All clouds are clocks—even the most cloudy of clouds.

-Karl Popper
Bronte Kuehnis
How do Anti-Immigrant Movements Develop?: Wage Competition and Relative Poverty

Grace Magness
A Social Network Analysis of Religious Freedom and Interdependence

Lucas Piedmonte
The Supreme Court Changed My Mind: How Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) Influences Public Attitudes on Same-Sex Couple Adoptions

Sarah Trautwein
How Merkel's Wilkammenskultur Welcomed the AfD into the Bundestag: A Comparative Case Study on Refugee Crises in Germany

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“Autonomy” for the Cordillera: Historically Tracing Ascribed Pan-Ethnic Identity and Failed Autonomous Movements
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INTRODUCTION

Over the last eleven years, the journal has grown and changed immensely, and it has been our honor to be a part of its continued legacy. This year, we have been challenged with the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. We thank every member of staff and authors who remained committed to the journal. The journal’s ongoing mission is to provide an outlet for premiere undergraduate research in political science and international relations, and to connect students, faculty, and administrators across our university. This year has been no different. As always, we are impressed by the quality of research that American University students submitted to the journal, and we were faced with difficult decisions with respect to publication.

This year, we are proud to highlight five pieces of stellar undergraduate research, representing diverse methodologies and topics. Bronte Kuehnis explores the development of anti-immigrant groups, with a focus on factors such as socioeconomic status and wage competition. Christian Von Rotz examines the Cordillerans’ peoples attempts for autonomy in the Philippines. Grace Magness utilizes social network analysis to study the relationship between religious freedom and economic interdependence. Lucas Piedmonte uses American National Election Survey results from 2012 and 2016 to investigate whether the Supreme Court’s 2015 Obergefell v. Hodges decision to legalize same-sex marriage impacted public attitudes same-sex couple adoptions. Lastly, Sarah Trautwein looks at changes in German attitudes towards refugees by analyzing two case studies - the Syrian refugee crisis from 2013 to 2017 and the Yugoslav refugee crisis from 1991 to 1995. The diversity of perspectives, topics, and methodologies in the journal you now hold is a testament to the thriving undergraduate research environment at American University. We are immensely grateful to the administrators and faculty in the School of Public Affairs and the School of International Service who have made research such a strong presence and valuable tool for learning on our campus. Clocks and Clouds is based on the premise that undergraduate students have ideas that matter. Join us in reading and listening to what these students have to say.

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HOW DO ANTI-IMMIGRANT MOVEMENTS DEVELOP?: WAGE COMPETITION AND RELATIVE POVERTY

Bronte Kuehnis

Abstract

Negative depictions of immigrants are generally false, but significant portions of the public still accept them as true. By generating anti-immigrant sentiment through nativist policy, the Trump Administration and its followers participated in an anti-immigrant movement. To determine the primary cause of anti-immigrant movements, the following study tests the hypothesis: relative poverty among U.S.-born residents causes anti-immigrant sentiment. This hypothesis is based on a wage competition theory and relies on economic threat perceptions. The hypothesis is tested with data collected from the 2016 American National Election Studies. The data consists of survey responses identifying both financial standing and nativism and was analyzed using the R program on a regression model. The results of the study indicate that there is no significant relationship between individual socioeconomic status and anti-immigrant prejudice. However, the findings do suggest a relationship between party affiliation and nativism and encourages further research on the effects of political ideology, presence of a far-right, and intergroup relations on increased xenophobia. Further research to expand on these findings could more clearly explain anti-immigrant sentiment and overcome the stigmatization of immigrant communities utilized to accumulate support for strict immigration policy.

Keywords: anti-immigrant sentiment; wage competition; labor competition; intergroup contact; nativism; relative poverty.
Introduction

Expressions of anti-immigrant attitudes have manifested in the United States to introduce several policies rooted in xenophobia over the past decade (Butz & Kehrberg, 2019). The post-Obama era developed into an anti-immigrant movement under the Trump Administration. This new era reflected a long history of exclusionary policies towards non-white Americans that have been written and rewritten for generations. It did not, however, adhere to the hope for immigration reform the Obama Administration provided with programs such as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). How did America derail from a path towards progressive reform and move towards a strict exclusionary approach to immigration? Since 2009, the cases of xenophobic and racist hate crimes reported by the police were in decline and began to rise dramatically between 2015 and 2016 to reach the highest number of reported cases in 2018 (ODIHR).

The rise in hate crimes and the acceptance of xenophobic policies indicate a greater manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment among Americans. Several threatening perceptions of immigrants contribute to the spread of anti-immigrant movements, particularly those which portray immigrants as criminals, harmful to the American labor force, a burden on the taxpayer, exhaustive of welfare services, and generally harmful to an Anglo-centric American identity. These stereotypes have developed an anti-immigrant rhetoric but fail to reflect many trends in U.S. immigration. Immigrants start businesses at significantly higher rates than U.S.-born residents, generating about 1.5 million jobs each year, and tend to compete for different kinds of jobs than citizen-born Americans (Bahar, 2018). The presence of undocumented immigrants is also a prominent topic among many conservative politicians, who often use xenophobic rhetoric to elevate their political platform by generalizing a diverse body of immigrants.

Despite the emphasis on illegal immigration present in anti-immigrant campaigns, the number of unauthorized immigrants residing in the United States has been declining to the lowest levels observed in over a decade (Passel & Cohn, 2018). The immigrant workforce has a firm position in the U.S. economy, and many companies are able to target their products towards consumer populations of immigrants to generate greater profit. Immigrant presence is fundamental to American society and the consequences of damaging this population through strict immigration policy and the spread of xenophobia are economically devastating. A 2011 Alabama law drew attention

1. Xenophobia and Racism were consistently the leading causes of all reported hate crimes in the U.S. (between 60-65 percent) from 2009-2018.
Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign and election exacerbated pre-existing platforms of xenophobia and reinforced stereotypes of immigrant communities to effectively execute political power. This administration prioritized restrictive immigration policies such as the popularized border wall at the U.S.-Mexico border. Executive Order 13768, known as one of Trump’s “Muslim Bans”, strengthened the false association between immigration and a national increase in crime and terrorism. By asserting that “deteriorating conditions in certain countries due to war, strife, disaster, and civil unrest increase the likelihood that terrorists will... enter the United States” the administration was able to evade the responsibility of refugee resettlement and adhere to the policy positions favored by its right-wing base (EO 13768, 2017). In other words, Trump was able to execute his policy agenda by characterizing refugees and immigrants of color as terrorists. The Trump Administration also attempted to (within approximately one month) dismantle medical deferred action, threatening the lives of immigrants who had legally been granted permission to reside within the United States. Across the San Francisco Bay Area, for example, there was public outcry for Isabel Bueso whose life was jeopardized by this policy, resulting in several legislative actions and political demonstrations that were successful in evading deportation.

The refusal of the Trump Administration to admit acceptable quantities of immigrants safety into the United States was detrimental to security, economic priorities, and an equitable and just American society. Migrants, including refugees, are facing ongoing displacements which disrupt not only their lives, but also the steady flow of migration patterns which predict economic stability and international security. The global migration crisis is worsening and its economic, political, and social consequences are projected to be exacerbated as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. During the pandemic immigrant unemployment rose at a higher rate than non-immigrants, immigrants were more than twice as likely to be infected by COVID-19 and were more highly exposed as essential workers, and by the end of 2020 the distribution of visas and permits declined by approximately seventy-two percent (OECD, 2020).

Right-wing politicians have targeted immigrants with overtly nativist and racist remarks. In one of Trump’s most famous campaign speeches he generalizes immigrants (specifically from Central America) as criminals as a human rights emergency for forbidding immigrant children from attending school, undocumented immigrants from working or being seen by a doctor, and eliciting law enforcement to profile immigrants and people of color. To immediate effect, many immigrants fled the state and it observed...
rapists, and drug traffickers. The conservative party was able to employ its political agenda on immigration through Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign by endorsing a series of collective actions. This movement connected immigrants to crime and terrorism, a decline in wages and job security of non-immigrant workers, and negative consequences resulting from open borders and deferred action. Finley & Esposito (2019) describe this collective action as being indicative of either a social movement or the exertion of positions of power (of wealthy white Americans) to maintain unequal status. The claims being made to support negative depictions of immigrants are more often untrue or misleading, and yet many Americans still endorse the rhetoric and accept such claims as factual. In this study I will seek to answer why individuals support anti-immigrant rhetoric and policies, and specifically how this applies to the spread of anti-immigrant sentiment and movements towards restrictive or exclusionary immigration policy in the United States. As the basis of this study, I propose a Work Competition Theory, which argues that financial insecurity combined with individual socioeconomic circumstances are significant in determining attitudes towards immigrants. I propose that the presence of relative poverty measured by individual financial insecurity, including low-bracket income and a perceived detrimental financial situation, will indicate a preference towards anti-immigrant rhetoric and policy. The study will account for varying economic class status and surveyed responses across a time-series panel will indicate whether nativism is present among the observed respondents. The next sections will discuss previous literature which has examined how conditions that impact support for anti-immigrant policy such as economic pressure, socioeconomic class, job insecurity, and intergroup conceptualization may directly impact attitudes towards immigrants. This will structure the definitions of the variables used in the study and propose wage competition to theorize that financial insecurity measured through relative poverty is indicative of anti-immigrant sentiment.

**Nativism**

Nativism can be observed as antipathy towards any group considered foreign to one’s own country and is rooted in the development of anti-immigrant sentiment. It is often expressed as protecting those born within a state against any given group perceived as foreign, and favors representing the former as residents over the latter. Passed in 1994, California’s Proposition 187 was introduced with the intent to deprive undocumented immigrants from basic public services as education, medical care, and welfare (Hovey,
of a movement driven by the othering of immigrants from social institutions. The scapegoating of immigrants for problems faced in society (i.e. economic failures and crime) is perpetuated on the basis of nativism. Introducing policy that limits the freedoms and rights of immigrants is a tactic for policymakers to gain trust from the public that their policies will succeed by relying on the foundation of nativism that has existed for several generations. Such policy is able to effectively target and slander different races, ethnic groups, or regions of origin.

Prop 187 additionally encouraged deportation by requiring public employees such as law enforcement and school teachers to report suspected unauthorized immigrants to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. This further exemplifies nativism as a driving force for anti-immigrant sentiment observed in policy as it not only excludes groups perceived as foreign from public institutions but also aims to forcibly remove those groups from the society itself. It has been observed that when predicting attitudes towards Prop 187 and undocumented immigrants, concern for economic exploitation and ubiquitous racial prejudice against Hispanics (as the group predominantly targeted by Prop 187) indicate support for anti-immigrant rhetoric and legislation (Lee, Ottati, & Hussain, 2001). Further examining the impact of perceived economic competition may be necessary to determine the influence of nativism on exclusionary immigration policy.

Arizona Senate Bill 1070 is infamous for its mandate of warrantless arrests by law enforcement of any person suspected to be an undocumented immigrant and punishment of any person for aiding an undocumented immigrant. The policy effectively encouraged police to profile people of color and aimed to exploit immigrants within the criminal justice system. The bill was indicative of a nativist movement in Arizona. Diaz, Saenz, & Kwan (2011) found that during the same period, U.S.-born residents experienced a growth in anti-immigrant prejudice that correlated with an increase in unemployment and a decrease in the GDP growth rate. Without evidence actually linking immigrant presence to economic failure, the assumption is still strong because large quantities of non-immigrant residents accept it as damaging to a population they consider American. Like Prop 187, SB 1070 provides an example of how nativist policy has historically served to scapegoat immigrants as a means to improve public opinion.

Despite nativism being evidently present in exclusionary policy, it alone may not explain the in-depth associations between social conditions and anti-immigrant sentiment. The common xenophobic claim linking immigrants to
economic failures or lack of job prospects for non-immigrants is supported by nativism and its mobilization of exclusionary policy. Nativism is expressed through policies that artificially validate the state’s responsibility to protect its citizens by harming, excluding, or restricting immigrants in society. Such policies are politized by exercising economic and labor threats which target the immigrant population as perpetrators. Therefore, I conclude that nativism is interrelated to theories of economic competition and must be identified to understand the association between relative poverty and anti-immigrant sentiment.

**Economic Competition**

Borjas (1987) applied labor market competition theory to relations between immigrant and non-immigrant workers, finding that an increase in the immigrant labor force does not significantly reduce U.S.-born earnings, but does reduce immigrant wages. Labor market competition indicates that U.S.-born workers hold preferences for strict immigration policy for immigrants with similar skills. Immigrants are generally not considered labor-market substitutes because the introduction of immigrants does not substantially reduce the wages or employment opportunities of non-immigrant laborers (Borjas, 1987, 1994). However, less-skilled workers are still significantly more likely to prefer restricting immigration in the United States regardless of the levels of immigrants in their community (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001). This finding is relevant to this study when determining if contact with immigrants is an intervening variable regardless of financial standing. Alternatively, pro-immigrant perceptions are significantly more common among Americans who are more highly educated, hold white-collar jobs, live abroad, and reject ethnocentrism than Americans without these cosmopolitan qualities (Haubert & Fussell, 2006). The multifaceted qualities of one’s identity or socioeconomic status may predict that labor market demands and competition alone do not cause anti-immigrant sentiment.

Wallace & Figueroa (2012) found that an assumed economic threat shapes public opinion towards immigrants. This observation is significant to this study given the prediction that low wages correlates to relative poverty and makes individuals more susceptible to accept the claim that immigrants are economically threatening. The same characteristics may determine individual immigration policy preferences. Other conditions such as economic stagnation, weak labor unions, and low minimum wage have been found to predict anti-immigrant sentiment among Americans who consider immigrants as threatening to job growth (Wallace & Figueroa, 2012). It may be conditional
for individuals to adopt economic threat perception to display anti-immigrant sentiment. This supports labor and wage competition theories which suggest that the perceived economic competition of the outgroup in relation to immigrants influences the development of anti-immigrant movements. These movements are then able to mobilize political power into nativist policy and xenophobia, which often results in direct attacks against immigrants and people of color.

Notably, immigration generates improvements to the economy’s productive capacity and does not have a significant impact on job growth for non-immigrant workers (Alesina, Harnoss, & Rapoport, 2016). U.S.-born workers do not compete with immigrant workers in the same capacity they do with other U.S.-born workers because immigrants tend to dominate specific sectors that non-immigrants are unable to fill. Regardless, the understanding of competition between immigrants and non-immigrants and the assumption that immigration reduces job growth is strong enough to sway public opinion. Ybarra, Sanchez, & Sanchez (2016) found that negative economic events, including the Great Recession of 2007-2009, propagate support for restrictive immigration policy. The suggestion that a significant population of non-immigrants have the tendency to respond to financial stress by blaming immigrants for economic strains is supported by nativism in public policy.

Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong (2010) propose an instrumental model of group conflict based on perceived competition of resources in relation to rising negative attitudes towards immigrants. Finding that desire for unequal distribution of resources (social dominance) does correlate to anti-immigrant sentiment and perceived competition resulting from immigration, it is assumed that economic resources on some level relate to opinions towards immigrants and immigration (Esses et al., 2010, p. 702-718). While such research measures the value placed on resource competition as perceived by the ingroup, it does not consider the potential effect of individual socioeconomic status or intergroup relations. Immigration does not significantly reduce the job prospects of non-immigrant workers in high-income countries such as the United States, so it is critical to frame the study around the conceptualization of economic competition rather than the actual economic outcomes of immigration. Given that previous scholarship establishes a relationship between economic conditions and xenophobia, and nativist policies are argued for on the basis of resource competition, I propose a wage competition theory as the model for this study.

There is extensive literature to address competition between U.S.-born workers and immigrants within a given labor force. However, few
studies suggest competition for higher wages, especially among low-skilled workers, in combination with the assumption that a greater influx of immigration disadvantages the wages of non-immigrant workers, as a basis for the development of anti-immigrant sentiment. Thus, I propose that wage competition is potentially a stronger determinant of xenophobia than labor market competition based on differences in job fulfillment between U.S.-born residents and immigrants as well as the outcome of lower wages among employed immigrants. However, building upon the framework of group conflict theories and its assumption that intergroup relations can predict anti-immigrant attitudes, the following study will control for exposure to immigrants.

**Intergroup Contact Theory**

Alternatively, Blumer’s (1958) fundamental racial group conflict research theorized that self-identification of race in addition to one group’s relations to another contributes to racial prejudice on a larger scale. Group threat theory expands to identify conflict over positions of power and resources as a determinant of a dominant racial group’s attitudes towards any given outgroup. Dominant groups tend to respond to uncertainty of outgroups with dehumanizing rhetoric which drives stigmatization, ethnocentrism, and xenophobic policy (Kusche & Barker, 2019). Ideology which encourages intergroup competition of resources, both economic and symbolic (such as status or religion), is found to produce negative attitudes towards immigrants and nativist rhetoric interpreted through economic competition may be recognized with a general assumption of a growth in the immigrant demographic (Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2010). While prior literature has found that an increase in immigration can predict anti-immigrant sentiment, intergroup contact with larger communities of immigrants can also reduce nativism (Schlueter & Scheepers, 2010). With this background in mind, the understanding of a general increase of immigration may increase anti-immigrant attitudes while interpersonal exposure to immigrants could reduce it. Expanding upon Blumer’s racial contact theory, this study will additionally control for race as a potential independent variable on anti-immigrant sentiment.

Intergroup contact theory suggests that contact with a broad range of outgroup members reduces intergroup prejudice (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). These findings may infer that a lack of exposure to or knowledge of immigrant groups leads to anti-immigrant sentiment among the ingroup of U.S.-born residents by allowing threat perceptions of immigration to develop.
However, other studies have found that intergroup contact between different ethnic groups under certain conditions can result in exclusionary attitudes (Hewstone, 2015). The conditions of the intergroup contact are most likely diversifying the causal relationships between prejudice and outgroup contact. Intimate versus non-intimate cross-group contact and the environment of such intergroup relations can explain a reduction in negative attitudes in some instances (Turner et al., 2007). Assuming that intergroup contact to immigrants has some significant effect on a shift in sentiment, it will be controlled for in this study.

Hopkins (2010) deduced that intergroup contact between immigrants and non-immigrants and the demographical landscape of a given area has little effect on anti-immigrant sentiment. However, a significant change in demographics, such as an influx of immigration, does correlate to an increase in xenophobic attitudes (Hopkins, 2010). Referring to the foundation of nativism in American society and culture, the consequences of immigration perceived by non-immigrants and upheld in policy may explain how migration patterns directly influence anti-immigrant movements. Kiehne & Ayón (2016) also reject intergroup contact theory by concluding a reduction in anti-immigrant sentiment is irrespective of a strong conservative ideology when identifying intimate cross-group relationships between immigrants and non-immigrants, such as friendships. This finding is important when considering exposure to immigrants and political ideology as factors in determining the acceptance of anti-immigrant rhetoric often perpetuated by conservative politicians.

**Theory and Hypothesis**

Wage competition is the theory that lack of wages or desire for increased wages, particularly among low-skilled workers, leads to the perception of intergroup competition with immigrants. The following hypothesis is based on the wage competition theory and addresses the general assumptions of government-issued welfare services and differentiation among earnings. The wage competition theory indicates that socioeconomic status is the primary determinant of individual attitudes towards immigrant communities, and that poverty may fulfill the conditions which produce anti-immigrant sentiment. To explain nativism, wage competition rejects theories of perceived threats to national security or associative political affiliation in an unstable socio-political environment. Economic class status has implications from previous studies to suggest anti-immigrant sentiment at the individual level in accordance with anti-immigrant movements that translate into mass society.
Conservative politicians have gathered public support for anti-immigrant policy in border security, which specifically targets immigrants moving from Central and South America. However, major threats to the United States tend to be centered around state affairs with China and Russia rather than migration and are considered to be economically and diplomatically threatening to U.S. stability (United States Congress & Coats, 2019). Considering that the U.S.-Mexico border wall is one of the most recognized immigration policies of this time, public perceptions on where groups are immigrating from into the United States often do not reflect actual trends. Americans are also widely divided on the urgency of the federal government to address both issues of terrorism and immigration based on political party identification, as interpreted through this study’s data analysis. Political affiliation is likely a persuasive component of nativism, indicating that if an individual already supports a political party or leader, they are more likely to identify with their anti-immigrant rhetoric. While this theory generalizes people’s attitudes, it may not account for individual levels of xenophobia that persist throughout a turbulent political climate. In the study conducted within this paper, political party affiliation must be controlled against socioeconomic status due to the tendency of individuals to align their policy preferences with their party’s position rather than personal political, social, or cultural beliefs.

While political affiliation may have a strong influence on an individual position towards immigration, the hypothesis argues that people develop anti-immigrant attitudes based on their socioeconomic status, specifically in regard to relative poverty. The wage competition theory suggests that competition within industries with high levels of low-paid positions causes U.S.-born workers to develop nativism towards a group of immigrants, potentially with similar job skills. The political economy of labor market competition is a primary indicator of an individual’s preferences towards immigration policy (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001). When American workers are competing for low-paying jobs, they may feel greater pressure to hold onto their position. Workers also develop specific skills that keep them grounded in their field of labor. Thus, a significant link between workers’ skills and sentiment towards immigrants may exist. Lesser paid immigrants are also assumed to be more exhaustive of federal welfare services despite being significantly less likely to benefit from these services, let alone seek them out (Nowrasteh & Orr, 2018). Hypothetically, U.S.-born residents who self-identify as living in relative poverty feel greater pressures to hold onto low-paid positions and are more likely to seek welfare services than wealthier citizens. The wage competition theory presented in this study proposes that this demographic is more
susceptible to develop anti-immigrant attitudes. The hypothesis that is being tested in this study is as follows: relative poverty among U.S.-born residents causes anti-immigrant sentiment.

**Research Design**

There are several intersectional factors that constitute poverty, and different approaches for recognizing it among an individual or household. Consequently, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has determined that there is no international consensus for defining poverty. The federal threshold for poverty across countries is interpreted by income. This relates to notions of absolute inequality, which recognizes poverty through income relative to the costs of basic needs but fails to consider quality of life. The concept of relative poverty was developed to include what are considered societal and cultural necessities (UNESCO). The overlapping clusters of meanings for the word “poverty” consist of factors such as standard of living, basic security, socioeconomic class, limited resources, and a pattern of deprivation (Spicker, 2007). Those who are experiencing poverty also exhibit multidimensional responses in characterizing their own financial insecurity. The responses, however, routinely observe that the consideration of poverty involves the lack of something that has been deemed a necessity for material well-being (Narayan et al., 1999).

For the purposes of this study relative poverty is the independent variable and will be conceptually defined as when any financial constraint prevents the individual from enjoying social or economic freedoms. Operationally, relative poverty will be cross-examined across a series of survey responses which measure financial stability. Relative poverty allows for self-identification, which will be interpreted in the data analysis. Income alone may be a poor measure of poverty provided that one respondent’s income does not indicate their entire household’s wealth, similar to other measures for employment and education. Therefore, an individual with no income or no employment may be considered to be living well above the line of poverty when considering the income contributions of their entire household. Income measures relative to cost of living differences by location could also shift the results. One’s own perception of their socioeconomic class and financial situation may provide a more accurate indication of financial standing in some cases. To consider the various factors which contribute to wealth, poverty is measured by the respondent’s income, highest level of education, job and pay status, social class, and feelings towards one’s financial situation. Throughout American history the rhetoric for illustrating groups as
for propagating racially biased policies to restrict or violate the rights of immigrants (Friedman, 1967). These policies represent peaks of xenophobia and racism that are often considered a phenomenon in the United States. Movements representing high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment have become a philosophy often interpreted as nationalism by the far-right. However, the concepts of nativism and nationalism are very adverse, especially in respect to the United States’ interest to maintain stability in migration practices and immigration policy.

Anti-immigrant sentiment will be identified when a respondent demonstrates they harbor the belief that immigrants generally harm American society. Anti-immigrant sentiment will also be correlated with support for anti-immigration policies to identify if relative poverty has an effect on either. Policy preferences, such as support for a wall on the southern border or preferred admission levels of immigrants, will be utilized in the study to strengthen the identified cause for such preferences. Anti-immigrant sentiment can be detected through survey responses on opinions towards immigrants or immigration. The opinions that observe nativism include American culture is harmed by immigrants and a general negative feeling towards undocumented immigrants. Other measures will include the reinforcement of negative stereotypes of immigrants by the respondent. These stereotypes include immigrants will take away jobs from Americans, immigrants hurt the economy, and immigrants increase the rate of crime.

The data collected and analyzed in this study is accredited to the American National Election Studies (ANES) 2016 Time Series Study. The study was chosen for the data analysis of this paper because it applies to the movement being discussed and has comprehensive data on the variables being implemented. More specifically, ANES surveyed the participants on their positions towards the negative claims of immigrants that have been frequently discussed in this paper and correlate to nativism in policy and anti-immigrant sentiment. There are also several response measures taken on socioeconomic status that will be cross-examined to produce the variable relative poverty within the sample.

Response rate in ANES is calculated as a ratio with the number of interviews expressed as the numerator and the denominator consisting of age-eligible citizens, randomly selected among individuals of sample households who both have and have not been interviewed (“Data Quality”). The response rate of interviewed respondents is determined for presidential election years in three waves: pre-election, midterm, and post-election (“Data Quality”). Validity and bias in measurement are of concern as data is collected. Eliminating the presence of random errors and maximizing the reliability of data analysis can
ensure high validity and prevent bias. For each study ANES trains interviewers with a study guide of question objectives and pre-study training conferences to ensure bias is minimal (“Data Quality”).

The data analysis in this study will be interpreted on a regression model. The dependent variable (anti-immigrant sentiment) and the independent variable (relative poverty) are not interchangeable. Provided that the results of the data should be significantly altered if the variables are reversed, linear regression will provide the most accurate presentation of the relationship. The model will give insight into the consistency of findings with the hypothesis, relative poverty among U.S.-born residents causes anti-immigrant sentiment. If the p-value of the relationship of poverty to sentiment is statistically significant for most or all survey questions analyzed, the conclusion will find the results are consistent with the hypothesis.

Intervening variables will be analyzed against relative poverty for each response. These variables are education, age, race, political affiliation, and exposure to immigrants. If any of the confounding variables eliminates the statistical significance for most of the responses, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The regression model will provide a more detailed analysis to address these confounding variables where applicable.

**Data and Analysis**

The data retrieved from survey responses was analyzed on the R program on a regression model. The responses targeted a low-high indication of anti-immigrant sentiment derived from six survey questions. These questions were introduced to respondents as the following: feeling thermometer: illegal immigrants, to be truly American it is important to have been born in the U.S., America’s culture is generally harmed by immigrants, immigrants increase crime rates in the U.S., how likely is it that immigration will take away jobs, and the country would be better off by getting rid of rotten apples. Each question was then measured on a regression model with various indicators of financial instability, including worry about losing a job in the near future, out of work or laid off in the last six months, had a reduction in work hours or a pay cut, worry about a financial situation, social class, and total income amount. Income, financial situation, and social class were integrated individually and holistically. Income negatively correlated to worry about losing a job, worry about financial situation, and positively correlated to social class, indicating that the measure of relative poverty was achieved through self-identified financial health. Low-income subjects were also more likely to be out of work and have a reduced pay or work hours.
It is worth noting that uncontrolled measures of anti-immigrant sentiment observed a trend of a significantly higher p-value when correlated to questions regarding the respondents perceived level of their financial situation rather than income. Conjoined financial situation, social class, and income also increased the p-value more than income alone and was more significant to the additional measures for poverty. This could be explained by income not being an accurate measure of poverty when considering location differences, or the respondents’ tendency to reflect levels of financial insecurity or identified class that do not align with their household’s income bracket. This supports the use of relative poverty as the independent variable rather than absolute poverty because social circumstances skewing the participants financial standing did affect the integration of poverty on the regression and the results of the study as a whole.

Measures of anti-immigrant sentiment lost any significance to poverty on the regression model when controlled for party ideology and age. This was the case regardless of differences in question wording to emphasize job security versus financial status and income levels. Political ideology as an independent variable was most statistically significant to anti-immigrant sentiment than any other value. This applied to all survey responses measuring attitudes that were included for each participant of the sample. Younger respondents were less likely to harbor anti-immigrant sentiment in most but not all of the responses. Agreeing with the claim that immigrants take jobs away and a general negative feeling for “illegal immigrants” did not observe differences across age. When considering self-determined social class as a measure for poverty, a minor relationship can be observed with anti-immigrant sentiment for most responses while controlling for age, but this significance also disappears when accounting for political ideology.

In most cases, intergroup contact depreciated any relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and relative poverty. This was observed when the presence of zero, one, or two “non-native-born” parents was controlled for. Being an immigrant oneself or having one or two immigrant parents reduced the likelihood of anti-immigrant sentiment. Out of the three indicators, having two immigrant parents reduced anti-immigrant sentiment by the widest margin. Further examination of this finding may support intergroup contact theory and potentially negate other hypotheses that personal exposure to immigrants increases support in nativism.
There was no change in the relationship between poverty and sentiment when controlling for race or education level. The analysis did not indicate that the white population of the sample responded to anti-immigrant sentiment differently than non-white populations, excluding those who responded with exposure to immigrants (one or two immigrant parents). This finding potentially rejects racial group conflict theory. It would require further analysis to determine if certain racial groups are more or less inclined to exhibit anti-immigrant sentiment. The study was limited by the data collection for race as interpreted through ANES. There was no correlation found between anti-immigrant sentiment and any level of education ranging from less than a high school diploma to one or multiple doctoral degrees. This finding rejects some of the assumptions within labor market competition theory.

Policy preferences were tested as dependent on the observed measures of poverty and against all cofounding variables on the regression model. Immigration-related policy questions were measured from the following questions: children brought illegally should be sent back to their home country, the U.S. should build a wall with Mexico, should Syrian refugees be allowed to come to the U.S., what should immigration levels be, and in favor of or opposed to ending birthright citizenship. There was no significant relationship found between preferences in policy and relative poverty or education when accounting for age or party ideology. The only value between poverty and policy preference that was not distorted by age was children brought illegally should be sent back to their home country. However, this did not apply to party ideology, which did remove the statistically significance p-value on poverty to the policy stance on undocumented children.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

There are several significant findings from the results of the study. Firstly, the initial hypothesis, relative poverty among U.S.-born residents causes anti-immigrant sentiment, could not be sustained. There was no direct relationship found between xenophobia and any indicator of socioeconomic status utilized in the questionnaire. This was also true of policy preferences leaning towards an anti-immigrant position in relation to poverty. Instead, the results implied a stronger relationship between political ideology and anti-immigrant sentiment. There were also indications that age and exposure to immigrants influences nativism in most cases of the study. This could lead to further studies on how specific events may influence waves of political tolerance of anti-immigration movements for certain generations, and how residential
proximity to areas with high levels of immigrant communities may deter nativism or influence attitudes towards immigrants.

Indicators of anti-immigrant sentiment were not observed as an effect of any level of education or job status as an independent or intervening variable. This negates some findings in previous literature and supports this study’s prediction that labor competition is likely a generally insufficient model by itself in explaining anti-immigrant movements. However, the results of this study cannot reject the hypothesis that a trend in lower levels and higher levels of income observe more nativism than those who experience moderate wealth. Racial class also did not alter the association between poverty and anti-immigrant sentiment. This is surprising considering the significance of racial group contact theory and its relationship to nativism. While education and race were not observed to influence anti-immigrant sentiment in this study, other intervening variables did affect the association between socioeconomic status and anti-immigrant sentiment. These variables included age, political party affiliation, and exposure to immigrants.

There were significant limitations to the variable exposure to immigrants as measured through the ANES study. The most relevant survey responses indicated if the participant was an immigrant, a first-generation American, or had one or two immigrant parents. This measure could be potentially problematic to the evaluation of intergroup contact as an indicator of attitudes towards immigrants. This measure could have more highly represented ingroup or outgroup perceptions rather than intergroup relations. It would improve the study to better understand the participants’ contact to immigrant communities, such as their residential location or through self-identification. Regardless, respondents with two immigrant parents were less likely to harbor anti-immigrant sentiment or support nativist policies.

Wage competition theory was not suggested from the findings, especially considering questions targeted at financial and job insecurity in relation to poverty and its effect on anti-immigrant sentiment. This does reflect that most U.S.-born residents do not actually experience job competition with immigrants based on the fact that certain groups of immigrants tend to seek out jobs that non-immigrant workers do not. This basis could be irrelevant to anti-immigrant endorsers who use economic competition as reasoning for their political position if these proponents are simply borrowing the rhetoric from the politicians that they endorse. Therefore, political affiliation and acceptance of the far-right (as a driving force in the propagation of xenophobia) likely has a strong effect on anti-immigrant movements and should be relevant to the understanding of economic competition as a determinant to anti-immigrant sentiment.
It is concluded from the results that party affiliation and the political ideology associated with a given party is the most probable cause of expressed anti-immigrant sentiment. It is less likely that the respondents who expressed nativist attitudes chose to identify with a conservative ideology particularly for its anti-immigration platform. Likewise, Americans are not expected to endorse a politician because that politician harbors or expresses anti-immigrant beliefs. This is attributed to the evidence that indicates a voter is more likely to endorse a candidate they like and then subsequently associate themselves with that candidate’s policy preferences (Sinclair, Smith, & Tucker, 2019). The presence of a far-right movement and varied materializations of racism likely have a more fundamental influence on an individual’s susceptibility to develop or exhibit xenophobic beliefs than suggested in the original hypothesis. Subsequent studies should assess how the development of the far-right has produced changes in public attitude and interacts with other variables to construct higher levels of nativism. While considering that Americans systematically do not tend to align their policy and ideological preferences with actual immigration trends, the conclusion of this study encourages further research on how party affiliation, far-right, and subsequent immigrant depictions in culture and media generate anti-immigrant movements.

Economic competition was upheld in the data analysis since those who initially consider immigrants to be threatening to job growth did tend to adopt other anti-immigrant attitudes and support nativist policy. Also, relative poverty was identified with income level as it correlated to self-identified financial health status and socioeconomic class. However, the null hypothesis could not be rejected because relative poverty did not predict anti-immigrant sentiment through rhetoric and policy approval scales without the presence of the intervening variables party affiliation, age, and exposure to immigrants. This suggests that while wage competition could potentially be identified, a combination of financial insecurity and other variables is needed to explain the development of anti-immigrant movements. For further research to expand upon economic conditions and intergroup competition models, I suggest identifying adherence to social class dominance. Without this measure, and perhaps others, it is unlikely that anti-immigrant sentiment will be observed from relative poverty or socioeconomic status alone.

The newly integrated Biden Administration has spread hope for an Immigration Reform Act which would notably create a pathway to citizenship for Dreamers (childhood arrivals) for the first time. Parallel to the Obama Administration, the president has also been criticized for deporting tens of thousands of undocumented immigrants within one month in office.
Further research is needed to determine the intent of the current administration in deportations thus far. It remains to be seen if deportations will reduce over the next four years, how this administration will respond to demands to eliminate problematic entities such as Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and detention centers, and if immigration reform proposals will be successful. Despite the Trump Administration’s failure to permanently eliminate the DACA program, the case Texas v. United States currently threatens the population of current and potential recipients. These trends reflect ongoing alterations in public standing on immigration-related issues. The policies which emerge from this administration will provide more insight into the current socio-political geography of immigrant attitudes.
Works Cited


Kuehnis, How do Anti-Immigrant Movements Develop?: Wage Competition and Relative Poverty


A SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND INTERDEPENDENCE

Grace Magness

Abstract

Within the field of international relations, interdependence represents a complex and increasingly relevant area of study. Despite immense research having been carried out, it is still not fully understood how and why interdependence forms, necessitating further research. This paper seeks to examine the correlation between religious freedom and economic interdependence, using social network analysis (SNA) to visualize the structure of this relationship. SNA allows for a holistic examination of these two concepts, looking at each nation’s level of religious freedom as well as connections with other nations in order to answer the question: What is the connection between restrictions on religious freedom and interdependence among nations? Using data from The World Religion Database, Resource Trade Earth, and Pew Research Center, the results of this study indicate that nations tolerate moderate restrictions on religious freedom and that nations tend to rely economically on other nations who have similar levels of restrictions on religious freedom. Understanding the role of religious freedom in shaping interdependence allows us to recognize how seemingly disparate factors affect the global world.

Key Words: religious freedom, interdependence, globalization, trade, peace, social network analysis

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Introduction

As nations and businesses continue to develop increasingly complex international ties, globalization becomes an important concept to study in order to better understand the factors that influence it. A defining characteristic of globalization is international interdependence, “the idea that the developed and developing countries [are] in a position of mutual economic reliance on one another” (McFarland 2015, 217). Essentially, when countries are interdependent they provide each other with economic benefits which prompts the nations to rely on each other. Interdependence is most often discussed from an economic standpoint, such as how nations’ bilateral and multilateral trade develop and strengthen over time, but underlying whether or not nations are interdependent are a multitude of different factors, some economic, others not.

Factors that potentially play a role in whether or not two countries are dependent on one another include geographic location, GDP, endowment of natural resources, political climate of a nation, and shared national interests, but there are many other potential elements at play. An under researched topic in regard to globalization is the role religion and religious freedom may have in determining whether nations are interdependent. Throughout the world there are many nations in which citizens do not have freedom of religion and of these nations some are major global players; a prominent example being China. This presents an interesting topic for research, looking for the correlation between globalization and religious freedom.

Thus, this research seeks to understand the relationship between religion, specifically religious freedom, and interdependence. The proposed research question is: What is the connection between restrictions on religious freedom and interdependence among nations? It is hypothesized that economic interdependence is negatively correlated with restrictions on religious freedom, meaning that as restrictions rise, levels of interdependence decrease.

First, this paper will examine existing literature on the topic, followed by an outline of data collection and methods, a detailed summary of results, a discussion of the results, and finally a conclusion is drawn. Overall, this paper looks at the key trading partners of nations with varying religious freedom restriction levels, studying whether or not government restrictions on religion have a bearing on economic interdependence.
Literature Review

Existing scholarly literature on religious freedom and international interdependence fails to discuss these two concepts in relation to one another, especially from a social network perspective. The level of religious freedom in a nation is reflective of its respect for human rights, which undoubtedly influences and is influenced by globalization. As Dreher et al. concluded in Globalization, Economic Freedom, and Human Rights, “the hypothesized incentives to respect human rights provided by globalization mainly work for narrow basic human rights (‘physical integrity rights’), but not for the broader ‘empowerment rights’” (2012, 538). In other words, the authors found that globalization and an increase in respect for physical integrity rights, which they define as encompassing one’s physical well-being and health, are positively correlated. Respect for empowerment rights though, which include freedom of speech, political participation, and freedom of religion, do not receive the same attention.

In Dorussen et al.’s paper Networked International Politics: Complex Interdependence and the Diffusion of Conflict and Peace (2016), the authors argue that social network analysis (SNA) allows for a more complex understanding of the international system as it moves beyond only looking at dyads (two nations interacting) to an examination of interactions between multiple actors at once. They emphasize how SNA helps to identify factors that contribute to peace through interdependence. Religion is not mentioned as a potential factor, so this paper will center on this gap and seek to fill it. In Hafner-Burton and Montgomery’s Power Positions: International Organizers, Social Networks, and Conflict (2006), participation in intergovernmental organizations (IGOS) is used as the basis for an SNA approach to interdependence. This research will take a similar approach to Hafner-Burton and Montgomery’s paper, but instead of seeking to understand how IGO membership influences interdependence, religious freedom will be studied.

The importance of understanding the factors that influence interdependence is explained in Boehmer et al.’s Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict (2001). The authors explain how economic interdependence fosters peace and mitigates conflicts between nations. Due to this, it is necessary to research the different factors that may influence trends in interdependence as these factors themselves would then affect international conflict. Yet religion again is not addressed as one of these factors. As Grim discusses in Cross-National Influences on Social Hostilities Involving Religion and Government Restrictions on Religion (2013), restrictions on religious freedom can have international impacts.
including tension, extremism, terrorism, and war. Religious freedom thus is viewed as influencing international relations, but not in the context of economic interdependence. Finally, Demirchyan in International Justice in an Age of Globalization (2013) analyzes the role of international justice in facilitating interdependence which he finds leads to cooperation. One key aspect of this is the prevention of political repression, which he explains includes the protection of religious freedom. Thus, the author analyzes how international justice fosters interdependence, addressing religious freedom as only a subset of the larger idea of justice. In analyzing these sources, the importance of researching how the topics of religious freedom and interdependence intersect becomes evident.

Data Collection and Methods

This project will use social network analysis (SNA) in order to visualize the relationship between interdependence and religious freedom, with each country being examined in relation to its top five trade partners. With this in mind, we can define the nodes and edges that will be used to carry out this research.

Nodes

The nodes, or actors, in this project are the countries themselves, with each node representing an individual nation or territory. The 202 nodes in this study are drawn from The World Religion Database, with 194 nodes representing nations and the other eight representing “Other Asia, Not Elsewhere Specified (NES),” “Free Zones,” “Special Categories,” “Bunkers,” “Curacao,” “American Samoa,” “Areas, Not Elsewhere Specified (NES),” and “Palestine.” According to the United Nations, “Other Asia, NES” and “Areas, NES” designate a trade partner that is either of a very small volume or is unknown, “Free Zones” designate a geographical area where trade is not subject to duties or taxes, “Special Categories” designates a trade partner that is undisclosed, and “Bunkers” designates ships/aircrafts that supply mainly fuel (2016). Curacao is a small island territory of the Netherlands, American Samoa is a territory of the United States, and Palestine is only partially recognized. Since these three locations are not recognized nations, they are listed as such in the databases used. Thus, these nodes do not adhere to the node level characteristics. Each node that represents a nation will have two characteristics: size and color.

The data for size comes from Pew Research Center’s study A Closer Look at How Religious Restrictions Have Grown Around the World (2019). This dataset denotes different levels of restrictions on religious freedom based on a ten-point scale separated into four categories, “very high” (6.6-10), “high” (4.5-6.5), “moderate” (2.4-4.4), and “low” (0.0-2.3).
These categories are derived from four variables used to define what constitutes restrictions on religious freedoms, those variables being: “government favoritism of religious groups, laws and policies restricting religious freedom, government limits on religious activities, and government harassment of religious groups” (Pew Research Center, 2019). The dataset takes each of these variables into account when determining what numerical value will be given to a country to denote its religious freedom restriction level.

To accurately represent this variable within the network, each node size is based on the continuous scale (0-10) that the categories are based on. Actors with a score of “0” are the smallest, “0.1” the second smallest, and so on, with actors with a score of “10” being the largest. This will allow for a more accurate visual representation of religious freedom restriction levels within the network.

The second characteristic of the nodes is color, derived from The World Religion Database (Grim and Johnson 2020). This database contains information regarding religion in each nation, including the most widely practiced religion. This is used to color the nodes based on the primary religion in each country to understand if this plays a role in shaping international interdependence. “Primary religion,” for the purposes of this research, refers to the religion which has the largest percent following in each nation, not necessarily the religion that the majority (more than 50%) of citizens practice. For example, the database lists Benin as being 46.5% Christian, 28% Muslim, and 25.1% Ethnic Religionists (Grim and Johnson 2020). While Christianity is not practiced by the majority of citizens, the node denoting Benin is colored to represent Christianity as the primary religion. This is done in order to simplify an otherwise complex variable, making the network more visually understandable.

The World Religion Database lists seven different religions as being the most followed in one or more countries, those religions being: Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Agnostic, Jewish, Hinduism, and Chinese-Folk religionists. To represent this in the social network graph, the nodes will be colored as follows: Christianity (pink), Islam (blue), Buddhism (purple), Agnostic (red), Jewish (yellow), Hinduism (orange), and Chinese-Folk religionists (green).

**Edges**

The edges which connect the nodes will represent interdependence as defined by trade. They will be both directed and weighted, with the direction representing the flow of trade and the weight representing the volume of trade. Only the top five trade partners of each nation will be denoted by an edge. This will not only aid in simplifying the network to make it more visually understandable, but also allows for focus to be placed on each country’s most...
important trade partners. It is a nation’s top trade partners that contribute most to trade volume, and thus foster interdependence. Due to this, going beyond a country’s top five trade partners is not likely to yield relevant results.

The data for the edges comes from Resource Trade Earth, a database that analyzes trade volume between countries. For example, based on this dataset, the U.S. has an edge originating from it going to Mexico, Canada, China, Japan, and South Korea, as these are the top five countries the U.S. exports to. Mexico is listed as the nation receiving the largest portion of U.S. exports (16%), meaning it will be the U.S.’ most weighted edge, followed by Canada, China, Japan, then South Korea. Mexico would then also have an edge originating from it going to the U.S., since the U.S. is the country Mexico exports the largest portion of its exports to, but then would also have edges going to Areas, China, Japan, and Canada, each of which will also be weighted. Thus, edges are both directed and weighted.

**Network Characteristics**

When examining the graph as a whole, the most important aspects to examine will be degree-in, reciprocity, and community detection. As to degree-in, it is necessary to look at which nations receive the most edges, who they receive them from, and if this correlates to religious freedom restriction levels. The research question this project seeks to answer revolves around the number of edges nations with varying levels of restrictions on religious freedom have directed toward them, indicating whether or not government restrictions on religion play a role in economic interdependence.

Reciprocity will help identify if nations with similar levels of religious freedom or with the same primary religion are in each other’s top five trade partners. A higher reciprocity score would indicate that a large proportion of nations are mutual trade partners, which when examined jointly with node level characteristics will allow for an understanding of the relationship between restrictions on religious freedom and interdependence.

Community detection will allow for the identification of groups of nodes that are closely connected and who frequently are among each other’s top five trade partners. What this project will look for is whether or not these groups are composed of nodes of similar sizes (level of restrictions on religious freedom) and/or color (primary religion).

Degree-in, reciprocity, and community detection in conjunction with node and edge level characteristics will allow this project to identify the connection, or possible lack thereof, between government restrictions on religion and international interdependence. Degree-out and density are not relevant to this study as every node will have five edges going out from it, which counteracts the relevance of these network level characteristics.
Results

To understand the relationship between religious freedom and economic interdependence, it is necessary to first look at general findings of this study. Table 1 shows the number of nodes per primary religion. This table shows that Christianity is the primary religion of the most countries (126), followed by primarily Muslim nations (48), Buddhist (9), Agnostic (4), Hindu (3), Chinese Folk Religionists (3), and finally Jewish (1). The row labelled N/A represent the nodes “Other Asia, Not Elsewhere Specified (NES),” “Free Zones,” “Special Categories,” “Bunkers,” “Curacao,” “American Samoa,” “Areas, Not Elsewhere Specified (NES),” and “Palestine.” As previously discussed, the databases do not have data on these as they are not recognized nations.

Table 1. Nodes per Primary Religion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary Religion</th>
<th>Number of Nodes</th>
<th>Percent of Nodes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agnostic</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1.98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese Folk Religionists</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>62.38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>23.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.96%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Next, Table 2 outlines how many nodes fall into each religious freedom restriction level. While the network itself uses the raw data and is on the continuous scale from 0-10, this table uses the categorical version of this variable. Thus, the Low category encompasses nations with a score from 0.0 to 2.3, Moderate from 2.4 to 4.4, High from 4.5 to 6.5, and Very High from 6.6 to 10. The majority of nations fall into the low category (74), then moderate (68), very high (27), then high (24). Once again, the row labelled N/A represents those nodes without data.
Table 2. Nodes per Religious Freedom Restriction Level

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Religious Restriction</th>
<th>Number of Nodes</th>
<th>Percent of Nodes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>36.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>34.16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>11.88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>13.37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3.96%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With these overall findings, the relationship between religious freedom and interdependence in a network starts to form. Figure 1 is the basic network plot, showing node and edge level characteristics. There are 202 nodes, each representing a different actor, while size dictates the level of restrictions on religious freedom and color dictates the primary religion. The nodes are scaled so that size increases as the religious freedom restriction level rises. The legend next to the network indicates which color represents each primary religion.

There are 962 edges in this network which are directed and weighted. When a node receives an edge, it is in the originating node’s top five trade partners, as defined by being a top five importer. The heavier (or thicker) the edge, the larger the volume of trade. This network is laid out using Kamada Kawai, a force-directed algorithm. Thus, edge-crossing is minimized and edges are mostly of an equal length, allowing the network to be more easily understood. To aid in readability of the network, node labels are not included.

The pendulums (nodes connected to the network by only one edge) represent American Samoa, Free Zones, Palestine, Special Categories, Bunkers, and Curacao. These six nodes have one edge each directed at them and no edges originating from them. The other two nodes without any edges originating from them are Other Asia, NES and Areas, NES, but unlike the pendulums, they have more than one node directed towards them.
In order to better understand what results this network yields, Table 3 outlines detailed statistics for three quantitative variables: Religious Freedom Restrictions, Degree In, and Reciprocity. For each of these variables, minimum, maximum, and mean is shown. While minimum does not tell us much, maximum and mean do.

As to Religious Freedom Restrictions, the mean is 3.21 and the maximum is 8.9. As to Degree In, the average number of edges a node receives is 4.78 and the maximum is 101. As to Reciprocity, the average number of nodes that have a reciprocal relationship is 9.55 and the maximum is 106. To better understand these variables, they will be examined in more detail.

Table 3. Variable Means

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Religious Restrictions Level</th>
<th>Degree In</th>
<th>Number of Reciprocal Edges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maximum</td>
<td>8.90</td>
<td>101.00</td>
<td>106.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>3.21</td>
<td>4.78</td>
<td>9.55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Degree in

First, we will examine degree in, which is the number of edges directed at a node. Table 4 outlines how many nodes receive a certain number of edges, broken down by category of restriction. “Religious Freedom Restriction Category” outlines the four categories previously discussed. “Degree In” shows the number of edges received by a node. Note that only degree ins present in Figure 1 are shown; for example, no node receives 10 edges so this degree in is omitted from Table 4. The table is read as follows: 36 nodes in the low category receive zero edges, 28 nodes in the moderate category receive zero edges, and so on. The final row displays the total number of edges received by each category of node.

Table 4. Degree In per Level of Restriction on Religious Freedom

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree In</th>
<th>Religious Freedom Restriction Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>17</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To better understand what this total value tells us, Table 5 further breaks down degree in, calculating the average number of edges received per category of religious freedom restriction. It shows that the average number of edges received by nations with low restrictions is 2.10, while for those with moderate restrictions the average is 4.57, for high restrictions the average is 8.75, and for very high restrictions the average is 7.11. The “Very High” category contains an outlier, which when removed drops the average number of in degrees to 3.5. Discussion on this outlier will come later in the discussion section of this paper.

Table 5. Average Number of In Degrees by Level of Religious Restrictions Category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Restrictions on Religious Freedom</th>
<th>Number of Countries</th>
<th>Total Number of In Degrees</th>
<th>Average Number of In Degrees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>2.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>4.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>210</td>
<td>8.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very High</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>7.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very High without Outlier</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2 visualizes the degree in characteristic. As in Figure 1, nodes are sized by the level of restriction on religious freedom and edges are directed towards nodes which are a top five importer of the originating node’s exports. Unlike Figure 1, the color of nodes now represents in degree. The nodes are colored on a gradient from blue to red, with the nodes becoming redder as degree in increases. Many nodes have an in degree of zero, so these are the bluest, while the node with the highest in degree, 101, is the reddest.

The majority of nodes fall on the blue end of the gradient, indicating that most countries have a relatively low degree in. When examining the graph, one node becomes obvious as it is the largest and reddest. This node represents China, which simultaneously has the highest level of restrictions on religious freedom and the highest degree in.
Reciprocity

The second characteristic examined is reciprocity. The overall reciprocity score of this network is 0.1036. This tells us that 10.36% of the nodes in this network have a mutual connection, meaning they are in each other’s top five trade partners. It is interesting to note that of the 962 edges in this network, only 100 are reciprocal.

Figure 3 visualizes this by highlighting reciprocal edges in red. What is evident from this network is that most of the reciprocal edges are between nodes of the same color and of similar sizes. In other words, reciprocal edges are more prevalent among nations with the same primary religion and with similar levels of restrictions on religious freedom. This network shows that many of the reciprocal edges are between pink nodes, revealing among these mutual connections, many are between primarily Christian nations.
Community Detection

The third characteristic of this network to look at is community detection. Community detection groups nodes who are closely connected to one another based on the characteristics of degree in and reciprocity. Figure 4 visualizes this in a network.

Nodes are scaled by level of religious freedom while the communities are highlighted, and nodes are colored to identify which community they belong to. The community length, or the number of communities identified, is 10. Of these 10 communities, four are composed of only one node each, those being American Samoa, Free Zones, Palestine, and Curacao. Within this network, the nodes with higher levels of degree in are more central and are in regions with many overlapping communities.

Looking at this network, we can see that there is a relationship between the size of the nodes and which community they belong to. This is especially prevalent in the communities represented by the green and dark blue nodes, each of which contains relatively small nodes. Similarly, the community represented by the orange nodes contains nodes which are relatively average in size as compared to the rest of the nodes.

Fig. 4. Network by Walktrap Clusters

While this network allows for a general overview of community structure, Table 6 and Table 7 further break down this characteristic. In Table 6, the number of countries in each community is broken down by the four categories of restriction on religious freedom. In Table 7, the number of countries in each community is broken down by primary religion. Communities Seven, Eight, Nine, and Ten are those with only one node each and thus are omitted from these tables.
Community One contains 26 nations, 16 of which are primarily Christian, nine primarily Muslim, and one primarily Buddhist. While this community is predominantly Christian, the restriction levels are more diverse. Four nations have low levels of restrictions, 11 have moderate levels, five have high levels, and seven have very high levels.

Community Two is made up of 46 countries, 21 of which are primarily Christian, 15 primarily Muslim, six primarily Buddhist, and two primarily Chinese Folk Religionists. Along with this, 22 have low levels of restrictions, six have moderate levels, seven have high levels, and 11 have very high levels. Community Two thus contains a combination of religions but has primarily low levels of restriction.

Communities Three, Four, Five, and Six, unlike Communities One and Two, are less differentiated in their makeup. Community Three contains 57 nations, 47 of which are Christian and 48 of which fall into the low and moderate restriction levels. Community Four contains 50 nations, 28 of which are primarily Christian and 17 primarily Muslim, and 38 of which fall in the low and moderate restriction levels. Community Five contains only seven nations, six which are primarily Christian and all of which fall into the low and moderate categories. Community Six contains only nine nations, eight
of which are primarily Christian that fall into the moderate restriction level. Based on these communities, we can begin to see the relationship between religious restrictions, primary religion, and interdependence.

**Discussion**

*Degree In*

Based on these results, the research question comes back into focus. As to degree in, we can see that the average number of edges a node receives increases as the level of restrictions on religious freedom increases. This continues until the very high category, when degree in decreases. Nations with low levels of restrictions averaged 2.10 in degrees, 4.57 for moderate nations, 8.75 for high nations, and 7.11 for very high nations. But within the very high category there is an outlier that must be accounted for. China has an in degree of 101, while the second highest in degree is only 73. When we remove China from the calculation of average in degree, the very high category decreases to an average of 3.5.

China’s growing economic power makes it one of the biggest players in international trade, with many nations relying on it as an export market, as shown by its high degree in score. Despite China’s restrictions on religious freedom, it continues to have economic relations with many nations who have low restrictions on religious freedom. Many of the edges China receives are from small nodes, while four of China’s top five export markets are in the low to moderate level of restriction.

What we can infer from this is that restrictions on religious freedom are tolerated when they fall into the low, moderate, or high categories but then are not tolerated when these restrictions fall into the very high category. China shows that there are exceptions to this when the economic potential is so great that it outweighs concern for religious freedom. Thus, unless a country with very high levels of restrictions on religious freedom provides overwhelming economic benefits, it is not likely to be a top trade partner of other nations.

*Reciprocity*

The reciprocity score of this network is 0.1036, or 10.36%. Of the 962 edges in this network, only 100 are reciprocal. These mutual economic relationships are more common among primarily Christian nations with low levels of restrictions on religious freedom. So, while the overall number of reciprocal edges is relatively low, the distribution of these 100 edges indicates that interdependence is related to religious freedom and primary religion.
Community Detection

As to the communities present within this network, of the six that represent clusters of nations, four are distinct in their religious freedom restrictions and primary religion makeup. The majority of nations in Communities Three, Four, and Five have low to moderate restrictions, and nations in Community Six mainly have moderate restrictions. Communities Three, Five, and Six are all mainly composed of primarily Christian nations.

Communities Five and Six are almost identical, with seven and nine nations respectively, all of which are primarily Christian except for one nation each which are primarily agnostic. What differentiates them is that the nations in Community Five have a mix of low to moderate restrictions, while in Community Six all but one nation fall into the moderate category. The makeup of these communities again indicates that religious restrictions play a role in determining economic interdependence.

Conclusion

Understanding the factors that influence economic interdependence is important as it allows us to better recognize the many individual aspects of this complex topic. Interdependence has the ability to foster peace and mitigate conflict and is of growing relevance as globalization continues to take place, making the study of this topic increasingly necessary.

This project sought to answer the question: What is the connection between restrictions on religious freedom and interdependence among nations? This was answered through studying the role of religious freedom in determining whether or not nations are economically dependent on one another. Using social network analysis to examine each nation in relation to their top five trade partners, looking at degree in, reciprocity, and community detection, it was found that there is a relationship between interdependence and religious freedom. Nations tend to tolerate religious restrictions up to a point, unless the economic benefits of a nation are large enough. Along with this, primarily Christian nations tend to be in mutual relationships. Finally, economic communities are largely composed of nations with similar levels of restrictions on religious freedom.

Future research on this topic should analyze different rights, such as speech or press, in order to gain a more comprehensive and holistic understanding of how human rights affect interdependence. This paper has shown that religious freedom is linked to economic interdependence, meaning that other empowerment rights may have similar connections. If it is found that these other rights do follow the same pattern as does religious
freedom, then it can be said that there is a relationship between empowerment rights and interdependence. Economic interdependence’s potential to foster international peace necessitates extensive research into factors which may influence it, with this project indicating that religious freedom is one of these factors.
Works Cited


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“THE SUPREME COURT CHANGED MY MIND”
HOW OBERGEFELL V. HODGES (2015) INFLUENCES PUBLIC ATTITUDES ON SAME-SEX COUPLE ADOPTIONS

Lucas Piedmonte

Abstract
The connection between the Supreme Court and U.S. citizens is a complex relationship that a chorus of researchers has studied. This project considers the extent of the Court’s ability to influence public attitudes. Whereas previous literature has identified the Court’s influence on attitudes on same-sex marriage, this project evaluates whether the Court’s decision to legalize same-sex marriage in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. (2015) influenced public attitudes on another LGBTQ+ related-policy: same-sex couple adoptions. This study tested a hypothesis that the Court has a legitimizing function by conducting fifteen separate chi-square tests and a single independent t-test using the American National Election Survey (ANES) data from 2012 and 2016. This study is the first to examine the effects of the Court on a national scale in this light. The study reveals an overall increase in public support for same-sex couple adoptions after Obergefell (2015), which lends support to the idea that the Supreme Court legitimizes public attitudes and makes citizens re-think their previous opinions.

Keywords: Supreme Court, public opinion, same-sex marriage, same-sex couple adoptions, and legitimizing function.

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Purpose and Overview

There exists an age-old question within the political science community: does the United States Supreme Court influence public opinion? While the research remains mixed at best, many scholars have examined this issue through the lens of Supreme Court decisions on gay civil rights. This research has increased the understanding of how the Court’s decisions affect public attitudes toward lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) individuals. The most current research has examined the public’s attitude toward same-sex marriage after the landmark Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. (2015) ruling to legalize same-sex marriage nationwide. However, an unexplored area of this research is how Obergefell (2015) has influenced attitudes on same-sex couple adoptions. This is the first study to examine this inquiry on a national scale.

This study hypothesizes that when comparing U.S. citizens, those surveyed before Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) are more likely to oppose same-sex couple adoptions and have negative feelings toward LGB people, compared to those surveyed after the decision. To test this hypothesis, this study conducted two tests using the American National Election Survey (ANES) data in 2012 and 2016. Test one examines attitudes toward same-sex couple adoptions with the use of chi-square analyses. Test two examines attitudes on LGB individuals in general by using an independent t-test.

The results from both tests show an increase in support for same-sex couple adoptions and overall positive feelings for the LGB community. This study provides support for the idea that the Supreme Court does influence public opinion and that U.S citizens have rethought their opinions on LGB people and support for same-sex couple adoptions following the Obergefell (2015) decision. In other words, this study lends support to the idea that the Supreme Court legitimizes support for LGB individuals and for LGB policies like same-sex couple adoptions.

Adding to the evidence that the Supreme Court is a legitimizing function is essential, as Americans may be more inclined to vote for a President based on who they might select for the Supreme Court. Alternatively, more evidence showing the Supreme Court as a legitimizing function may encourage advocacy groups to direct more resources to judicial advocacy if it means more easily swaying overall public opinion.

This paper will begin by presenting a review of the literature, before outlining the research method, research design, and expectations based on previous research. Then, this paper will present the results of the tests, accompanied by an analysis and discussion. Finally, the paper will examine the limitations and weaknesses of these tests, before proposing future research ideas.
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Review of Literature

The Supreme Court and Public Attitudes

Among the ongoing debate as to whether the Supreme Court is a legitimizing function, some political scientists assert that it is more likely that citizens are persuaded by Supreme Court actions and not that the Supreme Court is more likely motivated by citizens’ public opinions (Mondak, 1992; Bartels and Mutz, 2009). A premier study conducted by Franklin and Kosaki (1989) measured whether the Supreme Court decision Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) affected attitudes on abortion rights. They tested their structural response hypothesis by using two cross-section samples, one before and after the ruling (Franklin and Kosaki, 1989).

Franklin and Kosaki found that the Court played a significant role in an overall increase in support for abortion rights (1989). This study also defined the notion that the Court is not only responsible for the immediate reaction after the decision, but also the following media coverage and responsive policy action (Franklin and Kosaki, 1989). In other words, Franklin and Kosaki’s study broadened the extent to which researchers hold the Supreme Court responsible for the “effects” of its decision (1989).

Supreme Court Legitimizing Social Issues

Dahl (1957) asserts that the Supreme Court may legitimize support for a social issue. This is a “positive response” or “legitimacy” hypothesis. Dahl concludes that this hypothesis exists because the U.S. public holds the Supreme Court in such high regard (1957). Research by Scheingold (2004) endorses this assertion, citing that the general public holds profound respect for the rule of law. As a result, Scheingold finds that the general public is likely to honor the Court’s ruling and deem the Court’s ruling as legitimate (2004).

Furthermore, Dahl’s research suggests that the public is likely to adjust their own opinions according to the view held by the Supreme Court (1957). In other words, the Supreme Court can normalize a different opinion. Dahl’s findings are consistent with a recent study by Christenson and Glick (2015), which found that following the Supreme Court’s ruling to uphold the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate as constitutional, the public’s support for the mandate increased. This is a prime example of how the Supreme Court may legitimize public opinion. Some researchers have used LGB-related Supreme Court cases to advance their theories as to whether the Court has legitimized the public’s support for LGB social issues.
Supreme Court Legitimizing Public Attitudes toward LGB Individuals

A study by Flores and Barclay (2015) tested the effects of states’ same-sex marriage policy and the Supreme Court legitimizing support for LGB individuals. Using ANES data, Flores and Barclay found that state judicial action in favor of same-sex marriage made respondents reconsider their previous opinions on same-sex marriage and attitudes toward LGB individuals (2015). Flores and Barclay noted an increase in support for same-sex marriage and warmer attitudes toward LGB individuals (2015). Later researchers Tankard and Paluck (2017) expanded this model to the federal level by measuring the effects of Obergefell (2015) on social norms and personal attitudes. Similarly, their study determined that Obergefell (2015) shifted the respondents’ support of same-sex marriage in a positive direction (Tankard and Paluck, 2017).

An analysis by Kazyak and Stange (2018) complements Tankard and Palucks’ (2017) findings. Kazyak and Stange’s analysis, which used t-tests with data from the Nebraska Annual Social Indicators Survey (NASIS), indicated an overwhelming increase in support for same-sex marriage among Nebraskans from 2013 to 2015 (2018). They concluded that public opinion shifted to be aligned with the Court’s decision (Kazyak and Stange, 2018). Overall, their study indicated support for the legitimacy hypothesis of how the Supreme Court’s ruling in Obergefell (2015) affected public opinion of LGB issues (Kazyak and Stange, 2018). Kazyak and Stange’s findings from Nebraska mirror the national trend. As of 2017, a majority of U.S citizens support same-sex marriage (McCarthy, 2017).

Furthermore, Kazyak and Stange’s study found that the Obergefell (2015) decision also increased support for same-sex couple adoptions and protections for LGB individuals from facing discrimination in housing and employment (2017). Anderson and Fetner (2008) offer evidence to support why Obergefell’s (2015) decision on same-sex marriage also affected views on same-sex couple adoptions. Anderson and Fetner determined that increased support for gay marriage following state judicial decisions has also shifted U.S. citizen’s overall acceptance of same-sex individuals (2008). Put another way, when the Court legitimizes one LGB social issue, it may also facilitate other forms of LGB social acceptance.
Study Design

Theory and Expectations

Overall, the literature supports the idea that Obergefell (2015) has swayed public opinion to increasingly support same-sex marriage. Furthermore, when the Court legitimizes one LGB social issue, it facilitates other forms of LGB social acceptance. Putting those concepts together, this study evaluates whether Obergefell (2015) increased the support of LGB couple adoptions. This study would be the first to do so on a national scale - in this light. Based on the literature review, one would expect to observe a national increase in support for same-sex couple adoptions following Obergefell (2015).

This study hypothesizes that when comparing U.S. citizens, those surveyed before Obergefell (2015) will be more likely to oppose same-sex couple adoptions and have negative feelings toward LGB people, compared to those surveyed after the decision. This is a legitimacy hypothesis. The null hypothesis states that when comparing U.S. citizens, those surveyed before Obergefell (2015) will have the same likelihood to oppose same-sex couple adoptions and have negative feelings toward LGB people, compared to those surveyed after the decision. If this legitimacy hypothesis is untrue, this study may suggest a divergence from the consensus of current literature and empirical studies on this matter.

Operationalization and Measurement of Concepts

The method utilized will mirror a similar method conducted by Flores and Barclay to measure the effects of judicial action on attitude change (2015). Flores and Barclay used ANES data from 2012 and a re-contact study from 2013 to analyze the effect state same-sex marriage legalization policies had on attitudes toward the LGB community (2015). Their study used an ANES question asking whether same-sex marriage should be legal, coupled with a 100-point scale feeling thermometer on the LGB community as dependent variables (2015). The independent variable was the years 2012 and 2013, accounting for when four states faced ballot measures and referenda on same-sex marriage (2015).

Therefore, this study will also use data from ANES. The independent variable will be the timing of surveys, pre-and-post the Obergefell (2015) decision legalizing same-sex marriage. To measure the independent variable, the study will use ANES survey data based on the years 2012 (pre-ruling), and 2016 (post-ruling). The dependent variables will be (1) the support of same-sex couple adoptions and (2) general feelings toward the LGB community. To operationalize the dependent variables, this study will similarly mirror Flores and Barclay’s usage of two ANES questions and responses (2015). Although, it is important to recognize that this study will not be making use of a re-contact study, which differs from the Flores and Barclay model (2015).
To measure the first dependent variable, support for same-sex couple adoptions, this study will use responses from the question: “Do you think gay or lesbian couples, in other words, homosexual couples, should be legally permitted to adopt children?” Answers to this question are coded in ANES with only two values “yes” or “no.” To measure the second dependent variable, general feelings toward the LGB community, this will use responses from the question: “How would you rate: gay men and lesbians (that is, homosexuals)” on a 100-point feeling thermometer scale. A score of 100 indicates a very warm or favorable feeling, 50 indicates no feeling, and 0 indicates a very cold or unfavorable feeling.

Research Design:

To test the proposed hypothesis, this study will perform two tests using ANES data in 2012 and 2016. One test will examine attitudes toward same-sex couple adoptions, and the other will examine attitudes toward LGB individuals in general. The independent variable will be the same for both tests: the year 2012 (measuring pre-Obergefell) and the year 2016 (measuring post-Obergefell). In test one, when measuring attitudes on same-sex couple adoptions, the independent (years) and dependent (“yes” or “no” support of same-sex couple adoptions) variables will be nominal. Therefore, this study will conduct a chi-square test. If the results suggest a significant relationship, the analysis will report an appropriate proportional reduction in error measures. In test two, when measuring general feelings toward LGB individuals, the independent variable will be nominal (years) and the dependent variable will be interval. Therefore, this study will conduct a t-test to compare the means of LGB feelings.

There are variables that could skew the results or cause one to conclude that the relationship is spurious. To account for these variables, this study will control for the respondent’s gender, education, age, political affiliation, race, if they are religious, and if they know someone who is LGB for the chi-square tests. Previous research indicates that support of LGB issues varies among different demographics. More specifically, studies show that women, higher educated people, non-religious people, younger generations, and liberals support same-sex marriage at higher levels compared to men, lower educated people, religious individuals, older generations, and conservatives (Andersen and Fetner 2008; Brumbaugh et al. 2008; Galupo and Pearl 2007; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2005; 2008; Kreitzer, Hamilton and Tolbert 2014; Lewis 2011; Lewis and Gossett 2008; McCarthy, 2017; Sherkat, de Vries and Creek 2010; Whitehead 2010; Woodford et al. 2012; as cited in Kazyak and Stange, 2018).
Moreover, research by Lewis (2003) shows that, in general, Black people disapprove of homosexuality more strongly than White people. Although, evidence in the field regarding Black-White differences in LGB acceptance is limited (Lewis, 2003). Lastly, research indicates that people who report knowing an LGB individual are more likely to have a positive attitude towards gay rights, as compared to people who do not (Fetner 2016; Herek 2002; Herek & Capitanio 1996). A study by DellaPosta (2018) determined that people who know at least one LGB person were more likely to later change their minds about LGB civil rights issues and become more accepting of LGB people overall.

In order to control for the variable of age, this study will subgroup respondents into “18-39,” “40-59,” and “60+”. To control for education, this study will subgroup respondents into two groups of “high school or less” and “college/advanced degree.” To control for race, this study will subgroup respondents as “White people” and “Black people.” The study will control for religiosity by subgrouping respondents as “religious” and “not religious.” To control for if the respondent knows someone who is LGB, the study will subgroup the respondents in “yes” and “no” based on the question: “Among your immediate family members, relatives, neighbors, co-workers, or close friends, are any of them LGB as far as you know?” To control for gender, this study will subgroup the respondents into two categories: “male” and “female.” To control for political affiliation, the study will subgroup a 7-point political ideology scale into two categories: “liberals” and “conservatives.”

Analysis:

Test 1: Chi-Square Tests Measuring Support for Same-Sex Couple Adoptions

The study was conducted in an attempt to reject the null hypothesis. The first test examined support for same-sex couple adoptions. Separate chi-square tests for 15 control variables were performed with the appropriate proportional reduction of error (PRE) conducted. By comparing support for same-sex couple adoptions over two surveys from 2012 and 2016, a simple cross-tab analysis shows that overall support has increased. Without controls, overall support increased from 61.6 percent in 2012 to 73.2 percent in 2016.
A very high chi-square value of 143.761, coupled with a p-value of 0.00 (passing the .05 significance test), indicates that there is a significant relationship between the two variables. As a result, this study can confidently reject the null hypothesis, which hypothesized that when comparing U.S. citizens, those surveyed before Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) will be no more likely to support same-sex couple adoptions and have the same feelings toward LGB people, compared to those surveyed after the decision.

Furthermore, a wide range of control variables was tested to see if the relationship is spurious. When looking at the control tests, every p-value was less than 0.05, which indicates statistical significance for all variables. Overall support increased between every control demographic: White people, Black people, high school educated or less, college-educated, conservatives, liberals, religious individuals, non-religious individuals, individuals with gay friends, individuals without gay friends, and all age groups (18-39, 40-59, 60+). Since none of the controls rendered the relationship insignificant, one cannot conclude that the relationship between the variables is spurious.
An analysis of Lambda values may provide a more in-depth answer when it comes to interpreting the strength of the relationship between the variables. According to Pollock (2016), Lambda values measure the strength of the relationship between two categorical variables, with at least one being nominal in nature. Lambda values of less than 0.1 indicate that there is a weak or no (0.0) relationship between the variables (Pollock, 2016).

Every chi-square test, including control variable tests, had a lambda value of less than 0.01, many of which were 0.00 (Pollock, 2016). On its surface, this may indicate that there was either no or very little strength of association between the variables (Pollock, 2016). However, according to Pollock, Lambda has its limitations (2016). While all the other evidence leads us to believe a relationship does exist, the Lambda values may fail to detect the relationships (Pollock, 2016). This is not uncommon. As a result, in situations like these, we rely on the value of Cramer’s V, which is measured on a range of 0 (no association) to 1 (perfect association) (Pollock, 2016).

Generally speaking, the minimum threshold indicating there is a moderately-strong but significant relationship between variables is a Cramer’s V value of .10 (Pollock, 2016). When analyzing Cramer’s V results, it became clear of the relationship between the variables, especially when looking at the controls (Pollock, 2016). These results indicated that there was at least a weak relationship (Cramer’s V value of .10 or higher) between the variables when accounting for the controls except for the control demographics of Black respondents, college-educated respondents, and respondents who knew someone who was LGB (Pollock, 2016). Overall, this study can conclude that the relationship between the variables is significant, but weak in nature.

**Test 2: Independent T-Test Measuring Overall Support for LGB Individuals**

Test two performed a simple independent t-test to test the independent variables of before and after Obergefell (2015) against the feeling thermometer on LGB people. The mean for the year 2012 was 52.16 and the mean for the year 2016 was 60.73. Further, the test computed a p-value of 0.00, a t-statistic of -14.549, and a mean difference of -8.574. Since the p-value was less than .05, the result passes the test of significance and is considered statistically significant. Since the t-statistic is far from zero, it is even more likely that there is statistical significance.
Table -2: Difference of Means, T-Test Results (IV: Year of Survey); DV: Feeling Thermometer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gay Feeling Thermometer</th>
<th>Year of Survey</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Standard Mean Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5549</td>
<td>52.16</td>
<td>27.555</td>
<td>.373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>3598</td>
<td>60.73</td>
<td>27.356</td>
<td>.456</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The test also revealed that the 95 percent confidence interval of the difference had a lower value of -9.730 and an upper value of -7.419. The effect is significant since all values in the confidence interval are on the same negative side of zero. Since zero is not contained within the confidence interval, this also agrees with the very small p-value of 0.00. When it comes to the null hypothesis. Given all these results, the test lends further support that we can reject the null hypothesis. This result also reflects the chi-square results, as overall support for an LGB-issue (same-sex adoption) increased between 2012 and 2016.

Conclusions

The results of the chi-square tests are consistent with the work by Kazyak and Stange (2018). As indicated in the literature review, Kazyak and Stange tested whether state same-sex marriage legalization affected the support of other LGB-related issues, like same-sex couple adoptions (2018). Using data from the Nebraska Annual Social Indicators Survey (NASIS), they found an overwhelming increase in support for same-sex couple adoptions among Nebraskans from 2013 to 2015 (2018). This study, which brought this analysis to a national scale, complements their findings. Moreover, the results of the independent t-test are consistent with the general trend that U.S citizens increasingly support same-sex or LGB-related policy (McCarthy, 2017; Pew Research, 2014).

Overall, the results of this study can reject the null hypothesis. This study’s two tests lend support to the hypothesis that when comparing U.S. citizens, those surveyed before Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) will be more likely to oppose same-sex couple adoptions and have negative feelings toward LGB people,
compared to those surveyed after the decision. This study provides support for the idea that the Supreme Court does influence public opinion, by legitimizing support for the LGB population and for specific LGB policies like same-sex couple adoptions.

**Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research**

It is important to note some of the major weaknesses of this study. First, this study may not reflect other significant changes in society, such as an increased representation of LGBTQ+ individuals in the media. Perhaps a good future question to study is: “How has increased representation of LGBTQ+ people in the media and on TV affected the public’s views of the community at large?” Second, the scope of this paper does not extend to attitudes toward transgender individuals, as ANES has separate data for attitudes toward transgender individuals. Moving forward, a vital expansion of this study would be to include attitudes toward transgender individuals. For example, an interesting addition to this study may be to examine if Obergefell (2015) facilitated a changing of attitudes towards transgender individuals and support for anti-discrimination laws.

Another expansion of this study would be to include data from 2018 and 2020. With the Donald J. Trump presidency, there may be a “pendulum swing” into a more negative general public opinion on LGB-related issues. Additional avenues for further research could be exploring how the presidency affects the public’s perception of Supreme Court cases. After all, research suggests that support for the LGB community has declined dramatically since President Trump has been elected. According to the Accelerating Acceptance Index, a national survey conducted by the Harris Poll, 2018 signaled a most severe drop in support for LGBTQ acceptance, especially among male respondents aged 18-34 (GLADD, 2018). The 2018 Accelerating Acceptance report indicates that this drop began in 2016 (GLADD, 2018).

Moving forward, the LGBTQ+ research community might benefit from applying this study’s tests to other LGBTQ+ issues, such as public support for anti-discrimination protections in housing and workplaces for LGBTQ+ individuals. With the recent passage of the Equality Act in the House of Representatives and the newly appointed Justice Amy Coney Barrett, there may be another colossal LGBTQ+ policy enacted, or Supreme Court decision handed down in the near future. Overall, the results of this study may prompt researchers to more strongly consider the Supreme Court as a legitimizing function when analyzing how public attitudes on LGBTQ+ civil rights will progress in the future.
Works Cited


HOW MERKEL’S WILKOMMENSKULTUR WELCOMED THE AFT INTO THE BUNDESTAG
A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY ON REFUGEE CRISSES IN GERMANY

Sarah Trautwein

Abstract:
This neopositivist case study compares the Syrian Refugee Crisis between 2013 and 2017 and the Yugoslav Refugee Crisis from 1991 to 1995 in Germany to understand the rise of an extreme right-wing party with anti-immigrant sentiments, the AfD, in the German Bundestag in 2017. By looking back in comparison, I identify the manner in which the German federal chancellors presented their refugee policies as a key influence on the public response to these crises. While Chancellor Angela Merkel advocated for a Wilkommenskultur, a welcome culture, towards Syrian refugees, former Chancellor Helmut Kohl held a much less welcoming tone in the 1990s. The AfD quickly gained prominence in German national politics by capitalizing on a power vacuum and a wave of backlash Merkel had created on the right side of the political spectrum through decisions that abandoned the traditional position of her party. In contrast, there were no major political party shifts in the 1994 Bundestag, the German federal parliament, election because Kohl’s migration policies remained consistent through the 1990s Refugee Crisis allowing voters to remain comfortable with the party, thus eliminating the potential space for an alternative party.

Keywords: German politics, Bundestag election, Alternative for Germany (AfD), populism, refugee crisis, immigration policy

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Introduction

Alongside the influx of refugees in the past five years, Germany has experienced the rise of a right-wing populist party with extreme anti-immigrant sentiments called the Alternative for Germany (AfD). During its second national election in 2017, the AfD became the third largest party with 94 seats in the German parliament, the Bundestag. The massive success of the AfD calls for explanation as the country had never seen a new party gain over an eighth of the Bundestag votes in only its second national election, as can be seen in table 1.

Table 1. Emergence of New Political Parties in German Bundestag Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>First Appearance on National Scale</th>
<th>Percentage of Seats</th>
<th>Next Election Year</th>
<th>Percentage of Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AfD</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Linke</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republikaner</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piraten</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Grünen</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The nearest earlier parallel to such success was the rise of Die Grünen, the Green Party, in the early 1980s. Die Grünen became a prominent party of the German political system unlike other new emerging parties, such as the Piraten and the Republikaner, which began as protest parties but never rose to success on a national scale. While the German political system is thus one in which newly formed political parties have come to matter previously, this explanation alone does not suffice. Therefore, the question becomes why the AfD has been successful in the German Bundestag when earlier far-right parties like the Republicans have not been.

The emergence of the AfD came at a time when the German Chancellor Angela Merkel advocated for a Wilkommenskultur, a welcome culture, towards the refugees of the 2015 Syrian Refugee Crisis. In this paper, I aim to address what explains this major political shift in parties and their support in Germany by comparing the 2015 Syrian Refugee Crisis to the quite similar 1990s Yugoslav Refugee Crisis cases and analyzing the different political responses to refugees of the German chancellors in each case. Chancellor Merkel strongly promoted an open-door policy during the peak of the refugee crisis in 2015, while former Chancellor Helmut Kohl took a more cautious approach towards refugees in the 1990s. As noted, Germany experienced a significant political shift during the Syrian Refugee Crisis, but the 1990s Yugoslav Refugee Crisis...
but the 1990s Yugoslav Refugee Crisis did not cause any major shifts in the German political party system. I argue that Chancellor Merkel’s Wilkommenskultur and open-door contributed to the success of the AfD because her liberal position towards refugees caused backlash from portions of the German public and created a vacancy on the conservative side of German politics. As there is plenty of existing literature on the change of party support in Germany amid the Syrian Refugee Crisis, my research offers additional evidence for this political shift and places it in a broader framework by contrasting Chancellor Merkel’s progressive response with Chancellor Kohl’s more conservative response.

I begin with a review of literature regarding the theory of populism and how it relates to the rise of extreme right-wing parties before moving into prior scholarship specifically on the Syrian Refugee Crisis and the 1990s Yugoslav Refugee Crisis. Next, I provide a methodological explanation of my hypotheses, operationalization of variables, and case selection. My empirical analysis starts with the Syrian Refugee Crisis case and Angela Merkel’s response. By looking back in comparison, a discussion of Helmut Kohl and the 1990s Yugoslav Refugee Crisis case will then be my major empirical contribution as it expands upon arguments from a new angle. Lastly, I synthesize my findings and reflect on my hypotheses in a discussion section, where I also address an alternative explanation for the rise of the AfD.

**Literature Review**

*Populism and the Rise of the AfD*

The concept of populism has gained popularity among scholarly literature in the past five years, with many scholars identifying a rise in right-wing populism in Europe and linking it to the Syrian Refugee Crisis. Therefore, there is a huge existing scholarly debate on whether immigration and xenophobia spur populism. In fact, many scholars have tied Merkel’s open-door policy to a populist backlash in Germany.

Scholars like Vieten and Poynting characterize right-wing populism as the scapegoating of others and the creation of an urgent crisis that affects the collective ‘we’ (2016, 534). Populist rhetoric typically establishes a “fundamental distinction between ‘we’ the pure people, and ‘them’ the corrupt elite,” but the enemy figure is often structured around other insecurities based on social divisions and identity, including ethnicity, race, and religion (Vieten and Poynting 2016, 537). However, “economic insecurity” has also strongly influenced populist voting (Sola 2018, 5).
Within the past decades, scholars have studied the emergence of the party family of the extreme-right populist parties, especially in Western Europe. Scholars like Jens Rydgren assert that right-wing populist parties often take advantage of political opportunities. He describes that these opportunities take shape as “the emergence of niches on the electoral arena” (Rydgren 2005, 418). Essentially, these niches are large gaps “between the voters’ location in the political space and the perceived position of the parties” on crucial issues which emerge due to the “time lag between voter and party movement within the political space” (Rydgren 2005, 418).

In 2017, a far-right radical party entered the German Bundestag for the first time in postwar Germany with ninety-four seats and 12.6 percent of the national vote (Art 2018, 76). The AfD’s stronger electoral support in East Germany is in line with the findings that Eastern German states typically have higher values of xenophobia than those in the West (Sola 2018, 27). Carl Berning has identified the AfD as a right-wing populist party which draws on “unscrupulous use and instrumentalization of diffuse public sentiments of anxiety and disenchantment” (2017, 16). Although the party initially gained popularity through its anti-euro party stance, it soon shifted towards an anti-immigration position upon the outbreak of the Syrian Refugee Crisis (Sola 2018, 26). David Art argues that Chancellor Merkel’s decision to allow one million refugees into Germany “led both to the AfD’s radicalization and its electoral takeoff” (Art 2018, 77). In addition, findings show that “the AfD benefitted from losses by the CDU and CSU,” Angela Merkel’s party (Berning 2017, 18).

**Chancellor Angela Merkel and the 2015 Syrian Refugee Crisis**

Since the outbreak of the Syrian Refugee Crisis in 2015, scholars have been eager to study Chancellor Angela Merkel’s open-door policy and promotion of a Wilkommenskultur in Germany in addition to the rise of the AfD. Scholars repeatedly point to key decisions which have defined Merkel’s response to the crisis. According to Helms, Van Esch, and Crawford, these include Merkel’s announcement to take in nearly one million refugees, her suspensions of the EU’s Dublin Agreement which had established the examination procedure of asylum applications, and her decision to “expand on the interpretation of the German constitution to provide refuge to those fleeing war rather than simply those fleeing persecution.” Under the Dublin Regulation, refugees must “register in the first EU country they enter,” so Merkel’s rejection of that agreement was significant as it allowed refugees to now come directly to Germany and register there “thus lowering the hurdle for Syrians to enter the EU” (2019, 359). Another key feature of Merkel’s response to the refugee resettlement” and a common asylum policy (Helms, Van Esch, and Crawford 2019, 360).
Angela Merkel is the first female chancellor of Germany from the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). According to Joyce Mushaben, Merkel’s response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis can be derived from her experiences with GDR policies which “violated international human rights accords” and led to a perceived responsibility towards oppressed people (Mushaben 2017, 530). Angela Merkel ultimately views herself as the moral leader of Europe who will guide the response to the humanitarian crisis (Helms, Van Esch, and Crawford 2019, 360). This is particularly interesting as other scholars like Alessandro Sola have repeatedly reported higher values of xenophobia in Eastern German states (2018).

Scholars wonder whether Merkel’s response to the crisis directly increased the flow of refugees into Germany and xenophobia among Germans. According to Ludger Pries, many conservative politicians have interpreted Merkel’s “dictum as an invitation to flee Germany” (2019, 2). Scholars like Pries found that there is little empirical evidence of Merkel’s response directly affecting the volume and direction of refugee movements in Europe (Pries 2019, 7). However, according to other scholars like Mushaben, Merkel’s “inclusive response” to the Refugee Crisis might have led to “ugly backlash channeled through... AfD gains” (2017, 529).

Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the 1990s Yugoslav Refugee Crisis

The German response to the Yugoslav Refugee Crisis in the 1990s has not been studied as in-depth by scholars as the Syrian Refugee Crisis. Helmut Kohl’s response to the Yugoslav Refugee Crisis was not radical like Angela Merkel’s policies, and, therefore, has received less attention from scholars over the past thirty years. In addition, Germany had not risen to the prominent global political and economic world power which it is today, in the aftermath of its unification in 1989.

Scholars often criticize Chancellor Kohl’s refusal to “adopt a genuine immigration law” amid the Yugoslav Refugee Crisis in the 1990s (Mushaben 2017, 517). Eventually, Kohl’s government amended Article 16 (2) of Germany’s constitution which made immigration more restrictive (Bosswick 2000, 47). This meant that Germany removed the right to asylum “from those who entered from a state which provides protection according to the Geneva Convention and the European Human Rights Convention regulations, in fact all of Germany’s neighbors” (Bosswick 2000, 49). According to Bosswick, Kohl framed this response as a protection from “massive abuse by asylum seekers” (2000, 47).
Although scholars like Mushaben link the increased wave of xenophobic violence to the negative state policies towards refugees, Germany did not see the emergence of an anti-immigrant populist party during this refugee crisis (Mushaben 2017, 521). In fact, a power shift did not happen until the 1998 election when the SDP and the Greens, which actually had a much more liberal stance on immigration, gained power in the Bundestag election and marked the end of the Kohl era (Green 2001, 98). Essentially, under Kohl, Germany did not experience any political shifts until nearly eight years into the Yugoslav Refugee Crisis, which is the opposite of the immediate emergence of AfD during the Syrian Refugee Crisis.

Research Design

Variables and Hypotheses

In order to more fully research the gap in literature contrasting the Syrian Refugee Crisis with the Yugoslav Refugee Crisis in Germany, my research explores the differences in chancellor response amid these crises to understand why only one case saw a rise in an extreme right-wing political party. I employed a neo-positivist methodology by setting up a most-similar case comparative case study which draws on the Syrian Refugee Crisis between 2013 and 2017 and the Yugoslav Refugee Crisis from 1991 to 1995. I also relied on interpretive methodology, specifically discourse analysis, to analyze primary sources relating to the German chancellors’ frameworks such as rhetoric used in their speeches.

I treated the frameworks of chancellors in relation to the refugee crises as an independent variable. I defined these frameworks as any rhetoric or level of support expressed towards immigration, asylum, or events related to the crisis, including terrorism and xenophobic violence, that has the capacity to influence the voting behavior of the German public. My dependent variable is the level of political shifts, which I defined as the changes in the Bundestag seats across parties after the German federal elections of 1990 and 1994 as well as the later elections of 2013 and 2017. I measured the link between the independent variable—the chancellors’ framework regarding the crisis—and the federal election outcome by examining responses from the German public to the chancellor’s refugee frameworks. I defined these responses as any statement shown in support or opposition of the chancellor’s views, statements, or supported legislation regarding the refugee crisis.
From the literature review, I determined the following hypotheses which I explored within my study of the Syrian Refugee Crisis and the Yugoslav Refugee Crisis:

Hypothesis 1: If there is a vacancy along the political spectrum during a time of crisis, a new political party may take advantage of the situation and rise to power by filling in the gap.

Hypothesis 2: If the central leader of a country promotes radical immigration policies within a short period of time, native citizens will feel threatened by immigrants leading to high levels of xenophobia and support of anti-immigrant populist parties.

My research expands on Art’s and Mushaben’s hypothesis by applying it to a new historic case. I drew on the Yugoslav Refugee Crisis of the 1990s which did not experience any significant political shifts to provide additional support on this shift in German parties and to apply existing findings more widely.

Case Selection

My first case is Germany 2013-2017 as these years encompass the 2015 peak of the Syrian Refugee Crisis. For my second case, I focused on Germany from 1991 until 1995. During this period, refugees came to Germany from Yugoslavia to flee violence and civil war. Being only two years after reunification, this case addresses the aftermath of several decades of separation of the German states and its impact on attitudes towards foreigners. The second case complements my first case as there are several notable parallels.

A noteworthy similarity between the two cases is that both chancellors were members of the Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands Party (CDU). Since its foundation as an interdenominational Christian party in 1945, the CDU has served as the catch-all party of the German center-right. In addition, the regional variation of xenophobia has remained the same across this thirty-year period, with East German states manifesting much higher levels of xenophobia. An economic gap between Western and Eastern German states existed after reunification in the 1990s and continues to exist today. In both cases, Eastern Germany has a much higher unemployment rate, while the West has a larger highly skilled workforce. Other key similarities include the demographics and motivations among refugees. In both cases, the majority of refugees coming to Germany were non-Christians fleeing from violence and war. Lastly, Germany took in the highest number of refugees among all Western European countries during both refugee crises.
As a most-similar comparative case study, the two flows of refugees into Germany not only share various similarities including volume of asylum applicants, demographics of refugees, and the regional variation of xenophobia, but ultimately have different outcomes in terms of political party shifts due to different causes which may involve the response of the German chancellors at the time. Therefore, these two cases allowed me to vary my independent variable, the response of the chancellors.

Source Selection

For my research, I relied on a balance of primary and secondary sources. I used four main groups of primary documents in my research: 1) Speeches from the German chancellors, 2) Legislation, 3) Newspaper articles, and 4) Public opinion polls. Together, these documents allowed me to understand why Chancellor Merkel’s response to the 2015 Refugee Crisis gave rise to the AfD, a radical right-wing populist party, while former Chancellor Kohl’s response led to no major political shifts.

Primary sources including immigration policies and political speeches provided evidence for my independent variable. Speeches were the focus of my research as they are the most direct way that the chancellors expressed their views and engaged with audiences like the German public and the Bundestag. I accessed Chancellor Merkel’s and former Chancellor Kohl’s speeches through the German Bundesregierung’s website. These speeches did not indicate whether speechwriters assisted drafting them, so I kept in mind that speeches might not be the own words of the chancellors when analyzing them (“Schreibt Merkel Ihre Reden Selbst,” 2010).

My second type of primary source is legislation which the chancellors supported. Online publications of legislation were mostly available on the German Bundestag’s website. Including legislation in my research provided both vital context and insight into the chancellors’ views. I took into consideration that it is often difficult to determine the chancellor’s exact position on legislation, as the stance of the German chancellor is not part of the law-making body of the government.

In addition to speeches and legislation, I looked at newspapers and political polls to analyze whether they are in favor of the chancellors’ immigration frameworks. I explored my dependent variable—the level of political shifts—by examining how these two types of sources reflect the reaction of the public to the chancellors’ decisions and rhetoric regarding the refugee crises. As there is a great amount of newspaper articles available that cover both time periods, I chose to account for regional variation by covering a representative geographic range.
Lastly, I prioritized primary sources which have already been translated to English; however, I consistently cross-checked the translation with the original to see if certain nuances, tones, and meanings were preserved. If an English translation was unavailable, I conducted the translation myself. This was the case for all the chancellor speeches, newspaper articles, public opinion polls, and social media posts as well as for some legislation sources.

**Syrian Refugee Crisis (2013-2017)**

*Angela Merkel’s Speeches*

At the advent of the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Germany, Chancellor Angela Merkel was already laying the groundwork for her later well-known Wilkommenskultur. From the beginning, she emphasized the horrors of the Syrian Civil War and the need for both Germany and the international community to offer protection to those who were affected by it. Merkel framed the refugee crisis as an issue Germans would overcome collectively. In her 2013 speech to the Bundestag, Merkel positioned herself and Germany as the moral leader of Europe. Instead of promoting Wilkommenskultur as an idea of her own she emphasized that “we are all concerned about the extraordinary difficult situation in Syria” and “we all agree that it requires a clear response from the international community” (Merkel 2013). With great pride she announced that Germany was the first EU member state to offer admission to 5,000 Syrian refugees and called on the Bundestag to work together to create an example that other European countries could follow (Merkel 2013). In addition, Merkel took a clear stance on xenophobia from the start by announcing that it was “shameful that people who are traumatized by civil wars or seek help in Germany are exposed to hostility” (Merkel 2013). Again, she called to the unity of Germans by announcing that there was “cross-party consensus” on this topic (Merkel 2013). It is important to note that at this time the AfD, the anti-immigrant party on the rise, had not gained any seats in the German Bundestag yet.

During the height of the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Germany, Chancellor Merkel clung to a rhetoric based on overcoming this national challenge through unity and German values of compassion and openness in her speeches. She tied these values to her own ideas about Germany’s response to the refugee crisis. The Chancellor’s 2016 New Year’s speech reflected this Wilkommenskultur. On December 31, 2015, Merkel made the refugee crisis the central subject of her New Year’s speech to the German people. She began by thanking all the countless volunteers and full-time helpers who had been involved in tackling the crisis in the past year and praised them for their “warmth of heart” and
willingness to go beyond their official duties (Merkel 2015). This was not only a call for collective action in the coming year but continued to build on the idea of the ‘ideal’ German citizen, which she had been promoting since the beginning of the crisis. Merkel appealed to German values even more strongly than before and argued that they enable everyone to live together with mutual respect. Throughout the speech, Merkel strongly pushed for a Wilkommenskultur by asserting that “we want a country that is self-assured and free, compassionate and open to the world,” while directly condemning “cold-heartedness or even hate” (Merkel 2015). Although she advocated that Germany can profit “both economically and socially” from immigration, the Chancellor ignored the continuing economic disparities between the East and the West during her announcement of the 25th anniversary of German reunification (Merkel 2015). She merely stated that “we have lower unemployment and more people working than ever before in a unified Germany,” but she did not acknowledge that unemployment rates continued to vary significantly between the East and the West in this unified Germany (Merkel 2015). Merkel closed her speech by stating that “we can do it (wir schaffen das) because Germany is a strong nation” (Merkel 2015). This phrase soon became infamous with the refugee crisis in Germany and began to be used repeatedly by Merkel when addressing the nation.

With the influx of refugees, Germany also saw a stark rise in terrorism. In response, Angela Merkel heavily relied on a love-versus-hatred rhetoric which she had previously used to condemn xenophobia directed at refugees. Merkel did not dismiss or ignore that terrorist acts were committed by refugees, but instead she furthered her mission of Wilkommenskultur by asserting that Germans must now “counter the terrorists’ world of hate with our compassion and our cohesion” (Merkel 2016). In her next New Year’s Speech for 2017, Merkel began by acknowledging that terrorist acts in 2016 in Würzburg, Ansbach, and Berlin were committed by people who came to Germany seeking the country’s protection. As in the previous year, Merkel praised the achievements and the kindness of the German people when referring to “our country helped those in true need of our protection find their footing in Germany and integrate into our society,” but also voiced her frustration with the few who had taken advantage of this kindness, and therefore deprived those who truly deserved protection (Merkel 2016). Merkel contrasted the German public’s kindness, compassion, and readiness to help with the hatred of the terrorists, thereby furthering her own mission of a Wilkommenskultur, which was based on being kind and welcoming those in need. As in many other speeches, she specifically referred to values of the German people throughout
stating that they are based on “cohesion, openness, our democracy, and a strong economy” and are much stronger than terrorism (Merkel 2016). By reminding the German people of the strong economy and a stable democracy for which Germany is known for, she dismissed any concerns that the refugee crisis might be negatively affecting the political, economic, and social wellbeing of the German state and population. In the end, Merkel used terrorism in her speech as an opportunity to unite the German people not against a common enemy but under common morals and a mission to act on these values.

Legislation Supported by Angela Merkel

At the peak of the Syrian Refugee Crisis in 2015, the German Federal Cabinet passed a legislative package, known as Asylpaket I (Asylum Package I), with significant changes in asylum law. Among these was the Asylum Procedure Acceleration Act which was approved on October 24, 2015 by the Federal Council. Chancellor Angela Merkel had previously asked for its approval in government statements, stating that it would help those in need of protection receive more efficient help through legal plans, while “people without asylum would have to leave the country faster” (“Effektive Verfahren” 2015). Albania, Kosovo, and Montenegro were declared as safe countries of origin, so asylum seekers from these countries could be sent back faster (“Asylpaket II” 2016).

Among its main objectives was to provide relief to the German Bundesländer by taking over the costs of asylum seekers and paying them a flat rate of 670 euros per month. It also stated that asylum seekers with good prospects of staying in the country should be integrated into the German labor market at an early stage and have access to integration courses. Lastly, this act declared that the placement of refugees into accommodations must be sped up, with a focus on ensuring that underage refugees receive adequate care (“Effektive Verfahren” 2015). The Asylum Procedure Acceleration Act was passed rather quickly, considering the impact of the refugee crisis was not realized until the summer of 2015. When speeding up the asylum procedure, it can come at a cost of accuracy and efficiency. Merkel quickly announced that this law would not be enough to tackle the refugee crisis and additional laws would need to follow (“Effektive Verfahren” 2015).

As soon as the first package was passed in October 2015, another asylum package was already under discussion in November of 2015 (“Asylpaket II” 2016. Asylpaket II (Asylum Package II) entered into force on March 17, 2016 (“Angela Merkel” 2015). Ideas within the first package were expanded upon by setting up special reception centers where certain groups of refugees were to go through accelerated asylum procedures (“Kabinett Bringt Asylpaket II” 2016). Among its most important points was a discussion on family reunification for
Syrian refugees. In the end, it was decided that the right to reunification would be suspended for two years for refugees with subsidiary protection, which is given to those “who cannot be granted asylum status, but who also should not be deported for humanitarian reasons” (“Asylpaket II” 2016, “Weg Frei Für Asylpaket II” 2016). However, in return, Merkel announced that refugees from camps in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon would be brought to Germany to catch up with their families more easily (“Weg Frei Für Asylpaket II” 2016). Additional restrictions included that refugees were to stay in the district of their respective immigration office. It also decided that refugees would need to continue to the cost of integration courses with ten euros per month which would be deducted from their benefits protected under the Asylum Seekers Benefits Act (“Asylpaket II” 2016). In the end, the restrictions of both asylum packages starkly clashed with Merkel’s initial rhetoric of there being no upper limits on asylum.

**Public Response**

A major wave of backlash followed Merkel’s decision to open up Germany to thousands of refugees who were stranded in Hungary on September 4th, 2015 and was amplified by her controversial Wilkommenskultur rhetoric. In the following months and years, public opinion was often that the Chancellor “completely lost control of the crisis” According to Sven Siebert’s article from a Saxon newspaper, Merkel was “under increasing pressure, even from her own party” in September 2015. He expressed the public sentiment towards Merkel’s motto “Wir schaffen das” by stating that it seemed relatively vague and that the Chancellor simply “did not have quick solutions ready” (Siebert 2015). According to a poll commissioned by the ARD Morgenmagazin, over half of Germans did not believe in “Wir schaffen das” (2016). This shows the lack of confidence in the Chancellor felt by the German public following her overnight decision to open Germany’s borders. According to a 2015 September public poll, 53 percent of Germans felt that Merkel had not handled refugee policies appropriately. The same public opinion poll found that more Germans believed that Germany should accept less refugees than Germans who supported a higher volume of refugees (ARD-Morgenmagazin 2015a). This is significant because it shows that many Germans did not back Merkel’s decision from the night of September 4th. Alan Posener reported for the Welt newspaper that on that critical night Merkel “simply pushed aside the provisions of the Dublin Treaty, which Germany had pushed for its adoption” (2016). To many Germans, this action conveyed that Merkel seemed to think that she was above laws and rules, damaging her credibility as a trustworthy leader. Posener mocked this situation by titling the article “I am Angela Merkel, I can do that” (2016).
After the Asylpaket I was passed on September 29, 2015, Chancellor Merkel continued to receive heavy criticism from the public. Polls conducted in December 2015, show that 33% of Germans felt dissatisfied with Merkel’s refugee policies, and 24% of Germans even stated that they were extremely dissatisfied. At this point, 98 percent of AfD followers were among those who stated that they were either dissatisfied or extremely dissatisfied (ARD-Morgenmagazin 2015b). In this aftermath of rapid decision-making in regards to the refugee crisis, Jürgen Marks, writing for the Augsburger Allgemeine, concluded that although Merkel’s welcome messages were heartwarming, they were a political mistake because she “underestimated the effect of her words” when she declared that the fundamental right to asylum has no upper limit (2015). The weekly national newspaper Junge Freiheit, known for its conservative views, argued that Merkel “left the path of rational politics” and “lost control of borders” when she decided to pursue a Wilkommenskultur. The newspaper article reflected the sentiment of many German voters, including AfD supporters, that the Chancellor “sidelined Germany” when she turned to an “emotional policy” (Hoffgard 2015). An article published by the Stern magazine the following year echoes this same sentiment by stating that “Merkel acts irresponsibly towards Germany, for which the Chancellor is still responsible” (Gerwien 2016). Therefore, many Germans were dissatisfied with Angela Merkel’s refugee policies because they felt that she was prioritizing the wellbeing of refugees while putting German citizens second.


Helmut Kohl’s Speeches

Former Chancellor Helmut Kohl held a much less welcoming tone towards refugees in his speeches compared to Chancellor Merkel as he promoted limited immigration to Germany. Even before the Bosnian War erupted in the Balkan Peninsula in 1992, the Chancellor adopted a rhetoric that put the needs and wellbeing of German citizens first. When addressing the National Association of Employers in North Rhine-Westphalia on October 17, 1991, Kohl took a powerful stance towards immigration stating that “it is entirely out of the question that we can solve the problems of the many countries on this Earth in Germany. The Federal Republic of Germany, one of the most densely populated countries in the world, is not an immigration country” (Kohl 1991). The former chancellor believed that based on Germany’s size, it could not “accommodate 450,000 people every year” (Kohl 1993b). Kohl did not strictly oppose all immigration, but he was much more critical than Merkel. In his 1993 speech in Vienna, he merely remarked that “immigration must be manageable,” instead of extending an open invite, and called for
“fairer burden sharing” among European countries (Kohl 1993a). Although Merkel also called for European countries to take in refugees, she framed it much more as a common responsibility of the international community, while Kohl put a much more negative spin on it by referring to immigration as a burden.

In his speeches, Chancellor Kohl implied that he was committed to protecting the German economy and jobs of German citizens from the waves of immigrants. He argued that concerns regarding workplaces and living spaces are a reality when “strangers” arrive (Kohl 1993a). Kohl also recognized the divisions in economic well-being between East and West by discussing the higher unemployment rates in the “new federal states” early on in his 1991 speech to the National Association of Employers (Kohl 1991). By acknowledging the economic disparities in Germany, Kohl showed that he was willing to protect economic stability and to prevent immigration from posing a threat to the economic security of Germans. The former Chancellor acknowledged how the German economy had benefited from immigration by stating that “without the work of our many fellow citizens from other countries, our high gross national product could not be generated” (Kohl 1993b). However, he also promoted his own stance on immigration policy by stating that “regulated immigration still enriches life and the economy” (Kohl 1993a). As a result, Kohl suggested that immigration was a matter of finding the right balance.

Helmut Kohl did not encourage or support the attacks on foreign citizens even before the Yugoslav Refugee Crisis broke out. Instead he continuously insisted that Germany was a “country that is friendly to foreigners” and that the violence towards foreigners must end. While declaring that xenophobia was not acceptable in Germany, he defended his own position on controlled immigration as not xenophobic in nature (Kohl 1991). Kohl believed that the historical experience of the drafters of the German constitution in 1949 was much different than the situation in Germany in the 1990s. Therefore, “a reasonable constitutional solution,” a reference to the 1993 Asylum Compromise, was not a matter of xenophobia but merely a response to the changing nature of immigration and the German state (Kohl 1993b). In his 1993 speech about migration and minority protection in Vienna, the chancellor warned against “immediately dismissing [fears related to the crisis] as xenophobia” (Kohl 1993a). Helmut Kohl asserted that due to the bitter experiences of the Nazi era, Germans “know what it means when racially, politically or religiously persecuted can find protection and a home in exile” and, therefore, included asylum provisions in the 1948 Basic Law (Kohl 1991). He believed that limiting immigration was not xenophobic as long as the moral responsibility to help
other nations in need was recognized (Kohl 1991). He implied that this had to be done through finding alternative ways, since bringing everyone to Germany was not feasible (Kohl 1991). Kohl stated that “we have to help the people in their home, we cannot solve the problems here with us” (Kohl 1993b). His point was that it is more effective to protect ethnic, cultural, and religious minorities in their home countries as this prevents migration in the first place (Kohl 1993a).

Legislation Supported by Helmut Kohl

Before the Yugoslav Refugee Crisis unleashed in the early 1990s, Chancellor Kohl had already been pushing for the Asylum Compromise of 1993 for nearly a decade. It was created as an amendment to Article 16 of German Basic Law. Until its passage, article 16 of the Basic Law “had stated that anyone who was persecuted for political reasons had a right to asylum with no exceptions” (Gesley 2017). The CDU, the SPD, and the FPD agreed on the compromise on December 6th, 1992. Kohl and the CDU had “been urging a new immigration law for years, but because of opposition” from the SPD, which had a much more liberal stance on immigration, it took tough negotiations to get it passed (Kinzer 1992). In order to achieve the two-third majority requirement for constitutional changes, the SPD was promised more integration efforts (Geuer 2017).

Within the 1993 Asylum Compromise, refugees fleeing from war continued to be admitted, but not “in unrestricted numbers” (Kinzer 1992). However, economic migrants were determined to be much more restricted with Germany decreasing the number to 100,000 annually (Kinzer 1992). The Asylum Compromise included that asylum seekers who enter through the so-called safe-third countries would not be permitted entry into Germany (Reinle 2008). A list was created that “enumerated additional countries of safe-origin” (Gesley 2017). After these restrictions were put in place in 1993, the number of asylum seekers in Germany did indeed fall continuously.

Arguably, Chancellor Merkel’s asylum packages mirror the clauses already put in place by the 1993 Asylum Compromise under Kohl’s administration. The legislations supported by both chancellors addressed the so-called safe countries of origin as well as the third safe countries and placed restrictions on asylum. Due to its nature of a compromise, the Asylum Compromise might not entirely reflect Kohl’s views accurately. Table 2 shows that the SPD vote share in the 1990 and 1994 elections was around ten percent higher than it was in the Bundestag elections during the Syrian Refugee Crisis. Therefore, the Asylum Compromise reflects this relatively greater power of the SPD at that point in time as it took SPD concerns into account. This in turn also
explains why elements of the legislation were friendlier towards immigration, resembling Merkel’s policies, than what might be expected from Kohl’s typical rhetoric on this subject. Angela Merkel’s measures during the Syrian Refugee Crisis were her own measures, while Helmut Kohl’s legislation reflected more of a cross-party dynamic.

Table 2. Bundestag Election Results around the Time of the Refugee Crises

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Yugoslav Refugee Crisis</th>
<th>Syrian Refugee Crisis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>43.8</td>
<td>319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfD</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPD</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grüne</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Linke</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Public Response**

At the advent of the Yugoslav Refugee Crisis in the early 1990s, many Germans were already dissatisfied with foreigners in their country. In January of 1992, 66% of Germans reported that they felt like foreigners were misusing the German social system and 73% of Germans felt that foreigners were the largest issue in Germany (“Jeder Achte Deutsche” 50, 1992; “Asylstreit Entscheidet Wahl” 63, 1992). As a result, these Germans supported the restrictions to immigration which the Asylum Compromise of 1993 put in place. A news article by the Spiegel directly stated that “the Chancellor is right” in speeding up the procedures for asylum as the long duration of the asylum process in Germany had been “the main incentive for refugees” to come to Germany (“An die Wand” 22, 1992). Nonetheless, the former Chancellor did receive some criticism. For example, the Spiegel reported that “the chancellor not only has in mind the well-being of the German fatherland threatened by asylum seekers. He is also concerned with maintaining his power” (“Das Ist Der Staatsstreich” 1992, 19). However, by being concerned about retaining his position as chancellor, Kohl did what his CDU voters, as well as SPD voters, desired when he pushed for the passage of the Asylum Compromise of 1993.

Since the Kohl legislation had been on the horizon for quite some time, the German public responded much less shocked to this legislation, than the public did in 2015 regarding Merkel’s refugee policies. The public was much more aware of Kohl’s policies leading up to the crisis because there had been mild migration flows into West Germany before the Yugoslav Refugee Crisis.
broke out in the 1990s. In fact, Kohl and the CDU had been trying to amend the definition of asylum for over a decade until they finally convinced the SPD to approve the Asylum Compromise of 1993. As a result, Kohl’s decisions regarding the Yugoslav Refugee Crisis did not come as a surprise to Germans. Meanwhile, Merkel’s chancellorship leading up to the Syrian Refugee Crisis was relatively quiet in terms of refugee flows. Although this crisis had been luring on the horizon for quite some time, major actions were first taken in the summer of 2015 when thousands of refugees were already on the way to Europe.

Ahead of the 1994 Bundestag election, Kohl’s administration had just successfully passed the Asylum Compromise which regulated asylum more strictly and decreased the flow of refugees into Germany. A month before the CDU and the SDP finalized the Asylum Compromise, another newspaper reported that Kohl and his party feared “losing power” and laid low (Gansei 1992). This shows that Kohl was extremely cautious; his decisions and policies regarding the refugee crisis were well-thought-out. Gunter Hofmann confirmed this when he reported that “Helmut Kohl is benefiting from the conditions that he himself created in the long years of his chancellorship” only two days before the Asylum Compromise in 1992. As a result, public opinion was favorable upon the passage of the amendment, recognizing that Kohl was “not an impotent chancellor” (Hoffman 1992). The CDU continued to be ranked as the most competent party to get the refugee crisis under control, but 65% of Germans still felt that the circumstances in Germany were a cause of concern (“Stärkste Partei” 28-29, 1993). However, in the months leading up to the 1994 Bundestag election, 52% of Germans reported that they did not agree with the overall politics of Kohl, and more Germans felt the SDP had a better leader than the CDU did (“Ins Niemandland” 34, 1993; “Schlamm Und Tränen” 41, 1994). As a result, public favor shifted slightly to the SDP, as can be seen in Table 2.

The political shift during the 1994 Bundestag did not resemble the party shift in the 2017 Bundestag election. The SPD, a party with a liberal stance on immigration, had existed for over a century in German politics and was not a newly formed party like the AfD. At the time of the 2017 Bundestag election, there was no party which represented the views of people who favored strict immigration and asylum restrictions, with the exception of the NPD and the Republikaner. However, the NPD is an extreme-right party, often viewed as a neo-Nazi party, which most Germans do not want to associate themselves with, while the Republikaner party was on the brink of existence at this time. Merkel’s shift to the political left many CDU supporters without representation
Other parties were already representing a welcoming attitude towards refugees, so when Merkel joined these parties and abandoned the traditional CDU position, she created a vacancy on the right side of German politics. In contrast, there were no gaps in the political party system in the 1990s as all positions on the political spectrum were filled. With Chancellor Kohl’s party still covering the majority of the right side, the SPD, and the Linke covered the left side of the political spectrum, while the Republikaner Party at this time was still strong enough to take in voters that were even more conservative. Therefore, opponents of Kohl’s policies had the option to move either further right or left of the CDU. However, his original voters mostly continued to feel comfortable within the party due to his consistent immigration politics; there was simply no need for them to seek an alternative party, so there was only a slight shift to the SDP in the 1994 Bundestag election.

**Discussion**

Since Merkel’s party, the CDU, usually represented the conservative position on issues, the AfD capitalized on the chancellor’s liberal open-door policy to gain support from conservative voters throughout Germany. The evidence favors the first hypothesis which states that if there is a vacancy along the political spectrum during a time of crisis, a new political party may take advantage of the situation and rise to power by filling in the gap. Following its foundation in 2013, the AfD quickly found its way to power in German national politics by taking advantage of the power vacuum which Chancellor Angela Merkel had created on the right side of the political spectrum.

Although the evidence is not entirely conclusive for the second hypothesis, it does point to the rhetoric of the chancellor having an enormous effect on public responses during times of crises. The pieces of legislation which each chancellor supported were actually quite similar in nature, but public response varied greatly. The way the chancellors presented their refugee policies in their speeches determined the public response much more than the pieces of legislation themselves. With the Syrian Refugee Crisis requiring a much faster response than the 1990s Yugoslav Refugee Crisis, Merkel was forced to make rapid decisions which many Germans viewed as irrational and emotionally driven. She did not have time to ease voters into her refugee policies like Kohl did, so they came as a shock to many. Early on, her Wilkommenskultur rhetoric made promises the country could not feasibly support which severely damaged her credibility as a leader. By declaring no upper limit on asylum and abandoning the EU Dublin Regulation, she made it seem like the head of the country was operating under lawlessness, a typical complaint of AfD voters, triggering severe backlash. In the end, Merkel not only lost voters that her party the CDU had traditionally represented, but also lost the trust and confidence of some voters who simply voted for the AfD as a form of protest.
Although the evidence presented favors the explanation that the AfD capitalized on Chancellor Merkel’s position to gain support throughout Germany, it is also important to consider alternative explanations for the rise of the AfD. Therefore, I provide additional evidence on what AfD rhetoric directly responded to. The most prominent alternative explanation is that the political shift amid the refugee crisis in 2017 was based on changed legal institutions and traditional ideas about German identity instead of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s response. Since the turn of the millennium, Germany had introduced multiple laws regarding immigration, citizenship, and integration which had not existed during the Yugoslav Refugee Crisis in the early 1990s. This positioned the 2015 Syrian Refugee Crisis in an entirely different environment of legal institutions compared to the Yugoslav Refugee Crisis.

Overall, these laws were largely in favor of immigration. For example, double citizenship became possible for children of immigrants in 2000 and an entirely new Immigration Act came into effect in 2005. Therefore, it is possible that reformed legal institutions caused a major pushback from the German public. Since many of these laws were implemented in the early 2000s when refugee flows were low, the Syrian Refugee Crisis served as a trigger for a major political shift in the party system. Germany is a country with a rich history and citizens are proud of their identity and values. Therefore, Germans have a traditional understanding of the German identity and continue to hold traditional views on immigration. The new legal institutions created tensions with these views, but the full impact of the new laws was not realized by Germans until the Syrian Refugee Crisis entered national headlines in 2015.

Although new legal institutions created in the years leading up to the Syrian Refugee Crisis challenged existing ideas about immigration and the German identity, the AfD did not draw on these institutions. Instead, the party continuously addressed and directly criticized Chancellor Merkel’s response to the crisis. In 2016, the year before the massive success of the AfD in the German Bundestag, the party uploaded 77 timeline photos which focused on the ongoing refugee crisis as well as related events on its Facebook page. Out of these 70 posts, over half of them (42 posts) directly addressed the German Chancellor and criticized her flawed positions and actions on immigration and the refugee crisis (Alternative für Deutschland 2016a). Multiple posts mentioned an increase in terrorism and crime as a result of Merkel’s policies (Alternative für Deutschland 2016b). It is also noteworthy that none of these posts attacked the existing legal framework regarding immigration to Germany that had been implemented in the early 2000s.

In a September 2017 interview, Alice Weidel, who became the leader of the AfD in the Bundestag the following month, explained how the influx of refugees had contributed to a spiral of violence and identity fraud due to chancellor’s refusal
to secure the German borders. Weidel announced that the AfD aimed to fight such a “climate of lawlessness” (AfD TV 2017). Six days later, the AfD entered the German Bundestag gaining 94 seats, with Alice Weidel leading the party. Even after its successful entrance, the AfD continuously attacked Merkel’s actions on the floor of the Bundestag, explaining how her decisions have led to criminals gaining access the country and endangering German citizens (Phoenix 2018). This shows that the AfD used a strong stance against Angela Merkel’s more liberal position on immigration to gather voters and fill the vacancy on the more conservative side of German politics.

**Conclusion**

This research primarily focused on the domestic policy responses of Chancellor Merkel and former Chancellor Kohl. Domestically, Merkel abandoned the traditional political position of the CDU and shifted to the political left with her radical response to the Syrian Refugee Crisis. This enabled the rise of the AfD as the party collected voters without representing views on restricted immigration. In contrast, there were no major political party shifts in the 1990s as Kohl’s domestic migration policies remained consistent during the Yugoslav Refugee Crisis. The findings of this case study suggest more broadly that choices made by the mainstream leader of a country might be key to understanding the rise of populist parties. Existing research mainly focuses on how the leaders of populist parties themselves influence the success of populism within a country, but this research instead looked at how the actions of the central leader of a country may facilitate the success of new parties, which could be applied to the larger emergence of populist right-wing parties throughout Europe amid the Syrian Refugee Crisis.

A next step for this research is to broaden the findings of this paper to foreign policy and an EU perspective. Both German chancellors were centrally involved in foreign policy to deal with the respective refugee crises. As mentioned, both Merkel and Kohl appealed to other European countries to take on greater burden sharing of the refugee crises. Merkel also facilitated the formation of an EU-Turkey Deal which controlled the crossing of refugees from Turkey to Greek islands. Other countries throughout Europe saw a rise in extreme right parties during the Syrian Refugee Crisis, so broadening the range of the findings within this paper to other countries with similar political shifts during this time is a promising avenue for further research.
Appendix

Timeline

- October 1st, 1982- Helmut Kohl is elected as the German Chancellor
- January 1st, 1991- The Act Concerning the Entry and Residence of Aliens in the Territory of the Federal Republic expands possibilities for naturalization and creates more legal security for immigrants
- October 17, 1991- Helmut Kohl’s “Zeitwende und Neue Herausforderungen” speech
- 1992- Germany receives 438,000 asylum applications
- April 6th, 1992- The Bosnian War begins
- August 22nd, 1992- Violent xenophobic riots take place in the Lichtenhagen district of Rostock
- December 6th, 1992: The CDU/CSU, RDP and SDP finalize the Asylum Compromise (Gesetz Zur Neuregelung Des Asylverfahren) which limits the fundamental right to political asylum and amends the German Basic Law
- January 27, 1993- Helmut Kohl’s “Standortbestimmung Deutschlands für die Herausforderungen der 90er Jahre” speech
- October 13, 1993- Helmut Kohl’s “Migration und Minderheitenschutz in Europa” speech
- November 1st, 1993- The Maastricht Treaty, which established cooperation in controlling illegal immigration and a common asylum policy across EU countries, comes into force
- November 16th, 1994- Helmut Kohl is elected to his 4th and last term as German Chancellor
- September 1st, 1997- The Dublin Regulation comes into force which establishes the criteria for determining which EU member state is responsible for examining an asylum application
- March 5th, 1998- the Kosovo War begins
- May 1st, 1999- The Amsterdam Treaty supplements the Maastricht Treaty
- January 1st, 2005- The new Immigration Act (Zuwanderungsgesetz) comes into effect. It contained provisions on the entry of foreigners into Germany, their residence in the country, and the termination of residence and asylum procedures.
- November 22nd, 2005- Angela Merkel becomes Germany’s Chancellor
- October 28th, 2009- Angela Merkel is re-elected as Federal Chancellor
- 17th October 2010- Start of the Arab Spring in Tunisia
- March 15th, 2011- The Syrian Civil War begins
- February 6th, 2013- The AfD is founded
- September 3rd, 2013- Angela Merkel’s Speech “On the Situation in Germany”
- December 17th, 2013- Merkel is sworn in as Chancellor for a third term
- 2015- Germany receives 900,000 asylum seekers
- August 25th, 2015- Germany suspends the Dublin procedure for Syrians
- August 31st, 2015- Merkel uses the phrase “Wir schaffen das!” for the first time in a press conference
- September 4th, 2015- Germany decides to accept thousands of refugees stranded in Hungary
- September 6th- 2015- The CDU, CSU, and SPD coalition committee agrees to increase federal spending on refugee aid by three billion euros
October 20th, 2015 - The *Asylum Procedure Acceleration Act (Asylverfahrensbeschleunigungsgesetz)* comes into force

November 10th, 2015 - Germany returns to the Dublin procedure

November 20th, 2015 - At a CSU party conference, Merkel rejects the party’s demand for an upper limit on immigration

December 31st, 2015 - *Angela Merkel’s 2016 New Year’s Speech*

January 1st, 2016 - On New Year’s Eve, hundreds of women are sexually assaulted, mostly by men of non-European background

February 18th, 2016 - Riots against refugees take place in Clausnitz

March 13th, 2016 - The AfD wins seats in three German state legislatures (Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland-Palatinate, and Saxony-Anhalt)

March 17th, 2016 - Asylpaket II enters into force

March 18th, 2016 - The EU-Turkey Deal is created to limit the influx of irregular migrants entering the EU through Turkey.

July 31st, 2016 - The *Integration Act (Integrationsgesetz)* is finalized

December 31st, 2016 - *Angela Merkel’s 2017 New Year’s Speech*

September 24th, 2017 - The AfD wins 94 seats in the Bundestag and becomes the third-largest party in Germany
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“AUTONOMY” FOR THE CORDILLERA: HISTROCIALLY TRACING AN ASCRIBED PAN-ETHNIC IDENTITY AND FAILED AUTONOMOUS MOVEMENTS

Christian Von Rotz

Abstract

In the Cordillera mountains of Northern Luzon in the 1970s, dozens of ethnolinguistic groups coalesced under the pan-ethnic identity of “Cordillera”, to seek autonomy from the Philippine government and reassert their indigenous ways of life. After over 30 years, despite the establishment of an Administrative Region with legal pathways to autonomy and 2 referendum plebiscites, the Cordillerans have yet to achieve autonomy. At the height of the movement, the Cordillera fulfilled many theoretical prerequisites of a post-colonial, indigenous, nationalist autonomy movement centered around an ethnic identity. Although, through historically tracing the origins and evolution of the Cordillera identity, it becomes clear that the saliency of this identity varies based on conflict and necessity. The Cordillera shared constitutive story is that of unification to defeat Spanish colonial invaders, exploitation and institutionalization of differences between Cordillerans and lowlander Filipinos by the American colonials, and ultimately, resistance to the socioeconomic and environmental destruction of their people and lands by the Philippine Republic under Marcos. Prior research on why the movements have failed have largely centered on political corruption, pacification, and socioeconomic determinants, whereas this research seeks to question a possible root of these causes, the identity’s saliency. While the movement has been largely pacified by the post-Marcos government, the identity’s saliency, the movement’s viability, and the future of the Cordillera people remains in question. This research seeks to advance focus on the saliency and viability of a pan-ethnic Cordillera region, questions that must be answered for possible Cordillera self-determination.

Keywords: Colonialism, indigenous, Post-Colonial, Autonomous Movements

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Introduction

The Gran Cordillera Central mountain range of Northern Luzon in the Philippines is home to dozens of ethnic groups, all with a shared historic struggle against external efforts to dominate the mountains they call home. This spirit of resistance resonated throughout many of these ethnic groups, and manifested itself against Spanish colonialism, American colonialism, Japanese invasion, and the Philippine Republic. In 1986, under the leadership of multiple organizations, most notably the Cordillera People’s Alliance (CPA) and the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA), a broad autonomous movement was formed. After negotiations with the government, the Cordillera was established as an Administrative Region, with the intention of eventually becoming an autonomous region of the Philippines (Executive Order 220, 1987). The Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) is made up of the Abra, Apayao, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga, and Mountain provinces, with the regional center being Baguio City. While still operating under the federal government and as independent provinces within the Philippine Republic, the region was granted the ability to organize and draft legislation for autonomy through their Congressional representatives. However, despite multiple legislative efforts since 1986, the provinces remain as an Administrative Region and no autonomous bid has successfully emerged.

To begin to question why these autonomous efforts have failed, it is important to first understand the Cordillera – the assumed identity of the peoples of this region. While there are many ethnic groups with diverse languages spoken here, there are unifying attributes amongst these people which establish a Cordillera identity. The ethnic groups of the Cordillera region were first distinguished from other surrounding ethnic groups when they were able to ward off Spanish colonizers and did not succumb to Spanish rule (Castro n.d., 1). Their resistance to the colonial system contrasted most lowlander Filipinos’ subservience to the Spanish, which quickly evolved into stark differences between Cordillera peoples and the rest of the Philippines, coupled with pre-colonial differences amongst Cordillera ethnic groups. American colonial rule and the transition to Philippine independence intensified highlander versus lowlander differences, as differences were institutionalized and began to impact Cordillera ways of life, socioeconomic disparities, and opportunity. The uniting factors of the peoples of the Cordillera will be assessed, as will their differences.

The validity and saliency of a Cordillera identity will be assessed through historically tracing the usage of this identity through colonial eras and the 1986 autonomous movement. This historical tracing will be utilized as a basis...
of research, including tracing the identity’s creation through colonial eras, recent census and polling data, political contexts, and research gathered on more recent movements for autonomy. History tracing will show that the Cordillera identity is one that has been historically ascribed by oppressors and invaders of the Cordillera land. By analyzing this identity within theoretical frameworks of identity, nationhood and nation-building, and autonomous movements, I will show that a lack of identification from within the Cordillera is a root cause for weaknesses of Cordillera autonomous movements, manifested in varying political and socioeconomic factors.

**Purpose and Methodology**

Past research on the Cordillera movement for autonomy has largely focused on operational reasons as to why autonomy eluded the region, such as political corruption, lack of cohesion in the movement, or lack of central leadership. While my research certainly includes and builds off this research and the perspectives of scholars such as Miriam Coronel Ferrer, Nestor Castro, and Gerard Finin, I will be making a theoretical contribution focused on the Cordillera identity, its history and formation, and attempting to exemplify how this is a root issue of failed autonomy. The following section will set a theoretical basis of identity, nationalism, and nation-building based on the work of Ernest Renan, Ernest Gellner, Max Weber, and Rogers Smith. Utilizing this theoretical framework, I will show that while the Cordillera identity and autonomy movement fulfills many existing theoretical prerequisites for self-determination and nationalist movements, there are very clear weaknesses in the saliency of this identity which complicate any desires for future autonomy. The work of past scholars on the Cordillera identity and autonomy movement will be discussed and referenced throughout my research.

In my research I will be historically tracing the Cordillera identity and its saliency throughout pre-colonial, colonial, and modern eras. I will be assessing how the identity was utilized by outward oppressors (Colonial Spaniards, Americans, and the Philippine Republic) through the institutions they implemented to disrupt indigenous traditions and ways of life throughout the Cordillera history, and exploit the region for resources. This is to show that the Cordillera shared history is one that is dependent on the presence of these outward invaders, bringing into question the saliency of the identity. There is lacking research in tracing the Cordillera identity in the years after the initial autonomy movement, which I will also assess and attempt to fill. Through assessing the Cordillera identity across these eras and through this theoretical framework, I hope to advance the conversation around Cordillera autonomy and reflect its importance in being studied as a post-colonial, indigenous, autonomy movement.
**Theoretical Foundation and Identifying Terms**

The essence of nationhood, nationality, ethnic groups, and identity in the context of the Cordillera will be the central focus of this study. Ernest Renan theorized on the nation and nationhood in late 1800’s France, and his theories focused on the nation as an idea and not necessarily based on tangible objects such as land or borders. Renan theorized the nation as “a soul” and being of two things: “a common rich heritage of memories”, and “the desire to live together, and the will to continue to make the most of the joint inheritance” (Renan 1995, 153). Ernest Gellner, a philosopher and anthropologist a century later, focused on political aspects of nationhood, describing the nation as a political principle holding the “national and political unit as congruent”, and goes on to define nationalist sentiments and nationalist movements within this principle (Gellner 1983, 1). While nationalist sentiment is the “feeling of anger aroused by the violation of this principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfillment,” nationalist movements are the actions taken in order to secure this sentiment (Gellner 1983, 1). In addition to nationhood, there will be a strong focus on the concept of ethnic groups and connections to nationalist sentiments. Max Weber, in Economy and Society defines ethnic groups within the context of political community, and the foundation of their connection. Weber described ethnic groups as having a “subjective belief” in a common descent for a variety of different reasons, importantly because of “similarities of physical type or of customs”, or of “memories of colonization and migration” (Weber 2013, 389). Weber elaborates on the connection of ethnic groups and political community, stating that “ethnic membership does not constitute a group; it only facilitates group formation of any kind, particularly in the political sphere” (Weber 2013, 389).

In 2001, Rogers Smith theorized in an essay on building political communities that there are three types of narratives which contribute to the establishment of a peoplehood, through assuring trust and worth of its members (Smith 2001, 78). There are economic stories which rest on groups, leaders, and constituents recognizing the economic benefits of coalescing. The second are political power stories, focusing on trust through assured representation in leadership and worth is shown through the heightened power of leadership and their actions. The third are constitutive stories, which Smith places emphasis as playing a unique role in establishing peoplehood. These stories “proclaim that members’ religion, race, ethnicity, ancestry, language, culture, history, or other such factors are constitutive of the very identities of persons” (Smith 2001, 79).
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My research will attempt to utilize the breadth of anthropological research on nations, peoplehood, ethnic groups, and identity to analyze the groups that reside in the Cordillera Administrative Region. It is through the application of these differing perspectives on nationalism and identity that conclusions can begin to be drawn on the Cordillera struggles for autonomy.

Through Renan’s definition of nationhood, the Cordillera have a rich, shared history, but lack the common will of shared governance as they have been unable to achieve autonomy despite their designation as an Administrative Region. As Gellner defined it, the Cordillera share the nationalist sentiments, shown in the rise of organizations such as the CPLA and CPA, who led the nationalist movement which created their path to autonomy. Per Weber’s theory on group formation, the Cordilleran identity is a unification of smaller ethnic groups, done for political reasons throughout history including rebelling against Spanish colonialism. It will become clear that the partnering of smaller ethnic groups varies and changes greatly in political context, and has limitations due to cultural tendencies of independence. The application of Smith’s theory on constitutive stories to the Cordillera phenomena is of particular interest. Smith defines these stories as being “intrinsically normative”, “likely to account better for why membership in this particular community is enduringly important”, and “are less subject to tangible evidence” (Smith 2001, 80). Smith discusses the more common religious-based constitutive story of a peoplehood believing they are the people of a god, a divine mandate, which becomes very reliable in uniting a group once widely accepted. I argue here that aspects of the Cordillera constitutive story, their story that unites them as one group, is also what has kept them from being able to politically coalesce to create an autonomous nation. As I will illuminate further in this paper, the ethnic groups that make-up the Cordillera peoplehood share a sense of independence and loyalty to their specific tribes and villages, along with a common history of resistance to groups outside of their native Cordillera mountains. I argue that the manifestation of these values in the modern political contexts have created complications in unifying again to establish autonomy. The following section seeks to historically trace the Cordillera identity, along with the problematic, yet sometimes interchangeable, Igorot identity, which have been ascribed to define these diverse mountainous ethnic groups for centuries.

**History Tracing of the Cordillera and Igorot Identities**

Within the present-day Cordillera Administrative Region are dozens of ethnolinguistic groups with cultural variations and dialects, developed over hundreds of years which provide historic distinctions between peoples of this region. For centuries these ethnic groups lived in and around the mountains
divided by more localized villages, known as illi. The Cordilleran socialization of the illi presents the first notions of autonomy, as each illi was recognized amongst these groups as autonomous from each other (Rood 1989, 266). Illis were largely agricultural-based, with a loose power structure which differed depending on the illi, but were consist in being led by village elders or strong warriors, and in representing a political unit. It was common during the precolonial era and throughout the Spanish colonial era for villages to negotiate peace with other villages over land disputes, trading routes, resource sharing, or disputes with other illis. These peace agreements were known as bodongs, representing the shared interest of multiple illi. Just as common as peace agreements were situations of enmity amongst illis, and it was very common for groups to engage in violent conflict on the illi political level, but not on an ethnolinguistic political unit level (Finin 2006, ch.1 under “The Gran Cordillera Central as a Region”). While it is popularized in general Philippine history that the distinction of Cordilleran ethnic groups from other indigenous Filipino groups is based on highlander vs lowlander geographical differences, there is little to no evidence of group unification or any nationalist sentiments as highlanders, especially in pre-colonial and colonial eras. Amongst these ethnolinguistic groups existed differences in style of dress, systems of belief, architectural styles, along with economic trading networks (Finin 2006, ibid.). In fact, many Cordillera groups sought trade in lowlander villages outside of the mountains, towards the coasts, and with Chinese merchants, rather than other Cordillerans (Finin 2006, ibid.). Discursive analysis shows that ethnolinguistic groups in the precolonial and Spanish colonial era here did not fit common western or Euro-centric definitions of ethnic groups, as far as political power relations, possession of land, resource sharing, and economics.

Despite the linguistic, cultural, and economic differences between these highlander ethnic groups in the precolonial era, the encompassing term “Igorot” began to be utilized during the Spanish colonial era to identify the highlander ethnic groups of this region. This Igorot identity was labeled by lowlander groups who were more subservient to Spanish colonial rule, and Spanish colonials (Anderson, Reed, and Sardalla 1996, 77). Dr. William Henry Scott, an American historian and anthropologist who focused his research on, and lived in the Cordillera region, found that the Igorot label is of indigenous lowlander origins by way of linguistics. In Tagalog ‘igolot’ means “dwellers in/people of a mountain chain”, and in some local lowlander dialects, ‘golot’ means mountain with an i- prefix
head-hunting tradition among these mountain people” (Ferrer 2020, ch. 5 pa. 3). This came with negative connotations of the mountainous ethnic groups, their culture of resistance and independence, and fearless defense of their indigenous lands from Spanish invaders. The word became connotatively synonymous with rebel or bandit, and “perpetuated a negative and highly prejudiced image that was carried over to the postcolonial period” (Ferrer 2020, ch. 5 under “From Igorot to Cordillera”). Throughout the Spanish colonial era however, unification amongst some of these ethnic groups and saliency of a more pan-ethnic identity became increasingly prevalent through a shared resistance to Spanish invaders.

Spanish colonization was largely focused on urban planning and geographically transforming communities by Christianizing villages throughout the Philippines, which was heavily resisted by Cordillera ethnic groups. While the Spanish viewed this resistance as rebelling and not as a united stand for independence, the Spanish were able to stoke enmity between Christianized lowlanders and the pagan highlanders. Cultural differences began to became increasingly prevalent over the three centuries of Spanish rule, as the Hispanicized lowlanders adopted practices that highlanders “frowned on contemptuously”, adopting colonial perspectives and viewing the pagan highlanders as “an embarrassment” and as being uneducated savages (Finin 2006, ch. 2 under “Precolonial Life and Spanish Rule”). Numerous attempts by the Spanish to establish military outposts near Baguio or roads through Cordillera territory were met with violence and resistance. In 1750, an attempted construction of a road between Pangasinan and Cagayan was met with resistance by the Ifugaos (ethnic group within Cordillera), and led to a “150 year war with the Ifugaos” which included dozens of military expeditions by Spanish soldiers (Scott 1993, 5). By 1850, the Ifugao had driven out all Spanish missionaries from three major illis in their territory and attacked a nearby military outpost for decades until the revolution began, when the Ifugao massacred the Spanish soldiers in their territory and sent 600 men south to continue the fight (Scott 1993, 5). At this time however, there was still no wide acceptance of a pan-ethnic identity amongst Cordillera ethnic groups. While stark differences began to develop between Cordillera groups and colonized lowlanders, Cordillera illis interacted similarly to the pre-colonial era, where peace agreements were made, but intervillage fighting and warfare was common, especially as illis were displaced by the Spanish (Finin 2006, ch. 2 under “Precolonial Life and Spanish Rule”).
American colonial rule was marked by the co-optation of Cordillera ethnic groups and the manipulation and utilization of tensions between Cordillera groups and lowlanders in order to establish systems of control through labor exploitation in mining and a standardized education system, forcing the development of a pan-ethnic Cordillera identity. The Americans organized the Cordillera mountains as one province (Mountain Province), and established 7 sub-provinces, based on the most prominent ethnic groups (Apayao, Amburayan, Benguet, Bontoc, Ifugao, Kalinga, and Lepanto). Tribal leaders were selected as American deputies in sub-provincial governments, typically ones who “had, prior to the American presence, proven themselves as fearless and successful headhunters”, which coincided with a common cultural high regard for warriors and headhunters amongst Cordillera groups (Finin 2006, ch. 3 under “Americans in Mountain Province”). American rulers facilitated the condensing of ethnic groups, as village leaders were gathered for meetings in sub-provincial capitals. The Americans established a respect between themselves and highlanders which allowed for “social changes and adaptations necessary for organizing the newly created sub-provinces”, but this meant labor exploitation in order to extract gold and other resources from the mountains (Finin 2006, ibid.). It is important to note that while the colonial political unit of the sub-province included the linking of many illis by more broad ethnic groups, consciousness and acceptance of others in their sub-province as compatriots only occurred due to the imposition of these institutions by the Americans.

The establishment of a Cordillera education system by the Americans further institutionalized highlander and lowlander differences, and continued to develop a pan-ethnic consciousness. The Trinidad Agricultural School was located in Benguet sub-province and was meant to “train highlanders in ‘modern’ agriculture”, but was most importantly based on the premise that “highlanders should not mix with lowlanders” due to different habits of life and observed experiences that highlander students “rapidly develop an inferiority complex”. (Finin 2006, ch.4 under “Trinidad Agricultural School”) Many career pathways for graduates encouraged them to remain in the highlands as teachers, political leaders, and administrators for Mountain Province public schools, and for provincial and sub-provincial governments. As students returned to their respective sub-provinces, they brought with them a consciousness of other sub-provinces, ethnic groups, and their similarities and shared ancestral history as highlanders and Cordillera. The Trinidad School was also able to reinforce and, through the impact of the school’s young alumni, institutionalize cultural differences between highlanders and lowlanders (Castro n.d., 6).
American colonial rule in the Cordillera heavily focused on exploiting the gold mines in the mountains and establishing a mining industry, paid for by US interests and private entrepreneurs from the lowlands, at the expense of Cordillera laborers from across the region. For years, illis located near gold reserves would create small mines to be used for trade to benefit their illi. In the 1930s, multiple American and lowlander-supported mining companies expanded these small community mines into industrial-scale mines. Americans exploited tensions between highlanders and lowlanders through wage competition and initially hiring lowlanders to work in the mines. This eventually attracted thousands of Cordillera men to uproot their families from ancestral illis to move closer to and work in the mines for a living (Finin 2006, ch.4 under “Cordillera Mining”). American managers separated highlander workers and lowlander workers and broadly referred to Cordillera laborers as Igorots (Finin 2006, ch.4 under “Division of Labor in Mines”). In just a few decades, the mountains had been completely altered through rapidly industrialized mines, cutting of forests for logging and water pollution, amongst other environmentally detrimental practices that impacted these ancestral lands (Anderson, Reed, and Sardalla 1996, 82). American rule was marked by displacing communities, forcing migration, ascribing the Igorot/Cordillera identity to highlanders, normalizing a highlander/lowlander divide, and physically altering their lands.

After the Americans granted the Philippines its independence, previous prejudices and classifications of highlander ethnic groups as Cordillera or Igorot were maintained and further institutionalized. Until 1966, the Mountain Province was maintained, electoral and regional politics remained largely the same as under American colonial rule, and per the independence agreement, corporate interests were allowed to continue mining and competing for natural resources throughout the Cordillera. The new government, however, did not share a political relationship with Cordillerans as the Americans did, making Cordillerans feel like “second class citizens within the Philippine polity” (Ferrer 2020, ch. 3 under “Felt Discrimination”). Free market practices and the persistence of corporate mining continued to bleed the Cordillera of resources and of capital, as laborers continued to be exploited while landowners and company officials reaped profits (Ferrer 2020, ibid.). Environmental impacts from industrialization affected diet patterns of Cordillerans and Western goods flowed into the region, along with pressured adoption of Western medical practices (Ferrer 2020, ibid.). Development projects commissioned by the Philippine government were typically decided on with little say from local officials, leading to situations like the Ambuklao-Binga Dam project in Benguet. Through building the largest hydroelectric dam in Asia, which supplied power
to communities outside of Mountain Province, the Philippine government had displaced hundreds of Ibaloi families, who argued that promises made by the government to assist them were not kept (Ferrer 2020, ch. 3 under “Growth of the Resistance”). Simultaneously, younger alumni networks stemming from the Trinidad Agricultural School were becoming increasingly conscious of the impact of the highlander/lowlander divide on their province’s development in various sectors (Finin 2006, ch.4 under “Trinidad Agricultural School”). A Philippine national identity was being formed that was “Christianized” and “Westernized”, and in many ways excluded Cordillera ethnic groups.

Movement for Cordillera Autonomy
Throughout the post-war era and into the Marcos era of Philippine politics, Cordillera-rooted organizations in different sects of society were rising, uniting topics of nationalism, religion, and social ideology with a growing desire to retain indigenous ways of life and reconnect with Cordillera identities. In the 1970’s many Cordillera students began to seek higher education outside of the provinces in Manila, where students were becoming more politically active, and beginning to organize against then-President Marcos. Cordillera student activists, noticing that fellow students in Manila paid less political attention to disparities that disadvantaged Cordillera provinces, formed a highlander student organization, Hi-Act (Highlander Activists). This group recognized “their unity as Igorots was important in relation to the broader political struggle” (Finin 2006, ch. 8 under “Igorot Students in Manila Transformed”). While young Cordillera activists sympathized with this nationalist Filipino movement against Marcos, their disillusionment from lowlander students as Igorots remained, and they were “informed and enriched through a fuller understanding of existing indigenous institutions in Cordillera society” (Finin 2006, ibid.).

Throughout the Cordillera, organizations linking Cordillera societal reform and religious beliefs were rising. The Communist People’s Party (CPP) was attempting to establish footholds in the Cordillera provinces in the early 1970’s, with little success, but their broader success in the Philippines led to the enacting of martial law by Marcos. The martial law era included the proposition of development projects in Abra, Kalinga-Apayao, and Mountain Provinces in the Cordillera, which galvanized a wider Cordillera rebellion against the Philippine government, pushing Cordillera nationalist sentiments into a nationalist movement. Within the Cordillera, educated professionals and religious leaders were beginning to advocate for societal,
Opposition to the development projects first united Bontoc and Kalinga illis, then religious organizations and other highlander youth activist groups, followed by the revamped CPP-NPA (Communist People’s Party joined with New People’s Army as a military wing) created a broad movement for a larger Cordillera autonomy. The largest proposed logging project in Abra and construction of four hydroelectric dams in Kalinga and Mountain Province would have displaced nearly 10,000 people, with little government planning on the relocation of affected peoples. After Bontoc and Kalinga elders’ requests to meet with government officials were ignored, a bodong, a traditional peace pact between illis, was formed in 1975 under supervision of religious organizations (Ferrer 2020, ch.3 under “Growth of the Resistance”). As protests against the development projects grew, the CPP-NPA provided assistance which allowed protesters to lead higher-scale attacks against the development project’s survey camps, and allowed the CPP-NPA to influence the movement to be more anti-government (Buendia 1991, 344). Among the bodong’s initial demands were land rights and “self-determination to manage their resources and to maintain communal socioeconomic systems according to established cultural traditions and social control mechanisms” (Hyndman 1991, 3). In 1980, Kalinga elder and protest leader Macli-ing Dulang was murdered by soldiers and became a martyr for the larger Cordillera movement, as his societal views were heavily pan-ethnically based. In 1983, the original bodong was first expanded to include rising organizations from other provinces and changed their name to the Cordillera Bodong Administration. By 1984, they joined with 26 other student, professional, religious, and political organizations to form the Cordillera Peoples Alliance (CPA), which would become the largest legal political organization advocating and lobbying for the creation of a Cordillera Autonomous Region (Castro n.d., 14). The CPP-NPA organized and funded many Cordillera-based underground militant organizations, but after disagreements within the party and the military units, a faction splintered from the NPA, forming the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA), which became the militant organization which paralleled the popularity and influence of the CPA, although the groups had multiple philosophical differences (Ferrer 2020, ch.3 under “The Split”). The outbreak of armed conflict throughout the Cordillera for autonomy, along with the rise of legal groups like the CPA advocating for Cordillera autonomy, show that pan-ethnic nationalist sentiments could no longer go unheard by the Philippine government.
Pacification of the Movement, Struggle to Create Autonomy

Thus far, it is clear that nationalist sentiments for a pan-ethnic Cordillera people existed, and these sentiments manifested in a large-scale, militant and legislative movement for autonomy that helped to destabilize and topple the authoritarian Marcos government. This movement is regarded as the pinnacle of pan-ethnic sentiments in the region, but multiple efforts from the government after this moment to create an autonomous region for the Cordillera have since failed. The following research will look into the Executive Order establishing the Cordillera Administrative Region and the two Congressional acts which preceded Cordillera referendums on autonomy. Through analysis of census data, referendum results, socioeconomic and cultural differences, and activity of the CPA, CPLA, other nongovernmental organizations and tribal elders, I will shed light on operational reasons as to why autonomy has eluded this region.

The fall of Marcos brought lasting change for the Cordillera region, as the new democratically elected Aquino government announced the abandonment of the development projects and began peace negotiations with the CPLA on the issue of autonomy for the Cordillera. The establishment of the Cordillera Administrative Region, however, did not fully fulfill the goals of the CPA, CPLA, or the broad scope of the Cordillera movement for autonomy. In 1986, President Aquino traveled to Mount Data to establish a bodong with the CPLA, CBAd, and associated organizations, who had been maintaining hostilities. The growth of the CPLA and its co-opting of the former CBA and rebranding as the CBAd as its administrative wing greatly weakened the CPA, as tensions between the various pan-ethnic autonomy groups in the region were rising (Buendia 1991, 346). The agreement made between Aquino and the CPLA involved the end of hostilities towards the government and the establishment of a Cordillera autonomous regional government, with the CPLA as its security force (Finin 2006, ch. 9 under “Cordillera Regional Autonomy”). With the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, however, came shifts in governance and representation throughout the provinces, as highlander politicians more politically in line with “conventional lowland structures of governance” gained control of political institutions and Congressional seats and were invited to negotiate with President Aquino on establishing the Cordillera Administrative Region, replacing the CPLA and CBAd (Finin 2006, ibid.).

Executive Order 220 (EO 220), signed into law in 1987, created the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) and established a Cordillera Regional Assembly and Executive Board (whose members would be appointed by President Aquino), and incorporated the CBAd as a commission within the CAR (Executive Order 220, 1987). The Administrative Region included the
provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao (later separated into two provinces), and Mountain province. Per the Executive Order and the 1987 Constitution however, any move to establish the Cordillera as a fully autonomous region required the passage of an organic act in Congress, and then a plebiscite amongst the Cordillera provinces where a majority of the population must vote for it to count (Finin 2006, ch.9 under “Cordillera Regional Autonomy”). This limited the innovation and flexibility for Cordillera leaders and groups to establish what an autonomous Cordillera would look like. Because the majority of legislators in the Philippines were raised outside of precolonial institutions and ways of life, any sort of autonomy too radically different from modern Philippine politics would not be viable and would not pass in Congress. The creation of the Administrative Region would best be described as confusing for the general Cordillera population, as the difference between autonomous and administrative meant very little to the general public and no pan-ethnic Cordillera organization (CPLA, CBAd, CPA) was in support or included in the negotiations (Finin 2006, ibid.) It took more than a year for appointments to the Regional Assembly, Executive Board, and other commissions to be made for an Organic Act to be negotiated. It became clear that any path to autonomy was going to be through government control, which left any autonomous proposal to be subject to corruption, lack of representation, and most importantly the pacification of the movement.

Just a year after President Aquino appointed officials to the Cordillera regional institutions, an Organic Act had passed Congress and was signed into law, leaving the Cordillera only a plebiscite referendum away from autonomy. The Organic Act would establish the Cordillera as an autonomous region within the Philippines, and created regional institutions similar to the Philippine government system (Congressional Act no. 6766, 1989). The Act’s biggest failure was that it still allowed national government oversight over ancestral domain and natural resources, which was one of the main policy demands amongst autonomy groups over the years (Hyndman 1991, 178-179). The officials appointed to advocate and write the legislation were lowlanders, or highlanders separated from the original autonomous movement. Leaders of Regional Assembly, Executive Board, and other commissions within the new regional government were former leaders from the autonomous movement but had been co-opted by the Philippine government. The passing of this Organic Act elicited two responses from the Cordillera, one from the general public and one from the activists still fighting for what they viewed as ‘true’ autonomy. Activists still involved with the CPLA, CPA, or other organizations that had been pacified by the Philippine government were publicly opposed to the Organic Act,
and campaigned against the Act. A CPA newsletter wrote “genuine autonomy as envisioned by the Cordillera people is the empowerment of the majority of the Cordillera masses. That is what the Cordillera struggle is for, anything less should be rejected as the Cordillera Autonomy Law shall be” (“Statement of the Cordillera Peoples Alliance” 1989, p. 16). The CPLA campaigned on a counter proposal, an autonomous government under which the system of governance would be a bodong peace-pact system, more similar to pre-colonial institutions (Hyndman 1991, 180). With the new Philippine government again attempting to change the system of governance for the Cordillera, and with the existing autonomy organizations that Cordillerans were aware of being publicly opposed to the Organic Act, the general public was unsure of the Act and the results of the referendum reflected this. Around 70% of Cordillerans voted against the Act, with only the province of Ifugao approving the referendum. The prospects of an autonomous government being established began to wane, as the philosophical divides amongst existing autonomy organizations became more apparent and efforts by the government to dictate autonomy onto the Cordillera were not being accepted by these groups or by the general Cordillera public.

The mid-1990’s saw a resurgence of the autonomy movement, as the Organic Act was passed again with minimal changes and another plebiscite was held. President Ramos, elected in 1992, strongly supported autonomy as a means of establishing peace and stability in the region. This Organic Act held mostly the same language as the previous Organic Act, with small changes made on the subject of natural resources as the Philippine government now only maintained control over coal, uranium, and petroleum. (Congressional Act no. 8438, 1997). This included a widespread information campaign led by the government to ensure that the Cordillera people were informed of the Organic Act and what autonomy would mean for them. This information campaign was subject to corruption however, as elected officials for each province were entrusted with the campaign funds to spread the information and reports came that some officials were using the money to bribe citizens, while others were pocketing the cash for themselves (“Militants Seek Real Autonomy for Cordillera” 2020).

Similar to the previous referendum, the specifics of the Organic Act were made without consulting village elders, and held to similar circles of politicians and educated highlanders who had been co-opted by both the regional and national governments in some capacity. This referendum failed again, with 62% of Cordillerans voting against and only Apayao province approving of the Organic Act (“Militants Seek Real Autonomy for Cordillera”
autonomy as a form of self-determination for the Cordillera”, and they wanted real autonomy to include “full recognition of indigenous peoples’ rights and the institutional rectification of national oppression and discrimination” (Cordillera Peoples Alliance, 2020). At this time, CPLA membership and influence was decreasing, as quarrels with the CPP-NPA resulted in the assassination of the organization’s founder in 1999. Two years after the plebiscite, the Philippines collected census data across the country, including ethnic identification which includes around 150 different possible responses. While ethnic groups within the Cordillera such as Ifugao or Kalinga were collected (17,867 and 12,830, respectively), there was no data collection for anyone to identify as Igorot or Cordillera, just two years after a plebiscite asking thousands to publicly identify with those an-ethnic identifiers, and establish an autonomous region (IPUMS 2000, Census Data). With organizations again campaigning against the plebiscite, government officials misusing campaign funds, and changes only being made to the Organic Act by highlanders co opted by the government, the Cordillerans were further disillusioned to the concept and plausibility of regional autonomy.

**Analysis**

The history of this region and the ethnic groups that reside there have exhibited that, based off the theoretical framework of Renan, Gellner, Weber and others, there is a pan-ethnic identity; there are similarities amongst these ethnic groups that bring them together; and at one time, there were intense nationalist sentiments and a larger national movement that sought real autonomy based around this identity. Ongoing efforts by organizations like the CPA and some Cordillera lawmakers to establish this autonomy reflect that some sentiments remain, but is the identity still salient? Is autonomy for this region still plausible? The answer is unclear for a number of reasons, and requires further research into current ongoing pan-ethnic unification efforts.

The modern political context of the Philippines and the Cordillera region complicates any effort to create an autonomous region, especially with Executive Order 220 and the Organic Acts as the foundation. The Aquino government’s initial ignoring of the CPA in negotiating what would become EO 220 and lack of recognition of the CPLA in the Executive Order showed that any path to autonomy was going to be in the government’s best interests. Gaining complete rights to ancestral domain and the resources that the Cordillera region provides, for economic and ecological preservation reasons, were some of the original principles of the broader autonomous movement.
The commonality of corruption among politicians in the Philippines was present in the Cordillera as well, shown during the campaign for the second Organic Act. Along with this, educated Cordillerans continue to be co-opted by the regional and federal government and unknowingly perpetuate a disconnection between Cordillerans and their roots to indigenous ways of life, similar to the educated Cordillerans before the autonomous movements began. The maintenance of patronage politics was important to politicians outside of the CAR, thus making the passing of an Organic Act not possible if outsider politicians could not also be satisfied (Ferrer 2020, ch.3 under “Failed Autonomy Project”). The CPA recognizes the problem of corruption, patronage politics and ruling elites when it comes to autonomy. They believe that one of the largest obstacles to regional autonomy is “that the ruling elites in Philippine Society will be against [autonomy] if the natural resources are to be used primarily for the indigenous peoples’ benefit” (Cordillera Peoples Alliance 2020). Ancestral domain and control of natural resources are basics to the autonomy movement, as many village elders recognize. By not including village elders in negotiations for EO 220 or the Organic Acts, it became apparent that when it came to the CAR government, “rural village leaders could expect little real voice in the political process” (Finin 2006, ch. 9 under “Cordillera Regional Autonomy”). The political system of the Philippines is adopted from previous American colonial rule, with the post-Marcos Constitution making little changes to that status quo especially in the case of seeking Cordillera autonomy.

A major issue of the autonomous movements is the lack of cultural understanding of the Cordillera and the questionable saliency of a pan-ethnic identity. More recently, movements for autonomy and negotiations for the passage of a new Organic Act were being spearheaded by former Ifugao Congressman Teodoro Baguilat Jr. He questioned whether autonomy was something the Cordillera still wanted, and a recent survey of the provinces found that 40-60% of respondents were either unaware of or undecided about autonomy (Baguilat Jr. 2013, under “Third Attempt”). As the most recent plebiscite referendum is over 20 years in the past, autonomous activists and local lawmakers like Teddy Baguilat run into the issue of lack of interest and lack of understanding of the autonomous movement in general. The reality is that the Cordillera identity is salient when it comes to comparisons to the larger national Philippine context. However, if you were to ask a Cordilleran how they identify, they would respond with their ethnic group – Kalinga, Ifugao, Bontoc, etc. Within the
resource management systems and conflict resolution mechanisms” (Ferrer 2020, ch.3 under “Failed Autonomy Project”). While the movement calls for a reclamation of indigenous ways of life, what does this mean to distinct ethnic groups who are generations separated from ancestral histories?

One of the most uniting factors of the Cordillera identity is the shared history of resistance and independence, which finds its origins in the illi system of governance. In the pre-colonial era and during Spanish colonialism, illi’s were the extent of ethnic identification and as discussed, it was common for illi’s to war with each other, a crucial factor to the headhunting history of Cordillera ethnic groups. Now centuries removed from this, the shared history of resistance, independence, and loyalty to respective illi’s has created a paradoxical unification of Cordillerans. By this I mean that the present-day Cordillera are able to create bodong’s and alliances to defeat common enemies and advocate for a restoration and protection of their indigenous ways of life. But this very same sense of resistance and independence makes full subscription to a Cordillera pan-ethnic identity limited, as none of these ethnic groups thus far have sacrificed, forgotten, or traded their ethnic identity for the larger Cordillera or Igorot identity. The limits of a pan-ethnic identity, coupled with a repressive political context have created a passivity in the autonomous movement that complicates further development. The Philippine government’s co opting of the autonomous movement has both limited any possible paths towards autonomy, and also pacified the nongovernmental autonomous organizations and village elders by not giving them the representation needed to establish what could be seen as a true autonomy that fits pan-ethnic Cordillera identity.

**Conclusion**

Throughout this research, various conclusions have been drawn on identity, identity formation, and the transformation of an ascribed pan-ethnic identity into a nationalist movement. Background on the ascription of a pan-ethnic Cordillera/Igorot identity on the ethnic groups of this region was done through analyzing the colonial histories of Cordillera ethnic groups, specifically within the scope of their identity consciousness. Further research could be able to track a specific ethnic group, analyzing a specific illi’s or sub-ethnic group’s experiences with the ascribed identity. While religion plays a role in the Cordillera constitutive story in terms of responses to Spanish and American colonial rule, and on the autonomous movement, little detail was provided on the impact of religion due to its lower priority in the region,
especially in comparison to the Moro movements for autonomy in Mindanao which were completely centered on religion. Understanding of the pan-ethnic Cordillera identity and its intricacies and limitations provide context for the autonomous movement. The autonomous movement’s militant influence and ability to turn opposition to the Chico River Dam project and the Abra logging project into an issue for all Cordillerans were incredibly important in broadening the movement. Intergroup tensions amongst Cordillera autonomy groups gave the government the ability to co-opt the autonomy movement after Marcos’ presidency. This entrapped any future path to autonomy to be limited in its scope to be acceptable to the larger Philippine government, which brought with it the complications of true representation of the Cordillera and its diverse ethnic groups, patronage politics, and a lack of cultural understanding of the Cordillera amongst the general Philippine population. These limitations have subsequently caused the failure of both Organic Acts and plebiscites since the passing of EO 220, and brought into question whether autonomy for the Cordillera is feasible. The pan-ethnic Cordillera identity remains salient and the autonomous movement is still relatively recent history, but current political context and a lack of broad unification across the Cordillera around the cause due to previously mentioned obstacles has complicated the path to autonomy.

All of the above reasons are valid and operationally researchable aspects of why autonomy continues to elude this region. What connects each of these reasons is the root saliency of the pan-ethnic Cordillera identity. Historically tracing this identity throughout the pre-colonial, colonial, and modern eras has shown that the shared constitutive story of the Cordillera ethnic groups is centered on resistance, forming bodongs to combat invaders of the ancestral lands, and survival amidst exploitation, displacement, inequality, and generational differences with lowlander Filipinos. While this shared constitutive story and generations of forced cohesion amongst Cordillera ethnic groups unifies them all in history, culture, and political perspectives, they have not achieved autonomy. Gerard Finin suggests that possibly, “pacification of the Cordillera might, in and of itself, have been sufficient to establish the idea of one Igorot people of the Cordillera” (Finin 2006, ch. 10 under “The Igorot of the Cordillera”). Further research could be done from a post-colonial perspective, emphasizing the indigenous aspects of the movement and the viability to reclaim and reassert indigenous ways of life. I suggest that further research be done specifically on the paradoxical identity that
continue to be efforts for autonomy. I believe that this identity’s paradoxical nature of being centered on resistance and outward invaders complicates any efforts to unify and organize around it as a pan-ethnic identity, and that the saliency of sub-ethnic groups in the Cordillera is too great for autonomy to be fully realized today.
Works Cited


Appendix

Appendix 1: Political Map of Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR)

Appendix 2. Provincial Vote Tallies for 1990 Plebiscite on Organic Act

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province/City</th>
<th>Yes Votes</th>
<th>No Votes</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abra</td>
<td>10,832</td>
<td>53,521</td>
<td>(42,689)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benguet</td>
<td>8,974</td>
<td>73,246</td>
<td>(64,272)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ifugao</td>
<td>20,158</td>
<td>14,269</td>
<td>5,889</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalinga-Apayao</td>
<td>17,919</td>
<td>27,898</td>
<td>(9,979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mt. Province</td>
<td>15,094</td>
<td>16,505</td>
<td>(1,411)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baguio City</td>
<td>7,918</td>
<td>38,083</td>
<td>(30,165)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>80,835</td>
<td>223,522</td>
<td>(142,687)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: COMELEC Resolution No. 2259

Appendix 3.: Provincial Vote Tallies for 1998 Plebiscite on Organic Act

Abra, 22,684 (yes), 39,897 (no); 20
Apayao, 23,201 (yes), 7,741 (no); 20
Baguio City, 19,205 (yes), 114,043 (no);
Benguet, 15,345 (yes), 69,823 (no); 20
Ifugao, 16,417 (yes), 18,476 (no);
Mountain Province, 16,154 (yes), 25,982 (no); and 20
Kalinga, 21,841 (yes), 25,631 (no).
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*Clocks and Clouds* is an American University undergraduate research journal that publishes articles on the cutting edge of political science, international studies, and public policy. The journal is meant to add a voice to the intellectual dialogue both within the American University community and in broader academia. Our name comes from the work of philosopher Karl Popper, where clouds are a metaphor for the disorderly and irregular in social science while clocks represent the predictable and rational. By providing a venue for top undergraduate research, *Clocks and Clouds* aims to find the clocks amidst the clouds.

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