs, Feminization of Poverty, and Female Liberation Contribute to Mass Incarceration of Women</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Austin Krug</strong></td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>The China Dilemma: A Study of the Ideological Roots of U.S. Foreign Policy Towards China During the Cold War</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Celia Lohr</strong></td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>“Solidarity of ‘the Colonized’”: A Critical Discourse Analysis of Sinn Féin’s Connection to Palestine</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Clocks and Clouds takes great pride in offering its readers the newest contributions to undergraduate social science research in international affairs, political science, public policy, and beyond. The scholarly works that fill these pages are nothing short of supremely impressive, and we are humbled and honored by their contributions. Within the pages of this issue of Clocks and Clouds, the reader will undoubtedly find an inspiring and ultimately successful effort at academic research. These studies demonstrate American University’s undergraduate students’ passion, drive, and collective ambition; and this issue’s success is owed in part to them. In another part, the Journal owes its success to the passionate and dedicated staff who reviewed, edited, and selected the seven papers published in this issue.

To begin this issue, Dan Fitzgerald applies a cox regression analysis to forward troop movement and argues that the risk reduction occurring from conventional deterrence may also apply to air and naval forces. Next, Adam Goldstein investigates the use of citizenship laws in the process of democratic consolidation in ethnically fractured states, suggesting that unequal access to citizenship inhibits democratic consolidation over the long term. Bailey Wong examines three periods of Chinese foreign policy in the South China Sea; Wong’s work attempts to show that economic interdependence offers the most reliable bulwark against Chinese aggression, but that no one solution is likely to resolve conflict in the region. Bill Kakenmaster analyzes dominant U.S. print media sources’ discursive construction of Latin American ethnic and national identities, and he argues that surface-level positive word associations obscure deeper themes that otherwise marginalize U.S. Latin Americans and threaten their political agency. Gretchen Cloutier then asks what has caused increased levels of female incarceration in Latin America. Cloutier posits that the theoretical empowerment of women through criminal activity actually economically marginalizes them, and leads to a feminization of poverty, whereby women commit further criminal activities in a cycle of poverty, crime. Subsequently, Austin Krug analyzes the public and private documents of two U.S. Presidents, Lyndon Johnson and Jimmy Carter, in order to understand how understandings of China as an ideological enemy contributed to anti-Chinese policy rhetoric. Finally, Celia Lohr systematically analyzes the syntactical and grammatical elements of Sinn Féin’s statements on Palestine, claiming not only that Sinn Féin was able to assert linguistic power over the British in some circumstances, but also that such power was expressed in solidarity with other former colonies, including Palestine.

Clocks and Clouds’ success demonstrates not just that undergraduates can and do produce worthwhile research, but that such research actively engages in, challenges, and critically reflects on some of the most important issues in national and global affairs. Our readers are welcome to the perspectives shared in this issue, and we humbly invite them to join us in this exchange of knowledge.

Bill Kakenmaster, SIS/CAS
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Paul Jeffries, SIS/CAS
MANAGING EDITOR
CLOCKS AND CLOUDS FALL 2016 STAFF

FACULTY ADVISORS
Professor Kimberly Cowell-Meyers, SPA
Professor Lucia Seybert, SIS

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
Bill Kakenmaster SIS/CAS - 2017

MANAGING EDITOR
Paul Jeffries, SIS/CAS - 2017

ASSISTANT MANAGING EDITORS
Ariane Choupo, SIS - 2017
Dan Fitzgerald, SIS/CAS - 2018
Jonathan Kaufmann, CAS - 2018
Melanie MacKenzie, CAS/SIS - 2017
Molly McGinnis, CAS/SIS - 2017

REVIEWERS
Lina Alam, SIS/CAS - 2018
Erin Campbell, SIS/CAS - 2017
Stella Cooper, SIS/CAS - 2017
Christian Cyr, SPA/SIS - 2017
Jeremy Davis, SIS/CAS - 2017
Stephanie Dromerick, SIS/KSB - 2017
Sheridan Gardner, SIS/CAS - 2017
Adam Goldstein, SPA - 2017
Yelizaveta Layer, SIS/CAS - 2018
Celia Lohr, SIS/CAS - 2018
Paloma Losada, SIS/CAS - 2019
Abby Newbold, SIS - 2018
Arinzechukwu Ofodile, SIS/CAS - 2017
Harrison Palefsky, SIS/SPA - 2017
Benjamin Shaver, SIS/CAS - 2018
Laura Sholtz, SIS/CAS - 2016
Erik St. Pierre, SIS - 2017
Luke Theuma, SIS/CAS - 2018
Bailey Wong, SIS/CAS - 2018
Samuel Woods, CAS - 2017
Henock Yilma, SIS - 2017

DESIGNER
Bill Kakenmaster, SIS/CAS - 2017
REEVALUATING MILITARY STRATEGY: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE

Dan Fitzgerald

Abstract

The rise of modernized and efficient militaries competing for dominance against the United States’ military has resulted in increased eruptions of conflict globally. A majority of decisions by the Joint Chiefs and EUCOM about long-term U.S. military policy in these areas are currently being based off personal and historical observations, along with blatant speculation. The question that should be asked before formulating these positions is if crisis management techniques, like conventional force movement, have a positive effect on the response to crisis triggers. The aim of this research is to understand the effectiveness of forward deployed forces to conventionally deter adversaries and reduce or stop conflict. A majority of previous deterrence researchers have focused on the change in utility during a crisis between actors to determine if deterrence was successful. However, there is still a lack of research on whether force variables have had an effect on conflict dynamics during non-conflict years. The answer for this research will be found by testing the level of hazard for conflict using cox regression based on U.S. troop levels and position during the time difference between conflicts in singular countries. Based on initial inquiry and extensive background research, this research hypothesizes that forward deployed troops will have either no effect or a worsening effect. The results from this research should provide greater insight into future military policies toward conflict situations and whether troop deployment is the effective.

DAN FITZGERALD is a student of International Studies and Economics. He graduates in December of 2017.
School of International Service (SIS) and College of Arts & Sciences (CAS), American University
Email: df2310a@student.american.edu

* I would like to thank Dr. Joseph Young, Dr. Thomas Zeitzoff, and Dr. Benjamin Jensen of American University for all of their comments and support throughout this research. I would also like to thank the School of Public Affairs for providing me with the funds to produce this research through the Peace and Violence Research Lab Fellowship.

<http://www.edspace.american.edu/clocksandclouds/>
HBP Publishing <http://www.hbp.com/>
The past five years has seen an upsurge in organized violence and conflicts, contradictory to the overall trend of the past fifty years. These conflict escalations are occurring across the globe with higher and higher frequency, particularly in Eastern Europe. Such instances include an increase in unannounced Russian military exercises, the invasion of Ukraine by pro-Russian separatists, and the rising threat of nuclear engagement after Russia’s boycott of the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit. To a lesser but important extent, this also includes the aggressive island-building in the North China Sea.

It is pre-supposed that the deployment of the United States Army to these regions would reduce the outbreak of violence, because its mission has been to deter as well as reassure its Allies since WWII. As Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work recently remarked on the Third U.S. Offset Strategy for the Army, “our ability to project dominant military forces across the trans-oceanic distances underwrites U.S. conventional deterrence” (Department of the Army 1985). These dominant military forces take the form of forward deployed forces within the European and East Asian theaters, and in the Middle East with Operation Spartan Shield. Just recently, within President Obama’s Fiscal 2017 summary, it mentions “deterrence” three separate times in concern with Chinese and Russian aggression, and an increase in funding for the European Reassurance Initiative (ERI) (Office of the University of Defense 2016).

However, there is a lack of evidence to suggest that these deterrence strategies against Russia and China are successful (French 2014). In recent months, the United States has sent naval forces into the North China Sea to “reiterate” international maritime movement to the Chinese. Likewise, the US government announced an increase in military bases, weapons, and forward deployed forces along the Eastern European frontier in NATO countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). This comes on the heels of Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine and growing attempts of coercion against the three Baltic Republics, all of which have sizable ethnic Russian populations. Yet, in both cases of deterrence strategies, the exact opposite occurred. China released a statement vehemently condemning the actions of the United States and demanding that they stay out of China’s zone of influence. Russia has also continued its own military build-up along its Western frontier. If the deployment of conventional forces does not deter these aggressions, significant questions emerge about the structure, size, and application of military power in the modern world.

This research seeks to estimate the extent to which forward deployed conventional forces deter conflict. This inquiry sits within a broader body of scholarship that struggles to accurately disseminate what is causing determent.
Previous military policy scholars have focused on the change in utility throughout the progression of a crisis between actors to determine the success of deterrence. In other words, they focused on the push and pull of cost-benefit strategies between the various actors. Yet, there is still a lack of sufficient analysis on whether military forces have had a positive effect on conflict de-escalation between conflict events. Thus the question emerges: do forward deployed troops actually deter conflict situations?

Based on recent research on deterrence strategies, scholars are beginning to question the overall effectiveness of the U.S. military’s current strategy of deterrence. If empirical analysis shows that forward deployed forces do not deter, this raises significant questions about the U.S.’s military posture and spending. If forward deployed forces actually escalate conflict situations, their entire logic of conventional deterrence is misguided and dangerous. If forward deployed forces have no effect on crises, then the entire conventional deterrent posture is suboptimal. The United States is either engaging in dangerous policy or bad policy. In this research, I focus directly on these forward deployed troops in conflict zones and, contrary to current scholarly trends, argue that conventional forces still have an effective, de-escalating effect in crises. The results of this analysis should be utilized to reassess future military postures toward conflicts and whether forward troop deployment is effective.

Theoretical Framework

In contemporary research on conflict aversion, the realist paradigm has been the foundational theory of rationalization. Based on the logic of John Mearsheimer, Niall Ferguson, and Hans Morgenthau, interest defined as power and the security of the state constitutes the reoccurring actions and reactions of state movements and patterns (Ferguson 2003; Mearsheimer 1983; Morgenthau 1978). The emphasis and supremacy of state interest, and the necessity of state intervention when their interests are threatened was at the core of all actions. This threat of intervention has been the standard method used by states to manipulate their adversary’s prudence toward their potential act. Scholars have since studied this practice as deterrence theory, and seek to further understand the benefits and consequences of using conventional deterrence. The argument at the center of this theoretical debate is whether conventional deterrence is applicable and effective in both the pre and post-Cold War world.
Understanding the sheer complexity of conventional deterrence is challenging based on the number of factors simultaneously affecting a conflict. Almost every variable that influences the success or failure of deterrence is interconnected and dependent on each other to the point that a majority of scholarly research on the topic has a shared theme. For the sake of clarity and consistency, this paper will define conventional deterrence as “the direct or indirect persuading of an adversary, through threat of military retaliation, that the costs of their actions far out-weigh the benefits” (Huth 1988). Huth and Gelpi, as well as Wilner, describe cost and benefit analysis as both the challenger and the defender’s threat and consideration of using military force (Huth and Gelpi 1993; Wilner 2015). This working definition will provide a more concise scope when analyzing the aspects of deterrence later in the research by specifically focusing on potential military action.

Beyond understanding the theoretical framework of deterrence, scholars have further categorized the concept into two distinct practices with varying sub-parts; general and immediate deterrence, and central and extended deterrence (Smith 2004; Wilner 2015). General deterrence is seen as the anticipation of potential enemies in the future and the seeking of the rebalancing of power through coercion, whereas immediate deterrence is the more well-known practice of using threats of attack in order to prevent potential conflict escalation. Central deterrence is the classical sense of a bipolar world where superpowers seek to prevent attack on each other through a balance of powers system. This can be seen in conflicts during the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union (e.g. Cuban Missile Crisis). Extended deterrence, on the other hand, involves the protecting of proxy allies from war through the use of threats, as well as a more “distance-is-comfort” protection strategy (e.g. Vietnam War) (Thränert 2015).

During the Cold War, a majority of research on deterrence analyzed not only the success of conventional deterrence, but also the factors that determine how to conduct successful deterrence. This type of deterrence research is known as Classical Deterrence Theory. Classical scholars have since classified the success of conventional deterrence into four distinct variables: (A) a clearly defined behavior that is deemed unacceptable, (B) communication to the adversary a commitment to punish violations, (C) possessing the capability to defend this commitment, and (D) demonstrate resolve to carry out the retaliation if the adversary fails to comply (Huntington 1984; Zagare 1990). While they emphasize the importance of the capability of defenders to follow through on their commitment, almost all agree that the effectiveness of the psyche against the adversary is of the utmost importance. If these four conditions are satisfied, the expected net costs of the threatened sanction should be greater than the expected net benefits (Harvey
1999). In other words, much like a formula, the presence of these factors create successful results of deterrence strategies.

Certain neo-classical deterrence scholars have since revisited this theoretical framework and have made further contributions. They argue that the absence of certain variables with the presence of others in this deterrence formula will worsen conflict situations (Ibid; Soloman 2013). An example pointed out by Frank Harvey is that the absence of resolve (D) is more likely to provoke noncompliance when defenders clearly communicate a threat of retaliation (A) along with a strong commitment to the issue (B) (Harvey 1999). The deterrence formula that was supposed to guarantee successful deterrence now may lead to further conflict escalation. Despite this finding, scholars continue to argue in favor of deterrence strategy and that the adoption of an action-retaliation tactic would work in favor of defending states.

In the post-Cold War era, however, deterrence research has seen an increase in post-structural analysis that is now questioning the validity of many previous notions of deterrence theory. These new-era scholars argue that the world is no longer a bipolar structure, where escalation was linear between superpowers. Instead, they argue that the world is a multipolar structure that is interwoven in a web of four types of deterrence: conventional, strategic (nuclear), cyber, and space (Blackwell 2011; Payne 2001). Particularly, the new domains of cyber and space represent the growing awareness that conventional Land-Air-Sea forces and Nuclear/ICBMs are no longer sufficient. A good example of this is the Iran Nuclear Crisis, when Iranian nuclear facility networks were attacked by the online program Stuxnet, a computer worm used by foreign hackers in 2010 (Aronson 2009; Coleman 2012). Thus, post-deterrence theorists argue that electronic warfare, or “cyber-politique,” is the preferred way to augment conventional threats and strikes in order to achieve campaign objectives (Soloman 2013). Unlike new technology and tactics, scholars are also beginning to analyze the effectiveness of unconventional methods of deterrence.

Scholars have observed that this multipolar world generates such tactics for adversaries to “design around” a conventional deterrent once its outlines are evident (Ibid; Beattie 2010). For example, the use of geography by Pakistan, analyzed by Walter Ladwig III, is used to counter-deter the growing presence of a modernized military in India (Ladwig III 2015). The current argument emphasizes that the multipolar world of global communication and information sharing is eroding the power of conventional deterrence and traditional power simultaneously.
Figure 1.0: Theoretical Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classical Deterrence Theory</th>
<th>Neo-Classical Deterrence Theory</th>
<th>Post-Classical Deterrence Theory</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scholars: Huntington; Huth; Smith</td>
<td>Scholars: Harvey; Soleman; Thränert</td>
<td>Scholars: Blackwell; Ladwig III</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- “Formula of Deterrence”
- Bipolar World
- (A) A clearly defined behavior that is deemed unacceptable
- (B) Communication to the adversary a commitment to punish violations
- (C) Possessing the capability to defend this commitment
- (D) Demonstrate the resolve to carry out the retaliation if the adversary fails to comply
- E.g. A+B+C+D=Success

- “The Redesigned Formula”
- Bipolar World
- The absence and presence of certain variables in the formula results in escalation or de-escalation of conflict
- The absence of (D) from the equation intensifies conflict with presence of (A) and (B)
- -A+B+(absence of D)=Failure

- “The Alternative Approach”
- Multipolar World
- The rise of alternative tactics to deterrence through communication/information
- E.g. cyber warfare; geographic effects

Current conventional deterrence is at a cross road between two schools of thought: the realist/classical and the post-structural. The free flow of information and rapid communication has deteriorated the classical formula for deterrence success; however, the reoccurrence of military modernization and build-up across the world continues to keep the threat of force alive. Conventional deterrence has been around since the strategies of Thucydides, and it would certainly be unwise to abandon a policy of deterrence outright (Monten 2006). The aim of this research is to question the effectiveness and power of conventional deterrence strategies and provide adequate support for their continuation (Ferguson 2003). Analyzing the theoretical framework that scholars have produced vis-à-vis deterrence through extensive methodologies will better frame what is missing to accomplish this.

Literature Review

The methodological approach most often used to research the effectiveness of deterrence has not changed much in the past 25 years. What has changed is how researchers define the success and failure of deterrence based on their chosen dependent variable. These variables have predominantly focused on statements and movements to acknowledge the deterrent action as success or failure; however, as Danilovic Vesna points out, it is near impossible to define true success and failure of deterrence by observing post-conflict actions. While this research is more focused on whether military forces have a deterring effect, it is essential to note that most research has been on analyzing variables post-conflict. This lack of a solid definition has created a lack of clarity on how to measure success and failure,
resulting in case bias based on selection (Danilovic 2001).

Huth and Russett’s 1990 approach to testing deterrence attempts to set a standard for the measurement and testing of deterrence effectiveness. What sets their work apart from previous research is how they measured success and failure: as either the absence of force by the attacker, lack of defender concession, or a limited force fatality of at least 250. While the specificity of their definition allows for a more concise case selection to strengthen their research, the allowance of force absence as a factor created a subjective measurement. Lebow and Stein pointed out this subjective measurement when they conducted a cross-study of Huth and Russett’s research, which resulted in differing successes and failures. They argued that in order to accurately define success and failure, deterrence research should focus more on context-dependent generalizations (Lebow and Stein 1990).

Quackenbush tries to accommodate this in his own research through his quantitative analysis of general deterrence. Using a Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset by Ghosn, he measures success and failure by whether the attacker or defender concedes or if there is conflict (Ghosn 2004). He observes utility as the independent variable for each possible outcome in order to determine which action will result in successful deterrence, or game outcome. This was done by measuring it through Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman’s equations for utility and simulating the variables in a multinomial logit (Quackenbush 2010). However, his research resulted in five separate outcomes from these equations, which calls into question the effectiveness of this methodology. Furthermore, Quackenbush’s research also proves problematic for the accuracy of which outcome the players preferred, resulting in the inability to designate as success or failure of deterrence.

The closest research to testing for variable effectiveness in deterrence is Frank Harvey’s 1998 testing of hypotheses by previous researchers to prove the weakness of deterrence overall (Harvey 1998). The method he used was assigning each “overestimated” hypothesis a categorical weighted percentage, then calculating each for strength of deterrence. What is important to note is that Harvey’s approach highlights the problems with using utility as a measurement of deterrence. However, his research still lacks sufficient empirical analysis of other possible variables that determine successful deterrence besides utility measurement.

The overarching lack of clarity and variation in dependent variables within deterrence research, along with reliable case selection, is detrimental to accurately testing deterrence. What current testing on deterrence lacks most is an analysis of non-conflict times in order to observe if the same independent
factors prevent a rise in crisis dynamic. This would provide a more contextual analysis of the changing dynamics pre and during the crisis based on the given factors.

**Methodology**

Throughout this research, a large-n methodological approach was most appropriate in order to analyze the effect that U.S. troops positioned in conflict countries have over an extended period of time. It also proved to be effective in acquiring enough cases when using hazard model testing, like the cox proportional hazard model, which will be discussed later. The variables chosen for this specific research are tested for their effectiveness via the cox regression test, with US troop data as the covariant in assessing the hazard of a conflict occurring over a given time span.

This research focuses on conflict occurrence as the dependent variable in order to observe influence during time change. In order to control for the variation in interpretation of what constitutes a crisis for case selection, this research will be using data from the International Crisis Behavior Version 10.0 (ICB10) (Brecher et al. 2016). The dataset contains 1000 crisis actors and 455 crises with a time span from 1950-2001. The chosen crises were selected based on the accumulation of three databases previously assembled by the researchers: dyadic crisis data, crisis-density rivalries, and one-sided crisis data (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2010). In order to accommodate the time-dependent model necessary for this research, the dataset was altered to also include all non-conflicts years for every actor with at least one crisis. This will assist in providing a more accurate test for the level of hazard between crises.

The analysis of U.S. troop force presence over the course of the time frame is integral to finding whether it has a direct, and hazardous, correlation to conflicts. As the independent variable, the level of impact that these forces have before, during, and after the selected crises should indicate whether they play a significant role on the overall hazard. In order to accommodate the data to fit the model test for this research, the data were transformed into five different subcategories: (0) 0 troops, (1) 1-50, (2) 51-100, (3) 101-500, (4) 501-1000, and (5) for 1000+. This categorization of the data will be more useful when inserting them into the model, as they can be compared in a repetitive fashion. Additionally, it provides greater clarity as to which cases have predominantly more troops because of alliances during conflicts (e.g. Germany has consistently had well over 1000+ since 1950, while India has relatively been between 51-100).

The application of Cox Proportional Hazards Modeling (PH) is integral in
assessing whether the presence of US troops in crisis zones has a positive or negative effect. Cox regression, as it stands, is a type of “survival analysis,” or the length of time before the occurrence of the specified event happens (Smith, B. and Smith, T. 2000). The hazard function for cox regression describes the concept of risk as the outcome (e.g. failure, conflict eruption) in an interval after time $t$. The probability that the outcome occurs somewhere between $t$ and $t + \Delta t$ divided by the probability the event doesn’t occur beyond $t$. The hazard function $h(t)$ is given by the following:

$$h(t, X) = h_0(t) \exp \left( \sum_{i=1}^{p} \beta_i X_i \right)$$

What makes cox PH effective compared to non-proportional hazard tests, like Kaplan-Meier, is that the baseline hazard $h_0(t)$ does not entirely depend on $X$ (the covariate), but also on $t$. Typically reserved for research analyses of disease and prescription drugs until death, this test has proven to more useful within the field of IR in measuring time until next crisis eruption (Box-Steffensmeir and Zorn 1998). Cox PH relies specifically on the effectiveness of covariates to fit into the time sequence within the model. This allows for distinct sub-variables to be observed in cases, along with differences that arise from them over the course of time until the next event.

The practicality of this model for this research is sufficient enough to achieve reliable results needed to answer the proposed question. In terms of explaining the effect of the covariate on time until event, cox PH is best for relative risk and non-parametric assumptions (Box-Steffensmeir, Reiter, and Zorn 2003). The relative risk is desirable in measuring the difference between the exposures of covariates instead of knowing whether they are different, especially for the differences between U.S. troop levels. The lack of parametric assumptions is also useful in controlling the hazards as proportional over time. With this method of proportional hazard testing, it is sufficient to say that enough control of bias will allow for an accurate analysis of hazard variation associated with the different levels of U.S. troop presence.

This goes without saying that conducting PH tests in IR research has its critics, who point out such flaws of the model, like biased estimates, incorrect standard errors, and faulty inferences about the substantive impact of independent variables (Goodman and Chandalia 2010). Critics have cited that the time-independent variable of the hazard ratio may not be correct,
and may in fact be fitted for a non-proportional hazard test. This ultimately comes down to reexamining whether the chosen covariate for the model has any potential for time impact change (Ibid). This does pose a potential risk for this research, as trying to analyze a specific variable’s impact on conflict and using hazard to measure deterrence effectiveness can result in misinterpretations; however, this research is confident that by turning U.S. troop data into categorical variables that can individually be analyzed in the model will create an unbiased conclusion.

**Results**

Conducting the testing of this research first involved the integration of various prevalent data into one unified dataset. As stated previously, this involved using the International Crisis Behavior Version 10.0 as the foundation within the model. Then, an addition of all non-conflict years was plugged into the existing country cases that had been involved in at least one conflict between 1950-2001. Finally, the U.S. troop data was incorporated into the dataset with their corresponding countries and years. In order to make U.S. troop data more significant within the model, it was ideal to transform the data into categorical sub-covariates. With these, the model can test each individual variable, and more accurately test which holds a significant relationship with the status (conflict).

Once the data were integrated, the testing for hazard could begin. The test was conducted in IBM SPSS’s Cox Proportional Hazard Regression model. The time variable used was “time since last crisis trigger,” the status variable was crisis (1) or no crisis (0) in order to select which events would be used, and the covariate pattern was U.S. troops split into six categorical variables. The criteria for significance to deny the null hypothesis was a 95% curve, or a p-value=.05.

Out of a total of 6805 cases, 553 (8.1%) crisis events were available for analysis with none censored and the rest dropped for incompatibility with the model. The first analysis was to determine whether the model with the covariates demonstrates a relationship to the overall model, and was significant enough to reject the null hypothesis. Referring to Table 1.0, the difference between -2log likelihood without covariates in the model and the -2log likelihood with the covariates resulted in a Chi-Square value of 11.152. With a df of 5, the critical value was .048, less than p=.05. This shows that the model is significant enough to reject the null hypothesis.
Since the model is significant enough to use with the given covariates, the research advanced with observing the different ratios of hazard associated with each category of troop levels and whether they were significant. Referring to Table 1.1, we can see that U.S. troop variables, with a df of 5, are significant at .051, close to the p-value of .05. For this research’s purpose, it will continue to find this significant, as it is relatively close, but should be noted with an air of caution. When the variables are furthered analyzed, it can be noted that US troops (2) of 50-100 troops and (5) of 1000+ troops demonstrate significance under p-value=.05. These two variables also show 95.0% confidence interval without including 1, suggesting that there is a difference in hazard.

Table 1.1: Hazard Ratios (Exp(B) and Sig. of Deterrence Variables in Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables in the Equation</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>Wald</th>
<th>Df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Exp(B)</th>
<th>95.0% CI for Exp(B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Lower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy Variable for U.S. Troops</td>
<td>11.038</td>
<td>.127</td>
<td>10.00</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.752</td>
<td>.762 .961 .749 .1232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy Variable for U.S. Troops(1)</td>
<td>-.40</td>
<td>.100</td>
<td>6.163</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.762</td>
<td>.614 .944</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy Variable for U.S. Troops(2)</td>
<td>-.272</td>
<td>.110</td>
<td>11.038</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>.931</td>
<td>.985 .694 .1398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy Variable for U.S. Troops(3)</td>
<td>-.016</td>
<td>.179</td>
<td>11.038</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.927</td>
<td>.510 .970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy Variable for U.S. Troops(4)</td>
<td>-.076</td>
<td>.226</td>
<td>11.038</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>.549</td>
<td>.310 .970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dummy Variable for U.S. Troops(5)</td>
<td>-.600</td>
<td>.291</td>
<td>11.038</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>.549</td>
<td>.310 .970</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For conflict zones with US troops between 51-100, the hazard ratio is .762 times more likely to cause another conflict than without troops present. In other words, instances with troop levels between 51-100 pose a 24% decrease in risk to conflict eruption compared to non-troop conflicts. Even more interesting is that having 1001+ troops present has a hazard ratio of being .549 times more likely for a conflict to occur than without troops, also considered a 46% reduction in risk compared to conflicts without troops. Interestingly enough, this trend of reduction in risk occurs with all levels of troop presence; however, for variables (1), (3), and (4), the p-value was not statistically significant and the 95% confidence interval for the hazard ratio included 1, suggesting no difference in risk compared to no troops. Overall, there is a proportional level of hazard that is attributed to troop presence on conflict occurrence. As shown with Figure 1.0, the lines of the two significant variables are about standard to each other. These results can be interpreted into two different ideas: the presence of troops does have a risk-reducing effect on conflict occurrence, and relative small-scale or large-scale troop presence have varying reduction capabilities.

The first idea supports the general idea that conventional deterrence does reduce the chance for conflict outbreak or escalation. This would be supportive of Huth’s argument of the importance of forward deployed troops in deterring the situation between the aggressor and the defender (Huth 1988). This would make for a compelling argument; however, three out of the five variables showed no sign of statistical significance. The two variables (2) and (5) that did show statistical significance do leave room for interpretation of the importance that U.S. troops play in conflicts. Given that Figure 1.0 highlights the risk-ratio line for no troop presence as being relatively equal to the lines of variables 2 and 5, the strength of their risk-reduction should be questioned. The interpretation of these results finds that the presence of troops does have an overall effect on reducing the chance for a future conflict to occur.

It goes without saying that there is room for possible error during the testing of this data. One possible error would be an incorrect assumption of proportionality for the model. It is assumed with conducting this test that the covariant of U.S. troops does not change over time. This research has attempted to control this by constructing a controlled time variable that can apply constitutently for all designated events, while also splitting the original covariate into categorical sub-variables. Another possible conflict with the research is not also conducting non-proportional hazard model tests on the data. Due to time constraints of this research, it would be wise to further test the data in non-proportional models like the log-rank test. This would confirm the effectiveness of using a proportional hazard test for this specific use of data.
Conclusion

Given the findings of the cox regression hazard test of U.S. troops presence in conflicts, this research concludes that troops do have a risk reducing effect on preventing future conflicts from occurring. The risk reduction of conflict eruption by troops can be analyzed as effective deterrence in the prevention of future conflicts within a given country. This is similar to the findings previously conducted by Huth and Quakenbush, that military flexing in conflict situations does reveal a trend of successful conventional deterrence. It can also be inferred that if this trend works for the deployment and stationing of troops on the ground, then it may also be applicable to all forward deployed forces, including naval and air forces.

Furthermore, this is a confirmation of the U.S.’s continued support of its allies through military stations in conflict regions in order to reduce the overall risk of conflict escalation. Much of the data supported this argument for the United States’ troop presence in Europe and Asia, for the overall length between conflict occurrences. This is further parallel to the general realist paradigm of conventional deterrence, where a show of force by a more militarily superior country against weaker countries is effective. This research does not attempt to answer the complex question of conventional deterrence; however, it does contribute to the argument that military presence in conflict-ridden areas does work.

Future research that would build upon this research would be an analysis of forward deployment naval units and naval exercises’ proximity in relation to conflict areas. Michael Gerson’s and Daniel Whiteneck’s overview research of the navy’s role in conventional deterrence is an excellent starting point in incorporating maritime power; however, what their research is lacking is the comprehensive testing of naval data as my research does with ground troops (Gerson and Whiteneck 2009). This additional testing can further strengthen the argument either for or against the effectiveness of conventional deterrence whatever the results may be.

As the global political dynamic continues to change and new conflicts begin to escalate, it would be in the general interest for the United States and regional military alliances like NATO and EUCOM to deploy their forces earlier into conflict escalation zones. It would also be in their best interest to retain some manageable force level in these conflict zones after the initial escalation in order to prevent future conflicts, as this research has shown.
Works Cited


Fitzgerald, “Reevaluating Military Strategy”


NEW METHODS OF DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION: THE APPLICATION OF CITIZENSHIP LAWS IN ETHNICALLY FRACTURED STATES

Adam Goldstein

Abstract

The consensus in scholarly circles regarding democratic consolidation stipulates the importance of a cohesive demos, or population, that is also congruent with a representative polity, or political class. One of the main inhibitors of this goal is ethnic conflict, which can easily derail democratic transitions and consolidations. I begin this article with a discussion of the flaws of the two established notions of conflict alleviation in ethnically fragmented states: consociationalism and federalism, especially in regards to how they define groups and segment political power. I then identify the difficulties of consolidating democracy in this paradigm. Next, I propose that a democratic solution to ethnic fragmentation involves the extension of fair citizenship laws. These laws will either initiate a full democratic consolidation, as in the cases of Latvia and Estonia, or when missing, will result in democracy’s inability to consolidate, as in the case of Israel. Lastly, I conclude by pinpointing areas of future research and other potential cases to apply to my model.

Introduction

Democratic transitions are a Sisyphean task, often failing for a multitude of reasons, ranging from economic hardships, to authoritarian backlash, to myriad different societal cleavages. Typically, these cleavages manifest at their worst during the most important period of a democratic transition: the consolidation phase. If the consolidation period ends in failure, a transition back toward authoritarianism is the most likely outcome, as...
displayed by Russia in the aftermath of Vladimir Putin’s initial political success (Evans 2011, 42). If the consolidation succeeds, wide swaths of people and groups are able to express themselves politically and culturally via a robust civil society (Havel 1999). While democracy provides space for the population to express their unique political and social characters, as historical examples have shown, reaching that point can be incredibly treacherous, time-consuming, and extremely violent. France experienced several violent revolutions and illiberal regimes before it could properly be classified as a democracy. Japan and Germany received significant investments from the United States in the aftermath of World War II to leave their more authoritarian past behind and consolidate democratically. Democratic consolidation is a difficult enough task without one of its most frequent inhibitors: ethnic cleavages.

The United States’ progression toward a more inclusive democracy is an excellent case to study the difficulty of consolidation in a divided state because of its history of ethnic fragmentation and its solutions to these fissures. Often portrays as a symbol for justice and freedom, the United States only became a real democracy in the eyes of the American population after the unimaginable violence of the Civil War and difficult periods of civil rights advocacy allowed them to incorporate black voters. Likewise, South Africa experienced decades of apartheid rule, while ethnic divisions also plague or plagued states and regions like Afghanistan, Turkey, the Baltics, the Balkans, and Iraq, to name a few. While it should be noted that many of these countries did not democratize for several different reasons, ethnic divisions were either strong barriers or contributing factors to this failure, and thus deserve a tenable solution.

This article utilizes a comparative case study approach to answer the question: is there a tenable democratic solution to ethnic factionalism in a democratizing state? First, I critically evaluate the most common approaches to democratic consolidation in disunified states, assessing common solutions proposed by scholars, and why their solutions tend to fail. I then propose an alternate approach to alleviating ethnic tensions in this paradigm. I analyze three cases, Latvia, Estonia, and Israel. While the Baltic States demonstrate how fair extension of citizenship laws allows democracy to consolidate, Israel shows that unequal access to citizenship inhibits long-term democratic consolidation. The crux of this new approach is the application of citizenship laws. While power sharing or division agreements frequently fail, extending a common, necessary, and unifying benefit in the form of citizenship can spur democratic consolidation.
Literature Review: The Flaws of Established Notions of Ethnic Power Sharing

Ethnically fractured states typically face a severe obstacle when undertaking a democratic project: ethnic conflict. Ethnic conflict can be explained as a conflict in which the goal of the factions is defined through the lens of racial identity (Wolff, Landis, and Clark 2010, 2). Two of the most utilized solutions to ethnic conflict are consociationalism, which can be generally defined as elite agreements to share power, and federalism, which can broadly be defined as a self-governance for different groups within a greater state (Lijphart 1979, 1). Despite their common use, these solutions either present immediate or long term structural impediments to democratic consolidation. First, federalism provides opportunities for elites in the ethnic majority to under-allocate funding to minority local governments. Second, federalism provides space for minority-run local governments to obtain a high enough degree of autonomy to disunify the larger state, harming democratic consolidation. Consociationalism fails mainly in the long term. This system of government rigidly defines ethnic groups and which groups can ascend the political hierarchy. Smaller minority groups that may not reach a certain threshold will thus be either unrepresented at worst or underrepresented at best.

A consociational democracy is defined as an “elite cartel” (Lijphart 1969, 215), wherein governmental authority is shared between the leaders of the different ethnic groups. In other words, elites from each of the main ethnic groups in a state agree to share power between themselves. In Bosnia, for example, the internationally supported Dayton Accords stipulate that a Croat, Bosniak and Serbian split the presidency for eight-month periods throughout a four-year term (Kasapović 2006, 3-13). Ostensibly, this approach sought to provide fair representation for an ethnically diverse country; however, it was unsuccessful. Although Bosnia saw peace after a brutal conflict, the government’s failure to be fully inclusive demonstrates the limits of consociationalism. Bosnia’s parochial and stagnant definitions of ethnic identity prevented any citizen who did not identify with any of those three groups from seeking the presidency.

Furthermore, Bosnia’s consociationalism is rooted in proportional representation, another ostensibly democratic aspect. The result of this strategy, however, puts non-Bosnians at an electoral disadvantage because of the ethnic Bosnian majority (Kasapović 2006, 20). Serbs and Croats will remain in the minority so long as this division of power persists, stoking tensions due to the intractability of power allocation in this system. Lastly, consociationalism also served to cement the current allocation of power between the three groups, stopping
any transition of power away from the established ethnic hierarchy. In 2009, Bosnia showcased one of the key shortcomings of consociationalism when a Jew and a Roma appealed to the European Court of Human Rights because they were not allowed to run for president (Reuters 2009). The aftermath of the case left Bosnia with an opportunity to expand its democracy, and although the state took initial steps in this direction (Human Rights Watch 2011), there has been little progress beyond that point, showcasing the difficulty of breaking up an entrenched hierarchy. Rather than granting equal political opportunity to every Bosnian citizen, only members of one of the three major ethnic groups could seek the presidency, thus marginalizing ethnic minorities who did not fit into the dominant groups.

Aside from consociationalism, federalism offers another popular, albeit flawed solution for power-sharing in an ethnically fragmented state. While definitions of federalism have changed over time, the common thread connecting each explanation is typically some combination of local and national government, each with their own attribution of sovereignty and sphere of influence (Law 2013, 100). Federalism; however, offers its own share of dangers. The allocation of power away from the central state apparatus might embolden ethnic minority groups to secede from the greater state or to contradict the authority of the decisions made by the national government because of the amount of autonomy given to local governments (Anderson 2004, 5).

Federalism also runs into trouble in regards to resource allocation. Resources are finite, thus their allocation will not always be equitable. These inequalities are often amplified by implicit or explicit governmental biases. Members of the ethnic majority could see members of the ethnic minority as somehow inferior, and thus use that perception as a rationalization to underfund minority regions and governments. Consider the allocation of school funding in the United States. A 2012 Center for American Progress report found that African American and Hispanic majority school districts received far less funding per pupil than that of Caucasian majority school districts (Spatig-Amerikaner 2012, 8). The allocation of funding along ethnic lines might stoke ethnic tensions, disunifying the fledgling democracy. While the United States is indeed a functioning democracy, problems caused by implicit bias can swiftly grow out of hand if the institutions designed to handle grievances are underdeveloped, as they inherently will be in states wrought with ethnic factionalism. Even if the funding is meant to be proportional to population, it may still be perceived as a form of discrimination, delegitimizing
the national government in the eyes of the minority in the process. Finally, federalist systems do little to attempt to reach a positive peace between the majority-minority paradigms because it frequently fails to establish avenues for fair, effective, national representation for ethnic minorities (Erik and Anderson 2010, 57). Rather than improving inter-ethnic relations and national cohesiveness, they merely create self-governing zones, segmenting the conflict instead of resolving it. Lastly, the decentralization inherent to federalist systems tends to worsen corruption because they facilitate the expansion of patron-client networks, thus increasing illiberal policies, specifically, sycophantism (Norris 2008, 5). Because a functioning state needs a central governing apparatus with primacy over local governments, elites in the central government could abuse their ability to dictate laws to local governments, privileging one group while disadvantaging others.

Yugoslavia showcases one example of federalism’s failures. Upon the death of the Yugoslavian dictator Josip Broz Tito, the country devolved into ethnic tribalism. Former members of the pan-Slavic movement fragmented and joined different subgroups, ultimately culminating in an extraordinarily violent civil war. The policies of federalism, formerly used to alleviate ethnic tensions, were turned around by elites using federal institutions to persecute local minorities (Critchley 1993, 443). This violence continued until the institution of the Dayton Agreement, which implemented the consociationalism troubling the region today. Federalism as a system of governance offers an easy path for elites to attack rival ethnic groups, and thus provides a poor solution to ethnic factionalism.

Citizenship Theory and Consolidation

Democratic consolidation is the endgame for a demos. Consolidation secures the future of democratic politics and norms and protects the differences and intricacies of the different ethnic groups in the state. When ethnic divisions are beyond rapprochement, however, consolidation becomes impossible. This section outlines a path to resolve these differences without abandoning the ideals that inspire any shift toward democracy.

The ultimate goal for any polity, or, member of the political class, is to consolidate the ability to implement policy and to create a favorable context for tenable political rule. This truth is no different in autocracies or democracies; the need to consolidate is perennially present. Authors Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan initially present a step to begin the consolidation process, and then posit that democracies can only be consolidated when they meet behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional requirements. Linz and Stepan (1996b) begin by attesting that, “conflicts about the authority and domain of the polis and the identities and loyalties
of the *demos*” can be “so intense that no state exists. No state, no democracy” (Linz and Stepan 1996b, 14). Essentially, societies that are too fragmented are impossible to govern. The three requirements for a consolidated democracy can be thought of as certain behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional stances taken by the *demos*.

First, a democracy is consolidated when the *demos* behaviorally accepts that the democratic regime is either the legitimate or acceptable regime (the difference being in the amount of support for the regime) (Linz and Stepan 1996b, 15). The second requirement is that, *attitudinally* the *demos* accepts democracy, or, a clear majority of people believe that political change must occur from the accepted democratic processes and not through revolution, even in the case of political or economic crisis (Ibid, 16). Lastly, a democracy is consolidated when, *constitutionally* the *demos* accepts the institutionalization of democratic norms, or the necessary democratic institutions have firm and tenable positions in society (Ibid). To reiterate, a consolidated democracy requires a functioning state, as well as behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional components that ultimately prohibit a citizenry from overthrowing the democratic system.

“Toward Consolidated Democracies” also observes a hindrance to consolidation, namely ethnic conflict in multinational states. The authors argue that there must be a certain “congruence between the *polis* and *demos*,” which facilitates the creation of a functioning state (Ibid, 22). When the *polity* consists of multiple sets of people with different political agendas, it becomes more difficult for the government to implement policy and avoid undemocratic opposition. The greater the extent to which the population of a state is composed of a plurality of national, linguistic, religious, or cultural groups, the more complex the politics becomes, since an agreement on the fundamentals of the government will involve more variables. Essentially, the more nuanced the *demos*, the less representative the *polity*.

While Linz and Stepan (Ibid) accurately paint a picture of what a consolidated democracy looks like, they do little to address solutions to the central challenge to their path toward consolidation (Ibid). A more complex *demos* means more centers of power, and thus the need to bring the competing parts of the nation-state into the political fold. Linz and Stepan do not adequately describe the necessary mechanisms to implement democratic solutions to the multi-ethnic problem (Ibid). While Linz and Stepan offer that the only democratic solutions to the multi-national problem are predicated on voluntary assimilation, exit, or partitioning (Ibid, 24), they fail to explain how this can be done, alluding to the difficulty of pursuing these avenues.
To resolve Linz and Stepan’s problem without resorting to the flawed ideas of consociationalism or federalism, political scientists should look toward the application of two citizenship doctrines: *Jus Soli* and *Jus Sanguinis* (Ibid). In his article “Nationality: *Jus Soli* or *Jus Sanguinis*,” political scientist James Brown Scott defines *Jus Sanguinis* as the right to citizenship based on blood relationships and *Jus Soli* as the right to citizenship based on birth within the borders of a state (1930, 58). Clever manipulation of these citizenship policies allows a politician or party to expand the size of its winning coalition, or its set of supporters backing the politician or party’s power, while at the same time allowing other ethnic groups to maintain their democratic privileges. The three cases discussed in this article (Estonia, Latvia, and Israel) all feature the manipulation of these two types of citizenship laws.

In particular, *Jus Sanguinis* plays a historically important role in the democratic consolidation of an ethnically fragmented state. In her article “Illegitimate Borders: *Jus Sanguinis* Citizenship and the Legal Construction of Family, Race, and Nation,” Kristin Collins states that *Jus Sanguinis* provides officials “with an exclusionary tool that appears natural and race-neutral in the lines it draws between citizen and non-citizen” (2014, 2). In other words, *Jus Sanguinis* is applied so as to allow the polity to structure who can and cannot be citizens without discriminating on the basis of ethnicity. Thus, *Jus Sanguinis* serves as a tool for the polity to either expand or limit access based on their political desires. If the polity wishes for democratization, they can elect to expand citizenship to certain groups without appearing to favor any particular group.

Essentially, citizenship laws rooted in the idea of “birthright,” or, a citizen’s legal entitlements based on their parents, are utilized in such a way as to support an ethnically indigenous nation-building enterprise. This occurs because, as Collins (2014) alludes, it is difficult to argue against the specific logic of citizenship by birthright. A person born to Irish parents, for example, will likely be raised Irish, and will easily integrate into Irish society and adopt Irish norms. Thus, that individual is culturally Irish and should retain access to the benefits of Irish citizenship. The political effect of such a policy, however, is that the titular ethnic group can expand democratic rights to larger amounts of people, thereby making political reintegration or integration easier for minority ethnic groups. In other words, citizenship rights can be expanded to the children of naturalized citizens, making the state function cohesively because avenues toward the benefit of citizenship are available. Due to the assurance of the continual majority of the titular ethnic group through birthright citizenship, extending citizenship rights to ethnic minorities becomes more palatable to the empowered ethnic group.

Furthermore, *Jus Sanguinis* allows the titular ethnic group to secure their
own political future while simultaneously giving the same rights to ethnic
groups that will never reach the population levels to effectively challenge the
titular ethnic group in the political arena. What this means is that elites can
utilize Jus Sanguinis to offer the benefits of citizenship without the risks of
political contention so long as their demographic majority remains solvent
(assuming that political cleavages fall along ethnic lines). Jus Sanguinis
thereby offers a solution to the problem of democratic consolidation in an
ethnically fractured demos. Because the same political rights are offered to
ethnic minorities, they will not challenge policies made by the titular ethnic
party undemocratically.

To reiterate, Jus Sanguinis contributes to two helpful aspects of
democratic consolidation. First, the steady stream of new members of the titular
ethnicity ensures the political majority of the titular ethnicity. Second, as a
result of that assurance, extending political and citizenship rights to minorities
becomes more palatable because the titular ethnic group understands that
they will be able to maintain their privileged position. Thus, Jus Sanguinis can
be the basis of Jus Soli, a much easier path to citizenship for foreigners and
ethnic minorities.

While Jus Soli provides more opportunities to citizenship for ethnic
minorities and immigrants, it is the connection between a defined portion of
land and a certain ethnicity that allows for a fluid path toward citizenship.
Foreigners who share ethnic or religious similarities to those who occupy a
body of land, such as Jews and Israel, can gain citizenship regardless of where
they were born or who their parents are. In other words, the Israeli state views
Jews as indigenous to Israel, thus the connection between that identity and
the land is a firm basis for citizenship. Furthermore, Jus Soli maintains that
children of immigrants and non-citizens can obtain citizenship through the
location of their birth, presenting a more acceptable reality to non-citizens,
which in turn, purports the democratic regime under which they live.

In a broader sense, Jus Soli citizenship laws tend to be used for the
incorporation of minority groups into the body politic. Rogers Brubaker
(1992) discusses one such case in Citizenship and Nationhood in France and
Germany. In his analysis of France, Brubaker illustrates how Jus Soli was used
to remove the exemption on settled foreigners from military service (Ibid, 85).
Resentment of settled-foreigners in French territory, who had been enjoying
the benefits of living under French law without paying any of the dues required
of other citizens, had reached a fever pitch. To diffuse this tension, Jus Soli
was extended to previous non-citizens, forcing them to join the military and
thus ending the resentment built into French society (Ibid). As demonstrated
by France, targeted use of *Jus Soli* can resolve problems rooted in ethnic instability, and while this strategy relieves the grievances of the majority, it could also be argued that it does not do so for the minority. Yet, one can trace the criticisms of minorities due to their specific stratification; they are unable to participate in mainstream society because they are excluded. The benefits of citizenship, however, are an inclusive force, and thus should resolve inter-ethnic tensions in this type of paradigm.

However, much like how *Jus Sanguinis* can preserve the political supremacy of the titular ethnic group, use of *Jus Soli* can achieve the same end as well. The fluid definition of *Jus Soli* allows for varied targeting of whom the citizenship laws affect. In cases where a state is plagued by ethnic divisions, a broad definition of *Jus Soli* can be used to expand the winning coalition of the titular majority without lessening the democratic rights of the minority groups. One example of this strategy would be the relationship between Jews and Israel. The Israeli government contests that any Jew outside of Israel possesses an inherent connection to the region and can thus apply for citizenship on the basis of their religious and cultural identity, regardless of their birthplace. Additionally, *Jus Soli* can be utilized in such a way that ethnic minorities feel more integrated within the state. The clever manipulation and targeted application of *Jus Soli* provides another solution to the issue of democratic consolidation in a multi-ethnic and fractured state.

Something as simple as citizenship is important because it grants specific, shared benefits to individuals, increasing national cohesiveness through a common allocation of rights, liberties, and opportunities. In their article “Mobility and Security: The Perceived Benefits of Citizenship for Resettled Young People from Refugee Backgrounds,” Caitlin Nunn, Celia McMichael, Sandra M. Gifford, and Ignacio Correa-Valdez discuss the importance of citizenship to ethnic minorities, especially those that are capable of providing shocks to a state’s political system. Nunn et. al posit, “The nation state remains the foundational source of legal rights and obligations for individuals” (Nunn et. al 2015, 383). Nunn et. al aptly argue that because the nation state possesses the capability to either protect or inhibit rights, membership to the state, i.e. citizenship, will grant protections to ethnic minorities (Ibid). Considering that a consolidated democracy is predicated on a cohesive *demos*, citizenship rights are an integral component to democratization insofar as they act as an equalizer, establishing a basis for what each member of the *demos* is entitled to.

Access to full participation and integration in the nation state provides
the democratic freedoms that are especially pertinent to my research because the acceptance of democracy as “the only game in town” is the most integral step for democratic consolidation (Linz and Stepan 1996b, 14). Through expansion of political involvement via the use of citizenship laws, democratic consolidation in an ethnically fragmented state becomes easier.

To be clear, the use and manipulation of citizenship laws is not a cure-all for ethnic factionalism. In my view, this model is dependent on four conditions which, if they are not met, will cause the application of citizenship doctrines to consolidate democracies to succumb to the same flaws as federalism and consociationalism: elite corruption, misuse or abuse of resources to disadvantage other groups, and parochial and arbitrary definitions of ethnic groups granting or preventing access to citizenship.

The first condition is that the titular ethnicity must be significantly more populous than the minority population. This type of ethnic distribution facilitates the safety-valve politics described earlier, stipulating that because there is such a formidable majority, the titular ethnic group can feel comfortable extending full citizenship and democratic rights to ethnic minorities. Considering that the titular ethnic will maintain its majority, their political security will not be compromised. Ethnic minorities will view their ability to genuinely participate in the political process as an opportunity to influence policy within the system, legitimizing the new democracy.

The second condition requires that there must be genuine democratic zeal. The desire for democracy should reverberate throughout the population and permeate throughout all institutions and civil society. Democracy should be considered a wheel. If spokes in the wheel break, then the wheel breaks. Likewise, democracy is dependent on the participation of all aspects of the body politic. If part of the body politic is incongruent with a functioning democracy, the democratic order breaks as well. Consider that a powerful media organization does not favor a democratic transition. The organization could perpetuate ethnic disunity, perhaps painting one group as the saboteurs of the state’s future success. Without a fully cohesive population, citizenship opportunities will not fully extend to certain groups, marginalizing ethnic minorities and breaking the democratic wheel.

Thirdly, elites must also accept democracy as the new system of government following the transition. Citizenship laws are often complex and broad, granting opportunities for lawmakers to insert clauses that perpetuate structural inequalities targeted at ethnic minorities. Structural inequalities contribute to disunity, exacerbating the greed and grievance cycle characteristic of ethnic conflicts. To establish democratic zeal throughout the
state, elites should create inclusive policies rather than exclusive policies. This condition directly relates to the ethnic demographics. To ensure that elites play the democratic game, they must feel that their political position is secure. Having a favorable balance of power concerning demographics will allow these elites to feel more comfortable extending full citizenship rights to ethnic minorities.

The last condition stipulates that citizenship laws should not include language governing who can and cannot be a citizen. While it may seem like an inclusive idea to codify that different ethnic groups can all be citizens, it ignores the fluidity and confines the trajectory of identities. Ideas of what constitutes a certain ethnic group change over time, as does who identifies within that ethnic group. While citizenship laws in this model can list certain requirements, such as knowledge of the country’s history or constitution, it should not list who can become a citizen based on anything resembling a social or economic characteristic, lest it fall to the same flaws as federalism and consociationalism.

**Methodology and Case Selection**

This article utilizes the methodology of a comparative case study (CCS). CCS allows the reader to synthesize similarities across cases, providing a path toward theory generalization that will give political scientists a model from which to analyze future cases in the field of ethnic politics. The main goal of a CCS is to find relationships between variables (Lijphart 1971, 683). By finding points of convergence and divergence for independent and dependent variables, an argument can be constructed. In this analysis, I identify the fair extension (or lack thereof) of citizenship as my independent variable, and the full consolidation of democracy, and thus a necessarily cohesive population (or lack thereof) as my dependent variables.

Each of the three cases explored in this article (Estonia, Latvia, and Israel) are analyzed to understand the uses of *Jus Sanguinis* and *Jus Soli* both individually and together. Estonia, Latvia, and Israel are used in this analysis because they each dealt with or are in the midst of an ethnically fractured society. In Estonia and Latvia, the cleavage was between ethnic Estonians and Latvians on the one side, and Ethnic Russians on the other. In Israel, the cleavage is between Jews and Arab Muslims. The key difference between the cases is located in what their respective application of citizenship doctrines produced. Latvia and Estonia demonstrate how the fair extension of citizenship laws produces consolidated democracies. For example, citizenship laws were used to defuse ethnic tensions between Latvians and Estonians, and Russians. Meanwhile, while Israel’s application of citizenship laws has solved the ethnic conflict, they did not extend them fairly and equally to
all potential citizens, and thus failed to heal the ethnic fractures.

The differences between the Baltic cases and Israel demonstrate that when fair citizenship laws are extended, democracies consolidate. When they are not extended in an egalitarian manner, the ethnic cleavages go unresolved, harming the potential for a long lasting consolidate democracy. While Latvia and Estonia represent the first model, Israel represents the second.

At the time of democratization, Latvia and Estonia felt immense pressure to join NATO and the EU to secure their newfound sovereignty after the fall of the Soviet Union. The requirements for joining the European Union were laid out in the Copenhagen Constitution, which emphasizes democratic freedoms and institutions as the first requirement (Copenhagen European Council 1993). One of the political criterions for NATO membership is the promotion of democratic values. Latvia and Estonia would therefore need to democratize to join NATO. As Linz and Stepan (1996b), explain, however, a fractured society poses a large stumbling block in this process. The pressure to consolidate a democracy in this paradigm forced astute political maneuvering from Estonia and Latvia’s titular ethnicity, which would want to keep their country’s Estonian or Latvian characteristics without becoming too illiberal.

The third case, Israel, felt similar pressures to consolidate its democracy under difficult circumstances. The state of Israel itself is an ideological project serving as a safe haven for Jews in which they can govern themselves on the one hand and a fully democratic outpost on the other. Because Israel was founded to exist as a Jewish state, it is expected that the Israeli polity will be Jewish, yet confining who exactly can lead a state to a certain group means is illiberal in design. Resolving the inherent tension between these two goals is key to implementing a fully consolidated democracy in Israel. Perhaps the most pertinent statement of Israel’s goal to consolidate its democracy can be found in its declaration of independence, which states that the country “will be based on freedom, justice and peace [...] it will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all inhabitants irrespective of religion, race of sex” (Israel 1948). Yet, to a state wishing to be both Jewish and democratic, additional ethnic groups can be a barrier to those lofty goals. Would it be possible to reconcile idealistic democratic goals and a state founded to be Jewish in an overwhelmingly Arab region? The solutions and failures to prevent ethnic divisions inhibiting democratic ventures can be found in Latvia’s, Estonia’s, and Israel’s use of citizenship laws.

**Latvia**
Latvia’s path toward democratization is largely informed by its history of oppression at the hands of two foreign powers: Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Authors Anders Åslund and Valdis Dombrovsk discuss Latvia’s history of alternated subjugation between Germany and the Soviet Union since the 1920s (Åslund and Dombrovsk 2011, 5). Attempts to alter the cultural makeup of Latvia had largely failed and instead triggered an increased sense of what it meant to be Latvian. Perhaps the most important instance in this process was the Soviet Union’s intense strategy to “Russify” Latvia. According to the Soviet census in 1989, only 52% of the Latvian population was composed of ethnic Latvians, with the rest split between ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians (Ibid, 6). These demographics remained throughout the fall of the Soviet Union and presented a problem when Latvia began its path toward democratization after the fall of the Soviet Union.

In 1991, Russian president Boris Yeltsin recognized Latvia’s independence, allowing Latvians to chart their own course (Ibid, 7). Given the poor economy and history of subjugation to foreign powers, Latvians quickly sought economic development and social liberalization initiatives to spearhead their goal of joining NATO and the European Union (Ibid, 10). Because economic liberalization and development often go hand-in-hand with political democratization (Moore 1966, 418), and because the route toward Western protection against Russian encroachment was predicated on those goals, Latvians felt enormous pressure to pursue democratic transition. Consolidating democracy in Latvia, however, demanded an artful solution to the common problem of ethnic factionalism.

The obstacle Latvia faced was the ratio between ethnic Latvians and non-Latvians, primarily ethnic Russians. In 1989, ethnic Latvians composed only 52% of Latvia, while 34% consisted of ethnic Russians (Linz and Stepan 1996a, 403). While this ratio displayed a large discrepancy between the titular and minority ethnicities, it was a sharp decline compared to previous demographic censuses. For example, the 1939 Latvian census highlighted a ratio of 75% Latvian to 10.6% Russian (Ibid, 403). The decline in ethnic Latvians came as a result of the effort to “Russify” Latvia by the Soviet Union and largely contributed to the main ethnic cleavage in the country: Latvians supporting a Latvian Latvia, and Russians supporting a Russified Latvia.

Rather than suppressing the rights of ethnic Russians, pro-democracy Latvians decided to push ahead with their democratic initiatives. Survey data show that although ethnic Russians were not viewed as assimilable, they were comfortable identifying as “citizens of the republic” (Ibid, 411-414). Members of the Latvian polity, recognizing that ethnic Russians were comfortable identifying as citizens even if they identified as Russian rather than Latvian, extended citizenship
rights to the minority ethnicity.

Through data gleaned from the 1939 census, the Latvian polity inferred that before Soviet domination, Latvia maintained a much higher percentage of ethnic Latvians than non-Latvians. Implementation of combined Jus Soli and Jus Sanguinis citizenship doctrine allowed for the re-incorporation and re-integration of ethnic Latvians who had not been considered citizens under Latvia's foreign rulers. Ethnic Latvians who had been living overseas and descendants of former Latvian nationals were presented with a path toward citizenship. Information from the most recent Latvian census, taken in 2011, shows a significant uptick in the ethnic Latvian population, with an approximate increase of 10% (Centrālā Statistikas Pārvalde 2011). Securing the ethnic majority provided a more comfortable atmosphere for the Latvian polity to consolidate democratically.

Pressure to secure Latvia's independence coincided with the need to join the liberal-democratic institutions of NATO and the European Union. Rather than capitulating to ethnic factionalism, lawmakers in Latvia recognized the favorable demographic context and strategies to amplify the population of the titular nationality. This maneuver allowed them to implement a type of safety-valve democracy, in which full democratic rights could be extended to ethnic minorities via citizenship without compromising the secure position of ethnic majority. Due to the extension of full democratic rights to minority groups, they felt comfortable joining in and accepting the process of democratic consolidation, eliminating any of the large cleavages that would have split the population and deconstructed any democratic transition. The Latvian elites could, on one hand, display their democratic improvement and, on the other hand, embrace their comfortable majority and initiate moves to join the EU and NATO. The offer of citizenship in this case facilitated democratic consolidation through securing the future for the titular nationality and through extending full citizenship rights to ethnic minorities.

**Estonia**

In several ways, Estonia's democratization story shares similarities with Latvia's. Both transitions and consolidations occurred toward the end of the Soviet Union's regional hegemony, both states faced ethnic factionalism, and both states used a combination of Jus Soli and Jus Sanguinis to resolve this cleavage. The cases differ, however, in the origins of the democratization. Li Bennich Bjorkman (2007, 341) asserts that Estonia's democratization specifically came as a result of two unique circumstances: Estonia's robust
social and civil societies and a strong zeitgeist of communalism and cooperation. The result of these two circumstances meant that the Estonian polity, in addition to experiencing the same pressures as Latvia to democratize and liberalize in order to retain protection from Russia, strongly felt that democracy was the appropriate system of government for their country.

Despite this ostensibly favorable scenario for democratic consolidation, cleavages between ethnic Estonians and Russians threatened to destroy any democratic system of governance. The last census taken before Soviet control of Estonia was in 1934 (Linz and Stepan 1996a, 403). This census shows that 88.8% of the population was ethnically Estonian, while 8.2% was Russian. In 1984, the last census taken during Soviet rule, ethnic Estonians only constituted 61.5% while ethnic Russians comprised 30.3% of the population (Ibid, 403). Efforts to “Russify” Estonia contributed to this cleavage and, as in Latvia, created significant tensions between ethnic Russians and Estonians. In a 2010 interview given to Baltic news organization, Baltic Reports, University of Tartu professor Marju Lauristin contested that ethnic Russians had faced and continue to face discrimination at the hands of the state (Joost 2010). Despite the bias against ethnic Russians in Estonian politics, a 1990 survey showed that 76.6% of ethnic Russians feel either “proud” or “very proud” to live in a “republican Estonia,” or in other words, a democratic Estonia (Linz and Stepan 1996a, 412).

Acceptance of a democratic Estonia by ethnic Russians, who were legally disadvantaged compared to ethnic Estonian citizens, can be attributed to the full extension of citizenship rights to every Estonian, regardless of ethnicity. Estonia’s citizenship doctrine is informed through a mixture of Jus Soli and Jus Sanguinis. Individuals born in Estonia with at least one parent who is a citizen are granted citizenship. Moreover, an individual born to an Estonian parent outside of Estonia is also a citizen. Furthermore, a path to naturalization is quite simple, requiring only eight years of residency and a rudimentary understand of Estonian law and language (Estonia.eu 2016). These policies ensure a steady stream of ethnic Estonians with Estonian citizenship, securing the ethnic Estonian majority. Lastly, voting rights are extended to non-citizen residents in local elections. Because most governing is done at the local level, ethnic Russians, who may opt-out of Estonian citizenship, can still provide input to policies that directly affect them, thereby increasing cohesiveness among the demos.

Because of the ethnic distribution, the Estonian polity could feel comfortable extending liberal democratic rights to non-ethnic Estonians, as well as streamlining an often-complicated naturalization process. These aspects of Estonian citizenship and voting law facilitated the democratic consolidation of Estonia without compromising the ideals of a democratic revolution. Furthermore,
the broadness of Estonian citizenship and voting law present a hopeful path forward. Because ethnic identities are fluid, it can become difficult to fairly codify who can and cannot gain citizenship, yet Estonia has successfully circumvented this through their naturalization process. Thus, along with Latvia, Estonia’s citizenship model presents a successful model for resolving ethnic tensions in a transitioning democracy.

Israel

Although Israel obtained a semblance of democracy, it did not resolve the ethno-religious cleavage of the Jewish-Arab divide. Thus, Israel should not be viewed as having fully consolidated. The population is not fully cohesive, and thus, its democratic system faces serious threat of dissolution. Regardless of Israel’s disunity, there is a general consensus in political science arguing that Israel is more democratic than not. This is reflected by Freedom House, an organization that maintains democratic indexes, which ranks Israel as a 1.5 on its 7-point scale (Freedom House 2016). Freedom House’s scale ranges from a 1 to a 7, with 1 representing a full democracy, and 7 a full autocracy (Freedom House 2016). Likewise, the Polity Data Series, another organization that maintains democratic indexes, also states that Israel is a democracy (Marshall 2010). While not everyone living in Israel is happy with the system governing them, Israel does indeed reflect numerous notions of democracy; however, Israel lacks the cohesive demos required for full democratic consolidation. Although the most recent Polity Data Series article highlighting Israel was published in 2010, its key point of proportional representation in the Israeli legislature, the Knesset (Marshall 2010, 2), illuminates how Israel maintains its democratic character. The Jewish polity feels secure enough in its majority that it can maintain its more equitable policies without jeopardizing the governmental hierarchy. Through preserving the democratic order and institutions, transitions to reaching a more stable solution to ethnic conflict will become more feasible.

Attaining the critical mass of support necessary for initial democratic consolidation involved a large degree of manipulation of Israel’s citizenship laws. The modern Israeli state formed in the aftermath of the 1947 UN Partition Plan (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013b). The Israeli state was to be a strong democracy and safe haven for Jews fleeing Europe following the Second World War. While on one hand these goals may seem righteous, they sparked outrage in the Arab world due to the perception that Zionism was merely a veiled colonialist enterprise, forming the basis for the political

The 1948 Israeli census showed that approximately 87% of the Israeli population was Jewish, with the remaining 13% consisted mainly of Arabs (Rabinovich and Reinharz 2008, 571-572). The Jewish \textit{polity}, acknowledging that Arabs composed (and continue to compose) a significant portion of the population, offered full political rights irrespective of religious or ethnic identity; however, this offer was conditional on citizenship, which is made problematic by right to return law, which stipulates that the \textit{Jus Soli} connection between people and land means Jews have a privileged access to Israeli citizenship while non-Jews have a more difficult path (Shapira 2012, 460). Due to the absence of a formal constitution, these rights and liberties were codified in Israel’s declaration of independence and basic laws.

Israel’s basic laws are the roots from which future Israeli law stem. The Israeli basic laws plainly state that Israeli nationals should have the fundamental rights that are integral to any consolidated democracy, without making any mention of race, religion, or other forms of identity apart from citizenship (Yitzhak, Weizman, and Weiss 1948). This policy guarantees the same political rights to all Israelis, and purports the acceptance of the regime. Furthermore, the ideological underpinning of the formal Israeli state, the Israeli declaration of independence, calls upon Arabs to, “preserve peace and participate in the upbuilding of the State on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its provisional and permanent institutions” (Ben-Gurion 1948). Thus the ostensibly liberal offers made by Israel only existed to a narrow set of individuals. Access to citizenship was, and still is, difficult for non-Jews to obtain.

In practice, the Israeli \textit{polity} established a citizenship doctrine capable of preserving the Jewish identity and majority in the \textit{Knesset}, or, the Israeli Parliament, through the implementation of \textit{Jus Sanguinis} and \textit{Jus Soli}. Israeli citizenship law stipulates that citizenship may be granted to individuals born to at least one Israeli parent, individuals born within the borders of Israel, and to those who have lived in Israel for five years, three of which must be spent within the borders of Israel (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010a). Furthermore, Israel operates under a “right to return policy,” under which Jews across the world possess the ability to immigrate to Israel and obtain citizenship (Ibid). The right to return policy, however, is also one of the key inhibitors of full democratic consolidation and the healing of the Arab-Israeli cleavage.

The right to return policy operates under the belief that individuals should always be able to emigrate back to their indigenous land (Shapira 2012,
While Israel fully extends this right to Jews, it does not do so for Arabs (Ibid). This policy privileges Jews over Arabs. While Jews have an easy path to citizenship, Arabs do not (Ibid). This divide has formed a large point of contention, and endangers a democratic solution to the conflict between Arabs and Jews because of the unequal access to citizenship (Ibid). Although Israel has adopted key democratic institutions, afforded many of the necessary democratic rights to its demos, and for all intents and purposes functions as a democracy, this is only true for Israeli citizens. Israel does not offer access to citizenship equally, and thus, should not be considered a fully consolidated democracy.

Conclusions and Areas of Future Research

I began this project to identify a model with which ethnically fractured states could consolidate democratically. Utilizing the fair and equal extension of citizenship laws as the independent variable, and a consolidated democracy as the dependent variable, I argue that genuinely equal access to the benefits of citizenship is the most important avenue toward consolidation. I offer this solution because of the flaws I identify with consociationalism and federalism. While those models perhaps offer more digestible solutions to elites, they fail to alleviate the structural barriers to a cohesive society in the way that egalitarian citizenship laws do.

I recommend additional research into two areas related to this article. First, identifying more effective solutions to ethnic fragmentation in states without intense desires to democratize demands more study. Second, additional survey research into the opinions of minority groups living in this system should also be conducted. It would be valuable to ascertain the level of their continued support of the government under which they live.

Democratic transitions are a supremely difficult undertaking. Numerous cases display the careful tightrope that democrats must cross. It is all too easy for politicians to embrace authoritarian or illiberal tendencies to resolve issues inhibiting their consolidation of power. To alleviate ethnic tensions, leaders frequently use oppressive strategies, from political and social suppression, to genocide. I propose a new path for democrats. Rather than indulging in ethnically charged policies such as land relocation or ethnic cleansing to create a more cohesive society, democrats should extend citizenship rights to all individuals. The guaranteed protections of citizenship make rule by a majority ethnic group more palatable to a minority group. The cases of Latvia and Estonia demonstrate that equal access to citizenship
incorporates and imbues a cohesive identity among the population, while unequal access to citizenship in Israel highlights the problems that occur when a state tries to organize itself by democracy and ethnicity, an incompatible combination.
Works Cited


UNDERSTANDING THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

Bailey Wong

Abstract

Foreign policymakers, academics, and regional pundits have all acknowledged the importance of the South China Sea. This region, rich in resources and trade, is the subject of intense territorial contest and is perpetually at risk for escalation and confrontation. This research analyzes the potential for conflict in the South China Sea by examining when and why China has used force in its past territorial disputes. Current theories in international relations offer multiple competing explanations for when and why states use force, highlighting different explanatory variables, such as military might, economic interdependence, and regional norms. Current scholarship has yet to conduct a historical analysis and apply these variables to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. This research will address this gap by offering a qualitative case comparison focusing on three distinct periods of Chinese foreign policy. These cases are analyzed through Mill’s method of difference, incorporating historical analysis and quantitative data to analyze explanatory variables for China’s use of force in territorial disputes. Evidence collected concludes that economic interdependence is the strongest constraining force in preventing the use of force in the South China Sea. The results of this research will work to aid policymakers in future conflict prevention.

Introduction

This paper analyzes the potential for conflict in the South China Sea by conducting a qualitative case study comparison. My research seeks to help explain China’s use of force in territorial disputes—specifically by contrasting China’s strategy of escalation in previous decades to the current absence of violent conflict in the South China Sea. This puzzle is supported by prevalent theoretical
explanations and empirical findings. Historically, territory has been the most frequent and consistent cause of violent conflict (Vasquez 1993). It is for this same reason that scholars are concerned with China’s territorial disputes in general (Friedberg 2005). Among Sinologists, understanding China’s past uses of force in territorial disputes thus offers an understanding of the potential for violent conflict in East Asia (Fravel 2008). This research seeks to understand the conditions of conflict in an attempt to help prevent it. This question also more broadly speaks to a larger theoretical debate within international relations: how and when do states decide to use force?

Of course, there are more specific reasons as to why the South China Sea is uniquely important. The South China Sea represents a host of geopolitical interests and territorial disputes, neatly wrapped into an area a little larger than the Caribbean. Current territorial disputes involve China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Brunei, and initially began in 1951 when the People’s Republic of China formally claimed the Spratly and Paracel Islands (Zhou 1990). Why the disputes have persisted for decades becomes clearer upon closer inspection (Fravel 2008). The South China Sea is home to substantial fisheries, potentially vast reserves of energy (some estimates reaching 70.78 billion tons of oil and natural gas) (Wang and Shu-yuan 2013; Guoqiang 2015), and approximately $5.3 trillion in global trade each year (the Straits of Malacca representing 40% of global trade alone) (Kaplan 2009; Glaser 2012). Such incentives for conflict and control, already considerable, have been significantly exacerbated since 2009, when a new phase of Chinese foreign policy reasserted aggressive Chinese maritime and territorial claims in the region (Tellis et al. 2011). The current situation continues to concern many ASEAN countries and the United States as China has compounded its exorbitant “Nine Dash Line” claim with a massive military buildup and land reclamation efforts in the South China Sea (O’Rourke 2015, Dolven et al. 2015; Raine 2001, 71).

This paper first begins with a review of other scholarly works, analyzing prevailing attempts in international relations theory to explain the use of force. The literature reviewed includes preeminent schools of thought: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. This ongoing debate informs the situation in the South China Sea by offering competing explanations for how and when states decide to use force.

My research thus uses a state’s use of force as the dependent variable, which is tested by three independent variables (Fravel 2011; Li 2013). These independent variables include relative power, regional normative frameworks, and economic interdependence, all of which are supported by literature (Fravel
2008). I then analyze data collected to identify the variables, if any, which share a potentially causal relationship with the constraint of the use of force.

As this research conducts a qualitative case comparison, three cases are analyzed to test for a relationship between the use of force and independent variables: the first period of modern Chinese foreign policy, in which violent conflict did erupt in the South China Sea (1950-1999), a period of increased diplomatic and economic engagement (2000-2008), and another where tensions are arguably at an all-time high, yet no violent conflict has precipitated (2009-2015). Because the present situation is so deeply characterized by Chinese aggression, especially compared to previous conflicts, it is particularly surprising that states have thus far managed to constrain the use of force. This would make the (2009-2015) case deviant from a realist perspective, where one would otherwise expect China to have resorted to force in light of present tensions, and a most likely case from a commercial liberalist or constructivist prediction, where the use of force has been successfully constrained. Using Mill’s methods of difference, this paper tests for a causal relationship between economic interdependence and the use of force. A qualitative case comparison became the optimal methodology as comparisons between these cases allow results to infer a case-specific causal mechanism. Such an inference would be more precise than statistical methods, and the number of Chinese territorial disputes are too few to conduct a meaningful statistical analysis. A discourse analysis is not appropriate given the nature of this research’s goals, as I aim to inform future studies of Chinese uses of force, and more broadly other conflict models. Such findings will then help build on a larger theoretical debate, as well as contribute to international peacekeeping and conflict prevention efforts.

**Literature Review**

Three schools of international relations theory offer competing explanations for how and why states act, including when and why states use force. The relevant schools of thought include realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Each offers differing explanatory variables for how and why the use of force is constrained, ranging from military might to normative change.

**Realism**

Realism, as defined by Hans Morgenthau (2005, 5), is “the concept of interest defined in terms of power.” Modern scholars on East Asia have understood this as states’ “permanent struggle for power arising from the perennial quest for security” (Tellis 2012, 76). This school of thought is most clearly defined by five
key assumptions: that international politics remains anarchic, that states have offensive capabilities, cannot be entirely certain of the intentions of others, wish to survive, and are rational (Mearsheimer 1994). Realists thereby understand situations in terms of material capabilities, be they militarily, economically, or diplomatically channeled (Slaughter 2011). Scholars have divided the school into several sub-sections, the most prevalent of which include offensive, defensive, and “balance of power” realism.

Offensive realists maintain that states seek to achieve security through domination and hegemony (Mearsheimer 2001). Such a strategy would implicitly require states to offensively maximize their power and influence whenever possible, typically by pursuing an expansionist policy as they acquire or perceive to acquire additional material power (Labs 1997; Hendrickson 1998; Elman 2004). Scholars who have applied tenets of offensive realism to modern China have constructed what is now called the “China threat,” which interprets China’s rise as a considerable threat to Southeast Asian and U.S. national security (Roy 1996, 758). Other scholars have gone as far to say that “Asia’s future is Europe’s past,” arguing that conflict is inevitable due to the region’s sustained disequilibrium and strategic competition (Friedberg 2011, 147).

Defensive realists, by contrast, reject domination as a strategy for survival, as hegemony may lead to dangerous conflict with rivals (Slaughter 2011). Instead, the anarchy of the international arena encourages states to achieve security through defensive and conservative policies, encouraging cultures of “self-help” (Waltz 1979). Such explanations gain increasing gravity when considering China’s unique security environment, in which China shares a border with fourteen separate neighbors. China has waged war with five of these neighbors in the last 70 years, and several of these states are ruled by unstable regimes (Nathan and Scobell 2012). All of this is exacerbated by the fact that none of China’s neighbors share its core national or security interests (Ibid).

Other forms of realism include “balance of power” theories, which claim that stability is best maintained through systems “where a roughly equal distribution of power amongst States ensures that none will risk attacking another” (Slaughter 2011, 2). This form of realism maintains that conflict is not inevitable; conflict can be prevented if states “hedge” or “balance” against a larger threat. For Asia, this would involve ASEAN states balancing against a Chinese threat (Medeiros 2005). Among these “balance of power” realists, the United States is still the dominant actor in Asia, and can help offset China’s rising influence (Sutter 2006; Christensen 2006).
Liberalism

Liberalism in international relations is understood through three underlying principles: its rejection of power politics as the only sensible outcome of international relations, its argument for the possibility of international cooperation between states and the benefits thereof, and its acknowledgement that international organizations and other non-state actors have an influence in shaping state policy preferences (Shiraev 2014). Liberalism emphasizes that national characteristics influence a state’s international relations, and the nature and dynamics of the international political economy are important (Slaughter 2011; Acharya 2014). Scholars have divided liberalism into three sub-schools of thought: commercial liberalism, republican liberalism, and liberal institutionalism. Unlike subsets of realist thought, these variants of liberalism are not mutually exclusive (Pempel 2005). All subsets of liberalism collectively hold that the growth of multilateral institutions and deepening interdependence constrain strategic competition (Ikenberry 2013).

The first is commercial liberalism, which holds that “economic interdependence, particularly free trade, reduces the prospect of war by increasing its costs to the parties” (Acharya 2014, 68). Such theorists identify the “performance legitimacy” phenomenon whereby the Chinese government in particular derives ruling legitimacy from the country’s economic strength (Ibid, 69). The constraining influence of this economic interdependence was most recently highlighted in China and Japan’s Senkaku Islands dispute, where neither side used force. Commercial liberals attribute this constraint to the fact that China is Japan’s largest trading partner (Junguo 2012).

Second is republican liberalism, or the “democratic peace” argument, which holds that liberal democracies are more peaceful than autocracies, or at least seldom fight other democracies (Doyle 2005, 463-64). This theory holds limited applicability to potential for conflict in the South China Sea as Asia has relatively few democracies. The ones that do exist are mostly illiberal democracies who focus on “economic growth, performance legitimacy, and sovereignty-protecting institutions” (Acharya 2014, 70).

Lastly is liberal institutionalism, which focuses on “the contribution of international organizations in fostering collective security, managing conflict, and promoting cooperation” (Ibid, 69). Such liberal institutionalism has been seen in the creation of regional security and cooperation frameworks, including many of the ASEAN-centric organization such as ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN+3, and the East Asia Summit (Ibid). Such institutions serve to reinforce
a “liberal peace” and constrains force, given that developing Asian countries have benefited greatly from the existing liberal international order (Ikenberry 2011). This constraint in force is supported by a scholarly consensus, which agrees that China has historically acted as a status quo power (Kent 2007; Johnson 2007).

**Constructivism**

Constructivism, in the realm of international relations, asserts that state behavior is “constructed” by “a complex and specific mix of history, ideas, norms, and beliefs” (Slaughter 2011, 4). The school of thought is thereby commonly defined through two tenets: “1) that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces; and 2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature” (Wendt 1999, 1). Constructivism also places special emphasis on the role of social interactions, relationships, state identities and interests, and the ability of ideas and concepts to shape state behavior (Wendt 1995). When applied to studying the use of force, two subsets of constructivism are most pertinent: regional institutionalism and constructivist critiques of realism.

The first school of constructivist thought argues that regional institutions are crucial to the development of norms in international relations. These institutions give constructivists and policymakers the opportunity to test the role of ideas, shared identity, and socialization in building cooperation (Acharya 1997; Nischalke 2000; Haacke 2003). These trends have manifested in the form of ASEAN’s continual search for a “common and cooperative peace” through the “ASEAN Way” or the “Asia-Pacific Way” (Acharya 2014, 74). Regional efforts thus help to constrain aggression and the use of force through mutual interests and shared identity. Scholars have noted that such institutions have played an instrumental role in improving regional security and developing cooperative norms for a constructive future (Thayer 2012; Thayer 2015).

The second subset of constructivist thought critiques realist assessments of the Southeast Asia security landscape. Most notable has been an intense scholarly debate: some constructivists argue that Southeast Asia represents a bandwagoning environment, conditions inconsistent with certain realist presuppositions (Kang 2003). While not all constructivists agree, there is a general scholarly consensus that constructivism has provided a “mainstream” theoretical alternative to realism (Acharya 2004; Acharya 2014, 76; Karim 2007).
Alternative Models Applied to the South China Sea

As previously discussed, the three primary schools of thought in international relations have competing explanations for why states may choose to use force; however, some authors have proposed distinct and specific models for why states, specifically China, may choose to use force, particularly in the South China Sea. Fravel, in his 2008 article “Power Shifts and Escalation: Explaining China’s Use of Force in Territorial Disputes,” proposes an alternative model which posits that the Chinese use force in territorial disputes when its bargaining power in said disputes declines. The model draws from the preventative war theory, and argues that China will use force to fight “now in order to avoid the risks of war under worsening circumstances later” (Fravel 2008, 48). Fravel’s model suggests that despite heightening tensions in the South China Sea, China is not inclined to use force because its bargaining power in the dispute remains high.

Another author, Li, offers a competing explanation for China’s use of force in the past. In his 2013 article “The Taming of the Red Dragon: The Militarized Worldview and China’s Use of Force, 1949-2001,” Li argues that China’s previous uses of force have correlated with a more militarized worldview in Chinese leadership. By studying memoirs and various accounts of the Chinese leadership since the formation of the modern Chinese state, Li concludes that Chinese use of force could be previously explained by China’s stance in the international community and Mao’s overestimation of force’s efficacy. Both of these models are specific to China, and are not considered mutually exclusive to the traditional schools of thought in international relations.

Collectively, the literature reviewed informs and improves this research in several ways. Firstly, the schools of thought offered various theoretical models from which to draw variables from. This not only informed my variable selection, but also offered precursors to how said variables would interact in constraining the use of force. This additionally helped refine my research topic in both topic and scope. Specifically, the literature reviewed implies that economic interdependence may hold the greatest constraining force. By analyzing both qualitative and quantitative data, I hope that my findings will test this relationship, building upon an ongoing theoretical debate and potentially helping policymakers in the region.

Case Selection and Justification

There were three cases selected for comparison—all of which examine China’s evolving strategy in the South China Sea territorial dispute from 1950 to
the present. These cases are comprised of three distinct historical timelines, demarcated by very clear shifts in Chinese foreign policy (Zhao 2013). First is the period when China pursued a strategy of aggressive escalation, from 1950-1999. During this period, China demonstrated a willingness to use military force to defend its territorial claims. The second period, known as China’s “Charm Offensive” from 2000-2008 (Kurlantzick 2006), signals a substantial shift in foreign policy priorities, where China departed from an attitude of belligerent confrontation to engaging in regional normative frameworks (Ibid). This included China economically intertwining itself with ASEAN states and adopting several regional treaties. The third and final period is the current situation in the South China Sea, defined as all maritime activities (military and commercial) in the South China Sea in 2009-2015. In this period, Chinese policy shifts once again to reasserting previously aggressive Chinese claims, up until the point of using military force (Tellis 2011). Despite discrepancies in the number of years covered per case, cases are divided by periods in foreign policy because of the reactive nature of foreign policy decisions (Heng 2016).

These cases were selected because China’s use of force in territorial disputes remains one of the greatest risks of violent escalation in East Asia. Among Sinologists, understanding China’s aggressions and strategy in the South China Sea offers precedent to understanding the likelihood of East Asian aggression more generally (Fravel 2008). The cases also collectively represent examples of a most-likely case in commercial liberalism literature and a deviant case in realist literature. Among liberalists, it only seems natural that the use of force has declined as economic interdependence has increased; but among realists, China’s lack of force in territorial disputes against other inferior militaries is puzzling. As a result, understanding the causes and underlying factors in the South China Sea holds larger theoretical implications in understanding the potential for conflict. Analyzing China’s current aggressive posture in the South China Sea would help build a broader understanding of the use of force and conflict prevention.

Methodology

The three cases are analyzed using a case study comparison. This research is being conducted through a case study format because the inclusion of qualitative data and analysis allows for a greater understanding of causal mechanism(s) behind the phenomenon (VanEvera 1997). Although case studies can also suffer from spurious correlations and inconclusive results,
its selection is appropriate here as the dependent variable is binary (observed as present or absent), and the values of independent variables are observed to fluctuate over time (Ibid).

Mill’s method of comparison is selected as the method of analysis because the method can help eliminate variables which are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions, while identifying variables with potential explanatory power (George and Bennett 2005). This makes the method well-suited for this research, as there are multiple competing theoretical explanations which explain the use of force in the South China Sea. Mill’s method of comparison can thereby be useful in testing theories which already identify the variables in causal mechanisms. In total, there are four variables: a dependent variable and three independent variables. By studying the fluctuation of these variables across the three cases, Mill’s methods allow some conclusion to be made about which independent variable best explains variation in the dependent variable. Of course, the approach does suffer from a variety of drawbacks. Mill’s methods can be subject to false positives and negatives, and lacks explanatory power if other explanatory variables are not initially identified (Ibid).

The limitations of Mill’s methods are addressed in this research in two ways. Firstly, a thorough review of the literature guards against unforeseen explanatory variables. All of the primary variables used to explain the use of force in prevailing international relations literature is included in this research. Secondly, the likelihood of a false positive can be mitigated if the dependent variable observed is extreme (VanEvera 1997). Because Chinese use of force is a relatively rare occurrence, its presence is thus extreme by rarity, which helps limit this methodological risk.

**Variables**

This research examines the relationships between four variables: a dependent variable and three independent variables. The dependent variable is a state’s use of force in a territorial dispute (Fravel 2008). “Use of force” is defined to include blockades, raids, clashes, or war, as per the Correlates of War (Palmer et al. 2015). While this dependent variable is binary (present or absent), there are two indicators to observe the use of force. The first is whether or not a disputing state seized territory during the dispute. The second is whether or not a military engagement resulting in injury or loss of life occurred (Singer et al. 1972; Singer 1987). The presence of both of these indicators is necessary to determine if use of force is present within a territorial dispute.

The literature reviewed identifies three independent variables used to explain the use of force (Fravel 2008; Fravel 2011; Li 2013). The first is the relative
power of the states themselves. Relative power is generally understood as the national material capabilities, primarily militarized, which a state has at its disposal. There are two indicators for a state’s relative power. The first is the state’s aggregated national material capabilities, including factors such as military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban population, and total population (Singer et al. 1972). The second indicator of relative power is a country’s naval capacity (Tellis et al. 2000). The inclusion of this indicator is necessary, as the aggregated national material capabilities value does not take into consideration more technical capabilities such as naval warfare. Given the nature of this territorial conflict, the inclusion of naval capabilities as a consideration becomes necessary. As relative power increases, states have more militaristic options which make supporting their territorial claims possible; according to realist literature, this makes use of force in territorial disputes more likely.

The second independent variable is the presence of regional normative frameworks. The existence of these regional normative frameworks is determined through two indicators: the negotiated frameworks and institutions themselves, and country’s participation and adherence to those frameworks. Evidence of regional normative frameworks can be found through the founding documents of institutions such as ASEAN, and countries’ adherence to them can be measured through treaties ratified and violations of those treaties. Both liberalist and constructivist literature argue that the presence of regional normative frameworks helps reduce the transaction costs of negotiation and diplomatic solutions. As a result, their presence and adherence to them would presumably reduce the risk of conflict.

The third independent variable is the economic interdependence of the states in the territorial dispute. There are two indicators: bilateral trade and balance of payment statistics. Bilateral trade is calculated as the amount of bilateral trade between two disputing states as a percentage of GDP in U.S. dollars (Barbieri et al. 2009). Balance of payments measures “for a specific time period, the economic transactions of an economy with the rest of the world” (International Monetary Fund 1995, 6). According to commercial liberalist literature, because commercial activities and intraregional trade activity are ceased in times of war, economic interdependence invariably deters the use of force by raising the cost of conflict for all parties involved (Fravel 2010).

Hypothesis

This research conducts a qualitative case comparison to analyze three distinct periods of Chinese foreign policy. From researching previous scholarly
work on the South China Sea, my hypothesis is that as economic interdependence increases over time, the likelihood of the use of force decreases. This hypothesis is supported by liberalist literature reviewed, which purports economic linkages and interdependent commitments constrain the use of force by raising the cost of conflict for all parties involved. Cross comparison between cases and analysis helps determine which variables, if any, hold explanatory value in the current situation. The results of this research will ultimately help build on an ongoing debate by testing the viability of commercial liberalism.

Findings and Analysis

In comparing the three cases of Chinese foreign policy, three independent variables, relative power, regional normative frameworks, and economic interdependence, were examined. It is important to note that the dependent variable, the use of force, was only observed in the first case. Later cases are characterized by its absence. Aggregated into Table 1, the values assigned to these explanatory variables across all three cases are as follows:

Table 1: Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relative Power</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Normative</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frameworks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Interdependence</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uses of Force in</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South China Sea</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first period of Chinese foreign policy (1950 to 1999) is best characterized by the creation of multiple disputing claims over the South China Sea, leaving states with various capabilities to assert and defend them. China had relatively strong national capabilities at its disposal during this period; however, its equipment, technological, and naval limitations prevented it from exerting the full extent of its military might, particularly in a territorial dispute which is naval in nature. As a result, the first independent variable of relative power was awarded a value of four in a scale of zero to nine, indicating a “moderate” level of power relative to other disputant countries. The period was also noted for the absence of any substantive regional engagement, and there were no identifiable norms in

---

1 The dependent variable, uses of force in the South China Sea, is displayed as an interval variable. The three independent variables are displayed as ordinal variables.
which China engaged during this period, let alone adhered to. This is primarily due to the fact that ASEAN was not created until 1967 (ASEAN Secretariat 2008), and strong Chinese engagement in regional frameworks such as ASEAN did not begin until the late 1990s. As a result, the influence of regional normative frameworks was given a one on a scale of zero to four, indicating a “low” level of regional normative engagement. The final independent variable, economic interdependence, was assigned a value of three, or “moderate,” on a scale from zero to seven. Trade still occurred during 1950 to 1999, developing some economic interdependence, but levels of engagement was not nearly as high as they would eventually reach (World Bank 2016).

Because this period represents the only uses of force in the South China Sea, this first case serves an exceedingly crucial role for case study comparison. The conditions under which Chinese use of force occurred were only observed in this case, and were documented across three instances in the South China Sea: 1974, 1988, and 1994 (Ma 2013; Shipler 1974; The New York Times 1974). The period’s limited relative power, modest economic interdependence, and absence of regional normative frameworks will thus be compared to the two later cases.

Figure 1: Chinese Military Expenditure as a % of GDP

China’s Charm Offensive represents a dramatic departure from previous Chinese foreign policy in the region. The period witnessed no Chinese military provocations and the use of force was entirely constrained. While China still occupied island and reefs won through violent naval contests from the previous period, no new instances of conflict occurred. Instead of engaging

2 China’s first engagement with ASEAN occurred in 1990, when Malaysia included China in its regional free trade proposal for the East Asia Economic Caucas.
in provocative conflict with other Southeast Asian states, China instead engaged in various diplomatic and economic initiatives. But despite this change in focus, relative power still quietly accumulated, earning a six, or “moderate” amount of relative power. This is largely attributed to an increase in military spending and Chinese efforts to modernize its naval and force projection capabilities. Figure 1 illustrates this increase in military spending—something that persists to the present day (World Bank 2016). Because the Chinese economy as a whole was improving, military spending in RMB amounts rose, despite the fact that these spending increases are regarded as consistent as a percent of China’s rising GDP during this period (Liff and Erickson 2013). However, the period is still called the Charm Offensive for good reason—the presence of regional normative frameworks tremendously improved. China used this period in foreign policy to usher in an unprecedented era of cooperation, resulting in several economic treaties and diplomatic declarations (Minh 2013; Heads of State/Government at the 1st ASEAN Summit 1976, ASEAN Secretariat 2002; Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations n.d.). This is the most obvious change during the Charm Offensive: China’s sudden willingness to negotiate with other disputing states, especially through the engagement of ASEAN. Regional normative frameworks were awarded a four (out of a possible four), indicating a “high” level of engagement. In turn, economic interdependence simultaneously rose, as Figure 2 illustrates the rise of this increased trade activity (Barbieri and Keshk 2012). Note that this trade activity began in the late 1980s, as Chinese use of force in the region was beginning to die down. Trade levels witnessed its most dramatic increase in the early 2000s—an explosion from 1% to almost 2.5%—just as China joined the World Trade Organization and began its economic engagement efforts as a part of the Charm Offensive. As this trade activity has increased, the use of force has historically remained constrained. This earns the period a five, or “moderate” level of trade intertwinement, and such results bode well for constructivist and liberalist theories of how states decide to use force.

The present period of Chinese foreign policy (2009-2015), is best characterized by renewed tensions between disputing nations, ASEAN, and China, exacerbated by China’s renewed, measured territorial reclamations in the South China Sea (Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative 2016). Such reclamations are exceedingly aggressive in nature, and satellite imagery has confirmed Chinese military installations being placed on the island. But while these blatant aggressions violate international norms and represents a clear departure from the good-faith diplomacy in the Charm Offensive, my analysis indicates that such activities fall short of actual deployments of force. The international community and disputant nations have reacted in a number of ways. The Philippines have filed a contest over
such reclamations in an effort to channel regional normative frameworks into a diplomatic solution (Republic of the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs 2013). The United States has exercised Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in an attempt to establish militaristic precedent in the region and violate the maritime and air space “sovereignty” of Chinese reclaimed territory (Perlez 2016). China has responded by adding additional surface-to-air missile platforms to various islands (Hunt et al. 2016). But while the islands and reefs have been militarized, there have been no documented uses of force during this period of Chinese foreign policy. Tensions in this period are instead characterized by the continued use of civilian craft and the harassment of other disputant nations.

Figure 2: Total Trade by Disputant Countries as a Percentage of Chinese GDP

During this period, China’s military strength has increased dramatically relative to other disputant nations. This is due to China’s increased and sustained military growth and modernization, which has amassed a force far superior to other disputants in the South China Sea (Singer et al. 1972). Relative power thus earns an eight, or “high” level of relative power. Adherence to regional normative frameworks has also very obviously declined. Due to territorial reclamations and dubious activity on disputed territories, China has toed-the-line in regard to declarations of conduct it previously agreed to (Republic of the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs 2013). As a result, the presence of regional normative frameworks earns a three, indicating “high” levels. However, continued economic relations with ASEAN states remained strong, and have assured a close economic interdependence. As such, economic interdependence was awarded a value of six, or “high” level
of economic interdependence.

In comparing the variance of independent variables across the three cases, Mill’s methods of comparison would almost immediately eliminate relative power as an explanatory variable for Chinese use of force. Historically speaking, the use of force in the South China Sea is a rare occurrence, with only three documented instances, all of which are spread across decades in China’s first aggressive period of foreign policy. But as China’s relative power increases across these three cases, uses of force decline to zero instances of the use of force, suggesting that relative power has no causal relationship with a state’s willingness to use force. Explanations for why this may be true remain relatively consistent with historical expectation. Data indicate that China has enjoyed a relative power advantage compared to other disputant countries for decades, despite having weak and limited naval resources during the early years of the dispute. This advantage in military might, which has only grown for China throughout the years, was thought to incentivize the use of force through presumably more decisive military engagements. However, we see that this has not encouraged additional uses of force. This is particularly evident during the Charm Offensive: a time when China first began to seriously improve its military, especially naval and air, forces. Even as relative power has increased, China has restrained its use of force. If China had been acting in accordance to conventional realist theory, one would expect that a military transgression has already occurred. The fact that one has not occurred indicates that the “China Threat” theorists and relative power have offered an incomplete explanation of conflict in the South China Sea.

However, this is not to say that China’s relative power has had no influence on its aggression in the region. While not constituting actual uses of force, island reclamation efforts and the militarizing nature of the region would suggest that Chinese aggression has been encouraged, up until force becomes necessary. In current disputes, the Chinese have opted to continue reinforcing progressively aggressive claims and harassing or following the vessels of other nations instead of resorting to the use of outright force (Torbati 2015).

These findings would give credence to the explanatory power of the other two independent variables: regional normative frameworks and economic interdependence. The presence of both of these variables increased dramatically during the Charm Offensive, while relative power gaps only steadily increased, with no instances in the use of force. Given the almost immediate and dramatic effect of this increased economic and diplomatic engagement, it is much more compelling to believe that either of these variables encourage greater levels of restraint. Between these two variables, economic interdependence seems to offer a more compelling
explanation than regional normative frameworks. While regional normative frameworks have played a considerable role since the Charm Offensive, China has demonstrated an increasing disregard for ASEAN security interests. China’s pursuit of its expansionist goals in the South China Sea thus illustrates a newfound, more aggressive “toe-the-line” attitude. Through its island reclamations and renewed aggression, the Chinese are operating in spite of the cooperative and peaceful spirit they previously negotiated in. These factors would collectively indicate that regional normative frameworks play a less constraining role than the Charm Offensive would have suggested.

Such findings would give credence to liberalist thinkers, particularly those of school of commercial liberalism, who argue for the constraining influence of economic interdependence. Because trade and commercial cooperation cease in times of war, the economic consequences of conflict raise the costs of war for all parties involved. In today’s globalized economy, these costs would run unacceptably high. Such results imply that as trade activity rises, conflict becomes increasingly less likely, despite China’s ongoing aggressions and the heightened tensions of the territorial dispute. This further implies that economic interdependence is the single greatest variable in preventing an all-out war. These results collectively indicate that, at present, the potential for conflict in the South China Sea is relatively low, and the use of force should remain constrained so long as economic interdependence and regional norms continue to be consistent, assuming that Chinese foreign policy acts in accordance with previous behavior.

Potential and Alternative Interpretations

This research concludes that economic interdependence plays the single greatest role in constraining the use of force in the South China Sea; however, there are other potential and alternative explanations for the same decline. Data used to analyze China’s Charm Offensive would also support constructivist claims that the establishment of regional frameworks (which thus create norms of behavior among states) substantially mitigates the risk of conflict. That said, there are other interpretations among Sinologists and international relations theorists as to how these findings can be interpreted.

Most prominent of dissenting interpretations belong to realist scholars. The evidence collected could tentatively support a nuanced interpretation of the offensive realist’s argument: that China’s vast accumulation of power could have hegemonic, stabilizing effects on the region. Still, the plausibility of such an explanation is hampered by the disputant states’ vigorous opposition
to China’s island reclamation activities, and the increasing role of U.S. naval projection, both of which risk escalating the conflict.

Other Sinologists argue that China is using the Charm Offensive and this current period of prolonged economic and diplomatic engagement to cynically bide time for a sustained military buildup and perhaps impending military engagement. Such a buildup would inevitably expand China’s growing naval capabilities, which represents a dangerous challenge to U.S. naval primacy, and certainly the security of disputant states (O’Rourke 2016). Data regarding China’s military spending and pundit speculation of China’s naval ambitions (most notably its pursuit of a second, homegrown aircraft carrier and an increasingly treacherous submarine fleet) would support these claims (Lim 2011; Ross 2009). Such realists allege that China’s recent economic parity with the United States and military modernization have allowed China to make the constrained provocations it has in the South China Sea. However, these scholars acknowledge that China is not yet powerful enough to openly engage in a violent conflict over the South China Sea. So long as that remains true, the use of force in the South China Sea will be constrained. However, this interpretation of peace is subject to change should China’s military strength—especially relative to the United States and the collective will of ASEAN—rapidly surge. These realists would mostly agree that economic interdependence and regional norms are constraining force for now, but disagree as to whether these factors will continue to hold in the decades to come.

Conclusion

The South China Sea will continue to be a contentious nexus for conflict in Southeast Asia for the foreseeable future. At present, there are no clear solutions to the multiple territorial disputes currently at stake. Regional normative frameworks, primarily propagated through Chinese-ASEAN cooperation, has made diplomatic progress, but remain unlikely to permanently constrain China’s aggressive provocations. This is supported by conditions surrounding the Philippines’ legal challenge to invasive Chinese claims—a step taken through a legal, normative framework which is widely anticipated to be ignored by the Chinese (Permanent Court of Arbitration 2013). At the same time, relative power does not offer a complete explanation either. Growing Chinese military advantages, especially in defense spending, technology, and geographic proximity may have encouraged recent territorial reclamation, but offer no sign of actual use of force. My analysis thus calls into question the supposedly belligerent nature of states which increase their relative power, and identifies possible contradictions in the influence of regional normative frameworks. Of the three variables analyzed, the increasing
economic interdependence would appear to have the most constraining influence on the use of force by raising the costs of conflict.

This research contributes to an ongoing debate within international relations regarding the factors by which states decide to use force. By identifying economic interdependence as the most plausible constraining influence on the use of force, this research can hopefully provide insight to policymakers regarding the South China Sea and conflict prevention at large. By specifically investigating variables pertinent to prevalent international relations theory, this research can also inform future conflict prevention models. Of course, these findings are subject to methodological limitations. As such, future research regarding the potential for conflict should seek to identify other plausible factors for conflict between states. Such research would have to examine other global hotspots to compare these same variables, and new ones, for explanatory power.

Future research specifically focusing on the South China Sea will have to carefully monitor potential normative and economic solutions for a permanent resolution to the territorial dispute. The data that I collected has demonstrated an unquestionable Chinese military advantage that is widely expected to grow over the coming years. However, all parties involved, including China, have indicated a preference against conflict (at least for now), and a long-term, non-violent solution is viewed to be in everyone’s best interest. This combination only makes further research regarding conflict prevention more important. This research can continue to search for and improve operationalization for factors which constrain the use of force. Such research would hopefully help guide security policy into an optimistic future.
### Appendix

**Table 1A: Dependent Variable 1—Relative Power**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable/Indicator</th>
<th>Main Scale/Sub-Scale</th>
<th>Sub/Main Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Variable and Scaling</strong></td>
<td>Relative Power</td>
<td>0-3: low levels of military strength&lt;br&gt;4-6: moderate levels&lt;br&gt;7-9: high levels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 1 Variable and Scaling</strong></td>
<td>China’s national material capabilities in comparison to other disputant nations</td>
<td>Disadvantageous: limited capabilities compared to other nations&lt;br&gt;Parity: on par with other disputant nations, at no disadvantage&lt;br&gt;Advantage: substantial advantage over other disputant nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 2 Variable and Scaling</strong></td>
<td>China’s air and naval resources in comparison to other disputant nations</td>
<td>Disadvantageous: lacking power projection and/or numbers&lt;br&gt;Parity: moderate power projection, relatively equal numbers&lt;br&gt;Advantage: significant air and naval advantage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Variable and Scaling</td>
<td>Variable/Indicator</td>
<td>Main Scale/Sub-Scale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Regional Normative Frameworks established in Southeast Asia</td>
<td>0: minimal strategic benefit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1-2: moderate strategic benefit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3-4: high strategic benefit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator 1 Variable and Scaling</th>
<th>Variable/Indicator</th>
<th>Main Scale/Sub-Scale</th>
<th>Sub/Main Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nonexistent: no economic or diplomatic agreements reached</td>
<td>Nonexistent</td>
<td>Nonexistent = 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrequent: some economic or diplomatic agreements reached</td>
<td>Infrequent</td>
<td>Infrequent = 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequent: agreements building regional norms frequently reached</td>
<td>Frequent</td>
<td>Frequent = 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator 2 Variable and Scaling</th>
<th>Variable/Indicator</th>
<th>Main Scale/Sub-Scale</th>
<th>Sub/Main Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low: no to minimal amounts of agreement compliance</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low = 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium: moderate amount of compliance</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium = 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High: total compliance with agreements</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High = 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3A: Dependent Variable 3—Economic Interdependence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable/Indicator</th>
<th>Main Scale/Sub-Scale</th>
<th>Sub/Main Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Main Variable and Scaling**              | Economic Interdependence             | 0-2: low levels of economic engagement  
                                           |                                      | 3-5: moderate levels                  | Indicator Scales will be added to result in a score of 0-7 overall.  
                                           |                                      | 6-7: high levels                     |                                                                                             |
| **Indicator 1 Variable and Scaling**       | Trade between disputant nations as a % of GDP | Low: low and limited bilateral trade, economic engagement  
                                           |                                      | Medium: moderate economic engagement, some trade agreements  
                                           |                                      | High: significant economic activity, many trade agreements and mutual dependence |                                                                                             |

### Table 4A: Independent Variable—Use of Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable/Indicator</th>
<th>Main Scale/Sub-Scale</th>
<th>Sub/Main Relationship</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Main Variable and Scaling**              | Use of Force                          | 0: absent  
                                           |                                      | 1: present  
                                           | Indicator Scales will be added to result in a score of 0-1 overall.  
                                           |                                                                                             |
| **Indicator 1 Variable and Scaling**       | Territory exchanged during dispute    | 0: absent  
                                           |                                      | 1: present  
                                           | Absent = 0  
                                           | Present = 1  
                                           |                                                                                             |
| **Indicator 2 Variable and Scaling**       | Militarized engagement in which injury or loss of life occurred | 0: absent  
                                           |                                      | 1: present  
                                           | Absent = 0  
                                           | Present = 1  
                                           |                                                                                             |
Works Cited


Wong, “Understanding the Potential for Conflict in the South China Sea”


Torbati, Yeganeh. 2015. “’Hope to See You Again’: China Warship to U.S. Destroyer After South China Sea Patrol.” Reuters, November 6, 2015.
BELONGING IN A NEW HOME: DISCURSIVE OTHERING OF LATIN AMERICAN IMMIGRANTS IN U.S. PRINT MEDIA†

Bill Kakenmaster

Abstract

The year 2015 saw heightened racial and ethnic tension in the United States, with particular regard to Latin American immigrants and the U.S. presidential election. Discourse theory assumes that identity (re)production serves to legitimize, institutionalize, and eventually internalize hegemonic and resistant discursive portrayals of political actors and actor groups. Some discourse analysts attempts to “reveal racism” in society and combat that racism. Yet, to the extent that “racism” represents a series of systemic and systematically oppressive power structures, highlighting racist prejudices in media, policy, popular, or other discourses only scratches the surface of discriminatory identity construction. This study (1) employs Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) to analyze the seven most widely circulated U.S. print newspapers’ (re)presentations of Latin American immigrants in 2015, (2) challenges the popular notion of discourse’s non-quantifiability in CDA research, and (3) ruminates on the implications of media (re)presentations of actors for their political agency.

BILL KAKENMASTER is a student of International Studies and Spanish. He graduates in May of 2017. School of International Service (SIS) and College of Arts & Sciences (CAS), American University Email: wk63444@student.american.edu

† I acknowledge and am thankful for the generous funding of this project by American University’s School of International Service, and by SIS Dean’s Council Member Dr. Sherry Mueller. I am further indebted to both Dr. Jeffrey Bachman and Dr. Aaron Boesenecker for their constant support, time, mentorship, and expertise.

Introduction

Anyone paying attention to the 2016 U.S. presidential election undoubtedly noticed intensified rhetoric charged at the country’s Latin American population, indicating, for some, a potential regression into visceral and inflamed racial and ethnic relations (Milligan 2016). In fact, some reports indicate that members of the U.S. Latino population have been targeted specifically for their ethnicity, with their attackers citing Donald Trump’s views on immigration as motivation (Berman 2015). According to the Boston Globe, one of the attackers told police, “Donald Trump was right, all these illegals need to be deported” (Ibid). Moreover, such violence does not represent an isolated incident; America’s Voice—an immigration reform advocacy group—has mapped “documented instances where Donald Trump, his supporters, or his staff harassed or attacked Latinos and immigrants” across the country (America’s Voice 2016). Representations of Latin Americans as illegal immigrants, job-stealers, and so on thus permeate into popular discourse, likely leading to disastrous effects on their human rights.

But how are Latin Americans portrayed in other societal contexts? Considering that socially constructed identities consist of multiple, layered discourses, we should remain skeptical that the above popular representation necessarily characterizes the dominant U.S. discourse on Latin American identity. Indeed, it is unclear if the popular discourse simply receives disproportionate representation relative to other discourses’ share of the total U.S. political debate. For example, how do dominant U.S. media discourses represent Latin Americans? Scholars have shown awareness of media’s role in (re)producing the language, symbols, meanings, concepts, knowledge, and so on of a particular discourse in addition to (re)producing the language, symbols, meanings, concepts, knowledge, and so on developed within media discourses themselves (O’Keefe 2011). I seek to investigate discursive representations of Latin Americans within the seven most widely circulated U.S. newspapers in 2015 through the lens of critical discourse analysis (CDA). I further adopt CDA with the assumption that it can employ a mixed-methods analysis, bridging the traditional dichotomy between quantitative and qualitative research (Wetherell, Taylor, and Yates 2011, 10). Ultimately, I argue that dominant U.S. media discourses present a two-tiered image of Latin Americans. On one level, Latin Americans are portrayed overwhelmingly positively, particularly in regard to hard work. On a second level, however, these surface-level positives obscure deeper, tokenizing, paternalistic, and victimizing themes that other Latin Americans and endanger their political agency.
Discursive and Institutional Perspectives on Othering: A Review of Contemporary Scholarship on Ethnicity, Immigration, and Discrimination

Two significant schools of thought attempt to address the question of Latin American immigration and integration: one discursive and one institutional. Although innumerable approaches to migration questions exist, from economics to national security and beyond, both schools of thought do so in terms of human rights. This paper similarly adopts a human rights-based approach, interpreting the primary purpose of migration and migration law as the protection of the rights of migrants, not vague notions of national security or economics. The theoretical inviolability of human rights thus renders such former concerns largely inapposite for all present intents and purposes.

The discursive school of thought attempts to advance theoretical claims about how different societal actors use language to give meaning to different ethnicities in society, thus attempting to “reveal racism” in myriad different discursive regimes (Herzog et al. 2009). Scholars in this school of thought propose that nativist discourses marginalize Latin American immigrants by constructing their identities as an intrinsically different “other” to the national “self” (Otazu 2002, Marshall 2007, van Dijk 2005). For example, Herzog et al. (2009) claim that Spanish nativist discourses use drug and alcohol consumption as a scapegoat for ethnic discrimination, casting all or most Latin American immigrants in the same light. According to Herzog et al. (2009), this discursive othering results in less successful integration on the part of the othered community—in this case, Latin American immigrants. Not all of these assumed differences are inherently negative, however. According to Fernández-Lasquetty (2010, 58), problems confronting immigrants do not comprise “reception, idiomatic difficulties, or adapting to the [the host country’s] way of life” so much as they comprise the same concerns as natives, such as unemployment and local politics. Discourse analysts challenge these assumptions and ultimately claim that nativist discourses that assume immigrants to possess inherent or irreconcilable differences from native populations lead to racism and marginalization.

Most discourse analysts assume that the rhetorical and discursive othering they interrogate translates into material oppression for othered communities. It is, however, unclear whether or not oppressive discourses translate into “real-world” discrimination. Certainly discourse analysis can reveal prejudices, but to claim that it reveals racism in terms of a systemic, collective, and ongoing cycle of oppression may exceed what available evidence concedes. Furthermore, that discourse analysts have largely focused exclusively on nativist discourses contra-
dicts their own central tenet—leaving an oppressed community’s voice out of a conversation about that community’s experience is itself a form of meta-oppression. This study does not index Latin Americans self-construction of identity, but it interrogates the social construction of Latin American identity by popular print media sources and assumes that media discourses factor into identity construction as only one layer of a multi-layered discursive regime.

Institutionalists, by contrast, explicate Latin American marginalization in terms of the tensions and contradictions within official government policy (Ivan 2009). On the one hand, for example, Latin American immigration in Spain is unsurprising because of close “linguistic and cultural-colonial ties” (Calavita, Garzón, and Cachón 2006, 191). Yet, on the other hand, institutionalists claim that Spanish law itself “produced [irregular migration]” by criminalizing some forms of immigration but not others, thus resulting in fear and lack of integration due to the threat of deportation and other penal factors for migrants (Ibid). Some institutionalist scholars propose a “feed-back” model of immigration, whereby local populations’ interactions with immigrant populations and their perceptions of immigrants from mass media and political discourse influence their interactions with immigrants in a certain way (Solé et al. 2000, 133-134). If an “attitude of rejection” presides among the local population, then it can “promote labor and economic exclusion” and “legitimize the institutional mechanisms of discrimination themselves” (Ibid, 135). In other words, immigrants’ lack of integration into the host country’s society reinforces negative stereotypes of immigrant populations, thereby furthering the notion of immigrants’ intrinsic differences compared to native populations.

The principal criticism of institutionalism is that it overemphasizes the relevance of top-down structures (Herrigel 2005). In fact, precisely because institutions consist of people and depend on them to construct their rules, values, and norms, the discrimination that results from any institution ultimately results from the social construction of institutions in the first place. Institutions dealing with migration are no different; that the Spanish law “produced [irregular migration]” where none such existed previously means that the type of migration subsequently classified as irregular could not have been so were it not for the particular values determinant of that distinction (Calavita, Garzón, and Cachón 2006, 191).

In this paper, I adopt both the general disposition of the discursive school and that of its critics. Studies like Herzog et al.’s that employ Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) adopt, on one level, a post-structural conception of discourse as any social practice that communicates meaning from one actor to
another. However, the claim that simply identifying prejudices in nativist discourses reveals racism implicitly assumes a Foucauldian-Derridean logic of discourse, in supposing that language is “constitutive of consciousness from the outset,” and that discursive prejudices are “real-world” forms of discrimination (Derrida 1973, 6-7; Howells 1998, 43-44; Foucault 2002). The value-added of this logic of discourse lies in its analysis of discursive structures. I do not deny the bitter cruelty of discursive prejudices; however, I assume that the discursive representation of the world does not necessarily fully reflect life or the state of the world’s affairs. Whereas a Foucauldian-Derridean logic assumes that humans are subjectified by myriad discursive structures, I assume that all discursive actors have agency, and are “(re)produc[e] shared meanings, related interests, [potentially] aiming to impose them on others” (Leipold and Winkel 2013, 7). Hence, making claims about a way of life that rely exclusively on others’ claims about that way of life for evidentiary support reflects a certain tautological reasoning, lending itself more than anything to confirmation bias and conceptual obscurity.

I concede that discourse consists of any social practice that communicates meaning from one actor to another, but I deny that language constitutes actors’ relations from the outset, or as Alexander Wendt puts it, that the world is made up of “discourses all the way down” (Wendt 1999, 110). By maintaining the distinction between language and an independent, physical reality, this paper’s logic of discourse raises the threshold level of evidentiary support for oppression claims. In order to demonstrate that discrimination exists as a structural or systemic societal problem, it is not sufficient to show that prejudices exist. Rather, one must explain how those prejudices translate into negative consequences for oppressed persons and communities, however the latter may be defined. Here, I focus only on media discourses in a similar style as Herzog et al., but I refrain from claiming that this paper reveals any racism or oppression in practice—only in discourse. This study therefore adopts the discursive school of thought’s methodological premises, but seeks to improve its conceptual assumptions.

A Theoretical Framework of Othering and Discursive Identity Construction

This paper deals heavily with culture, its construction, and intercultural relations. Therefore, referring to culture necessitates some definition. Most basically, culture is the “way of life of a group of people—the behaviors, beliefs, values, and symbols that they accept, generally without thinking about them” (Hall 1976, 17; Weaver 2013). Practically, discursive identity construction involves establishing cultural in- and out-groups by fixing the identities of members of each group
to various nodal meanings. These identities are layered and may have multiple meanings constructed by various, different discourses. Figure 1 demonstrates the theoretical identity construction of Signifier A by two different discourses 1 and N.

Figure 1: Theoretical Identity Construction and Layered Nodal Meanings

Othering represents a specific kind of identity construction, whereby a cultural in-group—when presented with a new set of behaviors, beliefs, values, and symbols—establishes a self-other dichotomy in order to legitimize their own set of behaviors, beliefs, values, and symbols. For example, a report by the Open Society Foundations found that one principal source of immigrant marginalization in Manchester, England was the “strong sense of community” that simultaneously engendered “supportive conditions” for insiders, while also worsening integration conditions for “people perceived as ‘outsiders’” (Open Society Foundations 2014, 11). Social identities consisting of the self and the other are relational—there is no clear “self” without an “other,” since groups “define themselves in relation to others” (Okolie, 2). In terms of discourse analysis, othering entails the use of language and symbols to construct the identities of members of a cultural out-group as an intrinsically different other when compared to the cultural self (Hülsse 2006; For another example of identity construction in Europe, see Said 1978). The relationship between self and other is also one of “power, of domination, [and] of varying degrees of a complex hegemony” (Said 1978, 5). However, at the same time as the dominant in-group constructs the out-group in one way, so too does the out-group imbue their own cultural practices with different meanings, constituting itself as its own in-group. In short, members of both in- and out-groups retain discursive agency and the ability “to get their message across by producing, distributing, and interpreting text” (Leipold and Winkel 2013, 5, 2016). Figure 2 demonstrates the hypothetical othering of population B by population A in
country X.

Figure 2: Theoretical Discursive Othering in the Context of International Migration

Moreover, the production, reproduction, and outcomes of discursive identity construction stem from—and oftentimes reinforce—historical structures, institutions, and social norms. As meanings that characterize discursive agents’ linguistic and social practices become normalized over time by historical narratives, institutionalized in formal rules, and internalized in ordinary social norms and relations, those meanings then lead to one or another production of identity. For example, Sarah Léonard argues that securitizing discourses and practices in the European Union—institutionalized in Frontex—created an internal logic that lead to the presentation of migration and migrants as a security threat, resulting in “a negative impact on the status of asylum-seekers and migrants, including the protection of their human rights” (Léonard 2011, 2). In other words, the discursive
production and reproduction (securitization) of migrants’ identities’ resulted in tangible outcomes (negative impact on human rights) and reinforced institutional norms (aversion to migrants and denial of asylum). Recall, however, that while these types of macro social structures are important for discursive identity construction, all discursive actors retain some modicum of autonomy. Individuals are not simply defined by discursive structures, but rather input their own meanings to construct their identities as well. Figure 3 outlines the layered process of identity (re)production and outcome in relation to historical structures, institutions, and social norms, using the hypothetical immigrant example. Importantly, this implies that measuring any given discourse’s power grows with its production and reproduction, meaning that at least one element of a discourse’s power entails is quantitative in nature.

**Figure 3: Identity (Re)production and Outcomes with Relation to Historical Structures, Institutions, and Social Norms**

Thus, this paper’s theoretical framework adopts two key assumptions, the first from discursive institutionalism, and the second from critical discourse theory. First, discourse—and the relations within any given discourse—deal “not only [with] the communication of ideas or ‘text’ but also [with] the institutional context in which and through which ideas are communicated” (Schmidt 2010, 4). In other words, this paper theoretically assumes that identities are produced and reproduced through and under the auspices of collective sets of institutions. Therefore, institutions are both “constraining structures and enabling constructs of meaning,” and are neither fixed nor given once created, but are rather always changing with the influx of new norms and ideas (Ibid; Schmidt 2008, 314).

Second, although institutions may enable meaning-making processes, agency resides within subjects as well, not just the institutions they construct.
Rather than a unidirectional top-down model of discourse whereby identities and meanings are constructed via discursive institutions created by an assumedly exogenous force, discourse inherently implies a series of “dialectical relations between discourse and power” (Fairclough 2010, 8). Therefore, as individuals fill institutions with meaning (constructing political issues and identities one way or another), they create power imbalances, causing other individuals to resist the constructed the meanings in question. Essentially, discursive identity construction consists of a give-and-take relationship between individuals, who retain discursive agency, and institutions, through which meanings are produced and reproduced, leading to inequality and power struggles within any given discourse.

**Interpretive Methodology and CDA**

This study is an interpretive CDA insofar as it deals with the power relations between different discursive actors’ representations of Latin American immigrants’ identities (Fairclough 2001, 232). While sympathetic to postmodern conceptualizations of discourse that do not rely on spoken or written language, this paper only includes written language in its dataset. This methodological choice does not exclude the possible existence of other forms of linguistic identity construction. It does, however, consider those forms extraneous to this study’s data and purpose. Furthermore, this study is a CDA insofar as it “brings a normative element into [its] analysis” (Fairclough 2010, 6). Social science research assumes an implicit normative focus; we would not research discrimination if we did not perceive such research as somehow beneficial to society. In interpretive social scientific research, the principle of contextuality dictates that the meanings produced and reproduced by different actors in any discursive regime do not, and likely cannot, exist except in that specific context (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 49; Fairclough 2001). In other words, the specific time, place, political moment, and so on serve as enabling conditions for people’s meaning-making processes. The central concept considered in this study is “Latin American,” or rather, what it means to be Latin American within the current U.S. political climate.

This study also considers the role of othering discourses in constructing Latin American identities from a U.S. print media perspective. One previous discourse analysis of Spanish print media highlights othering of Latin Americans in a 2000 article in *La Vanguardia*, which states: “Pickpockets and thieves comb Barcelona looking for tourists. Latin Americans are the best prepared pickpockets and North Africans dominate the art of robbing cars with their owner inside” (van Dijk 2004, 22). Linking Latin Americans to illicit or illegal activity implies their illegitimate place in Spanish society. In other words, oppressive and othering
discourses imply that Latin American immigrants do not belong in Spain because they behave illegally upon arrival, even if they immigrated legally. Similarly, in the United States, Donald Trump disparaged Latin American—specifically Mexican—immigrants in announcing his bid for the 2016 U.S. presidential election, stating, “When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. [...] They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people” (TIME Staff 2015). Although no significant work on U.S. print media has been conducted so far, Spanish print media sources have cast Latin American immigrants’ identities negatively, and primarily in terms of the law.

Interpretive social scientific research further assumes the principle of reflexivity. Reflexivity refers to the notion that “separation [of the researcher from the data] is impossible,” and “considers the implications of the identity of the researcher for data collection and analysis” (Taylor 2001, 16). To that end, I am not Latin American, nor do I experience life day-to-day as an immigrant, and can therefore only make knowledge claims with the explicit recognition that my interpretation of U.S. media portrayals of Latin Americans invariably differs from interpretations of Latin Americans themselves, as well as the interpretations of any other ethnic or social group for that matter. The principle of reflexivity renders hypothesis testing impracticable and ineffective for making knowledge claims, according to the interpretivist tradition; therefore, in this paper, I refrain from hypothesizing about why U.S. media portrayals of Latin American immigrants exist the way they do, and instead seek to explain how media sources construct Latin American immigrants’ identities.

In order to understand media representations of Latin American immigrants, I used the LexisNexis database to collect all news articles related to Latin American immigration between 2015 and 2016 from the seven most widely circulated newspapers in the United States. These included USA Today, the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Los Angeles Times, Daily News, the New York Post, and the Washington Post. In addition to their mass circulation, these papers demonstrate significant influence on political discourse and variation in political standpoint. As some scholars note, for example, the New York Times is the U.S.’s “‘paper of record’ and the Washington Post is often considered the official newspaper of Washington, DC” (Bachman 2015, 2).

In order to ensure sufficient textual exposure, I sought to limit the articles collected to those explicitly related to Latin American immigration. To achieve this, I limited textual samples to those news articles with one or more references to a Latin American ethnicities and nationalities in their headlines,
and migration in the body.\textsuperscript{1} The search terms were based on Spanish-speaking countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, and they constitute this study’s 23 “empty signifiers.”\textsuperscript{2}

I then used QSR NVivo 11 to code all references to Latin American immigrants based on six popular media conceptualizations of Latin American immigrants.\textsuperscript{3} I ran several tests on the data to determine word associations and frequency. First, I coded all references to Latin American immigrants defined by the first bulleted list given in Appendix A, including stemmed words such as—for example—Paraguay and Paraguayans with Paraguayan. Second, I coded for the following three positive and negative societal criteria (including their synonyms and stemmed words, such as ambition and hard working with hard work):

- Negative
  - Drugs (Node 1)
  - Theft (Node 2)
  - Assault (Node 3)

- Positive
  - Education (Node 4)
  - Success (Node 5)
  - Hard work (Node 6)

Third, I ran a compound search that cross-referenced both sets of terms to determine how many times each media source referred to Latin American immigrants in relation to those criteria within the same context. This, however, presents an imprecise test if the goal is to determine each media source’s understanding and portrayal of Latin American immigrants; for example, this test would count the two following hypothetical phrases within the same result.

- All Latin American immigrants are drug-dealers.
- Not all Latin American immigrants are drug-dealers.

Therefore, my fourth test consisted of coding each cross-referenced result based on its positive or negative association of each empty signifier to each node. In analyzing the data, I quantified the total number of coded references and mapped the power relations between the two hypothetical representations of Latin

\textsuperscript{1} See Appendix A for a complete list of search terms.
\textsuperscript{2} Discourse theory considers linguistic signifiers “empty” until filled with meaning by different discursive actors. For an example of this, see (Ziai 2009).
\textsuperscript{3} See Appendix A for a full coding rubric.
American immigrants in each source.

**Findings and Results**

The sample included 531 news articles—as Table 1 shows—with a total of 8355 references to empty signifiers 1-23 and 3276 references to nodes 1-6 (shown in Tables 2 and 3). In general, dominant U.S. media representations of Latin Americans displayed more positivity in relation to hard work, drugs, and education than their negative counterparts. In other words, these representations generally suggested that, ceteris paribus, Latin Americans do work hard, do not use drugs, and are well-educated. Overall, positive associations with nodes 4-6 and negative associations with nodes 1-3 comprise over 75% percent of the total discourse. This descriptive portrait contrasts prevailing U.S. public opinion, where only 45% of people believe that immigrants better American society, and where 50% believe that immigrants worsen American society in terms of crime and the economy (Pew Research Center 2015).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Total Stories</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wall Street Journal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Times</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA Today</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Los Angeles Times</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daily News</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Post</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Post</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>67.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>531</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2: Total References to Empty Signifiers**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Empty Signifier</th>
<th>Number of References</th>
<th>Number of Items Coded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: Argentine</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: Argentinian</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: Bolivian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Chilean</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: Colombian</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6: Costa Rican</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7: Cuban</td>
<td>1789</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8: Dominican</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9: Ecuadorian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3: Total References to Nodes 1-6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nodes</th>
<th>Number of Coding References</th>
<th>Number of Items Coded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: Drugs</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: Theft</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: Crime</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Education</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: Success</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6: Hard Work</td>
<td>2098</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7: TOTAL</td>
<td>3276</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4: Number of Coding References vs. Empty Signifiers 1-23
To the extent, however, that this study concerns how the media represents the U.S. Latin American population—not whether one element of that diaspora is more or less represented than another—we can use a word association test to determine which ideas, concepts, or social practices are generally associated with media portrayals of different elements of Latin Americans in the U.S. Figure 5 demonstrates that the dominant association is with hard work. Indeed, associations between Latin Americans and hard work represent the majority of nodal associations (>50%) in all but one category of empty signifiers: Salvadorans (28.6%). Indexing these six nodes by their average percent share of associations with empty signifiers 1-23, finds the following:

1. Hard work (54.97%)
2. Assault (8.49%)
3. Drugs (8.44%)
4. Education (7.05%)
5. Success (3.53%)
6. Theft (0.14%)

Therefore, judging by an initial word association test, the dominant portrayal of Latin Americans by U.S. print media discourses is in terms of hard work, assault, and drugs, despite the enormous gap between the first and second associations. Education, success, and theft represent less dominant representations, as measured by the frequency of associations between empty signifiers 1-23 and nodes 1-6.
However, as discussed earlier, this initial test is somewhat inaccurate as it cannot distinguish between positive and negative associations within those categories. Figure 6 therefore disaggregates these data accordingly. Indexing these modified categories yields the following:

1. Hard work positive (51.82%)
2. Hard work negative (42.1%)
3. Assault negative (11.9%)

4. Drugs positive (9.67%)
5. Education positive (7.27%)
6. Education negative (6.44%)

7. Assault positive (5.07%)
8. Success negative (4.57%)
9. Success positive (4.39%)
10. Theft negative (0.53%)
11. Drugs negative (4.03%)
12. Theft positive (0.03%)

See Appendix B for tabulated data.
Kakenmaster, “Belonging in a New Home”

Crucially, here, “positive” and “negative” refers to the explicit or implicit value given to word associations. Essentially, a positive representation of Latin Americans in terms of drugs might imply that most Latin Americans do not consume, produce, sell, distribute, etc. drugs. In the first index, two-thirds of the dominant media portrayals of the U.S. Latin American diaspora held socially negative connotations. (In other words, if we accept the top half of the index as the dominant media portrayal of Latin Americans, then the first word association test results in two negatively connoted categories out of three total categories: assault and drugs.) In the second index, though, negatively connoted associations comprised only one-half of the dominant media portrayals. Furthermore, even if we accept just the top three categories as the dominant media portrayals, only one-third of those categories hold socially negative connotations in the second index.

Excluding results that returned a value of “0” for any given cross-reference, Table 4 below provides a breakdown of the largest and smallest percent share of each nodal association within each empty signifier. The dominant discourse (as measured by a descriptive statistical portrait) of U.S. print media’s representations thus primarily associates Latin Americans positively with hard work (which claims the highest percent share in 12 out of 19 nodes).

Before moving on to the next section, it is important to discuss the relative representation of some Latin American identities compared to others. That the sampling returned no results from the first (Wall Street Journal) and fourth (Los Angeles Times) most widely circulated newspapers in the U.S. seems problematic from the outset. This indicates either (1) a measurement error within this study, or (2) a distorted discursive reality that does not match the “real-world” U.S. ethnic composition. Yet even within the news sources for which the sampling did return results, representational errors occur. For example, Venezuelans were covered 72 times (approximately 1.9% of the total references to a specific group when excluding non-specific signifiers such as Hispanic, Latin American, Latino, and Immigrant). At the same time, however, Venezuelans only comprise around 0.5% of the total U.S. Hispanic population according to a 2015 Pew Research Center report (López 2015, 1). Compare this to, for example, Mexicans who were covered 901 (23.5%) times, yet comprised approximately 63% of the U.S. Hispanic population in 2010 (Lopez and Dockterman 2011, 1). Some signifiers essentially received disproportionately more or less media representation than others when compared to their relative makeup of the Hispanic population in the U.S.
Figure 6: Number of Positive and Negative References to Nodes 1-6 vs. Number of References to Empty Signifiers 1-23
Table 4: Highest and Lowest Percent Share Nodes by Empty Signifiers 1-23

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Empty Signifier</th>
<th>Highest Percent Share Node</th>
<th>Lowest Percent Share Node</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: Argentine</td>
<td>Hard work negative (66.7%)</td>
<td>Drugs positive (8.33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Education positive (8.33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: Argentinian</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: Bolivian</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Chilean</td>
<td>Drugs positive (100%)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: Colombian</td>
<td>Hard work positive (53.6%)</td>
<td>Drugs positive (3.57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Drugs negative (3.57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Education positive (3.57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Education negative (3.57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hard work negative (3.57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6: Costa Rican</td>
<td>Hard work positive (100%)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7: Cuban</td>
<td>Hard work positive (60.2%)</td>
<td>Theft negative (0.21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8: Dominican</td>
<td>Hard work negative (59.4%)</td>
<td>Theft negative (0.94%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Success positive (0.94%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9: Ecuadorian</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10: Guatemalan</td>
<td>Hard work positive (50%)</td>
<td>Assault positive (16.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assault negative (16.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Education positive (16.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11: Hispanic</td>
<td>Hard work positive (57.7%)</td>
<td>Education negative (0.34%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12: Honduran</td>
<td>Hard work negative (37.5%)</td>
<td>Assault negative (12.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13: Immigrant</td>
<td>Hard work positive (60.8%)</td>
<td>Theft positive (0.16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14: Latin American</td>
<td>Hard work positive (47.8%)</td>
<td>Drugs negative (4.35%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Education positive (4.35%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15: Latino</td>
<td>Hard work positive (61.7%)</td>
<td>Theft positive (0.52%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16: Mexican</td>
<td>Hard work positive (53.6%)</td>
<td>Success negative (0.72%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17: Nicaraguan</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18: Paraguayan</td>
<td>Hard work positive (100%)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19: Peruvian</td>
<td>Hard work positive (70.8%)</td>
<td>Hard work negative (4.17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Education positive (4.17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20: Puerto Rican</td>
<td>Hard work positive (55.4%)</td>
<td>Success negative (3.61%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21: Salvadoran</td>
<td>Assault positive (37.1%)</td>
<td>Education negative (5.71%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Success negative (5.71%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Hard work negative (5.71%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22: Uruguayan</td>
<td>Hard work negative (100%)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23: Venezuelan</td>
<td>Hard work negative (45.5%)</td>
<td>Success positive (4.55%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Drugs negative (4.55%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Discussion

If the former section meant to provide a descriptive portrait of the U.S. print media’s representations of Latin Americans in 2015, this section is more akin to a traditional, qualitatively oriented discourses analysis, where I attempt to describe, analyze, and contextualize several themes that appear within the discourse of study. In that spirit, several themes arise out of the texts that do not necessarily give negative portrayals of Latin Americans, but nonetheless represent problematic findings. Those themes include tokenism, patronizing and paternalistic representations, and victimization.

Tokenism

Much of the media’s discursive representation of Latin Americans in the U.S. involves using Latinos, immigrants, and Latin Americans as tokens to achieve a symbolic or contrived idea of ethno-racial equality, empowering the tokenizing group and oppressing the tokenized. Consider the following passage:

Starting in the 1980s, as civil war tore the country apart, thousands of Salvadorans uprooted their families to start life anew in the Maryland and Virginia suburbs around Washington. As their numbers swelled over the years, so did their restaurants, which introduced many of us to the masa cake at the center of Salvadoran life: the pupusa, a handmade round dedicated to frugality and deep corn fragrance.

Often compared to a gordita or an arepa, the pupusa has a personality all its own, less flashy and more workmanlike. At least it is in Washington, where the masa pocket has proved immune to fashion, its flavors and ingredients seemingly locked in place, as if Salvadoran immigrants decided long ago that one thing would remain constant in their chaotic exodus from the mother country (Carman 2015).

This reference to the Salvadoran Civil War—and the reference to “their restaurants”—tokenizes Salvadoran Americans. In other words, mentioning the country’s civil war does not pertain to the article’s context—a culinary review. Moreover, after mentioning this complex historical event, the article quickly devolves into a traditionally stereotypical representation of Latinos and Hispanics in the U.S., namely that of the hard working cook or restaurateur. Other articles
similarly represent Latin Americans’ hard work in relation to traditionally stereotypical careers in manual labor. For example:

The new residents, crucially, were not from East Los Angeles, where Mexican-Americans had developed an activist political tradition since the 1960s. Instead, they were Mexican, straight from the ranchos – small villages on Mexico’s frontiers, far from the center and from government. Most came here to work in jobs they believed, even after decades, would be temporary. They focused their lives on returning home someday. They packed into cheap housing and spent their savings on building homes back in Mexico (Quinones 2015).

The following passage interestingly employs two distinct strategies in its discursive representation of Puerto Ricans.

But the surge of Puerto Ricans does not always make for an easy transition. Increasingly, it is also having an impact on schools and government service agencies, both of which are working to help absorb the latest arrivals, particularly those with children in schools.

As a result, schools are scrambling to hire more bilingual teachers (some of them also from Puerto Rico) and expand dual-language programs that can best suit Puerto Ricans. In the last month alone, the Osceola County School District […] registered more than 1,000 new students, many of them Puerto Ricans, said Dalia Medina, the director of the multicultural department for the school district.

“We are a mini-Puerto Rico here,” she said. “We are now 58 percent Hispanic in the schools, and every year we have increased” (Alvarez 2015).

On the one hand, this passage tokenizes Puerto Ricans in a manner similar to the previous two articles; it uses Puerto Rican nationality to provide a surface level example of the school’s diversity. On the other hand, however, it appropriates Puerto Rican nationality, claiming that the school itself represents “a mini-Puerto Rico.”
Moving beyond the initial analysis of media portrayals of Latin Americans thus reveals the nuances behind both positive and negative results. These three passages returned positive results—they imply that Salvadorans, Mexicans, and Puerto Ricans do work hard. However, presenting their hard work in stereotypical and tokenizing ways represents a superficially positive portrayal of Latin Americans that nonetheless maintains the previously existing stratified social structure. Tokenism maintains unequal social hierarchies by expanding diversity and inclusion on a surface level, thereby trivializing them. In other words, claiming that a school in Florida is a “mini-Puerto Rico,” or that Salvadorans contribute to the United States’ ethnic and culinary traditions speak past concerns over the substantive nature of intercultural relations, such as discrimination, intolerance, bigotry, and so on. This representation of the hard-working Latin American is, furthermore, intertextual in that it calls to mind historic, racist U.S. government policies such as Operation Wetback, which sought to forcibly deport mass numbers of Mexican and Latin American immigrants (Korte 2013). It is also self-referential in that it perpetuates problematic media discourses. The term “wetback”—meant to refer to Mexican and Latin American immigrants who crossed the Rio Grande River to find work in the Southwest U.S.—first appeared in the New York Times in 1920, indicating how extensively the hard working Latino trope has been (re)produced, legitimized, and internalized in media discourses (Breitigam 1920).

Furthermore, if Latin Americans’ identities have been fixed to the concept of hard work for the better part of a century, then abandoning any negative connotation with Latin Americans’ ambition does little to fundamentally alter the representation of those identities. Essentially, not disparaging Latin Americans while still linking them to traditionally discriminatory identity features maintains the current discursive balance of power between Latin Americans and non-Latin Americans while absolving any culpability by powerful discursive actors—like dominant U.S. media sources—to problematize that balance of power. Within this paradigm, Latin Americans are implicitly, perhaps unconsciously, portrayed as hard working, but only in making arepas, on the rancho, and in assimilating to U.S. culture, suggesting little change in media (re)presentations of their identities.

The point, lastly, is not that diversity does not exist in the previous three passages, nor that those passages necessarily represent consciously prejudiced depictions of Latin Americans. Rather, these three passages represent an unconscious, internalized sense of cultural dominance, which feeds into the dominant media portrayal of Latin Americans that typifies them according to their ambition in the manual labor and service industries instead of resisting such a discourse. While tokenism appears as one problematic theme in media representations of Latin Americans in the U.S., patronizing and paternalistic themes also arise out of
Patronizing and Paternalistic Representations

Common among U.S. media’s discursive representation of Latin Americans is a patronizing, and oftentimes paternalistic, sense of superiority. Patronizing representations of Latin Americans may seek to expose bad government policies or facilitate acculturation, but they nonetheless establish a hierarchical power structure where Latin Americans are subordinated to other U.S. citizens. On the one hand, this discursive strategy differs from the above in that more directly defines the identities of Latin Americans in relation to U.S. culture, whereas tokenism only co-opts Latin Americans’ identities without necessarily requiring their relative cultural definition. In a New York Post feature on Cuban-American baseball player Yoenis Céspedes, for example, the author describes how

Céspedes [sic] was completely enamored with the new technology, experiencing unfamiliar luxuries while training in the Dominican Republic with former Packers running back Ahman Green.

“He was like a kid in a candy store,” said Green, who connected with Céspedes [sic] through mutual friends. “He was really drawn to my iPhone, with all the games and apps. He was censored from a lot of stuff, so just going online and going on Facebook, it was all brand new. He was eager to know about adapting to everything in the United States” (Kussoy 2015).

Similar to above, the point is not so much that this representation of Céspedes is divorced from his “true” identity. Perhaps, as this passage suggests, he had never seen or used an iPhone before. However, this nonetheless reinforces the dominant understanding of Cuba as “a society so closed, full of prejudice and discrimination, [and] with state control over every step of its [citizens’ lives],” including limiting their access to technology (Masjuán 2010, 108). Of course, governments should not prohibit their citizens’ reasonable use of technology, but this subtle commentary on Cuba’s lack of technological freedom essentially politicizes Céspedes’ identity, and subjugates him to an oppressive dictatorial regime, which itself appears subjugated to a supposedly freer and morally superior United States.

This association of Latin Americans with technological or cultural il-
literacy extends beyond Cubans. Consider a *Washington Post* article, which describes the history of the Spanish language TV show *Línea Directa* in Washington, D.C.:

The earliest version of the program took two years to come to fruition. Working with a young Colombian broadcaster, Arturo Salcedo, and using borrowed equipment and family members as actors, the partners began recording 30-second public service announcements in Spanish on everything from fire prevention to counseling for alcoholism.

The spots covered how to use seat belts, enroll children in school and access publicly funded health care—information that was hard for new immigrants to obtain in an era when government agencies rarely had materials written in Spanish, or employees fluent in the language. The spots eventually were broadened into a half-hour news show that the local Univision station included in its prime-time lineup on Wednesdays and Saturdays (Hernández 2015).

If the passage referring to Cespedes represents the paternalism of the discourse, to the extent that highlighting his technological illiteracy as a product of his nationality establishes a power structure that subordinates Cubans to other nationalities, then the *Washington Post* passage similarly patronizes Latinos generally. Implicitly, the identities of Latinos are constructed as inferior both in terms of technological literacy and cultural competence given their status as immigrants. However—and with specific regard to technological literacy—these identity constructions contribute to a dominant discourse in which Latin America “has been seen as dependent, exploited, and institutionally weak” (López-Alves 2011, 243). Even if patronizing elements of the media discourse have good intentions to help correct perceived deficiencies in Latin American immigrants’ technological literacy and cultural competence, they betray a distinct air of superiority that nonetheless casts the role of immigrants as consumers of technological and cultural knowledge, and non-Latino residents of the U.S. as either knowledge producers or gatekeepers.

**Victimization and Politics**

The representation of Latin Americans in relation to ethnic and identity politics is somewhat unsurprising given the increasing convergence of ethnic-
ity and politics in contemporary U.S. political discourse. As observed earlier, 2016 U.S. presidential candidate Donald Trump stated: “When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. [...] They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people” (TIME Staff 2015). Perhaps unsurprisingly, 66% of prospective Hispanic and Latino voters said they would vote for Hillary Clinton in a Pew Research Center poll, while only 24% would support Donald Trump (Pew Research Center 2016, 49). Other polls indicate an even more apparent convergence between ethnicity and political preference; a Wall Street Journal and NBC News poll suggests 82% of registered Hispanic voters would vote for Clinton, while only 14% would vote for Trump (O’Connor 2016). Therefore, the connection between Latin American identity and politics in media discourses is unsurprising. It does, however, present a pervasive and problematic view of Latin Americans as victims of a corrupt political system, which ironically places their political identities outside that system and degrades their political agency.

The primary point of departure for connecting Latin American identity to U.S. politics seems, unsurprisingly, to be Donald Trump. Two discursive strategies characterize the U.S. media discourse surrounding the country’s Latin American diaspora. First, it produces and reproduces the same or similar politically charged narratives of Latin Americans. The Washington Post alone reprinted the sound bite of Trump labelling Latin Americans as “rapists” a total of 92 times. For reference, the Daily News and New York Times reprinted it nine times each, and USA Today reprinted it three times. At first glance, this finding helps orient the papers’ political perspectives. At the one end of the spectrum, the New York Post did not reprint the “rapists” sound bite whatsoever, which seems easily explainable. If the “guilt by association theory” of Trump’s politically damaging rhetoric is believed, then we should not react with shock when right-leaning sources like the New York Post fail to reproduce such rhetoric (Clement 2015). At the other end of the spectrum, meanwhile, that the Washington Post reprinted rhetoric that would clearly damage Trump’s standing with U.S. Latinos by a factor of 10 times the next highest figure likely indicates the Post’s left-leaning stance (Blake 2016). Of course, none of this suggests that either side is wrong for distancing themselves from beliefs they do not necessarily hold, or for holding Trump to account for his inflammatory and racist rhetoric. However, the scale of discursive reproduction employed by certain media sources serves to clarify their political leanings.

At the same time, such identity reproduction normalizes destructive representations of Latin Americans’ identities, paradoxically empowering such representations while attempting to resist them. In a deeply ironic mo-
ment of self-reflection, the *Huffington Post* asks: “Has The Media Become Comfortably Numb to Donald Trump?” (Linkins 2016). Indeed, a fine line exists between supposedly honest reporting and reproducing “divisive and hateful rhetoric toward Mexicans and Latinos” ad nauseum (Parker 2015). Recall Figure 3, which theorizes that as identities are (re)produced, they reinforce and reify the specific historical structures, institutions, and social norms of any given discourse. Paradoxically, then, attempts to expose negative representations of Latin Americans render themselves ineffectual past a certain threshold where they simply contribute to a seemingly endless stream of hate-fueled rhetoric.

If, in the first place, the constant reproduction of Latin American identities involves determining their position relative to non-Latin Americans, then it secondarily involves an oftentimes implicit normative bias against perceived injustices against Latin Americans. The *Daily News*, for example, called Trump’s suggestion that he would win the Latino vote “loco,” going on to state:

> Even as he slimed Mexican immigrants as “rapists” and drug pushers, Oval Office hopeful Donald Trump says he’s still confident he’ll carry the Latino vote – because Hispanics just “love” him.

> “I’ll create jobs and the Latinos will have jobs they didn’t have, I’ll do better on that vote than anybody,” The Donald boasted Wednesday on NBC News.

> But on CNN, the mouthy mogul admitted he “can’t guarantee” there are no illegal immigrants in the ranks of his own workforce – and if there are he’d fire them.

> Trump has sparked outrage – and won himself some supporters – with a series of screeds on immigration and Mexico that began the very first day of his campaign for the GOP nomination last month. A backlash ensued, with NBC, Macy’s and a parade of others soon refusing to do business with him.

> [...]”

Nonetheless, Trump said of Latinos, “They love me. I love them” (Hastings, Katz, and Fermino 2015).
Labelling Trump as a “mouthy mogul,” the sarcastic scare quotes in the first paragraph, and the characterization of his remarks as having “slimed” Mexican immigrants suggests a negative stance towards Trump and a positive stance towards Mexican immigrants. The victimization extends beyond the discursive realm, however, with articles from the *Washington Post* detailing how Trump’s rhetoric affects business interests and legal rapport with Latin Americans:

During one of the two news conferences Trump held in Texas, [Telemundo anchor] Diaz-Balart reminded the candidate that 53,000 Hispanics turn 18 each month and that many are offended by his suggestion that Mexicans crossing the border are rapists or criminals.

“No, no, no, we’re talking about illegal immigration and everybody understands that. And you know what? That’s a typical case – wait – that’s a typical case of the press with misinterpretation,” Trump shot back in response. [...] And I tell you what – what’s really going to be fun? I’m suing Univision for $500 million and I’m gonna tell ya – we’re going to win a lot of money because of what they’ve done.”

“You’re finished,” Trump told Diaz-Balart.

“He never allowed me to finish asking my question,” Diaz-Balart told his viewers.

Notably, neither network included Trump’s reminder to supporters that he’s suing Univision. The network dropped plans to air the Miss Universe pageant – one of Trump’s dozens of business interests – because of his comments about illegal immigrants. In response, Trump has said he will sue the network for breach of contract (O’Keefe 2015).

The victim narrative further extends beyond Trump (whom we might identify as the lynchpin for this narrative). For instance, following a gathering of “Democratic Hispanic Leaders” in Nevada, the *Washington Post* reports:

[A]head of tonight’s GOP debate in Las Vegas, photos of
Cruz and Rubio were plastered alongside Trump’s picture, as all three were criticized as anti-Latino. A press release noted, “While Trump continues to grab headlines with his hateful anti-Latino, anti-immigrant language, the positions and records of the two Latino presidential candidates in the race are equally dangerous for Nevada communities.”

Dolores Huerta, an influential labor leader and civil rights activist, called Cruz and Rubio “sellouts” and “traitors” at the gathering and said the Hispanic candidates “are turning their backs on the Latino community” (Jordan 2015).

In what can only be considered supreme irony, this Post article reproduces the identities of Latin Americans as victims of themselves. Or, rather, that Ted Cruz and Marco Rubio betray the U.S. Latin American community and show their true natures as “anti-Latino” candidates, as if the Latino experience and political identity could be so reductively and singularly defined.

The problem with this bully narrative of Trump does not lie in its falsity. Again, this paper is not concerned with media constructions of politicians’ identities, so discursive representations of candidates are irrelevant. The problem, rather, lies in the necessary opposite role the media constructs for Latin Americans—namely, that of the victim. Constantly reproducing Latin Americans as victims defined by their relation to a political bully accomplishes the singularly important function of legitimizing the role of the media in exposing perceived injustices against Latin Americans, and thereby reducing their ability to define and address social problems themselves. In other words, reproducing Latin Americans as victims within a corrupt system of elite politics disregards their role as political agents, and helps keep U.S. newspapers in business.

Othering and Problem Definition

These three themes serve both to other Latin Americans and degrade their political agency. Recall from the section 3 that othering consists of establishing an “in-group/out-group distinction” through the conscious or unconscious manipulation of discourse, which both validates a group’s own sets of beliefs, practices, values, and symbols and “becomes clearer as we try to eliminate the ambiguities” between groups (Weaver 2013, 203). To the extent that media discourses fix Latin Americans’ identities to certain nodes—whether drugs, theft, assault, education, success, or hard work—those reproductions reinforce either dominant or alternative discursive representations of Latin Americans and clarify any potentially
extant in-group/out-group distinctions contained therein. Furthermore, in clarifying these intercultural boundaries, the extent to which the nodes fixed to Latin Americans agree with the nodes fixed to the dominant U.S. culture is irrelevant. In other words, perhaps fixing Latin Americans positively to hard work agrees with the dominant American work ethic, but that does not necessarily suggest agreement between the types of ambition conceptualized and subsequently valued.\(^5\) Therefore, the media discourses investigated in this paper serve to other Latin Americans in relation to the dominant U.S. culture.

Beyond simply othering Latin Americans in the U.S., media discourses also degrade Latin Americans’ political agency. In The Politics of Problem Definition, David Rochefort and Roger Cobb outline how political conflicts can arise from disputes over “(1) whether a problem exists, (2) what the best solution is, and (3) what the best means of implementation are,” with the definers of any given socio-political problem invariably influencing these three steps in the problem definition process (1994, 5). If we apply othering theory to The Politics of Problem Definition, we can begin thinking about the ways in which those with the greatest amount of cultural capital—the in-group—come to dominate certain discourses, thereby framing any given problem one way or another. Simply by defining the problem of, for example, Donald Trump’s racist rhetoric against Latin Americans, the existence, potential solution, and implementation of that solution becomes laden with the values, symbols, and meanings inserted by the dominant U.S. media culture. Thus, no matter how the problem of Latin American immigration comes to be defined, the dominant U.S. media definition of that problem excludes and diminishes the ability of the Latin American diaspora itself to define the problem and manipulate the discourse according to that definition.

Within the dominant U.S. media discourse, Latin Americans are othered by tokenism, patronizing and paternalistic representations, and victimizing definitions of Latin Americans in relation to their political positions and contemporary U.S. politicians. The dominant discourse further degrades Latin Americans political agency by defining the problem of their immigration for them, rather than allowing the community to define the problem itself.

**Conclusions and Avenues for Further Research**

How does so much inflammatory, prejudiced rhetoric exist in the U.S.,

---

\(^5\) Recall the “Tokenism” section, where Latin Americans’ ambitions were fixed to manual and service labor industries. Cf. (Camarota and Zeigler 2009). Furthermore, empirical evidence exists to suggest that U.S. culture does value hard work. On this, see (Weaver 2013, 135).
while the dominant media discourse seemingly give an overwhelmingly positive representation of Latin Americans? This study offers as a solution that symbolically and surface-level positive representations obfuscate more nuanced discursive themes that tokenize, paternalize, and victimize Latin Americans on a deeper level. At an abstract level, these themes other Latin Americans and degrading their political agency. Superficially positive representations of Latin Americans help clarify the distinction between immigrants and the dominant U.S. culture and shift the ability to define the socio-political problem of their immigration from the Latin American population to the dominant U.S. cultural agents, such as print media.

Exposing false-positive representations of Latin Americans in media discourses is a product of this study’s partial employment of quantitative data. Critical discourse analysts often assume discourse is essentially non-quantifiable, but in mapping the power relations between one or more discursive representations of any given group, problem, or practice, quantifying discourse offers equal—if not necessarily greater—concrete evidence. Moreover, quantitative data acts as a bulwark against attempts to take CDA too far and “reveal racism,” using only a few select examples. I maintain CDA’s normative mission in this study, but challenge its methodologists to reflect critically on both their reliance on qualitative data and assumptions regarding the extent to which CDA can address certain normative questions.

Further research could follow two paths. First, future research could apply alternative methodologies to the study of Latin American identity construction in media discourses. While this paper avoided hypothesis testing, neo-positivist research might advance several hypotheses to understand if, for instance, media sources disproportionately index prejudiced, anti-immigrant policymakers compared to non-prejudiced, pro-immigration policymakers. This would broaden subject-area knowledge on several theoretical and methodological levels too lengthy to discuss here. Second, future research could follow from this study and investigate the practical effects of othering and political agency degradation on Latin Americans’ success at political, economic, and social integration. Such research would broaden subject-area knowledge across disciplines, perhaps influencing media practices, social justice activism, and so on.

In all of this, we must reflect critically on the specific discourses, narratives, and worldviews that enable oppression. Media discursive othering practices can reflect serious and disguised senses of cultural dominance, and—whether or not these translate into “real-world” oppression—I remain wary of the ways in which non-dominant cultural groups are constructed as tokens, patrons, or victims. Nonetheless, the tension between constructing Latin Americans as hard working model citizens in one sense, and belittling them in another, underscores
the importance of the media’s self-legitimation mechanism. As exposing hardships that befall U.S. Latinos’ cultural, political, economic, and social integration, then, the major newspapers in America authorize themselves as reporters. Doing so degrades the ability of Latin Americans as political agents to define the problem of their immigration themselves. The self-legitimation of the dominant U.S. media sources creates discourses on immigrant communities that are—on the one hand—superficially positive, but frankly disempowering on the other hand.
Appendix A: Search Terms and Coding Rubric

Search terms:

I. Headline
   • Latin America/Latin American/Latin Americans
   • Latino/Latina/Latinos/Latinas
   • Hispanic/Hispanics
   • Mexico/Mexican/Mexicans
   • Puerto Rico/Puerto Rican/Puerto Ricans
   • Cuba/Cuban/Cubans
   • El Salvador/Salvadoran/Salvadorans
   • Dominican Republic/Dominican/Dominicans
   • Guatemala/Guatemalan/Guatemalans
   • Colombia/Colombian/Colombians
   • Honduras/Honduran/Hondurans
   • Ecuador/Ecuadorian/Ecuadorians
   • Peru/Peruvian/Peruvians
   • Argentina/Argentinian/Argentinians/Argentine/Argentines
   • Chile/Chilean/Chileans
   • Uruguay/Uruguayan/Uruguayans
   • Paraguay/Paraguayan/Paraguayans
   • Venezuela/Venezuelan/Venezuelans
   • Bolivia/Bolivian/Bolivians
   • Costa Rica/Costa Rican/Costa Ricans
   • Nicaragua/Nicaraguan/Nicaraguans

II. Body
   • Immigration/Migration/Emigration
   • Migrant/Migrants
   • Immigrant/Immigrants
   • Emigrant/Emigrants

Coding rubric:

I. Code 1 (=including stemmed words, =narrow coding context)
   • Latin American
   • Latino
   • Latina
• Hispanic
• Mexican
• Puerto Rican
• Cuban
• Salvadoran
• Dominican
• Guatemalan
• Colombian
• Honduran
• Ecuadorian
• Peruvian
• Argentinian
• Argentine
• Chilean
• Uruguayan
• Paraguayan
• Venezuelan
• Bolivian
• Costa Rican
• Nicaraguan

II. Code 2 (=including stemmed words, synonyms, =broad coding context)
• Drugs
• Theft
• Assault
• Education
• Success
• Hard work
### Appendix B: Tabulated Data for Figures 5 and 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1: Drugs</th>
<th>2: Theft</th>
<th>3: Assault</th>
<th>4: Education</th>
<th>5: Success</th>
<th>6: Hard Work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: Argentine</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: Argentinian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: Bolivian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: Chilean</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: Colombian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6: Costa Rican</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7: Cuban</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8: Dominican</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9: Ecuadorian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10: Guatemalan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11: Hispanic</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12: Honduran</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13: Immigrant</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>444</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14: Latin American</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15: Latino</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16: Mexican</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17: Nicaraguan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18: Paraguayan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19: Peruvian</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20: Puerto Rican</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21: Salvadoran</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22: Uruguayan</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23: Venezuelan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24: TOTAL</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>1590</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Number of References to Nodes 1-6 vs. Number of References to Empty Signifiers 1-23
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3/22</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1/18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0/16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Number of Positive and Negative References to Nodes 1-6 vs. Number of References to Empty Slots 1-23
Works Cited


Breitigam, Gerald B. 1920. “Welcomed Mexican Invasion; Thousands of Families Crossing the Border to Till the Soil and Otherwise Build Up the Southwest 100,000 in the Northward Movement. Replacing the Drift to Cities. Entering the Sugar Beet Field. Qualities to Be Reckoned With Bilingual New Mexico.” New York Times.


Jordan, Mary. 2015. “Liberal Hispanic activists assail Rubio, Cruz as ‘traitors’ to their culture; The attacks underscored some Democrats’ worries that a Latino GOP nominee would be threat to Hillary Clinton.” *The Washington Post*.


Kussoy, Howie. 2015. “La Potencia: Yoenis Cespedes’ Journey from the Island of Cuba to New York and the Heart of the Mets Batting Order is Defined by his Strength Both on and off the Field.” *New York Post*.


Linkins, Jason. 2016. “Has the Media Become Comfortably Numb to Donald Trump?” *The Huffington Post*.


Cascadilla Proceedings Project.


TIME Staff. 2015. “Here’s Donald Trump’s Presidential Announcement Speech.” *TIME*.


LATIN AMERICA’S FEMALE PRISONER PROBLEM: HOW THE WAR ON DRUGS, FEMINIZATION OF POVERTY, AND FEMALE LIBERATION CONTRIBUTE TO MASS INCARCERATION OF WOMEN‡

Gretchen Cloutier

Abstract

According to the International Centre for Prison Studies, the number of women in prisons in Latin America has almost doubled since the 1990s. Most women in prison are incarcerated for drug-related crimes, and although women are still a minority within the prison population, the number of women behind bars is growing disproportionately in comparison to men. Simultaneously, Latin American states are implementing harsh drug criminalization policies in accordance with the global War on Drugs. Scholars have theorized that women commit crimes due to both societal liberation and out of economic necessity. Economic need can be observed empirically by the feminization of poverty, whereby women are becoming increasingly poorer and economically marginalized relative to men. In a quantitative analysis of seventeen Latin American countries, this paper tests the hypotheses that an increase in poverty rates among women and the implementation of harsh drug criminalization laws lead to an increase in the incarceration rates of women. This paper is novel in offering a holistic analysis of how liberation, economic marginalization, and criminalization uniquely influence women and thus explain the increase in female incarceration rates in Latin America. The results of this study may be used as a tool to help inform the policy debate surrounding the War on Drugs and the problem of poverty among women in Latin America.

‡ I thank Dr. Eugene Walton at American University for his statistical expertise and assistance with the quantitative analysis for this study.
Introduction

Latin America has seen a dramatic increase in the number of incarcerated women over the last twenty-five years. This figure nearly doubled from under 40,000 female inmates in the early 2000s to over 74,000 female inmates in the region by 2011 (Giacomello 2013, 9). While women are still a minority in prisons, accounting for only about six percent of Latin America’s incarcerated population, the number of women behind bars is growing disproportionately compared to men (Ibid, 8). Furthermore, the majority of these women are incarcerated for drug-related crimes. Although the rates among countries vary, upwards of eighty percent of incarcerated women in Ecuador, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Panama, and Argentina are in prison on drug-related charges (Ibid). For other Latin American countries, rates of women imprisoned on drug-related charges hover somewhere between thirty and sixty percent of the total female inmate population (Ibid).

Most of these women are incarcerated not for large-scale trafficking or violent charges, but rather non-violent crimes related to micro-trafficking and small-scale possession of illicit substances (Insula 2013, 59). While there are some exceptions, women often enter the drug trade as low-level mules, with little upward mobility in terms of economic earning and decision-making power. This limited mobility exacerbates social and economic marginalization, trapping women in a cycle of poverty and crime.

Regardless of a woman’s reason for entering the drug-trade, she is often subject to dangerous and victimizing roles. Transportation of drugs often involves women strapping drugs to their body, swallowing plastic capsules filled with drugs, or inserting these capsules into the vagina. This can become lethal if the drug-filled capsules burst while inside the body. Women may also be subject to rape, violence, drug addiction, and forced prostitution while participating in drug-related activities within the organized-crime structure (Ibid, 10-14). The compensation for doing this type of work is often extremely low; one woman who smuggled drugs into prisons reported earning just 500 Mexican pesos (about $37 USD) for each trip (Giacomello 2013, 6). Frequently, the women who work as mules are misled about the quantities they will be carrying or about the legal and criminal repercussions they may face if they get caught. Due to harsh drug laws in Latin America, women who work as low-level drug mules may be subject to maximum criminal sentences.

Using a large-n quantitative approach, this study will test how varying degrees of drug laws in seventeen Latin American countries, combined with the vulnerable economic and social status of women, can be used explain
increased female incarceration rates. This paper will begin with a review of the literature on the feminization of poverty and the War on Drugs, as well as two important theories of female offending: liberation and economic marginalization. These four concepts will help piece together the unique circumstance of women in Latin America and provide guidance in uncovering why this increase in female incarceration is occurring. This paper argues that liberation makes women more likely to be economically marginalized, as can be observed by the feminization of poverty. Combining the propensity to commit economically motivated crimes, such as drug offenses, with aggressive War on Drugs criminalization practices explains the increased incarceration rates of women relative to men. These hypotheses will be tested using an original dataset of female incarceration in Latin American countries.

This research contributes to the rather limited scope of literature regarding female offending and incarceration. Furthermore, it contributes to the policy debate regarding the War on Drugs, and explores ways in which circumstances surrounding female criminal behavior differ from male criminal behavior. Latin America faces a crisis with an over-populated prison system, and this increase in female incarceration will only exacerbate the problem. By studying female incarceration in relation to legal, economic, and societal mechanisms, this paper provides statistical evidence to invoke discussion around practical reforms in Latin America.

**Review of the Literature**

There has been a lack of research on female criminality, since most studies focus on male criminality, or simply do not distinguish between genders. Although the emerging field of female criminology has begun to address this issue, there is still much to be studied in relation to women and crime. Scholars have highlighted a gender gap in studying crime because traditionally it has been perceived that men more frequently commit crime (Murdoch et al. 2012, 412). Due to this observation, most of the scholarship regarding criminality only focuses on men and is written from a male perspective (Chesney-Lind and Pasko 2004, 2). Furthermore, many scholars simply assume that female-perpetrated offenses, when they do occur, are motivated by and carried out for the same reasons as offenses committed by men (Barberet 2014, 18). However, more recent research on the theories below has demonstrated evidence that female offending does exist more frequently than previously thought, and, furthermore, it occurs for different reasons than male offending. There are two main schools of thought regarding female offending considered in this paper: liberation theory and economic marginalization theory.
Economic marginalization can be observed via the feminization of poverty in Latin America. Additionally, the War on Drugs, with its promotion of zero-tolerance drug possession policies, will be examined as a causal mechanism contributing to the increased incarceration of women.

_Liberation_

Liberation theory posits that criminal activity is more empowering than victimizing for women. The basic tenet of this theory states that as women achieve more equality and opportunities for participation in society, their participation extends to illegitimate parts of society as well. This means that as women gain more opportunities to enter professional jobs, there is also an increased opportunity to enter the criminal sector. Campbell notes, “Recent improvements in Mexican women’s access to education and medical services and their expanding opportunities in politics and social life [...] for better or worse include openings in the drug world” (2008, 26). As society progresses, women exercise greater freedom to make their own decisions, whether that be in a legitimate or criminal capacity. Liberation theory is not concerned with judging the outcomes of increased freedom, for example by condemning (or condoning) an increased propensity for criminal activity. Rather, it is simply observing a societal trend.

Similarly, Ray and Kortweg also argue that increased urbanization, industrialization, and education contribute to increased economic and social mobility among women, which may extend into the criminal sector (1999, 52). Liberation theory contends that if more women are independent and actively involved in society, the crime rates for women will increase (Giordano 1978, 127). Again, this is not to say that women should not be equal or included in society, and it is unlikely that anyone would argue for the deliberate oppression of women in order to keep female crime rates down. Conversely, it is important to understand that increased female offending is one outcome of liberation.

However, Giordano also argues that “it is a mistake and an oversimplification to suggest such a direct link between the liberation of females and increased involvement in crimes” (Ibid). Despite this critique, the academic consensus among liberation scholars is ultimately that female offending is a byproduct of empowerment; however, other considerations further examined in this paper, including societal, cultural, and economic factors, may also contribute to increased female criminality.

_Economic Marginalization_
The economic marginalization theory proposes that if women are unable to take advantage of economic opportunities, “they are relegated to the economic periphery of society where monetary disadvantages are associated with higher crime rates” (Hunnicutt and Broidy 2004, 131). Barberet demonstrates that women in developing countries are generally poorer than their male peers and they rely more heavily on social welfare, such as cash transfer programs and food assistance. These types of social safety nets are often highly restricted in the neoliberal economies of developing countries, such as those in Latin America (Barberet 2014, 18). Essentially, women become poor with no support or means to solve their financial problems. In order to regain some form of economic autonomy and sustainability, women may turn to criminal activities to earn money. Hunnicutt and Broidy contend that female crime, especially non-violent offenses such as drug crimes, “can be characterized as fundamentally economic in nature (2004, 131).” Reynolds agrees that “poverty is the motivation behind women’s drug smuggling” (2008, 79). Even more staggering, Reckdenwald and Parker found that “a standard deviation of one in the increase in economic marginalization index is associated with a 46 percent increase in female drug sales” (2008, 216). Women who are economically marginalized, especially in countries with little welfare support, are more likely to commit non-violent crimes with the aim of earning money for financial stability.

Liberation theory is connected to economic marginalization theory because the greater freedoms women experience due to liberation mean that they also have more economic responsibility. Societal expectations have shifted in that women are now seen as autonomous figures with distinct rights and capabilities, as well as earning power for themselves and their families. While this is an overall positive shift, the actual situation that women face in their day-to-day lives may not provide them with good options to fulfill this role. Women may not have the means to earn a legitimate income, due to a variety of reasons such as domestic responsibility in the home or a depressed job market. Therefore, due to the lack of legitimate earning power, women may commit crime to earn money and fulfill these economic obligations (Campbell 2008, 241).

**Feminization of Poverty**

Economic marginalization can be empirically observed by the feminization of poverty in Latin America. The feminization of poverty is a process by which women are becoming increasingly poorer in comparison to men. According to Chant, there are three major tenants of the feminization of poverty: (1) women are the majority share of the world’s poor; (2) a disproportionate share of poverty among women is rising relative to men; and (3) the feminization of poverty is linked
to the feminization of household heads (Chant 2007, 1). In considering this theory, it is important to make the distinction between an absolute worsening of poverty and a feminization of poverty. Absolute increases in poverty—whereby everyone becomes poorer—may be viewed as a gender-neutral relationship of poverty, because both women and men are worse off in the aggregate. A true feminization of poverty, therefore, is a women-to-men comparison where the ratios of poverty matter more than the absolute numbers (Medeiros and Costa 2007, 116). Furthermore, although poverty as a whole may decrease, this does not mean a feminization of poverty is not possible. The number of women in poverty may fall in absolute terms, but if the ratio of women in poverty increases relative to men, this is still a feminization of poverty.

Several previous studies have found “no evidence of a systematic over-representation of women [in poverty] around the world (Ibid, 117).” However, official country reports and international documents continuously point to an empirical feminization of poverty in Latin America. For example, in a CEPAL data set that measures male to female poverty ratios (with a ratio of over 100 meaning more women than men are in poverty, and a ratio of under 100 meaning more men than women are in poverty), in the early 2000s Costa Rica, Panama, Venezuela, and Bolivia had ratios of 122.9, 111.1, 111.3, and 103.6, respectively. While these numbers already mean that more women than men were living in poverty, by the year 2010, these ratios had reached 130.4, 122.9, 122, and 110.8 for Costa Rica, Panama, Venezuela, and Bolivia, respectively. The trend is similar for the other Latin American countries, thus demonstrating a feminization of poverty (CEPAL).

Studies have also shown a “feminization of responsibility and obligation” whereby more women are—on top of their domestic duties—tasked with working outside the home, usually earning wages far below a male’s average income (Chant 2007, 333). This social and economic strain on women can contribute to the feminization of poverty, especially when women become the heads of households. It is necessary to recognize that the female-headed household is not a determinant of poverty, but rather these households are at greater risk of being impoverished (Ibid, 336). Scholars have not come to a consensus on whether or not the feminization of poverty exists on a global scale, although it is clear that “gender gaps in poverty have remained stubborn” (Ibid, 285). However, in viewing this trend through the narrow lens of Latin America, it becomes clear that a feminization of poverty is occurring.

War on Drugs
The United States has played a major role in promoting international anti-drug legislation, essentially exporting the War on Drugs to Latin America and pushing for harsh policies to criminalize drugs. The U.S. especially targets Latin America because U.S. citizens’ demand for drugs such as cocaine and heroin are often produced by and trafficked via Latin American countries. The policies for which the U.S. advocates include mandatory minimum sentences and little codified distinction between low-level dealing and large-scale trafficking. Because these laws carry mandatory minimum sentences based on class and weight of the drug, low-level female drug mules, who are often unaware of exact regulations, are severely punished when apprehended (Barberet 2014, 145).

Especially in Latin America, women may also commit drug offenses as a result of gang influence or involvement (Umana and Rikkers 2012, 11). Gang leaders order women to commit various crimes such as extortion of money, arms trafficking, and drug trafficking on behalf of the gang (Ibid). This may be because a woman’s physical attractiveness and perceived innocence makes her less likely to arouse suspicion from law enforcement than a heavily tattooed male gang member would (Ibid). Although gangs do not commit all drug crimes, some form of organized crime group facilitates most operations, with the large-scale traffickers and dealers at the top, and the low-level mules, who are more likely to suffer consequences, at the bottom.

Scholars who have studied the U.S. War on Drugs in relation to female offending agree that women are disproportionately affected by these policies (See: Barberet 2014; Campbell 2008; Reynolds 2008). The penalties go far beyond the obligation of any UN Convention, and are disproportionately harsh when considering the penalties for violent crimes such as homicide. For example, in Ecuador the maximum penalty for homicide is 16 years in prison, while the penalty for non-violent drug trafficking may range from 12 to 25 years (Metaal and Youngers 2011, 5). Laws and policies implanted during the War on Drugs era target low-level, non-violent offenders while remaining virtually ineffective at preventing large-scale trafficking or reducing drug crime (Barberet 2014).

In examining the two theories of female offending, liberation theory and economic marginalization theory, as well as two concurrent phenomena, the feminization of poverty and the globalization of the U.S. War on Drugs, Latin America occupies a unique intersection of all four factors. This paper argues that liberation makes women more likely to be economically marginalized, as can be observed by the feminization of poverty. Combining the propensity to commit economically motivated crimes, such as drug offenses, with aggressive War on Drugs criminalization practices explains the increased incarceration rates of women relative to men.
Method

This paper uses a quantitative, fixed effects regression analysis in order to study the causal mechanisms contributing to the increased incarceration of women in the region of Latin America. Seventeen cases (countries) were evaluated and analyzed based on the intensity of their drug laws, the incarceration rates of women, the rates of feminization of poverty, and additional variables to control for other socio-economic factors. Since the phenomenon of increased incarceration rates of women is occurring across almost every country in Latin America, employing a quantitative approach allows for a holistic analysis of the problem.

Case Selection

The seventeen Latin American countries to be examined in this paper are: Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. The Caribbean islands, Brazil, and Francophone Latin American states have been excluded in order to strengthen the basis for a most similar case comparison by maintaining cultural, language, and social homogeneity as much as possible. The unit of analysis is the country-year in panel set data.

This study examines female drug offenders’ incarceration between the years 2000 and 2010. This period of time allows for the trend of increased incarceration of women to be fully observed, as it is when most of the selected countries had already codified harsh drug laws for at least a few years, allowing for the judiciary systems to implement these standards and for the incarceration rates to adequately reflect the punishments in accordance with these laws.

Finally, the sample is restricted to women since the increased incarceration of women is the core concern of this study. This spike in incarceration is only attributed to women, not to men, thus there is no need to include men in order to show a specific gendered relationship; rather, it is inherently gendered.

Data Availability

The largest obstacle for the study of female incarceration related to drug offenses is data availability. Reports on Latin American prison populations are highly inconsistent both from year to year and country to country, and are rarely gender-disaggregated. Due to the gender-specific
nature of this research, it was necessary to sacrifice some of the completeness of data sets in order to use data specific to females. This lack of complete data highlights the need to consistently collect gender-segregated data on a countrywide level. Using the limited available data, an original time-series cross-section dataset was constructed by compiling female prison population rates from various reports by the International Centre for Prison Studies and Washington Office on Latin America (Walmsley 2012; Metaal and Youngers 2011, 2-98).

The observations are for seventeen Latin American countries, from 2000 to 2010, but a complete record for all countries in each year is unavailable which results in both unbalanced panels and a large number of missing observations. Approximately half of the missing values were replaced using interpolation. It was also nearly impossible to locate substantial data for crime-specific breakdowns of prison populations. Therefore, the reported data in this paper is the number of females in prison for committing any crime, not just drug offenses. Although using the entire prison population as a proxy for an increase in drug-related incarceration is not a perfect measurement, the use of this sample should bias the results against my theory and by including incarceration rates for all crimes, the relationship between the variables will be diluted. Therefore, if a trend was able to be detected, it is quite likely that such a pattern truly exists.

Index of Drug Law Intensity

Among the scholarly contributions this paper makes is the development of an ordering system for the intensity of drug criminalization laws in all seventeen Latin American countries between 2000 and 2010. The laws were judged on three key aspects: criminalized personal use, maximum penalty, and threshold limits. Criminalized personal use refers to a criminal penalty for possession of an amount of a substance that would be considered a reasonable amount for one person to possess with the purpose of consuming immediately or in the near future. Usually this is below 2 grams of a controlled substance. Additionally, maximum penalty is the longest prison sentence that a person could receive for possession of an illegal substance. Finally, threshold limits refer to the amount of a substance a person is permitted to carry before the offense is considered a higher degree offense (i.e. the difference between personal possession and illegal possession; or between

---

illegal possession and trafficking). Maximum penalty was then broken down into three categories: personal possession, illegal possession, and trafficking. Thus, there are five sections in total for which each law was judged. Numerical values were assigned to each category as follows:

**Criminalized Personal Use**
- No (0)
- Yes (1)

**Maximum Penalty**
- 1-3 years prison (1)
- 4-7 years prison (2)
- 7-10 years prison (3)
- 10-20 years prison (4)
- 20+ years prison (5)

**Threshold Limits**
- Judge Determined (0)
- >2 grams (1)
- <2 grams (2)

Each country was evaluated for the years in which their respective laws were in place. The indicators were added together and then scaled so that the least harsh laws are a one (1) and the harshest laws are an eight (8). On the map in figure A, the countries with more intense drug laws are represented with darker coloring.

**Table A: Index of Drug Law Intensity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2000-2008</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belize</td>
<td>2000-2010</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guatemala</td>
<td>2000-2010</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>2000-2010</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>2000-2002</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>2003-2010</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>2000-2010</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>2000-2010</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Time Period</td>
<td>Intensity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>2000-2010</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>2000-2010</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2000-2002</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2003-2010</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>2000-2010</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>2000-2010</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2000-2008</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>2000-2010</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>2000-2010</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>2000-2010</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>2000-2010</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure A: Map of Latin America by Drug Law Intensity**
Variables

The dependent variable is the incarceration of women, operationalized by the number of women in prison.

The first main independent variable is intensity of drug laws, operationalized on an ordinal scale by the index previously established (See Table A). The second main independent variable is the feminization of poverty, operationalized by the ratio of women in poverty compared to men. A number greater than 100 in the dataset means there are more women in poverty than men, representing a feminization of poverty (See Table B).

Control variables are factors attributed to female liberation. The variable of female unemployment, operationalized by the share of the female labor force that does not have a job but is available and willing to work, is used to demonstrate more traditional societies where women do not work. Female labor force participation, operationalized by the proportion of the female population aged 15-64 that is economically active, is used to demonstrate the liberation theory idea that more women will work in progressive society. Female lower secondary education completion rate is used to demonstrate the liberation theory idea that more women will attend school and complete their education in a progressive society. This variable is operationalized by the gross intake ratio to the last grade of lower secondary education, calculated as the number of new female entrants in the last grade of lower secondary education, regardless of age, divided by the female population at the entrance age for the last grade of lower secondary education. The final control variable is female population in a country, which is used to measure the female incarceration rate against the number of women that could possibly be incarcerated.

Hypotheses

\( (1) H_A: \) If there are more intense drug laws in a country, then there will be higher rates of female incarceration in a country.
\( (1) H_0: \) There is no relationship between intense drug laws and female incarceration.

\( (2) H_A: \) If there are higher rates of feminized poverty in a country, then there will be higher rates of female incarceration in a country.
\( 2) H_0: \) There is no relationship between feminized poverty and female incarceration.

\( (3) H_A: \) Factors of female liberation will significantly affect the rate of
female incarceration in a country.

(3) \( H_0 \): Factors of female liberation will not significantly affect the rate of female incarceration in a country.

Results

The results of this study are based on a total of 176 country-year observations. A fixed-effects regression test was used to show a causal relationship between the independent and dependent variables (intensity of drug laws and female incarceration, respectively), which can be modeled as (See Table C):

\[
(inc) = fempol \cdot penpol \cdot lowpol \cdot femploy \cdot labfor + e
\]

Table B: Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min.</th>
<th>Max.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fem. of Poverty</td>
<td>109.976</td>
<td>2.653</td>
<td>104.46</td>
<td>113.671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Penalty</td>
<td>3.948</td>
<td>.2214</td>
<td>3.333</td>
<td>4.142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Educ.</td>
<td>68.489</td>
<td>8.884</td>
<td>50.523</td>
<td>78.527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Unemployment</td>
<td>9.216</td>
<td>4.819</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>22.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Pop.</td>
<td>101.e+07</td>
<td>1.37e+07</td>
<td>115499</td>
<td>6.16e+07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Participation</td>
<td>51.464</td>
<td>7.480</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>68.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incarceration</td>
<td>2564.837</td>
<td>1570.636</td>
<td>819.75</td>
<td>5617</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table C: Fixed Effects Regression

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Incarceration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fem. of Poverty</td>
<td>36.8 (18.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Penalty</td>
<td>6.161 (271)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary Educ.</td>
<td>133.4 (6.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Employ</td>
<td>-78.32 (35.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Population</td>
<td>.000 (.000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Participation</td>
<td>61.59 (34.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2 (within variance)</td>
<td>.2664</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With a threshold of \( p < .05 \) (the cut-off for statistical significance at the 95 percent level) the results show a number of significant factors related to the
incarceration rates of women in Latin American countries. The R squared value is .2664, meaning that the independent variables account for about 26 percent of the variance in the dependent variable, incarceration of women. Although the feminization of poverty does not meet the 95 percent significance level (p = 0.065), it can be used to partially explain the increase in incarceration rates of women because a correlation is likely as it does meet the 90 percent level of significance—a generally accepted threshold, though admittedly not as strong at the 95 percent level. According to this model, a one-unit increase in the feminization of poverty, as measured by a ratio of women to men living in poverty, is associated with a 36.77213 unit increase in the incarceration rate of women. Because women are the unit of measurement in this case, statistically about 36 more women will be incarcerated for every unit increase in the feminization of poverty. As seen in Figure B, there is a positive trend indicated by the correlation between the feminization of poverty and female incarceration.

The second main independent variable, intense drug laws, is significantly related (p = 0.00) to the increase in incarceration rates of women. The average index rating for the intensity of drug laws for Latin American countries in this study is approximately 4. A one unit increase in the intensity of drug laws is associated with a 6161.68 unit increase in incarceration rates. This means that approximately 6,161 more women will be incarcerated for each one-step increase in the drug law intensity index. Due to this finding, we accept the hypothesis (H_A1); if there are more intense drug laws in a country, then there will be higher rates of female incarceration in a country. The intensity of drug laws arguably criminalizes women disproportionately to the severity of the crime committed.
Other factors not considered as main independent variables, those that are related to the liberation theory of female offending, were also found to be statistically significant in considering the incarceration rates of women. There is a positive relationship between lower secondary education completion rate for women and incarceration rates of women (p = 0.00). According to the model,
a one-unit increase in lower secondary education completion is associated with approximately 133 more women incarcerated. Furthermore, the female unemployment rate is a statistically significant factor \((p = 0.042)\) in determining women’s incarceration rate. The relationship is negative, demonstrating that a one unit increase in the unemployment rate among women is associated with approximately 78 fewer women incarcerated. Due to these results, the null hypothesis \((H_{03})\) that factors of female liberation do not significantly affect rates of female incarceration, can be rejected, and the hypothesis \((H_{A3})\) that factors of female liberation will significantly affect female incarceration rates can be accepted. Neither female population \((p = .092)\) or female labor force participation \((p = .098)\) were statistically significant.

**Discussion of Results**

The results of this model demonstrate that the most significant factors associated with female incarceration rates are intensity of drug laws and the rate of women that complete secondary education. The female unemployment rate is also statistically significant, and the rate of women in poverty compared to men (the feminization of poverty) is correlated, although not statistically significant at the 95 percent level.

It may seem surprising that there is a positive relationship between the number of women who complete secondary education and the number of women incarcerated; however, this correlation is demonstrative of the liberation theory of female offending. The fact that more women complete secondary education is an outcome of increased overall inclusion of women in society. Women’s liberation and greater participation in society is not only limited to legitimate sectors, but rather opens opportunities to women throughout the underground and criminal parts as well.

Similarly, the negative relationship between female unemployment and female incarceration rates may seem counter-intuitive. While this result is slightly harder to understand, it can be understood in the context of economic marginalization theory. Traditionally, women in Latin America have not been employed in the formal job sector and only recently have they begun to seek employment outside the home. While employment outside the home can be empowering and a source of independence for women, it is also often a result of increased financial pressures on the family. Instead of working domestically and caring for children and the elderly, women are tasked with both earning income through formal employment for the families as well as caring for them in the home. This financial stress can drive women to commit economically motivated crimes, as described by the economic marginalization theory.
Therefore, a higher unemployment rate may mean that women are not facing the burden of being both breadwinners and caretakers for their family, as they are only working informally in their households. They do not have the dual obligations of both caring for their family and working outside the home to make ends meet. Without this pressure, fewer women will be motivated to commit economic crimes such as drug offenses, leading to fewer women incarcerated.

It is important to recognize that economic marginalization theory and liberation theory are not mutually exclusive, but rather that as women become increasingly integrated into society, they are becoming so under desperately unequal economic conditions. Thus they may be dually motivated by liberation and economic marginalization to commit drug-related crimes.

The feminization of poverty variable does not reach traditional levels of significance; however, the modest positive relationship apparent in the scatter plot and the fact that it does meet the somewhat less stringent 90 percent significance threshold does suggest that the trend may in fact exist and could become statistically apparent if the quality of the data improves. Recall that the data suffer from two distinct problems. First, the strength of the variable could be diluted by the fact that the data include non-drug related incarcerations. Second, the panels are unbalanced with a large number of missing values. While interpolation was able to replace approximately half those values, it cannot calculate values for observations that are surrounded by additional missing values nor can it calculate values for the first missing value in a panel. If these problems can be addressed, the mild trend which has been displayed in this study may become more clearly manifest in the data. Therefore, it is entirely possible that the feminization of poverty is indeed important for understanding how the unique economic vulnerability of women contributes to incarceration rates. In further studies, more specific and complete data for both the ratio of women to men in poverty and female incarceration rates may demonstrate that the feminization of poverty is indeed statistically significant at the 95 percent level or higher. Due to the imperfect nature of the data sets used in this paper, the results are close enough to this threshold to consider more deeply. Accepting the feminization of poverty as a contributing factor to incarceration rates of women highlights the need to reform social welfare policies so that they directly target economically vulnerable women, and, in turn, address the root causes of gender-based economic inequality.

Not surprisingly, the intensity of a country’s drug laws has a positive relationship with the number of women incarcerated. Harsh laws that carry long sentences for drug crimes such as simple possession target low-level mules and street dealers, who are often poor women. Long sentences also exacerbate the problem, with more women becoming incarcerated but few being released. A one
Cloutier, “Latin America’s Female Prisoner Problem

step increase in the intensity index of a country’s drug laws is associated with over 6,000 more women being incarcerated, showing the extreme societal consequences of these War on Drugs policies.

By reforming non-violent criminal codes and at least decriminalizing possession of reasonable amounts of drugs for personal use, Latin American countries could reduce their female incarceration rates by the thousands. Treating drug use and dependency as a public health issue instead of criminalizing addiction restructures the paradigm of how these infractions and the people who commit them are treated by society. Instead of sentencing a woman to years in prison for simple possession, outpatient treatment programs and counseling should be utilized. This not only helps the woman and any dependents she has, but also benefits society as a whole in terms of social cohesion and contributions from productive members of society. Moreover, possession for small-scale trafficking may indicate dire economic need rather than malicious criminal intent. These cases highlight the need for better social safety nets and improved welfare policy, not the criminalization of impoverished, non-violent offenders.

Conclusion

This paper began with an examination of two relevant theories of female offending: liberation and economic marginalization. The feminization of poverty was used as an empirical demonstration of the economic marginalization of women in Latin America. A quantitative approach used the feminization of poverty, the incarceration rates of women, and intensity of drug laws, along with variables to control for female liberation in a fixed effects regression test across seventeen Latin American countries. The results found that drug law intensity, female lower secondary education completion rate, and female unemployment rate significantly contribute to female incarceration rates. The feminization of poverty, taking into account complications with the data, may also be a contributing factor. The results support the liberation theory of female offending and the economic marginalization theory, showing that the two theories are not mutually exclusive. As society further engages women, it does so under increasingly marginalizing economic circumstances. Furthermore, the results demonstrate the adverse effects of the globalized War on Drugs, which significantly increases female incarceration rates throughout Latin America. Policy considerations as an outcome of this study could include improving social safety nets to target vulnerable population of women, and reforming criminal codes to treat low-level, non-violent drug crimes as a
public health issue rather than felonies. As the decriminalization movement gains momentum across the Americas, this change may become a reality, and help to lower the number of women behind bars.
Works Cited
CEPALSTAT. 2014. “Feminine Poverty Ratio.” CEPAL.
International Harm Reduction Association, ch. 3.4.


THE CHINA DILEMMA: A STUDY OF THE IDEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS CHINA DURING THE COLD WAR

Austin Krug

Abstract

This paper investigates the influence of U.S. foreign policymakers’ perceptions towards China on policy formulation during the Cold War. The influence of perceptions, especially perceptions surrounding the ideology of combatant states, is especially controversial when looking at the Cold War, a period known for extreme ideological vitriol between the United States and the Soviet Union. Drawing on the literature surrounding the relationship between these two states, I aim to expand the analysis to Sino-American relations. Specifically, I ask what influence did ideology have on U.S. foreign policymakers as they formulated foreign policy with regards to China. In order to understand the influence of ideology on U.S. foreign policy making, I take the perceptions of China—either positive or negative—as my independent variable while using the level of ideological language as my dependent variable. In order to vary the independent variable, I look at the Lyndon B. Johnson and Jimmy Carter presidencies, which respectively came before and after the U.S. opening to China under Richard Nixon. Through an analysis of both public and private documents, my findings suggest that foreign policy makers were not themselves influenced by ideological vitriol, but instead employed it as a mechanism to motivate domestic audiences to support their policies.

Introduction

Despite having concluded many years ago, the Cold War remains a topic of controversy for many historians and international relations scholars. One of the key dividing lines between scholars is the importance of ideology.
during the period. The two main political and economic ideologies of this period were democratic capitalism championed by the U.S., and authoritarian communism exemplified by the U.S.S.R. Given the nature of such occurrences as the Red Scare and McCarthyism, relatively few scholars debate the reality of ideology influencing public opinion. However, one of the key debates within the scholarly community is whether ideology and perceptions of other countries’ ideology influenced foreign policy makers in their decisions. While a substantial amount of literature focuses on the ideological influences on foreign policy between the United States and the Soviet Union, many countries influenced and were influenced by the Cold War. One such country was the People’s Republic of China (PROC).¹

Literature Review

To begin with, ideology played a role in the Cold War as a method of antagonism between the United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies. While there are multiple methods of defining ideology, I use Lorenz Lüthi’s definition of ideology as it explicitly applies to the U.S.S.R. and the PRC. She defines ideology “broadly as a set of beliefs and dogmas that both construct general outlines—rather than a detailed blueprint—of a future political order, and define specific methods—though no explicit pathways—to achieve it” (Lüthi 2008, 8). From the Chinese and Soviet Perspective, the overarching ideology was Marxism-Leninism, which “envisioned the communist society as the final objective of history” (Ibid). Capitalism, on the other hand, was a self-serving economic system where everyone was concerned primarily with his or her own interests (Ralston et al. 1997, 180). Scholars throughout the Cold War and into the modern era have hotly debated the influence of ideology on foreign policy. While the majority of scholarly literature on ideological differences focuses on the division between the Soviet Union and the U.S., these arguments can also be applied to China and the U.S. Two theoretical schools dominate the discussion on ideology: constructivism and realism. Constructivists are interested in how an actor’s identity influences their threat assessment and actions. Realists, on the other hand, argue that the foremost concern of states is power politics.

Constructivism assumes that the identity of states influences how they perceive threats (Goldstein and Pevehouse 2012, 97). John Lewis Gaddis, one of the foremost Cold War scholars, follows this school of thought by arguing

¹ For clarity, the People’s Republic of China will henceforth be referred to as China. When mentioned, the Republic of China (Taiwan) will be referred to as the Republic of China or Taiwan.
that ideology played a pivotal role in determining the actions of the Soviet Union and the United States. Gaddis hypothesizes that the United States, through its liberal democratic capitalistic ideology, maintained positive economic and military alliances, which resulted in its rapid economic growth while maintaining political power (Gaddis 1997, 219-220). The Soviet Union’s Marxist-Leninist authoritarian ideology resulted in it being unable to maintain its series of alliances, which resulted in economic and political stagnation (Ibid).

His argument rests on three distinct claims about ideology. The first claim is that economic ideological differences led to the start of the Cold War and the resulting isolation of the Soviet Union. After World War II, as the United States and other Western powers formulated plans for a new international order within the United Nations and Bretton Woods institutions, the Soviet Union viewed capitalism as fundamentally incompatible with Marxism-Leninism (Ibid, 193). As a result, rather than participating in the Bretton Woods regime and the international economic order, the Soviet Union instead relied on economic autarky within the socialist bloc, which restricted its economic development (Ibid). Meanwhile, the U.S. through international trade and cooperation was able to achieve rapid economic growth after World War II (Ibid, 194).

The second claim is that the ideological constraints combined with the fundamental inconsistencies within socialist ideology resulted in an inflexible foreign policy within the Soviet Union. The authoritarian mentality derived from the Marxist-Leninist one-party state and best exemplified by Stalin resulted in the Soviet Union employing exploitative practices with other socialist countries in Eastern Europe and East Asia (Ibid, 204). The fundamental result was that socialist countries followed the Soviet Union only out of fear of repression from Stalin (Ibid, 205). When Khrushchev became the leader of the Soviet Union, he was often unwilling to use force to put down insurrections, which resulted in splits within the socialist bloc that undermined the political and economic power of the Soviet Union (Ibid, 206). The third claim is that the ideological inflexibility of the Soviet Union also resulted in the Soviet Union refusing to reform their economy despite its inherent weaknesses (Ibid, 215).

While many constructivist scholars look at the Cold War from the perspective of an ideological battle, realists on the other hand commonly view the period as a balance-of-power struggle between the two world superpowers. Realism is a conglomeration of different policies and beliefs aimed at understanding the world in terms of power politics. Central to realism is the concept of power, which is the ability to influence foreign entities to do...
something that they would not otherwise do (Goldstein and Pevehouse 2012, 45). Beyond this broad focus, however, there are multiple different varieties of realism. The two most prominent varieties for analyzing Cold War ideology are neorealism and neoclassical realism.

Neorealism, first articulated by Kenneth Waltz, explains patterns of international events in terms of the international distribution of power (2001, 56). Waltz himself analyzes the influence, or lack thereof, of ideology on foreign policy (Ibid, 112). Waltz argues against ideology from both prescriptive and descriptive perspectives. Prescriptively, Waltz highlights the logical fallacy associated with basing foreign policy on ideology. He argues that ideology should not form the basis of foreign policy because of the impossibility of determining an objective utopian ideology (Ibid). Carrying out any ideological foundation of a state to its logical conclusion will lead to “a perpetual war for perpetual peace” (Ibid, 113). From a descriptive perspective, Waltz iterates the practical difficulties associated with employing ideology as a unifying force by historically analyzing domestic socialist parties during World War I. From this archival research, Waltz concludes that the protection and defense of one’s own state supersedes adherences to an ideology (Ibid, 136).

Neoclassical realist Cold War scholars, on the other hand, frequently seek to bridge the gap between constructivism and neorealism. In his review of the literature, Gideon Rose summarizes the fundamentals of neoclassical realism in that neoclassical realists agree with neorealists that a state’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its position in the international realm (Rose 1998, 166). However, it diverges from neorealism by arguing that state’s foreign policy actions are not based on objective power, but rather perceived power (Ibid, 147). They argue that international pressure is translated through intervening variables such as decision-makers’ perceptions and domestic state structures (Ibid, 152). As a result, a leader does not have full autonomy to act that neorealists presume, but are limited by the domestic structure of their state (Ibid).

One key debate within the area of neoclassical realism is the influence of perceptions on foreign policy formulation. The usage of perceptions takes on a double-edged characteristic. The neoclassical scholar William Wohlforth uses the case of Khruschev’s grandiose claims of Soviet power to display both sides. From the perspective of the U.S., Khruschev’s claims and their consequent influence on U.S. foreign policy show that perceived power, even if not a reality, can influence foreign policy (Wohlforth 1993, 181). As a result, from the perspective of the Soviet Union, manipulating perceptions can result in firm power advantages: “Khruschev’s efforts to manipulate the metaphor
of power, like Stalin’s before him, were doubtless connected to concrete diplomatic and strategic objectives” (Ibid, 165).

Thomas Christensen extends this analysis to the realm of ideology by arguing that the manipulation of ideology can be an effective tool to mobilize domestic audiences: “In order to secure public support for their most basic strategy, the [political elites] may, in certain cases, decide to adopt a more hostile or more ideological foreign policy than they otherwise would prefer” (Christensen 1997, 4). Christensen utilizes this framework in a comparison of Sino-American relations. Specifically, he argues against the realist interpretation of Sino-American relations before rapprochement that occurred in 1972. Realists believe this period of foreign policy was influenced by “the impact of ideological differences, domestic political pressures, and leadership psychology on both nations’ policies” (Ibid, 5). However, one of the realities of this period was that the international environment before and after 1972 was remarkably similar. A key question then is explaining this change in policy with no prior change in the international environment (Ibid). While Christensen explores this gap in the literature by arguing that strategic thinking influenced the pre-1972 period foreign relations, I aim to explore this gap looking at it from the continuing ideological influences both before and after 1972. While realists assume that power politics and balance of power dominated Sino-American relations after 1972, my goal is to explore the influences of ideology during this time and contrast it with the pre-1972 environment. In this way, I hope to more concretely flush out the change, if any, which occurred in U.S. foreign policy decision making before and after 1972.

Research Design

Variables and Hypotheses

In order to more fully research the gap in the literature between the pre-1972 and post-1972 treatment of China, my research explores how U.S. perceptions of Chinese ideology influenced U.S. foreign policy. I selected two cases—the Lyndon B. Johnson and Jimmy Carter presidencies—that stretch between 1963 and 1979 to explore this phenomenon. During this period, both Chinese and American ideology remains the same, so it will be a constant during the research experiment. My independent variable will be the perceptions of China, as either a friend or an enemy. I take this variable as given by the historical record. Specifically, during the Johnson administration, Chinese were supplying Vietnamese communists with weapons to be used against American soldiers, as a result “China and the United States were
each other’s most active enemy in the years 1949-1972” (Ibid, 4). The Carter administration came after the rapprochement, which resulted instead in the Chinese being viewed as a friend. My dependent variable is the level of ideological statements in both public and private statements by U.S. officials. I conceptualize ideologically-charged language as language by U.S. officials that explicitly or implicitly referred to the ideological divide between the United States and China. Examples include references to communist subversion or referring to communists in derogatory language.

Although I am looking to explain the influence of ideology, I keep ideology constant throughout the experiment. While I could have chosen my independent variable as ideology and looked at periods before and after Chinese reform and opening up, which was capitalistic in nature, I chose not to. The predominant reason would be that the key focal point identified in the literature review was the rapprochement that occurred in 1972. Chinese transition to a more capitalistic economic model did not start until 1979 (Kissinger 2012, 638-639). As a result, by this time, the United States already perceived China as a de-facto ally against the Soviet Union. Instead, I decided to look at how ideology influenced and permeated the discourse both before and after rapprochement.

From the literature review, I have determined two hypotheses that I plan to explore. The first is:

(1) Negative government rhetoric will be more pronounced when the U.S. views China as an enemy rather than as a friend.

Within this hypothesis are two potential contradictory hypotheses. The first is the opposite in that negative government rhetoric will be more pronounced when the U.S. views China as a friend rather than an enemy. Intuitively, the thought of any country speaking better of its enemies than of its allies does not make sense, and this argument is not present in any of the major theoretical frameworks on the subject. The second, more intuitive hypothesis would be that the level of ideological rhetoric does not change as perceptions of China change. The second hypothesis is:

(2) Public statements will contain more ideologically charged language than private statements.

According to the neoclassical framework identified above, the predominant reason would be to use ideology to rally the population against
a common enemy. In my research, I do not study the success of this tactic, but I instead study whether or not U.S. Cold War policymakers employed this tactic. The opposite hypothesis would be that private statements contain more ideologically charged language than public statements. A possible reason would be because the policymakers are more informed about the subject and thus have more biases.

Case Studies and Source Selection

In order to vary the independent variable, I look at two cases: Lyndon Johnson’s presidency where China was viewed negatively and Jimmy Carter’s presidency when China was viewed positively. I chose these two cases for two fundamental reasons. The first would be the ability to control for several key variables. The main variable I aimed to control by choosing these two presidents was their party affiliation, which is generally indicative of foreign policy choices (Drezner 2013, 143-152). Both Lyndon Johnson and Jimmy Carter are Democratic presidents. The second reason I chose these two presidents is that they vary based on my independent variable: U.S. perceptions of China.

From 1963 through 1969, the Vietnam War—one of the most controversial American wars—raged in South East Asia. Although China’s army was never directly involved in hostilities against U.S. soldiers in this conflict, the PROC did provide military supplies to the North Vietnamese communists that were then used to attack and kill American soldiers (“Vietnam War” 2016). As a result, perceptions among Americans were generally very negative towards the PROC during this period. In order to limit the number of documents relevant to my research, I decided to focus on a particular focal point that proved to be the best example of Americans viewing the PROC as an enemy. This focal point would be the Chinese testing of an atomic weapon, which reaffirmed to many Americans that the Chinese were a threat to international stability (“U.S. Relations with China (1949-present)”). Specifically, leaders had earlier debated the necessity of a preemptive strike against China while the Department of Defense argued that this bomb could set the stage for “100 million dead Americans in the event of conflict with China in 1980” (Burr 2014). As a result, this event was the defining moment in Sino-American relations during the Johnson presidency. In 1972, however, positive relations between the United States and China increased substantially with President Nixon’s visit to China (Ibid). This visit began a process of gradual thawing of relations between the United States and the PROC. The Carter presidency from 1977 to 1981 witnessed the pinnacle of this thawing of relations with U.S. recognition of the PROC as the authentic government of Mainland
China on January 1, 1979 (Ibid). The focal point within Carter’s presidency that best represented American’s perceptions of solidarity with China was U.S. recognition of the PROC on January 1, 1979 and Deng Xiaoping’s subsequent visit to the United States between January 28, 1979 and February 5, 1979 (Encyclopedia Britannica Online “Deng Xiaoping” 2016).

I explored my dependent variable—the level of ideological rhetoric—by reading two different types of sources. The first type would be public documents of the president of the United States, which I accessed through the HeinOnline’s U.S. Presidential Library search engine (“U.S. Presidential Library” 2016). My search parameters were the respective president, either Jimmy Carter or Lyndon Johnson, and “People’s Republic of China” or “Peoples Republic of China,” which I used in order to limit search results to Mainland China rather the Republic of China. The second type of sources was private documents by the respective presidents’ administration, which I found through the Foreign Relations of the United States series. This series is a collection of formerly classified statements since released to the public under the Office of the Historian. I focused on sources related to my focal events—China’s atomic test and U.S. recognition and Deng Xiaoping’s visit—in order to refine my search.

Empirical Evidence

Lyndon Johnson’s Private Statements

Lyndon Johnson’s private statements, both those involving the president himself and those involving key members of his administration, that reference the Chinese atomic test focused primarily on the technical capabilities of the Chinese atomic weapons program and the resulting redistribution of international power. One of the key results of the Chinese atomic weapons test was the solidification of the PROC as the governing authority over Mainland China. In a memorandum from Robert W. Komer from the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, Komer noted that China, in testing an atomic weapon, has affirmed their presence in the international realm. Specifically, Komer argued, “Peiping’s test also dramatically underlines that Red China is here to stay [emphasis in original]” (Foreign Relations of the United States 2008, Document 68).  

Moreover, because of this increasing presence of China on

---

2 On January 1, 1979, the United States government transitioned their method of referring to Chinese places and names from the Wade-Giles system to the Hanyu Pinyin system. All Chinese names before this date in both private and public statements employ the Wade-Giles system. All Chinese names after this date employ the Hanyu Pinyin system. This changeover has resulted in substantial name changes such as
the international stage, the United States must change policy to recognize this new reality and incorporate it into their Cold War framework: “the Sino-Soviet split (which will continue even if in muted form), provides further public justification for dealing with both Communist centers, not only one” (Ibid). Therefore, the dropping of the atomic weapon increased the legitimacy of the Chinese while reiterating that it was now a major player on the international stage.

The increasing prominence of China created two distinct threats to the United States, one technical associated with nuclear weapons and the other geopolitical in nature. The first threat to the United States was that of China’s added nuclear capacity. This manifested itself in two distinct ways. The first threat to the United States was direct war with China. Because of China’s nuclear test and increasing aggressiveness in Asia, a key concern within the United States government was that these aggressive actions would result in war. In a meeting between Secretary of State Dean Rusk and delegates from Canada on the upcoming vote on UN recognition of China, Secretary Rusk noted, “if the ChiComs [Chinese Communists] continue on their present aggressive course, there will be war in the Pacific” (Ibid, Document 65). Moreover, while Rusk realized that a war between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. was unlikely because of geopolitical considerations of both sides, he was not as sure with regards to China: “Looking ahead we [the United States government] could see the possibility that the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries could work out their problems without war. We are not so sure about Peiping” (Ibid).

The second threat emerged from the destructive capability of the nuclear weapons themselves. While the U.S. government did not believe that China would directly threaten it, they were concerned with the threat of accidental nuclear discharges starting a large-scale nuclear war between the Soviet Union, China, and the U.S. Specifically, Kommer in his message to Bundy noted that “the more likely problem [than a Chinese nuclear attack] was that a ChiCom capability might trigger Soviet CD [Civil Defense] or ALCBM [air-launched continental ballistic missiles], which in turn might trigger us [the United States]” (Ibid, Document 51). Not only could China itself potentially trigger the nuclear arsenals of other countries, but the development of Chinese nuclear weapons also created a precedent for other nations to develop them. This precedent would have resulted in other countries potentially trying to acquire nuclear weapons, which would have resulted in additional insecurity.

in the realm of nuclear weapons. In a presidential meeting with congressional leadership on October 19, 1964, Secretary of Defense McNamar pointed out to the president and the congressional leaders “that there are half a dozen countries which could move rapidly in this [nuclear] direction if they made the political decision to do so, and that the cost of developing a nuclear device was now on the order of $120 million—not a prohibitive figure” (Ibid, Document 6). Therefore, one of the greatest threats of Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons was that other countries would also be more likely to acquire them, which would further endanger international stability.

While the private statements lack ideological language or language that implies that the policymakers are taking action because of their perceptions of communism, the policy makers do recognize the threat of perceptions in questioning their legitimacy. The third threat that emerged was from the geopolitical strategic decisions the U.S. would have to make in regards with other countries as a consequence of China’s rise. As previously mentioned, China’s detonation of an atomic bomb reaffirmed in the minds of many leaders that the Communist Party was the official leader of Mainland China and would remain the leader for the conceivable future. While this forced the United States to alter its own perceptions towards China, it also altered the perceptions of many other countries across the world, including some U.S. allies. As a result, the U.S. lost international prestige as its policy of isolating China by refusing to recognize it was ignoring a key geostrategic reality. In a conversation between Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs Harlan Cleveland and Secretary of State Rusk, Cleveland noted that the increasing presence of China, exemplified by the detonation of an atomic bomb, was fundamentally undermining the U.S.’s commitment to defend against Communism: “Many of the relevant political leaders in the world do not favor Chinese Communist influence; they fear it. They do not want Southeast Asia to become a peninsula of China; they just don’t believe we [the United States] can prevent that outcome in the way we are trying to prevent it” (Ibid, Document 64). Cleveland further noted, “what is eroding is not the opposition to Communist China’s behavior, but the support of our traditional tactics for dealing with it [emphasis in original]” (Ibid). As a result of China’s increasing prevalence in global society combined with the implicit assent of the majority of leaders to their increasing position, the U.S. feared that their traditional allies would abandon their cause in favor of China.

In addition, an emboldened China would have had additional incentives to engage in conflict with the West: “The Chinese Communist leaders, who are still the veterans of the Long March, have some reason to
believe that their toughness pays off: French recognition, Western trade credits, Khruschev’s fall and the political fall out of their own nuclear test all pay witness” (Ibid). The majority of government discourse focused on the geostrategic threats of the China to the United States and its interests. This suggests that the key consideration in the mind of U.S. policymakers is not the ideological implications of communism, but instead is the very real threat of Communist China to their interests in the Asia-Pacific arena.

**Lyndon Johnson’s Public Statements**

Reflecting the administration’s private view that the perceptions surrounding China and Sino-American relations were also significant in addition to the technical aspects of China’s manipulation of power, the Johnson administration publicly reinforced these perceptions for its own benefit. Specifically, rather than arguing that the ideological debate was between communism and capitalism, President Johnson instead argued that it was between communism and freedom. Moreover, in direct response to the Chinese detonation of the atomic weapon, he also grouped together the Chinese Communists with the Soviet Union Communists. In a statement on October 18, 1964, he discussed both the replacement of Khruschev with Leonard Brezhnev and the Chinese explosion of an atomic weapon in the same speech. He emphasized that, “there has been discontent and strain and failure—both within the Soviet Union and within the Communist bloc as a whole” (Johnson 1963, 1377). This statement applies to the U.S.S.R.’s communists: “We must never forget that the men in the Kremlin remain dedicated, dangerous Communists. A time of trouble among Communists requires steady vigilance among free men” (Ibid). In addition, it also includes the Chinese: “But the Red Chinese kept to their chosen purpose [of nuclear weapons], even as their economic plans collapsed and the suffering of their people increased” (Ibid). The conjoining and mutual overlap of the term communist in regards to the Soviet Union and China stress that, despite the Sino-Soviet split in 1960, the Johnson Administration continued to characterize the Soviet Union and China as virtually the same.

This perception of the ideological nature of China and the Soviet Union, especially when contrasted with Johnson’s private statements, reflect the nature that Johnson was using these perceptions to his own advantage by promoting the Soviet Union and China as working together against the United States. Moreover, Johnson contrasts both of these communist powers with the United States: “We [the United States citizens] love freedom and we will protect it and we will preserve it. Tonight, as always, America’s purpose is peace for all
men” (Ibid, 1380). Through these ideologically charged statements, Johnson draws a sharp dichotomy between the United States as a freedom and peace loving country and the Soviet Union and China as the communist enemies.

Jimmy Carter’s Private Statements

Although Jimmy Carter and Lyndon Johnson are temporally separated by approximately two decades, their decision-making reflects many of the same processes. However, Jimmy Carter’s presidency occurs after Nixon’s visit to China, which resulted in a very drastic change in perceptions towards China. Rather than China being the enemy, they increasingly started to be seen as a friend. However, the exact nature of this “friendship” takes a very strategic perspective. In looking at the nature of this improvement in relations, the normalization of relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China and subsequently Deng Xiaoping’s visit to the United States provides an insightful glance into the new workings of this friendly relationship between the two countries. However, this friendship has underlying roots in the geostrategic environment at the time. Specifically, both the United States and China used the other in order to pursue their geopolitical aims.

Both countries were attempting to use the mutual building up of one another as an effective counterweight against the Soviet Union. A memorandum from Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter’s National Security Advisor, to President Carter best captures this new relationship. In his words, “We [the United States] have embarked on a course that could have very great international consequences. U.S.–Chinese normalization could open the doors to a political-economic relationship with one-fourth of mankind. It would alter the international balance. Success here would be very much a historic achievement for you [Carter]” (Foreign Relations of the United States 2013, Document 118). While these improved relations would have resulted in a safer geopolitical environment between the U.S and the China, it was also designed specifically to serve as a counterweight to the Soviet Union. In a separate memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs William Gleysteen to Brzezinski dated June 6, 1978, Gleysteen noted that Brzezinski “implied clearly to the Chinese that there has been a shift in our global strategy since the [Secretary of State] Vance visit so that the competitive elements of our policy vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R. now heavily overshadows the cooperative elements” (Ibid, Document 118). As a result, the United States would benefit heavily from this new security arrangement playing Beijing off against Moscow: “It is obvious that continued animosity between Moscow and Peking, coupled with a broadening in the Sino-U.S. relationship,
brings us [the United States] beneficial security and economic dividends” (Ibid, Document 130). Clearly, it was in the interest of the United States to pursue more beneficial relations with China as an effective counterweight to the Soviet Union.

In addition, from the perspective of the Carter administration at least, the Chinese and specifically Deng Xiaoping were pursuing these types of geopolitical arrangements. Like the United States, the Chinese goals were two-pronged: (1) to counter the Soviet Union and (2) to reap economic benefits through a relationship from the West. This decision was the culmination of several decades of division between the Soviet Union and China; however, it wasn’t until this time that China fundamentally closed off relations with the Soviet Union to pursue closer relations with the West. In a memorandum from Michel Oksenberg of the National Security Council Staff to Brzezinski dated August 21, 1978, “the Chinese have both nailed the coffin [of Sino-Soviet relations] shut and embarked on a strategy to modernize China by turning to the West. And with that, the Sino-Soviet conflict has entered a new stage” (Ibid). Therefore, the alliance with the Soviet Union no longer benefited the Chinese, so the Chinese found a new strategic partner.

From the perspectives of U.S. policymakers, Deng Xiaoping largely drove this process on the Chinese side. Although Deng was still the vice-premier, he was the de-facto head of the Chinese government after the conclusion of the meeting of the politburo. Deng’s power led the Acting Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research John Marks to comment in a briefing to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance that Deng “Teng Hsiao-p’ing [Deng Xiaoping...] is clearly now the person with whom the U.S. needs to deal directly concerning the issues between us [the U.S. and China]” (Ibid, Document 160). Deng recognized the geostrategic reality that he faced: “[Deng] believe[d] diplomatic relations with the US are central to thwarting Soviet and Vietnamese pressures on China. They [were] also important in gaining easier access to the capital, expertise, and technology of the U.S. and its allies” (Ibid). Through these statements, both representatives of the U.S. and of the PROC formulated foreign policy with their primary focus being their geostrategic concerns, especially with regards to the Soviet Union. When considering China, an authoritarian and communist country, and the United States, a capitalistic democracy, wanting to cooperate on their foreign policies with the intention of limiting the Soviet Union, another communist power, then ideological considerations do not seem to be a key factor.

However, despite the fact that ideology does not play a prominent role, the question remains whether ideology played a role at all. The answer
again appears to be that ideology and non-strategic words and actions were a method to arrive at the correct geostrategic balance. Because of the desire to improve relations, the usage of ideologically charged language that was prominent in President Johnson’s statements is absent. In its place has been the glossing over of strategic differences and the promotion of cultural and scientific ties between the two countries. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke, in negotiations with the Chinese, argues:

We [the United States] believe that although there may be differences on some issues between us we have many areas where we have common views and objectives, and we have many common interests. And we hope that consultations, exchanges, discussions—all will lead to more and more common ground between our two countries (Ibid, Document 117).

Moreover, these closer ties were encouraged through non-military, non-diplomatic means such as science expeditions. Holbrooke adds: “I think that visits by Dr. Schlesinger and by Dr. Press and other distinguished scientists would be very useful and productive in the relations between our two countries” (Ibid). Therefore, while the primary focus of the discussions within the U.S. government about China and between the U.S. and Chinese focused on geostrategic and geopolitical aims, these external factors that Constructivists prize also played a role in achieving these broad aims by improving relations between the two countries.

Jimmy Carter’s Public Statements

Jimmy Carter’s public statements surrounding the normalization of relations with China and Deng Xiaoping’s subsequent visit also followed the trend of diplomatic talks between the United States and China in that they glossed over the institutional differences between the two countries. In the signing ceremony recognizing the establishment of Sino-American ties, Carter reiterated the strong historical background of the Sino-American relationship by referencing the Chinese-American population: “Almost 700,000 American citizens trace their roots to China. There are strong bonds of blood kinship and history between the United States and China” (Carter 1980, 1773). Moreover, Carter argued that the United States and China have been friends for many
years. In remarks after announcing the intended treaty between China and the United States, Carter noted: “the American and the Chinese people had a long history of friendship,” which suggested that the Chinese should be seen as brothers and kin rather than as the enemy (Carter 1978, 2265).

Despite Carter’s attempts to downplay the differences, he still recognized the reality that relations between the United States and China had been very poor since Communist takeover. These strained relations have even led to the potential for war. In a statement welcoming Deng Xiaoping to the United States, Carter iterated that “for the past century and more, our relations have often been marred by misunderstanding, false hopes, and even war” (Carter 1979, 190). Carter recognized that the United States and China had had very tense relations, including during the Korean War when U.S. forces directly combated Chinese forces or in the Vietnam War where China supplied forces hostile to the United States. Interestingly, Carter emphasized that these are mistakes and “misunderstandings,” suggesting that publicly at least Carter wanted to recognize that the pre-existing relations were not driven by rational thought, but instead were driven by a lack of information or experience on the part of policymakers on both sides of the Pacific. In other respects, Carter emphasized publicly the United States was avoiding pursuit of a realist framework. In a Question and Answer session on July 11, 1978, Carter states: “I think it would be a serious mistake for ourselves, for the People’s Republic of China, for the Soviet Union, to try to play one against another [...] We would never use China as a lever against the Soviet Union. I think the Chinese people would resent it very deeply, and I think the Soviet Union would also” (Carter, 1263). By consistently emphasizing publicly that the U.S. is not pursuing a strategic framework in developing its relations with China, Carter suggested that speaking in realist terms would be unattractive in the public’s eye, and instead used other means of arriving at the same conclusion, which is a balance of power.

Finally, moving from recognizing and limiting the reality of the past century of tense relations between the United States and China, Carter also challenged the ideological dichotomization seen in President Johnson’s statements by arguing that ideological differences, rather than being a source of fear, could be a source of strength. Carter explicitly recognized that ideological differences can help both the United States and China: “Our histories and our political and economic systems are vastly different. Let us recognize these differences and make them sources not of fear, but of healthy curiosity; not as a source of divisiveness, but of mutual benefit” (Carter 1979, 190). Therefore,
by recognizing these differences, both nations could have benefited rather than being limited in relations through the ideological language of the past. Carter also specifically noted the mechanism by which these different ideologies can mutually benefit both nations: “As long as we harbor no illusions about our differences, our diversity can contribute to the vitality of our new relationship. People who are different have much to learn from each other” (Ibid). Therefore, these differences can be sources of strength for both sides. More than that, however, the key component according to Carter is that both sides recognize these mutual differences and do not hold unrealistic expectations about the other side.

Comparison Between Jimmy Carter and Lyndon Johnson

Through the private sources, the Carter and Johnson administrations both focused on the realist, geopolitical implications of the Sino-American relationship. Johnson and his staff emphasized the danger of China’s acquisition of an atomic weapon to the security of the United States. Rather than viewing the Chinese as evil just because they are communists, the Johnson administration appeared to view them in more of a power related scenario where Chinese acquisition of this powerful weapon posed a threat to the stability of the United States. The Carter administration continued to view the decisive importance of the Sino-American relationship as a strategic counterweight against the Soviet Union. Similar to the Johnson administration’s internal rhetoric, private documents within the Carter administration also lacked a focus on ideological differences between the United States and China and instead viewed the strategic component as more valuable.

In their public rhetoric, the situation is very different which reflects the difference in the independent variable. When China assisted the North Vietnamese Communists, then the United States consequently viewed China as an enemy. In this environment, Lyndon Johnson strategically employed ideological language and the dichotomization between freedom and communism to motivate the public against the Chinese communists. This facilitated U.S. foreign policy by encouraging the public to support any retaliatory acts the United States took against China. In the case of Jimmy Carter, the situation is very different. As China was now viewed as a friend, especially after the Sino-Soviet split and Nixon’s visit to China, the public rhetoric of Jimmy Carter took a very different direction. Recognizing that Johnson’s rhetoric paints a negative picture of China, Carter could not only ignore the ideological differences between the U.S. and China, but he had to
cast them in a new light. This necessity led him to emphasize the fact that the ideological differences between the two countries can be a source of strength rather than weakness. While this is the exact opposite reaction of President Johnson, the motives are the same throughout: they are both using ideological rhetoric to influence the mindsets of their constituents to support their policies. As a result, Constructivist argument that ideological influences impact foreign policy decisions of decision makers seems to not hold. Moreover, this portrayal of relations in an ideological suggests that the policymakers did not have autonomy in foreign policy making, but instead were limited by the non-strategic thinking of their constituents, which trends against the neorealist explanation. In comparison, the neoclassical realist perspective that the government focused on geopolitical aims while the president used ideology to motivate the masses to support the government seems to hold true.

In response, the evidence appears to support both of my hypotheses. My first hypothesis was that negative government rhetoric would be more pronounced when the U.S. viewed China as an enemy rather than as a friend. Both presidents support this hypothesis within the context of the public statements. When China was viewed as an enemy during President Johnson’s administration, Johnson employed strong rhetoric contrasting the Chinese and Soviet Communists with the free people of Western Europe and the United States. During Carter’s administration, on the other hand, Carter goes to great lengths to downplay the importance of the ideological differences between the United States and China. Rather than being negative or even neutral, Carter’s administration displayed positive rhetoric regarding the different ideologies of the U.S. and China. My second hypothesis was that public statements would have more ideologically charged statements than private statements. The evidence also supports this hypothesis. Statements pertaining to ideology—both negative for President Johnson and positive for President Carter—played a substantial role within their public statements; however, there is a paucity of ideological language on private statements. Instead, the majority of the language focused on the strategic and power relations between the United States and China. As a result, the realist argument appears to hold sway given the available evidence surrounding these two presidencies.

**Alternative Explanation**

Although the evidence appears to support my two hypotheses, there are also alternative explanations and variables that could influence the findings. The first would be the influence of the president himself and whether
he had diverging views or perceptions from his advisors. The majority of private statements within the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series are not from the President himself, but instead focus on different key figures within the Executive Branch of the United States Government. They are primarily conversations between key officials, such as the national security advisor and the secretary of state, and between the State Department and overseas ambassadors. By arguing that the views of these key officials are indicative of the views of the presidential administration, I hold the unitary actor assumption, which treats states as a single entity. Therefore, the views of these key actors would thus be the same as the president. However, as with all assumptions, it may not be realistic. One avenue for future research on this topic would be to explore the perceptions of Presidents Johnson and Carter themselves. This research can be conducted either through diary analysis or through unprepared statements with reporters.

A second alternative explanation would be the underlying nature of the independent variable in my research, which is the perception of China as either a friend or an enemy. Throughout this analysis, I took as given that during the Johnson administration the administration viewed China as an enemy. I based this conceptualization on the fact that the U.S. was currently engaged in the Vietnam War and the Chinese were assisting the other side. However, a key limitation to the argument that ideology does not have a noticeable impact on foreign policy is how exactly these perceptions of China as a friend or enemy came into being. One alternative explanation could be that the U.S. engaged in Vietnam for ideological reasons and the Chinese engaged in it for ideological reasons as well, and the U.S. officials formulating foreign policy were taking these ideologies as given and then formulating responses based on them. An alternative explanation would be that, in overt ways, the U.S. foreign policy makers did not take into consideration ideology, but in psychological, cultural, and societal ways they were shaped by the ideology of their time. Although the exceptionally few instances of foreign policymakers taking into consideration ideology when formulating policy argues against this theory, further research on the topic would be necessary to elucidate the influence of underlying societal and cultural perceptions on influencing foreign policy makers. Possible research could compare U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War in what is perceived as a very ideologically charged time period with a similar time period lacking the ideological language. If the realist argument is correct, the foreign policies should be exactly the same. If ideology does have an influence, then the foreign policies would differ.
Conclusion

Relations between the United States and China took a variety of different forms in the 20th century. From ally in World War II to enemy at the start of the Cold War and then back to friend at the end of the Cold War, a thorough analysis of Sino-American relations would be a tall order; however, my research on two select historical events from this time period suggests that the foreign policymakers prioritized strategy over ideology. By analyzing both the public and private rhetoric of the Johnson and Carter administrations, I tested two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that negative government rhetoric will be more pronounced when the U.S. viewed China as an enemy rather than as a friend. The presence of negative ideological rhetoric when viewed as an enemy and positive ideological rhetoric when viewed as a friend supports this hypothesis. The second hypothesis is that public statements will have more ideologically charged statements than private statements. Given the focus of the private statements on analyzing the technical and geopolitical implications of China and the focus on public statements for gaining support for U.S. foreign policy, the evidence supports this hypothesis as well. While the Cold War ideological divide between communism and capitalism appeared to fade out with the decline of the Soviet Union, a thorough understanding of the influence of ideology on foreign relations formulation and perceptions of foreign relations formulations, and the divide between the two, remains important to understand. This is because the ideological influences on foreign policy may still exist, but in less overt forms. The reality of present-day Sino-American relations is that China remains a communist power. Although numerous scholars and foreign policy analysts differ in how communist China actually is, understanding how ideology and perceptions of that ideology influence foreign policy is important for contemporary understanding of Sino-American relations.
Works Cited


“SOLIDARITY OF ‘THE COLONIZED’”: A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF SINN FÉIN’S CONNECTION TO PALESTINE

Celia Lohr

Abstract

Ireland and Palestine share histories of colonialism, ethno-nationalist conflict, and resistance characterized as “terrorism.” While Ireland has reached an official status of “peace,” the de-legitimization of its struggle for independence perpetuates cycles of conflict in the region and reveals lasting difficulties with legitimacy between Ireland and Britain. Through discourse analysis, I examine how the Sinn Féin party reaffirms the Irish struggle for independence through solidarity with Palestine. Specifically, I analyze how Sinn Féin constructs moral and immoral identities, de-legitimizes state violence, and acquires agency through linguistic devices. This research interrogates colonialism as a macro social structure and examines the social practice of solidarity among colonized peoples.

Introduction

Ireland and Palestine share histories of colonialism, ethno-nationalist conflict, and resistance characterized as “terrorism.” While Ireland has reached an official status of “peace,” the de-legitimization of its struggle for independence perpetuates cycles of conflict in the region and reveals lasting difficulties with legitimacy between Ireland and Britain.

Over the past decade, the Sinn Féin political party—the remaining representation of the struggle for Irish unity—has regularly expressed solidarity with Palestine. Through discourse analysis, I examine how the Sinn Féin party reaffirms the Irish struggle for independence through solidarity with Palestine. Specifically, I analyze how Sinn Féin constructs moral and immoral identities, de-legitimizes state violence, and acquires agency through linguistic devices.

CElia LOHR is a student of International Studies and Economics. She graduates in May of 2018.
School of International Service (SIS) and College of Arts & Sciences (CAS), American University
Email: cl2362a@student.american.edu

<http://www.edspace.american.edu/clocksandclouds/>
HBP Publishing <http://www.hbp.com/>
This research interrogates colonialism as a macro social structure and examines the social practice of solidarity among colonized peoples. Additionally, this analysis aims to investigate the moral values of identities constructed by Sinn Féin on case-specific and international scale. As outbursts of conflict chip away at the 18-year peace, analyzing Sinn Féin’s speeches and fervent solidarity with Palestine could not be more pertinent.

**Historical Context: The Making of Sinn Féin**

Before analyzing Sinn Féin’s discourse of solidarity with Palestine, it is necessary first to consider the history of Sinn Féin and the Irish struggle for independence, and the dynamics of ethno-nationalism, legitimacy, and violence in the ongoing conflict. The modern conflict over sovereignty in Northern Ireland began in 1916 when Irish nationalists seized the General Post Office in Dublin and declared an independent Irish Republic. British forces crushed the rebellion—known as Easter Rising—and executed all seven signatories of the declaration. The failed rebellion sparked the emergence of the paramilitary Irish Republican Army and its political counterpart, Sinn Féin (Lynn and Melaugh 2016). Following the failed rebellion, the IRA launched a war of independence that partitioned Ireland and left six counties under British rule. A civil war followed between Irish nationalists who accepted the partitioning, and Irish republicans who desired a unified, independent Ireland. Tensions between ethnic Irish Catholics and ethnic English Protestants escalated over the course of the 20th century, and violence peaked during the 1950s through the 1980s during a period known as The Troubles. The IRA pursued their goal of national self-determination while Britain continued its colonial campaign.

During The Troubles, the IRA implemented extensive guerilla techniques including car bombings, strategic targeting of political figures, infrastructure, and British Army institutions, and accessed a variety of weapons ranging from homemade explosives to military-grade assault rifles (PBS 1998). At the same time, British troops enforced systematic discrimination policies, terrorized Irish Catholic neighborhoods by conducting home invasions under the guise of “arms confiscation,” implemented internment, and deployed military weapons on Irish civilians (Doherty and Poole 1997, 523). In addition to police and armed forces, multiple Loyalist Protestant terrorist groups aided British suppression of the Irish struggle for independence. Each party in the conflict asserted their legitimacy in using violence; the British derived their argument from the concept of State authority, while the IRA appealed to their right of self-determination and resistance of colonial occupation.
Despite the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 that officially ended The Troubles, communities in Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, and mainland Britain still experience outbursts of political violence and witness persistent displays of protest (Hill and White, 31-50; Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium 2016a; Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium 2016b). The internationally renowned peace process following the Agreement mandated that Sinn Féin cut all military ties with the IRA in exchange for recognition in a modified political structure in Northern Ireland. But by isolating the political wing from the military and thus condemning violence committed by the IRA, the Good Friday Agreement delegitimized the Irish struggle for independence and aided British suppression of Irish ethno-nationalist sentiment.

Like the IRA, many Palestinians express their ethno-nationalist claims to sovereignty through separatist political and violent movements. The modern Israeli-Palestinian conflict began in 1917 when Britain publicized its design for a Zionist State in the Palestinian territory (Balfour 1917). The subsequent 1947 partition plan led by the United Nations (UN) established Israel as an ethnic Jewish state and triggered the backlash of nearly every Arab state in the region (U.S. Department of State 2016). Israeli seizure, occupation, and settlement of Palestinian territories since 1948 has been met by armed, organized Palestinian insurgency groups like Hamas, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the Palestinian Authority, Fatah, and their affiliated factions, as well as other groups and disorganized violence against Israelis. Israel’s militarized occupation campaign enforces a system of apartheid that oppresses ethnic Palestinian Muslims and crushes opposition through airstrikes, extrajudicial killings, and internment (BBC 2009). Recently, more prominent members of international society have condemned Israel’s violations of international law and human rights, but the state’s powerful Western status allows it to operate with impunity (Hammond 2010).

While the Palestinian struggle for independence is undeniably more complex than the Irish, several notable scholars have analyzed parallels between the two struggles (Brown 2013, 143; Frampton 2004 61; Richmond 2002, 391; Siqueira 2005, 223). Specifically, both states share histories of colonialism, ethno-nationalist conflict, and resistance characterized as “terrorism.” A central feature of this research explores Sinn Féin’s identification of parallels between the two struggles and the resulting solidarity among colonized peoples. However, a gap in literature on similarities between the two conflicts remains, perhaps due to contested definitions of “terrorism” and oversimplified characterizations of the Irish and Palestinian struggles, in
addition to a reluctance to criticize violence committed by Western states in a so-called “post-colonial” world.

**Text Collection and Methodology: Sinn Féin’s Voice for Palestine**

My dataset for this research is comprised of four speeches given by Sinn Féin leadership: two speeches delivered in 2005 and two in 2015. I collected my texts from Sinn Féin’s website archives, intending to capture the official message of the party. Next, to underscore the modernity and relevance of this research, I selected a timeframe for speeches given between January 1st, 2014 and December 31st, 2015. I used the website search function and entered my key terms “Palestine” [and] “Palestinian” with these dates selected. My first search delivered 125 archived results, from which I selected two speeches at random to analyze. Next, to establish continuity in Sinn Féin’s discourse of solidarity towards Palestine, I replicated my text collection process with speeches given between January 1st, 2004 and December 31st, 2005. By using two pairs of speeches separated by a decade, I insulated my dataset from chances of outliers.

The tools of critical discourse analysis I employ in this research include investigation of assumptions, evaluation and modality, and narrative and identity building. Following Norman Fairclough’s work, I define “assumptions” in text as “missing links’ between explicit propositions, which the hearer/reader either supplies automatically, or works out through a process of inferencing” (Fairclough 1989, 67) In other words, a listener finds meaning in a text by combining both the explicit connections made by the author—in this research, Sinn Féin speakers—and connections they supplement from context. In his more recent work, Fairclough explains assumptions as “a background of what is ‘unsaid,’ [in a text] but taken as given” (Fairclough 2003, 40). Any text contains assumptions made by the speaker, and the meanings he anticipates his audience will attribute to his words and phrases. This dual process of assumptions and meaning-making between speaker and audience directly informs the direction of a discourse (Ibid, 153). That is, assumptions within a text reveal underlying ideologies that influence the speaker and audience.

I continue my analysis by assessing evaluation and modality within Sinn Féin’s speeches. According to Fairclough, evaluations in a text “are statements about desirability and undesirability, what is good and what is bad” (Ibid, 172). Most often, value in a text presents as inexplicit, or assumed (Ibid). Analysis of evaluative statements in a text may expose the ideology informing the speaker’s values and how the speaker understands his identity.
Like evaluation, modality inherently discloses ideology and identity within a text. Modality functions in two ways, epistemic and deontic—“what is true and what is necessary” (Ibid) Speakers express their modality commitments on what Fairclough calls a “scale of intensity” (Ibid, 172) Most importantly, a speaker’s modality decisions influence how they understand reality and obligation and seek to communicate these concepts. To further my analysis of Sinn Féin’s discourse of solidarity with Palestine, I will examine the identities Sinn Féin constructs through evaluation and modality, and continue to investigate embedded ideologies.

Finally, following the works of Fairclough and James Paul Gee, I explore narrative and identity constructing devices in Sinn Féin’s speeches. Narrative and identity interact within texts to help a speaker achieve a certain goal. The narrative of any text relies on the epistemic modality commitments of the speaker and the temporal nature of human experience (Ibid, 138). In short, people communicate through stories; discourse analysts call the “storyline” of a text its “narrative.” The identity of the speaker in a text informs the perspective of the narrative, and by extension influences the truth and value systems embedded in the text. When representing social events, speakers often manipulate levels of abstraction in their narrative to accomplish a rhetorical goal, such as emphasizing a specific detail that unites an audience while generalizing another that might cause disagreement (Fairclough 2012, 9). Speakers also use language “to build different identities for themselves [... and] for other people” (Gee 2011, 110). These strategies often blend together, as speakers define one identity in relation to “other people, social groups, cultures, or institutions” (Ibid, 114). Varying types of grammatical devices assist narrative and identity construction within texts. These concepts provide a crucial tool to analyze Sinn Féin’s conceptualization of identities and their consequences.

After explaining my tools of discourse analysis, I now discuss two fundamental themes in my research: legitimate use of violence and agency. The question of legitimate use of violence manifests in the blurred distinction between a freedom fighter and a terrorist, in the politicized definitions of terrorism, and in the struggle for sovereignty between historically powerful colonizers and their counterpart colonies seeking self-determination. Max Weber in 1918 argued that only the State exercises a legitimate right to use violence; this monopoly on violence now serves as a core tenet of modern Western statehood (Weber 1918, 1). Convenient for colonial powers, this clear-cut and widely accepted delegation of legitimacy affords them the right to suppress any interior threats to state power. However, the UN Charter of
1945 re-introduced the concept of legitimacy and shook Weber’s foundation for state authority. Article II of the Charter—respecting a peoples’ right to self-determination—provides potential political legitimacy to insurgent groups representing a collective cause of an ethno-nationalist group within a country (United Nations 1945, 1). In context, the right to pursue self-determination followed on the heels of WWII and massive de-colonization efforts, and set an international precedent that challenged Western assumptions about legitimate use of violence and sovereignty. As the last political connection to the IRA, Sinn Féin’s discourses on legitimacy and violence offer insight into the value systems of one of the most long-standing insurgent powers in history.

My second term, agency, guides my evaluation of Sinn Féin’s discourse for evidence of social action. For this research, I follow Ahearn’s provisional definition of agency as “the socioculturally mediated capacity to act” (2001, 112). According to Ahearn’s understanding, agency appears in language practices, but becomes restrained by sociocultural contexts. Agency as a concept remains indefinite, but many linguistic theorists agree that agency contains elements of resistance, complicity, and action (Ibid, 112). In the following Sinn Féin speeches, the speakers demonstrate agency through linguistic choices that reaffirm the Irish struggle and solidify their dichotomized worldview of colonizer states and colonized peoples. Throughout my analysis, both agency and legitimacy serve as fluid concepts in constant negotiation between actors and temporal and spacial context.

**Text Analysis**

My text analysis consists of three subsections: Sinn Féin’s constructions of moral identities and narratives; the process of delegitimizing state violence; and, acquisition of agency through linguistic devices.

*Identities and Morality: “Colonizers” and “Colonized”*

Through evaluative grammatical choices and temporal emphasis in narrative, Sinn Féin constructs a collective Irish nationalist identity inseparable from its connection to the IRA and the struggle for independence. Through humanizing and dehumanizing noun choice, family metaphor, and utilization of the collective first-person possessive marker “our,” Sinn Féin unifies and moralizes ethno-nationalist Irish identity while it dehumanizes the British.

The following Table 1 displays nouns used by Sinn Féin in reference to the Irish and the British:
Table 1: Nouns Used by Sinn Féin to describe Ireland and the Irish, Britain and the British

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ireland/Irish</th>
<th>Britain/British</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irish parliamentarians</td>
<td>British Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our dead and wounded</td>
<td>British Paratroopers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family members</td>
<td>British Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our friends and neighbors</td>
<td>British soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The thirteen men murdered</td>
<td>British soldiers, unionists, or RUC personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loved ones</td>
<td>Our oppressors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People from Ireland</td>
<td>British governments and its agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[names of victims]</td>
<td>British Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td>law makers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>law breakers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When referring to the Irish, Sinn Féin repeats humanizing nouns—“family members, friends and neighbours, loved ones”—while, in direct contrast, references British people only with descriptive nouns that omit a human element. “Family members” humanizes the Irish by referencing the unit of social life—the family—and the word “member” which ascribes humanity to a person as part of a whole. Moreover, “friends and neighbors” are human nouns that are dense with personalized sentiment and connect to each listener, who also has “friends and neighbors.” These choices of humanizing nouns indicate Sinn Féin’s positive valuation of the Irish identity.

Juxtaposed to the humanized Irish, Sinn Féin’s portrayal of the British includes de-personalized, descriptive, and militarized nouns. To Sinn Féin, the British are “paratroopers, soldiers, army.” These Sinn Féin speakers never once refers to the British as “people.” This vocabulary reveals Sinn Féin’s perception of the British, not as people, but as militaristic aggressors. Furthermore, the dehumanizing nouns used by Sinn Féin mark the British as opposites—and antagonists—of the moral “family, friends, neighbours” identity of the Irish, and instead identify them with low value. By simultaneously humanizing the Irish and dehumanizing the British through noun choice, Sinn Féin portrays the Irish as a unified and moral front against the immoral British.

Sinn Féin continues to demarcate the Irish identity through the use of family metaphor. By referencing multiple nouns associated with family and
adding possessive markers like “our,” Sinn Féin extends its political identity to encompass all Irish people as part of a national Irish family. “Family” in this sense alludes to bonds of fraternity, innocence of women and children, the home—all emphasized by Sinn Féin to reaffirm a single, moral Irish identity threatened by Britain.

In combination with evaluative noun choice and metaphor, Sinn Féin constructs the Irish identity for his audience as inseparable from its struggle for independence through temporal emphasis in narrative. In a speech given on an anniversary of Bloody Sunday, Sinn Féin spokesperson on International Affairs, Aengus Ó Snodaigh, asserted that the consequences of the attack “were so far reaching that the repercussions catapulted us into a spiral of conflict that left few in Ireland untouched [emphasis added].” This text uses several ambiguous grammatical devices that leave space for listeners to fill in assumptions that are individually relevant. Specifically, this sentence format allows each listener to assume meaning in “the repercussions” and the ways in which they went “untouched” by the conflict. By leaving openings for listeners to find personal meaning through assumptions, and therefore prompting them to agree with the speaker, this Sinn Féin text unites listeners with their shared experiences of “repercussions” and reminds them of their shared history.

This emphasis on the past in Sinn Féin’s narrative of the Irish struggle and Irish identity appears again when Ó Snodaigh rhetorically asks:

1. Does he think that we cannot remember when British Ministers intervened to release?

2. British soldiers convicted of murder here in the North?

Again, the speaker’s narrative focuses on the collective memory and experience of the Irish people as victims of British oppression. The phrasing of the question—“Does he think that we cannot remember”—implies intellectual insult to the Irish that this text expects its Irish listeners to react to. The text pits the British “he” versus the Irish “we,” and adds value and obligation to remembering the conflict. By emphasizing the Irish struggle in its temporal narrative, Sinn Féin reminds listeners of shared oppression, strengthens ties among them, and solidifies the Irish identity as connected to collective Irish suffering at the hands of the British.

I have so far established that Sinn Féin’s linguistic choices fuse Irish nationalist identity with positive evaluative morality and the struggle for independence. These elements of Sinn Féin’s discourse allow the extension
of moral identity to be associated with all struggles for independence. In other words, Sinn Féin connects morality with struggle against an oppressive colonizer state. This perspective, informed by the experience of the IRA and Irish history, mandates a dichotomy in international order of “colonized” peoples and “colonizer” states with respective moral and immoral valuations. By applying its evaluation of identity to an international context, Sinn Féin obligates itself to express solidarity with Palestine, a fellow “colonized” people.

Below, Table 2 presents linguistic parallels that Sinn Féin constructs regarding the British-Irish and the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts:

**Table 2: Nouns Used by Sinn Féin to describe the Irish, Palestinians, British, and Israelis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ireland/ Irish</th>
<th>Palestine/ Palestinian</th>
<th>Britain/ British</th>
<th>Israel/ Israeli</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Irish parliamentarians</td>
<td>the Palestinians</td>
<td>British Government</td>
<td>Israeli Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>our dead and wounded</td>
<td>Palestine and its people</td>
<td>British Paratroopers</td>
<td>an aggressive heavily militarized state</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>family members</td>
<td>a Palestinian family</td>
<td>British Army</td>
<td>aggressive armed checkpoints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>our friends and neighbours</td>
<td>Palestinian civilians</td>
<td>British soldiers</td>
<td>hilltop forts and military spy posts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the thirteen men murdered</td>
<td>Palestinian men, women and children</td>
<td>British soldiers, unionists, or RUC personnel</td>
<td>the occupiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>loved ones</td>
<td>Palestinian youths</td>
<td>our oppressors</td>
<td>the occupying power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People from Ireland</td>
<td>the Palestinian people</td>
<td>British governments and its agencies</td>
<td>Israeli occupation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[names of victims]</td>
<td>the occupied</td>
<td>British Ministers</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republicans</td>
<td></td>
<td>law makers</td>
<td>Israeli iron fist</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sinn Féin employs the same rhetorical strategies to humanize the Palestinian people as it uses to humanize the Irish: utilizing human nouns and alluding to innocence through family metaphor. Conversely, Sinn Féin dehumanizes Israel and emphasizes their militaristic, aggressive, occupational presence. By portraying the Palestinians as moral and human and the Israelis as immoral and oppressive, Sinn Féin accomplishes its larger goal
of moralizing the identity of “the colonized” who legitimately challenge the immoral “colonizer” state force. By establishing this type of precedent, Sinn Féin enables the reaffirmation of its own struggle. Therefore, the roots of Sinn Féin’s solidarity with Palestine stem from desire to reaffirm the morality of the Irish nationalist identity and its own struggle for independence.

De-legitimizing Violence: A Progression of Identity and Morality

Sinn Féin continues its reaffirmation of the Irish struggle for independence through delegitimizing violence committed by Britain and its parallel, Israel. The dehumanizing and devaluing of “colonizer” state identities provides an ideal foundation for Sinn Féin to delegitimize violence committed by the state against the moral “colonized” peoples. This negotiation of legitimacy allows Sinn Féin to challenge the de-legitimization of the IRA in the Good Friday Agreement and reaffirm the struggle for Irish political sovereignty.

Through high epistemic modality, Sinn Féin’s speeches delegitimize British and Israeli violence with verb choice and valuation. The speeches repeat the verbs “murder” and “attack,” to describe the actions of British and Israeli troops on Irish and Palestinian people. Both “murder” and “attack” are offensive verbs, with an implied perpetrator and victim. Instead of using a synonym with flexible epistemic modality like the passive “died” or “lost,” Sinn Féin demonstrates high epistemic modality commitment to the notion of actor-onto-object violence. This modality choice indicates absolute conviction in the illegitimacy of violence committed by colonial states and removes flexibility from interpretation by Sinn Féin or its audience.

Sinn Féin further undermines the legitimacy of the “colonizer” state by applying a non-dominant definition of terrorism to Britain and Israel.

1. “People from Ireland and particularly people from this area know what it is like to live under

2. oppression. We understand the terror, which the Palestinian people live with daily.”

3. “…they killed our friends and neighbours on the same spurious grounds of defending

4. democracy from terrorism.”
First, in lines 1 and 2, Sinn Féin spokesman, Conor Murphy, references the abstract social event of Irish suffering under British rule, and denotes it as “terror.” The use of the word terror defies the Western hegemonic definition that excludes state actors as perpetrators of terrorism. By challenging the accepted norm of “colonizer” states with the word “terror,” Sinn Féin undermines the authority and legitimacy of these states.

Second, in lines 3 and 4, the speaker highlights the irony of a democratic state killing innocent “friends and neighbours” as counterterrorism. This text connects two clauses with “on the same spurious grounds,” thus making the information equal. Referring back to Sinn Féin’s moral identity construction, this first clause in line 1 implies that killing “our friends and neighbors,” is immoral. On the opposite side of the connector, “defending democracy from terrorism,” also becomes immoral. In this text, Sinn Féin challenges the Weber-esque legitimizing of state violence against a people by ascribing it negative, immoral value.

5. I would like to reiterate my call to place Palestine and its people under international protection.

6. The occupiers will not protect the occupied.

Finally, the grammatical devices in lines 5 and 6 display Sinn Féin’s inability to separate its solidarity with Palestine from its own struggle for independence as it seeks to delegitimize violence deployed by “colonizer” states. In line 5, the speaker implores the international community to protect Palestine and its people. But in line 6, the speaker shifts subjects from the Palestinians to “the occupiers” and the object “the occupied.” This immediate change from the specific “Palestinians” to generalized nouns indicates a broader scope for this statement. Sinn Féin again emphasizes the identity dichotomy of the world as “colonizers” and “colonized:” “occupiers” and “occupied.” The shift away from the specific proper noun “Palestinians” toward the general nouns alludes to the Irish conflict with the British, in which the British “occupiers” failed to protect the Irish “occupied.” This relationship constructed by Sinn Féin obligates them to show solidarity with Palestine and reinforces the morality of their identities in contrast with their oppressors.

Agency in Sinn Féin Discourse

Sinn Féin achieves agency through two key examples from the speeches analyzed. Below, I collocate the repetition of the cognitive verbs
In lines 1 and 2, the implied subject of the “teaching” is Britain. The speaker relays the idiom of “teaching a lesson”—punishing or disciplining an unfavorable act, often one of a child. This idiom places Britain in the power position of the punisher, or the teacher of the lesson to the disobedient Irish. However, the speaker’s subsequent repetition of the “teach/learn/know” verb corrupts the meaning of the idiom and redistributes power from the British to the Irish; this progression of lines 1 to 11 demonstrates linguistic agency. Following lines 1 and 2 which establish the idiom, lines 3 through 11 all take the subject pronoun “we.” As the subject, the Sinn Féin speaker commands control of the verb and the predicate of the sentence. Instead of being “taught a lesson,” the speaker repeats that Sinn Féin “learned” truths about the British that undermine their legitimacy. Through these linguistic choices, Sinn Féin resists the punishment of the British “lesson,” and instead corrupts the verb to suit its own agency and put itself in a linguistic position of power.

The second piece of text that displays Sinn Féin’s acquisition of agency occurs in the closing words of Sinn Féin’s speech commemorating an anniversary of Bloody Sunday:

---

1 The complete sentence of line 1 follows: “The intention was to teach the uppity Fenians that failure to obey British law would have dire consequences.”
1. “We know the truth and we will stack our truth against their propaganda and lies until we prevail.”

2. The world also comes to know that there can be no Justice without Truth.”

In this text, I analyze the subjects, verbs, and objects to demonstrate Sinn Féin’s assertion of agency. This final passage exhibits the highest epistemic modality and strongest evaluations of the Irish identity. In line 1, the speaker asserts that “we [the Irish] know the truth.” This pairing of a cognitive verb with the ultimate moral concept of truth underscores Sinn Féin’s steadfast belief in the legitimacy of the Irish identity and struggle for independence. It also reaffirms Sinn Féin’s identity dichotomy between “we” the Irish and “they” the British; however, this passage highlights the consequences of these identities by associating “truth” with Irish identity and “lies” with British identity. This polarization leaves no room for flexible morality. In addition, the speaker uses the metaphor of “stacking” truth against lies “until we prevail,” implying that the Irish aggregate the truth and should prevail in the end. To underscore this point, line 2 asserts that “the world” will eventually take the moral side of the Irish, the “colonized,” in seeking truth, and will therefore recognize the legitimacy of their struggle for independence.

Summary & Conclusions

A note on reflexivity: My background and my position as an undergraduate researcher have affected the topic choice and presentation method of this research. My preconceptions of the Irish and Palestinian struggles led me to examine similarities between their conflicts and then to my discovery and eventual analysis of the four speeches given by Sinn Féin leaders. Several assumptions and beliefs shape the way in which I present my critical discourse analysis: I come from a blue-collar socio-economic background that emphasized collectivism in my value structure; I believe there is intrinsic value in studying resistance politics, and I believe that unconventional conceptualizations of power and violence should be legitimized for the purpose of understanding today’s (and tomorrow’s) global phenomenon.

Through this research, I have suggested that Sinn Féin expresses solidarity with Palestine as a way to reaffirm the Irish struggle for independence and the legitimacy of the Irish nationalist identity. This solidarity stems from Sinn Féin’s construction of the Irish identity as inseparable from the narrative
of past conflict with the British, and as morally superior for resisting an oppressive state. This link of struggle to morality allows Sinn Féin to expand its conception of identities to an international scale; the texts reveal Sinn Féin’s worldview of the dichotomy between “the colonizers” and “the colonized.” After demonstrating this connection of morality and identity, I showed that Sinn Féin de-legitimizes violence committed by “colonizer” states in order to reaffirm the legitimacy of the Irish struggle for independence and the current legitimacy of the struggle for Irish political sovereignty. Lastly, I explained the linguistic agency achieved by Sinn Féin that reveals their lasting struggle for reaffirmation.

Also through this research, I intended to expose conflicting ideologies and their impact on unresolved issues of political legitimacy in Northern Ireland. Britain’s impending exit from the European Union will soon add strain to the delicate peace in Northern Ireland and once again force reevaluation of identity and values. New economic pressures and freedom-of-movement restrictions may further aggravate tensions between the peoples of the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland, and England. Through a lens of colonial occupation, Sinn Féin’s solidarity with Palestine reveals a powerful undercurrent in international affairs that may explain recent revival of conflict in Ireland and the increasing prevalence of successful insurgencies worldwide. And as transnational actors gain traction in international politics, addressing unconventional conceptualizations of power, violence, and identity could not be more critical. I believe this research began a critical process of interrogating discourses of solidarity and understanding social relationships with state power that are shaping our world.
Works Cited


Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium. 2016a. “Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA).” *Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)*. Terrorism Research and Analysis


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Clocks and Clouds is a highly collaborative effort. The journal is published with the support of the School of Public Affairs (SPA) and the School of International Service (SIS), as well as their respective undergraduate councils. Without their continued support, this journal would not be possible. We are incredibly thankful to all SIS and SPA faculty for the countless hours spent mentoring, instructing, and working with students of all strides. In particular, we would like to thank Drs. Kimberly Cowell-Meyers and Lucia Seybert, who selflessly advise and advocate for the journal. We also owe a debt of gratitude to the SPA and SIS Dean’s Offices, including Drs. Shinko, Boesenecker, Jackson, Newman, and Waters.

We are also gracious for the members of the American University community who have provided valuable advice and support for the journal throughout its existence. Dr. Michael Manson and the Honors Office have been instrumental in raising the profile of the journal, and the faculty instructors of SISU 206-306, GOVT 310, and all other research methods courses have ensured a steady pool of outstanding articles and reviewers. Dr. Aaron Boesenecker has worked tireless to create greater opportunities for undergraduate research at American University, and his hard work does not go unnoticed. James Helms provided crucial administrative and logistical support.

Finally, all our staff and student authors, whether published or not, deserve special recognition for the unbounded energy with which they have approached this process. The articles we publish represent only a small portion of the excellent research conducted by American University students. In the years to come, we hope the tremendous response the journal has received thus far continues to validate our mission and push us forward.
Clocks and Clouds is an American University undergraduate research journal that publishes articles on the cutting edge of political science, international studies, and public policy. The journal is meant to add a voice to the intellectual dialogue both within the American University community and in broader academia. Our name comes from the work of philosopher Karl Popper, where clouds are a metaphor for the disorderly and irregular in social science while clocks represent the predictable and rational. By providing a venue for top undergraduate research, Clocks and Clouds aims to find the clocks amidst the clouds.

The journal is organized as an independent student-run joint venture between the School of Public Affairs, the School of International Service, the School of Public Affairs Undergraduate Council, and the School of International Service Undergraduate Council. American University undergraduates of any major may submit work for publication and will have their work assessed through a double-blind peer review and revision process. Clocks and Clouds publishes one issue per semester in print and electronic formats and appoints staff and editorial reviewers for semester terms.

For more information, or to learn about participating in the journal as an author, staff member, or editorial reviewer, contact us at clocksandcloudsau@gmail.com, or visit https://edspace.american.edu/clocksandclouds/.