All clouds are clocks—
even the most cloudy
of clouds.

-Karl Popper
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Greek and Greek-American Youth’s Perceptions of Religion

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This year’s edition of *Clocks and Clouds* is in memoriam of our advisor Professor Lucia Seybert. We are forever grateful for the leadership and guidance she provided to the journal. Her legacy will live on in this edition, and each forthcoming edition, of *Clocks and Clouds*.

*Clocks and Clouds* was founded eight years ago. Since then, the journal has grown and changed each year, and it has been our honor to be a part of its continued legacy. The journal’s ongoing mission to provide an outlet for premiere undergraduate research in political science and international relations continues to connect students, faculty, and administrators across our university. This year has been no different. Each year, we are impressed by the quality of the research American University students submit to the journal, and are faced with difficult decisions. This year, we are proud to highlight nine pieces of stellar undergraduate research, representing diverse methodologies and topics.

Amanda Borth explores the discourses surrounding “eco-labeled” companies, shedding light on contemporary sustainable development discourses. Ben Shaver applies game theory to cases of triadic deterrence and explores the role of non-state actors in conflict. Sean Steiner compares and contrasts Russia’s image and military actions. Maria Adamou examines Greek and Greek-American identities through the lens of religion. The diversity of perspectives, topics, and methodologies in the journal you now hold is a testament to the thriving undergraduate research environment at American University. We are immensely grateful to the administrators and faculty in the School of Public Affairs and the School of International Service who have made research such a strong presence and valuable tool for learning on our campus.

*Clocks and Clouds* is based on the premise that undergraduate students have ideas that matter. Join us in reading and listening to what these students have to say.

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GREEK AND GREEK-AMERICAN YOUTH’S PERCEPTIONS OF RELIGION

Maria Adamou

Abstract

This paper examines the attitudes of Greek/Cypriot and Greek-American young adults vis-à-vis Greek Orthodoxy. It looks at the subject of identity formation utilizing the well-studied lens of religion to examine youth, a demographic which is largely absent from the relevant literature. Employing an ethnographic framework, this paper investigates the various roles of religion in identity formation using the common religious affiliation in both groups of young adults. The research question asks how Greek/Cypriot and Greek-American youth view questions of religion and identity differently from each other? Three major analytic categories emerged from the study that demonstrate differences in perception between Greek/Cypriot and Greek-American young adults: the role of women and the family in Greek-Orthodoxy, the role of the Greek language in the Church, and the role of religious tradition in preserving ethnic identity in a social context.

Introduction

Ethnic communities in the United States are all connected through issues of migration. Up until the mid 1970s, Greece was a country of emigration (Kaloudis 2008, 29-30). As one of the historic examples of diaspora, the Greek community provides an ideal case for the investigation of the movement of people and their settlement in nations such as the United States (Roudometof 2000, 367). The Greek community has existed in the United States since the nineteenth century. Immigrants arriving in various waves allow for a cross-generational analysis of the Greek-American community. The movement of
people between Greece and the United States produced a vibrant immigrant community that fostered strong ties between Greece and the Greek diaspora in the United States. This provides for a case study that reaches through multiple generations. Within the diaspora, there are fourth and fifth generation immigrants, as well as those who have newly migrated, making for a dynamic and ever-changing community (Roudometof 2000, 380).

I concentrated my research on the diversity among young adults, an understudied aspect of the community, rarely mentioned in literature concerning the Greek diaspora (Constantinou 1989, 99 and Scourby 1980, 43). Religion was a focal point in the literature surrounding Greek-American identity and the concept of nationhood (Pollis 1993, 339). Both perspectives provided insights into the concept of identity formation in the Greek-American community. By merging the two highlighted aspects, either by their omission or by their prevalence in the literature, I asked the question of how the newly migrated Greek/Cypriot young adults and the second and third generation Greek-American young adults view national and religious identities differently. Three major analytic categories emerged from the question regarding: the status of women in Greek-Orthodoxy, the role of the Greek language, and how religious traditions preserve ethnic identity.

This research project was situated within a larger institutional frame. This pilot study was conducted as part of an undergraduate course in International Relations research methods. Since it was conducted during the semester, the scope of the study was limited to the Washington D.C. metropolitan area. These parameters also enabled the investigation of young adults, since a university is the perfect location for gathering participants. That limited the number of participants that could be interviewed, thus necessitating the utilization of other research methods such as participant observation and textual analysis. This limitation poses questions concerning the implications of the findings. Such a small-scale study cannot, and should not, lead to generalizable conclusions, however, it can point to avenues of further research, in this case concerning women and their role in Greek-Orthodoxy.

The rationale for this study is twofold. The literature pointed to a gap in the investigation of youth and their connection to the Greek-Orthodox church. While there was substantial literature on the role that the first, second, and third generations play in the development of the Greek-American community (Scourby 1980, 44), there was no discussion concerning people of the same generation who belong to different elements of the diaspora. There was also no literature comparing young adults who had just arrived in the U.S. with young adults identifying as second and third generation Greek-Americans. Since a
common religious affiliation was shared by both groups I used it to investigate the roles of religion in identity formation (Safran 2008, 172).

**Literature Review**

Three major schools of thought emerged delineating various aspects of the Greek diaspora in the United States. The first focuses on generational differences within the Greek-American community within the context of intergenerational perceptions of ethnic and religious identity. It sheds light on major cultural differences between first, second, and third generation Greek-Americans. The second discusses the Greek diaspora in the context of transnationalism, defining diaspora as an amalgamation of those who identify on a spectrum from Greek/Cypriot to Greek-American. The emphasis is placed on the ties and interests that Greeks abroad share with those in Greece, irrespective of their positionality in the United States. The third looks at how Greek-American identity is constructed through the diaspora community and in the United States, stressing the creation of a Greek-American identity separate and apart from that which is considered Greek. Each school of thought frames the research question through a different lens and highlights the existing explanations concerning differing perceptions of ethno-religious identity.

*Generational Differences*

The literature argues that the generational differences among first, second, and third generation Greek-Americans are stark. As more generations pass, the further assimilated Greek-Americans become in terms of ethnic and religious identity. Major markers of ethnicity in the literature are use of the spoken Greek language, cultural and religious engagement within the Greek-Orthodox Church, and a preference for endogamy in the Greek-American community. While each of these cultural markers is inherently intertwined, analyzing components of ethnic and religious identity can help unpack generational differences.

The use of the Greek language within the cultural and religious activity of the Greek-Orthodox Church in different generations was the focus of several studies surrounding the Greek diaspora. First generation immigrants were found to value the Greek language more than second or third generation immigrants, while second generation Greek-Americans were more involved with sociocultural and religious Greek events than either the first or third
generations. Third generation Greek-Americans were not as active in the Greek-Orthodox Church, nor as likely to speak Greek. However, they still actively identified as Greek-American (Constantinou 1989, 115). As the generations progressed, the tendency was for Greek-Americans to speak less Greek and be involved in fewer ethnically Greek activities (Scourby 1989, 50). Identity markers changed with each generation. While first generation immigrants marked their identity through the Greek language, identity markers shifted towards religious and cultural activities in the later generations. Essentially, each generation preserved and defined their Greek-American identity differently.

Endogamy and its relation to culture and religion played a significant role in the literature regarding generational differences within the Greek-American community. For example, Shultz examines cross-generational Greek-American identity asking the question of what ethnicity do first and second generation Greek-Americans prefer to marry. (Schultz 1979, 197). Both groups of participants preferred someone of Greek heritage, emphasizing the belief that marrying another Greek-American would preserve their ethnicity by marrying within the Greek-Orthodox Church (Schultz 1979, 200). This highlights the connection between religion and ethnicity by using a shared religion as a marker of common ethnic heritage. Endogamy and the preservation of ethnicity delineate identity markers in a multitude of ways. Scourby’s study examines these identity markers by surveying factors such as English replacing Greek as the main language in church, Greek-School attendance, intermarriage, contact with Greek mass media, and attitude towards the church (Scourby 1989, 47-49). As the generations progressed, the importance of the Greek language as an identity marker declined. However, other markers of identity such as endogamy and the importance of the Greek-Orthodox Church remained (Scourby 1989, 50).

This school of thought focuses on the generational differences between Greek-Americans and the impact of varying generational perspectives on ethnic identity, providing insights concerning the ever-evolving definition of a Greek-American. A major weakness, however, is that the literature surrounding generational differences is outdated. Most of the literature dates from the late 1970s to the late 1980s. A lack of literature since, points to a dearth of contemporary discussion surrounding generational differences. This gap, however, opens avenues, for studies such as this one, to reconsider the importance of generational difference in the Greek-American community as they relate to religious perceptions.
Greek Transnational Diaspora

The second body of literature discusses how the Greek diaspora influences Greece. Consideration is given to the depiction of the diaspora within the United States, the factors that influence the portrayal of “Greekness,” and the political and religious implications of that portrayal. Within the literature, Greek-Americans are depicted as a “model” immigrant minority, implying an ability to quickly assimilate into American culture (Roudometof 2000). Anagnostou criticizes that representation, arguing it homogenizes the diaspora community by dismissing the ties that the Greek diaspora in the U.S. have to Greece (Anagnostou 2003, 313). Transnational links between the diaspora and Greece were especially visible in the U.S. based lobbies formed after the fall of the 1974 junta. The late 1970s were a time when, the repatriation of Greeks previously living abroad in the United States, and the strength of the Greek-American lobby in the U.S. on issues concerning Greece and Cyprus, demonstrated how fruitful transitional ties are possible between the Greek-American diaspora community and Greece (Kaloudis 2008, 50-55).

However, portrayals of Greekness are bound with generational differences, while focusing on the transnational element of the U.S. based Greek diaspora. Roudometof (2000, 382) demonstrates this by conceptually differentiating between the recently migrated Greek diaspora and the established Greek-American community. Religion, however, is discussed as a unifying force in the diaspora. Through an historical case study, Vlami (1997), looks at the Greek immigrant community of Livorno and examines how they preserved their identity. By demonstrating the constitutive role that the Greek-Orthodox church played in the cultural identity of the, Greek-Orthodoxy is further validated as a shared identity marker (Vlami 1997, 86).

This body of literature focuses on broad trends that concern and unite the Greek diaspora, offering a macro perspective on questions of transnational identity and influence. The literature provides a lens through which to view the political and cultural influence of the Greek diaspora in the United States and around the world. While a more global perspective allows for the examination of unifying trends it risks treating the Greek diaspora in the United States as one large entity. This makes it easy to lose sight of the immense difference within the U.S. based Greek diaspora since it is impossible to down the identity of such a broad group (Anagnostou 2003 and Roudometof 2000). The diversity within the Greek diaspora can be melded with an intergenerational focus on the Greek diaspora in the United States providing a contextual basis
for this study on how Greek/Cypriot and Greek-American students regard their religious identity.

**Greek-American Identity**

The third school of thought focuses on the how Greek-American identity is constructed separate and apart from that which is considered “Greek.” Thus, creating the analytic category of Greek-American. The literature explains how perceptions of ethnicity vary within the diaspora community and the way in which ethnicity, religion and language combine to form Greek-American identities. This body of literature concentrates on different constructions of Greek-American identity, taking a micro approach in its analysis of the Greek diaspora.

Tziovas (2009) discusses the role of the Greek diaspora in shaping Greek-American identity into a hyphenated identity. He argues that a separate identity has been created by Greek diaspora in the United States, one that is not fully Greek nor fully American, but a combination of both (Tziovas 2009, 4). The Greek concept of ethnos, or nationhood, unites a national and religious identity and is crucial in the conceptualization of the Greek-American. In this manner, belonging to the Greek-Orthodox religion is a central aspect of “Greekness,” tying together those of Greek heritage regardless of their location or citizenship (Pollis 1993, 348). Ethnicity, religion, and language are all elements that are linked together in the conceptualization of the Greek-American (Safran 2008, 172). In this manner, identity can be constructed by transversing national identities.

The literature points to the various aspects that construct a distinct Greek-American identity. Through aspects such as language, perceptions of ethnicity, and religion within the U.S. diaspora. The focus on religion is especially pertinent to this study, since it attempts to examine how two different groups of youths within the Greek/Cypriot diaspora in the United States perceive their own identity using the lens of religion. The literature delineates the various facets that create a Greek-American identity. However, in addressing Greek-American identity formation, it does not address how and why some aspects, such as language, become less influential in the formation an ethnic identity while corresponding ones, such as religion, gain prominence.

The three schools of thought all address questions of identity in the Greek diaspora in the United States from a different angle. A focus on generational differences is key to understanding the evolution of a diasporic identity, however an outdated body of literature calls for fresh work on
the subject. The second perspective looks at the Greek diaspora from a transnational lens, connecting the dots between the U.S. based diaspora and Greece. However, due to its macro analytic scope, it fails to provide a nuanced picture of the differences specifically within the diaspora community in the United States. The third school of thought examines various factors that lead to the formation of a Greek-American identity. While the literature is not comprehensive in its examination of all the facets, the micro approach, utilized by the third school of thought is best placed to examine differing religious perspectives within the Greek and Greek-American student community in Washington D.C. The generational aspect, however, cannot be ignored in a study that focuses on youth. In that regard, this study is uniquely positioned to explore how micro perspective interacts with generational issues.

**Research Methodology**

An ethnographic method was employed in this study. Much of the literature revised employed ethnography (Scourby 1989, Schultz 1979, and Vlami 1997) to examine different aspects of the Greek diaspora. Since this research question asks how Greek/Cypriot and Greek-American youth view questions of religion differently, a case study such as the one conducted by Vlami (1997) was the most feasible way to go about the research design. The study also echoes elements used in other ethnographic work on the subject (Safran 2008), building on the existing research.

The three methods of data collection used over the course of the study were: semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and archival analysis. I interviewed three participants and completed four hours of participant observation, two at each site. I also felt that the research could be enriched with archival material from the Greek Orthodox Cathedral of Washington D.C. To that end, I collected three separate Sunday bulletins to analyze, which further substantiated my findings. Each method was used to create what Geertz (1973), a pioneer in the use of ethnography in cultural anthropology, referred to as “thick description” (Geertz 1973, 6), meaning that the data collection methods were all intended to create an accurate and nuanced portrayal of the actors involved.

The semi-structured interviews provided an opportunity to learn from others’ personal experience in a way that would not have been possible with structured surveys (Weiss 1995, 3). They provided three narratives that focused on the personal beliefs and observations of those interviewed. However, a major weakness of the study is the limited number the interviews. This was
due to the small number of Greek/Cypriot and Greek/American students on campus. The pool of potential participants was circumscribed, making it difficult to recruit volunteers since a one to two hour time commitment was needed from the participants. To overcome this shortcoming, the data was supplemented with participant observation and archival evaluation to provide a more complete analysis. The interviews, nevertheless, were crucial to the study since various angles of the research question were illuminated by the personal narratives of the participants.

I asked for participants to volunteer from members of the two major clubs that represented two student groups: the Orthodox Christian Fellowship (OCF), which the Greek-American participants were part of, and the American University Hellenic Society whose primary members are Greek/Cypriot students. Some of the participants knew each other prior to this study, while others were only vaguely aware of the existence of the other group of participants. There were three interview conducted in total, two of them were with members of the Greek-American community and one with an international student from Cyprus. The three interviews were conducted both on campus and in eateries in the surrounding neighborhood. They were all taped and then transcribed. The interview with the Cypriot international student was conducted and taped in Greek and then subsequently translated into English in the transcription stage. All names used in this study are pseudonyms.

Participant observation similarly constituted the base of the study. The goal of participant observation is to reveal the truth as others perceive it, and in doing so to form relationships that “do not so much disrupt or alter ongoing patterns of social interaction as reveal the terms and bases on which people form social ties in the first place” (Emerson, Fretz, and Shaw 2011, 3). Thus, the participant observation also framed the basis of the study by allowing an immersion in the culture of the sites. Visits to the field site allowed me to get a sense of the location and observe people interacting with each other in a relaxed setting. Participant observation was conducted at two locations: the coffee hour immediately following Sunday liturgy of the Greek Orthodox Cathedral of Washington D.C. and the Orthodox Christian Fellowship (OCF) meeting in American University’s Kay chapel. Both sites were chosen because they are places where the role of religion in Greek/Cypriot and Greek-American identity formation is visible.

Participant observation also exposed assumptions that underlie the analysis. Data collection occurred in venues that I was familiar with before the start of the study. Therefore, it was necessary to find a way to look at the two field sites in a fresh manner to cub underlying assumptions concerning the
behavior of the participants. To do so, I applied Glesne’s well-known mantra and sought to “make the strange familiar and the familiar strange” (Glesne 1992, 67). This phrase has gained prominence in within ethnographic research as a way of expressing the need to look at a well-known context in a different light. This exercise proved invaluable to the data collection process because it made me aware of the assumptions concerning the behavior of the participants at the two field sites. For example, I was already familiar with the way people conducted their everyday routines in the field sites and needed to remind myself to note and reflect on those happenings. In this manner, I was able to collect data on the interpersonal relations of the participants and to see how the personal accounts of the participants were manifested.

Archival research also enriched the final analysis through the examination of the Sunday church bulletins that were put out each week. I looked at three of the Sunday bulletins from the past semester and analyzed them for content, organization, and layout. They provided a window into written culture that was not otherwise mentioned, since in cultures which emphasize written production, the examination of documents can reveal aspects of the culture that would otherwise be hidden (Hammersly and Atkinson 2011, 158-159). In this manner, the Sunday bulletins revealed the public and advertised happenings of the church community in a way that interviews and participant observation would not have been able to.

**Findings/Implications**

From my interviews, participant observation, and analysis of the Sunday bulletins three broad themes emerged which shed light on my research question: how do Greek/Cypriot and Greek-American youth view questions of religion differently? The findings illuminated different aspects of Greek/Cypriot and Greek-American identity vis-à-vis religion. Three themes emerged: they concerned: the role of women and the family in Greek-Orthodoxy, the role of the Greek language and the Church, and the role of religious tradition in preserving ethnic identity in a social context. Each theme delineated an area where Greek/Cypriot and Greek-American youth view the role of religion differently.

The role of women and the family in Greek-Orthodoxy was noteworthy, and two of the participants spoke on the role that women play in the church and in their religious lives. One of the interviewees, Gus talked of his mother and grandmother and how they influenced his perceptions of Orthodoxy, saying that:
My mother is heavily involved in it. She had my father be baptized. When I was younger it would always be an experience where I would always go with my mother and grandmother. My grandmother was one of the yia-yas [grandmothers] everyone congregated around, she would sit at the end after communion and everyone would be passing by saying hello to her. You know how it is. It was very much a family affair. Afterwards we would go have lunch with everyone else or we would bring something for all of us. They [mother and grandmother] were heavily involved in it and I certainly know that had a big influence in me getting involved in the Greek Orthodox Church. (Interview, 3/27/2017)

Gus’ experience emphasizes the social aspect that women often play in Orthodoxy. His mother and grandmother were both catalysts in his involvement with the church and were responsible for socializing him into the church community. The role of women in the Greek-Orthodox church is then shown to be a family oriented one.

The function of women in the church community as providers was also highlighted during the dinner portion of OCF meetings. At the dinners that followed the OCF Vespers services, women from the Philoptohos, the national Greek-Orthodox women’s association, brought food and set up the meal while the students were in Vespers (Fiednotes, 4/3/2017). The labor that the women of the church provided was also prevalent in the church bulletins. The Philoptohos had ads or announcements in each of the bulletins about happenings in the church that they sponsored such as food drives, lectures, and bake sales. The constant mention of the Philoptohos society and of the women at church was unexpected, since it was not mentioned in the literature that discussed the social aspects of the Greek-Orthodox Church.

Women, however, were mentioned in the theological context of Orthodox church as spiritually inferior beings. Pollis (1993) demonstrates the religious perception of the inferiority of women using an example frequently cited by the Greek-Orthodox Church. Women were considered inferior since Eve tempted Adam, who subsequently fell from grace (Pollis 1993, 344). Consequently, women are considered sinful and unclean (especially during menstruation when they are banned from the sacrament of holy communion) and are barred from entering the holy site of Mount Athos (Pollis 1993, 345). Alexandra confirmed what she termed “sexism” in the Greek-Orthodox Church calling out practices such as “The concept of Mount Athos [a series of secluded monasteries that allow only men pilgrims to visit] and how women are not
allowed to be there supposedly because the Virgin Mary was the purest of us and we can’t go. The fact that we are not allowed to be anything other than chanter girl. We are not allowed to stand up there and be altar women or priests, and that’s hard for me.” (Interview, 4/5/2017). Alexandra illuminates the ever-present dichotomy that, to this day, divides men and women roles in the church. Men and women of the same ages have very different experiences within the same religion since some tasks are explicitly gendered. Gus, for example, was an altar boy and had an insider’s perspective to the minutia of the Sunday liturgy while Alexandra described having a more observatory role (Interview, 3/27/2017 and Interview, 4/5/2017). Thus, the gender of the participant demarcated certain tasks and might have resulted in differences in religious perception between the participants.

Alexandra does however credit the church for her ability to reconcile the prescribed roles and her personal belief in the equality of the sexes, saying that “the way I reconcile my faith with my feminism is that we have so many saints, so many women we value” (Interview, 4/5/2017). In this manner, Alexandra cites Greek-Orthodoxy as both a complex and contradictory entity that is sexist, but one that also values women’s contributions to the faith. The depictions of women and femininity that were revealed during the research provided insight into how perceptions of religion vary among Greek/Cypriot and Greek-American youth. Men and women had different experiences based on what activities they could participate in based on gender (Interview, 3/27/2017 and Interview, 4/5/2017). However, only women in the study addressed the theme of gender in terms of inequality (Interview, 4/5/2017).

The usage of the Greek language also emerged as a major theme that in the analysis of the fieldwork. Perceptions of the Greek language were found to vary between Spiridoula, the Cypriot participant, and Gus and Alexandra, the Greek-American students. The Greek-American students both connected the Greek language to a religious context and recognized its importance in the church’s liturgical practice. Gus emphasized the liturgical importance of Greek saying that:

I myself don’t speak much Greek. I mostly know my grandmother’s Greek which is a little mix of Greek in English, but the words do matter ... What’s interesting is that every time I would have a discussion about these translations it would go back to the original Greek. Talking about what does that Greek word mean in comparison to this Greek word. I feel that it does play a very important role concerning the official
Gus uses the Greek language to connect and better understand the meaning of the readings in church. For him the Greek language is a means to a religious end. Greek as the language of the church is also emphasized by Alexandra. She says that, “as someone who doesn’t speak Greek, the Greek language functions for me as something primarily in church. It is a means of primarily connecting us back to our roots and hearing how people hundreds of years ago were saying liturgy. I think it is a nice way of going back.” (Interview, 4/5/2017). Alexandra emphasizes the historical importance of Greek in the church and its value in providing continuity of tradition. Greek is then used a linkage that connects the past and present. For the two Greek-American participants, the Greek language held a special purpose in religion. Although they did not speak the language, both participants felt that Greek held religious value connecting them to the past through scripture and tradition. These narratives of the two participants emphasize the continuing religious importance of the Greek language.

Spiridoula on the other hand had an understanding of Greek that was unconnected to Greek-Orthodoxy. She described Greek and the transmission of the Greek language in secular terms, saying that “It takes a lot of work to raise children in the U.S. that speak fluent Greek. I have another friend here who is a Greek-American and his parents spoke to him in English. Even though he went to Greece in the summers his Greek is broken. If you don’t speak it [Greek] to them every day in the house it does not stay.” (Interview, 4/9/2017). For her, Greek was unconnected to religion, but was an identity marker that parents attempt, and sometimes fail, to pass onto their children. The context that Greek language is considered by the Greek-American and Cypriot students is different. For the Greek-Americans, there is an explicit connection between the Greek language and religion. For the Cypriot student, that connection did not occur perhaps because Greek was frequently encountered in other contexts that were not religious. For example, Spiridoula and I spoke in Greek during the interview and continue to do so whenever we encounter each other around campus. The context in which Greek is used varies tremendously between Greek-American and Greek/Cypriot students. The former link it primarily to religion while the latter think of it as an identity marker. However, these results are only valid in the context of this study. A much larger number of students in various universities in the United States would need to be interviewed before any of results presented in this paper could be used to draw more broad conclusions.
The role of tradition in upholding a Greek ethnic identity also surfaced as major analytic category. The Greek Orthodox Church played a large social role in creating and upholding that Greek identity in the Greek-American participants. The Cypriot participant also mentioned that the Greek-Orthodox Church in the United States was a catalyst for the preservation of a Greek ethnic identity. Alexandra, in particular, spoke about how the church connects the Greek element saying “Greekness is very much intertwined with our religious beliefs. I think it’s an ethno-religious thing, our sect of Christianity... having an ethnic component to our religion and makes me a very proud person to be a Greek because for the most part I see Greek people helping each other in their community, loving one another.” (Interview, 4/5/2017). She describes a pride in being Greek that emerges from the ethnic element involved in Greek-Orthodoxy where history and tradition are seen as tied to each other. This was confirmed by Spiridoula, who does not take part in many church events, but observed that:

The Greeks of Cyprus and Greece don’t really hold their roots to such importance. We are more relaxed about tradition. Take history for example. The majority of Cypriots don’t...[care]...about [their] history. Here, however, they are more updated about the holidays. They want to keep them alive. That is what I observed at least. (Interview, 4/9/2017).

In her comments, Spiridoula, draws attention to the notion that while disconnected by time and space from their roots, the Greek-American community is actively trying to preserve its original customs. The literature supports this claim citing that the Greeks living abroad tend to keep close to the traditions that were common when their ancestors immigrated (Roudometof 2000, 383). In this manner, traditions that are preserved and continued in the United States may seem to be outdated by the Greeks and Cypriots that have newly immigrated.

Tradition and ethnic identity was not just preserved by the religious and historic element but also through the important social function that the church plays. Gus cited that his ethnic identity emerged through his experience as an altar boy. He said that:

It was one of those things that when you come of age as a young man you go give it a shot. I still remember my first time, when we had this wonderful older gentleman and this man call Sam and they both gave us a little debrief in the priest’s office... Then I developed friendships
through that, quite a few have stayed. My main friends that I have there are studying in Pennsylvania, and so I’ll see them there at church back home. (Interview, 3/27/2017).

His membership in that group, while religious, formed a strong foundation for the formation of an ethnic and social identity that carried over after he left his home church to attend university. The social element of the church was one that was enculturated at a young age and remained. He similarly sought out a Greek-Orthodox community upon his arrival at AU. OCF (Orthodox Christian Fellowship) provided him with an opportunity to expand his social network. He said that, “I was able to meet some very interesting people through it [OCF]. It gave me quite a lot of confidence my first two semesters ... It was nice to have that comfort.” (Interview, 3/27/2017). The sense of familiarity with a community then also provided the interviewee with an ethnic affiliation, which he sought out when he moved to attend university.

In both of my field sites the social element was emphasized just as much as the religious one, and in many ways the two were connected. During coffee hour after church one day, the conversation among the group I was talking to connected the priest’s sermon on the importance of letting go of material wealth with spring cleaning (Fieldnotes, 4/2/2017). Similarly, at the OCF dinner the day after, one member had just returned from a Spring Break trip to Jerusalem where he visited the holy sites. The conversation, although emanating from a quasi-religious matter turned into one that focused on traveling experiences (Fieldnotes, 4/3/2017). The social elements of the church allowed for an ethnic and community identity to emerge that was tied to the a religious one. In that aspect, the Greek Orthodox Church served as a link that promoted the creation of an ethnically Greek identity alongside a religious one.

**Conclusion**

This study focused on the question of how do Greek/Cypriot and Greek American youth view questions of religion differently. Using an ethnographic methodology, it examined the role of religion in identity formation using interviews, participant observation, and archival analysis. Greek/Cypriot and Greek-American youth became the focus of the study due to question of access and geographical constraints. These two demographic groups allowed for a comparative analysis concerning the role of religion in identity formation.
The relevant literature can largely be separated into three schools of thought, each shedding light on how the Greek diaspora in the United States has been conceptualized through elements of generational differences, transnational ties, and notions of what constitutes Greek-American identity. A common religious identity emerges as a marker for the Greek diaspora in the United States. The literature, then, provides a framework for a comparative analysis of the role of religion for a specific demographic group, youth in the United States, by linking the generational, transnational, and identity forming elements.

Three major findings emerged from the study concerning the Greek/Cypriot and Greek-American students. Themes emerged regarding: the role of women and the family in Greek-Orthodoxy, the role of the Greek language and the Church, and the role of religious tradition in preserving ethnic identity in a social context. Each theme delineated a category where tradition and religion combined to form an element of Greek-American identity or where Greek/Cypriot and Greek-American youth view the role of religion differently. For the Greek-American youth, religious, cultural, and social elements of their Greek-American identity are closely tied to the Greek-Orthodox Church. On the Greek/Cypriot side, it seemed easier to separate religion and national heritage since each was viewed as a separate and distinct concept. Religion and ethnicity were not conflated. This was especially visible in the findings that emerged surrounding the Greek language and the social element of the Greek-Orthodox Church. For the Greek-American youth, religion is an integral part of their Greek-American identity. The Greek/Cypriot student tended to shy away from religion as an identity marker, and identified themselves as Greek based on other elements, such as language. However, the study did not provide generalizable results based on its small-scale nature and a much larger study would be necessary to draw more accurate and nuanced conclusions.

Works Cited


UNDERSTANDING GLOBAL SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSES WITHIN ECO-LABELED COMPANIES

Amanda Borth

Abstract

Sustainable development (SD) has been a buzzword in global environmental policy since 1987; however, its definition is extremely vague. Scholars have worked to reduce its ambiguities at higher levels of abstraction by analyzing monumental global policy. And yet, there is little discussion of how international SD discourses trickle down to domestic businesses, citizens, and organizations. To help fill this gap, I conduct a discourse analysis examining how SD is characterized among four eco-labeled tea companies. This analysis involves a four-step process where I analyze reports, social media posts, press releases, etc. to determine how the selected eco-labeled companies and policy initiatives understand and embody sustainable development. I then compare the meanings across the companies and policies to situate them within one another and determine trends. By employing this methodology, I have found that the global environmental policy discourse is still in the process of norm emergence as the meaning of SD has shifted from needs centered, to green economy focused, and then to environmental justice based. Conversely, the eco-labeled businesses have experienced norm internalization. The triple bottom line is the norm for understanding and acting upon SD. It is characterized through relationships, health, quality, and integrity and is acted upon through community, transparency, and Fair Trade USA and USDA Organic certifications. These findings are aimed at enriching the current understanding of SD and inform effective SD characterizations. This has future implications for working toward successful sustainability practices.
Introduction

During the early 2000s, a movement began to remove soda from school cafeteria vending machines in an effort to combat childhood obesity and promote healthy lifestyles. This trend sparked the creativity of two health conscious businessmen, Steven Kessler and Erich Schnell. These two joined forces to develop a healthy alternative to soda (Fox 2013). In 2002, they launched a sparkling green tea beverage company called Steaz Tea with a mission that was healthy for consumers and healthy for everyone and everything at all steps of the supply chain (Fox 2013). Kessler explained in an interview, “We literally founded this company based on a mission to help people lead healthier lives and to run a humanistic, socially conscious business” (Fox 2013). Kessler and Schnell’s effort to achieve a “humanistic, socially conscious business” directed them toward the triple bottom line (TBL) business model which seeks to ensure the health of people, planet, and profit. What is seldom discussed is that the TBL is rooted sustainable development (SD), which characterizes a much larger historical narrative of social and environmental consciousness. In essence, Kessler and Schnell’s simple goal of creating a healthy beverage is a product of something more than promoting healthier lifestyles. It is indicative of the proximate diffusion of sustainable development as a now deeply entrenched norm that was once exclusively discussed at the level of international environmental policy.

Sustainable development first appeared at the international level in 1987 when it was coined by the Brundtland Commission – a group of United Nations members dedicated to solving social and environmental dilemmas – in their publication on environment and development called Our Common Future (Clapp and Dauvergne 2011, 63; Beckerman 1994, 194). Since this publication, sustainable development has become a buzzword in global environmental policy (Clapp and Dauvergne 2011, 63; Beckerman 1994, 194). However, the meaning of this term has been fluid and ambiguous over the last few decades (Cohen 2001, 21-37; Colby 1991, 196-197; Jabareen 2008, 181-184; Ziai 2011, 27-43). The current perception of SD, portrayed in the United Nations 2015 Sustainable Development Goals, has departed significantly from the meaning presented in 1987 (Cohen 2001, 21-37; Ziai 2011, 41-42). Scholars have worked to clarify the uncertainties surrounding the meaning of SD (Cohen 2001, 21-37; Colby 1991, 193-213; Jabareen 2008, 179-192; Ziai 2011, 27-43). However, there is little literature seeking to understand how these definitions align with the norms of domestic businesses, citizens, and organizations. Corporate business structures are arguably the most important way in which SD has transcended
the bounds of global politics as sustainable business practices reach almost all members of society via the consumers. Consequently, this paper evaluates the understandings of SD as produced by eco-labeled companies through the question: how does the global policy understanding of SD align or depart from that of various eco-labeled companies in their pursuit of effective sustainable business practices? Answering this question reduces some uncertainties surrounding how the global SD discourse translates into domestic meanings and sustainability practices.

While this research question is pointed at a very specific slice of the SD discourse, it addresses themes that are of paramount importance for deepening the understanding of SD that pertains to the everyday person. Humanity is inevitably in an interdependent relationship with the environment, which means environmental issues are made, and can be solved by, changes in human practices. If humanity focuses on redefining consumption practices, which is intrinsically linked to goods-producing business, to reach SD goals, the everyday person can contribute to substantial environmental progress (“Story of Stuff 2008). Eco-labeling is a mechanism which allows individual consumers to encourage sustainable development by choosing to support environmentally and socially conscious businesses. Paul Rice, CEO of Fair Trade Certified USA, best elicits how consumers can support SD when buying eco-labeled products when stating, “if we can...with a cup of coffee...reach halfway across the world and help a family keep their kids in school, that’s very empowering to us...” (Paul Rice-Fair Trade” 2015). Rice’s comment demonstrates how eco-labeling is a powerful and simple tool for conscious consumers to promote a healthier world for themselves and future generations. In essence, it is useful to study eco-labeled companies when attempting to unpack SD because it is eco-labeled companies that take SD as a concept in international policy to the lowest level actors, which are individual consumers.

To comprehensively unpack the meanings surrounding sustainable development, norm diffusion frames this paper’s analysis. The frame of norm diffusions allows for comprehensive insight into the ways in which SD operates as a concept in the world because it provides for a historical view of the emergence, development, and internalization of the meanings associated with SD. The frame of norm diffusion also helps in analyzing how meaning is attached to SD and used by global policy and the corporate world because norms diffuse across levels of analysis as well. Norm diffusion as an international relations concept is first defined in the literature review, followed by a historical account of SD. Then, the literature review moves to a description of the norm diffusion of SD. After addressing those core concepts
of this research paper, the literature review address how scholars have worked to understand meanings attached to SD through three approaches: discipline, paradigmatic, and language/meaning. The language/meaning approach is most conducive to researching global environmental policy and is employed in this research paper. In order to explore how SD operates in the policy and business sector, I employ an interpretivist discourse methodology to track the meaning of sustainability through environmental policy and four eco-labeled tea companies: Steaz Tea, Honest Tea, Celestial Seasonings, and Numi Organic Tea. This follows a four step approach: 1) evaluate how each eco-labeled company comprehends and acts upon their respective meanings of SD through social media posts, mission statements, press releases, interviews, 2) determine the global policy understanding of SD through the texts of three key initiatives (The Brundtland Commission, the Rio+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, and the 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals), 3) compare these meanings and actions across the companies, and 4) situate the meanings within the global contexts evaluated in step one.

By employing this methodology, I have found that in global environmental policy SD is discursively understood in The Brundtland Commission through needs and resource management, Rio+20 in terms of the Green Economy, and the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) regarding environmental justice. The eco-labeled tea companies align best with 2015 SDGs. However, their understandings of SD have been much less variable due to norm diffusion. This has created an optimal understanding of SD which is characterized through the TBL business model: people, planet, profits. This model is rooted in four key values: relationships, health, quality, and integrity. To best portray these meanings to the public and execute effective sustainability practices, the eco-labeled companies have obtained a Fair Trade USA and USDA Organic certification, practice transparency, and involve themselves in the communi-tea (the specific terminology for community involvement characterized by the companies). These findings, along with their implications on the future of sustainable development activities, are conveyed in the analysis section of this paper. This research concludes with a discussion of limitations and future research opportunities.

**Literature Review**

In order to best comprehend how SD norms have emerged in global policy and the corporate world, this literature review defines norm diffusion,
tracks the development of SD as an idea, explains how the concept of norm diffusion is employed to analyze the development of SD in my research, and reviews how scholars have worked to comprehend SD. The international relations theory of norm emergence is fundamental to this research since SD is a construction of norms. Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998, 896) piece, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”, is a monumental text in international relations scholarship that defines norm diffusion. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 891) define norms as, “...a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.” They elaborate upon how these norms are developed by state actors through the process of norm diffusion which is the outgrowth of norms that “explains how principled ideas gain power and change identities and behavior with the rest being internalized” (Ring 2014, 1).

In viewing the emergence of SD, some scholars may consider resource initiatives by Theodore Roosevelt and the 1949 United Nations Scientific Conference on the Conservation and Utilization of Resources as the beginning of the SD discourse. However, it was not until 1987 when SD truly entered into environmental discussions by being codified in Our Common Future (Bennington 2000, 4; World Commission on Environment and Development 1987, 41). In this report, the Brundtland Commission famously defined SD as, “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability for future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987, 41). From this point forward, SD has been a buzzword in international environmental policy; moreover, policy has aimed to refine the definition of SD through initiatives set by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), including: the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; the 1997 Special Session of the General Assembly to Review and Appraise the Implementation of Agenda 21; the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD), Johannesburg Summit; the 2012 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio+20; and the United Nations Sustainable Development Summit 2015 (“Process & UN System 2016).

Most importantly, the UNEP’s policy-making activities set the overall context for my research, as the UNEP has been the key global policy regime defining SD since 1972 (Clapp and Dauvergne 2011, 56-57). The 1972 Stockholm Conference (organized by the UNEP) first linked the economy and environment; however, there are three specific UNEP summits that set the historical frame for SD and are thus the primary subjects under analysis in this
research. The first is the Brundtland Commission’s Our Common Future since it coined the term SD in 1987 (Clapp and Dauvergne 2011, 56-57). The 2012 Rio+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development is the second monumental historical subject relevant to this paper because it highlighted the green economy and built on the 1992 Rio Earth Summit (Clapp and Dauvergne 2011, 104; Allen 2012, 12).¹ While developed only three years later, the 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are also relevant to the global and historical context of this research because they provide the opportunity to evaluate how norms have changed since Rio+20 in 2012 and set the benchmark for understanding SD. In short, the SDGs are indicative of the dominant discourse surrounding SD in global policy. Ultimately, this historical context of SD within UNEP activities set the international precedent for SD at the corporate level (“TEDxAshokaU2011-Paul Rice” 2011).²

SD has emerged in the corporate world as, in part, independent of its development in global policy. As consumers increasingly demanded goods developed with environmental and social concerns in mind, businesses worked toward redefining production to have a socially and environmentally conscious supply chain. Doing so addresses SD because in order to be socially and environmentally conscious the supply chain must incorporate practices that do not degrade the environment and support the social and economic advancement of all actors along the supply chain. In 1994, John Elkington used his consultancy, SustainAbility, as a platform for incorporating SD into product supply chains (“Triple Bottom Line” 2009). Elkington can be considered a norm entrepreneur as he took the international policy concept of SD and incorporated it into the corporate world as the TBL (people, planet, profit) (“Triple Bottom Line” 2009). The TBL “agenda focuses corporations not just on the economic values that they add, but also on the environmental

¹ The green economy is relevant to this research because it focuses on sustainable develop through conscious production and consumption which directly aligns with the functions of eco-labeled tea companies. Moreover, the 1992 Rio Earth Summit was the first instance where environmental management through trade was considered on the international stage.

² Further scholarly support for defining the context of my research can be found in the work of Schwartz-Shea and Yanow. These scholars explain that it is important to understand the context of one’s research before determining the methods for data analysis in order to clarify the grounds of that research. Peregrine Schwartz-Shea and Dvora Yanow (2011, 45).
and social values that they add or destroy” through seven drivers: markets, values, transparency, life-cycle technology, partnerships, time, and corporate governance (Elkington 2004, 3).

To analyze how the meanings of SD have developed in global policy and corporations, I look to Finnemore and Sikkink’s process of norm diffusion. According to Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, 895), norms diffusion is characterized by a three stage life cycle of norms that tracks “the process through which norms influence state and non-state behavior... .” Figure 1 highlights each stage of norm diffusion, beginning with norm emergence where “[n]orm entrepreneurs attempt to convince a critical mass of states (norm leaders) to embrace new norms” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 895). Once norm entrepreneurs have prompted the international community to embrace a new set of norms, these norms experience a tipping point that causes norm leaders to gather norm followers (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 895). This process continues to “cascade” throughout a population as more and more actors seek to conform to and embody the new norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 895). This process is understood as the norm cascade. The development of norms then reaches the final stage of norm internalization where norms are “taken for granted” and are no longer debated (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 895).

**Table 1. Stages of norms**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage 1</th>
<th>Stage 2</th>
<th>Stage 3</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Norm emergence</strong></td>
<td><strong>Norm cascade</strong></td>
<td><strong>Internalization</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actors</strong></td>
<td>States, international organizations, networks</td>
<td>Law, professions, bureaucracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norm entrepreneurs with organizational platforms</td>
<td>Legitimacy, reputation, esteem</td>
<td>Conformity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Motives</strong></td>
<td>Socialization, institutionalization, demonstration</td>
<td>Habit, institutionalization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Altruism, empathy, ideational, commitment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Dominant mechanisms</strong></td>
<td>Persuasion</td>
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This chart was drawn directly from Finnemore and Sikkink’s piece, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”. It provides a useful visual of the three stages of the norm life cycle by identifying the actors, motives, and dominant mechanisms that initiate and develop each step of norm diffusion within and among states. (Finnemore and Sikkink, 898).
This research employs the theory of norm diffusion in two key ways. The first is by using the theory of norm diffusion to understand the discourses that have emerged from United Nations initiatives pertaining to SD. This portion of the research focuses on the norms developed at an interstate level through the platform of the UN. This is consistent with Finnemore and Sikkink’s use of the model. I then employ this theory on the deeper, less traditional analytical level of norm diffusion within the corporate world. Furthermore, I transition between these two analytical levels to provide a cohesive comparison of norm emergence among international and domestic actors. As a whole, SD is a topic with a rich historical narrative that many scholars have worked to understand, and Finnemore and Sikkink’s theory of norm emergence accompanied by the meaning/language approach to understanding SD is useful for understanding the progression of this topic.

Figure 2: Diagram of Schools of Thought: How literature approaches the meaning of sustainable development

Aside from Finnemore and Sikkink’s norm diffusion, I look to how scholars have worked to understand SD in order to inform my own research (Colby 1991, 202; Hopwood, Mellor, and O’Brien 2005, 41). There are three main approaches to comprehending SD: discipline, paradigmatic, and language/meaning. A discipline approach seeks to make sense of how SD is understood from an ecologist, economist, and/or sociologist perspective (“Making Development” 1994, 14-30; Russ 2010, 47-52; Cernea 1993, 11; Pezzy 1992, 324-325, 334, 351). Literature suggests that ecologists are most

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3 This is an example of how a scholar looks to global environmental policy to determine the meaning of sustainable development by analyzing the Brundtland Commission’s Our Common Future. Here, Hopwood, Mellor, and O’Brien look to various scholars to construct their figure that maps views on sustainable development.

4 Please reference Fig. 2 as a visual aid to the content discussed in this section of the paper.
This chart was presented in Hopwood, Mellor, and O’Brien’s “Sustainable Development: Mapping Different Approaches”.

Scholars who employ a paradigmatic approach weigh the importance of humanity versus environmental goals, along with a willingness to deviate from the world’s current economic and social systems (Hopwood, Mellor, and O’Brien 2005, 41-42; Gladwin, Kennelly, and Krause 1995, 882-896; Colby 1991, 196-197; Caption, Jr. and Dunlap 1980, 34; Milbrath 1984, 22 & 24). Regardless of the specific terminology applied to this mapping, scholars consistently agree on three fundamental views toward SD: technocentric (technology and status quo), anthropocentric (human centered and reform), and ecocentric (environment and transformation) (Hopwood, Mellor, and O’Brien 2005, 41-42; Gladwin, Kennelly, and Krause 1995, 882-896; Colby 1991, 196-197; Caption, Jr. and Dunlap 1980, 34; Milbrath 1984, 22 & 24). Figure 3 maps these three different characterizations and is drawn from the work of Hopwood, Mellor, and O’Brien (Hopwood, Mellor, and O’Brien 2005, 41; “Mission/Values” 2015; “Our Mission” 2015). The ‘Y’ axis represents variation in environmental concerns, with technocentric being the
least concerned, ecocentric the most concerned, and anthropocentric falling
between the two. The ‘X’ axis represents levels of sociological concern when
viewing SD; however, the shaded area highlights the willingness of these views
to change the status quo to achieve SD. Both green consumers and policy
narratives, such as the Brundtland Report, hold anthropocentric views toward
SD. However, policy initiatives like the Brundtland Report are more willing
than green consumers/businesses to reform the status quo to achieve SD.

This is indicative of the fluidity of SD norms at the policy level compared to
consumers/businesses, which will be addressed throughout my analysis.

The least explicit, but most useful, approach is language/meaning
(Jabareen 2008, 181-184; Beckerman 1994, 205; Hopwood, Mellor, and
Development” 1994, 5). This approach analyzes the raw meanings of SD
without relying on a paradigmatic or discipline framing, even though it can
be incorporated into the first two approaches (Jabareen 2008, 181-184;
Beckerman 1994, 205; Hopwood, Mellor, and O’Brien 2005, 40; Gladwin,
Scholars applying this approach demonstrate how SD is complicated in that
its characteristics overlap (Jabareen 2008, 182, 184 & 186). For example,
scholars debate equality’s utopianism and capacity to maximize welfare
within SD. Regardless of these complexities, there is significant consistency
among scholars suggesting equality and relationships are main components
of SD. These two characteristics of SD will appear in my findings. These two

5 While this chart does not incorporate sustainable businesses, green consumers are
representative of businesses as consumers are the primary drivers of sustainability
within corporations (Borth 2016).

6 An example of this is SD’s characteristic of eco-form, (time, space, and energy
reduction), as noted by Jabareen, that is contingent upon managing natural capital
stocks, which Jabareen defines as a separate quality.

7 An example of the different understanding of equality within SD can be seen in the
work of Hopwood, Mellor, and O’Brien (2005, 40) which defines equality as “futurity
— inter-generational”, “social justice — intragenerational”, “trans-frontier responsibil-
ity — geographical”, “procedural equality — people treated openly and fairly”; and
“intra-species equality — importance of biodiversity.” Jabareen (2008, 183), on the
other hand, defines equality through “environmental, social, and economic justice.”
Gladden, Kennelly, and Krause (1995, 879) define equality as property rights. Con-
sequently, equality may be a key component of SD but the definitions of equality can
also vary.

8 Colby (1991, 877 & 883) and Beckerman (1994, 188) are two examples where equal-
ity and relationships (or synonymous terms) are employed to characterize sustainable
meanings and the complications associated with meaning-making shed light on the understandings within eco-labeled companies and global environmental policy. Since this is the most encompassing way to analyze the language of SD across perspectives, it is employed in my methodology.

Methodology

I conduct an interpretivist discourse analysis that explores language/meaning in order to understand the contextual representations of SD produced by four eco-labeled tea companies and position those depictions within the dominant meanings constructed in international policy. Tea companies are the objects of analysis because tea is a particular product that has been on the forefront of implementing socially conscious business models. Analyzing these companies will thus provide significant opportunity for determining how eco-labeled companies understand SD since it is a concept that has been extensively discussed when producing tea. Beyond the objects of analysis, this research takes an interpretivist epistemological and constructivist ontological approach. The reasoning behind this approach is that interpretivism is fundamentally concerned with meaning-making within highly contextual situations, which is conducive to my goal of understanding the deeply entrenched perceptions of SD constructed by labeled companies (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 80). To achieve this goal, this research analyzes the messages about SD that eco-labeled companies convey to the public. This is best achieved through a discourse analysis of the texts these companies present to the public because, as Neumann notes, by analyzing language as socially constructed one can better understand the realities it produces (Neumann 2008, 61). The realities of this research are the sustainability practices that emanate from discussions of sustainability among labeled companies. In this section, I detail my methods of evidence generation and data analysis, then support these by addressing my methodological choices regarding context, mapping representations, and evaluative standards which underpin this discourse analysis.

To understand how the discourse of SD emerged among eco-labeled tea companies and correlates with the global discourse, this research employed a four-step analysis that was inspired by the works of Thomson and Milne, Tregida, and Walton (2009, 1221-1223). The first step evaluated how each eco-labeled company interprets and acts upon their respective characterizations of development.
SD. To do so, I analyze the websites (focusing on the mission statements and press releases), Instagrams, Twitter feeds, and Facebook pages of Steaz Tea, Honest Tea, Celestial Seasonings, and Numi Organic Tea. Furthermore, I conducted supplemental interviews, when possible, to gain a better understanding of the motivations behind the constructed meanings made by the tea companies. The second step determined the global policy understanding of SD. I achieved this by analyzing primary documents from and scholarly literature on three UNEP policy initiatives which had the distinct mission of defining SD: The Brundtland Commission’s Our Common Future (1987), the 2012 Rio+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, and the 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. Step three compared the meanings and actions found in step two across the companies and UN initiatives while focusing on norm diffusion. The final step evaluated the meanings and norm diffusion processes between the eco-labeled companies and global policy to determine further implications.

Most specifically, this research analyzed the publications of Steaz Tea, Honest Tea, Celestial Seasonings, and Numi Organic Tea from May 1, 2015 to May 1, 2016. These four companies were chosen because they all have Fair Trade USA and USDA Organic labels and explicitly address SD concerns in their missions (“Our Mission” 2015; “Our Mission” 2016; “Our History” 2015; “Numi’s Vision” 2016). This allows for a unity between the goals of the companies because they are influenced by very similar labeling standards and approach SD from an economic perspective, as opposed to a social or environmental lens (Cernea 1993, 324-325, 334 & 351). This is also a useful dynamic for contrasting the constructed meanings of each organization because with similar characteristics they are expected to maintain corresponding goals. I have chosen to limit my research to one year of publications because I am interested in understanding the current discourses of these companies. If data had been gathered from before a year ago, it would not accurately portray the current discourse among the eco-labeled companies due to developments in their labeling status.

9 The rationale for choosing these four tea companies is that they all have distinct missions to achieve corporate sustainability and represent diversity within the tea industry (Celestial Seasoning-1969, Honest Tea-1998, Numi Organic Tea-1999, and Steaz Tea-2002). They were founded in separate decades, which represents a different atmosphere for norm emergence, and they illustrate two subsections of the tea industry: ready-to-drink/bottled/canned teas (Steaz Tea and Honest Tea) and bagged tea (Celestial Seasonings and Numi Organic Tea).

10 For example, Steaz Tea’s Fair Trade certification has been effective since August,
The immediate actors producing SD discourse are the tea companies and those UNEP summits that are part of the wider global context (as discussed in the literature review). However, external actors also affect this discourse, so I also map these representations. External actors, such as labeling schemes (primarily Fair Trade USA and USDA Organic), and consumers most directly influence how companies view SD. These actors weigh heavily in corporate meaning-making because companies must comply with the standards set by labels and cater to consumer demands in order to sell products. As a result, a distinct power dynamic is constructed where the companies must comply with the expectations of labeling schemes and consumer preferences to build an organization that is socially and environmentally conscious (“Our Mission” 2015; “Our Mission” 2016; “Our History” 2016; “Numi’s Vision” 2016). All of the actors have the potential to create alternative discourses, and some have already done so, depending on their paradigmatic or disciplinary perspectives.

Credible interpretive research is also dependent on cultural competence, reflexivity, and trustworthiness. Neumann (2008, 63) explains that cultural competence is a vital prerequisite for interpretivist research because a robust knowledge of the culture a researcher is entering allows the researcher to be more aware of discursively created meanings. I expanded my cultural competence for this research by learning about the history of SD through canonical texts that define the term SD, such as the Brundtland Report and Agenda 21 (Cohen 2001, 21-28). I have also researched the history of Fair 2006. If I drew from their marketing before that I would not accurately portray their current emphasis on fair trade (Kessler 2016).

11 Each of the tea companies that are analyzed are Fair Trade USA and USDA Organic certified. Aside from these labels, some companies are certified NON GMO Verified, Certified 100% Organic, Wind Power certified, etc.

12 On a broader scale environmental NGOs, Climate Summits, and the United Nations Millennium Development Goals also contribute to the atmosphere surrounding SD within the companies but are more removed at the international policy level.

13 Because companies are economically oriented they inevitably have a different perspective on sustainable development than social development NGOs or environmental activists. Furthermore, the paradigmatic approach employed by each company (whether it be ecocentric, anthropocentric, or technocentric) fundamentally challenge each other on sustainability practices and constructs. This has been detailed in the literature review and can be seen in scholarly sources such as (Cernea 1993, 324-325, 334, 351; Gladwin, Kennelly, and Krause 1995, 882-896).

14 Neumann (2008, 67) explains the importance of familiarizing oneself with canonical texts, as they can be “crossroads or anchor points” for discourses. In my case the Brundtland Report of 1987 is a prime anchor point for sustainable development because it coined the term and scholarly literature still refers to it today.
Trade USA and other labels to best understand the practices they employ. By examining the history of SD and the functions of labeling schemes, I realized the contexts of the current discussions of sustainability and effectively employ discourse analysis tools.

In order to practice reflexivity, I considered how my social situation shapes the information being accessed, how I constructed my identity and that of the companies, and assessed how my exposure to texts generate new understandings. My identity of a capitalistic-minded American is most relevant to this research. I believe that sustainability initiatives can be reached through the world’s current economic system; whereas, others may think the globalized economy requires an overhaul to be more conducive to SD. My perception of capitalism and sustainability aligns with that of Fair Trade USA (one of the labels that is emphasized through this research), which can be seen in Paul Rice’s TEDTalk “Awakening the Sleeping Giant: Fair Trade on College Campuses” (TEDxAshoka2011-PaulRice 2011). Furthermore, I believe SD is a key approach to solving many environmental and social issues, causing me to be optimistic about the subject of research. Practicing this reflexivity is one way of working toward trustworthiness.

While situating oneself within research is a fundamental practice of interpretive research, it is a limitation as viewed by neo-positive scholars who believe reputable research comes from eliminating biases. Thus, I also employ alternative measures to build trustworthiness, adopted by Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, to keep the logic of my methodology and argument in-check.  

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15 This is one example of texts that provide insight into the goals and functions of labeling schemes. (“TEDxAshokaU2011-Paul Rice” 2011).

16 While I work toward a general understanding of the origins of sustainable development and its practices, there are some points where I lack cultural competence, such as external influences that determine company decisions beyond sustainability goals. These cannot be adequately foreseen because they are contextual for each company.

17 These checkpoints are borrowed from Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2012, 99-100).

18 Trustworthiness, or the accurate “understanding of human meaning-making in context,” can be addressed in three additional ways (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 108). Shwartz-Shea and Yanow (2012, 108-109) list these as: 1) “the consistency of evidence from different sources (the intertextuality of the analysis),” 2) “the way in which conflicting interpretations have been engaged,” and 3) “the logic which the argument has been developed.” Points one and two are accomplished through steps two and three of my four-point methodological approach. Schwartz-Shea and Yanow’s third point is addressed throughout the entirety of the research by constantly reviewing my findings to check for accuracy.
As a whole, the methodological choices in this section are aimed at better understanding the truths of how eco-labeled and global policy formulates understandings of SD.

**Analysis**

When analyzing how eco-labeled companies understand SD and the ways in which it connects with international policy, there are norm internalization and norm emergence. Among the eco-labeled companies, the TBL is the norm for understanding and acting upon SD. It is characterized through relationships, health, quality, and integrity and is acted upon through Fair Trade USA and USDA Organic certifications, transparency, and community. Conversely, the global environmental policy discourse is still in the process of norm emergence as the meaning of SD has shifted from needs centered, to green economy focused, and to environmental justice based. Eco-labels correlate best with the environmental justice discourse of the 2015 SDGs due to mutual understandings of health and the TBL.

To begin the story of norm internalization within eco-labeled companies, I look back to the origins of the TBL. It was 1994 when norm entrepreneur John Elkington re-envisioned SD through the TBL business model (“Triple Bottom Line” 2009). Just over twenty years later, the TBL has achieved norm internalization, as it has become habit when understanding and designing companies toward SD (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 898). Celestial Seasonings was the first of the four companies in this research to embrace the TBL model when designing their sustainability vision as it launched its first two tea flavors in 1972 (“Our History” 2015). While Celestial Seasonings does not explicitly state the TBL in their publications, it can be inferred through the people, planet, and profit principles of their Blended With Care: From Seed to Sip corporate outlook that “cares for the health of [their] people,” aims to grow ingredients “according to Earth-friendly practices,” and purchases 70% of its ingredients “directly from farmers and local communities” (“Blend With Care” 2015).

About a decade later, Honest Tea also developed their sustainability mission under the implicit TBL framework that includes the pillars of “promoting health & wellness,” “reducing [their] environmental footprint,” and “creating economic opportunity” (Goldman 2015, 3). Around this time, Numi Organic Tea explicitly employed the TBL model and even added purpose as a fourth component (“Philanthropy” 2015). Steaz Tea is the newest of the tea companies and also explicitly acknowledges the TBL as a foundation for...
their mission in stating, “Our ‘triple bottom-line’ business model is steeped in our core values” (“Our Mission” 2016).

Furthermore, it is necessary to discuss the deeper meanings that underpin the TBL to fully understand how the TBL has manifested itself as a framework for SD in these eco-labeled tea companies. Across the four eco-labeled companies, the core characterizations of SD are: relationships, integrity, quality, and health. When these companies speak in terms of relationships, they are concerned with how people interact with the planet and other individuals, which deals with the links between farmers and business, business and the community, and/or components of the supply chain. Honest Tea demonstrates the importance of this value when stating, “there’s no substitute for developing personal relationships,” in the opening of their 2015 Mission Report (Goldman 3). Numi Organic Tea also exemplifies the significance of personal relationships in stating, “…we value people involved in every step of the business...” (“Celebrating People” 2015). Steaz Tea expands upon just personal relationships by making “360 degree relationships” between people, planet, and profit paramount (Kessler 2016).

Creating relationships, particularly with consumers, is one way these companies achieve their second core value, integrity. This means being honest with consumers about how products are crafted, which is best stated by Honest

19 Please see Appendix I column ‘Relationships’ for more extensive textual evidence of these findings.
20 Please reference Appendix I column ‘Integrity’ for more extensive textual evidence of these findings.
Tea’s Mission Director Jenny Burns, “We strive to grow our business with the same honesty and integrity we use to craft our products, with sustainability and great taste for all” (Goldman 2015, 3). Each company is also highly concerned with the consumer’s health as evident in Steaz Tea’s mission that explains, “We created Steaz with one goal in mind: to help people lead healthier lives” (“Our Mission” 2015). Steaz also emulates this value on social media posts as in Figure 4. Part of maintaining a health conscious business also includes sourcing quality ingredients. The power of this value is best seen in Celestial Seasonings Blend With Care: From Seed to Sip mission where they mention quality 12 times in their description of this mission (2015).

To best achieve the values of relationships, integrity, health, and quality, the four companies have obtained USDA Organic and Fair Trade USA certifications, ensure transparency, and involve themselves in the communi-tea (Borth 2016; “WELCOME TO THE” 2016; “Communi-Tea” 2016; “Give Back” 2015). Eco-labels become a cornerstone for sustainability practices within these businesses, to the point where co-founder Steven Kessler (2016) considers them fundamental to the “DNA” of Steaz.21 The TBL is considered a checklist for achieving SD and eco-labels, specifically USDA Organic and Fair Trade, provide guidelines that fulfill that checklist through impact assessments and other qualifications regulating the uses of resources, pesticides, etc. (“Triple Bottom Line” 2009; “Mission/Values” 2016). These assessments also ensure fair price premiums and community development, which not only achieve aspects of the TBL but also satisfy the core values of relationships, health, and quality (TEDxAshoka2011-PaulRice” 2011).

These labels also lend to transparency, which is another way in which SD values are achieved. In an interview with a public relations representative for Numi Organic Tea, the representative explained that, “Eco-label[s], along with so many other certifications/verifications that Numi has [been, and are,] part of ou[r] commitment to educate and influence other[s] to make a difference in their contribution to society” (Borth 2016). Moreover, Kessler of Steaz Tea considers eco-labels the primary way in which Steaz’s mission is conveyed to the public (Kessler 2016). This provides for transparency so consumers can recognize the values in these labels by perceiving the products as of high quality and being made by a company with integrity. Transparency is also achieved by providing the public with information about company supply chains, so consumers can track where products are sourced, in what ways, and how workers are paid. Consequently, this enhances the integrity of a company. Celestial Seasonings accomplishes this by tracing the tea supply chain ‘from seed to sip’ (“Blend with Care” 2015). The final

21 Please reference Appendix II columns ‘Fair Trade USA’ and ’USDA Organic’ for explicit evidence of how the companies discuss these labels.
way in which these companies act upon their sustainability values is by building communi-teas to develop relationships. For example, Steaz Tea has participated in running events and festivals to foster wide-spread relations with their local community (“WELCOME TO THE” 2016).

Figure 5: This is a visual representation of the findings regarding how Steaz Tea, Honest Tea, Celestial Seasonings, and Numi Organic Tea understand sustainable development. The overarching model for this understanding is the triple bottom line framework, as represented by the people, planet, profit triangle. The left triangle demonstrates the underlying meanings of the triple bottom line model, which are listed inside the triangle. The right triangle conveys how these meanings are acted upon in an effort to achieve effective sustainability practices. These actions are listed on the outside of the triangle.
While one may expect the perception of SD in global policy to be internalized, much like in the corporate world, considering its long history in the UNEP, a closer examination presents the contrary.\(^{22}\) These meanings are still in the process of norm emergence where the international perceptions of SD are still volatile (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 895; Gilardi 2012, 23). The inconsistencies of how international policy views SD is evident in the 1987 Brundtland Report, 2012 Rio+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, and 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. The overarching narrative of these policies exemplify a shift in discourse from needs and limits, to the green economy, and then to environmental justice.

In 1987, the Brundtland Commission coined the term SD with the central concepts of needs, limits, and resource management (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987, 41).\(^{23}\) These values were specifically mentioned in the Brundtland Report’s definition of SD, and the definition was elaborated upon by stating, “[this definition] contains within it two key concepts: the concept of ‘needs’...to which overriding priority should be given...[and] the idea of limitations...on the environment’s stability to meet present and future needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987, 41). This includes setting “limits in terms of...resource use” (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987, 42). However, these dominant understandings did not successfully move out of the first stage of norm development considering the next significant policy initiative, the Rio+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, defined SD in term of the green economy (Allen 2012, 12). The green economy balanced all aspects of SD (environmental, social, and economic) through market flows, international governance, and international cooperation (Allen 2012, 14; UNCSD Secretariat 2012, 14-15). Consequently, international market management through the TBL became more dominant than a need based understanding of SD.

Just three years later, the 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals shifted the global discourse toward environmental justice (EJ) in culmination with the TBL (“Sustainable Development Goals 2015). Goals such as “gender equality” and “peace, justice, and strong institutions” align with EJ as they aim to

\(^{22}\) This can be seen through similar findings across the works of scholars, which is also referenced in the literature review (Colby 1991, 193; Hopwood, Mellor, and O’Brien 2005, 41).

\(^{23}\) Our Common Future states, “Sustainable Development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own need” (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987, 41).
foster an equal and healthy society. Moreover, the UNEP includes the TBL in one of its “five big, transformative shifts” as it aims to “put sustainable development at the core” by “mobilizing social, economic and environmental action” (A New Global Partnership 2013). These understandings best correlate with those of the eco-labeled tea companies. Some may argue they best align with the perception of the green economy presented in Rio+20. To a certain extent, this is accurate because Rio+20 embraced the TBL and focused on market strategies for SD (Allen 2012, 17; UNCSD Secretariat 2012, 14-15). However, this was in the context of global, top-down governance of markets, which naturally contends with free-market, domestic businesses (Allen 2012, 17; UNCSD Secretariat 2012, 14-15). Moreover, the green economy’s view of SD is less concerned with the social aspects of health and relationships, which are fundamental in the meanings of both the four eco-labeled companies and the 2015 UN SDGs (“Sustainable Development Goals” 2015). Moreover, the 2015 SDGs embrace the TBL (A New Global Partnership 2013). Consequently, the underlying meaning of SD as understood by the four eco-labeled companies correlates with those present in the 2015 UN SDGs.

The findings that the understandings of SD are still in flux at the global level while domestic businesses have embodied the TBL business model are peculiar because they are both consistent with and contrary to current scholarly understandings of SD. Scholars such as Colby and Beckerman highlight equality and relationships as major components of SD, which are seen in the four labeled companies and the SDGs (Colby 1991, 877; Beckermann 1994, 883). On the whole, scholars consider SD to be highly ambiguous. Colby (1991, 193) states, “[s]ocieties are now beginning to have serious discussions about ‘sustainable development’, but there is still a great deal of confusion over what that means and how to achieve it.” More recently, Hopwood, Mellor, and O’Brien (2005, 38) explain how SD “needs more clarity and meaning.” While this may be true at the international policy level, it is not the case in the corporate world as the four eco-labeled companies have a framework (the TBL) for, values that ground, and means of achieving SD. However, this norm internalization is not surprising to scholars, such as Pattberg.

24 A full list of goals that complies with EJ is as follows: Goal 4 (“quality education”), Goal 5 (“gender equality”), Goal 10 (“reduced inequalities”), Goal 16 (“peace, justice, and strong institutions”), and Goal 17 (“partnerships for the goals”) (“Sustainable Development Goals” 2015).

who have studied the diffusion of environmental reporting norms throughout the business and policy worlds (Pattberg 2006, 242; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 893). Pattberg (2006, 257) has explained how environmental reporting has become a strong norm in forest certification and CERES, a non-profit organization working toward corporate sustainability, and “has considerable influence in the policy domain.” This process of norm internalization in the corporate world can lead to the first implication of my research, norm reification (Urmeneta 2013, 1810-1811).

Norm reification is when internalized norms become concrete and attain a taken-for-granted quality (Urmeneta 2013, 1810-1811). As a result, they are not able to be re-evaluated and are difficult to alter when new discourses arise (Urmeneta 2013, 1810-1811). This may be occurring among eco-labeled companies as they almost automatically comprehend SD and work to achieve its goals by adopting the TBL business model. If facts, theories, and/or consumer perceptions of SD change these companies may have trouble modifying their business model to meet new demands. Global policy, on the other hand, will be more open to new ideas because their understanding of SD has been, and can continue to be, molded to fit emerging views of SD.

While this may be a significant drawback to the consistency of the TBL, there are significant merits associated with reification. Often, the UNEP is criticized for lofty, undefined policy initiatives that have a broad and almost meaningless understanding of SD (Luke and Igoe 2015; Porter 2014). A result is scholars continually criticizing the inability of global policy to make significant achievements regarding SD (Luke and Igoe 2015). Contrarily, eco-labeled companies, while debated to a degree, have hard evidence demonstrating their advancements toward SD (Potts, et al. 2014, 36-354). Regardless of how social scientist discuss abstract ideas of norm emergence and what their possible implications could mean, the aspect that matters most is if these notions toward SD are working and if individuals have the opportunity to make a difference.

**Conclusion**

In searching to understand how the discourses of SD among global policy

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26 “Despite a flourishing research agenda on corporate social responsibility, business ethics, and the privatization of global regulation, the issue of good corporate conduct remains highly contested” (Pattberg 2006, 242).

27 This source provides a statistical overview of the strengths and weaknesses of eco-labeled programs throughout multiple sectors in their effort to work toward sustainable development (Potts, et al. 2014, 36-354).
and eco-labeled tea companies align or depart from one another, I have found that eco-labeled companies have experienced norm internalization as they characterize SD through the TBL framework rooted in the values of relationships, integrity, quality, and health. To effectively pursue these values, each company is Fair Trade and USDA Organic certified, emphasizes transparency, and is involved in the communi-tea. On the other hand, global policy is still in the phase of norm emergence. Since 1987, the global policy discourse has shifted from need and limits, to the green economy, and to the current discourse concerning environmental justice. The implications that may result from these trends are linked to norm reification.

The distinction between norm emergence among global policy and norm internalization among eco-labeled companies compelling because it provides insight into the abilities of our society to achieve sustainable development. Studying the discourse surrounding SD sets the conditions of possibility for policy. Regarding eco-labeled companies, the possibility of effectively practicing SD values can be seen as promising because the TBL is entering into the phase of norm reification where SD practices are taken for granted. The TBL provides a clear way for companies, well beyond just tea companies, to be socially and environmentally conscious. However, because SD is internalized in the corporate world, the discourse is relatively set and has little room for change. Thus, if there is a norm of SD in the corporate world that may turn out not be ineffective, it will be very challenging to change because the norms of SD in the corporate world have been internalized. It may then be up to the consumer to use the power of their purchase to shift the norms. SD in Global policy, on the other hand, is still in the form of norm emergence and is thus much more malleable. This means that global policy can continue to adjust in reaching the perfect practices for achieving SD. We have seen this happen already as there were only 8 Millennium Development Goals in 2000 and there are now 17 Sustainable Development Goals. The scope of options in the corporate world versus the international policy world differ. The links between these two worlds and the opportunities within them must be realized to turn the ‘shoulds’ of SD into reality.

However, with any research, there are limitations. My research is limited in that I only analyzed a very discrete set of eco-labeled products. Tea companies were useful to study because of their strong interest in sustainable practices as compared to companies selling other consumer goods. Moreover, the TBL used by tea companies is not a business model exclusive to tea companies, and the findings of this paper can be considered when analyzing other companies. But, another avenue for research would be to conduct a similar project but with a different set of companies selling different products to see how it compares to the findings of this
paper.

My work also neglects to analyze consumer perceptions of SD and what they consider to be effective sustainability practices. Companies such as Steaz Tea make it clear that consumers (and people in general) come first. The name of their company (Steaz) means “a person’s style (hip, grounded, centered, purposeful, real)” (Kessler 2016). This is the “DNA” of their company because Fair Trade USA and USDA Organic certifications that demonstrate “sustainable and social responsibility” is trendy among their consumers (Kessler 2016). As a result, Steaz ingrains this into their business model and acts specifically to reach the sustainability expectations of consumers (Kessler 2016). Research in this realm can inform how relationships are built between consumers and producers to work toward SD goals. Future research could also analyze other industries to determine if the trends found in this paper resonate outside the specific context of four eco-labeled tea companies. This provides a more comprehensive understanding of SD’s presence in the corporate world. Overall, two future research opportunities are to focus on consumer perceptions and analyze businesses other than tea.

Continuing to research eco-labeled companies and SD within the corporate sector is necessary for improving relationships between humanity and the environment. Changes in consumption patterns are the most direct way individuals can take initiative and ‘vote for change with their dollar’. As the CEO of Fair Trade USA explains, consuming eco-labeled products allow the consumer to “reach halfway across the world” and make sure our world does not continue to degrade the environment, keep a child in school, advocate for equality, and contribute to community building ("Paul Rice-Fair Trade for All 2015). This is truly powerful. Research in this realm will deepen the understanding of SD among social scientist and the public to empower them to make educated decisions about how they impact the global community and ecosystem.
Appendix I: Hard Evidence of Values Underpinning the TBL in Eco-labeled Companies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Steuz Tea</strong></th>
<th><strong>Relationships</strong></th>
<th><strong>Health</strong></th>
<th><strong>Quality</strong></th>
<th><strong>Integrity</strong></th>
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<td></td>
<td>Steuz Tea’s logo, the flower of life, represents the relationship between the components of the company through its leaves that all meet in the center to demonstrate a unified relationship (Kessler 2016).</td>
<td>“We literally founded this company based on a mission to help people lead healthier lives and to run a humanistic, socially conscious business. The product name summed…” (Fox 2013).</td>
<td>“Social media posts often include individuals practicing yoga and other fitness activities” (Steuz 2016).</td>
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<td>Honest Tea</td>
<td>Mission Statement: Honest Tea seeks to create and promote great-tasting, healthier, organic beverages” (Goldman 2015, 3).</td>
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<td>&quot;...there is no substitute for developing personal relationships&quot; (Goldman 2015, 3).</td>
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<td>&quot;...we have also developed a close relationship with the farmer cooperation....&quot; (Goldman 2015, 5).</td>
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<td>&quot;These 5 Pillars of Our Mission&quot;...&quot;Promoting Health &amp; Wellness&quot; is number one (Goldman 2015, 3).</td>
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<td>&quot;...we enable FoodCorps to make schools healthier places for kids to eat....&quot; (Goldman 2015, 9).</td>
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<td>&quot;Honest Tea seeks to create and promote great-tasting, healthier, organic beverages” (Goldman 2015, 3).</td>
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<td>Part of mission statement: &quot;We strive to grow our business with the same honesty and integrity we use to craft our products, with sustainability and great taste for all&quot; (Goldman 2015, 3).</td>
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<td><strong>Celestial Seasonings</strong></td>
<td><strong>Blend With Care: From Seed to Sip</strong> (&quot;Blend With Care&quot; 2015).</td>
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<td>“We believe our delicious teas improve people’s lives by inviting balance, and that belief drives our commitment to our customers, our community and our planet” (&quot;Learn About Us&quot; 2015).</td>
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<td>“…we started a movement—a shift toward healthier, happier little moments carved into ever-busier days” (&quot;Learn About Us&quot; 2015).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>“Celestial Seasonings was founded more than 40 years ago with one goal: to provide delicious, high-quality teas that are good for our customers and good for the world” (&quot;Blend With Care&quot; 2015).</td>
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<td>“We select the highest-quality herbs, teas, and botanicals…Our farming partners meet strict standards for purity, quality…” (&quot;Blend With Care&quot; 2015).</td>
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<td>“…whenever possible allows us to select only the highest-quality ingredients …” (&quot;Blend With Care 2015&quot;).</td>
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<td>“By purchasing our herbs wholesale rather than pre-milled, we are better able to test the quality of our raw ingredients to ensure they meet our high standards for purity and quality” (&quot;Blend With Care 2015&quot;).</td>
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<td>“Consistency in quality and flavor in each cup of our tea” (&quot;Blend With Care&quot; 2015).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Can be seen in transparency of supply chain (&quot;Blend With Care&quot; 2015).</td>
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<td><strong>Numi Organic Tea</strong></td>
<td><strong>The Numi Foundation’s mission is to foster thriving communities by supporting initiatives that nurture art, education, health, and our natural environment</strong></td>
<td><strong>“In 1999, after observing that competing brands in the U.S. tea market differed little from one another in quality, consistency, and selection, Numi was created...”</strong></td>
<td><strong>“Even through Fair Trade USA certification as it produces fair wages, etc.</strong></td>
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| “...we value the people involved in every step of the business...” (“Celebrating People” 2015). | “Numi is a creative and collaborative company, engaged in a strong work ethos, tea creations, art, music, and more. Our strong culture echoes beyond the Numi offices with events, volunteer efforts and contests. We value our greater community and invite...” (“Community” 2015). | “In 1999, after observing that competing brands in the U.S. tea market differed little from one another in quality, consistency, and selection, Numi was created...” (“Founders Story” 2015). | }
Appendix II: Hard Evidence of How TBL/SD is Achieved in Eco-labeled Companies

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Steaz Tea</th>
<th>Fair Trade USA Certification</th>
<th>USDA Organic Certification</th>
<th>Transparency</th>
<th>Communi-Tea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• “...the DNA of our company being organic and Fair Trade Certified...” (Borth 2016)</td>
<td>• “...the DNA of our company being Organic and Fair Trade Certified...” (Borth 2016).</td>
<td>• “We search the world for the highest quality ingredients, and that means wherever possible we’re using organic and fair trade. Because doing the right thing means doing right by our fans and making sure you get the great taste, nutrition and quality you deserve” (“INGREDIENTS” 2016).</td>
<td>• certifications present a “clean bill of health” to consumers (Borth 2016).</td>
<td>• “University of Michigan Harvest Festival” and the “Boulder Cream Street Ciclovia” community events (“WELCOME TO THE” 2016).</td>
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<td>• the labels establish a “clean bill of health” (Koscius 2016)</td>
<td>• “Steaz Plays Fair—Every Steaz iced tea...is made with organic, Fair Trade Certified green tea, and natural sugar...Fair Trade takes the goodness you find in each can of Steaz green tea and spreads it around the world. It’s good for farmers because it guarantees safe working conditions and a fair price for their crops...It’s good for the environment because it promotes sustainable farming practices. And it’s good for you, because it ensures you receive only the highest-quality products” (“ALL FAIR” 2016).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Honest Tea</strong></td>
<td><strong>“Organic and fair trade have always been core to the Honest Tea mission”</strong> (Goldman 2015, 3).</td>
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<td>“In 2014, we paid $200,124 back to our tea and sugar sourcing communities in the form of fair trade premiums. These funds have helped to establish improved farming, healthcare and education initiatives” (“Our Mission” 2016).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>“Organic and fair trade have always been core to the Honest Tea mission” (Goldman 2015, 3).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>“In 2014, we purchased 6,722,336 pounds of organic ingredients, meaning they are grown without synthetic chemicals and pesticides, genetically modified organisms or irradiation” (“Our Mission” 2016).</td>
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<td>“Stakeholders who gave [them] the benefit of the doubt when [they] were a small, independent company grew more skeptical when [they] became part of the world’s largest beverage company” (Hark 2016).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>“Enterprise impacts the ecosystem and consumers” (Hark 2016).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>“Real Talk” (Hark 2016).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Celestial Seasonings</td>
<td>&quot;...with 70% of those ingredients purchased directly from the farmers and local communities&quot; (&quot;Blend With Care&quot; 2015).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>“Our new Estate Teas are ideal for consumers in the natural channel who prefer Certified Organic and Fair Trade Certified products, and they are also continuing our long history of treating our farming partners with the respect they deserve” (&quot;Celestial Seasonings&quot; 2014).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>“...a bright and lively black tea from a successful plantation that’s led the economic revival in this central African republic...” (&quot;Celestial Seasonings&quot; 2014).</td>
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<td>“...and Certified Fair Trade by Fair Trade USA to support the rural farming communities from which teas are sourced” (&quot;Celestial Seasonings&quot; 2014).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>“...and Certified Fair Trade by Fair Trade USA to support the rural farming communities from which teas are sourced” (&quot;Celestial Seasonings&quot; 2014).</td>
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<td>“Each Celestial Seasonings Estate Tea is Certified USDA Organic to ensure that its ingredients were grown and processed in accordance with strict, earth-friendly standards, and Certified Fair Trade by Fair Trade USA to support the rural farming communities from which the teas are sourced” (&quot;Celestial Seasonings&quot; 2014).</td>
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<td>“Blended With Care: From Seed to Sip”. “We think it’s important to share with you the steps we take to ensure that our teas are of the highest quality, delivered the great taste you expect and are produced in a way that protects the Earth’s natural resources. Celestial Seasonings and our parent company, Hain Celestial, supports Right to Know GMO and for you to make informed purchase decisions when it comes to GMOs...We call our sustainability story “Blended With Care: From Seed to Sip”, and we’d like to take you through it in eight steps – from the farmers’ fields to your kitchen” (Goldman 2015, 2-3).</td>
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<td>“Community Support: From Local to Global Celestial Seasonings has always believed that the goodness of our teas should be exceeded only by the goodness of our actions toward the world. We know that our efforts truly make a difference in our local community and all around the world, so we give back to charities and social organizations in our home state of Colorado, across the country and around the world” (&quot;Give Back&quot; 2015).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Numi Organic Tea</td>
<td>&quot;Numi is a leading brand purchaser of Fair Trade Certified teas, with more than half of our blends (and 80% of the raw ingredients we purchase) bearing the Fair Trade Certified label. Fair Trade guarantees farm workers are paid a minimum fair wage for their labor and empowers them to lift themselves out of poverty by investing in their farms and communities. At these gardens, the worker community votes democratically on how Fair Trade premiums are used to invest in education, health, promoting the environment, and developing the business skills necessary to compete in the global marketplace. Some programs include: new roads, cooking stoves, mosquito nets, new schools... (&quot;Fair Trade Certified&quot; 2015).&quot;</td>
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<td>As with all intensively farmed crops, conventional tea is routinely treated with a broad range of agricultural chemicals that are potentially harmful to farmers, farm workers and the environment. As opposed to most produce that is washed prior to consumption, most teas are air-dried without first being washed. The first-time tea comes into contact with water is in our own cups, right before we drink it... Beyond delivering the highest quality of product, organic teas are cultivated without the use of chemical fertilizers, herbicides or pesticides... Choosing organic not only preserves our earth's resources and protects the health of the farmers, but ensures that what is going into our bodies is 100% natural, made the way nature intended&quot; (&quot;Why Organic&quot; 2015).</td>
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<td>&quot;...the co-responsibility audits on the bottom of each box, we try to portray the thoughtful choices that Numi makes every step of the way&quot; (Burch 2016).</td>
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<td>&quot;COMMUNITEA Numi is a creative and collaborative company, engaged in a strong work ethos, tea creations, art, music and more. Our strong company culture echoes beyond the Numi offices with events, volunteer efforts and contests&quot; (&quot;Communitea&quot; 2013).</td>
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SECURITY OR HUMANITY:
GERMAN IDENTITY AND THE SYRIAN
REFUGEE CRISIS

Olivia Valone

Abstract

Under the leadership of Angela Merkel, Germany has committed to greeting refugees and asylum-seekers with open borders and open arms. But Germany has also seen the rise of a right-wing populist party and a divide within a conservative alliance between two parties. Literature on the topic of migration highlights the debate between protectionist and humanitarian principles, and the contradiction of Germany’s inclusive refugee policy but exclusive citizenship process. There is, however, a gap in research detailing how discourses on refugees reflect and co-construct different conceptualizations of German identity and responsibility. This discourse analysis examines the underlying international norms and inclusive conceptualizations of German identity that are represented and challenged by discourses on refugees from five German political parties. The debate between understandings of Germany as a multicultural society or as one with a leading culture (Leitkultur) shape discourses on deservingness and national interest. This research finds that parties with identity-inclusive discourses on refugees favor a humanitarian response, whereas parties with identity-exclusive discourses favor protectionism. The analysis helps to understand the prominence of German Leitkultur in discourses about refugees and its connections to protectionist policy recommendations.

Introduction

On October 3, 2016, most of Germany was celebrating German Unity Day. The city of Dresden, however, was the scene of an anti-Islamic and xenophobic demonstration led by the Pegida movement (Gruber and Meiritz 2016). Shouting “Merkel must go” and calling her a “folk traitor,” the demonstration...
voiced a concern about the negative implications that liberal refugee policy adopted by Merkel has on the German identity (Ibid). On a national holiday intended to celebrate the creation of a united Germany, the demonstration protested the changing face of Germany as a result of the Syrian refugee crisis. The Syrian civil war and the resulting global refugee resettlement crisis has particularly impacted Europe, warranting different reactions from EU member states and reflecting a general trend towards more restrictive asylum and refugee policies (Spiegel Staff 2015). Under the leadership of Angela Merkel, however, Germany has committed to greeting asylum-seekers and refugees with open borders and open arms (“Creating a Viable Humanitarian System” 2016). While this is the policy, is it truly the reality that migrants encounter?

The answer is complicated by the passage of Asylum Packet II in February of 2016, which restricted refugee policy through establishing reception facilities to facilitate quicker deportation when necessary, prohibiting migration of families, and demanding refugees’ financial participation in the cost of integration courses (Schuler 2016). In May of 2016, the Integration Act specifically for refugees and asylum-seekers was passed in Germany, making cultural integration an imperative (Die Bundesregierung, “Merkel: Integrationsgesetz ist Meilenstein,” 2016). It provided easier access to the labor market and job training, while also making integration courses a requirement for maintaining refugee status (Ibid). The laws present questions about who is truly deserving of protection and what protections are justified – and, importantly, to what extent does cultural identity play a role in determining deservingness. Some argue that they are measures meant to reassure the voters and counter the rise of anti-immigrant and xenophobic sentiments which were associated with the rise of the AfD (Alternative für Deutschland) – a right-wing party established in 2013 on an anti-immigration platform (Kern 2016). At first a small fringe party, the AfD continues to make gains in state elections while the CDU loses support (BBC News 2016).

The discourse of the Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU) party reflects an understanding of refugees and migration a humanitarian issue, emphasizing human rights and dignity (Die Bundesregierung, Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel at the Annual Reception for the Diplomatic Corps in Meseberg on 11 July 2016 2016). Despite this, they promote rigid integration policies (CDUa., 2015; CDUj., 2016; CDUe., 2017). In its multi-party system, German political parties have contrasting discourses on refugees, and this research seeks to understand how those discourses shape policy and reflect different conceptualizations of German identity and responsibility in the world. This topic, although very specific to the context of Germany, is relevant to the rise of right-wing groups and the ongoing conflict between instituting humanitarian or
protectionist values in immigration policy. It also helps to understand the existence of strict integration policies despite the adoption of an open border policy on a humanitarian basis (Mowat 2016).

This study involves an inquiry into the discourses on refugees during the Syrian refugee crisis by representatives of five German political parties, as it relates to different interpretations of German identity and responsibility regarding migration. I've observed that the different discourses on refugee policy from political parties in Germany exist and have created opposing images of refugees as humanitarian concerns and as threats to national security and identity. This discourse analysis establishes that discourses on German identity based on culture, basic law, and humanitarian considerations shape the conversation about refugees. I find that the understandings of German identity are consistent with specific policy measures which explain the contradictions in German policy and the conflict between doing what is considered to be “good” and what is considered to be “right” in terms of societal values. The next section serves to review relevant literature to the topic of migration policy and outlines three approaches: the protectionist, institutional, and identity approaches. I then outline the interpretivist methodological choices in more detail, and move onto my findings and conclusions.

Introduction

On the topic of migration, most scholarship lies in the realm of immigration policy, more specifically the European models of immigration policy and how attitudes towards immigrants and immigration as well as institutional factors interact to shape policy. The literature on migration policy primarily determines that policy is decided under two schools of thought: the protectionist approach and the institutionalist approach (Cerna 2016; Freeman 2006; Boswell 2007). The protectionist approach highlights the importance of security interests in determining policy, while the neo-institutionalist approach discusses the importance of institutions and social norms (Joppke 2007; Boswell 2007). Under a third approach, which I will be calling the identity approach, scholars discuss the influence of identity on refugee policy, specifically highlighting a tension between tolerance and feelings of nationalism. The three approaches represent realist, liberal, and constructivist explanations for refugee policy, respectively. This literature review outlines each of these approaches and the different conceptualizations of policy model, state interest, and normative influence when approaching the topic of migration.

Protectionist Approach
In terms of international relations theory, the protectionist approach to migration policy tends to take a more realist perspective in terms of policy model and state interest. Scholars find there exists a national model for migration policy, leading a state to choose a national policy based on state interest defined as national and economic security. Lavenex (2001) finds the argument that international or converging models of policy exist is disproven by states reluctance to transfer sovereignty, as demonstrated by the failure of a supranational asylum policy. As a result, commitment to humanitarian values takes a back seat to security consideration, and cooperation only occurs as needed to reduce the number of asylum-seekers to protect internal security (Ibid, 857-860). In this model, state interest is defined as physical, economic, and cultural security within national borders, making it incompatible with the movement for global security. Scholars justify restrictive migration policies, seeing migration as a danger to public order, cultural identity, and domestic labor markets, as well as a tool of political coercion (Huysmans 2006; Greenhill 2010). As a result, humanitarian norms and values would take a back seat to the crisis of national security in the case of a crisis. As Kofman (2002, 1040) argues, the “notions of universal rights and duties to refugees as human beings in need of protection come into conflict with national interests and sovereignty justifying more restrictive and selective policies.” Although this has not been the case in Germany, where the right to asylum has been guaranteed as a humanitarian right, it is helpful in identifying policy contradictions within the specific context (“Creating a Viable Humanitarian System” 2017). The literature also points out the limit to the humanitarian perspective of migration policy and supposed liberalization. The integration policies are liberal in theory, but, when implemented, they become somewhat problematic and illiberal in order to maintain protectionism. As a result, despite increasing European cooperation and the influence of human rights in the asylum policy, states implement programs that restrict liberal policy through prohibiting deeper integration (Kofman 2002, 860-861). This distinction could be particularly useful in explaining the context of Germany, where rigid integration and citizenship procedures have been adopted alongside seemingly liberal asylum policy (Die Bundesregierung, “Merkel: Integrationsgesetz ist Meilenstein,” 2016).

**Institutionalist Approach**

The protectionist approach, however, does not provide an explanation as to why liberalization of refugee policy in various European countries, and

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1 The Tampere European Council in 1999 tried to establish a supranational asylum policy, but it was limited by the Treaty of Nice. Lavenex uses this example to demonstrate the tension between national security and human rights.
particularly in Germany, has occurred and resulted in enhanced rights for refugees and asylum-seekers (Thielemann 2016, 644). If it means going against national security, are states acting irrationally when responding to humanitarian concerns? The institutionalist approach takes a liberal perspective in defining state interest, focusing more on how state actors and international institutions, or a complex combination of the two, influence immigration policy in Europe (Joppke 2007; Lavenex 2001; Freeman 2006; Freeman 2004). In the international model of immigration, scholars examine the convergence of policy in the European Union as a result of increased institutional capacity and the creation of a transnational asylum system (Ibid; Laubenthal 2011). Scholars favoring the institutionalist approach find the protectionist argument weak because it disregards the role of international norms and institutions in determining state interests (Boswell 2007, 78). When deciding on what immigration policy to adopt, the state must consider the fairness, wealth accumulation, security, and institutional legitimacy of the policy (Ibid, 91). The protectionist approach emphasizes importance of wealth accumulation and security, but the institutional approach stresses that institutional legitimacy outweighs those considerations in the age of globalization; in order to preserve institutional legitimacy, a state will not dismantle a liberal migration policy whenever it stands in the way of a protectionist migration policy if it is fundamental to maintaining favor under the scrutiny of the international community (Ibid, 89). In order to maintain favor, it is in the state’s interest to maintain humanitarian values such as liberty, freedom, and democracy on policies associated with liberalism and the EU (Joppke 2007, 3-5).

**Identity Approach**

Although Merkel has been promoting these values in response to the refugee resettlement crisis, Germany has seen the rise of a right-wing extremist group, promoting nationalism, Euro-skepticism, and protectionism (Kern 2017). The humanitarian values continue to be promoted at an international level, but the legitimacy of those values are being challenged within the national context. A focus on identity and internal dynamics can be useful to explain the particular dynamics within Germany. The third approach takes on a constructivist perspective toward migration policy, understanding policy models and state interests as determined by identity and attitudes towards refugees and asylum-seekers. This approach differs from the formerly discussed approaches in its emphasis on the role of societal ideas and norms in defining interests as opposed to the state. Along with questions of liberalization, migration brings up the issues of multiculturalism, nationalism,
and xenophobia through challenging the myth of national cultural homogeneity (Huysmans 2000, 762). In examining how prejudices, identities, and ideologies influence and shape attitudes toward migrants, scholars recognize that the main rationale for restrictions is economic security, but public fears and prejudices are responsible for the general attitudes towards migration (Burns 2000; Ceobanu 2010). Blank (2003) and Kurthen (1995) examine how conceptions of migrant identity provide an insight to German identity, detailing the debate between the inclusive and exclusive definitions of national identity, which then shapes refugee and integration policies. While Germany’s liberal asylum law promotes universal rights and inclusivity, it is contradicted by rigid citizenship laws that promote nationalism and exclusivity out of a fear of diluting “Germanness” (Kurthen 1995; Checkel 1999). Different understandings of national security create a conflict between valuing cultural homogeneity and fearing the revival of extreme nationalism and xenophobia (Huysmans 2000, 766; Langenbacher 2008; van Munster 2009). The identity approach assists in understanding how the discourses about refugees reflect and contribute to the contradiction between different conceptions of what it means to be German.

The literature has provided variables impacting both domestic and international politics that are present in discussions about migration policies. Questions of state interest are influenced by economic and cultural security, as well as international humanitarian and multicultural values. In evaluating the influence of norms on migration policy, a debate between national security and human rights emerges. In the protectionist approach, states choose national policies based on fears of a threat to physical, economic, or cultural security. In the institutional approach, states choose to adopt international or social norms to establish legitimacy (Langenbacher 2008, 81-84; Freeman 2006). In the identity approach, migration policy is decided based on questions of identity and understandings of responsibility. Based on how state interest is defined, discourse may emphasize either a national or international model of policy, which also ties to inclusive or exclusive conceptualizations of German identity (Luedke 2005). Guided by these concepts, this research will serve to show how values and conceptualizations of German identity are conveyed and contribute to rationalizations of different approaches to migration policy.

**Methodology**

This discourse analysis seeks to understand how discourses on refugees draw on and co-construct discourses about refugees, and how these discourses then influence positions on contested issues. In an analysis of the discourses of five
German political parties on refugees and asylum-seekers, I aim to understand how they are constructed and as a result convey specific understandings of German identity and responsibility. As opposed to a neopositive study, which has been used by other scholars to examine national policy with a comparative international perspective, this interpretivist approach allows for a closer look at the contradictory aspects of German asylum policy, and perhaps a better indication of the direction in which the policy is headed. I chose to analyze five discourses on identity in order to be exposed to different meaning-making across the political spectrum. Through analyzing party platforms and party press releases, this analysis shows how refugees are framed within political discourse on refugee policy, and also how conceptualizations of German identity are constructed. In this section, I outline and justify my methods of gathering evidence and analyzing data, and then address the credibility of the methodology.

In terms of conceptualizing European security, some scholars argue that this tension creates a conflict between the fear of multiculturalism and the fear of a revival of extreme nationalism (Huysmans 2000, 766; Langenbacher 2008, van Munster 2009). Other scholars, such as Blank (2003) and Kurthen (1995), have studied how conceptions of migrant identity detail and provide an insight into the debate between inclusive and exclusive definitions of national identity. An example of this contradiction can be seen in Germany’s open asylum policy but rigid integration and citizenship requirements. Based on these concepts, my research will examine the interaction between discourses on refugees in Germany and discourses on identity.

The five parties creating the discourses that I analyze are the Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU), the Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (CSU), the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), Die Linke, and the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). The CDU and the CSU are both liberal-conservative parties to the center-right of the political spectrum and part of a conservative coalition (Große Koalition) for a Bundestag majority (national parliament). The AfD is a right-wing populist party, which currently does not hold seats in the Bundestag, but has been making gains in state elections. The SPD is a democratic socialist party in the center-left of the spectrum and, after the Große Koalition, holds the most seats in the Bundestag. Die Linke is a party that holds some of the same principles as the SPD but is more socialist and has a smaller base of supporters.

3 The press releases, specifically articles and interviews, were accessed from each party’s online archives.
Although there are more German parties than those selected for this analysis, I have chosen these specific parties based on party membership and different positions on the political spectrum (see Figure 1). In this analysis, the actors producing the discourses and creating meanings are the representatives from each of the political parties. The specific context being addressed by the research is the period following the declaration of a refugee crisis and a German open-border policy regarding asylum-seekers in fall of 2015. This context provides insights into the current state of the discourse as it becomes a central concern for German internal and external policy.

I analyzed party platforms on refugee policy and integration policy as it pertains to refugees and asylum-seekers. I also analyzed party press releases that presented an argument on refugee policy in a three-month period preceding state elections in March and September of 2016.1 The time period before the elections is an important period of analysis as a result of increased attention to the discourses. The combination of these texts provides an in-depth understanding of how the discourses on refugees and asylum-seekers produce meanings and change over time, while also paying attention to how they interact with discourses on German identity. More specifically, I paid attention to how refugees were framed as deserving or undeserving through characterizations as criminals, Schützbedürftigen (deserving of protection), and humanitarian responsibilities. Within these discourses, I analyzed how German culture was framed by mentions of culture and basic law, whether it focused on Leitkultur (leading culture) or multiculturalism, basic law or humanitarian law. In order to do this, in the analysis I ask who refugees and asylum-seekers are in each party’s discourse, who is considered to be deserving, and what makes them so. I then consider how the German identity is represented within the discourses on refugee identity and deservingness. I also consider how the different understandings of German responsibility are represented in debate between the right and left, especially in discourse portraying AfD as un-German because of their discourse on refugees and asylum-seekers.

In analyzing 40 press releases from five different political parties, I have been exposed to different meanings and developed intertextuality, which contributes to trustworthiness. Having advanced German proficiency will allowed me to read and analyze texts from the political parties, which are written in German. An interpretivist methodology places limits on the generalizability of my research by grounding it in a specific context; however, it allows for a more in-depth analysis of how identity and values can influence policy and attitudes toward refugees. Through examining these discourses of five political

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1 The Landtag elections in March of 2016 took place the states of Baden Wurttemburg, Rheinland-Palatinate, Saxony-Anhalt. The elections in September of 2016 took place in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and Berlin.
parties, I encountered different meanings that are assigned to refugees through a specific framing of the German identity. I explain that the discourses make certain policy choices seem more rational, but more research can be done to determine which discourse is dominant. This research design also addresses intertextuality through analyzing texts from two time periods and analyzing how they reflect or invoke each other. I pay attention to how the ideas about German identity are presented across political parties in discussions about Leitkultur, Grundordnung, and multiculturalism. I analyze how these concepts are present in discourses about refugee policy and bring about constitutive understandings as a more nationalistic and identity-exclusive discourse regarding migrants gains influence.

Analysis

The issue of migration brings up not only the issues of economic integration, but also cultural integration and issues of multiculturalism, nationalism, and xenophobia (Huysmans 2000, 762). This discourse analysis seeks to understand how discourses on refugees draw on and co-construct discourses about identity, and how these discourses then influence positions on contested issues. The literature examines the debate between inclusive and exclusive definitions of national identity, which then influence refugee policy (Kurthen 1995; Checkel 1999). This analysis shows how inclusive and exclusive conceptualizations of German identity are represented in discourses about refugee deservingness of protection and social services, and looks at the different understandings of German society and culture represented in the arguments. The analysis is concluded with a discussion of alternate interpretations and work that remains to be done on the topic of discourses about refugee and asylum-seekers.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2018) defines refugees as people fleeing conflict or persecution who, according to international law, are not to be returned to situations where their life and freedom are at risk. Similarly, asylum-seekers are people fleeing conflict or persecution who qualify for international protection (UNHCR 2018). The distinction between the two terms is that “asylum-seeker” is used to refer to individuals whose requests for sanctuary have yet to be processed, often occurring during mass movements of refugees (Ibid). Both of these terms are distinct from concepts of immigration and economic migration, which are pull factors. The terms are also not limited to Syrian refugees and asylum-seekers, which is reflected by the discourse. This study concerns itself less with how the German political parties define refugees and asylum-seekers, but rather in how the discussions about deservingness frame German culture and the identities of refugees and asylum-seekers.

The five parties creating the discourses that I analyze are the CDU, CSU, AfD, SPD, and Die Linke. Each of the five German political parties converge in acknowledging that some asylum-seekers need protection, but diverge on qualifications of deservingness and the extent of German responsibility. Deservingness is a recurring concept in the CDU discourse, with eight of the eleven releases from the CDU referring to refugees and asylum-seekers as people in need or Schützbedurftigen, which literally translates to “those deserving of protection” (CDUa., 2015; CDUj., 2016; CDUe., 2017). This is an interesting concept, because it not only introduces the idea that there is a right to protection, but also indicates that some asylum-seekers are undeserving. Within the discourse on deserving-
ness, a refugee is qualified for protection if they are facing persecution or have protection claim, whereas economic or illegal migrants and criminals do not (CDUa., 2015; CDUj., 2016). Those who are deemed to be deserving of protection are entitled to equal opportunity based on German basic law, or Grundordnung, but refugees and asylum-seekers are also expected to integrate (CDUi., 2016; CDUd., 2017). In the discourse on integration, the responsibility for integration falls both on German citizens to be open and welcoming and on refugees to learn the way of life, respect the culture, and learn the language (CDUd., 2017; CDUh., 2016; CDUi., 2016; CDUc., 2016). Two of the texts mention German Leitkultur, or leading culture, which is described as basic law and a free society with the sense of a leading culture (CDUc., 2016; CDUi., 2016). While they do not use the specific word, seven other texts describe German basic law, values, and way of life into which Schützbedürftigen are expected to integrate (CDUg., 2016; CDUa., 2015; CDUf., 2015; CDUk., 2016; CDUh., 2016; CDUd., 2017; CDUe., 2017). The discourse on Leitkultur presents an opening for refugees and asylum-seekers to be accepted and incorporated into German society, but only if they conform to the culture.

The discourse of the CSU on refugees and asylum-seekers similarly focuses on deservingness and migrants deemed to be Schützbedürftigen (CSUa., 2016; CSUe., 2016). Reflective of humanitarian values, the CSU party platform states that Germany has a “humanitarian responsibility for the bombed, prosecuted, and abused people from areas of crisis (humanitäre Verantwortung für ausgebombte, verfolgte und misbrauchte Menschen aus Krisengebieten)” (CSUa., 2016). Although the party recognizes that German basic law protects refugees and asylum-seekers, the CSU conceptualization of Leitkultur is more based on culture and security than Grundordnung. In five of the six texts analyzed, refugees and asylum-seekers were framed as security threats by discussing criminality, terrorism, and cultural incompatibility (CS Ud., 2016; CS Ue., 2016; CS Uc., 2016; CSUa., 2016; CSUf., 2016). According to the CSU party platform, refugees “must live with us instead of next to or against us (muss mit uns leben, statt neben oder gar gegen uns)” (CSUf., 2016). In a press release about integration, former CSU chairman Erwin Huber stresses that those who do not acknowledge and accept values undermine peaceful coexistence, and thus forfeit guest rights (CSUd., 2016). CSU understands society as being dominated by German Leitkultur instead of multiculturalism, and discussions of refugee culture criminalize them and set them irrevocably at odds with German culture (CSUb., 2017).

The AfD discourse places refugees and asylum-seekers not just at odds with culture, but also with economic and physical security. It centers on the theme of undeservingness, characterizing refugees and asylum-seekers as economic burdens, and criminals, and difficult to integrate in nine of the eleven texts analyzed (AfDg., 2016; AfDc., 2016; AfDe., 2016). Repeating a phrase from the CSU party platform, the AfD platform states that German society is characterized by “Leitkultur statt Multikulturalismus (leading culture instead of multiculturalism),” with cultural practices and a legal system that is at odds with Islam (AfDd., 2017). Six of the texts tie refugee identity to Islam and serve to characterize refugees and asylum-seekers as threats by linking them to terrorism and women’s roles that are at odds with a German Leitkultur values (AfDi., 2016; AfDb., 2016). Further
reinforcing the skepticism of deservingness, not a single one of the texts uses the term Flüchtling (refugee), but rather use immigrant, migrant, or asylum-seeker. Since refugees are people who are granted state services, the avoidance of this term is important because it disassociates the individual from deservingness and humanitarian considerations. It also indicates that most refugees are not, in fact, refugees, but rather outsiders and societal disruptions. This discourse places refugees on the fringes of society, in a state of identity limbo between fleeing from a war, violence, or prosecution and trying to integrate into a society that does not want them.

The left-leaning parties take a different route than the right-leaning parties when it comes to conceptualizing refugee and German identity. In seven of the nine texts analyzed, The SPD describes refugees and asylum-seekers as people facing war, violence, or political prosecution, framing them as a humanitarian responsibility (SPDe., 2016; SPDg., 2015). In the SPD party platform, social diversity is noted as a strength of Germany (SPDf., 2017). Other press releases stress the values of openness and tolerance, which is considered to be “the basis for everyone who lives here whether they have a German passport or not (die Grundlage für jeden, der hier lebt – ganz gleich, ob mit oder ohne deutschen Pass)” (SPDi., 2016; SPDh., 2016). Describing refugees as “victims” of both persecution and right-wing violence, the SPD describes a policy focused on ensuring peaceful coexistence and societal cohesion rather than conformity in five of the texts (SPDb., 2016; SPDg., 2015; SPDi., 2016; SPDh., 2016; SPDf., 2017). This indicates that the party holds a more inclusive perspective of identity and see Germany as a multicultural society rather than one with Leitkultur. In the SPD discourse, basic law and social democracy are also considered to be indispensable aspects of German politics (SPDb., 2016; SPDf., 2017; SPDc., 2016; SPDd., 2016; SPDa., 2016).

Similarly, Die Linke frames refugees and asylum-seekers as deserving recipients of protection; however, the discourse deviates from that of the SPD in framing refugees and asylum-seekers as victims of government policy decisions that take away basic social protections in all eight texts (Die Linkeh., 2016; Die Linkef., 2016; Die Linkec., 2016; Die Linkea., 2016; Die Linkee., 2015; Die Linked., 2016; Die Linkeg., 2016; Die Linkeb., 2016). Three of the texts point to the UNCHR as a model for German asylum policy which has been challenged by rising nationalism and increasing restrictions (Die Linkeh., 2016; Die Linkee., 2015; Die Linkea., 2016). Integration is not mentioned in any of the texts, highlighting that humanitarian and socialist values place responsibility on the government rather than on refugees. This indicates that the deserved humanitarian rights and services should take the main focus, rather than maintaining a German cultural identity. Die Linke's discourse on refugees and asylum-seekers stresses that the government is not adequately committed to German humanitarian and socialist values, but also disregards the possible existence of a German national identity.

In the various discourses, refugees are generally framed either as threats to German Leitkultur or contributions to a multicultural society. The CDU, SPD, and Die Linke expressed concern about how the fear of cultural heterogeneity led to a revival of nationalism and xenophobia. Specifically targeting the discourse from the AfD on refugees, the parties stress that right-wing extremism and racism in the name of “patriotism” go against the basic law and democratic values of German society (CDUi., 2016; SPDe., 2016; SPDg., 2015; SPDb., 2016). The AfD on the other hand argues that the refugee policy is
not consistent with values and needs of German society, especially in terms of security and women’s rights (AfDf., 2016; AfDh., 2016). Interestingly, the CSU is absent in both of these discourses, indicating These discourses contribute to the contradiction and conflict between different conceptions of what it means to be German, and how that ties specifically to refugee policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Refugee Identity</th>
<th>German Identity</th>
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<tr>
<td>AfD</td>
<td>Criminal, economic burdens, difficult to integrate</td>
<td>Leitkultur - anti-Islam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Schützbedürftigen – expected to integrate with help of society</td>
<td>Leitkultur - Grundordnung, openness</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>Schützbedürftigen – must integrate</td>
<td>Leitkultur - against multiculturalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>People facing war, violence, or political prosecution</td>
<td>Multiculturalism, Grundordnung</td>
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<tr>
<td>Die Linke</td>
<td>Victims of inhumane governments</td>
<td>Multiculturalism, Socialism</td>
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These discourses on refugee and German identity contributed to how each of the parties framed the crisis, specifically the issues discussed and the identified solutions; each party presents a distinctive understanding of deservingness of protection which were tied to exclusive or inclusive discourses on German identity. The discourses on the refugees and asylum-seekers and the ties to German identity reflect what the parties consider to be the main challenges of the time. The main policy issues that are discussed are distributive politics in the EU, border regulation, and integration.

The disparities within the Große Koalition’s recommendations were particularly interesting, since they united on the basis of similar interests and values. Both the CDU and CSU stress the importance of protecting EU borders and working on international cooperation, reducing migration, and ensuring integration, but the CSU takes a more conservative stance on border and integration controls (Ibid). This is made understandable on the basis that the CSU’s discourse emphasizes cultural unity and a specific German way of life that is not consistent with that of refugees. The CSU frames the refugees and asylum-seekers as more of a threat to Germany’s dominant Leitkultur and physical security (CSUe., 2016; CSUc., 2016; CSUa., 2016). It would also make sense that, despite being led by the woman who called for open borders, the CDU also calls for rigid integration. Refugees and asylum-seekers were framed as deserving in terms of humanitarian norms and basic law, but since German Leitkultur is also cited an important aspect of identity, reducing migration and enforcing integration is an important focus of their refugee policy in order to maintain cultural unity. Consistent with characterizations of refugees as criminals and undeserving, as well as exclusive understandings of identity, they push for a closed borders and strict integration requirements (AfDa., 2016).

The SPD pushes for more equitable distribution in Europe and international cooperation on migration policy to reduce migration so that Germany can fulfill humanitarian obligations more effectively (SPDf., 2017). In terms of regulating migration, the SPD calls for a quota and secured borders in order to provide more services to refugees.
and make integration easier (Ibid). The discussion of social services relates back to refugee deservingness and values of multiculturalism that are also expressed by Die Linke. The difference between the left-leaning is interesting, because despite stressing a social safety-net and multiculturalism, Die Linke differs from the SPD in defining German society as socialist; thus, the party disparages efforts to institute quotas and stricter integration policies, and finds that the government is repeating the victimization process (Die Linke, 2016; Die Linke, 2016; Die Linke, 2016).

Conclusion

In the discourses, there exists a clear divide between the understandings of German society as one of Leitkultur or one of multiculturalism. The debate between the center parties, which maintain the largest membership and each claim to be the “party of the people,” and express different understandings of what it means to be “the people.” The SPD emphasizes multiculturalism and the CDU and CSU emphasize German Leitkultur, but in each instance they are understood in different ways. Both the CDU and SPD discuss basic law as a key aspect of German identity, but paired with a sense of a leading culture, the CDU represents a more exclusive conceptualization of identity; thus, a preference for a more restrictive approach to refugee policy is not as surprising. The parties of the Great Coalition, center parties banded together on the basis of similar values and goals, differ in the emphasis placed on the role of a set of German culture and values. The CSU, as well as the AfD, placed the Islamic religion at odds with German values which could tie back to the Christian identity of the party (CSU, 2016; CSU, 2017; AfD, 2017; AfD, 2016; AfD, 2016; AfD, 2016). Although it was not mentioned in the analysis, many of the discourses on refugees across parties brought up Islam and the connection to terrorism, but only the CSU and the AfD directly associated refugees with Islam (Ibid). The CSU mentions Muslim culture and terrorism in four of the texts, and the AfD does so in six. While the SPD and CDU also discuss terrorism as it relates to refugee policy in six different texts, they stress the separation of refugees from the terrorist acts. There seems to be a misunderstanding about Muslim culture and whether or not it has a place in German society. It would be interesting to further research the role of religious identity in Germany and how it relates to Islam. A longitudinal study on the changes within the discourse on refugees and asylum-seekers would also help to understand how discourse may shape policy.

Rather than simply characterizing party values based on policy position, the analysis provides an in-depth understanding about how German identity is being constructed in the context of the refugee resettlement crisis. This research also contributes to the identity approach to studying and understanding migration policy. Along with exposure and intertextuality which were addressed in the methodology section, Schwarz-Shea and Yanow (2012) explain that it is necessary to address reflexivity and trustworthiness when conducting interpretivist research. It is also important to recognize my status as an outsider and that American norms and values shape my own perceptions about liberalism and what is ‘good,’ although this paper does not make an argument on morality.

In my analysis of the discourses on refugees and asylum-seekers, I explained the interaction and co-constructions of discourses on refugees and German identity. This research was intended to understand how different political parties understand German
identity and responsibility, and thus does not address how discourses have changed over time or make an argument about which discourse is the most dominant. In this analysis I primarily used press releases and party platforms that are made available in the archives on the websites of each party, but this does not necessarily account for the official discourse of the German government. If one were to consider only government documents, it would provide insight into official national discourse but not exhibit the debates. The concept of German Leitkultur was represented in a majority of the analyzed texts but was defined differently within each discourse, as was the concept of a multicultural society. Essentially, this research provides an insight to the importance and prevalence of discussions about German identity that have been brought up in the period following the refugee crisis. With respect to the state of German democracy, it shows that a variety of opinions and understandings are being represented and debated within the state and national parliaments and there is not a clear dominant narrative on German identity and history. Since these discussions are so prominent in press releases, it can be assumed that similar questions are also troubling the German public.

Although other policy debates were involved in determining the results of the state elections in March and September of 2016, it is important to note that the results showed continued political domination of the central parties - the CDU and the SPD. In all cases, however, the parties are down in seats, which have been claimed by the AfD. Refugee policy is only one of many issues that demands voter attention, but with these two parties in the lead, the discourse on policy will center on basic law with questions about a German cultural identity. The rise of the AfD contributes to the sense of an exclusive German identity.

On September 24, 2017, Germans took to the polling booths to vote for the German Chancellor and a political party for the Bundestag (Hawley 2017). The CDU/CSU led with 32.8% of the vote, followed by the SPD at 20.7%, but both parties were facing losses as the AfD claimed an unpredicted 13% of the vote (Ibid). As a result, Merkel gained a plurality of the votes for the position of Chancellor, but is unable to hold the position without the backing of a majority coalition within the Bundestag (Ibid). Meanwhile, the AfD became the first right-wing party in over half a century to win seats in the Bundestag (Ibid). On October 9th, Merkel agreed to placing a cap on the refugee intake, which she had consistently rejected up until that point, and her attempts to form a coalition continue without the support of the SPD continue (Vonberg 2017). The rise of more nationalistic and identity-exclusive discourses in Germany analyzed in this research helps to understand and explain this turn in policy. The German political spectrum has been tilted towards the right with the rise of the AfD and the fall of the SPD, which will play an important role in how the issues regarding refugee and German identity will be addressed in the upcoming years.
Appendix


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EXPLAINING THE FRENCH PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO

Luke Theuma

Abstract

Scholars have debated whether strategic, cultural, political, or ideological factors best determine the continued involvement of states in military alliances. However, the literature does not take into account partial withdrawal from alliances, and this potentially limits our understanding. To shed light on the nature of military alliances, this research uses a neopositivist methodology to examine the most powerful state that ever withdrew from NATO: Charles de Gaulle’s France. My research focuses on what specific combination of factors caused France to partially withdraw from NATO in 1966. It examines and weighs three independent variables: the degree to which NATO met French strategic priorities, the extent of nationalism in France, and French threat perceptions. The variables are operationalized using speeches by leaders, declassified communications between NATO members, and additional primary source material. The analysis indicates that nationalism, and thus constructivism, was a significant factor in the French partial withdrawal. By identifying the conditions influencing French withdrawal from NATO, this research improves our understanding of how the collision of constructivist, realist, and liberalist thought in a key NATO state lead to a partial withdrawal. Additionally, it works to determine whether political, ideological, or strategic factors are more important in holding an alliance together.

Introduction

With 28 members, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) boasts an alliance containing 14 percent of the world’s countries. This is an astonishing statistic for an alliance whose doom has been prophesied from the moment of its inception. NATO continues to be, after 65 years, a relevant international organization whose policies benefit a variety of states. The Alliance retains its importance geopolitically (Goldgeier 2010, 21), as it works to promote
North American and European interests (Barany 2009, 119), maintain a collective defense structure for all members (Ho Chun 2013, 79), and improve cooperation and communication on both sides of the Atlantic (Peterson and Steffenson 2009, 40).

Despite its past success, NATO is currently in uncertain waters. The widening gulf between the US and Europe over political and military goals is concerning (Noetzel and Schreer 2008, 17). Recent operations in places like Georgia and the Balkans were heavily criticized by the international community and military strategists alike as being ineffective or damaging (Oğuz 2008, 6-8). In addition, the European Union (EU) is starting to rise as a growing cultural and political alternative to NATO for European states, many of whom question the necessity of NATO (Kfir 2015, 83-84). These factors all add fuel to a growing public relations crisis, as scholars continue to question NATO’s relevance and efficiency in the 21st century (Wolff 2014, 73-95). An alliance is only as strong as the members that form its ranks. NATO’s 28 members are not created equal, and if more powerful states like the United States, France, the UK, or Germany begin to question the relevance of the alliance, its influence and military capabilities will suffer as these states disengage.

This paper investigates a single case: France under President Charles de Gaulle. The French partial withdrawal from NATO lasted over 40 years, from 1963 to the early 2000s (NATO Public Diplomacy Division 2015, 1-10). Such a long withdrawal demands a compelling explanation. Additionally, the French withdrawal was partial, since France left NATO’s military command structure but remained politically tied to the alliance. I am conceptualizing partial withdrawal from a military alliance as the act of cutting all military cooperation with the alliance for at least five years (the shortest time a country (Greece) has left NATO), while retaining political ties to the alliance (Kaplan 2004, 74-75). In order to understand the rationale behind France’s decision, it is critical to pose the question: what combination of factors caused France to partially withdraw from NATO in 1966? The answer will shed light on the factors that either destabilize, or unify, military alliances.

Moving forward, I explain why de Gaulle’s France leaving NATO cannot be explained by existing literature, which does not sufficiently take into account partial withdrawals, making France a deviant case (Klotz 2008, 43-58). I then lay out a small-n neopositivist approach that incorporates qualitative and quantitative sources to examine three independent variables which would influence a state to leave a military alliance. The dependent variable measures a state’s desire to leave a military alliance. The first independent variable measures the degree to which the military alliance met the state’s strategic goals, the second measures a
state’s level of nationalism, and the third variable is a state’s perception of external threat levels. Each of these variables is embedded in the existing literature and operationalized using the primary sources I gathered.

In conclusion, I find that high nationalism and the low utility of NATO to the French pushed France to partially withdraw from NATO’s military command structure. The dangers posed by the Warsaw Pact and West Germany is what convinced De Gaulle to remain politically engaged with NATO in order to retain a measure of political protection. I then apply these results to the current time period by explaining that high nationalism and disinterest in political and military alliances still impact Europe today, expanding on the dangers that poses for NATO. A small-n methodology allows these conclusions to remain generalizable while still drawing on extensive contextual sources that are critical to understand the time periods I am discussing.

**Literature Review**

An alliance is defined as a “voluntary agreement between states in which the signatories promise to take action (such as military intervention) under specific circumstances (usually war)” (Lai and Reiter 2000, 206). The literature on military alliances is categorized into three schools of thought: a realist school which postulates that alliances retain cohesion because members are united by common structural and strategic objectives, a liberalism-based school that suggests military alliances stay together because of common cultural factors or domestic considerations, which views cooperation as easier than unilateral action, and a constructivist school which suggests that military alliance cohesion is more fluid, and is determined by how the members of that alliance view ideas and norms about the international system. Realism in this context refers to what is known as “defensive realism,” which recognizes that states live in a world that is fundamentally chaotic, but that states seek to unify to create a balance of power while defending their interests (Slaughter 2015, 2). I am not focusing on “offensive liberalism,” a form of liberalism that views the maximization of power relative to one’s rivals as necessary and don’t view balance of power systems as productive (Ibid). Liberalism, in contrast, focuses on the sociopolitical characteristics of states and how these characteristics influence their decision-making process (Ibid, 3). Constructivism challenges both schools on the notion that state identities are predictable, explaining that states develop fluid identities that are shaped by the interactions they have with other states and can therefore change over time (Wendt 1994, 386). These schools of thought lay the necessary groundwork to understand and explain military alliance cohesion and, as a result, the decisions of individual
member states.

Realists assume that states form military alliances to achieve goals. Unlike for constructivist and liberal scholars, the culture and domestic politics of states have little weight to realist scholars, and military alliances are seen as useful only if they help to achieve concrete policies such as helping states face a more powerful threat (Walt qtd in Dwivedi, 224). As a result, these scholars agree that states band together to achieve common tactical or security-related goals, as opposed to states coming together because they have similar cultures or similar forms of government (Gibler and Wolford 2006, 130). There are a variety of explanatory factors emphasized within this school. These include: the extent to which diplomatic goals are shared between states (Martin 2004, 298; Basaraba and Herczeg, 33), the level of diplomatic recognition of state borders along with the ability to defend them militarily (Gibler and Wolford, 147-148), and the level of military and political clout states have regionally or globally (Ratti 2001, 53). Debates within this school revolve around which of these priorities is more relevant to military alliance cohesion: security-related priorities specifically, or other foreign policy-related objectives. Scholars within this school of thought typically utilize statistical analysis to reach general conclusions about military alliance behavior.

The debate amongst realists focuses on what goals states are trying to achieve. States either ally with other states to increase their own security or to further their tactical priorities. Some scholars argue that military alliances create a structure that maintains a more stable and peaceful status quo which results in increased security to alliance members (Bennett 1997, 848). Although the structure of alliances reduces individual state autonomy, states that are in military alliances are willing to accept this in order to be more secure (Ibid). This increased security results from two factors: proximity and communication. Firstly, because most states in military alliances share a border with at least one fellow member, the chances that a state will be invaded by a neighboring country are reduced (Gibler and Wolford, 153). Secondly, because alliances offer a formalized and streamlined structure for communication, the chances for misunderstanding or escalation are reduced (Peterson and Steffenson, 40). The more information states have about the intentions of other states, the less likely it is that war will break out between them (Trager 2010, 347).

Other realist scholars explain that states form military alliances in order to achieve tactical policies that only partially have to do with their military security (Sprecher 2004, 331). Italy serves as a good example. One major goal Italy wanted NATO to achieve was expansion into the Balkans, which, in Italy’s eyes, would have stabilized the region and increased Italy’s economic and political clout there, as Italy could not expand into the region by itself due to its relatively weak military
Alliances like NATO are an especially useful place to see states prioritizing strategic benefits over autonomy. Weaker states within these sorts of military alliances depend on a powerful state (or states) to absorb the costs of the alliance, while powerful states often manipulate weaker states to achieve their tactical objectives (Walt 2008, 115-116; Chun, 76; Oğuz, 8). In a realist world, these sorts of relationships do not have to be balanced, they just have to match up with the priorities of each state.

Certain decisions made by de Gaulle’s France fit into this realist paradigm. Under his leadership, France developed its own nuclear force (Martin 2013, 18), and one of de Gaulle’s central priorities was to restore French military, economic, and political dominance in Europe. Accordingly, in order to determine what combination of factors led France to partially withdraw from NATO, it is necessary to take into account realist priorities as factors which influenced de Gaulle’s decisions, because many of his goals centered around the issues realists focus on.

The second school of thought investigates the work of liberal scholars. Unlike realists, liberal scholars prioritize political and cultural considerations within states, laying these out as the main factors that cause states to unify or draw apart. The debate within this school focuses on which of these two factors is more important when determining alliance formation and withdrawal. Although these scholars touch on nationalism briefly, they do not hold such ideological concepts as centrally as constructivist scholars do, nor do they assume that state identities are fluid, which divides these two schools of thought as well. One branch of liberalism focuses on culture as being the primary catalyst driving alliance formation. They explain that states are more likely to come together when they share common backgrounds such as legal cultures (Powell 2010, 53). The literature takes culture into account by examining the unifying effect of international law on the international system, and how similar languages, ethnicities, and histories unify states (Ibid 46). For example, states are greatly influenced by the lessons learned early in their histories and common historical lessons lead certain states to work towards similar goals in the future (Chaudhuri 2009, 845). India is a good example of this. When India rejected an alliance with the U.S. in 1954, it did so because it viewed such an alliance as once again placing foreign troops in Indian territory, which brought back bad memories of India’s occupation by Britain, not because an alliance with the U.S. was a poor strategic choice (Ibid 850). As a result, the preponderance of common cultural factors has an impact on diplomatic operations, as government officials from different cultures make different choices in similar situations, which divides states by the different perspectives they have about similar problems (Johnston 1995, 34-35). In India’s case, they agreed with the United States on certain security issues, but a difference in culture made them
unwilling to fully cooperate with the West. These scholars stand in sharp contrast to realist thought, pointing to the historical and cultural backgrounds of different states to explain why states don’t always choose a realist foreign policy.

Cultural factors could even lead to issues within existing alliances, such as the U.S.-Japanese alliance, when a US submarine accidentally sank a Japanese fishing vessel in 2001 and cultural barriers made communication difficult (Curtis Martin, 289-291). The major barrier was the difference in outlook. America has a more individualistic culture, so they viewed this incident as isolated. The Japanese, however, were furious. As a collectivist culture, the Japanese believe that one person’s actions cast shame on the whole population. As a result, they viewed this incident as an example of overall American carelessness, which made this already tense situation worse. Even when strategic priorities are aligned, this theoretical subcategory maintains that a state’s culture strongly impacts what alliances it chooses to enter and remain in. Another example of this is the current state of U.S.-EU relations and the transatlantic relationship as a whole. The EU, more concerned with the spread of its soft power, is drawing away from the United States because the US is focused on the spread of its hard power capabilities (Basaraba and Herczeg, 165-167). Scholars explain this by pointing out the differences in the values and cultures of the EU and the US as a whole, highlighting variables such as: the importance of the military in everyday life, the degree to which citizens of states accept institutionalization, and the level of respect the governing bodies of the state have for international law (Ibid).

However, there is a division within this school. Some liberal scholars believe that domestic political concerns are the primary factor state leaders consider when choosing to join or leave military alliances, as opposed to culture being the primary catalyst overall. When citizens of states, particularly democratic ones, push for a certain policy or a certain alliance, state actions change as a result, because state leaders feel beholden to their people and pursue actions that their voting blocs would find acceptable (Auerswald 2004, 643; Gartzke and Gleditsch 2004, 791). This effect can certainly be observed in democratic states, such as the United States, where citizens’ voices matter (Yost 1991, 92-93). Even in more illiberal states, such as China, domestic forces such as nationalism need to be maintained through diplomatic and military successes, because leaders use these successes to bolster their popularity (Wu 2009, II). However, the link between nationalism and the actual formation of policy is not explored extensively by liberal scholars.

Regardless of whether the scholars within this school focus on culture or domestic political trends, they utilize a mix of statistical studies and case studies in their work. These scholars all reject the idea that realist priorities are the main drivers of military alliance formation. Additionally, they reject the constructivist
notion that the culture of a state is fluid, which sharply separates constructivist and liberalist scholars. In terms of France, de Gaulle’s continued integration with the political aspects of NATO highlight the importance of similar political cultures and adds credence to views espoused by liberal scholars. Regardless of differing strategic priorities, France chose to remain politically unified with the Atlantic Alliance, which may have occurred because France could have shared similar political or cultural systems with other NATO members. As a result, factors that liberal scholars focus on need to be investigated as potential influences on France.

The third school of thought investigates constructivist work, particularly scholars that identify nationalism as a central component of constructivism. Alexander Wendt, a key constructivist scholar, identifies the differences between constructivism and realism. While realists assume that an anarchic international system creates policies that are geared towards self-preservation, Wendt points out that when states join military alliances, they create a system of “friendly anarchy” that gradually transforms state identities to ones that are more peaceful in nature, moving away from conflict (Wendt, 388). Overall, the constructivist notion that identities are not static is one of the major differences between this school of thought and the previous two, which both consider behaviors to be fluid but identities to be static (Tan 2006, 243). Additionally, this school strongly emphasizes state sovereignty. Sovereignty motivates states to define boundaries between themselves and those that they consider different, which results in a rejection of protection by other states and a resistance to join collective units like alliances until such sovereignty is established (Ibid). Connected to sovereignty is the notion of nationalism, which seeks to defend a state’s sovereignty and in doing so grants legitimacy to the leader of the state (Goode and Stroup 2015, 721). A nationalistic state leader frames their goals as the objectives of the state, using nationalism as a way to generate enthusiasm for their policies (Ibid). In summary, a nationalistic leader will prioritize sovereignty over tactical or political concerns, and in doing so could pull their state from alliances or join ones that they deem maintains their sovereignty.

The existing literature sheds light on the overarching theories which seek to explain why states join or withdraw from military alliances. However, there are tensions within the literature that need to be addressed. The first is how the literature treats the phenomenon of a state partially withdrawing from an alliance. Only rarely in the literature is partial withdrawal mentioned. Constructivist scholars indirectly refer to it, and there was brief interest in the realist school on partial withdrawal when Greece temporarily withdrew from NATO. However, there are no case studies focused on partial withdrawal by a great power such as France. By examining the specific set of variables that caused France to partially withdraw
from NATO, this research will shed light on this seldom mentioned option for state leaders. Additionally, nationalism is considered differently by each school. Realists deem it irrelevant, liberal scholars consider it a unifying force but don’t investigate it further, and constructivists view nationalism as one of the primary forces causing states to leave a military alliance. Such variance in views on nationalism in mainstream IR theory is curious and warrants further investigation, which is why it is a main focus of this research. De Gaulle’s France was exceptionally nationalistic (Peyre 1965), which I research in order to determine whether nationalism was one of the key reasons France partially withdrew from NATO. If so, this would show the constructivist school to be correct in identifying how nationalism affects military alliances. Overall, nationalism’s impact on multilateral military alliances is seldom considered, and this research seeks to address this gap. In addition, I investigate whether realist and liberalist priorities influenced French partial withdrawal, and seek to explain why they did or did not do so. In addition, the literature focused on aspects of why states chose to join and leave military alliances; because the conditions under which states join an alliance, once changed, shed light on why they would leave.

**Greece: A State that matches Realist Theories**

Greece partially withdrew from NATO on August 15th, 1974, a move that has often been compared with the French withdrawal nine years earlier (Randall 1974). However, I chose not to include Greece as an official case because it is well explained by realist thought. Greece withdrew from NATO for two reasons. First Greece was furious at the U.S. because America did not step in to help the Greeks when Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974. Secondly, Greece viewed Turkey as an external threat, and lost confidence in NATO’s ability to resolve the conflict peacefully (Kassimeris, 165-179). The Greeks were correct in the second assessment. NATO did not have any mechanisms for addressing inter-alliance conflict and this worsened an already tense situation (Chipman 2004, 237). This furthers realist scholars like Bennet, who stipulated that states join military alliances for their physical security and if they perceive that the alliance no longer is willing to protect them, they will withdraw from it (Bennett, 848). Unlike de Gaulle’s France, which had extreme nationalist elements that complicated the application of realist thought to its partial withdrawal, Greece was a clear application of the realist school of thought. As a result, I did not consider it as a formal unit.
Methodology

In order to determine the combination of variables behind the French partial withdrawal from NATO, I conduct a case study of France from 1958 to 1966. The overall goal of this project is to provide a critique of existing theory on military alliances by identifying key variables that fueled French partial withdrawal, then explaining the impacts, if any, that these variables had on France. A case study framework is useful for this, as it allows me to analyze qualitative primary source literature in order to add weight to my arguments, which strengthen my ability to critique existing theory (Evera 1997, 54). It also allows me to explain the significance of these variables on France and generalize these impacts to NATO as a whole, and to the conversation surrounding military alliance formation and fragmentation. The methodology is organized as follows: I first justify the parameters of this case study. Following this, I outline the dependent variable and the independent variables that affect it. Lastly, I postulate a hypothesis and provide an overview of the analysis.

The case, or formal unit (Gerring 2004, 344), I am investigating is France, specifically France under Charles de Gaulle from 1958-1968. Charles de Gaulle led France away from NATO in 1966 (Garret Martin, 99), thus the time that he was in power (up to the French withdrawal) is significant. There were several unusual elements that made the French withdrawal from NATO valuable to research. France was the only state to leave NATO for a significant period of time (over a decade, in this case around forty years) (NATO Public Policy Division, 1-10), and one of a few examples of states in history that eschewed integrated military alliances like NATO (Ministry of External Affairs 2012). Many of these other states, such as India, were in a group known as the “Non-Aligned Movement”, a rough union of developing states which did not fit with the developed European order (Ibid). Additionally, France was the only European state to significantly resist U.S. domination of NATO (De Gaulle 1959), and the only state in Europe to focus on reasserting its status as a Great Power after WWII (Garret Martin, 17-19). However, France continued to enmesh itself in European economic and political affairs, as de Gaulle wanted to free Europe from what he perceived to be U.S. control without destabilizing Europe’s economic and political stability (Ibid 19). This strengthens my argument that France was a deviant case (Klotz, 43-58), as it did not conform to theoretical predictions for countries in military alliances, or for countries in NATO specifically. I want to analyze this case to determine how it contributes to an overall understanding of military alliance cohesion. To do so, I identify and measure three independent variables and analyze their combined effect on the dependent variable.
The dependent variable measures the French desire to leave NATO. To operationalize this variable, I assign an overall scale to it, with High, Medium, and Low levels. My scaling systems were inspired by Lise Morje Howard (Howard 1-20). For each of these variables, the overall scale is measured based on individual indicator level. In the dependent variable, a “High” means that a state wants to leave NATO’s military command structure and its political structure. A “Medium” means a state just wants to leave one or the other, and a “Low” indicates a state wants to remain enmeshed in both. This variable has four indicators, the first investigating whether France expelled alliance personnel and bureaucracy from its territory. The two possible values for this indicator being present are “yes” or “no”. It is measured by reviewing telegrams sent from the American Embassy in France to the U.S. State Department in 1966 (State 1966, Doc.64). The second indicator is an increased amount of military operations occurring outside NATO jurisdiction. This is measured on a high-medium-low scale, depending on frequency. The scales are determined by how much time, money, or manpower the state dedicated to these military operations, with a greater value for these elements resulting in a higher value for the indicator as a whole. This is determined by examining letters from de Gaulle to the United States and Britain which discuss the rationale of French military operations (Office of the President 1959), and through articles from European and American newspapers which discuss public French military operations between 1958 to 1968. The third indicator investigates whether the French formally stated that they wanted to withdraw from NATO, which would involve Charles de Gaulle explicitly stating so in letters he sends to U.S. President Johnson in 1966(Charles de Gaulle Letter 1966). Possible values for this indicator are “yes” or “no”. The last indicator examines the extent to which the French pursued diplomatic goals that were contrary to the goals of NATO. To determine this, declassified American intelligence reports are examined that detail diplomatic clashes between the French and the rest of NATO (Herter 1959), and meetings between de Gaulle and Soviet leaders in 1966 (De Gaulle-Brezhnev-Kosygin-Podgorny meeting 1966, qtd. in Martin 109). This would be measured on a high-medium-low scale. This scale would be determined by the amount of time and resources a state spends pursuing diplomatic relationships with states that have poor relations with the state’s current military alliance, and the less resources the state allocates, the lower the rating would be on this scale. Overall, this variable is supported by both the realist and liberal schools of thought, which stated that the choice to leave a military alliance could occur for strategic reasons or, in the case of the second school, cultural reasons (Bennett, 848, Curtis Martin, 298).

Three independent variables potentially affect the dependent variable. The first is NATO’s utility to France. This is measured on a High-Medium-Low, and
the higher the score, the closer the strategic priorities of the alliance match up with the strategic priorities of the state being studied. This independent variable has two indicators. The first is the degree of NATO’s assistance to the French when France conducts an international military operation. This is measured on a Frequent-Occasional-Rare scale, and the higher the state ranks on this scale, the more military, economic, or diplomatic support it gets from its fellow members in its international military operations. This is determined by finding information specific to the Algerian civil war, which de Gaulle inherited from his predecessors and which raged till 1962. To determine if NATO supported France in stabilizing this conflict, I examined New York Times articles from 1958 (Doty 1959), memoirs from Lord Gladwyn, the British ambassador to France (Gladwyn 1972, 286), and other members of the British government (Bourdillon 1958, qtd in Martin Thomas). The British were extremely vocal about the French in this time period, so they provided a great deal of useful information. The second indicator measures the degree of influence France has over NATO operations, I measured this on a high-medium-low scale, with greater values equating with more diplomatic dominance in the military alliance. To measure this variable, I reviewed New York Times articles from 1958 that detailed meetings between de Gaulle and other NATO leaders (Doty 1958), and by reviewing NATO strategy reports that detail meetings between NATO ministers (NATO Strategy paper 1964, Qtd. in H.W. Brands). The connection this communication has to the literature is illustrated in the existing literature from the liberalism school, in which a leader’s culture impacts the results of their meetings with officials from other states (Johnston, 34-35). If state leaders fail to communicate properly due to cultural prejudices or different worldviews, then diplomacy will become strained and potentially undermine military alliance cohesion.

The second independent variable measures the level of nationalism in France. This is measured on a Low-Medium-High scale. The greater the state measures on this scale, the higher their level of nationalism. Nationalism has roots in the constructivist existing literature, which indicated that it fuels a desire to promote a state’s sovereignty and in doing so grants legitimacy to the leader of the state (Goode and Stroup, 721). Lack of deference to one state specifically (the alliance hegemon), is a natural extension of the liberal and realist existing literature, which explains that states within existing alliances can work poorly with other allied states because of cultural or strategic rifts (Curtis Martin, 289-291; Sprecher, 331). This variable has two indicators, the first being how charismatic de Gaulle is. This would be measured on a high-medium-low scale, which would be determined by level of government unity around the leader, amount of international respect afforded to the leader, and the level of media attention the leader receives. To measure this
indicator, speeches de Gaulle gave to the French people in the mid 1960’s (Charles de Gaulle 1965, 213), accounts by Stanley Clark and other historians alive at the time (Clark 1963, 228), and accounts from the Atlantic and New York Times are analyzed (Peyre). The second indicator is a lack of French deference towards the alliance hegemon, which measures the willingness of the French to comply with the foreign policy objectives of United States. This indicator would be measured on a scale of high-medium-low, with lower scores illustrating that the state is highly resistant to support the alliance hegemon in their foreign policy goals. I measured it by examining documents between French government ministers such as de Beaumarchais (“Instructions for de Beaumarchais,” 1963, Tome II, Qtd. in Garret Martin), speeches or letters by De Gaulle to the leader to of the United States in which the general tone is one of noncompliance (“Letter from President Charles de Gaulle to President Lyndon Johnson.”), and by examining the records of states such as Mexico referencing French diplomatic visits (Loaeza, 508, Qtd in Garret Martin 88).

The third independent variable is a measure of the external threat levels for the French. It is measured on a scale from High to Low, with greater values indicating a larger threat to the existence of France or to French economic and political power. The realist existing literature allows for this variable measurement, when it explains that states band together for security-related purposes, which would indicate a recognized threat (Bennett, 848). I assess three informal units, the Warsaw Pact, the Chinese, and the West Germans, because these were the two most powerful members of the communist bloc and the one NATO member that the French were the wariest of, respectively. I assess each unit using three indicators. The first indicator is the proximity of the threat to France, which I measured by identifying the distance between the borders of both states between 1958 to 1968 (Locher et al, 1-25). This was measured on a high-medium-low scale. The higher the threat ranks on this indicator, the easier it is for it to inflict harm, either through proximity or rapid deployment capabilities. Grounded in the existing literature, states can join military alliances for the purpose of protecting their borders and surrounding themselves with friendly states to extend this proximity (Peterson and Steffenson, 40). The second indicator details the relative power levels of the threat. This is measured using a high-medium-low scale, with a greater value indicating a greater degree of military dominance over the region. I conducted these measurements using declassified intelligence reports examining the military power levels of the opposing state, such as troop levels and levels of military modernization (“Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact,”). The last indicator investigates the French perception of the opposing actor, in terms of its economic, military, or political capabilities. This can be measured on
a scale of dangerous-not dangerous respectively, in terms of economic, political, and military power. My measurements were created by analyzing French embassy telegrams at that time (Rusk 1966; Bohlen 1965), as well as diplomatic meeting records between the French government and the government of each informal unit (“De Gaulle-Gromyko meeting,” 1965, Qtd. in Garret Martin 68; “CIA Cable on Deputy Press...” 1968, 2; De Gaulle-Erhard meeting 1964, Qtd. in Garret Martin), I used these indicators to determine if the French government perceived these actors as threatening.

From these three independent variables, I am now able to construct a hypothesis, which is as follows: In the context of France, a combination of a low score on NATO’s utility to France, a high score on the level of French nationalism, and two or more informal units having a medium level of threat to France is sufficient to result in a medium level of French desire to leave NATO.

The analysis consisted of two primary steps. First, I determined where my case fell on my scales by assigning values to my variables. I then analyze the correctness of the hypothesis in order to determine if it has a degree of explanatory power. I lastly illustrate how this combination of causes pushed France towards partial withdrawal and expand on how this impacts our understanding of military alliance theory. To back up my analysis, I reach back to the literature review to determine which schools were most influential to the studied case, in addition to expanding upon further work that needs to be accomplished. In conclusion, I discuss implications for modern day NATO, connecting those implications back to the operationalizations and the existing literature.

Analysis

In order to determine the specific combination of factors that caused France to partially withdraw from NATO in 1966, I consider four variables. My scaling system is laid out in detail on charts in my appendix. The dependent variable (see charts in Appendix for indicator values), French desire to leave NATO, scores at a Medium. The first notion that French interest in NATO was ebbing came in the form of two events which occurred in 1959: the establishment of a central French command in the Mediterranean that was independent of NATO and the development of a French controlled nuclear force (De Gaulle 1959). Both of these initiatives reduced French reliance on NATO's central command. A letter from de Gaulle to US President Dwight Eisenhower, which pressed for equal political status with the U.S. and Great Britain, reinforced French displeasure with NATO’s current structure (De Gaulle). Diplomatically, the French improved relations with the Warsaw Pact and recognized the People’s Republic of China (“De Gaulle-
Brezhnev-Kosygin-Podgorny meeting,”), which ran contrary to the foreign policy goals of NATO, breaking the diplomatic consensus. All of these events culminated in an expulsion of NATO forces from French territory in 1966, indicating that the French were no longer concerned about the strategic priorities of other NATO members (“Letter from President Charles de Gaulle to President Lyndon Johnson on France’s Withdrawal from the NATO Command Structure,”). As a result, France signaled its declining commitment to NATO by exiting its military command structure in 1966, while still remaining a member of the Alliance.

From the French perspective, NATO had a Low degree of utility. While France had an appreciable level of political power in NATO, the lack of NATO support for its military operations in Algeria and diplomatic tension between the U.S., the U.K, and France all decreased the strategic benefit of NATO in French eyes. This is illustrated by the following points. First, the degree of NATO’s assistance to France was nonexistent. The French did not want NATO meddling in French military operations, nor were other members of NATO comfortable with French unilateralism in North Africa. The only relevant military operation France conducted was the Algerian War, between 1954 and 1962. The French rejected NATO efforts to push for a diplomatic solution to the crisis, preventing British diplomats from expressing their views on French colonial policies, since the French government was not comfortable discussing these policies with outsiders (Bourdillon 1958, Qtd in Martin Thomas). When the French military did request NATO’s help, they did so in a way that made the other NATO powers uneasy. The U.S. Secretary of State at the time, John Foster Dulles, explained that “the French military wanted unreserved NATO support without accepting any NATO role in the determination of France’s Algerian Strategy” (Dulles 1957, Qtd in Martin Thomas). This served to alienate other member states from the French. As a whole, Algeria served to isolate France within NATO and to show the French that NATO would not support all their military objectives. As a result, NATO had little political or military utility for the French.

Second, France had a Medium amount of political clout within the alliance. In his attempts to reassert French dominance, de Gaulle demanded that NATO reorganize so as to ensure that France would play a more significant role in alliance decision making (Doty). The reaction to this demand by other member states was telling. Weaker member states, while sympathizing with French demands, expressed irritation that France did not push for a consensus-driven form of policy formation that did not only involve NATO’s most powerful members (Ibid). Larger states, like the U.S., rejected these demands but were careful not to antagonize France, which was an important member of the alliance because of its strategic location and because member discontent towards France would undermine
alliance unity (“Strategy paper for NATO ministerial meeting, 201). To prevent such disunity, President Lyndon Johnson simultaneously expressed respectful disagreement without attempting to discredit the French position (Ibid). The sum of this evidence illustrates that, despite having enough influence to be listened to and have an impact, France did not have enough influence to change the alliance structure as it wished or convince other alliance members that its policies were worth following.

The second independent variable measured the nationalism of the French state. France scored at a high on my nationalism scale from 1958 to 1966, which is indicated by the “high” level of de Gaulle’s charisma and a high willingness to resist the U.S. in its foreign policy. In a speech he gave in 1954, de Gaulle emphasized French economic successes and the need for his country to remain unified and independent in the face of the fierce political and economic competition it faced from countries like the United States (De Gaulle, 213). In the beginning of his rule (1958 to around 1962), de Gaulle had the support of over fifty percent of France’s public, with a divided opposition that could not challenge his popularity (Peyre). This popularity stemmed from “the force of his own dominating personality; a magnificent sense of timing and, perhaps most importantly, an uncanny ability to manipulate and to exploit the fears that haunt [France] country” to solidify his grip on France in times of crisis (Louchheim 1968). This allowed de Gaulle a significant amount of domestic leverage over French international policy and illustrated the qualities that made him popular throughout his presidency.

Overall, de Gaulle made a significant effort to resist the U.S. in their foreign policy goals during his time in power. France was one of the first western countries since 1950 to establish diplomatic relations with Communist China, which further broke Western diplomatic unity against communist countries (“Instructions for de Beaumarchais,”. Qtd in Martin. pg. 56), he also frustrated U.S. efforts under Kennedy to further tie Western Europe economically to the U.S. by vetoing British entry into the European Economic Community, heavily campaigned against U.S. actions in Vietnam (Alphand 1965, 452, Qtd in Martin 93), and encouraged countries in Latin America and Africa to resist U.S. political domination wherever they could (Soledad Loaeza, Qtd in Garret Martin 88). There is no doubt that the U.S. felt threatened by these French actions, based on the negative language used to describe the French by U.S. ambassadors, yet they still emphasized the importance of continued engagement with France in the hope of changing de Gaulle’s anti-U.S. stance (Bohlen).

To determine the level of threats France faced involves looking at each potential threat individually, based on proximity to France, relative power levels, and French perceptions of such threats. All NATO member states, with the exception of
West Germany, are not considered potential threats in this study because France remained a member of the Atlantic alliance. West Germany is analyzed due to its traditional aggression towards France, which caused France to view it more warily than it would other NATO members. Other threats include the Warsaw Pact and China. West Germany receives a high ranking for proximity threat level, a low for relative power levels, and was perceived to be economically and politically dangerous by France, receiving a medium on my scales for total threat level. China receives a low ranking for proximity threat level, a medium ranking for relative power levels, and was perceived to be not dangerous by France, receiving a low on my scales. The Warsaw Pact receives a high ranking for proximity threat level, a high ranking for relative power levels, and was perceived to be dangerous by France, receiving a High level of threat on my scales.

The informal units I studied each scored differently on the indicator for proximity-based threat. With their capital in Bonn, West Germany was the closest potential threat France faced, essentially as close as the Warsaw Pact which could mass troops in East Berlin if they wished. With its closest city of Kashagar 5,729 kilometers away, the Chinese could not invade France as suddenly as the Warsaw Pact or Western Germany could. Additionally, each informal unit varied in terms of their relative power. West Germany spent less on its military than France did (SIPRI NATO Milex Data 1949-2014), and its budget was similar to that of smaller NATO member states (Ibid). As a result, the German armed forces were quite weak in comparison with the French armed forces. The Warsaw Pact was a different story. With a military four times as large as the French and a larger military budget, they were significantly more powerful (Simon 1988, 38- this chart compares NATO-Warsaw pact armies in terms of manpower; Wolf Jr. 1989, 17-this chart compared armies in terms of U.S. dollars spent). In comparison, China spent between 16 to 37 billion U.S. dollars on its forces in the 1960's (Ibid), but the Sino-Soviet Split (in which the Soviet Union cut all aid to China), happened during this time period (Khrushchev 1960, Translated by Jersild). This drastically weakened the Chinese armed forces, which were already weak in the sense that they depended on the Warsaw Pact for military aid.

De Gaulle viewed West Germany as a resurgent political force that could threaten French power in Europe (Couve de Murville to French embassies in Washington, London, and Moscow”, 24). Although de Gaulle led a significant improvement in French-German relations, this improvement happened because de Gaulle wanted to secure German support for his diplomatic campaign to develop a German-French axis of power in Europe, contrary to the wishes of the United States (“Memorandum of conversation between President Johnson and West German Chancellor Erhard...” 1997, 1-4). This failed, when in 1964 West Germany
publicly sided with the U.S. against French policies (“De Gaulle-Erhard meeting”, Qtd. in Martin, 34), chilling French-German relations well into the 1960s and beyond (“CIA cable on Deputy Press Chief Conrad Ahlers Comments regarding French President Charles De Gaulle’s visit to West Germany” 1968, 2).

France had amiable relations with China. De Gaulle was the first Western leader to reach out to Communist China, angering the United States and bolstering de Gaulle’s claim that France was the intermediary between the Eastern and Western blocs (“French Foreign Policy”). Relations between France and the Warsaw Pact nations as a whole had also been steadily improving. In 1964, Romanian Prime Minister Ion Maurer visited Paris, strengthening Romanian-French ties (Telegram 1 1964, Tome I; “Burin des Roziers-Dimitriu meeting” 1964, Carton 183, Qtd. in Martin, 59). Despite this, de Gaulle still viewed the Warsaw Pact warily. Just before pulling France out of NATO, he visited Moscow in 1966. There, he emphasized greater cooperation with Russia and the Warsaw Pact as a whole, yet highlighted his continued loyalty to the Atlantic alliance and his refusal to recognize East Germany (see “De Gaulle-Brezhnev-Kosygin-Podgorny meeting”). De Gaulle, motivated as he was by realist priorities, could maintain positive relations with a country and still perceive them to be a threat.

NATO’s low strategic and political utility to France was the first crack in NATO’s military command structure. When this was combined with the high levels of nationalism present in the country, which fueled de Gaulle’s desire for more French sovereignty and his disdain for the United States, France only needed one last push to leave. This push came in the form of West Germany’s declaration of unity with the United States, defying France as they did so. A resurgent West Germany, now a sovereign member of NATO, was too much for de Gaulle to bear.

As a result, high nationalism was one of the primary forces pushing France out of the alliance and this was best outlined by constructivist scholars. These scholars said that a nation would leave an alliance if they felt that their political and ideological sovereignty was under threat (Goode and Stroup, 721). The French push for such sovereignty was bolstered by de Gaulle’s high levels of nationalism, which he in turn spread to the state. The effect de Gaulle had on French nationalism was also supported by constructivist scholars (Ibid). De Gaulle’s changing of the French identity in this way also supported the constructivist view that identities are not static (Seng Tan, 243). However, continued French integration with the political Atlantic Alliance, along with a continued willingness to support their allies in times of crisis, remained unanticipated by constructivism or liberalism. The arguments of Liberal scholars, while compelling, did not factor into the reason’s surrounding French partial withdrawal.

Realist thought best explains the factors governing de Gaulle’s departure from
NATO’s military command structure. Every decision he made was calculated to promote French strategic interests over all other priorities. Despite the importance de Gaulle placed on an independent France that was free from U.S. meddling, and the low utility of NATO to France (all of which pushed France from the Alliance), de Gaulle still viewed the Warsaw Pact as a greater threat and thus a greater priority. He realized that France could not fight this threat on its own and that it needed the support of its allies within the Atlantic Alliance. As a result, France remained integrated in the Atlantic Alliance while maintaining its sovereignty by staying out of NATO’s command structure. This means my hypothesis is correct. In the context of France, a combination of a low score on NATO’s utility to France, a High score on the level of French nationalism, and two or more informal units having a medium level of threat to France is sufficient to result in a medium level of French desire to leave NATO. In addition, the reason such a withdrawal lasted forty years, well after de Gaulle’s death, was that the impact he made on French foreign policy was upheld by French leaders up to the 2000s. That further illustrates nationalism’s power, both then and now.

Since realist and constructivist thought best explains the influences on de Gaulle, it is those two sections of the literature review that have the most weight. Liberalism, with its focus on domestic politics, does not sufficiently explain his actions. Additionally, realism and constructivism still cannot explain de Gaulle individually. The existing realist literature assumed that states would only remain in a military alliance if their strategic priorities aligned with other members, whether those priorities were simply increased security or the advancement of their tactical goals (Gibler and Wolford, 130). In addition, the constructivist literature assumed that a state would always leave if its current identity clashed with other members of the alliance (Seng Tan, 243). What the constructivist literature did not take into account was that a state, once it achieved greater sovereignty by leaving, would use politics as a vehicle for remaining in the alliance. And the realist literature did not anticipate constructivism to be powerful enough to push states out of military alliances. In brief, the literature did not consider leaders to have competing interests, or that certain interests could convince a state to find creative ways to remain in an alliance, while still being formally disengaged from it. These are weaknesses that this research attempted to address.

This research has implications for modern day Europe. Europe today is experiencing a rise in nationalist movements, in the form of right wing organizations, that are gaining more power with each election (Erlanger 2015). This, coupled with the increasing differences NATO members have in terms of their tactical priorities (Noetzel and Schreer, 211), is starting to look similar to France in the 1960’s. The danger is that without a pragmatic leader, who can look past these
priorities and act in a way that will promote the stability of their alliance and their country simultaneously, NATO could experience a range of full withdrawals in the future. Without being checked by firm realist priorities, nationalism is more than capable of driving states from alliances entirely, just like it almost did in 1960s France.

There are a range of alternative explanations for my research. One could say that de Gaulle did not consider a recently shattered Germany to be a threat. In addition, scholars could point to literature which explains that de Gaulle found the Warsaw Pact to be weak in the 1960s, discrediting the operationalization of the third variable. However, I would argue the following: de Gaulle was influenced by realism in the sense that he viewed all political interactions as strategic in nature. It is precisely because he considered West Germany and the Warsaw Pact a threat that he continued to interact with them, thereby giving him a degree of insight into their leader’s thought processes. In addition, de Gaulle would not have insisted on an independent nuclear arsenal if he did not view the world the way defensive realists see it: as an anarchic place with “alliances” being a short term protective tool. A pure constructivist would say that alliances would cause a peaceful anarchy that would eventually fulfill state’s desires for protection (Wendt, 388). Realism rejects this argument and de Gaulle, whose distrust of NATO only grew with time, followed realist scholar’s predictions on this point. My research shows that, by partially withdrawing from NATO, de Gaulle maximized the benefits of Atlantic integration without the restrictions imposed by NATO military integration. He sacrifices political goodwill within NATO for this; however, France was still a strategic partner and thus retained a certain degree of influence in NATO even after they partially withdrew. It is tempting to view de Gaulle’s decisions as being fueled solely by beliefs, but my research indicated that it was fueled by both tactics and beliefs, both of which influenced his foreign policy in unpredictable ways, much to Europe’s misfortune.

Conclusion

Certain variables which led France to partially withdraw from NATO are not unique to 1960’s France. In Western countries today, there are voices which question NATO’s utility in a rapidly changing world, while militant nationalism is making itself heard in countries such as the United States, Russia, China, and several EU states. The variable that prevented this mix from imploding in 1966, thereby preventing a total French withdrawal from the Atlantic Alliance as a whole, was the high level of external threats that France faced. Charles de Gaulle believed in French exceptionalism and did not view NATO positively, but understood the
value of continued engagement because of his pragmatic nature. As a result, while nationalism and sovereignty-based concerns drove France away from NATO’s military command structure, the security of a political alliance became necessary to deal with external threats like the Warsaw Pact and West Germany, preventing France from fully withdrawing. The warning to the international community is clear: nationalistic fervor can throw military alliances into turmoil without realist-influenced leaders at the helm of their member states.

Returning to the existing literature, this research furthers all three schools in different ways. It highlights realism as a key unifying force, which contradicts the accepted belief that realism and military alliances don’t mix well. Constructivism is portrayed as a destabilizing force to military alliances where nationalism is concerned. My research portrays liberalism as the current status quo, with the majority of states that were in NATO in 1966 following patterns proposed by liberal scholars, but one that could be overridden with sufficient nationalism and skepticism with the goals of the alliance. Liberalism was not a critical explanatory factor for de Gaulle’s France. The only indicator that touched on liberalism was the degree of French political influence in NATO, and while that played a factor in French partial withdrawal, it presented an incomplete answer to the hypothesis. Realism and constructivism together provided the most concrete explanations for the conclusions I came to.

Some work remains to be done in future research. It would be useful to follow this methodology utilizing French-language sources, in order to gain a deeper understanding of de Gaulle’s thinking. Additionally, it would be important to investigate how economics affects a state’s decision to withdraw from a military alliance in the form of economic liberalism. Also, future research should apply this methodology to modern day Europe, incorporating survey-based methods to determine the extent of nationalism in modern day France, Germany, or other European states. Interviewing current ambassadors to NATO or representatives from various governmental organizations would be a good start when doing so. Furthermore, not isolating the research to one case, but conducting a comparative case study, would further help to generalize this methodology to the point where a theory can be developed about what would motivate a state to partially withdraw from a military alliance as opposed to a full withdrawal.

Overall, future scholars should pay more attention to nationalist movements. Charles de Gaulle’s France was a deviant case that shook the Western World, but the effect of French partial withdrawal could have been far worse if nationalism went unchecked in de Gaulle’s administration. Military alliances such as NATO will need to adapt to the threat posed by such domestic movements occurring within their member states.
### Dependent Variable

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable/ Indicator</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Variable:</strong> French Desire to Leave NATO</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variable 1:</strong> Degree to Which NATO was perceived to be clashing with French strategic goals</td>
<td>High clash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variable 2:</strong> French Level of Nationalism</td>
<td>Extreme levels of nationalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variable 3:</strong> Level of potential external threat to French</td>
<td>Medium Threat Level</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### NATO’s Utility to France (IV1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable/ Indicator</th>
<th>Main Scale/ Subscale</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Variable:</strong> NATO’s Utility to France</td>
<td>Low: Low Utility</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium: moderate utility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High: high utility</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 1:</strong> Degree of NATO assistance to France in its military operations</td>
<td>Nonexistent: no military, economic, or diplomatic support</td>
<td>Nonexistent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minimal: rare military, economic, or diplomatic support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequent: significant amounts of military, economic, or diplomatic support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 2:</strong> Degree of French influence over NATO operations</td>
<td>Low: Minimal amount of political influence in the alliance</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium: Moderate amount of political influence in the alliance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High: Significant political influence in the alliance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Level of French Nationalism (IV 2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Variable: French Nationalism Levels</th>
<th>Main Scale/ Subscale</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low</strong>: no to minimal levels of nationalism within state</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium</strong>: Moderate levels of nationalism within the state</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High</strong>: High Levels of Nationalism within the state</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator 1: Charles de Gaulle Charisma Levels</th>
<th>Main Scale/ Subscale</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low</strong>: minimal charisma</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium</strong>: moderate charisma</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High</strong>: significant charisma</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator 2: French Willingness to resist the U.S. in its Foreign Policy Goals,</th>
<th>Main Scale/ Subscale</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low</strong>: Rarely opposes U.S. in its foreign policy goals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium</strong>: Sometimes supports U.S.’s goals, sometimes opposes them.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High</strong>: Almost always opposes U.S. in its foreign policy goals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### China’s Level of Threat to France (IV3:1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Variable: Level of potential external threat to France</th>
<th>Main Scale/ Subscale</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low</strong>: Distant state, weak military, not perceived to be a threat</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium</strong>: Distant neighbor, moderate military power, is perceived warily by studied state</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High</strong>: Close neighbor, high military power, studied state considers it a threat to its existence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator 1: Proximity of Potential threat to France</th>
<th>Main Scale/ Subscale</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low</strong>: No proximity. State is far away, making aggression costlier</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium</strong>: Moderate proximity. Invasion would not be a surprise but state would not have much time to prepare</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High</strong>: Close proximity. Invasion would occur with little warning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator 2: Power Levels of Threat</th>
<th>Main Scale/ Subscale</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low</strong>: Weak power. No military influence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medium</strong>: Moderate power. Some military influence, but not the dominant military power</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High</strong>: Significantly powerful. High amounts of military influence, regional hegemony in place</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator 3: French Perception of Threat</th>
<th>Main Scale/ Subscale</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Not Dangerous</strong>: State does not consider the other state to be a threat to its existence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dangerous</strong>: State considers the other state to be a threat to its existence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Dangerous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Warsaw Pact’s Level of Threat to France (IV3:2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable/ Indicator</th>
<th>Main Scale/ Subscale</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Variable: Level of potential external threat to France</strong>&lt;br&gt;Low: Distant state, weak military, not perceived to be a threat&lt;br&gt;Medium: Distant neighbor, moderate military power, is perceived warily by studied state&lt;br&gt;High: Close neighbor, high military power, studied state considers it a threat to its existence</td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 1: Proximity of Potential threat to France</strong>&lt;br&gt;Low: No proximity. State is far away, making aggression costlier&lt;br&gt;Medium: Moderate proximity. Invasion would not be a surprise but state would not have much time to prepare&lt;br&gt;High: Close proximity. Invasion would occur with little warning</td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 2: Power Levels of Threat</strong>&lt;br&gt;Low: Weak power. No military influence&lt;br&gt;Medium: Moderate power. Some military influence, but not the dominant military power&lt;br&gt;High: Significantly powerful. High amounts of military influence, regional hegemony in place</td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 3: French Perception of Threat</strong>&lt;br&gt;Not Dangerous: State does not consider the other state to be a threat to its existence&lt;br&gt;Dangerous: State considers the other state to be a threat to its existence</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dangerous</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### West Germany’s Level of Threat to France (IV3:3)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable/ Indicator</th>
<th>Main Scale/ Subscale</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Variable: Level of potential external threat to France</strong>&lt;br&gt;Low: Distant state, weak military, not perceived to be a threat&lt;br&gt;Medium: Distant neighbor, moderate military power, is perceived warily by studied state&lt;br&gt;High: Close neighbor, high military power, studied state considers it a threat to its existence</td>
<td></td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 1: Proximity of Potential threat to France</strong>&lt;br&gt;Low: No proximity. State is far away, making aggression costlier&lt;br&gt;Medium: Moderate proximity. Invasion would not be a surprise but state would not have much time to prepare&lt;br&gt;High: Close proximity. Invasion would occur with little warning</td>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 2: Power Levels of Threat</strong>&lt;br&gt;Low: Weak power. No military influence&lt;br&gt;Medium: Moderate power. Some military influence, but not the dominant military power&lt;br&gt;High: Significantly powerful. High amounts of military influence, regional hegemony in place</td>
<td></td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indicator 3: French Perception of Threat</strong>&lt;br&gt;Not Dangerous: State does not consider the other state to be a threat to its existence&lt;br&gt;Dangerous: State considers the other state to be a threat to its existence</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dangerous</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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RELIGION, LGBTQ RIGHTS, AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY BILLS

Dakota Strode

Abstract

Throughout the twenty-first century, LGBTQ rights have expanded dramatically in the United States. With the repeal of Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell and the legalization of same-sex marriage via Obergefell v. Hodges in 2015, the LGBTQ community has legally been granted the right to marry and to proudly serve in the armed service. However, with the rise of equality for LGBTQ people, many Americans who reject these progressive ideas might feel threatened by such advancements and appeal to legislators to combat these advancements. Legislation like religious liberty bills are the legal alternative to marriage equality bans, which have the power to halt the continuation of LGBTQ rights. After the legalization of marriage equality, striking down numerous state bans on same-sex marriage, various states began developing religious liberty bills as an alternative to the bans.

This study tested the effect of the religiosity of the public towards their views about LGBTQ rights and how these views are represented by the amount of religious liberty bills in the various regions in the United States. The results indicated that religion guides people towards positive views of LGBTQ rights. However, the relationship between positive views about LGBTQ rights and the amount of religious liberty bills produced per region show conflicting beliefs between public and legislature opinion. This indicates that there might be other factors contributing to the increasing levels of religious liberty legislation across America, as public opinion is not connecting with legislative output. Further research is needed to test this relationship.

Introduction

What about LGBTQ rights is so polarizing to the public in America? Decades of activism among the LGBTQ community has led to the rapid expansion of their rights, but such advances have been politically challenged by opposing views. Too often people use religion as a justification for their
opposition to LGBTQ rights, yet there is a lack of modern, political science literature about how religion cultivates anti-LGBTQ beliefs and how those beliefs are translated into legislation. Examining how religiosity guides public opinion towards LGBTQ focused legislation may assist in understanding why many people oppose LGBTQ protections, like same-sex marriage or anti-discriminatory laws. Specifically, it may help political scientist understand the rise of religious liberty legislation that has grown throughout the early 2000s and beyond in relation to public opinion about LGBTQ rights. Research in LGBTQ rights in relation to religion may help to determine why LGBTQ rights have rapidly developed and have faced legislative pushback.

**Literature Review**

**History**

Since the launch of the modern gay rights movement after the Stonewall riots in 1969, LGBTQ equality has advanced greatly, birthing new political and social rights for future generations. Increasing support of the LGBTQ community has increased in America due to a growing acceptance of the members of the community by the majority population of heterosexual people. Specifically, legislators, such as President Barack Obama, have helped to advance the rights of these people by promoting inclusive legislation at the federal level. Under this president, the LGBTQ community has made substantial gains in their fight for equality. In particular, they have gained the right to marry after the historic Supreme Court case, Obergefell v. Hodges.

Religion has a profound effect altering public perception on LGBTQ rights and is often used as a defense for the objection to these rights. Because the LGBTQ community has gained so many rights and public support, it is imperative to understand how religious ideas have shaped public perception of the LGBTQ community. Understanding the relationship between religiosity and support of the LGBTQ community may reveal why more religious liberty bills are found in certain regions of America and less in other based on support of the LGBTQ community. It may also help to illuminate the complex and blurred relationship between public opinion on LGBTQ rights, religious beliefs, and legislative output. Because that relationship is understudied and difficult to determine, it is challenging to clearly define which aspects play the greatest roles in defining LGBT support. To examine this idea, a further inspection of prior studies is needed.
Religion

Many scholars attribute a variety of factors into the fluctuations of public support for LGBTQ rights, including major political events, contact with LGBTQ people, and religiosity. Major political decisions such as the passage of the Defense of Marriage Act in 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court elimination sodomy laws in 2003, or the legalization of same-sex marriage in 2003 in the state of Massachusetts have attributed to the changing opinions of the public about same-sex marriage (Fleischmann and Moyer 2009, 136). Such events are often pivotal in determining how the public might respond to gay rights and other LGBTQ rights advancements because they legally determine how the public can legally act. After such events, states began to adopt same-sex marriage bans or promoted the usage of civil unions for gay couples (137). Studies like Fleischmann and Moyer’s in the Social Science Quarterly, a top political science journal, predicted that several factors attributed to this anti-LGBTQ phenomenon in the early 2000s as a reaction to the push for LGBTQ rights. They expanded on the idea that while support for gay rights increased, the general population opposed legitimizing gay marriage (146). Higher levels of education led to lower supports of state constitutional amendments to oppose same-sex marriage, and the greater the support of the Republican party or evangelical religions, then the higher levels of support for state constitutional bans of same-sex marriage (141 - 142). Such conclusions could predict that religion and support of the Republican party greatly alter public opinion and state legislation in regards to same-sex marriage, which may help to explain the role of religion in the production of religiously defined legislation that targets LGBTQ rights.

In Sexuality and Culture, an academic journal that studies the relationships between politics and sexuality, Perry and Snawder tried to expand on the idea that religion plays a key role in affecting public opinion about same-sex marriage by examining what mechanisms religions use in order to change opinions. They believed that increasing exposure to religious media will alter public opinion about same-sex marriage (Perry and Snawder 2016, 786). Concluding, they produced results that demonstrated an increase in public support of LGBTQ rights of those that consumed less religious media; however, they also produced results among those that consumed religious media, which demonstrated a decrease in their likelihood to support LGBTQ rights (796, 798-799). Connecting Perry and Snawder’s research to Fleischmann and Moyer’s research, it becomes more apparent that those people that are more religiously affiliated or conservatively aligned support anti-LGBTQ beliefs and legislation, specifically in regards to same-sex marriage, in comparison to those that are not. This may help to explain the variation in support of LGBTQ rights and the legislation produced to support
or dismantle those rights.

While public opinion has been growing to support the LGBTQ community, bans on same-sex marriage have drastically increased. In 2009, only five states and the District of Columbia legalized same-sex marriage (PewResearchCenter 2015, “Same-sex Marriage, State by State”). Researchers might point to religion as the key contributor to the expanding legislation that opposes gay marriage; however, not all people in these states are religiously affiliated or have conservative majority legislatures to pass such laws. Other research has concluded that there could still be other factors contributing to the increasing legislation that opposes same-sex marriage.

What exactly about same-sex marriage is so threatening to the heterosexual population? While they seem to be increasing support for the LGBTQ community, same-sex marriage bans continued to be adopted throughout America. In order to test if heterosexuals felt threatened by same-sex marriage, Schmitt, Lehmiller, and Walsh studied the perception of same-sex marriage by heterosexuals in their 2007 study in Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, an academic journal that studies the relationship between social behavior, politics, and psychology. They believed that support for LGBTQ rights was strongest when using the term, “civil unions” rather than marriage (Schmitt, Lehmiller, and Walsh 2007, 444). Their research predicted that heterosexuals fear marriage equality because it threatens their social status (445 - 446). It implies that heteronormativity is socially acceptable and challenges to such cultural norms are threatening. The researcher’s results concluded that more people supported civil unions over marriage because of perceived threats to heterosexuals (448 - 449, 451). In relation to the previously described literature, it would appear that either/or religion and conservative ideology are somehow related to heterosexual status quo, and this relation can be reflected in the continuation of same-sex marriage bans across the nation while allowing for the increasing support of LGBTQ rights. Marriage is protected by law; therefore, heterosexuals feel threatened by marriage equality because it threatens the traditional, conservative, and religiously founded beliefs towards marriage that govern within the United States. But are these ideas of perceived threat to heterosexuals changing since the LGBTQ community is gaining so many new rights and more and more Americans are interacting with them?

**Contact Hypothesis Theory**

Herek and Glunt greatly expanded on contact hypothesis research in their 1993 study in the Journal of Sex Research, a journal that examines the influence of sexuality on culture. Previous research concluded that when heterosexuals
encounter minority groups, they tend to express more positive attitudes towards the minority group (Herek and Glunt 1993, 239). Heterosexuals, in their study, confirmed this theory (241). However, this study took place in the 1990s, so it contains relatively dated information in comparison to the beliefs of Americans as they progressed throughout the early 2000s. Garner expanded on contact hypothesis in his 2013 study in Politics & Policy, a journal that analyzes the relationship between legislative output and the culture that creates such legislative responses, by including how personal contact with gays and lesbians can change the ambivalence of Americans in regards to gay rights (Garner 2013, 243). However, this does not include the influence of LGBTQ people in the media. Other studies have greatly contradicted and reinforced studies like Fleischmann and Moyer’s, where religion and conservative ideology are typically unwavering in their stances on gay rights when exposed to gays and lesbians (244). His results concluded that the highly conservative and religiously affiliated people demonstrated greater ambivalence when exposed to gays and lesbians. Exposure to gays and lesbians has altered their traditional, religious stances to show greater inclusivity of the LGBTQ community and their rights, which may help to explain the increasing levels of legislation targeted at the LGBTQ community (252-255). The opinions about LGBTQ rights in comparison to heterosexual’s perceived threat of the LGBTQ community has greatly changed since Stonewall as demonstrated above due to increased contact with the LGBTQ community and changing religious beliefs towards gays and lesbians, but how are these views reflected in voting behavior of the public towards LGBTQ issues, specifically gay marriage?

To demonstrate this concept, Dyck and Pearson-Merkowitz’s study in the Political Research Quarterly, a top political science journal, tested to discover if contact with gays and lesbians can alter how Americans vote on gay marriage bans (Dyck and Pearson-Merkowitz 2012, 745 – 746). Since gay marriage was only allowed in a few states at the time of their study, and the support of LGBTQ rights had begun expanding under the Obama administration, their results could greatly build on previous ideas of contact hypothesis while reflecting how people vote, a different approach to contact hypothesis testing than Garner. Dyck and Pearson-Merkowitz used an expansion of contact hypothesis by enhancing the theory to conclude that exposure to gays and lesbians will cause Americans to not support discriminatory laws, and they also included the reverse theory, which claims that majority populations will feel threatened by the minority groups and will vote in favor of the discriminatory laws (745-748). Their results concluded that young people, women, and those in urban areas with larger LGBTQ populations tend to oppose discriminatory laws towards marriage equality, and conservatives, Republicans, and Christians tend to be in favor of the discriminatory laws (750).
Specifically, their results supported that contact with gays and lesbians increases peoples' likelihood to vote against gay marriage bans. When discussing religion, their results only supported that Christians felt threatened due to exposure to LGBTQ communities (751). While Republicans and conservatives are still more likely to vote for gay marriage bans, Garner’s idea about ambivalence among conservatives and Republicans could be reflected in their more modern voting behaviors towards gay marriage laws, such that Republicans, conservatives, and those that are religiously affiliated are showing greater inclusivity in their beliefs and voting behaviors. Further research needs to examine the relationship between how the religious beliefs of the public about LGBTQ rights are translated into legislation.

Beliefs and attitudes towards the LGBTQ community, specifically in regards to marriage equality, are changing to be more inclusive as the research above would suggest. The public often votes based on what they believe and support. Since the public is becoming more supportive of LGBTQ rights, then they should vote to support those rights because they believe in the need to help the LGBTQ community. If the beliefs of the public towards LGBTQ rights are changing, then why are there so many same-sex marriage bans? Lupia, Krupnikov, Levine, Piston, and Von Haggen-Jamar provided a possible reason for this phenomenon in their 2010 study in the Journal of Politics, a top political science journal.

States vary in how their legislatures can ban same-sex marriage (Lupia, Krupnikov, Levine, Piston, and Von Haggen-Jamar 2010, 1222). Previous studies suggested that state laws towards the issue reflect how the people feel about the law; however, these researchers believe that the laws are not in accordance with the people’s attitudes, but rather the structures of the state constitutions limit how their views are reflected in amendments (1222-1223). Specifically, their research showed a poor relationship between attitudes towards same-sex marriage and the banning amendments, and the structures of the constitutions have more to do with constitutional bans of same-sex marriage over public opinion, which means that even if the public supports same-sex marriage and they want it legalized, the constitutional amendment processes for each state may require differing levels of votes and time, preventing the legalization of the law (1224, 1227). This research is significant because it does not refute the contact hypothesis ideas or the growing support of gay marriage; rather it demonstrates that even if Americans are becoming more accepting of gay marriage and LGBTQ rights, there are other legislative factors influencing gay marriage laws. However, this would all change in 2015.
**Religious Liberty Bills**

In 2015, the United States Supreme Court would make a historic decision by legalizing same-sex marriage in every state in America; therefore, all same-sex marriage bans were forcibly nullified. Through this decision, the work of the Obama administration, and numerous inclusive laws adopted across the states, the LGBTQ community gained a variety of rights never seen during the beginning of the gay rights movement. What seemed like a bright day for the LGBTQ community would be attempted to be undermined by another legislative creation of the states – religious liberty bills.

In the past, religious liberty bills supported same-sex marriage bans, but after the legalization of same-sex marriage, religious liberty bills took on a similar role to that of same-sex marriage bans. These laws prevent state governments from “discriminating” against those people that hold “religiously founded beliefs.” In other words, they allow for Americans to legally discriminate against gays and lesbians if they find that providing services to them violates their religious beliefs. As previously stated, these laws have been around as long as same-sex marriage bans have, as they legally help to support and provide reasoning for LGBTQ discrimination. However, after marriage equality was legalized in 2015, there was a new surge of these laws across America. Such an increase in religious liberty laws could be attributed to a resurgence of conservativism or religious movements, or it could be from increased interest group pressure on politicians to adopt such laws. But, if Americans are more inclusive of LGBTQ rights, specifically in regards to gay marriage, then why are these laws still in existence?

This research will focus on a new concept derived from the previous literature described. Contact hypothesis has elaborated on how contact with gays and lesbians have changed views towards gay marriage bans, and constitutional structures have prevented changes in regards to such bans. However, if attitudes towards gay marriage have drastically changed since 2000, then should there not also be a change in how statutory laws towards LGBTQ rights are reflected in state governments? Whereas previous literature has focused on state constitutional amendments in regards to same-sex marriage, no previous studies that commonly use public opinion polls have examined the relationship between public opinion about LGBTQ rights and how these views are represented by state, statutory laws. Examining this connection could help explain why religious liberty bills are introduced, and it could also explain why there is disconnect between public opinion and legislative output about LGBTQ rights. Additionally, this research could help expand on the contact hypothesis because it could demonstrate the potential difference between changes in public opinion and voting behaviors.
towards LGBTQ rights due to exposure to the LGBTQ community and the legislative output to reflect these beliefs.

**Study Design**

**Context of Study**

Because religion plays an important role in determining the opinions of the public in regards to LGBTQ rights based on prior research, this study will test if the public’s guidance by religion in regards to LGBTQ rights, alludes to their states’ variance in religious liberty bills. Perry and Snawder discovered that religion has the potential to alter how the public views the rights of the LGBTQ community based on how much people are exposed to religious media; whereas, more exposure induced more guidance of negative feelings towards gays and lesbians and the opposite of less media consumption (Perry and Snawder 2016: 789-799). Additionally, Garner’s research demonstrated how contact with gays and lesbians can cause groups like nonevangelicals to decrease their ambivalence about their feelings towards gays and lesbians and increase ambivalence of evangelical Christians (Garner 2013: 254-255). However, disconnecting religion from contact hypothesis may help to determine why religious liberty bills occurred before and after the marriage equality case of 2015. Not always do heterosexuals encounter gays and lesbians, since they account for a very small portion of the population of the United States; therefore, contact hypothesis might not be an accurate theory to structure a study of why religious liberty bills occur. Additionally, many rural and conservative areas lack large LGBTQ populations, which may account for the inaccuracies in contact hypothesis due to the lack of LGBTQ exposure. This study will take parts of the contact hypothesis because measuring the level of interaction of religiously guided people with gays and lesbians and comparing that to how their views are reflected in their legislatures would be too time consuming and difficult for the purposes of this research. Based on the previous research, this study operates under the influence that religiously guided people become threatened by gays and lesbians as they gain civil and political rights, therefore, guiding the public to oppose gay rights.

Contact hypothesis states that heterosexuals become threatened by or support gay or lesbian couples when interacting with them. This study will attempt to show how religion guides beliefs on LGBTQ rights based on a perceived threat of LGBTQ citizens by religiously guided people. If religion can influence feelings towards LGBTQ citizens, then, drawing on the ideas from contact hypothesis, people may feel their religions are being threatened by increasing LGBTQ rights.
Thus, religion is guiding their need to protect themselves against LGBTQ laws that might infringe on their rights to believe and practice their religion in the public sector. This would lead to an increase in religious liberty bills to protect such rights.

**Hypothesis**

Among states, those with greater amounts of highly, religiously guided residents will have increasing numbers of religious liberty bills proposed in the state legislature, $H_a: U_r - U_{lr} > 0$. $U_r$ represents more religiously guided, and $U_{lr}$ is less religiously guided. The null hypothesis assumes that there is no relationship between the number of people in a state guided by religion in regards to LGBTQ rights and the amount of religious liberty bills that state produces, $H_0: U_r - U_{lr} = 0$. This study will test at the 95% confidence interval, $p < .05$.

Hypotheses: $H_a: U_r - U_{lr} > 0$ and $H_0: U_r - U_{lr} = 0$ at $p < .05$.

Dyck and Pearson-Merkowitz’s study concluded that religiously affiliated and guided people that hold conservative beliefs support anti-LGBT legislation if it helps to protect their religious beliefs and practices (Dyck and Pearson-Merkowitz 2012: 748, 750-751). Thus, this study predicts that the hypothesis will be correct because an increased threat to religion by gays and lesbians as demonstrated by increased levels of religious guidance and low levels of support for LGBTQ rights, would logically expand on the connection of religion to contact hypothesis theory by showing how religion guides opinions on LGBTQ rights, and demonstrates the translation of public opinion into the introduction of religious liberty legislation.

**Research Design**

For this study, the data will be obtained from national survey conducted every two years called, the American National Election Studies of Stanford University’s Time Series Cumulative Data File from 1948 to 2012; however, because many of these years are irrelevant to the study, variables will be limited to the time range between the years 2000 to 2012, in which 12,769 people were surveyed. This study will use three variables. VCF0847 - RELIGIOSITY: How Much Guidance from Religion, an ordinal variable, asks the respondents how much religion guides them on a response scale ranging from not important to a immensely. VCF0876 – Law to Protect Homosexuals Against Discrimination, a nominal variable, asks respondents if they oppose or support laws that protect gays and lesbians from job discrimination. VCF0112 – census region, a nominal variable, codes for the
region in which the respondent liveson LGBTQ support, but expands on this (American National Election Studies, idea by demonstrating how it may be and Stanford University. ANES Timereflected in state legislation. Series Cumulative Data File (1948-2012) 2015: 8, 134 -135, 669, 1415, 1986). To test the variables, this study will

Additionally, the number of use two tests – a means test and a religious liberty bills per state per year, cross-tabulation test. This study uses a numerical variables, such that the totals means test because religious guidance per year per state were organized into is an interval, independent variable groups based on the census region in and support of LGBT laws is a nominal, the data set, were obtained from the independent variable, and, region is a Lexis Nexis State Capital databases nominal, dependent variable. Support of (LexisNexis 2017). These variables protective LGBT laws will be compared to provide relatively valid and reliable the regions of the United States, and the measures of preferences towards LGBTQ religiosity of the people will be compared rights in comparison to religious beliefs to the regions of the United States, because if these religious beliefs guide providing for a greater understanding the actions of the respondents, then the of how religious guided each reason respondents’ religions would need to be and compare it with LGBT support. protected from LGBTQ rights in the work LGBT law support and religiosity will be place. This can demonstrate the increaserepresented through separate bar charts. of religious liberty bills per state per year, To test statistical significance, this study then totaled by region. However, should would use a one-sample t-test for both religions promote tolerance of LGBTQ means tests.

rights, then in states with greater amounts The cross-tabulation of LGBT of religiously guided individuals, there law support in comparison to religious should be a decrease in religious liberty guidance, dependent variable, per bills per region. This study connects there region will provide information about ideas of Perry and Snawder, who tested the percentage of LGBT law support, the mechanisms that religion uses to independent variable, depending on change opinions about gay rights using the religiosity per region. This can PALS surveys with the Dyck and Pearson show how much variance there is in Merkowitz study about how contact religious guidance per region in regards hypothesis theory changes opinions of to LGBT law support. The results will be gay marriage bans using state exit polls represented in cross-tabulation chart. (Perry and Snawder 2016, 786, 790; To test statistical significance, Dyck and Pearson-Merkowitz 2012, 745 this study will use a chi-squared test. – 746, 749). This study will expand on Additionally, these results per region will the idea that religion influences beliefs be compared to a Pew Research study in
which states were ranked based on religiosity based on “worship attendance, prayer frequency, belief in God and the self-described importance of religion in one’s life,” (Lipka and Wormald 2016). By averaging the overall index scores per state in each region, the overall religiosity of the regions can be depicted, which when compared to the results of the described tests above, can provide more evidence about how religion can influence the public (Lipka and Wormald 2016).

The Pew Research results will be represented by a bar chart. This will give more understanding to the context in which support of religion is apparent in states and its potential to be reflected in the support of religious liberty bills. This is accomplished by comparing the average amount of LGBT law support in regards to religiosity reflected under the assumption that it is reflected by state legislation. These results will also be compared to the amount of religious liberty bills per region, which could potentially give evidence to the reflection of public opinions about religion in comparison to the amount of religious liberty bills produced by region. A bar chart of religious liberty bills per region will be provided to assess how often religious liberty bills are introduced per region to determine the number of bills produced per region in comparison to other regions.

Analysis

Religious Guidance

The means test of the guidance of religion per region per year of the study provided rather interesting results. In 2000, the Northeastern section of the United States had a mean of 3.00 on a scale from 1 showing some guidance from religion to 3 with great deal of guidance from religion. A 5 indicated no guidance. These results indicated that religion guides the public immensely based on the means derived from the individual responses by the people in each region. In comparison, the West had a mean of 3.34, surprisingly larger than the South or the North Central regions, which had means of 2.75 and 2.88. The following years, the Northeastern region dropped to 2.94, North Central region dropped to 2.78, the South increased to 2.80, and the West decreased to 3.31. The Northeastern region and the West increased to 3.13 and 3.03 in 2004, with the North Central region and the South at 2.70 and 2.72. The North Central region and the South increased to 3.03 and 2.88 in 2008, and the Northeastern region dropped to 3.06 with the West an increasing mean of .01. 2012 demonstrated significantly larger increases by all the regions with the Northeastern region at 3.29, the North Central region at 3.04, the South at 2.98, and the West at 3.26.
Religion guides many people within the regions as indicated by the higher means across the regions. From the t-test, the P-value was .000 indicating that the null hypothesis, that there is no relationship between public views and religious guidance, can be rejected, which, when coupled with the large t-stat of 353.728, the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 95% confidence interval. Seeing that religion guides people in their everyday lives, which would include politics, this study can conclude that the public are guided by religion in regards to their beliefs.

Support of LGBT Laws

Analyzing the views of the public in regards to their views about laws to protect homosexuals against discrimination, the regions had moderate support for the laws. In 2000, the Northeastern region had a mean of 2.49, the North Central region had a mean of 2.39, the South had a mean of 2.74, and the West had a mean of 2.35. This shows that the public had a moderate stance on gay rights, since their means ranged between the middle mean of 2, approaching a mean of 3. Between 2004 and 2008, all states showed declines in their means, signifying more support of gay rights. Specifically, the North-
eastern region declined to 1.78 in 2004 and slightly increased to 1.93 in 2008. The North Central region slightly declined to 2.30 in 2004 and remained the same in 2008. The South declined to 2.51 in 2004 and again to 2.40 in 2008. The West had very similar results to the Northeastern region; whereas, they declined to 1.76 in 2004 and increased to 1.97 in 2008. Much like the increases in religious guidance in 2012, there were also increases in support against homosexual laws. While the Northeastern region had a mean that dropped .01, the North Central region and the South both decreased to 2.16, and the West increased to 2.04. Lowered means could indicate that more people came into contact with LGBT people, altering their views on their rights, religion could be guiding them to be more supportive of LGBT rights, or significant political events occurred in the regions in regards to LGBT rights, which prompted the people to become more supportive of their rights.

**Support of Anti-discriminatory Laws By Region Per Year**

<table>
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NE</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NC</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>2.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>2.74</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>2.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>2.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All the regions had moderate stances towards homosexual rights. With a t-stat of 135.425 and a P-value of .000 obtained from a chi-squared test, the null hypothesis is rejected at the 95% confidence interval; thus, the public seems to care about the LGBTQ community. But, how does religious guidance influence support of laws to protect against homosexual discrimination?
LGBT Law support and Religious Guidance

To interpret this relationship, this study used a cross-tabulation test. In the Northeastern region, those that indicated that religion had lesser levels of influence showed increasing support for anti-discrimination laws, increasing from 13.1% in 2000 to 21.6% in 2012. This also occurred with those that said that religion guides them a considerable amount, increasing from 13.0% in 2000 to 21.6% in 2012. Additionally, with respondents who claimed that religion guides them greatly, support of anti-discrimination laws increased from 12.6% in 2000 to 21.2% in 2012. With those, of which religion had no importance, support of the laws increased from 10.7% in 2000 to 32.2% in 2012. The overall totals from 2000 to 2012 indicated that there was increasing support for LGBTQ rights, as support increased from 12.1% in 2000 to 25.1% in 2012; however, the total opposition also increased from 14.3% to 17.5%.

Northeastern Region Support of LGBTQ Laws by Religious Guidance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Little Guidance</th>
<th>Some</th>
<th>Great</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Total Pro</th>
<th>Total Against</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>14.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The North Central region also showed increased support of anti-discrimination laws between 2000 and 2012. Of those who claimed that religion had a lesser level of influence, support increased from 12.5% in 2000 to 17.5% in 2012. For respondents who are considerably influenced by religion, support increased from 13.9% in 2000 to 24.1% in 2012, and those who are greatly influenced by religion, support increased from 14.6% in 2000 to 21.6% in 2012. Much like the Northeastern region, of those who are not impacted by religion, support increased from 12.6% in 2000 to 32.6% in 2012. Additionally, the overall totals increased from 13.5% in 2000 to 24.0% in 2012, which shows that the North Central region is increasingly more supportive of gay rights. Total opposition totals to these laws decreased from a total of 19.2% to 18.0%.

North Central Region Support of LGBTQ Laws by Religious Guidance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Little Guidance</th>
<th>Some</th>
<th>Great</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Total Pro</th>
<th>Total Against</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The South also increased their support of gay rights as indicated by their results. Of those that said that religion had some influence over them, there was increasing support of anti-discriminatory laws, such that support increased from 10.9% in 2000 to 25.6% in 2012. Similarly, those that claimed that religion had considerable influence over their beliefs, support increased from 10.4% in 2000 to 25.5% in 2012, and those of which religion has great influence over, support of the laws increased from 11.3% in 2000 to 26.0% in 2012. Additionally, respondents who are not influenced by religion indicated increasing support of the public as support increased from 9.4% in 2000 to 33.8% in 2012. The totals
of the support for the laws increased from 10.6% in 2000 to 27.4% in 2012; however, the opposition increased from 11.5% to 17.2% in 2012.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Little Guidance</th>
<th>Some</th>
<th>Great</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Total Pro</th>
<th>Total Against</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>27.4</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the West, of those that claimed that religion had some influence over them, support of the laws increased from 7.9% in 2000 to 25.9% in 2012. Support increased from 11.2% in 2000 to 25.6% in 2012 for those who religion influences them greatly. Support of those of which religion greatly influences, increased from 12.9% in 2000 to 26.3% in 2012, and support also increased among those who are not influenced by religion, such that support rose from 11.7% in 2000 to 27.7% in 2012. Additionally, the total levels of support of the laws increased from 11.2% in 2000 to 26.7% in 2012, and the total opposition also increased from 13.2% to 19.7%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Little Guidance</th>
<th>Some</th>
<th>Great</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Total Pro</th>
<th>Total Against</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>25.9</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>26.3</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Examining the totals of the chi-squared test, there is a value to 694.11, which means that the likelihood of a sampling error occurring is incredibly unlikely, giving support to reject the null hypothesis. With 12 degrees of freedom and asymptotic significance of .000, the P-value is below the .05 standard, then the null hypothesis is rejected. Thus, it appears that religion is influencing support of gay rights across the United States, a clear interactive relationship with significance.

**Religious Liberty Bills, Religious Guidance, and LGBT Laws**

While each region appeared to be more supportive of gay rights, each region has produced many religious liberty bills between 2000 and 2012. Religious liberty bills include a variety of differences in their text and have changed overtime, ranging from abortion rights to LGBT rights. However, this study focused on the religious liberty bills that only addressed LGBT issues in relation to religious protection against their advancements. Specifically, the Northeastern region introduced 16 bills, the North Central region introduced 14, the South introduced 17, and the West introduced 9. In comparison to the results, the totals of the Northeastern region had increasing support of gay rights laws when controlling for religious guidance; however, the opposition increased as well, indicating that some people may have been threatened by increasing LGBTQ rights. So, while
religion could be encouraging many Northeasterners to be more support of gay rights, there is some disconnect between public opinion and the legislation produced.

In comparison, in the North Central region, as gay rights support increased when controlling for religious guidance, the opposition decreased, which is should be reflected by their lower amounts of religious liberty bills. However, in comparison to the Northeastern region, the opposition of gay rights is much stronger in the North Central region than in the Northeastern region, which should be reflected by higher amount of religious liberty bills than in the Northeastern region. Examining the higher increase of anti-gay support in the Northeastern region in comparison to the decrease in anti-gay support in the North Central region could account for the higher levels of religious liberty bills in the Northeastern region rather than in the North Central region.

The initial, large opposition of gay rights when controlling for religious guidance when coupled with a large increase in anti-gay support is reflected by the South’s introduction of a large amount of religious liberty bills. However, the West had both a large increase in pro and anti-gay support, as well as a large original opposition to gay rights, which should have produced similar levels of religious liberty bills to that of the South. Yet, the West has the lowest amount of religious liberty bills.

Using Lipka and Wormald’s study, “How religious is your state,” Pew Research calculated results that demonstrated that the Northeastern region has a state level religiosity of .422 on a scale from 0 to 1 (Lipka and Wormald 2016). The North Central region averaged .538, the South averaged .650, and the West averaged .520. As indicated previously from the cross-tabulation results, religion seems to be guiding people to be more supportive of gay rights, so more religious religiously guided areas like the South and the North Central region should have more laws; however, the amount of religious liberty bills showed that the South and the Northeastern regions had the most bills, and the West and the North Central regions had the lowest amounts.
Conclusion

The connection between the amount of religiosity of a region in comparison to the amount of religious liberty bills that are produced seems to be a spurious relationship because there is stronger support for gay rights than against them, and religion seems to be making people more respectful of gay rights. Yet, the amount of religious liberty bills produced by each region does not match their support and opposition to gay rights laws when controlling for religion, which indicates that there is another factor contributing to the inconsistent amounts of religious liberty bills in each region. Therefore, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, and the results are not as much significant as they are underdeveloped because of the limited connection between the support of gay rights in comparison to the support of religious liberty bills and the threat of gay rights by religions. The relationship of regional religiosity and religious liberty bills can be inferred, but not fully tested by this study. This study demonstrated that there is some connection between religiosity and support of gay rights, yet the connection between this relationship and the amount of religious liberty bills in response to increasing gay rights is less visible. This study showed that religious guidance towards LGBTQ rights may not be reflected by the amount of religious liberty bills produced in American, implying that other factors may contribute to the debate on LGBTQ rights.

This study had limitations. First, the regions coded by ANES were not what many people assume as the “South,” or the “North,” which impacted the public support of gay rights and the amount of religiosity of a region. Second, the Pew Research Results for state based religiosity were for the year of 2016, not between the years of 2000 to 2012, which could have led to the rejection of the hypothesis instead of supporting it. Third, there was no way to observe how the respondents felt that their religions were threatened by LGBTQ rights or if they supported religious liberty bills. If this was observable, then it could have helped explain why certain areas had more religious liberty bills than others. Further research should examine LGBTQ rights in comparison to religious liberty bills on a state by state level analysis. The time frame between 2012 and 2017 includes the legalization of
same-sex marriage. Further research should examine the relationship between religiosity and religious liberty bills during this time because it challenged many ideas about the definition of marriage. An event like this could cause variations in public opinion about religion and religious liberty.

Additionally, this study was limited because the ANES data could have allowed for the respondents to overexaggerate their levels of religious guidance, which could have altered the results. Cultural factors and increased awareness of gay rights that may have taken place outside of the survey, such as the growing presence of LGBTQ people in media or the interest group participation in shaping the image of LGBTQ people, could have altered the perception of gay rights in each region differently in addition to religion. This was not accounted for in the ANES survey data and was not controlled for in this study but could be examined in further research. New research could also improve on this study by examining how religion may affect each region of the United States differently to determine how religion may help to religiously guide cultural norms and establish a culture about gay rights. Studying how regional cultures affect the perception of gay rights could help to determine additional factors that may guide LGBT law support.

However, these results may support Fleischmann and Moyer’s idea that people may support LGBTQ rights, but do not legally want to legitimize them (Fleischmann and Moyer 2009, 146). The results suggest that support for gay rights is increasing, but religious liberty bills are as well, meaning that in the regions in which it was expected for there to be lower amounts of these laws, there were more because people do not want to legally legitimize gay rights even if they support them. The relationship between LGBTQ support, religion, and politics, while still hard to determine, is beginning to become more visible. Additionally, the results support Garner’s idea that contact with gays and lesbians increases ambivalence among religious groups because in each region, religion seemed to increase support of gay rights, but it did not cause them to discourage counter legislation to gay rights, such as religious liberty bills (Garner 2013, 252-255). Also, contact hypothesis cannot be rejected or accepted, but rather questioned because this study could not examine the contact between gays and lesbians with religiously affiliated people, but assumed it through the religious approval of gay rights. This relationship must be examined in the future to continue expanding on the theory because religious people may be more tolerant of LGBTQ rights but may not politically practice these same beliefs. This study did not reject the idea that legislators are ignoring the wills of their people. While increased support in gay rights were apparent, so were unexpected levels of regional wide religiosity and the amount of religious liberty bills. With the increasing levels of LGBTQ rights in America, understanding what fosters such public support for these rights and what legal challenges prevent their expansion is critical to developing future LGBTQ rights in an inclusive culture.
Works Cited


THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF WARFARE:
A FORECAST ON FUTURE CONFLICT
WITH A GENDER PERSPECTIVE

Caroline Sparno, Kathleen Connolly, Kelsey O’Connor, Chloe Chbat, and Pierre Phillipps

Abstract

Previous studies conducted on the future of war have not examined how the inclusion of women in conflict, peacebuilding, and women’s participation in society can affect conflict itself. This project analyzes the theoretical framework surrounding gender security and inclusivity in the societal, governmental, and educational systems of African countries, and its effect on the onset of conflict. In determining the future environment of conflict, we propose that the inclusivity of women in the political process and their level of education will be important determinants in considering the onset of conflict. Our theoretical framework is based on a micro-economic analysis using the Pareto-Optimal allocation of resources, and microeconomic theory. To test our hypotheses, we analyze armed conflict in the African continent from 1990 to 2015 using existing data from OECD, UNDP’s Gender Inequality Index, the Uppsala Conflict Database Program (UCDP) and the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD). We conclude that regime type and women’s inclusion in the political sphere and education system have a correlation with the onset and frequency of conflict, and analyze the relevant policy implications and considerations for the future of war.

Introduction

The intent of our research is to add a crucial predictor or factor for the United States to use in analyzing and evaluating future conflict. Our hope is that our research will add a predictor of conflict onset and underscore the importance of existing factors when analysts and policymakers are considering potential hot spots of conflict around the world and gauging the probability of onset. In an ideal world, this would influence the level and type of resources
and approach to conflict resolution. The uses of our research are twofold. On one hand, it is the United States’ strategic interest to recognize women’s level of participation and education as indicators for forecasting and evaluating conflict and identifying conflict hot spots. On the other hand, these factors can be used in a preemptive way to enhance peacebuilding efforts.

While our data and research are specific to African countries, western powers are not immune to gender issues. Our research in African countries has ramifications for societies around the world. The push for greater inclusion of marginalized groups, specifically women with respect to our research, is likely to increase and be a significant trend to monitor in the next fifty years. Empowering women within the US foreign policy decision-making process can increase the number of inclusive agreements, permit better and broader access to information sharing, reduce asymmetries within bargaining processes, and allow the U.S. to be a better example. A spillover effect may occur, which could lead to more credible commitments and, as a result, impact the frequency of conflict.

**Literature Review**

Our research will take the underlying idea of what happens when marginalized groups that previously did not have access are included, specifically women, and extend this to considering how and whether the inclusion of women impacts conflict onset. Reverting to the existing literature, there are three major theories that scrutinize the relationship between conflict and gender. They can be disaggregated into gender and conflict recurrence, gender and conflict duration, and gender and conflict onset.

**Gender and Conflict Recurrence**

The group of scholars who analyze the role of gender equality and conflict recurrence consider how female participation decreases the probability of conflict recurrence. In a recent study, Sarah Shair-Rosenfield et al. specifically investigate the relationship between gender equality and the duration of post-conflict peace following a negotiated settlement and in this way, they build on Erik Melander’s research on women’s influence on peacetime affairs (Shair-Rosenfield & Wood, 2017; Melander, 2005). Shair-Rosenfield et al. operationalize gender equality as the proportion of female representatives in a national legislature. Essentially, Shair-Rosenfield et al. underscore that the proportion of female representatives in a national legislature prolongs
peace following a negotiated settlement, especially when the national legislature operates through democratic institutions. The two mechanisms that support their argument that female participation reduces the probability of conflict recurrence are “the prioritization of social welfare spending versus military spending,” and “by improving public perceptions of good governance and the credibility of political elites” (Shair-Rosenfield & Wood, 2017). This implies that the policy priorities differ for men and women. Their argument is germane to the objective of this paper, not only because they analyze the intersection of gender and conflict, but they underscore that gender inequality in domestic institutions is a key root of conflict. Additionally, Shair-Rosenfield et al. incorporate regime type into their argument by affirming that women’s inclusion in national legislatures is more significant in capable and legitimate legislatures that more directly determine policy outcomes, and these legislatures generally are those which operate through democratic institutions. As regime type is a control variable within this study, it will be cogent to analyze the relationship between regime type, female inclusion, and conflict.

Where Shair-Rosenfield et al. focus on political inclusion, DeMeritt, Nichols and Kelly specifically analyze how women’s participation, not only politically, but economically and socially, can decrease the probability of conflict recurrence. The indicators they use to measure female inclusion are ratio of female-to-male literacy rates, percentage of all parliamentary seats held by women, and percentage of adult labor force made up of women. Another way in which their study differs from that of Shair-Rosenfield is DeMeritt et al. assert the way in which a conflict terminates does not influence the “window of opportunity” immediately following a conflict for greater women’s inclusion (DeMeritt, Nichols & Kelly, 2015). Shair-Rosenfield maintains armed conflicts ending in negotiated settlements are better suited to promote women’s inclusion (Shair-Rosenfield & Wood, 2017). Moreover, DeMeritt et al. apply the essentialist and constructivist theories to frame their argument, specifically that women’s greater engagement following a conflict will perpetuate the pacifist stance traditional gender roles have applied to women, and promote non-violence that ultimately decreases the probability of conflict recurrence (DeMeritt, Nichols & Kelly, 2015).

In line with Mary Caprioli’s (2005) argument on gender inequality and state insecurity research, Hudson et al. investigate whether the security of women, specifically the way in which they are treated in society, influences state security (Hudson, Caprioli, Spanvill, McDermott & Emmett, 2008). Hudson et al. measure the dependent variable, state security, using state peacefulness based on internal and external conflicts, deviancy from international norms (such as treaties and conventions), and Relations with Neighbors (RN) from the Global Peace Index
Additionally, Hudson et al. seek to understand whether women’s physical security impacts state security. As a result, they are less convinced that certain indicators of women’s inclusion, such as literacy rates and female representation in parliament, are representative of women’s physical security. While both ours and the Hudson study concern the dependent variable of state security, Hudson et al. adopt a more macro-level understanding of security that includes the above indicators as well as those that measure domestic violence (Hudson et al., 2008). Our research investigates state security at a micro-level, specifically, security in terms of probability of conflict onset.

In terms of what we can bring to our own research from the recurrence field, we seek to adopt a broader understanding of women’s security through measuring education and political representation, rather than exclusively studying women’s physical security. While Hudson et al.’s research is thought-provoking in that it offers an alternative conceptualization of security, it does not address how women’s inclusion can serve as a proxy of women’s security and affect conflict onset. Shair-Rosenfield et al.’s focus is limited to women’s inclusion in the political arena and how that decreases the probability of conflict recurrence, while our research will take a more multi-faceted approach to analyzing gender equality in society (Shair-Rosenfield & Wood, 2017). Specifically, this study will include education and labor force participation variables as well as political participation, to investigate whether they directly affect conflict onset and frequency.

One benefit of the DeMeritt study is that it includes female literacy, implying that level of education may have explanatory capacity in conflict recurrence, which is the rationale for this indicator being included in our study. Additionally, they imply that the more women are educated, the greater their participation in the labor force (DeMeritt, Nichols & Kelly, 2015). As this study includes indicators for both women’s education levels and labor force participation rates, one objective will be to determine whether both variables are statistically significant to conflict onset.

**Gender and Conflict Duration**

Explanations for the duration of conflict center on regime type or behavior and the bargaining process, with approaches to gender’s role focusing on political participation. One study reverses the typical causal chain and considers how the duration and scale of war has an effect on women’s parliamentary representation, while another posits that post-conflict contexts positively impact women’s political participation (Hughes, 2009). Melanie Hughes uses civil war and international
linkages as predictors of women’s parliamentary representation, specifically the low-income states of Rwanda, Mozambique, Uganda, and Tajikistan (Hughes, 2009). Because her research focuses on brief case studies of civil conflicts in the 1980s and 1990s, she is able to consider how structural and cultural mechanisms, in combination with political openings, work together to create post-conflict gains like increased women’s parliamentary representation (Hughes, 2009). The idea is that longer, larger-scale wars that contest the political system or alter the composition of the government have the best likelihood of creating opportunities for women to gain seats in the government (Hughes, 2009). By adding internal armed conflict and international linkages to the conversation on predictors of political participation, Tripp and Hughes find that the most significant predictor is whether internal armed conflict can create political openings (Tripp & Hughes, 2015). Aili Mari Tripp and Melanie Hughes add that the majority of women’s representation accelerated after the year 2000, and assert that the impact of post-civil war contexts on female political participation is greater than “what can be explained by electoral institutions and democratization alone.” (Hughes & Tripp, 2015). Tripp and Hughes theorize that despite the popular idea that political change can gradually happen over time as institutions like education are built up, widespread social disruption, like that which follows the end of civil war, is the most effective at increasing women’s political representation (Hughes & Tripp, 2015).

Within other literature on conflict duration, the consideration of political variables like regime type and behavior continues to arise. Dr. Scott Bennett and Allan Stam incorporate realpolitik and domestic political variables by asserting that strategy, terrain, capabilities, and government type play key roles in determining conflict duration (Bennett & Stam, 1996). Their findings, contrary to other authors within duration literature, include the idea that realpolitik variables play a greater role than regime behavior or type (Bennett & Stam, 1996). This could be due to the fact that their data is compiled from interstate conflicts from 1816 to 1985 and does not consider civil or intrastate conflict. They also find that the length of time an interstate war has lasted does not have significant influence on the time it is likely to continue as conflict becomes more institutionalized, meaning war isn’t duration dependent (Bennett & Stam, 1996).

Within bargaining failures, the variables specific to conflict duration involve information asymmetries and commitment issues. Specifically, these variables consider how much information is revealed over the course of war and whether a third party is present and able to enforce any agreement the parties could come to (Walter, 2009). Barbara Walter finds that the conduct of war as well as number of parties play key roles, specifically that guerilla wars and wars with
multiple, shifting factions tend to be the longest because of the lack of credible information that persists (Walter, 2009). The other key aspect of duration that she notes, commitment, finds that wars with a clear imbalance of power, and conflicts with no solid option for a third party enforcer, also tend to be longer or fall victim to recurrence (Walter, 2009). The aspect of Walter’s work that we find relevant, taken with Bennett and Stam’s research, is that the number of parties involved affects the duration (Walter, 2009; Bennett & Stam, 1996).

We find a few compelling aspects within the field of duration that might be extended to the conflict onset field. The aspects of current rival explanations that interest us include Bennett and Stam’s finding that increasing the number of actors involved in a conflict decreases the duration of the conflict (Scott & Stam, 1996). What could be interesting for our own project is to consider the impact of increasing not just the number, but the diversity, of actors in the decision-making process leading to war. Bennett and Stam contend that war is a political decision, and even during war the strategic decisions are political, and we seek to determine whether the same logic can be extended to the onset of conflict in terms of women’s participation in these decisions at the political level. In terms of other variables, Bennett and Stam’s findings on political variables reveal to us that our own research cannot discount the importance of regime type as a control variable.

Melanie Hughes and Aili Mari Tripp’s work contributes the most to our thought process even though their chain of correlation is either the opposite of ours, or just considering a different point in time in the conflict process. Hughes and Tripp posit that the end of civil wars brings profound change in increasing women’s opportunities to be included at the political level; our research centers on whether an increase in women’s inclusion affects the onset of conflict. Our research could add to theirs by noting a pattern in which one civil war ends and allows more women, and diversity, into higher ranks of decision-making, which then either increases or decreases the likelihood of the onset of conflict in the future. Our time period is 1990-2015, allowing us to look at the change in representation after the 2000s that Tripp and Hughes consider. However, in adopting a quantitative research design, our study does not loan itself well to the less measurable concepts of culture and ideology that Tripp and Hughes highlight (Hughes & Tripp, 2015).

Gender and Conflict Onset

As significant authors in the field of civil conflict literature, Lars-Erik Cederman, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min provide a useful framework for understanding the correlation between power relations and marginalized ethnic minorities. Cederman et al. adopts Charles Tilly’s polity model by presenting a
political system containing a government and “contenders” who seek to maximize their degree of access to state power. Cederman et al. apply this model to Tilly’s theory that contenders are ethnic group leaders who use armed rebellion and ethnicize the fight for political power (Cederman, Wimmer & Min, 2010). Essentially, Cederman et al. analyze the non-neutral role of the state in ethnic conflict and assert that the fight for political control is one conducted on ethnic lines (Cederman, Wimmer & Min, 2010). The variables they use are the size of the ethnic minority group, loss of executive branch power, the level of access to state power, and prior conflict. They hypothesize that there is a linear relationship between each of the previously mentioned variables and conflict onset (Cederman, Wimmer & Min, 2010). While some scholars contend there is a correlation between ethnic heterogeneity and conflict, there are those who disagree, stating that no correlation exists between these variables (Ellingsen, 2000; Gurr, 1994; Cederman & Gleiditsch, 2009). For example, James Fearon and David Laitin maintain that regardless of ethnic diversity, as per capita income increases, the state’s susceptibility to war decreases. According to their findings, poverty, population size, and instability are more accurate indicators of conflict onset (Fearon & Laitin, 2003).

Cederman et al. state that it is incontestable that ethnic fragmentation induces conflict and suggest more research on the types of ethnic power relations that increase the probability of conflict onset. However, they constrict their recommendation to ethnicity and overlooks the way in which gender equality can play a role in conflict. There are a select group of scholars who seek to address this gap, and Mary Caprioli leads the field in this realm. Caprioli applies Ted Gurr’s relative deprivation model to gender inequality, which states that the interplay between inequality, discrimination, and rebellion lead to collective grievance that can fuel systemic discrimination (Caprioli, 2005). She measures gender equality using female fertility rates and percentage of women in the labor force and runs logistic regressions to control for polity type, prior conflict, and GDP per capita. Ultimately, Caprioli finds there is a statistically significant relationship between gender inequality and conflict onset when controlling for economic indicators (Caprioli, 2005). She concludes that higher gender equality increases the probability of peace (Caprioli, 2005). Moreover, gender discrimination is not solely an issue of societal transformation, but directly tied to the physical stability of a state, making it not only a human rights issue, but a security issue (Caprioli, 2005).

Caprioli’s argument is compelling and contributes the most to considerations for our own research, yet the indicators for gender equality lack comprehensiveness. For this reason, this paper will include a more extensive set of measures for gender equality. These indicators include female mean years of schooling, female labor force participation rate, and political participation based
on percent seats in parliament for both men and women. This study will test whether a correlation continues to exist between gender equality and conflict onset based on these indicators.

One scholar who builds on this relationship while offering a more inclusive set of measures is Erik Melander. Melander operationalizes gender equality by measuring whether the head of state is female, the percentage of women in parliament, and female-to-male higher education ratio (Melander, 2005). He altercates that the first two measures are illustrative of women’s influence in shaping wartime and peacetime affairs, while all three of the measures indicate women’s value in society and subordination to men (Melander, 2005). Melander tests how gender inequality can affect the levels of intrastate conflict over time. In this way, Melander’s study is more representative of the evolving socio-political dynamics of a country and the various subdivisions of conflict within intrastate conflict (Melander, 2005). Ultimately, when controlling for numerous indicators of ethnic fractionalization, economic development, and political stability, he finds that having a female head of state is not statistically significant (Melander, 2005). However, there is a linear relationship between percentage of women in parliament and female-to-male higher education ratio, and conflict. He also concludes that the relationship between economic development and intrastate conflict changes when gender is added, adding to Fearon and Laitin’s argument by noting that gender inequality can act as an intervening variable for level of economic development as a predictor of conflict (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Melander, 2005).

The gap we intend to address involves building on elements of research in the conflict onset field. Mary Caprioli’s research focuses on using relative deprivation model as the causal mechanism for how inequality, discrimination, and rebellion lead to collective grievance and increase the probability of the onset of conflict. She concludes that, therefore, higher gender equality must increase the probability of peace. Her research posits that gender inequality is part of a larger machine of systemic discrimination and this discrimination is what increases the probability of conflict. Our research takes her note of analysis and fleshes it out to discern how this relationship actually functions. We seek to consider how gender inequality in terms of lacking access to state power has a greater role in conflict than simply being one cog in a greater systemic discrimination machine. Our research also adds to the existing realm of authors addressing Cederman’s exclusive consideration of ethnic fractionalization, and Fearon and Laitin’s focus on income per capita, in that we’re considering whether women’s inclusion in society, specifically in the political and education arena, have tantamount, if not greater, explanatory power for intrastate conflict onset and frequency (Cederman, Wimmer & Min, 2010).
Furthermore, existing author’s indicators for gender equality also lack comprehensiveness. Specifically, in focusing on fertility rates and labor force participation, Caprioli neglects the importance of access to political power, which is an indicator of gender equality for which the Character of Warfare study accounts. One of Melander’s indicators for gender equality is percentage of women in parliament, which aligns with one of the measures for women’s inclusion we will use (Melander, 2005). Including this measure accurately depicts women’s agency, more so than Caprioli’s sole labor force measure. Melander’s conclusions are more uncertain in terms of determining the causal mechanism for associating gender with peace, and he relies on female data rather than using male data to fully round out the results of statistical testing; we intend to use measures of male and female percentage of seats in parliament in order to not enter this project with an expected outcome (Melander, 2005).

**Method and Analytical Approach**

*Analytical framework and broad cause effect*

The framework of our research is based on philosophy and microeconomic theory. John Stuart Mill’s metaphor of the “marketplace of ideas,” in which people exchange ideas freely, is a philosophical model of free speech which allows all ideas to be heard. It’s based on the idea of a market economy and free and perfect market exchange, in which consumers carefully weigh products based on various merits and quality (Gordon, 1997). In the marketplace of ideas, ideas and opinions would fail or succeed based on their own merit. This has a foundation in economics and is applicable to political theory and international relations theory in that the more representative, inclusive, and diverse a dialogue is, the more legitimate and carefully weighed a policy decision becomes.

Scholars affiliated with Neo-classical models assert that under the assumption of pure and perfect competition, the market will reach an equilibrium which is optimal. Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto is credited with developing this theory, which is also known as the Pareto-Optimal allocation of resources. The theory states that this optimal situation creates a global balance and leads to flawless market operation. These economic models can be applied to international relations conflict theory as the causal mechanism for the way in which information sharing can prevent the outbreak of conflict and its recurrence over time. Our study relies on Barbara Walter’s argument that information asymmetries subvert the bargaining process and cripple credible commitments of actors in peacebuilding processes (Walter, 2009).
This research seeks to analyze the link between the inclusion of marginalized groups (which, for our research, focuses on women) in civil society, and the onset of conflict. We hypothesize that gender inclusion helps decrease the lack of information during the bargaining and policy-making process. Greater female inclusion in society and political apparatuses will expand policy makers’ aggregate level of knowledge. More comprehensive information will promote a better understanding of national and subnational contexts, and spur more peaceful environments and outcomes. Increasing information and data sharing with different actors in a society may help find a better alternative to conflict. In other words, with better knowledge and information sharing, actors are aware of more options and can more effectively choose an optimal outcome (Cunningham, 2013).

*Research question and hypotheses*

Based on the aforementioned, the research focuses on gender inclusion and women empowerment in future decades. Many trends today argue that female empowerment in the education system and the political spectrum will condition the future of strife by decreasing the number of casualties and fostering more sustainable peaceful agreements (Caprioli, 2005).

As such, one may wonder: Does gender inclusion in political and peace-making processes decrease the amount of conflict over time? This brings us to our first hypothesis.

H1: *High level of education for women, operationalized as mean years of schooling, will negatively affect the number of internal conflicts per year.*

Higher levels of education for women increase the average knowledge of the population. By granting half of their populations access to educational resources, countries will exponentially increase the amount of information sharing. With the increase of information comes the greater possibility for alternative solutions to conflict other than armed violence. This will also lead to the development of new patterns for peacebuilding operations. This brings us to our second hypothesis.

H2: *Inclusion of women, in comparison with men, in governments and political-decision making processes will negatively affect the number of internal conflicts per year.*
Expected values and data gathering

To answer the research question and test the hypotheses highlighted above, quantitative statistical models are the most effective method. The study pulls from reputable databases such as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the United Nations Development Program in order to rigorously test these hypotheses. The study focuses on women’s empowerment among 21 African countries from 1990 to 2015.

Variables

Independent variable

The study’s independent variable is the number of conflicts per year over a set time period. We referenced the Uppsala Conflict Database Program (UCDP) and the Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD), to gather the data necessary for this analysis. SCAD and UCDP record different types of conflict yet, the study is mainly concerned with intrastate violence. The analysis follows the definition of the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflicts Dataset and Cederman on “internal conflict” that states, “any armed and organized confrontation between government troops and rebel organizations or between army factions that reaches an annual battle death threshold of twenty-five. This definition excludes one-sided conflicts, such as massacres and genocides, as well as communal riots, pogroms, and other non-state conflicts” (Cederman, 2010).

Dependent variables

The study’s dependent variables are the level of women’s education based on the mean years of schooling for women in each country, the level of gender equality in politics based on the percentage of women who hold seats in Parliament in comparison with men’s political participation, and the average labor force participation for women (ages 15 and older). The data collected from the Human Development Reports from the United Nation Development Program provided a Gender Inequality Index that was primary to the analysis of this data. Our study focuses on the share of seats in Parliament and the percentage of women’s representation among the 21 chosen African countries. For the purposes of objectivity and discipline, we decided to collect the same data for men for comparative analysis.
Control variables

Other control variables have been identified to ensure that the analysis considers additional factors which may affect conflict onset and number of fatalities during outbreaks of violence. Intuitively, we stated that GDP per capita is a relevant indicator in examining a country’s tendency towards intrastate violence and riots against national governments. Based on the numerous data sets from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, it is meaningful to explore the GDP per capita in each of the 21 African countries surveyed.

The team decided to examine data from the Center for Systemic Peace, Polity IV score, to include regimes types. Many theories, including the Democratic Peace Theory, have theorized the correlation between regime types and the likeliness of violent conflict within countries.

Ethnic fractionalization will not be a control variable in this study. In addition to the desire to narrow our research, Fearon and Laitin have already examined whether there was a statistically significant correlation between measures of a country’s ethnic fractionalization and civil war onset without finding clear causal evidence of such an association.

Program activity

For this project, we have decided to compile research on gender inclusion in politics – number of seats in Parliament for women and men, GDP per capita, level of education – years of schooling, existence of conflict in each country, and finally the type of regime present at the time. Our “Program Activity” in regards to this specific projected research is statistical testing. In collecting quantitative analyses of each variable, we will look at various gender indicators in datasets such as the “Human Development Reports – Gender Inequality Index” from the United Nations Development Programme, as well as “World Development Indicators” from the World Bank. Through these statistical testing and quantitative analyses of our results, we will be able to prove – or disprove – through past experience whether or not the level of women’s education affects the length of conflict, or whether the inclusion of women in politics and decision-making processes affects the number of casualties during armed, violent conflicts.
<table>
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<th>Country</th>
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<th>GDP per capita</th>
<th>Regime Type</th>
<th>Life expectancy at birth [men, women]</th>
<th>Mean years of schooling [female, male]</th>
<th>Labor force participation, women (ages 15 and older)</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
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</table>
After collecting and coding the data for all the variables, we tested the data using different statistical models such as a multiple variable linear regression, a fixed effects model, and a random effects model. Based on the results from each test, and because we wanted to allow for and acknowledge country and year effects in the data, it was determined that a fixed model is the best test. We used STATA to test the data using a panel regression on fixed effects because we have panel data, and altered the effects within the regression for country and year. We looked over the coefficients and p-values for our initial random effects model, and then ran the tests using a pooled regression model. We considered the significant variables, which would be those with a p-value of less than 0.05 (indicating a 95% confidence interval).

The test revealed that regime type is very significant, with the variables of autocracy, anocracy, and democracy all having a p-value of 0.00 and coefficients of -63.1, -75.5, and -88.9, respectively. This means each instance of being an autocracy, anocracy, or democracy decreases the number of conflicts by 63.1, 75.5, or 88.9, respectively. Democracy has the greatest effect on decreasing conflict. The next most significant variable is women’s political participation (% seats held in parliament) with a p-value of 0.011 and coefficient of -1.4. With each addition of 1% seats held by women in parliament, conflicts decrease by 1.4. Our third most significant variable is means years of schooling, female with a p-value of 0.014 and coefficient of 12.2. With each year of schooling added to the mean, this adds 12.2 instances of conflict. The rest of our variables, GDP per capita; life expectancy at birth, female; labor force participation, female, and men’s political participation (% seats held in parliament) have p-values over 0.05 and therefore are not statistically significant in terms of having an effect on the onset or frequency of conflict in the years 1990-2015 in the African countries we chose. This reveals that increased gender inclusion, in the years and countries we chose, has more of an impact on decreasing conflict than gender security, and regime has the most impact.

To analyze and interpret our findings theoretically, the significance of regime type suggests that the institutional framework and political order is one of the most important determinants of the onset of conflict. The coefficient and p-value of democracy suggest that if a strong institutional framework exists, the probability of conflict onset decreases. This could be due to the ability of democracies to allow for more diversity in who has a voice at the highest ranks of decision-making, and in society. The data also indicates within the context of the countries and time periods analyzed, that increasing the mean years of schooling increases the number of conflicts. While this appears paradoxical, a potential explanation is that women becoming more educated breaks cultural and societal norms, especially in African countries, which can lead to conflict, possibly because of men or other
groups in society feeling threatened or being unaccepting of societal change. This raises the idea of widespread social disruption that Melanie Hughes and Aili Mari Tripp discuss (Tripp & Hughes, 2015). Additionally, education is often poorly measured. Conflicts and education go hand in hand and feed off of one another in a vicious circle: education affects the onset of conflict, yet conflict also affects the level of education women are exposed to receiving as a result of treacherous environments, both at home, and in their country. It is also important to note that religion could be a proxy indicator for women’s education, and therefore impacts whether women have the opportunity to attend school. The Character of Warfare Identity Group recommends a variable for religion to be included in future studies of gender and conflict onset. Besides education, it was discovered that there is a strong relationship between women’s participation in the government and a decreased number of conflicts for each percentage of seats added. This shows that as women’s political representation increases, the instances of conflict decrease, and we are comfortable suggesting that increased women’s political representation decreases the likelihood of the onset and frequency of conflict. The more women are involved in political discussions, the less likely a country is to be involved in conflict for the selection of African countries and years analyzed.

An important point that was raised in our research was the lack of data in many countries, leaving many gaps in the data and leading us to delete countries from our original data set, such as Somalia and Angola. This posed a barrier to finding more data about women’s equality in developing countries. The lack of data is problematic for numerous reasons, but most importantly because if the data does not exist, then it is impossible for the relationship between women’s education and participation in the government conflict to be fully studied. Furthermore, if data does not exist then it is more likely for scholars to dismiss relevance of this topic in this region and continue to study women’s security and inclusion in developing and Western countries, further adding to a pre-existing academic bias and excluding an extremely important region of the world. If we continue to study women’s equality in Africa, then it is important for scholars to acknowledge the significant gap in the data sets. It should also be acknowledged the challenges that researchers face when trying to acquire the data, such as the effects of war or a corrupt/unstable regime on the inability to record more comprehensive data; however, this should not prevent researchers from searching for new ways to record more comprehensive data. At the same time, researchers should take into account that countries may not even have the data themselves because of the fact that in conflict-torn areas, a state’s priorities as well as the public’s may shift to basic survival.
Implication for Policy

Previously, little effort has been made in regards to intensifying women’s participation in political or policy making processes. U.S. policymakers might find it interesting to observe the progress made in countries around the world where women have been included in such processes. The impact on policymakers in the U.S. would stretch locally, nationally, and hopefully to the international community at large. The United States has always acted as a beacon and an example of conduct for communities and nations abroad. At home however, our communities suffer due to a lack of female representation in high-ranking positions. Thanks to the resolve to lower the gender gap by organizations across the world, any step in the right direction is a step that matters. However, this problem persists, especially in government where our country does not yet seem to be ready to embrace female leaders. Our research shines a light on the value of women and the importance of their presence in prominent positions in government. Through this, policymakers would need to create more intensified educational programs aimed at underprivileged communities that are often forgotten. Specifically, by creating programs that reach out to women in these communities in teaching them their value, and in helping them develop and refine their skill sets in order to set a tactful professional path. In order for these programs to be successful at the root, U.S. policymakers would need to set a standard of respect for women and their individual voices that would in turn motivate aspiring political leaders to reach the highest level of education. These findings will further act as a force of persuasion for the rest of the world and will hopefully have a spillover effect on both developed and developing countries around the world.

Conclusion

Throughout the course of this research, our group made many alterations to our theoretical framework, data, and research methods. Studying gender inclusivity in the government and educational systems of African countries is a timely issue to discuss considering the current complex debate surrounding gender inclusivity. The lack of existing data on important indicators underscores that this discussion is far from over. The OECD Gender Indicator warns that a “lack of existing data on a proposed indicator can lead to it being dismissed as not useful. But in fact, the lack of data may reveal a need for such an indicator and the need to stimulate data collection.” Additionally, author Melanie Hughes states that “our understanding of women’s parliamentary representation cross-nationally is dominated by research on industrialized democracies,” which represents a significant gap in the research.
as many African countries cannot be categorized as democracies. For this reason, our objective was to analyze countries in Africa where gender equality, or the lack thereof, is often understudied. We would have liked to consider the effect of increased gender security and equality on duration of conflict in addition to onset; however, the lack of existing data on intrastate conflict duration posed a significant barrier, notably in Somalia and Angola.

As the study evolved, our research counterintuitively came to the conclusion that the independent variable mean years of education, female was not indicative of the onset of conflict (H1), in these particular countries during these particular years (1990-2015). However, our second hypothesis, stating that inclusion of women in Parliament has a negative effect of conflict onset, was confirmed. Nevertheless, the most robust variables for forecasting future conflict onset remain regime type, most importantly the presence, quality, and stability of institutions and infrastructure. Additionally, a shift from an autocracy to a stable democracy has the greatest effect on diminishing the onset of conflict. These conclusions to a certain extent align with Barbara Walter’s discussion on information asymmetry and credible commitment because an increase in the availability of more and better information has a negative correlation with conflict onset. Furthermore, the relationship between women in parliament and decreased conflict onset can be attributed to an increase in information sharing and cohesive decision making processes, as a larger portion of society is being included in the decision-making process. Moving forward, future research should focus on the inclusion of minorities in order to gain a broader and more comprehensive outlook on the future of conflict onset to avoid advancing a gender-bias analysis. Arguing that the inclusion of women is the only indicator that can explain the decrease of violence is a dangerous step towards cherry-picking variables to obtain a previously determined conclusion. The empowerment of women and greater political representation foster a more sustainable peacebuilding process. This statement could be explained through the idea that women perceive wars and conflicts in a different way, usually because they are often the first victims (war-rape, sex-slavery, refugees, etc.) and seek alternatives to violence more extensively than men. On the other hand, a more scientific and structural explanation concludes that increasing information sharing and inclusion of grievances from differing groups within a population helps reach an optimal situation, in addition to the idea that increasing the number of steps in a decision-making process, or increasing the number of actors involved in a decision-making process, decreases the probability of reaching a foregone decision to engage in conflict.
Works Cited


PLAYING BOTH SIDES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA’S IMAGE AND MILITARY ACTIONS

Sean P. Steiner

Abstract

Russia’s 2014 military intervention in Ukraine displays a noteworthy military strategy. Russia’s leaders refused to admit that disguised Russian military personnel were present in Ukraine despite international consensus to the contrary. Russia’s preference for covert tactics signals an ambiguous and significant change in their national security strategy when compared to Soviet-era interventions. The combination of different justifying rhetoric and covert tactics presents a rich problem for examination. This research seeks to understand what Russia’s new combination of intervention rhetoric and tactics indicates about the state’s international self-image. Drawing on a unique collection of scholarship on image-theory and Russian foreign policy, this research analyzes the elite discourse and policy of three Russian military interventions, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, in Georgia in 2008, and in Ukraine in 2014. This analysis finds that Russia creates a multilateral and cooperative international image but maintains manipulative authority in their strategic backyard through covert action and image work.

Introduction: The Russians are Coming

When visualizing a Russian military intervention, many Americans are reminded of the 1984 film Red Dawn. To Americans, the film depicts a terrifying scenario; Soviet soldiers brazenly parachuting into a country and taking control by force. The Cold War reality of a full military invasion haunted many people and still echoes in American culture today. Russia’s interventions abroad have not ceased since the end of the cold war, but a film about modern Russian intervention would be very different from Red Dawn’s depictions.

Russian military intervention has changed. When Russia intervened in Ukraine in 2014, leaders did not deploy a whole battalion of parachute troops like in Red Dawn or send tanks through the city streets like in Czechoslovakia
in 1968. Instead, Russia covertly deployed soldiers disguised as volunteers, conducted an information war against Ukraine’s government, and orchestrated an annexation with complete deniability. After the intervention became public Russia deployed rhetoric justifying and legitimizing the intervention on humanitarian grounds. These rhetorical methods represent a departure from previous Russian justifications. Russia’s preference for covert tactics signals an ambiguous and significant change in their national security strategy. The combination of different justifying rhetoric and covert tactics presents a rich problem for examination. This paper seeks to understand what Russia’s new combination of intervention rhetoric and tactics indicates about the state’s international self-image. The paper uniquely combines theory on Russian intervention with an analysis of intervention rhetoric to identify the shifted tactics in modern interventions and explain Russia’s image. Before beginning the analysis, it is important to establish the theoretical tools that will be used to understand Russian intervention rhetoric.

History of Russian Foreign Policy Theory

Scholars who write about Russian foreign policy often identify sets of foreign policy attitude groupings. Though authors name these groupings differently, the general categories remain the same. Andrei Tsygankov, a San Francisco State University professor and expert on Russian politics, founded his book on the principle that Russian foreign policy actors can be divided into ‘Westernizers’, ‘Statists’, and ‘Civilizationists’ (Tsygankov 2006, 4-7). Westernizers emphasize, “Russia’s similarity with the West and view the West as the most viable and progressive civilization in the world” and in the post-Soviet world, they hope to foster good relations with the West instead of old Soviet allies (Tsygankov 2006, 4-5). Russian Statists believe preserving order in the country is the top priority and that state institutions are best equipped to ensure order persists. Statists believe the external threat to Russian sovereignty is constant and must be countered with power and heightened security (Tsygankov 2006, 6). Finally, Civilizationists take a more anti-West position than Statists. Civilizationists believe in the supremacy of Russian values and in Slavic-Nationalism (Tsygankov 2006, 7-8).

Other scholars create similar categories to Tsygankov but use different naming conventions. Ted Hopf’s work on Russian identity and the military intervention in Georgia proposes three different identities, Liberal, Centrist, and Conservative, that can be respectively associated with Tsygankov’s categories (Westernizer, Statist, Civilizationist) (Hopf 2005, 233-234). Liberals have an
affinity for the United States, Centrists believe in an independent but multilateral Russia, and Conservatives advocate alliances with any power that can balance the US (Hopf 2005, 234). Another scholar, Alex Pravda, names the categories ‘liberal internationalists’, ‘pragmatic nationalists’ and ‘patriots’ (Shearman 1997, 4).

Tsygankov and Hopf’s explanations converge even further when they describe Russian ideological history following the Soviet Union’s dissolution. Leading up to and immediately following the breakup, Russian policy trended towards the left. Gorbachev, labeled a Westernizer and Liberal, enacted reforms to bring Russia closer to the West and out of the Cold War. However, by 1992 the Russian economy stalled and public perception of both Liberalism and Conservatism plummeted (Hopf 2005, 235). Thus, Yeltsin’s later presidency trended towards Statism, as did future Russian presidents. The general academic consensus on Russia’s shift to Statism in the 21st-century is significant because it corresponds with Vladimir Putin’s election and presidencies (Hopf 2005, 235); (Tsygankov 2006). While Soviet leaders’ general trend towards Civilizationism corresponds with the historical pattern of unapologetic interventions, Putin’s obscured interventions in Georgia and Ukraine indicate a more Statist or Centrist policy (Tsygankov 2006, 9).

Russian foreign policy scholars have also identified changes in Russia’s perception of sovereignty since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. As the international community has placed more value on norms in human rights and international organizations, the concept of international sovereignty has changed. Nicholas Bian argues that “Westphalian Sovereignty” or sovereignty with an emphasis on, “exclusionary political space” and “autonomous decision making” is declining among states who prefer to emphasize interdependence and collective organizations (Bian 2012, 3). Russia initially embraced the modern sovereignty framework after the Soviet Union collapsed, but the state has been moving further towards a Westphalian understanding with every policy action (Bian 2012, 63-64). Putin’s Russia embraces Westphalian sovereignty and is hesitant to accept Western-led multilateral agreements. Bian would agree with Tsygankov and Hopf in classifying Putin as a Statist. Putin’s Statism deserves significant scrutiny because it means he recognizes Russia’s complex relationship balancing cooperation with the west and establishing a national identity.

Image Theory

To properly study the shift from Soviet to post-Soviet intervention, it is useful to establish a basis in image theory. Robert Jervis’ The Logic of Images in International Relations provides vital terminology for examining state rhetorical
actions and the implications of those actions. Jervis defines a state’s image of another state as, “those of his beliefs about the other that affect his predictions of how the other will behave in various circumstances” (Jervis 1989, 5). Defining international image this way indicates that any internationally visible action can change a state’s image and states can consciously manipulate the images they project through words and actions. Action to change a state’s international image will be known in this paper as ‘image work’ and image work strategy is the key difference between Soviet interventions and post-Soviet interventions. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian leaders have drastically changed the way they construct the international image of their actions.

International image and image projection are significant because, as Herrmann et al. found in their experimental tests of image relations, states often use perceptions of other states’ decision-making processes and capabilities to make conclusions about those states’ intentions (Herrmann et al. 1997, 422). International image plays a major role in international relations which makes any discrepancy between a state’s image work or rhetoric and actions even more significant (Herrmann et al. 1997, 422). Beyond international image theory, it is useful to examine schools of thought relating to rhetorical image work.

In the past, scholars have placed states’ rhetorical explanations of intervention into two different categories. These categories are ethical explanations of intervention and strategic explanations. The first school of thought, ethical explanations, includes interventions undertaken to protect human rights and the US government’s favorite explanation; to promote democracy. As Shannon Blanton found in her study on US military aid, democracy, and human rights criteria determine where the US sends arms (Blanton 2000, 129). Interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and most importantly Kosovo have all been explained ethically (Chandler 2003, 296). Some authors assert that leaders justify most 21st-century conflicts ethically either because of an increased global focus on human rights since 1945 or because 21st-century conflicts are drastically more dangerous to non-combatants than older conflicts (Chandler 2003, 297-298). Other authors, however, believe ethical explanations are examples of “rhetoric without responsibility” and are examples of domestic image work to create moral authority for the leader.

Theory on democratic explanations for intervention is equally pessimistic. In the US, few rhetorical explanations, “have been advanced with such regularity and frequency as the promotion of democracy” (Meernik 1996, 391). Despite this explanation’s popularity, research shows that most states where the US intervenes do not see a significant increase in democracy post-intervention (Meernik 1996, 400). Critics frequently claim rhetoric that justifies foreign interventions ethically
is hollow. These theoretical patterns are important to understand when examining intervention rhetoric, especially to reach the deeper meaning behind government statements.

Strategic rhetorical explanations focus on legally justifying intervention to the world. States use legal rhetoric to publicly express their concerns for international norms and law and to justify their actions to other states using law and precedent (Borgen 2009, 25) (Allison 2014, 1259). Scholars discussing legal explanations often use Russia as an example. Roy Allison appraised the Kremlin’s legal rhetoric on their intervention in Ukraine and found that Moscow used self-determination and legal protection of Russian citizens in the country as justification (Allison 2014, 1260,1284). Christopher Borgen discovered similar statements about self-determination and self-defense in his analysis of Russia’s intervention in South Ossetia in 2008 (Borgen 2009, 22). A state’s use of legal rhetoric to explain international intervention implies a deep concern for their international image and scrutinizing the justification can provide important information on the state’s desired image.

Scholarship on Russian foreign policy is well developed, as is scholarly work on image theory and intervention justifications. However, no comprehensive analysis of Russia’s changing foreign intervention methods exists. This research charges to examine Soviet and post-Soviet military intervention within the ideological frame created by Tsygankov and Hopf but will evaluate intervention rhetoric based on image theory. Knowledge of rhetorical intervention methods will help the researcher identify appropriate discourse to analyze, and image theory provides the framework to understand the findings. Interpreting Russian discourse with these tools will place the research inside the state decision-making process and uncover the international image that motivates post-Soviet Russia’s intervention methods.

Method

This paper’s discourse analysis will examine Russian image work regarding the country’s military interventions. This image work includes any document or speech created for a foreign audience by Russian government officials. It is important that the documents contain substantive image work, meaning that the language used alters Russia’s image. This analysis primarily utilizes statements from Russian executive leaders, statements from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and UN Security Council meeting records and documents. It is important to note that these documents have all been translated into English, and this study relies on these translations. It is possible that certain nuanced language or image
work is lost in the translations, and this represents a drawback to this study.

The Czechoslovak Anchor

To examine the shift in Russian intervention tactics, it is first necessary to anchor this paper’s analysis. The Soviet Union’s interventions provide a historical starting point that will be used to compare modern Russian interventions. The Soviet Union’s military intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 is a synecdoche of Soviet interventions during the Cold War. In 1968, Czechoslovakia’s leaders, including newly appointed first secretary of the Czech communist party Alexander Dubček, carried out reforms that moved the country away from the Soviet Union’s traditional Stalinist communism (Navrátil 1998). These reforms primarily included greater speech and press freedoms. Soviet leadership feared the reforms would inspire change and destabilization in other bloc countries and developed a plan to resist the reforms (Navrátil 1998). On August 20th, 1968, a Warsaw pact coalition of military troops invaded Czechoslovakia and Dubček was arrested (Navrátil 1998, 416). The international community immediately reacted to the military incursion; representatives from six Security Council nations requested an emergency meeting on August 21st to discuss the situation in Czechoslovakia (United Nations Security Council 1968a).

The Security Council provided the first public forum for the Soviet Union to explain the intervention in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet delegation moved promptly to sweep the issue under the rug. In a letter published as a UN document, the Soviet Representative to the UN claimed there was, “no basis for consideration of [the Czechoslovak situation] by the Security Council.” (United Nations Security Council 1968b). The representative also immediately justified the intervention, stating, “military units of the socialist countries have entered the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic pursuant to a request by the Government of that State” (United Nations Security Council 1968b). This statement represents a strategic justification that is exemplary of the USSR’s rhetorical tactics during the cold war. Though an invitation from the Czechoslovak Government would have validated the Warsaw Pact’s actions, no such request was ever approved by the Czechoslovak Government. After Warsaw Pact forces invaded, the Czechoslovak Government published a statement addressed to, “All the People of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic,” claiming,

the armies of the USSR, Poland, The German Democratic Republic, the Hungarian People’s Republic, and the Bulgarian People’s Republic crossed the state borders of the ČSSR. This occurred
without the knowledge of the president of the Republic, the chairman of the National Assembly, the prime minister and the CPCz CC first secretary, and without the knowledge of these organs as a whole. (Navrátil 1998, 414)

This statement completely invalidates the Soviet UN delegate’s justification for the intervention and explains the last portion of his statement. The delegate’s request that the Security Council not consider the Czechoslovakia issue closed by restating that, “The Soviet Government has repeatedly warned that the attempts of imperialist reaction to interfere in the domestic affairs of the [ČSSR] and in relations between the Socialist Countries will not be tolerated,” the Soviet delegate then warned that, “The events in Czechoslovakia are a matter that concerns the Czechoslovak people and the states of the socialist community.” (United Nations Security Council 1968b).

The Soviet Delegate’s statement evokes a sense of Soviet ownership over Czechoslovakia and other Socialist republics and emphasizes the hostilities and differences between the Cold War’s two ideological blocks. This idea of Soviet sovereignty is the basis, and first real-world test, of the Brezhnev doctrine. This doctrine was first promulgated in the Soviet propaganda newspaper, Pravda, in September 1968 after the intervention in Czechoslovakia. Authored by Sergei Kovalev, the article details how, “the peoples of [socialist countries] should have freedom for determining the ways of advance of their respective countries. However, none of their decisions should damage either socialism in their country or the fundamental interests of other socialist countries.” (“Pravda” 1968). Kovalev’s assertion that socialist countries are tied together and, “the weakening of any of the links in the world system of socialism directly affects all the socialist countries,” is the Brezhnev doctrine’s fundamental justification (“Pravda” 1968). The Brezhnev doctrine is a Soviet combination of the US’s Monroe Doctrine and Truman Doctrine, oriented towards Soviet satellite states. It asserts that the Soviet Union maintains the right to intervene in Socialist republics to preserve the world socialist system.

Leonid Brezhnev confirmed his doctrine in a speech to The Polish Communist Party Congress on November 12, 1968, stating that, “military aid to a fraternal country to cut short the threat to the socialist order is an extraordinary enforced step.” (Glazer 1971, 170). Brezhnev’s doctrine poised the Soviet Union to defend against a reverse-domino-effect of cracks in the socialist system. It also provided a written justification for overt military interventions. The context of the Cold War is drastically different from the modern world and the difference in context may help explain the intervention methods shift. The intervention in
Czechoslovakia was like modern Russian military interventions in that it was quickly constructed to appear legal and justified. However, Soviet leaders made no effort to conceal the intervention’s extent. It is necessary to examine the rhetorical strategies and justifications that have accompanied modern Russian interventions to make sense of the observed shift in tactics.

**Georgian Aggression?**

In August 2008, after months of diplomatic crisis between Georgia and Russia and a spike in tensions between Georgian separatists and state security forces, Russian troops entered Georgia. The fighting between Russian and Georgian security forces lasted five days and caused Abkhazia and South Ossetia to fully separate from Georgia. The volumes of discourse available from Russian government archives and Security Council archives provide a picture of how Medvedev constructed the intervention.

The lead up to Russia’s intervention in Georgia was much more drawn out than the rapid Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. Russian peacekeepers were already present in the semi-autonomous breakaway regions of Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as a carry-over from Georgia’s early 1990s war with separatists from the regions. The Georgian government tolerated these peacekeeping troops, but in late May 2008 troops and equipment from the, “Railway and Engineering Forces of the Russian Federation” entered Abkhazia without Georgian permission (United Nations Security Council 2008a). Georgia condemned the incursion and alleged that the Russian government was using these forces to prepare Abkhazia’s infrastructure for a full military intervention (United Nations Security Council 2008a). The Russian government’s response to Georgia’s allegations represented the starting point for Russia’s image work regarding Georgia.

In a letter addressed to the Security Council titled, “The participation of Russian military personnel in the rehabilitation of Abkhazia’s railway infrastructure”, the Russian representative to the UN stressed the humanitarian necessity of the railway work (United Nations Security Council 2008b). The Russian delegate claimed that the infrastructure work, “corresponds to the aspirations of the people of Abkhazia, who have been unable to achieve their inalienable right to a decent life because from, the devastation left over from the Georgian-Abkhaz war.” (United Nations Security Council 2008b). These words are significant because they construct the Russian position in Georgia in a few ways.

By emphasizing, “the aspirations” and “inalienable right” of the Abkhaz people, Russia pre-establishes a humanitarian justification for future action. The choice of language about rights evokes a sense of democracy, freedom, and
humanitarian protection that help to construct Russia as a positive actor. Russia pairs its humanitarian explanation with an immediate dismissal of Georgia’s fears about a future military intervention. This pairing is more effective than if Russia had only denied planning a future military action because it shifts focus and attention towards Georgia’s past wrongs and away from Russia’s potential future wrongs. Russia frequently employs this ‘devil’s-advocate’ strategy of drawing attention to an intervention target’s wrongs, and the strategy is seen in Russia’s attempts to vilify Georgia in the rhetoric surrounding the 2008 war.

Russia’s attempts to vilify Georgia began in the first sentence of their security council statement. Russia alleges that, “a new wave of anti-Russian clamor has arisen in Georgia,” establishing the pretext that anything the Georgian government does is hostile to Russia. This statement established historical credibility for Russia’s first statement after the hot war began on August 7th. The Russian foreign ministry announced that the Georgian military resorted to force in, “a treacherous, massive attack,” completely undermining, “the credibility of the Georgian leadership as a responsible participant of the negotiation process” (Affairs 2008b). Future statements from the ministry centered on highlighting the conflict’s carnage, discrediting the Georgian Government, and exalting the Russian Government’s humanitarian actions. Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, stressed the, “peaceful inhabitants, women children and old people,” who, “continue dying in South Ossetia. Many of [whom] have Russian citizenship” (Affairs 2008a). Lavrov’s focus on the conflict victims’ innocence and their potential Russian citizenship dually justifies Russia’s military action in Georgia. Lavrov also moves to discredit the Georgian Government claiming, “The Georgian leadership does not enjoy trust in regards to the facts” (Affairs 2008a).

Russia’s most significant attempt to slander the Georgian government was their accusations that Georgian forces committed ethnic cleansing. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said in August, “The ferocity in which the actions of the Georgian side were carried out cannot be called anything else but genocide, because they acquired a mass character and were directed against individuals, the civilian population, peacekeepers” (News 2008). However, a Russian investigation into the ‘genocide’ after the war found that only 162 civilians were killed during the conflict; a far cry from the 2,000 deaths that the Russian ambassador to South Ossetia claimed during the war (Van Herpen 2014, 227-228).

Russia’s other claims about Georgian aggression also do not reconcile well with facts. Many scholars believe that Russia’s intervention in Georgia was predicated by covert measures that allowed the Russian government to construct the intervention as Georgian aggression. Marcel Van Herpen identified six verified events in Georgia leading up to the Russian intervention that indicate
Russia’s premeditation. Van Herpen cites Russia’s cyber assault against Georgia, military exercises on the Georgian border, the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali’s evacuation, the arrival of Russian journalists in South Ossetia two days before the war began, preparations by Russian militias, and the arrival of Russian regular troops in South Ossetia before the war as indicators that the government did not simply react to ‘Georgian aggression’ (Van Herpen 2014, 219). Of these preparations, Russia’s cyber front against the Georgian government is most relevant to this study of image work and covert action.

Van Herpen establishes that the Russian government, “Immediately launched cyber-attacks against Georgia and effectively blocked the websites of the Georgian government and media” when the war began (Van Herpen 2014, 206). The attack effectively made Russia the only source of information on the war in Georgia, and Van Herpen found that, “it even managed to influence Western public opinion” (Van Herpen 2014). In 2008, a cyber-front like this could not have been completed at a moment’s notice or in response to an unexpected, “treacherous, massive attack” (Affairs 2008b). A preplanned information suppression like this indicates that the Russian government intended the military action to be covert. This makes these blatantly false statements even more interesting. Russia constructed an image directly contrary to their actions, and covert tactics allowed them to do so.

Ukrainian Instability

Russia’s intervention in Ukraine in 2014 occurred in two theatres; Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. The Russian government utilized new covert assets in both theatres. The new covert tactics used in this intervention create a unique opportunity for rhetorical analysis. This is because some of the statements set to be analyzed contain misleading information or facts that have been later found false.

On February 27th, 2014 “little green men” seized government buildings across Crimea, but most significantly in Simferopol (Karagiannis 2014, 408). Though international news media reported these troop movements almost immediately, Russian officials did not respond publicly until March 1st (Jacob Resneck 2014, BBC 2014). The first statement from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that specifically referenced Crimea, where the ‘little green men’ were first deployed, came at 1 pm on March 1st and made no mention of Russian ground troop presence. Russian officials instead pushed the narrative that “unknown armed people sent from Kiev” attempted to occupy a government building, but the “treacherous provocation” was prevented by “[sic] self-defence units” (Affairs 2014c). The ministry finished its statement appealing to, “all those who give such
orders from Kiev to be restrained” (Affairs 2014c). This continued the narrative that the Kremlin and MFA had been championing since former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych was forced to flee the country; the government in Kiev is illegitimate and actively trying to harm ethnic Russians in Ukraine. The Russian government continued this narrative in a statement on March 3rd, claiming that, “it is evident that the existing threats to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine are caused exclusively by the internal political crisis in the country” (Affairs 2014b). This statement is interesting because it both criticizes the Ukrainian government’s political control and asserts that Ukraine’s problems are internal in a hands-off way.

These MFA statements represent the Russian government’s first attempts at constructing their intervention in Ukraine. The MFA’s image work began before any news sources could confirm that the little green men in Crimea were affiliated with Russia. The swiftness of Russia’s anti-Kiev statements is purposeful. Focusing the narrative on unrest inside Ukraine and militant groups sent by the Ukrainian government distracts from news reports about Russia’s involvement. It also lays the groundwork for Russia to justify their military intervention in the future. Russian officials likely knew that their military forces were present in Ukraine when they published the March 1st and 3rd statements, making them even more interesting and calculated. With these statements and other statements throughout the unrest in Ukraine in 2014, the Russian government establishes a rhetorical pattern or narrative that the new Ukrainian government is illegitimate, and protesters who support the new government are hostile and anti-Russian.

For example, MFA statements on Feb 27th, 2014 highlighted events from protests in Ukraine that would be especially distasteful to the Russian domestic audience (Affairs 2014a). The MFA tells of how protestors created a waste dump near a monument to, “the heroes of the Great Patriotic War” and how, “priests of the canonic Ukrainian Orthodox Church frequently become subjected to physical violence, and their temples are destroyed” (Affairs 2014a). Though these may seem like typical protesting events, they have special significance to Russian audiences. The Great Patriotic War, the Russian name for World War II, holds deep significance to Russians because Russian losses in the war were severe. The Great Patriotic War is a massive symbol of Russian identity and culture, and Russian audiences would interpret creating a trash dump on the eternal flame monument as extremely disrespectful, like if American protestors did the same on a 9/11 memorial. Additionally, patriotic and proud Russians believe the Orthodox Church is another symbol of Russian identity. Actions against orthodox priests are seen as directly anti-Russian.

The MFA’s choice to report on these protests is significant because it
continues the narrative that Ukrainian protesters are anti-Russian and that the situation is becoming dangerous for Russian speakers. Highlighting these negative conditions positions Russia to justify a military intervention ethnically and empowers people in Ukraine who are opposed to the post-Maidan government.

One of the most significant pieces of rhetoric from the Ukraine intervention is an extended TV interview that Vladimir Putin gave on Rossiya Channel One. Putin fields questions from all over Russia, Crimea, and other parts of the world. This interview occurred over a month after Russia’s first troop deployment into Ukraine, and after the controversial referendum that officiated the annexation of Crimea into the Russian Federation. His discourse is a perfect representation of Russian foreign policy thought, and it is interesting how the questions and answers are selected to create a cohesive image of Russian policy (Putin 2014).

Putin continues many of the rhetorical patterns seen in early MFA statements about Ukraine and provides longer-form answers and explanations about Russia’s actions. Putin’s first answer concerns, “the events underway in the Lugansk and Donetsk Regions” of Eastern Ukraine. Putin explains his version of the Ukrainian conflict, and his version’s differences from other international retellings is an example of Russian image work to justify the intervention. Putin defends ousted Ukrainian President Yanukovych claiming the unrest began when he, “said he could not sign [the association agreement with the EU] because it would dramatically worsen the socioeconomic situation in Ukraine” (Putin 2014). Putin then talks of the resulting “unconstitutional coup” and “rapid growth of nationalist sentiments” that threatened to, “invalidate some of the ethnic minorities’ rights, including the rights of the Russian minority” immediately justifying Russia’s interest in the situation in Ukraine for the defense of its citizens abroad (Putin 2014). This frame is important, especially in concert with Putin’s assertion that, “There are no Russian units in eastern Ukraine” because it attempts to justify potential Russian presence even though there is none. Putin is essentially saying, “we are not there, but if we wanted to be, we could” (Putin 2014).

Like the image work Russia conducted six years earlier in Georgia, Russia creates doubt towards the Ukrainian government, vilifies the government’s agents, and purifies the Russian government’s actions by headlining negative humanitarian conditions in the country.

In summary, the Soviet Union intervened overtly in Czechoslovakia in 1968 using a strategic legal justification. In 2008, Russia made use of covert preparation methods and justified the overt portion of their intervention in Georgia as a humanitarian necessity. In 2014, Russia employed entirely covert tactics to intervene in Ukraine while again rhetorically emphasizing humanitarian justifications for intervention. The differences between the Soviet intervention
in Czechoslovakia and two post-Soviet interventions show a shift from overt to covert tactics, and from strategic to humanitarian justifications. The analysis also uncovered internal Soviet doctrine behind the intervention in Czechoslovakia, which explained the reasoning for the USSR’s overt action in Czechoslovakia. Examining a modern Russian national security doctrine may reveal more reasoning behind the shifted rhetorical method.

A Purposeful Strategy

Russia’s 2015 National Security Strategy provides one more source of rhetoric to explain the tactical shift. The National Security Strategy is, “the basic strategic planning document defining the Russian Federation’s national interests and strategic national priorities” (“National Security Strategy” 2015). The strategy establishes eight strategic priorities that Russia should pursue, most relevantly including culture and, strategic stability and equal strategic partnership (“National Security Strategy” 2015). The Russian national security strategy illuminates Russia’s approach to international politics and establishes the country’s worldview in a relatively simple way.

Point thirteen of the security strategy recognizes that the post-Cold War shift towards, “a new polycentric model of the world order is being accompanied by an increase in global and regional instability” (“National Security Strategy” 2015). Russian government officials are very concerned with stability and the changing dynamics of the international system. Variations of the word, “stability” appear forty-seven times in the security strategy, greater than once per page, and many of the strategy’s goals focus on maintaining regional or global stability. This is a result of Russia’s relative youth as a ‘democratic’ nation. The breakup of the Soviet Union created significant uncertainty about Russia’s position in world politics and internal chaos among Russians as society struggled to adapt to a new economic system. National security and stability go hand and hand for many countries, but Russia especially covets stability and maturity in their governing system.

The desire for stability reflected in Russia’s security strategy is accompanied by a natural desire for international prominence. The strategy document closes by declaring that the strategy is designed to, “enhance the competitiveness and international prestige of the Russian Federation” (“National Security Strategy” 2015). Russia’s emergence as a single country after the breakup of the Soviet Union was accompanied by a significant prestige loss. Russia went from being one of the two superpowers to a struggling young state. Russian Statist ideology is fundamentally linked with the restoration of international prestige, and this shows in Putin’s 2015 National Security Strategy. The strategy calls for prestige through,
“the enhancement of Russia’s role in the world humanitarian and cultural area,” and states that national security will be strengthened by, “the preservation and development of the common Russian identity of the Russian federation’s peoples and of the country’s unified cultural area” (“National Security Strategy” 2015). The Russian foreign ministry’s justification of the intervention in Ukraine similarly addressed the necessity of protecting Russian culture with its allusion to anti-Russian protests (Affairs 2014a). The desire to raise Russian culture and to strive for humanitarian prowess also represents Russia’s national uncertainty following the Cold War.

Much of the Security Strategy aims to restore Soviet levels of control and greatness, but one point does not. That is Russia’s expressed desire for cooperation with other nations. The strategy devotes multiple pages to listing the countries Russia intends to cooperate with, and the strategy states, “The Russian Federation’s objective is to acquire as many equal partners as possible in various parts of the world” (“National Security Strategy” 2015). This objective is a significant departure from previous Soviet cooperation goals that only centered around other socialist countries, but the objective is instrumental in understanding Russia’s shift in intervention methods and rhetorical denials.

Conclusions

Russia’s image work in Georgia and Ukraine centered on vilifying the opposing governments and elevating Russia’s motives. This paper’s analysis of Soviet and post-Soviet intervention has revealed that the shift from strategic intervention justifications to humanitarian justifications and the shift from overt action to covert action correspond with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Russian foreign policy ideology shift from Civilizationist to Statist leaders. Analysis of the image work Russian leaders used in these interventions has revealed significant information about the way present-day Russian leaders view their international image.

The Cold War was a high point in terms of influence and power for the Soviet Government. The Soviet Union was one of two superpowers in a bipolar global system. This gave the USSR a significant amount of international prestige and a stable position in the world order. The Soviet Union also had free reign to intervene in its satellite states because they held a monopoly on information coming out of the Eastern Bloc and because Cold-War international politics emphasized exclusive spheres of influence. This is reflected in the overt tactics the Soviet Union used to intervene in Czechoslovakia as well as the strategic justification they employed as image work. The Civilizationist policies and realities of the Cold-War
directly dictated the parameters of the Soviet Union’s military interventions.

The collapse of the Soviet Union destroyed many of the realities that allowed Russia to intervene without consequences. As the Russian Federation’s security strategy emphasized, the post-Soviet era has been characterized by instability. The bipolar system is finished and as the world evolves towards multipolarity, the Russian Federation is forced to cope with instability and uncertainty. Russia lost international prestige and authority to act with impunity on the international stage. Russia also lost its information monopoly in the East. Russian leaders are no longer able to intervene and immediately alter facts. Russia’s inability to control the states it once ruled weighs heavily on the nation’s strategic thinkers. This is reflected in the countless references to ‘stability’ in the security strategy, as well as in Russia’s interventions in Georgia and Ukraine. Russian leaders still feel a sense of ownership towards their “fraternal ally” countries but the shifted international order prohibits the state from acting in the same way it did during the Cold War. These desires struggle to reconcile with Russia’s other expressed goal.

Russia’s 2015 National Security Strategy also expresses the state’s “objective is to acquire as many equal partners as possible in various parts of the world” and stresses the necessity of cooperation (“National Security Strategy” 2015). This desire to cooperate is what causes Russia to ‘play by the rules’ on paper and conduct such extensive image work along with covert interventions. Modern international norms taboo military action without UN approval and would create a negative international image for the actor. As Jervis’s image work and Herrmann et al.’s empirical tests of the theory determined, states make decisions based on the images other states project (Herrmann et al. 1997). Russian politicians fear that a negative image could limit opportunities for cooperation.

During the Cold War, the Soviets’ image was intrinsically poised against the west, and could not be harmed by interventions or anti-western actions. Modern Russian leaders have found potential benefits in cooperating marginally with other nations and have taken large steps to create an image for Russia that is compatible with cooperation. This is reflected in Russia’s shift towards covert action and humanitarian intervention justifications. Covert military intervention is a necessity for Statist Russia to preserve its internationally cooperative image, and humanitarian intervention justifications preserve Russia’s image when covert action is exposed.

In closing, it is helpful to consider the Institute of International Relations Prague Professor Mark Galeotti’s analysis of a 2013 article in the Russian security journal, Military-Industrial Kurier (Galeotti 2014). The article, penned by Russian Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, discusses changing modern military tactics (Galeotti 2014). Galeotti identifies Gerasimov’s most significant realization
that, “The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness” (Galeotti 2014). Here Gerasimov recognizes the utility of Russia’s new covert tactics, and as Galeotti noted, he explicitly states that, “all conflicts are just means to a political end. The actual forces used in conflict are irrelevant and in modern realities, Russia must look to non-military instruments increasingly” (Galeotti 2014).

The modern realities that Russia faces are spelled out in the country’s security strategy and have been realized in this paper. Russia desires international cooperation but still has a nagging urge to ‘preserve Russian culture’ and enforce its will on satellite states. Gerasimov recognizes that Russia must abide by different rules than during the Cold War, a positive international image is important for cooperating with other nations, but also recognizes the Russian desire to create stability in its satellites. In pursuit of that positive international image, Russia uses covert assets and modifies rhetorical image work strategies to stay in line with international norms on paper and allow cooperation between their nation and others.

This leaves only the question of whether Russia will use the same methods again. Russia’s covert interventions have been only marginally successful in both goal areas. The intervention in Ukraine accomplished Putin’s goal to annex Crimea but resulted in significant economic hardship for the Russian people because the international community saw through Putin’s ruse. It is difficult to say if Russia’s covert tactics will be more successful in the future, or if an optimal situation for their use will ever present itself. However, the reduced costs if the tactics are successful, if a geopolitical goal could be achieved without other nations discovering Russian involvement, are too rewarding for Russia to intervene without attempting covert methods. The chances of Red Dawn Russian intervention in the future are very slim but listening to what Russia says will be critical to determine their next move.
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TRIADIC DETERRENCE AND THE ROLE OF HOST-STATE AFFINITY

Ben Shaver

Abstract

One of the most common conflicts present in the world today involves a state, a non-state actor, and a state supporting that non-state actor. In such cases, triadic deterrence, the application of threats or punishments to deter another state from providing support to a non-state actor, can be utilized. In this paper, I will argue that host-state affinity, which is defined as the level of affinity the state providing support to the non-state actor has for the non-state actor, plays a critical role in the effectiveness of the application of triadic deterrence. In cases where the host state has a high degree of affinity for the non-state actor, it is less likely to acquiesce to the threats from the state that is being targeted by the non-state actor, or target state. Alternatively, when the host state has a low degree of affinity for the non-state actor, it will be more likely to submit to the threats of the target state. To accomplish this, an extensive form model of triadic deterrence will be developed to model the interactions between the target state and host state. The payoff functions of the model will then be applied to three cases, the United States invasion of Afghanistan, the India-Pakistan border standoff in 2001, and Israeli raids in Egypt from 1948-1956. The development of the model and its application to the cases will show support for the hypothesis, leading to the conclusion that host-state affinity does play a critical role in the effectiveness of the application of triadic deterrence.

Introduction

In a world plagued by asymmetric conflicts, some of the most common involve a state, a non-state actor, and a state providing support to the non-state actor. Such relationships offer the opportunity for the application of the logic of deterrence. In such cases, the state being targeted by the non-state

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actor may employ triadic deterrence, which is the application of threats or punishments to deter another state from supporting a non-state actor (Atzili and Pearlman 2012).

The critical analysis of triadic deterrence begs the question, “under what circumstances will triadic deterrence succeed?” This analysis argues that triadic deterrence is more likely to succeed when the host state, the state from which a non-state actor is launching an attack, has a low affinity for the non-state actor. This is because the host state’s cost of abandoning the non-state actor will be lower than the cost of being punished by the state the non-state actor is targeting. Alternatively, when the host state has a high level of affinity for the non-state actor, it will be more likely to stand up to threats from the target state because the cost of abandoning the non-state actor will be higher than the cost of being punished by the state that non-state actor is targeting.

To test this hypothesis, a game theoretic model of triadic deterrence is developed and applied to three cases: the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001; the border standoff between India and Pakistan following the 2001 Indian Parliament attacks; and Israeli raids in Egypt from 1948-1956. These cases were selected because they differ in the effectiveness of the application of triadic deterrence, as well as in the level of affinity the host state had for the non-state actor involved. They also differ in the actors involved. By applying the model to the cases, its validity can be assessed.

This paper proceeds in four sections. The first section reviews the scholarly literature on this topic, revealing gaps that can be filled by further study. The second section develops a game theoretic model of triadic deterrence that focuses on the role of host-state affinity for the non-state actor. The third section applies the model to the cases to assess its validity. The final section summarizes the results of the preceding sections and makes policy recommendations.

Through development of the model and its application to the cases, it becomes clear that the host-state’s affinity for the non-state actor plays a critical role in determining the effectiveness of triadic deterrence. When the host state’s affinity for the non-state actor is so high that the cost of suppressing the non-state actors is higher than the cost of being punished by the target, the host state will not suppress the non-state actor.

Literature Review

The topic of triadic deterrence, a subset of complex deterrence, has been explored to a relatively small degree within the otherwise extensive
deterrence literature. In the absence of a wealth of literature on the topic, a review of the scholarship associated with this project will synthesize the literature related to three questions: whether deterrence of non-state actors is possible, whether a model of triadic deterrence differs from a model of conventional deterrence, and what factors impact the effectiveness of triadic deterrence.

Deterrence is the process of discouraging “the enemy from taking military action by posing for him the prospect of cost and risk outweighing his prospective gain” (Snyder 1961, 14-16). This concept came to prominence during the Cold War, when it was applied to the strategic interactions between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Since the end of the Cold War, two schools of thought have emerged on whether the logic of deterrence can be applied to conflicts beyond those between two great powers (Davis 2012, 67). Some scholars have concluded that with the end of the Cold War, the utility of deterrence disappeared (Freedman 2004, 1). Other scholars believe by altering the paradigm of conventional deterrence, a new style of “complex deterrence” can be developed that addresses the types of conflicts that the world faces today (Bowen 2004, 55). Within this school of thought, five different types of complex deterrence are identified: great power deterrence; deterrence among new nuclear states; deterrence among states with weapons of mass destruction outside of just nuclear weapons; deterrence by collective actors; and deterrence among states and non-state actors (Paul 2009, 1-27).

The application of complex deterrence as it relates to non-state actors, the focus of this analysis, is a contentious in the scholarly discourse. Some scholars argue that deterrence cannot be applied to conflicts with violent non-state actors, while others argue that it is applicable. Those who argue that it cannot be applied, point to fundamental characteristics of violent non-state actors, such as their small size, secretive nature, and lack of obvious “return address,” all of which would make application of the traditional concept of deterrence challenging to apply (Betts 2002, 31). To apply deterrence, credible threats must be made. However, it proves challenging to issue a credible threat without certainty about where the non-state actor is.

Critics also question whether violent non-state actors are rational enough to be deterred (Lowther 2012, 2). Particularly worrisome to these scholars is that many violent non-state actors are willing to die for their cause, radically changing the cost-benefit analysis that is so critical to the successful application of deterrence (Stein 2012, 49). In a strategic culture that glorifies martyrdom, it is challenging to issue a threat that will alter the cost-benefit calculations of a non-state actor enough to deter them. Finally, critics of the application of deterrence to non-state actors argue that the theory of deterrence runs directly contrary to the typical
strategies employed to counter violent non-state actors. When a state chooses to exercise deterrence, it is in effect signaling that it is willing to coexist with the actor it is threatening if the actor doesn’t attack them (Crenshaw 2013, 43). Is this the message that states want to send to violent non-state actors? Usually, the goal of strategies states employ to combat violent non-state actors is to destroy them completely (Stein 2012, 50). This makes the application of deterrence counterintuitive to typical strategies to combat violent non-state actors. This gap between theory and strategy is challenging to overcome.

Those who argue that violent non-state actors can be deterred recognize many of the same points that those who argue against the application of deterrence towards non-state actors raise. However, they argue that it is still possible to apply deterrence to interactions with non-state actors. One point raised within this school of thought is the difference between deterring a violent non-state organization, and deterring an individual acting on behalf of a non-state organization (Stein 2012, 50). While it is true that the mindset of an individual actor within a non-state group may make him or her challenging to deter, non-state organizations make similar rational cost-benefit calculations to those a state does. If they are threatened, they can be deterred from attacking (Crenshaw 2013, 43). Similarly, although the tactics of non-state actors might seem extreme, the surfeit of scholars agree that they are still rational actors. The individual who kills themselves in a suicide attack might not seem to be acting rationally, but the leader who ordered the attack did so after making a strategic calculation (Stein 2012, 49).

In his article, Terrorism and the Fourth Wave in Deterrence Research, which is an overview of different arguments researched within the emerging fourth wave of deterrence that is concerned with “new” threats, Jeffrey W. Knopf concludes that despite criticisms, there is widespread consensus among scholars that an altered form of deterrence can play a role in countering non-state actors (Knopf 2012, 37). Indirect deterrence, which is attempting to influence a state that has the ability to affect the likelihood of a non-state actor carrying out an attack, is an example of an altered form of deterrence that could be applied to non-state actors.

Indirect deterrence is only thoroughly explored in a small number of papers, and triadic deterrence, a specific type of indirect deterrence is explored in even fewer (Lupovici 2003). However, the concepts are referenced in some capacity in the works of a surfeit of scholars, including those of Amir Lupovici, Paul K. Davis, Alexander George, Boaz Atzili, and Wendy Pearlman (Lupovici 2003, Davis 2012, George 2003, Atzili and Pearlman 2012). The consensus of the scholarship is that by threatening or punishing a state, it is possible to coerce it into deterring a violent non-state organization from aiding a non-state actor (Knopf
Indirect deterrence can be used to combat a wide variety of aid a state might provide a non-state actor, whereas triadic deterrence specifically focuses on the ability of a non-state actor to launch attacks from the territory of a state. Triadic and indirect deterrence circumvent many of the issues raised by those who criticize the application of deterrence to combat non-state actors by resorting to state-to-state deterrence, a concept known to work, as opposed to state-to-actor deterrence (Knopf 2012, 23). Violent non-state actors usually depend on state support; either direct support, such as providing finances, weapons, or security; or indirect support, like allowing a non-state actor to live within borders. By targeting this support, a non-state actor becomes deterrable (Davis 2012, 68).

Does triadic deterrence differ substantially from traditional deterrence? The question is partially answered by the difference between compellence and deterrence. The aim of deterrence is to “preserve the status quo [or] to prevent a real or potential adversary from initiating a course of action” (Bowen 2004, 58). This differs from the definition of compellence, which is an attempt to alter the status quo (Bowen 2004, 58). Triadic deterrence differs from traditional deterrence because it blends these two concepts into one concept rather than relying on one (Atzili and Pearlman 2012, 304). A state that has been attacked by a violent non-state actor must compel the state providing support to the non-state actor to alter their status quo of support, and in turn the state must then deter the non-state actor from attacking. The incorporation of compellence additionally makes triadic deterrence challenging to successfully apply because compellence is deemed to be more challenging to achieve than deterrence (Schelling 1960, 27). Triadic deterrence also differs from conventional deterrence in that it is a two-level game; negotiations must take place at the international level, between the two states, and at the intra-national level, between the state and the non-state actor (Atzili and Pearlman 2012, 305). This combination of symmetric and asymmetric bargaining presents a radically different style of deterrence than traditional deterrence. The stark differences between triadic deterrence and traditional deterrence demonstrate the need for an effective analysis of the model of triadic deterrence.

The Model

To capture the strategic dynamics of the triadic deterrence dilemma, the model developed in this paper will have the following characteristics. First, the results of an attempt by the host state to suppress the non-state actor will be probabilistic, which is to say that no actor is sure of the outcome of an event until the event occurs. This will be indicated by a move by nature in the model. Second, the host state and target state will make decisions with perfect information. While
perfect information does not reflect reality where actors cannot be sure what decisions other actors will make, it will be assumed for this model because the research question does not relate to the role of information in triadic deterrence.

Additionally, it is necessary to define the term “affinity.” Within the context of this paper, affinity refers to a combination of the host state’s support for the goals of the non-state actor, which often comes in the form of logistical or financial support, and the level of kinship the host state feels for the non-state actor. The host state will have “high” or “low” affinity for the non-state actor, determined by analyzing the level of support the host state provides the non-state actor, quotes from the leaders of the host state about the relationship between the host state and the non-state actor, and the similarity of the host state and non-state actor’s expressed goals.

**Basic Setup**

The game in question (Figure 1) is an extensive form game played by two players; a target state (TS), that has been attacked by a non-state actor (NS); and a host state (HS), that is assumed to be providing NS with support. This support ranges from indirect support, allowing the NS to attack from their land; to direct support, providing NS with weapons, training or financial aid.

![Figure 1: Model of Triadic Deterrence](image)
The game begins with an attack by NS on TS. TS then has the choice to either threaten HS with punishment or not. If TS chooses not to threaten HS with punishment, then the sequence of moves ends. If TS does threaten HS, then HS has the choice to suppress attacks by NS or not. The decision by HS whether to suppress or not is closely related to the level of affinity HS has for NS. If HS chooses not to try and suppress NS, then TS has the choice to punish HS or not, with either choice ending the game. If HS chooses to try and suppress NS’s attacks, a move will be made by nature (N), and HS’s attempt will be successful with probability $p(\alpha)$ and fail with probability $(1-p(\alpha))$, where $p(\alpha)$, is determined by the regime strength of HS (either low or high). If the attempt to suppress attacks by NS is successful, then the game ends. If the attempt fails, then TS has the choice to punish HS or not, with either choice ending the game.

**Payoff Functions**

The target state’s payoffs (Appendix A) reflect the fact that its main objective is to prevent further attacks by the non-state actor. Secondarily, the state is concerned with the cost of punishing the host state, which can be assumed to entail using military force, and the cost to its reputation if it issues a threat that it later does not act on. As a result, the target state faces costs; $t$, the cost of being targeted in attacks by the non-state actor; $c$, the cost of launching a military attack to punish the host state; and $r$, the cost to its reputation if it doesn’t make good on a previously issued threat.

The host state’s payoff function (Appendix A) reflects the fact that its main objective differs depending on the level of affinity it has for the non-state actor. As a result, the host state faces two costs; $j$, the cost of being punished by the target state; and $a$, the cost of having to suppress a group that the host state has some degree of affinity for. The cost of suppressing the non-state actor is directly related to the level of affinity that the host state has for the non-state actor. As such, as host-state affinity increases, the cost of suppressing the non-state actor, $a$, also increases.

**Results**

The model of triadic deterrence can be solved for five equilibria. These equilibria were determined by finding the optimal behavior for the target state, then for the host state. Detailed solutions for each of the equilibria can be found in Appendix B. An abbreviated version of the equilibria most relevant to the discussion of host-state affinity for the non-state actor is provided below, as well as
a range of equilibria (Figure 2).

Equilibria: $t + r > c > t$ for the Target State

When the cost of being targeted by the non-state actor and the reputational cost of not carrying out a threat (-t-r) is larger than the cost of carrying out punishments (-c), which is larger than the cost of being targeted by the non-state actor (-t), the target state will threaten at Node One, punish at Node Two, and not punish at Node Three. Knowing this, when the magnitude of the cost of being punished (-j) is larger than the magnitude of the cost of suppressing the non-state actor (-a), the optimal behavior for the host state is to suppress the non-state actor. Alternatively, when the magnitude of the cost of suppressing the non-state actor is larger than the magnitude of the cost of being punished, the host state’s optimal behavior is not to suppress the non-state actor.

Equilibria: $t + r > t > c$ for the Target State

When the cost of being targeted by the non-state actor and the reputational cost of not carrying out a threat (-t-r) is larger than cost of being targeted by the non-state actor (-t), which is larger than the cost of carrying out punishments (-c), the target state will threaten at Node One, punish at Node Two, and punish at Node Three. Knowing this, when the probability of successfully suppressing the non-state actor multiplied by the cost of being punished ($p(j) = Y$) is larger than the magnitude of the cost of suppressing the non-state actor (-a), the host state’s optimal behaviors is to try and suppress the non-state actor. Alternatively, when $-Y$ is smaller than $-a$, then the host state’s optimal behavior is to not suppress the non-state actor.
Cases

The following three cases: the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks; the standoff between India and Pakistan following the 2001 Indian Parliament attacks; and Israeli raids in Egypt from 1948-1956; give insight into the effectiveness of triadic deterrence. The success of the model’s application to the following cases will be assessed in its ability to accurately predict the results of the application of triadic deterrence equilibria of each actor’s pay off function.

U.S. Invasion of Afghanistan, 2001

In 1996, after forming a few years earlier to fight the Soviet Union, the Taliban, a Pashtun, fundamentalist Islamic group, seized Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. In doing so, they seized control of the country from President Burhanuddin Rabbani (Laub 2014). From 1996 to 2001, the Taliban led Afghanistan, controlling up to ninety percent of the country (Laub 2014). During this period, Al-Qaeda, which also was formed in part to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan, was forced out of Sudan and into Afghanistan, where they received safe haven and forged a close relationship with the Taliban (“Kashmir: Why India and Pakistan fight over it” 2016).

Following the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center by Al-Qaeda affiliates, President George W. Bush issued a statement calling for the Taliban to deliver the leaders of Al-Qaeda to the United States or share in their fate (Bush 2001). Initially, there was support for voluntarily turning Osama Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda’s founder, and other senior Al-Qaeda leaders over to the United States among the Supreme Council of the Islamic Clergy, a committee of Islamic clerics that the leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar, had assembled. Omar ultimately decided against acquiescing to the United States’ threats (Grenier 2015). When it became clear that the threats of punishment were not working, the United States began Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), launching airstrikes on Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in early October 2001. In addition to the airstrikes, the United States backed the Northern Alliance, a military front that had been fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan which included the ousted President Burhanuddin Rabbani, by contributing U.S. troops (“Timeline” 2017). Within a matter of weeks, the Taliban regime was overthrown.

The decisions made by the United States and the Taliban follow the decisions in model of triadic deterrence developed in this paper. The model’s pay off functions predict that in the face of threats by the United States, the Taliban would not acquiesce because the perceived cost of suppressing Al-Qaeda is higher
than the cost of being punished by the United States, which is what occurred.

The Taliban’s high degree of affinity for Al-Qaeda is in part demonstrated by statements from Mullah Omar. In an interview with Voice of America following President Bush’s threat, Omar stated, “Islam says that when a Muslim asks for shelter, give the shelter and never hand him over to enemy. And our Afghan tradition says that, even if your enemy asks for shelter, forgive him and give him shelter. Osama has helped the jihad in Afghanistan, he was with us in bad days and I am not going to give him to anyone” (Bergen 2015). In an interview with Rahimullah Yusufzai, a Pakistani journalist, Omar explained further, “I don’t want to go down in history as someone who betrayed his guest. I am willing to give my life, my regime. Since we have given [Osama bin Laden] refuge I cannot throw him out now” (Bergen 2015). These quotes indicate the high degree of affinity the Taliban had for Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. The cost of being attacked was outweighed by the cost of turning on Al-Qaeda.

Another indicator of the Taliban’s affinity for Al-Qaeda was the exchange of financial support between Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Prior to the September 11 attacks, Al-Qaeda’s greatest single expense was support for the Taliban, provided in return for the safe-haven Al-Qaeda received in Afghanistan, amounting to about $20 million a year (Roth 2004). This support was critical to the Taliban’s operations, and they would not have wanted to place it in jeopardy by turning the leaders of Al-Qaeda over to the United States. The financial support Al-Qaeda provided the Taliban and the level of kinship the Taliban and Al-Qaeda resulted in the high degree of affinity the Taliban had for Al-Qaeda. As a result, the cost of a potential attack by the United States was lower than the cost of attempting to suppress Al-Qaeda. Because of this, the Taliban refused to acquiesce to the United States’ threats, which the United States was prepared to carry out, leading to the United States invasion of Afghanistan.

India-Pakistan Standoff, 2001-2001

On December 13, 2001, the Indian Parliament was attacked by five armed men who managed to murder seven people before they were killed (The Times of India 2016). Shortly after the attacks, the Indian government blamed the attacks on Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM); two Kashmiri-separatist, jihadi organizations that were covertly supported by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency. The Indian government then demanded that the Pakistani government stop the activities of LeT and JeM, apprehend the leaders of the organizations, and cease their financial support for organizations (Rediff 2001).
Following their threats, the Indian military mobilized troops along the India-Pakistan border, including three armored divisions, around five hundred thousand soldiers, and nuclear capable missiles; Pakistan responded in kind, deploying three hundred thousand soldiers along the same border (Wolfinbarger, Drake, and Ashcroft 2015). Initially, India’s threats appeared to work. In January 2001, the President of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf, announced, among other things, that five jihadi groups including LeT and JeM were banned in Pakistan and to hand over the perpetrators of the attack (Coll 2006). India’s leaders were surprised by the speech, although they were unsure if Musharraf was sincere. Eventually, the Indian Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, ultimately decided there would not be an attack (Coll 2006).

However, five months later, while both countries troops were still mobilized, another terrorist attack occurred. This attack, which targeted an Army garrison, led to the deaths of more than thirty people and injured fifty more, including the wives and children of soldiers at the garrison (Wolfinbarger, Drake, and Ashcroft 2015). In addition to the attack, it became clear that Musharraf had not followed up on his speech, refusing to extradite any terrorist leaders to India, allowing JeM to continue to operate as a charity, and letting the leader of JeM, Maulana Masood Azhar, out of prison. The realization that the threats had not been successful led to increased tensions between the two countries, culminating in cross-border shelling and small arms exchanges resulting in deaths on both sides (Kalyanaraman 2008, 26). Ultimately, with the help of the United States, a diplomatic solution was reached that deescalated the situation. However, while LeT and JeM are formally banned in Pakistan, they continue to exist and are believed to still be supported by the ISI (“Lashkar-e-Taiba” 2017).

The decision model of triadic deterrence accurately explains why India was unsuccessful in applying triadic deterrence. The model predicts that Pakistan would not submit to India’s threats because of the high degrees of affinity they had JeM and Let. It also predicts that the India would not carry out their threat because of the high cost to them for doing so. Both of these predictions accurately portray what occurred in 2001.

The Pakistani government’s high affinity for JeM and LeT is demonstrated partially by the similarities in the goals of LeT, JeM, and the Pakistani government. Since the partition of India, India and Pakistan have been in conflict over the status of Kashmir (“Kashmir: Why India and Pakistan fight over it” 2016). The government of Pakistan and the Kashmiri separatist groups want Kashmir to be reunited with Pakistan, and the leaders of Pakistan have used Kashmiri separatist groups such as LeT and JeM to advance their goals in India to give themselves plausible deniability. Since their inception, JeM and LeT have received financial
support and training from the ISI in advancement of their goal of pressuring the Indian government to negotiate over Kashmir (Burke 2010).

This high degree of affinity played a large role in the Pakistani government’s decision not to acquiesce to the Indian government’s threats. An interesting parallel is presented by the United States’ threats to the Pakistani government over their support of the Taliban. Following the September 11 attacks, the United States threatened to bomb Pakistan “back to the Stone Age,” if they did not cease their support of the Taliban (Reuters 2006). The threat worked more effectively than the Indian government’s threat. This was likely in part because the Pakistani government did not have the same degree of affinity for the Taliban that they did for LeT and JeM.

This case also demonstrates the veracity’s projection of what occurs when the target state’s cost of carrying out a threat is higher than the cost of being targeted by the non-state actor. India and Pakistan are both nuclear states, and the mobilization of troops on their border could have easily resulted in an exchange of nuclear weapons (Coll 2006). While there was some shelling and small-weapons exchanges, any further escalation of tensions could have led to Indian absorbing the costs of a nuclear attack, which would have been far more costly than the cost of future LeT and JeM attacks, which is why they chose not to carry out their threats.

*Israeli Raids in Egypt, 1948-1956*

During the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, two hundred thousand Palestinians settled in the Gaza Strip, which ultimately came under the control of the Egyptian government as a result of the Israel-Egypt Armistice Agreement (Atzili and Pearlman 2012; “Israel War of Independence” n.d.). Following the end of the war, Palestinians from the Gaza Strip would slip across the border into Israel. Some would do so for innocuous reasons, such as to visit family members or to cultivate their former fields; while others did to carry out attacks on Israelis. As time passed, more of the Palestinians were crossing the border to carry out attacks on the Israelis, leading to the deaths of fifty to one hundred and fifty Israelis each year from 1949-1956 (Morris 1993).

In response to the Palestinian attacks, the Israeli government issued threats in public and privately through diplomatic channels (Morris 1993). These threats made it clear that they would punish the Egyptians for the actions of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. When the attacks continued, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) carried out raids in Egypt, killing Egyptians and Palestinians (Morris 1993). The raids were effective in compelling the Egyptian government to institute measures to counteract the border incursions, such as arresting border infiltrators.
and pressuring village leaders to reveal the names of those who were carrying out the raids (Morris 1993). However, the Egyptian regime strength was very low and as a result, their attempts to suppress the Palestinians were unsuccessful. As a result, the Palestinians continued to carry out border incursions, and the Israelis continued to punish the Egyptians through violent raids.

This case further demonstrates the validity of the triadic deterrence model, and the role that affinity plays in it. The model’s pay-off functions predict that Egypt would submit to Israel’s threats because they had a low affinity for the Palestinians, which is what occurred.

From 1949-1956, the Egyptians did not have a high affinity for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, and as a result attempted to prevent the Palestinians from carrying out attacks rather than suffer punishments from Israeli raids. Compared to the previous cases, the Egyptian government did not provide the Palestinians with overt support, nor did they have the same goals as the Palestinians (Atzili and Pearlman 2012). For the Egyptians, the cost of the continued raids by the Israelis was higher than the cost of suppressing the Palestinians, which is why they tried to prevent the Palestinians from completing attacks. However, this case also demonstrates the vital role that the regime strength of the host state plays in the effectiveness of triadic deterrence. The weakness of the Egyptian regime translated into the inability to effectively implement policy, or to try and implement policy at all. While the Israeli threats were effective in convincing the Egyptians to alter their behavior, the Egyptians were incapable of effectively suppressing the Palestinians, which led to a continued cycle of Palestinian and Egyptian raids.

Conclusion

This paper demonstrates the fundamental role that a host state’s affinity for the non-state actor plays in the effectiveness of the application of triadic deterrence. Through the development of a game theoretic model, this paper makes clear that as the cost of suppressing the non-state actor for the host state rises compared to the cost of being punished by the target states, the effectiveness of triadic deterrence decreases. The increase in the cost of suppressing the non-state actor occurs as a result of an increase in the level of affinity the host state has for the non-state actor. This paper then verifies the validity of the model by applying it two three cases in which the actors make the decisions that the model predicted. Second, the model demonstrates that when the cost for the target state of carrying out their threat is larger than the cost of being targeted by the non-state actor, they will choose not to carry out their threat.

To arrive at a definitive conclusion would require more than the analysis
of three cases, the results of this analysis indicate that states which are targeted by non-state actors need to examine alternative strategies than triadic deterrence when the host state in question has a high degree of affinity for the non-state actor. In such cases, triadic deterrence is unlikely to be successful, and will result in sub-optimal outcomes for each of the actors involved. To arrive at definitive policy recommendations, further study of this topic is required that examines more than three cases.

Appendix A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Costs Key</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TS</td>
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<tr>
<td>HS</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Node</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
<th>TS Cost</th>
<th>HS Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>TS doesn’t threaten</td>
<td>i</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>TS threatens, HS chooses not to prevent, TS doesn’t carry out punishment</td>
<td>i, r</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>TS threatens, HS chooses not to prevent, TS carries out punishment</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>j</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>TS threatens, HS tries to prevent and fails, TS doesn’t carry out punishment</td>
<td>i</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>TS threatens, HS tries to prevent and fails, TS carries out punishment</td>
<td>c</td>
<td>i, a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>TS threats, HS tries to prevent and succeeds</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Appendix B

*Equilibrium: c > t + r > t for the Target State*

When the cost of carrying out punishments (-c) is larger than the cost of being targeted by the non-state actor and the reputational cost of not carrying out a threat (-t-r), which is larger than the cost of being targeted by the non-state actor (-t), the target state will choose the following optimal behaviors:

1. Node One- Target state at null: No threat
2. Node Two- Target state at no suppression: No punishment
3. Node Three- Target state at failed suppression by the host state: No punishment

Knowing the target state will not carry out the punishment the host state will choose the following optimal behavior:

4. Node Four- Host state at threat: No suppression

*Equilibria: t + r > c > t for the Target State*
When the cost of being targeted by the non-state actor and the reputational cost of not carrying out a threat (-t-r) is larger than the cost of carrying out punishments (-c), which is larger than the cost of being targeted by the non-state actor (-t), the target state will choose the following optimal behaviors:

1. Node One- Target state at null: Threat
2. Node Two- Target state at no suppression: Punishment
3. Node Three- Target state at failed suppression by the host state: No punishment

Knowing that the target state will carry out their threat at Node Two and will not carry out their threat at Node Three, the host state will suppress the non-state actor if:

\[ p(-a) + (1-p)(-a) \geq -j \]
\[ -pa + pa - a \geq -j \]
\[ -a \geq -j \]
\[ a \leq j \]

When the magnitude of the cost of being punished is larger than the magnitude of the cost of suppressing the non-state actor, the non-state actor will choose the following optimal behavior:

4. Node Four- Host state at threat: Suppress

When the magnitude of the cost of being punished is smaller than the magnitude of the cost suppressing the non-state actor, the non-state actor will choose the following optimal behavior:

5. Node Four- Host state at threat: No suppression

\textit{Equilibria: t + r > t > c for the Target State}

When the cost of being targeted by the non-state actor and the reputational cost of not carrying out a threat (-t-r) is larger than the cost of being targeted by the non-state actor (-t), which is larger than the cost of carrying out punishments (-c), the target state will choose the following optimal behaviors:

1. Node One- Target state at null: Threat
2. Node Two- Target state at no suppression: Punishment
3. Node Three- Target state at failed suppression by the host state: Punishment

Knowing that the target state will carry out their threat at Node Two and Node Three, the host state will suppress the non-state actor if
When the magnitude of the cost of the probability of being punished is larger than the magnitude of the cost of suppressing the non-state actor, the non-state actor will choose the following optimal behavior:

4. Node Four- Host state at threat: Suppress

When the magnitude of the cost of the probability of being punished is smaller than the magnitude of the cost of suppressing the non-state actor, the non-state actor will choose the following optimal behavior:

5. Node Four- Host state at threat: No suppression

Works Cited


GENDER AND RADICALIZATION: 
THE CONVERSION AND RECRUITMENT OF 
WESTERN WOMEN TO RADICAL VIOLENCE

Hannah Goda

Abstract

The rise of violent radical Islamic groups in the Middle East has provoked immense global fear within the past ten years. This panic has been elevated by an increase in the publication of stories of women from western nations such as the United States, Canada, Belgium, and France being recruited and radicalized by such organizations. Conventionally, research on this topic has focused on the motives these women may have in becoming radicalized. However, in this article, I argue that the seemingly inexplicable occurrence of converted and radicalized western women garners such a strong reaction due to a gendered lens regarding violent radical groups, women from western nations, and the construct and surrounding assumptions of masculinity. I will be utilizing transcripts of interviews with the radicalized parties, previous bodies of research on female radical combatants with ties to Europe and North America, and two Northern American states’ government research reports. Further research should critically examine Western females recruited to extremism through a feminist lens, and evaluate more specifically what attracts females to jihad.

Introduction

Alex, a 23-year old Sunday School teacher from rural Washington State met her recruiters on Twitter (Callimachi 2015). One of an estimated 4,000 westerners who converted to Islam and traveled to join jihadists (Willmot 2016) in Syria or Iraq, her story was sensationalized in an extensive New York Times article. Pictures of Alex sitting on a stool in the middle of her grey living room are surrounded by statements of how at home she felt with the radicals who targeted her loneliness and even direct quotes of what they would discuss with her over Skype. It seems impossible, that a girl like Alex
who was raised in the United States and chose a bible verse about Jesus for her high school yearbook quote, would convert so quickly to extremism. And her story isn’t unique (Sanchez 2014).

Groups like ISIL (Willmot 2016) and other violent extremist Islamic groups in the Middle East have grown as threats to Europe and American states such as the U.S. and Canada for years. Their growth has been analyzed and picked apart from all views and theories to the point where the term ‘radical terrorism’ has lost its initial impact. But one aspect that never fails to shock the public is the way that these radicals are able to convert women from countries like Canada, France, Belgium, and the United States. Of the hundreds and hundreds of radicalized people from Europe and North America, over 550 Western women have been radicalized as of 2015 (Neumann 2015). More specific numbers are unavailable, as Western nations hesitate to publish clear counts and demographics. Estimates of the male versus female breakdown range from 20% female to 13% female, and although there is no confirmed answer, 550 stands alone as a large enough number to incite concern and investigation. The radicalization of these western women has been painted as a recent international phenomenon (Willmot 2016). The question remains: why would women leave their homes to join a group known for its mistreatment of women?

The radicalization of western women¹ has been sensationalized to the point that the research surrounding this issue is no longer providing an accurate assessment of the situation because it has been conducted through a gendered lens which prevents a correct understanding of women and their motives. By putting women in constructs that do not exist, research is incorrectly reporting why online news sources² are so often covering stories of women leaving their homes to align with groups like ISIL. I will address my qualitative methodology and then summarize the current body of research before applying a feminist³ lens and re-examining the circulating theories to

1 This term will be used in this paper to refer to women from European nations, Canada, and the United States.

2 Online news sources can have limited reliability, but I believe that using them as an entry point is the step forward that this topic needs in its research. It is important to work within these limitations to further the knowledge on this topic.

3 Ashley Crossman, “Feminist Theory,” Thoughtco. (2017). Feminist theory is a major branch of theory within sociology that is distinctive for how its creators shift their analytic lens, assumptions, and topical focus away from the male viewpoint and experience. In doing so, feminist theory shines a light on social problems, trends, and issues that are otherwise overlooked or misidentified by the historically dominant male perspective within social theory.
see what ideas still hold true.

**Literature Review**

Before explaining how my research will add to the existing body of research on this complex issue, we must first understand what schools of thought already exist to explain the sensation of radicalized western women. One important thing to note is that while there is a great deal of dialogue surrounding the motives that these women have in aligning with violent radical groups, social media has recently come to light as one of the more practical ways that western women have been able to connect with radicalized groups and join them halfway across the world. Each of these schools of thought tie in social media as a recruitment tool to the Islamic groups. These ideas contain flaws and strengths that my own research will be able to address in a deeper way. In this literature review, I will be addressing the three main schools of thought that are currently circulated to explain why and how western women are being radicalized: grievance, narrative, and mobilization. Then I will discuss what a gendered lens is, how it has been previously applied to this area of international studies, and why it is essential to consider in this paper.

More women than are publicly documented engage in some way with radical Islamist groups via the internet and personal connections - even if they do not physically join the group (Hunter 2011). The catch is that most of these women will sever the connection or conversation at one point or another. They will either learn more and more about these groups until they find something that they disagree with, or are simply not committed to taking the giant leap of actually moving across the globe to serve these groups. The radicalization process has a unique timeline for each person that undergoes it; it can last years, or simply a few weeks (Hunter 2011). However, concerning few women that do actually become radicalized, there are several theories as to what their motives may be.

**Grievance**

The first school of thought is grievance. Grievance claims that “discontent seems to serve as the prerequisite of the radicalization process. Issues driving this attitude toward individuals in the West may include perceived persecution of Muslims throughout the world; a sense of uprootedness, alienation, or lack of acceptance; feelings of discrimination, especially among second- or third-generation immigrants; or a general search for identity” (Hunter 2011). Feelings of being left out or marginalized can feed into anger and resentment to non-Muslims,
pushing women into lives they may not choose otherwise. One article, written by the New York Times in 2015 tells the story of a young woman who converted from Christianity to Islam after coming into contact with several radicalized men and women from across the globe (Callimachi 2015). Slowly but surely she grew into the habit of staying up to talk with them overnight, calling them ‘brother’ and ‘sister’, writing letters, and receiving packages to her home full of propaganda. These letters were written with comforting words to this young woman, known by the pseudonym ‘Alex.’ Living with her grandparents in “the middle of nowhere,” (Callimachi 2015) dropping out of school, and becoming distant from her own Presbyterian church led her towards ISIL as a refuge. She said that she was shocked at how kind and polite the members of ISIL were in talking to her and answering questions about Islam. By explaining their own grievances with how the news was portraying ISIL, these recruiters were able to create a spirit of grievance within herself that pushed her towards radicalization. In a briefing presented before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States House of Representation, Sasha Havlicek reiterates this idea. The top three reasons that women have reported as their ‘drivers’ towards radical Islamic groups are:

1) Feeling isolated socially and/or culturally, including questioning their own identity and belonging to a Western culture;
2) Feeling that the international Muslim community or the ‘ummah’ is being violently persecuted; and
3) Resentment over the lack of international action in response to this persecution. (Havlicek 2015)

These ideas are precisely what the Grievance school of thought believes: that isolation, the feeling and belief of real persecution occurring, and resentment are pushing western women to radicalization. This school of thought has proven itself publicly in the case of the New York Times article about the American woman but has also been carried out across Europe and other North American states without a news article being written. In addition, Grievance explains how, should a western woman feel sympathy towards these groups as opposed to anger or terror, they would be more open to joining the group or at least having conversations with the recruiters.

**Narrative**

Second is ideology or narrative. Narrative provides a woman who feels a lack of purpose in her own life to find one within jihadist groups. Just like the title suggests, it creates a new storyline or plot for the targeted female.
The core significance of this ideological framing component should not be sought on the basis of its content, but because it provides followers (true believers) with an idea of their “true purpose” and sense of belonging to a transnational community. By accepting this highly polarized worldview and its narrow set of rules, the uncertain individual searching for meaning receives simple answers, as well as a comprehensive framework of social and moral norms and values (Hunter 2011).

By creating a unique story and specific ideology for people who are not already physically within the radicalized group, groups like ISIL are creating further divisiveness, pulling these western women out of their communities and setting them apart. In a report published in early 2015, it is stated that as many as 550 women are claimed to have traveled - from Western Europe alone - to join the Islamic State (Al-Jezairyu 2015). Targeted primarily on social media, this school of thought claims that women are chosen based on how the narrative of ‘us versus them’ would be understood and accepted by the women.

The biggest challenge recruiters face when trying to entangle women is that of family ties. If women have strong family relationships, they are much harder to tear away, and therefore it is all the harder to portray the world as an ‘Islam vs. everyone else’ situation. The same article goes on to say, “many of these young women experience either a cultural or generational gap with their parents, something that can be exploited by online radicalization…” (Al-Jezairyu 2015). The recruiters are serving up a new ‘true purpose’ to these women, by defining the gap between them and their parents as a calling to Islam. This gap is not found as frequently in men, who are more likely to have a stronger sense of belonging and purpose in the traditional role as family breadwinner. This school of thought also includes the flat-out ideology of Islam as a selling point for a young woman to join ISIL. E-International Relations writes,

While Western ISIS women in Syria must know by now about the Islamic State’s views on the roles of wives and female slaves as expressed in the citation above, they do not mention this in their online posts. Instead, they glorify ISIS’s religious cause, the courage of jihadists and martyrs, and the responsibility of women to marry holy warriors and give birth to and educate future jihadists (Nacos 2015).

In some cases, the truth of how women are treated in the Islamic State is not even glossed over, but rather it is actually glorified. In some twisted way, women can be attracted to the narrative of how women ‘ought to be treated’ based
on radical Islamist ideas. If their belief in Islam is radical enough, they believe that the group’s treatment of women is inherently good, right, and true.

Grievance and narrative overlap in the sense that they both address how radical Islamic recruiters use isolation as their strongest technique in the seduction of these Western women. However, they argue that recruiters inject different views of their groups into their minds. Grievance argues for a pity vote for radicals, a misrepresentation vote, but narrative pulls upon the vulnerability of the loneliness of the victim. Many different background elements can contribute to this, including traumatic life experiences, identity problems, or extreme family tensions. When parties are struggling with these issues, the concept of a “shell identity” arises, meaning the complete commitment to a total radicalization and new identity in Islam (Willmot 2016). By targeting specific problems in the woman’s life, recruiters are providing a way out of painful situations as well as excuses for why these things occurred. If trauma is suffered within the family and the woman was unable to process it in a healthy way, it quickly becomes a blank for the radical groups to fill with their own stories.

Mobilization

The third school of thought is mobilization. Mobilization is explained by showing how radical groups are able to attract women because, through the easy access filter of social media, the Muslim mentors create a sense of identity and purpose (Hunter 2011). Similar to the narrative explanation, this idea says that women become radicalized as they become more and more isolated from their families and communities, but puts more emphasis on the large part social media plays in this endeavor. In a presentation written for the Western Political Science Association, Sergio Sanchez writes,

The Internet is, therefore, an ideal venue for women to interact with like-minded individuals or organizations without having to sacrifice or tarnish their standing in the community or among their families...the power of information is, therefore, leveling the playing field for women to join radical organizations that were previously unavailable or taboo but are now accessible virtually, from the comfort of one’s home, and anonymous (Sanchez 2014).

This school of thought argues that the reason western women specifically are being recruited at alarming rates is not because of some recent policy change or specific theory, but just that practically, women are more connected to other
‘sisters of faith’ than in previous years through heightened online accessibility to ISIL and similar radical groups. The desire to align with these groups is already inherent in their being, but now that they have the tools to actually follow through, they do. In an article for CNN, Jane Harman writes that we are used to believing that men have a monopoly of sorts on violent extremism because we only see men in the media being a part of these groups. However, she argues that women have always been a part of radical groups, just that the migration of international women to places like ISIL has become easier to achieve through social media. She summarizes in saying, “Though women’s involvement in terror seems to be on the rise, the tactic is old” (Harman 2014).

In a testimony to the United States Senate Committee on Homeland Security, Peter Bergen supports this statement by adding a new element: family ties. “Many have familial ties to jihadism. More than a third of Western fighters have a familial connection to jihad, whether through relatives who are also fighting in Syria and Iraq, through marriage or through some link to other jihads or terrorist attacks” (Bergen 2016). These women are not always random targets, large portions of them have ties with jihadism since birth, and social media is just the place that they reconnect. The easy access that social media and the internet provide to both jihadists and to western women hasn’t introduced women to radicalization because they have been there from the beginning. It has just made the path easier.

Finally, assessing this issue through a feminist lens is critical. Issues in international relations, especially ones pertaining to women and violence, have for far too long been analyzed through a strong male perspective which is damaging because it limits the research to a gendered perspective with specific roles for men and women. It is incredibly impeding to consider the women who are radicalized as victims of jihad, as they are just as much active parties in their conversion as their male counterparts. In many publications and common news sources, men are seen as the manipulators and dominant forces in the process of radicalization, which severely limits the scope by which effective research can be conducted on women’s radicalization (Willmot 2016). The current body of research surrounding the radicalization of western women has for too long portrayed them merely as weakened victims of this atrocity, and we must reject this theory in order to

4 Tricia Ruiz, “Feminist Theory and International Relations,” “Overall, feminist theory says that most of the key players in IR, such as diplomats, policymakers, heads of government, and academic professionals, have been, and still are, males who come from patriarchal social and political backgrounds. Thus, discussions within IR remain largely constrained by those who lack consideration of women’s roles in world politics (because they have not been trained to value and include the perspective of women).”
make real progress in understanding what makes western women susceptible to radicalization.

Little to no effective research has been conducted on the issue of female radicalization because of this gendered lens. Eva Herschinger, research associate and lecturer in the Department of Political Science at Bundeswehr University Munich emphasizes the need to use gender as an analytical tool for understanding, as opposed to a description of a factor. She writes, “conceptualizing gender as difference in sexes only continues to treat female violence as an indication of gender deviance, as a threat to the social order” (Herschinger 2014). If the only way we analyze radicalized Western women is through a sexist lens that reinforces gender roles, our focus will shift to the recruiters who are considered the dominant aggressor, and any leads to true answers will be lost. We must “challenge the myth of female peacefulness” by affirming the fact that these women are just as much active in their radicalization as the men who are undergoing the same process in the same country. We must change the way we look at gender, it must be not just as a classification of a person, but as a tool to better understand the role of women in terrorism. Questions like the one I pose have been addressed in research in the past, but are crippling limited in their results due to their assumption of women as the victim. Other questions that could benefit from this lens include how far female suicide bombers are able to push the boundaries of the power dynamics in their societies, how women as agents of death for organizations seem to counter proclaimed beliefs, and how terrorist organizations are legitimizing female violence and suppression (Herschinger 2014). If we acknowledge and expand our views, the effectiveness of the research will be reflected in our ability to protect our country.

**Methodology**

This article will utilize a qualitative method to analyze female radicalization. By focusing on the how and why of Western women recruited to radical groups, the research will focus on conversations between radicalized women and their recruiters, conclusions governmental bodies have drawn, and intelligence reports on demographics of radicalized women. This approach is necessary because the question of why Western women are radicalized is far more complex than a black and white answer. In addition to looking at the behaviors of these females, I will point to the feminist approach to international studies and underline the importance of this theory in analyzing such a gendered topic.

Before addressing the existing body of research, we must first understand the immense problem radicalized Western women pose. Although men are radicalized at a higher rate than women from Western nations, the idea that any
females would be radicalized is astounding. Women from other nations recruited to ISIL only make up 10% of the total radicalized Western population, “it is still significant that women are joining an organization that a majority of the world deems oppressive towards women and extraordinarily violent” (Roble 2015). It is far more confusing that a female would align with these radical groups than a male. Radical Islamic groups carry stricter gender roles than any Western country. “The functions reserved for women in jihadist groups are gendered: mother of future mujahideen (in the sense of fighters), wife of existing mujahideen” (Peresin & Cervone 2015). These gendered roles reinforce misogyny and maintain an inequality between men and women so powerfully that even the sexist roles conservative societies of the United States or Europe enforce do not compare.

Some scholars argue that we should be focusing our research on how to combat the majority of radicalized Westerners that are male rather than spending time on the minority that is female, however, I argue that this argument is flawed and dangerous. Extremist groups are able to recruit hundreds of Western women, a group that by all understanding is treated so violently and oppressively upon conversion. Men are given positions of power, women are suppressed. Still, women raised in areas of relative freedom are converting at extremely high rates. If radical Islamic groups are still capable of targeting and recruiting these females, who fully know their roles once they are converted, then the groups have reached an inexplicable height of dangerous power over Western nations.

Body

In order to understand why a gendered worldview is preventing an accurate assessment of this situation, a definition of gender must first be established. Gender differs from sex, which is the biological body each human is born with.

[Gender is a] social process producing differences and hierarchy between women and men, feminine and masculine. This historical, dynamic, cross-cutting process operates in all social spaces and combines with other power relations (based on class, race, age, etc.) to produce and reproduce social inequalities (Willmot 2016).

The concept of masculinity as an attitude of anger, strength, victory in combat, force, and power limits the understanding of why women are joining radical groups. To cut differences between men and women in such a black-and-white dry cut manner leads to many assumptions about male roles in jihad:
their gender label is tied to words like fighter, terrorist, violence. On the other hand, feminine attributes are the opposite: they are considered frail and weak, good to produce children but not naturally inclined to combat. In fact, to focus on radicalized women is to inherently examine the issue through a gendered lens. To separate the analysis of why women and men are radicalized and join violent extremist groups is only a beneficial process if there is concrete proof that men and women are radicalized at different rates, or if we choose to analyze the radicalization of women while keeping our own biases about gender as a filter for our research. To the former, there is no obvious or public difference. Newspapers, government publications, and reputable online publication sites that issue from North America and Europe offer no solid proof that men are substantially more likely to be radicalized, but instead focus on elaborate descriptions of a single story of a converted female.

The news does a disservice by focusing so heavily on radicalized women as opposed to equal reporting of men and women. Reading constantly and only about female combatants reinforces the idea that western women are being radicalized at alarming rates, and that there is some background issue that is causing such a huge issue in female people specifically. Readers are unable to address their own implicit gendered ideas because even common publications such as The New York Times in the United States, Le Journal de Montréal in Canada, and La Croix in France all reinforce these wrong and dangerous ideas about gender in their coverage. This is a disservice for two reasons: first that it promotes false ideas about the rates of radicalized women over history, and second by portraying women exclusively as victims contributing to the further separation of gender.

Women joining violent radical groups such as ISIL is not a new sensation. Women have been involved in and even leading violent movements all throughout history, “whether during the French Revolution, in extreme left-wing or right-wing movements, nationalist groups like the Tamil Tigers, or revolutionary groups like the FARC in Colombia” (Willmot 2016). Here, social media plays a role. By making conversations with radicalized parties overseas more accessible, the internet also makes these connections more public. There are transcripts available online of real-life conversations between young women in America and Europe and recruiters (both men and women) in the Middle East (Nacos 2015). This goes to disprove the third school of thought in the literature review. Mobilization states that most of these women have some aspect of jihad in their background, social media just makes it far more likely that they will leave their homes to align with these radical groups. However, history makes it plain that the internet is not a new platform for more connections, just a more public space for these conversations to occur. Discussions held on popular social media networks such as Skype, Tumblr,
Facebook, or Twitter cannot be truly erased. Various intelligence agencies in the United States can easily track them down to start investigations, and further down the line, the identities of these women are often released by the media. Mobilization is an inaccurate assessment of the growing number of radicalized western women.

In addition, by reporting so sensationally on the radicalization of women, the media reinforces dangerous and false stereotypes of women that seep into the consumer’s bias and prevent real research from developing a strong answer as to how and why western women are radicalized.

The current phenomenon of women involved with jihadist groups in Syria rarely escapes the interpretive grid by which radicalized young Western women become little more than stereotypes, naive, manipulated ... dependent on the men who have indoctrinated them. That approach reduces a complex phenomenon to a caricatural explanation, denying women any form of agency (Willmot 2016).

This romanticization of women is not a new fad by any means, it shows whenever you or I are more likely to click on a news article about the number of women injured by a bomb than an article covering the total body count. It shows when a photo of a woman with scars on her face is shared millions of times across social media networks but our idea of men with injuries is that ‘it just happens in war’ and that it is their nature to be scarred and tough. It is what we consume that cyclically reinforces the improper dramatization and romanticization of women especially in relation to violence and radical groups. When the radicalization of these women is sensationalized, society is becoming more and more unable to analyze this issue from the truly feminist viewpoint that would allow for an accurate understanding of their motives.

The main issue that we must confront before analyzing the current body of research surrounding this issue is the ideas and biases that many people from western nations such as Canada, the United States, France, Belgium, and other European nations carry with them. More specifically, why does the idea of a radical Islamic woman intrigue us? Putting aside our constructs of gender, many of us still come up lost as to why these women would leave their homes to go physically support and ally with these groups. When discussing my article with a friend, she told me that the main question that came to her mind was, “why would these women leave a home of privilege and freedom to join a group that would take away all of it?” This is a complex question, and while we must be very careful not to let our own biases as western men and women seep into our judgment of those who seek another sort of life, groups like ISIS have been known to be particularly
horrific to their women (Landay 2015). This provides the puzzle that researchers should frame their research around: what entices western women strongly enough to paint this life as appealing?

After acknowledging this gendered lens through which most scholarly research currently sees the issue of western women joining these radical groups, the current body of research must be analyzed to determine what schools of thought remain accurate in answering the question of why these specific women could be susceptible. If these theories apply to men as well as women, then they are not adequate to explain the radicalization of western women.

First, does the Grievance school of thought apply to men as well as women? Absolutely. Friction tells the complete story of a young boy named Andrei Zhelyabov whose grievances and bitterness toward those around him pushed him to such radical terrorism that he was executed at the age of 30 (McCauley 2011). Maajid Nawaz was radicalized at a young age, and now pens articles detailing how he believes that Islamist extremists use complaints as their strongest weapon to radicalization.

No matter how many grievances we address, and no matter how much effort we make to encourage inclusiveness, just like racists, Islamist ideologues will always seek to manipulate any complaint for the purpose of recruitment (Nawaz 2015).

So yes, Grievance is an accurate assessment of radicalization techniques, but it applies to men as well as women and as such is not a helpful concept in attempting to understand how women are particularly vulnerable to radical recruitment.

Narrative is the one school of thought regarding this topic that stands the gendered test. The stories presented to women are specific and targeted. Many radicalized women feel as though they have no place in their families due to traditional gender roles. These subdued roles as homemaker or mother do not apply to men who are given completely separate roles in the household in most of the western world. Therefore, it is easy to see where the recruiters are more easily able to take advantage of women and radicalize them with a new narrative.

**Critical Reflection**

My own identity has undoubtedly had a significant impression on my research. My qualities as a woman raised in a western culture facilitate my ability to do this research in that it allows me to empathize with, at least partly,
the mindset that most western women have towards these radical groups before their interaction with the recruiters. My mindset may also prove a hindrance to my research, as I inherently have a bias against these groups. It is difficult for me to wrap my mind around the way these groups treat women and as such, it may prove harder for me to genuinely be open-minded when discussing these women’s motives for becoming radicalized.

Besides the inherent bias I hold as a woman raised in the United States, through the course of this year I have realized what an innate gendered lens I view the world with. Coming into the first class I truly believed I understood feminism as it applied to world politics, and that my mindset would serve me well. However, through reading the assigned articles and continuing my own research I discovered just how deeply societies constructs of masculinity and assumptions about female combatants are ingrained in me. The idea that news stories that cover radicalized women are read far more times than any about male jihadists caught me off guard, because I of all people consume these articles at a much faster rate than others. Building women combatants up to such a sensation has caused me to confront my own ideas about what role gender plays in our analysis of international affairs. The constructs we box men in with, such as fierceness, power, strength, and brutality, are just as incorrect and damaging to our understanding of the world as the boxes of vulnerability, victimhood, and weakness that we put women into. Even our word choice, describing women with ‘feminine’ adjectives like ‘victim’ and ‘target’ insinuates a gendered view of the issue, preventing us from analyzing these women’s actions for what they truly are: women who have chosen to become violent extremist combatants.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, my research aims to not provide complete answers for why western women have been radicalized, but strives to draw attention to the pitfalls of current research and the gendered lens which prevents useful analysis of the complex issue. By looking at problems like radicalization with such large constructs of ‘masculinity’ and ‘femininity’ we are generalizing all women when in fact each female may have her own reasons for converting to violent jihad. On top of that, we are reinforcing the idea that in all situations, men are aggressors and women are victims, which is inhibiting our ability to research and ultimately understand why radicalized women make the choices they make. If we approach their decision strictly as a manipulated act, we are crippling the true rationalizations from surfacing.

Theories like Grievance, Narrative, and Mobilization may all be applicable
but it is not until we remove the gendered lens through which we are viewing the radicalization of western women that the truth about this phenomenon is visible. Grievance and Mobilization apply to both men and women and are therefore unhelpful in addressing why Western females are specifically vulnerable to extremist recruitment. The only school that stands the test of a feminist lens is Narrative, because the stories presented to women are specifically tailored to their femininity and the social constructs that surround their gender in their home countries and communities.

My research is not verified beyond correction, but instead, I seek to lay the groundwork so that research in the future can be a more accurate assessment of how the radicalization of western women is possible. The existing body of research is simply not enough to conclude a concrete answer for why Western females are vulnerable to radicalization. For example, we can see generally that lonely women are more vulnerable but loneliness does not automatically preface a tendency to violence. It should be confusing then that Western women are targeted for recruitment to these groups with a willingness to leave relative freedoms in their home countries. Granted, this research is difficult and complex as it varies greatly case by case, but this should not deter research from being conducted through a large enough lens to allow for a truly complete answer without the inherent bias of traditionally understood gender roles.

Scholars such as Ashley Crossman have pointed out how a lack of a feminist lens in international relations and terrorism studies can create barriers to effective research, which has clearly happened in our understanding of this issue. Without a truly feminist approach, the enigma of radicalized Western women will never be solved. Men are radicalized as well, but the gender roles enforced within groups like ISIL that divide men into combatants and leadership roles and degrade women to solely child bearers and suicide bombers must be taken into account. These women are aware of what sort of treatment they are signing up for, we must look more intensely at why they would agree to these terms if we truly desire to better understand terrorism and the unique threat it poses.

In conclusion, I acknowledge the limitations of my research. When I began my research, I believed there would be at least one concrete answer to my original question as to what made a Western female vulnerable to radical groups. However, as I conducted my research it became apparent that the distinct lack of feminist theory applied to radical Islam and violence has crippled the research surrounding this issue. Therefore, this article strives to not give an answer for why women choose to join these groups but instead draws attention to the unique danger radical Islam poses when it is able to successfully target the people it treats worse. There simply is no compact,singular answer for why Western women are radicalized,
because as of right now there is not enough feminist research surrounding the topic. This article aims to lay the groundwork for further research to be conducted on the radicalization of Western women, as this issue is not simple nor will it fade from public attention soon. Feminist research on the radicalization of Western females must be promoted if we are to continue to combat the increasing threat of radicalization.

Works Cited


PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS BEFORE WORLD WAR I I - RE-ENVISIONING THE “ESSENCE” OF SCHLESINGER’S IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY

Danielle Siegel

Abstract

An increasingly-powerful President in the realm of foreign relations has dominated modern scholarly discourse. The most dominant iteration of this sentiment is Schlesinger’s 1973 work The Imperial Presidency, in which he argues that the post-War American President has actively and routinely seized war powers that the Constitution reserves for Congress. Many scholars contend that his argument is insufficient in explaining why the Imperial Presidency persists—yet struggle to propose alternatives that do not rely on Schlesinger’s assumptions. This research seeks to identify new tools for evaluating the Imperial Presidency by conducting a historical comparative case study of scholarly discourse surrounding presidential war powers during the Civil War and World War I. The findings suggest that although history does not provide any fundamentally new frameworks through which to evaluate the Imperial Presidency, within existing frameworks a new strategy ought to be employed. It argues that instead of starting from Schlesinger’s assumption that the Imperial Presidency is a consequence of an imbalance between the constitutional war powers of Congress and the President, scholars ought to consider that the tensions within the dual military and civil roles of the President as outlined in the Constitution make the presidency uniquely vulnerable to increasingly accumulating power.

Introduction, Research Question, & Schlesinger in Modern Scholarship

The rise of presidential power in the United States has been such a consistently popular topic in scholarly discourse post-World War II that it is in many ways an ubiquitous truism. For a country with a political tradition that is so deeply steeped in rugged individualism and distrust of centralized
authority, it seems as if an increasingly-powerful President is a permanent—albeit troubling—fact of American political life—particularly in the realm of foreign relations. From Eisenhower in Korea to Johnson in Vietnam, Clinton in the Balkans to Obama in the Middle East, it is difficult to identify a modern President who has avoided accusations of acting as an “emperor” or a “king” in regards to his foreign policy (Boylan 1999, 233).

The most popular iteration of that sentiment is the “Imperial President”—a term coined by Arthur Schlesinger in his 1973 book The Imperial Presidency (Schlesinger 1973, Introduction). Writing in the wake of the volatile Johnson and Nixon administrations, Schlesinger “…argued that Watergate and the Vietnam War were not isolated aberrations but the long-building climaxes of rampant presidential power that had been set in the direction of abuse soon after the office commenced its operations in 1789” (Koenig 1981, 31). What is at stake for Schlesinger is an increase in the “appropriation by the Presidency…of powers reserved by the Constitution and by long historical practice to Congress” (Schlesinger 1973, Introduction). While he identifies historical periods in which this “appropriation” of Congressional powers ebbed and flowed, Schlesinger largely characterizes this trend as a gradual, steady, and linear progression with Nixon constituting the largest threat to “constitutional balance” and signifying the “point of no return.” (Schlesinger 1973, 206).

It is important to note that, although Schlesinger portrays the Imperial Presidency as a long-term trend in American political history, he emphasizes the post-World War II presidency as being particularly problematic (Schlesinger 1973, Introduction). He contends that it is not until Roosevelt, Truman, Johnson, and ultimately the Nixon administration that the “essence” of the Imperial Presidency finally took hold of the office—defining the “essence” as “the image of the President acting by himself in foreign affairs, imposing his own sense of reality and necessity on a waiting government and people” (Schlesinger 1973, Introduction). It is also critical to point out that Schlesinger relies heavily on post-WWII paradigms to explain the problem. He cites factors like “an increasingly interdependent economy and society” and the rise in frequency and nature of global crises as propellers of the ultimate “impetus” which drove the Imperial Presidency to this modern breaking point—“the capture by the Presidency of the most vital of national decisions, the decision to go to war” (Schlesinger 1973, Introduction).

Despite the relative novelty of Schlesinger’s approach and the urgency and immediacy with which he made this argument in 1973, by the late 1970s the notion of an all-powerful President in the realm of war was already being treated as an intellectual truism. Writing in 1977, political scientist Alan F. Arcui claims that “Terms like the imperial presidency and constitutional dictatorship are now part of
the vocabulary of American politics” (Arcui 1977, 136). Yet its early cementation as an academic cliché did not render Schlesinger’s thesis irrelevant. From the discussion of George Bush’s measures in the Gulf and Bill Clinton’s unilateral actions in the Balkans in the 1990s, to the conversations surrounding George W. Bush and Barack Obama’s engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, scholars have been grappling with how to conceptualize the Imperial Presidency and its implications for decades—a trend which will undoubtedly continue based on the early trajectory of the Trump administration’s affinity for executive orders and his recent decision to take unilateral military action in the Syrian conflict (Banks and Straussman 1999, 195-217; Griffin 2013, 194-235; Zoppo 2017).

Despite the wide range of administrations and foreign policy issues through which presidential power has been discussed over the years and the relevance of the topic, the nature of how scholars approach the conversation about the “Imperial Presidency” has not substantially changed (Skowronek 2011, 151). Over a quarter of a century after The Imperial Presidency was published, scholars are still discussing modern foreign policy crises within the same framework employed by Schlesinger. As Boylan comments in 1999, “Twenty-five years later, the language, approach, and interpretive assumptions used in that work continue to provide a basis for analyses and evaluations of presidential initiatives abroad” (Boylan 1999, 233). He goes on to conclude that the “constitutional balance” debate initiated by Schlesinger “has not been addressed in a conclusive and satisfying way” (Boylan 1999, 233). This sentiment of dissatisfaction with Schlesinger’s framework is echoed in more recent commentaries, a frustration that is captured in Skowrenek’s 2011 analysis of George W. Bush and the Imperial Presidency when he states “...it has been more than thirty years since this story line felt so compelling, and that in itself is something of a complication...it appears that truisms will not take us very far” (Skowrenek 2011, 151). In other words, modern scholarship on the Imperial Presidency is at a standstill because the debate overwhelmingly relies on the fundamental assumptions and methods employed by Schlesinger—even when critiquing him.

If the conversation has not substantively changed, yet the question of increasing presidential power is as pertinent as ever, it begs the question of how to move beyond those traditional parameters of discourse and “interpretive assumptions” to re-envision the driving factors behind how and why the discussion of the Imperial Presidency persists. My research seeks to do just this. By looking at the ways in which scholars understood presidential war powers before the institutionalization of “the Imperial Presidency” as a paradigm in the 1970s, I may be able to shed light on this phenomenon and
identify new strategies for thinking about presidential power. I will specifically focus on the Civil War and World War I, posing the question: How did the intellectual discourse surrounding presidential war powers differ between the Civil War and World War I, and does this comparative discourse reveal any new insights about the nature of the “Imperial Presidency” or suggest any new tools for conceptualizing the problem?

I ultimately argue that, despite the absence of the post-WWII globalization context—and despite some shifts in intellectual attitudes and norms between the two wars—analysis of discourse during the Civil War and World War I does not reveal any fundamentally new interpretive tools through which to understand the Imperial Presidency. The historical conversations were still largely dominated by the frameworks that characterize modern debates about presidential war powers: questions of constitutional design, congressional-executive relations, democratic authority, and the relationship between the President and the public. However, within the existing framework of assessing the Imperial Presidency as a question of constitutional design, the findings of my comparative historical analysis point to an alternative to Schlesinger’s characterization of the Imperial Presidency as an attempt by the post-WWII President to actively seize war powers from Congress. I argue that the Imperial Presidency is not consequence of an “imbalance” between the respective constitutional war powers reserved for Congress and the executive, but an imbalance within the constitutional design of the presidency. More specifically, because the Constitution gives the President a dual role as Commander-in-Chief and defender of the Constitution, the tensions between these military and civil responsibilities make the presidency distinctly vulnerable to increasingly accumulating power. After a discussion of my methodological choices and an assessment of the historical literature from which I draw, I will analyze themes in the comparative discourse evaluating executive war powers in terms of constitutional design, congressional-executive relations, democratic authority, and the relationship between the president and the public.

**Methodological Choices**

*A Comparative Approach: Case Selection*

I have selected the Civil War and World War I as my historical cases of interest for a variety of reasons. First, they both occurred before the emergence of post-World War II modernity. Schlesinger claims that “...the essence of the Imperial Presidency was a product of the second half of the twentieth century” (Schlesinger 1973, Introduction). The intent of my research is to try to identify new ways of
thinking about the rise of presidential power in foreign relations. Analyzing two wars that occurred before the global order undertook such a substantial transformation—and before the United States was a global superpower—will create distance between conversations about presidential power and those post-WWII contexts that Schlesinger and other scholars so often use to explain the rise of the Imperial Presidency (Schlesinger 1973, Introduction).

I focus on the Civil War as a starting point for discussions of presidential power because, as Schlesinger himself notes, the Civil War was the first war during which there was a sense that the President was exercising power in ways that sparked unprecedented levels of controversy and concern (Schlesinger 1973, Introduction). Furthermore, Schlesinger makes a distinction early on in The Imperial Presidency between the war measures of early administrations and post-WWII Presidents. He claims that, unlike Johnson or Nixon, “Neither Lincoln or Roosevelt claimed an inherent and routine presidential right to do what they did” (Schlesinger 1973, Introduction). He goes on to argue that because Lincoln and Roosevelt were aware that some of their war measures exceeded explicit constitutional limits, and because they took those actions with full faith that they would be followed by formal congressional support, they do not constitute the “essence” of the modern Imperial Presidency (Schlesinger 1973, Introduction). Schlesinger has the luxury of making this distinction ex-post-facto; his analysis of Lincoln’s measures are grounded in comparison to modern presidencies and are very much embedded in the Vietnam and Watergate contexts. In order to understand the significance of the Lincoln administration in the larger story of the history of presidential power in foreign relations, it is crucial to analyze the ways in which scholars discussed Lincoln’s policies during the war.

I selected World War I as a second case and point of comparison for a few reasons. First, although World War I was perhaps the United States’—and the rest of the world’s—first large-scale encounter with global conflict, the post-WWII global order had not yet been established. For the most part, transnational economic, social, and political interdependence—factors upon which Schlesinger draws to explain the modern Imperial Presidency—were not yet a fact of life (Schlesinger 1973, Introduction). However, 1914 and 1865 are obviously incredibly different places in both American and world history and there are some notable changes that I hope to capture by including World War I discourse in my research. By the early twentieth century, the government was more institutionalized and the presidency was a more complex office. Additionally, while the United States maintained a policy of neutrality in European affairs, presidential administrations from McKinley to Taft had
been testing their military and state-building powers in Latin America. In many ways U.S. presidents were pushing the limits of American power abroad in the years leading up to World War I, but the United States was by no means the global superpower that it became after the Second World War. Thus, analyzing World War I discourse allows me to observe how those changes may have influenced intellectual conceptualizations of presidential power while maintaining the condition of the pre-WWII context from which I am trying to depart.

Source Selection and Literature

Civil War

Studying the scholarly discourse surrounding any topic in the Civil War era is challenging. There were very few academic journals in circulation, and the ones that did exist were not peer-reviewed to the extent that journals became later—and much less to the extent that they are today. Despite the lack of academic journals in circulation, there were alternative forms of intellectual discourse in the Civil War era; the primary ones on which I rely in my research are national magazines and legal reviews.

I have chosen to include a number of national magazines in my analysis of Civil War discourse surrounding the war policies of President Lincoln. These primary sources incorporate both news reports on the events of the war and editorial analysis. For example, I analyze an editorial piece from Knickerbocker Monthly, a national New York-based literary magazine, which both summarizes the content of Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation and analyzes the constitutionality and desirability of exercising such executive power (“The Unconstitutional Acts” 1863). Another example of a national magazine from which I analyze intellectual discourse is The Independent—a weekly New York-based magazine which claims to be “devoted to the Consideration of Politics, Social and Economic Tendencies, History...” among other things (“The Arbitrary Arrests” 1862). A benefit of national magazines as primary sources is that they are published more often than academic journals, and consequentially are more up to speed in capturing intellectual sentiments in immediate response to events of the war. Despite these magazines containing intellectual analysis, their articles are often short and are not peer-reviewed. Furthermore, the language contained in them is often informal and clearly deferential toward either the Union or Confederacy. I have carefully considered how those perspectives inform the analysis. Finally, several of these magazine articles do not list an author. This eliminates the possibility of evaluating personal perspectives of the author when interpreting the text.
Because much of the discourse evaluating the validity of Lincoln’s war measures was centered around determining whether they were legal in light of the executive powers outlined by the Constitution, I also draw on legal sources to inform my analysis. For example, I utilize an article that was published in the American Law Register discussing the legality of Lincoln’s unilateral suspension of writs of habeas corpus and the act’s implications for executive power and individual liberty (“Writs of Habeas Corpus” 1861). The analysis contained in legal sources is more academic and less blatantly politically-driven than the national magazines in both language and substance. However, because the Civil War had no legal precedent in the United States, it is inevitable that legal scholars were also relying on subjective judgement to some extent. This kind of bias is more disguised than that of national magazines, so I was particularly rigorous and attentive when interpreting them to ensure I accounted for these contexts.

World War I

By the twentieth century, academic journals had increased in quantity and were increasingly scholarly in nature. Thus, in my analysis of presidential power in World War I I rely much more heavily on journal articles as primary historical sources. One example of a journal I utilize is Political Science Quarterly; I have included an article in my analysis which discusses the American approach to diplomacy in WWI before the U.S. entered the war (Smith 1916). A benefit of using a scholarly article such as this one is that the aim of the content is to break down the logic of different diplomatic approaches to the war the President could take based on his executive powers—as opposed to endorsing a certain policy based on personal ideology or political sentiment (Smith 1916, 486).

Academic journals are not exempt from interpretive challenges. For example, I include an article from The North American Review entitled “The President’s Dictatorship.” Journalist and Author John Jay Chapman’s first sentence is, “Whether one admire Mr. Wilson without reserves or with reserves...his position deserves to be dispassionately studied” (Chapman 1918, 518). Despite this proclamation of political and ideological distance, there are still glimpses of relevant biases throughout the article—blanket statements about human nature, the desirability of American leadership on the world stage, etc. When reading journal articles from the World War I era I was mindful that the perspectives from which the authors were writing was influenced to some extent by the author’s personal view of Wilson or at least
their attitude toward neutrality in the war.

**Contexts and Approach**

My approach to locating and selecting sources from both the Civil War and World War I was to focus on events during each war that were most likely to complicate traditional understandings of presidential authority. I concentrated on intellectual discourse that took place during or immediately after significant events such as the suspension of the writs of habeas corpus during the Civil War and Wilson’s speech to Congress calling for American entry into the First World War. That being said, the following analysis does not include a comprehensive overview of all of the relevant events of each war—nor does it aim to evaluate the respective war policies of Lincoln and Wilson. Instead, I focus on highlighting the trends in language and assumptions employed by scholars in their discussions of presidential power during times of war. The following analysis of the historical discourse is divided into three of those trends: constitutional design, democratic consent, and executive tyranny.

**Constitutional Design**

One framework through which Schlesinger and the contemporary scholars who are in conversation with him employ to explain the emergence of the “Imperial Presidency” is constitutional design. More specifically, Schlesinger is concerned “…with the shift in the constitutional balance—with, that is, the appropriation by the Presidency, and particularly by the contemporary Presidency, of powers reserved by the Constitution and by long historical practice to Congress” (Schlesinger 1973, Introduction). Countless scholars follow Schlesinger’s tradition of discussing the rise of executive control over foreign relations as a consequence of how to interpret the relationship between the respective war-making authorities of the President and Congress. The intellectual discourse during the Civil War and World War I surrounding presidential power and war was also largely dominated by a constitutional design framework. There are two major strands of discourse in both Civil War and World War I sources that rely on arguments surrounding how the Constitution is designed and ought to be interpreted: first, a general debate about which war-making powers the Constitution grants to the respective branches of government, and second, the question of whether there is a tension between the President’s role as the Commander-in-Chief of the military and his duty to preserve and protect the Constitution.
Congressional Versus Executive War Powers

One dominant theme across the Civil War and World War I literature is the question of how to conceptualize war powers about which the Constitution does not contain explicit provisions. During the Civil War, President Lincoln’s unilateral suspension of writs of habeas corpus in 1861 sparked a debate among scholars and politicians about the constitutional legitimacy of executive actions in emergency situations. Whether in favor of or opposed to Lincoln’s war measures, the discourse suggests a nearly universal desire to support or condemn the suspension based on explicit constitutional evidence. An 1861 review of the suspension of the writs in The American Law Register begins its analysis by claiming that, “As the country is now struggling to sustain the Constitution, it is of the utmost importance to demonstrate, as it is believed may be done, that the measures adopted by the Government are strictly within the powers conferred by that instrument” (“Writs of Habeas Corpus” 1861, 705). The review goes on to argue that it is “clearly inferable from the Constitution and the existing laws of Congress” that the President does have authority to suspend the writ but only in the event of “a sudden and unexpected emergency, and then as a measure of necessity, to preserve the Government” (“Writs of Habeas Corpus” 1861, 708). Alternatively, an 1863 article in the national magazine Knickerbocker Monthly entitled “The Unconstitutional Acts of the Present Government” argues that Lincoln’s actions are outside of the bounds of the President’s constitutional authority, describing the suspension of habeas corpus as “... a power expressly reserved for Congress, and not for the Executive; and only to Congress is the power given in certain contingencies, and in rebellious districts” (“The Unconstitutional Acts” 1863). While the American Law Register review supports Lincoln’s executive actions and the Knickerbocker Monthly article condemns them, they use the same framework to make their arguments. Both derive their arguments from their perspective of what the Constitution specifically states or implies about which powers are delegated to the executive and which are reserved for Congress.

These concerns are strikingly similar to Schlesinger’s initial indictment of the Imperial Presidency. Recall that Schlesinger claims that The Imperial Presidency is concerned with “…the shift in constitutional balance—with, that is, the appropriation by the Presidency, and particularly by the contemporary Presidency, of powers reserved by the Constitution and by long historical practice to Congress” (Schlesinger 1973, Introduction). There are a few critical things to note. First, Schlesinger and the Civil War-era intellectuals writing for The American Law Register and the Knickerbocker Monthly are using
the same tools to analyze Lincoln’s executive war powers. They are all searching for evaluative legitimacy in terms of the constitutional delegation of war powers between branches in nearly identical ways. Despite Schlesinger’s exemption of Lincoln from the level of criticism he reserves for the post-World War II Imperial Presidency, intellectuals in the Civil War era thought that the suspension of habeas corpus was exactly what Schlesinger condemns—an executive “appropriation” of Congressional powers (Schlesinger 1973, Introduction). Although the review in the American Law Register arrives at the conclusion that Lincoln had the appropriate legal authority to suspend the writ, the comment about the importance of the President acting strictly “within the powers conferred” by the Constitution suggests that had the authors come to the conclusion that the President does not have this authority then the authors would not agree with Schlesinger’s dismissal of Lincoln’s war measures as benign” (“Writs of Habeas Corpus” 1861, 705).

A similar academic conversation about the nature of executive versus congressional war powers was taking place during World War I. In his 1917 book The President’s Control on Foreign Relations, Corwin discusses gaps in constitutional design: “Congress is given the power to declare war; the President and the Senate are given the power to make peace by treaty; but on the subject of neutrality the Constitution is silent” (Corwin 1917, 4). Writing in early 1917—shortly before the United States joined the war effort—Corwin is discussing these constitutional questions in the context of American neutrality and considers the possible implications of a change in that policy. He poses a scenario in which “The President and the Senate make a treaty of alliance with another government by the terms of which the United States becomes obligated at a particular moment to declare war on a third power: is Congress under constitutional obligation so to declare war?” (Corwin 1917, 4). He then goes on to reconcile this silence by noting that “the gaps above alluded to in the constitutional delegation of powers to the national Government, affecting foreign relations, have been filled in by the theory that the control of foreign relations is in its nature an executive function and one, therefore, which belongs to the President in the absence of specific constitutional provision to the contrary” (Corwin 1917, 5). Corwin’s resignation to the “theory” that constitutional silence on measures “affecting foreign relations” are by default the responsibility of the President echoes a larger trend in the way World War I scholars conceptualized presidential power (Corwin 1917, 5). Two years earlier in 1915 The Yale Law Journal published a piece by Edward C. Eliot stating that the Constitution does not expressly outline the powers of each branch of government at all, but rather expresses powers via “implication” and that the possibility for “a mass of implications” is what makes the Constitution a functional “operative instrument” of the law (Eliot 1915, 649).
Corwin and Eliot’s conceptualizations of constitutional design and presidential power differ substantially from the Civil War discourse. Where Civil War-era intellectuals sought to legitimate executive control over foreign relations by identifying explicit constitutional provisions, scholars during World War I were more comfortable relying on implication and treat a powerful President in the realm of foreign affairs as more of an intellectual norm. However, despite this shift in attitude from the Civil War to World War I about how literally the Constitution’s stipulations about Congress, the executive, and war ought to be interpreted, the framework, analytical tools, and vocabulary through which scholars during both wars had this debate were largely the same. Whether they came to the conclusion that the Constitution ought to be interpreted literally or by implication, all debates were predicated on the assumption that executive authority derives from the Constitution and—much like Schlesinger’s concern with “constitutional balance”— emphasized the executive’s power in direct comparison to the powers of Congress (Schlesinger 1973, Introduction).

The President—Commander-in-Chief or Defender of the Constitution?

Finally, in nearly all of the Civil War and World War I debates about the nature of the Constitution and presidential control of foreign relations, there was a sense that the Presidency is inherently susceptible to coming into conflict with individual rights (“Writs of Habeas Corpus” 1861, 709). Some scholars attributed this vulnerability to the more active role the President plays in the daily lives of citizens compared to other branches of government (“Writs of Habeas Corpus” 1861, 709). However, at the core of the fear that the President is likely to interfere with individual liberty, particularly in the formulation of foreign policy, seems to be a tension between the executive’s dual role as Commander-in-Chief and defender of the Constitution. An 1863 indictment of the Lincoln Administration in the national magazine Knickerbocker Monthly articulates this conflict when they argue that “Mr. Lincoln was not elected Commander-in-Chief, but President, and he is Commander-in-Chief only in virtue of being President. The greater includes the less, and the military power is subordinate to the civil” (“The Unconstitutional Acts” 1863). These comments are a response to Lincoln’s justification of the suspension of the writs of habeas corpus and other war measures as being a necessary exercise of executive war powers. While the editors of Knickerbocker Monthly recognize the multiplicity of the President’s constitutional roles, they clearly prioritize the President’s responsibility to “stand by the Constitution” and view any
military actions which violate individual liberty as an act of “arbitrary power” (“The Unconstitutional Acts” 1863).

In an 1862 news article in The Independent outlining the Senatorial debate about Lincoln’s war measures, one Senator is quoted presenting the opposite opinion: “...the President does not swear to support the Constitution, but to protect, preserve, and defend it, and therefore he may if necessary violate private rights” (“The Arbitrary Arrests” 1862). This argument echoes the justification utilized by Lincoln himself, who asserts in a letter to the nation in 1861 that “It was with the deepest regret that the Executive found the duty of employing the war power in defense of the government forced upon him; he could but perform this duty, or surrender the existence of the government” (“The Arbitrary Arrests” 1862). Whether in favor or opposed to Lincoln’s war measures, all of these arguments are framed as a consequence of an inherent tension between presidential responsibilities. For Lincoln’s critics, the President’s duty to actively avoid violating individual liberties is the essence of the presidency. Lincoln and his supporters, on the other hand, argue in favor of his war measures because they view the preservation of the physical nation as a precursor to upholding any other liberties—consequentially prioritizing the executive’s Commander-in-Chief duties.

While the Civil War may be a unique set of circumstances in which the President’s military duties are put in direct conflict with his responsibility to preserve the individual liberties outlined in the Constitution in perhaps the most extreme way, this way of thinking about constitutional design should not be dismissed. Though not as prevalent as in the Civil War discourse, expressions of this tension also appear in academic writing during World War I. For example, in their 1918 review of the Wilson Administration, the editors of The North American Review pose the question of whether it is desirable that a powerful wartime President continue to wield executive authority in non-military realms of governance (“Thank God for Wilson” 1918, 17). In reference to government control over American shipping and marine commerce, they exclaim “The Government is taking hold of them all, like a benevolent despot, for our good. More power to it! What we want now is to win this war, no matter how many pet theories of political economy are laid upon the shelf” (“Thank God for Wilson” 1918, 20) Although they do not expressly state the Commander-in-Chief versus Defender of the Constitution dichotomy, the same tensions are playing out in their analysis. The editors praise the “efficiency” of the war-time presidency because it has influence over both the military and what are traditionally non-Presidential concerns like the private economy—and are willing to give up some of their individual liberties in return for this efficiency (“Thank God for Wilson” 1918, 19). However, they are concerned about the ability of the nation to abandon that notion of Presidential
power during times of peace (“Thank God for Wilson” 1918, 21). Essentially, they are concerned that the influence that the President can amass as an effective Commander-in-Chief will make it such that they are unable to return to their defender of the Constitution role after the war ends.

The Commander-in-Chief versus defender of the Constitution conflict constitutes a way of thinking about presidential power that is different from the previously-discussed approaches through which constitutional design and the Imperial Presidency are usually conceptualized. In all of my findings, this framework constitutes the most promising way of rethinking how the Imperial Presidency is debated today. It moves beyond the “inconclusive” and “unsatisfying” argument that there is some kind of imbalance between the appropriate distribution of war powers between Congress and the President (Boylan 1999, 233). This framework is not about establishing the relationships between branches of government and the “constitutional balance” about which Schlesinger is concerned with restoring (Schlesinger 1973, Introduction). Instead, it highlights the inherent tension within the constitutional provisions which define the role of the executive that make the presidency vulnerable to exercising problematic power—suggesting the duplicity and sometimes contradictory roles of the President is what may be contributing to abuses of executive power in foreign relations.

The President, The People, and Consent

Democratic Consent as a Source of Executive Authority

The second major framework utilized by Civil War and World War I intellectuals to conceptualize presidential war powers is the principle of democratic consent. In both cases, regardless of an author’s perspective on the war or the Lincoln or Wilson administrations, academics understood popular consent as a critical source of executive authority. For intellectuals during the Civil War, the consent of the nation was arguably the most important condition for legitimizing any measures undertaken by the Lincoln administration. Henry J. Raymond, founder of The New York Times, captures this sentiment in his review of the Lincoln administration when he explains that “It is impossible for him to dissociate from his confidence in the people as the source of all authority” (Raymond 1865, 7). Raymond goes on to claim that “Monarchy itself is sometimes hinted as a possible refuge from the power of the people” (Raymond 1865, 9). Raymond’s comments capture the larger political reality of the Civil War era; one would be hard-pressed to locate any article, pamphlet,
or other form of academic writing that did not evaluate the legitimacy of Lincoln’s presidency in terms of how well his administration’s actions represented the will of the people. Despite Raymond’s acceptance of the centrality of democratic consent in legitimizing executive authority, he did not necessarily equate democratic consent with the President being obligated to act in exact accordance with public demands. He suggests that “The art and the duty of a true statesman in a republic is not to act on what the people ought to wish and think, but do adopt the best course practicable in accordance with what they actually do wish and think. It is not an attempt to exercise a despotic leadership, but to divine and to give force to the right will of the nation” (Raymond 1865, 18).

While Raymond was a close friend and confidante of Lincoln and supporter of the Union, his critics also drew upon democratic populist principles. In an article in The Old Guard—a New York-based pro-Confederacy magazine—the editors berate Lincoln not for his policies on slavery or war measures, but because they believe that Lincoln’s actions lack democratic consent. They argue that “The delusion that the war is for the Union and the Constitution, which gave it the first support, is now entirely over, and with that ends one of the chief sources of the popular submission” (“What Will Come of Re-electing Lincoln” 1864). Even though Raymond and The Old Guard constitute two completely opposing sides of the political spectrum during the Civil War and disagree on Lincoln’s policies, they seek evaluative legitimacy in the same source—the “free consent of the people” (“What Will Come of Re-electing Lincoln” 1864). The difference between their arguments, however, is that the editors of The Old Guard are suggesting that any measure Lincoln undertakes that is not an exact reflection of the will of the people is an affront to democracy (“What Will Come of Re-electing Lincoln” 1864). Raymond, on the other hand, suggests that the President’s authority is inseparable from popular sentiment yet believes the executive’s duty to put public opinion into effect only goes as far as to “adopt the best course practicable in accordance” with those sentiments (Raymond 1865, 18).

The President—Driver of Public Opinion or Just the Messenger?

This strategy for evaluating executive authority in terms of democratic consent is also widely utilized in World War I discourse. A 1916 review of American diplomacy reflects the importance of popular consent when it states “In considering the general attitude that our government should have taken toward the belligerent powers, it must not be forgotten that, in a democratic country, any important action on the part of the government must be supported by public opinion; and that, if it is a question of taking sides in a war at the risk of being drawn into the war, any policy
that deviates from strict neutrality must be approved by a very large majority of the people” (Smith 1916, 484). However, other scholars during World War I began to identify problems with conceptualizing executive authority as a direct reflection of popular consent and public opinion. For example, writing in The Yale Law Journal in 1915, Eliot points out that “…public opinion, an indefinite though powerful force…is impossible to distinguish from the demands of party politicians and the views of a partisan press” (Eliot 1915, 659). Some go even further than identifying logistical problems with foreign policy based on public sentiment and argue against the “American tradition” that “where war was concerned the executive must not outrun the people in his thought” (Chapman 1918, 519). John Jay Chapman indicts this as “a regrettable tradition” in a 1918 piece in The North American Review, suggesting that during times of war “a President ought to be a leader of popular thought” (Chapman 1918, 519).

At the core of this conversation during both wars is a question about the nature of the relationship between the President and the public; should the President be a vehicle for implementing popular opinions about war and foreign policy, or should the President try to influence and lead public sentiments? The ways in which scholars answered this question constitutes a notable difference between the intellectual conversation surrounding war and presidential power during the Civil War and World War I. During the Civil War, nearly every single piece of academic writing—from the most pro-Confederate voices to the most passionate Lincoln supporters—expressed the belief that the President ought to be the messenger of public opinion. Public opinion and democratic consent were the ultimate sources of executive authority. Even Raymond, the most skeptical and divergent voice, was not arguing for a total break in presidential policy and public opinion; he merely suggests there be a less strict expectation for how closely the President’s war policies must be aligned with public desire (Raymond 1865, 18). The suggestion presented by Chapman—that the President ought to lead public opinion during times of war—constitutes a fundamentally different understanding of the relationship between the President and the public in the context of war and executive power (Chapman 1918, 519).

This shift is particularly interesting in light of the political climate of World War I. There was no World War I equivalent to a controversial and unprecedented use of presidential power like Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus or the Emancipation Proclamation. There was also the absence of a major security threat during World War I. Americans were alarmed about and invested in the fate of Europe, but it was a war happening across the Atlantic Ocean in a time before post-WWII globalization meant a war in Europe posed
a significant security threat in the United States. Thus, the sentiment that Wilson ought to lead public opinion was not driven by the sense that the safety or very existence of the nation was fundamentally threatened.

**Tyranny and the “Point of No Return”**

Finally, a dominant framework through which Civil War and World War I intellectuals discussed presidential power in war is in comparison to the past. In both cases there was a sense that the extent of Presidential power was rising at levels unprecedented in history. One Civil War Senator calls the Lincoln administration’s policies “unconstitutional and tyrannical” usurpations of power that lacked any precedent in American history (“The Arbitrary Arrests” 1862). This sentiment is corroborated by a reviewer in Knickerbocker Monthly who claims that Lincoln has resorted to exerting “some indefinable despotic authority, which they call ‘the war power’” (“The Unconstitutional Acts” 1863). Other accounts expressed an even stronger sense that Lincoln’s administration meant impending doom for the nation, with one reviewer posing the question “Could a people so accustomed to freedom consent to live four years longer under a state of despotism, where no man can say in the morning in which bastille he may not be at night? Re-elect Lincoln, and ten centuries will not pair the havoc. All time will not do it. The ruin will be eternal” (“What Will Come of Re-electing Lincoln” 1864).

Granted, this dramatic and apocalyptic rhetoric is largely coming from the perspective of southern Democrats and Lincoln opponents and is very much embedded in the larger context of an incredibly tense and divided political climate with the fate of the nation at stake. However, the same sense that presidential power was rising at a level of concern unprecedented in history was also present throughout World War I discourse. The editors of The North American Review even make a direct comparison to the Civil War in a review of the Wilson administration’s handling of the war (“What Will Come of Re-electing Lincoln” 1864). They contend that “In the Civil War the National Government was charged...with violating the constitutional rights of the people. But its most extreme measures were mild and trifling compared with what is now being done every day without demur or comment...” (“What Will Come of Re-electing Lincoln” 1864). The editors ultimately argue in favor of strong presidential control over war policies and foreign relations, and are supporters of the American role in World War I—which the U.S. had entered at this point in 1918 when the piece ran in the journal (“What Will Come of Re-electing Lincoln” 1864).

However, academics were making similar accusations about Wilson exploiting presidential power in unprecedented ways in 1916—well before the
United States entered the war effort (Hill 1916). In reference to Wilson’s speech affirming the American policy of neutrality, Hill writes that “It was an announcement to the whole world that, no matter what happened in Europe—whatever law was violated, whatever outrage was committed—the people of the United States must remain ‘impartial in thought’! No president has ever before taken such a liberty with the American conscience” (Hill 1916, 562). What is interesting about both the editors of The North American Review and Hill’s accusations of the Wilson administration is that they were not made in direct response to a certain controversial act of presidential power. Again, there was no World War I equivalent to a controversial and unprecedented measure like Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus or the Emancipation Proclamation to which the editors were referring in 1918 nor in 1916 when Hill was writing. Thus, World War I discourse contains the same sense of shock and concern about the rise in presidential power and the “dictatorship” of President Wilson that paralleled Civil War discourse without the major security crisis or turning point like habeas corpus (“Thank God for Wilson” 1918, 20). Instead, World War I scholars were concerned with the “unprecedented” power the president held over both war and political life in general (“Thank God for Wilson” 1918, 20). Recall that Hill’s comments were about how “no other president in history” had exercised such control over public sentiments about foreign policy; his frustration was not over a violation of an individual constitutional liberty but over the sense that the President felt it was his right to urge the public to maintain a mindset of neutrality in the war (Hill 1916). The editors were also not concerned with a particular war measure. Their concern, rather, was that American entry into the war resulted in the President turning necessary into an “autocrat, dictator, despot” that then seized control over American political life in general (“Thank God for Wilson” 1918, 19). It is interesting that there was the same sense of feeling that the United States was at the cusp of an unprecedented “point of no return”—to borrow Schlesinger’s words—under such fundamentally different circumstances (Schlesinger 1973, Introduction).

Lessons Learned

One key takeaway from this comparative case study is that Schlesinger’s claim that the Nixon administration constituted a “point of no return” for the Imperial presidency is nothing new. Civil War-era scholars thought that Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus was the end of the Republic and democracy in America (“What Will Come of Re-electing Lincoln” 1864). World War I-era scholars—in the absence of any contentious Wilson war policies—
warned that Wilson’s control over foreign relations was unprecedented in American history and made Lincoln’s policies look like minor offenses in comparison (“What Will Come of Re-electing Lincoln” 1864). Thus, it is not entirely fair for Schlesinger to make the claim that post-WWII administrations constitute a more alarming iteration of the Imperial Presidency. It seems as if every administration in American history has been—and will continue to be—charged with acting in unprecedented ways with each act of executive power causing more alarm than the last.

The ultimate impetus of conducting this research was to see if history could provide any clues in my efforts to rethink this truism and to look for new ways to discuss the Imperial Presidency in modern scholarly discourse. Ultimately, the answer to my research question is both no and yes. I approached my research with the expectation that, given the drastically different political and historical circumstances of the Civil War and World War I, certainly scholars must have been talking about presidential power in fundamentally different ways than they do now—particularly given the modern emphasis on explaining the rise in presidential power as a result of post-WWII contexts. What I ended up finding was iterations of the same trends and concepts I have encountered innumerable times in modern discourse—evaluating executive war powers in terms of constitutional design, congressional-executive relations, democratic authority, and the relationship between the president and the public. While there were notable shifts within those frameworks between the Civil War and World War II, I found that the “language” and “interpretive assumptions” employed by Civil War and World War I scholars largely echoed those used by Schlesinger (Boylan 1999, 233). Thus, my quest to identify fundamentally new frameworks through which to evaluate the Imperial Presidency was not successful.

However, as I mention in my analysis, I did identify a promising new strategy for thinking about the Imperial Presidency within one of those existing frameworks—constitutional design and the tension between the President’s military and civil responsibilities. Although this is not a fundamentally different framework with a new toolbox of “language” and “interpretive assumptions,” it does suggest an avenue for changing the conversation from one that starts with Schlesinger’s assumption that the President has gradually “appropriated” Congressional powers over time through the impetus of control over the decision to go to war (Schlesinger 1973, Introduction). It is this “constitutional imbalance” between the President and Congress that Schlesinger defines as the “essence” of what drives the Imperial Presidency (Schlesinger 1973, Introduction). Yet what the tension between the President’s military and civil roles suggests is that scholars should revisit the presidency not in relation to Congress, but in relation to itself. Further research ought to explore the possibility that the President did not actively seize
congressional power over the course of history—but that there is something in
the way that the presidency is constitutionally designed that makes it distinctly
vulnerable to increasingly accumulating war powers.
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