Assignment Description: Students had to use ANES data to formulate a research paper that utilized data analysis. Students were required to conduct their paper in the form of a study, testing several hypotheses and their null counterparts. Students had to relate their paper back to research on the topic and use STATA to analyze and portray the data in some capacity.

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Influences on American Views on Immigration

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Introduction

Immigration has emerged as a hot button issue in recent times and became even more prevalent in the 2016 election. Opposite messages from the election cycle emerged from both sides. Republican Donald Trump promised to build a wall along the Mexican border, going back to an older piece of legislation, Secure Fence Act of 2006. Trump also promised to "get tough" on immigration and deport those who came illegally. On the other end was Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton, who aligned with the "dreamers" and vowed to protect DACA.

Contrasting messages from both sides was not only an indicator of the gulf in opinions between parties, but also the controversy surrounding immigration in America. Concern over immigration has hit a boiling point several times over, as reactions to terrorist attacks and other scares. This has only served to compound the intense debate and add to the dispute.

Immigration is not a "black and white" issue, and it is essential for politicians and sociologists to determine what influences contemporary American feelings towards immigration. This is a nuanced issue, and research is required to better understand citizens' attitudes about immigration. In this paper, I will utilize the American National Election Survey 2016 data and test for relationships between attitudinal and demographic variables to study what determines attitudes towards immigration in 21st century America.

Scholarly Background

There is a scholarly consensus surrounding some ideas that influence perceptions of immigrants and attitudes towards immigration as a whole.

Espenshade and Calhoun (1993) do a scholarly multiple regression analysis of the data set. A prevalent theory they tested was the "labor market" hypothesis, which pertains to the common rhetoric seen in the media surrounding immigrants taking away jobs from native

workers. Generally, the labor market hypothesis ties into the socioeconomic status of the respondents, and it is generally believed that the lower the respondent in on the economic ladder, the less supportive they are to increased levels of immigration. The reason economic status is thought to have an effect on feelings towards immigrants is explained by the perceived threat posed to native workers and their job prospects that immigrants may hold.

In their study, Espenshade and Calhoun (1993) only found weak evidence for this theory and Valentino, et al. (2012) has findings that aligned with studies that concluded citizens worry more about economic costs immigrants have on dependence on welfare than immigrant competition for jobs. This is significant, as it differs from the conceptions portrayed by the media for past few decades. After the contentious nature of the past election, it is worthwhile to retest with current survey data to measure if public opinion has shifted in the past election, and if this now is as influential for determining attitudes towards immigration as the media portrays it to be.

A follow-up study by Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) extends this to the economy, using a CBS News/New York Times joint poll that asked respondents how they wished to see the level of immigration changed. This drives my third and fourth hypotheses, as I analyze how respondents wish to see immigration levels changed in relation to beliefs on strength of the economy. Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) found that income and beliefs that the economy is improving are positively correlated with receptivity to immigration, however, several studies concluded in a later study that there was no evidence that perceptions towards immigrants were dependent on respondent's personal socioeconomic situation (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993, Valentino, et al. 2012). Both this and the labor market hypothesis tie into the economic realm that is seemingly essential to the immigration debate. Both have findings that contradict each

other, so clarity is needed in how these affect each other, however nuanced the analysis may need to be to get a definite answer.

Research also suggests that immigration attitudes are influenced by demographic variables such as education, race, and cultural perceptions. Several studies have found evidence that education has a positive relationship with views on immigration, with those with higher levels of education having less negative views towards immigrants (Espenshade and Calhoun 1996, Valentina, et al. 2012), however Espenshade and Calhoun (1993) found years earlier that education and race lost statistical significance after accounting for other variables.

Another demographic factor that is intertwined with the immigration debate is race. Some existing literature explains that race may have an influence by the cultural affinity hypothesis, in which respondents who can relate to the immigrants or accept their culture are more likely to have positive views towards immigration (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993). Other studies find race to have only a small, if not statistically insignificant effect (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993, Valentino, et al. 2012). There exists an argument that race has no role, as there have been consistent attempts by former immigrants to keep out new migrants from entering the United States, a phenomenon known as the "drawbridge mentality" (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996). Thus, it would be interesting to see what results the ANES 2016 data will yield in respect to attitudes on immigration across different ethnic groups.

Feelings of social and political isolation as well as isolationist sentiments also play into attitudes towards immigration (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996, Wright 2011). When people fear the social order as they know it is being threatened, they become opposed to the threat. Thus, they adopt a traditionalist attitude and develop ascriptive definitions of immigration, attributing stereotypes of crime and anti-Americanism. Another social factor discussed is

ideology. While public perception towards anti-immigration occurred in the late 1970's, the shift of white voters to the Republican party occurred in the 1990's. Despite this, studies have shown that the Republican party is closely aligned with anti-immigrant attitudes (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). Abrajano and Hajnal observed in the 2008 election that being supportive of immigration meant the respondent was 22.9% less likely to have voted for McCain in 2008, while a two standard-deviation shift over towards more negative attitudes regarding immigrants yielding a 39% probability increase in voting for McCain. While whites might not have shifted because of immigration values, there seems to be a common ideology among the Republican party. These findings drive my first and second hypotheses, regarding ideology and its effect on attitudes towards immigration.

Hypotheses

I will test four hypotheses and analyze one multivariate regression model in this paper. Using two controls, I hope to draw some inferences as to what impacts attitudes towards immigration while controlling for confounding variables.

Hypothesis 1 (H1): Americans who identify as liberal are more likely to support illegal immigrants than those who do not identify as liberal.

Null H1: Americans who identify as liberal are just as likely to support illegal immigrants than those who do not identify as liberal.

H2: Americans who identify as liberal are more likely to support illegal immigrants than those who do not identify as liberal, controlling for race.

Null H2: Americans who identify as liberal are just as likely to support illegal immigrants than those who do not identify as liberal, controlling for race.

H3: Americans who believe the economy is strong are less likely to believe immigration levels should be lower than those who believe the economy is weak.

Null H3: Americans who believe the economy is strong are just as likely to believe immigration levels should be lower than those who believe the economy is weak.

H4: Americans who believe the economy is strong are more likely to believe immigration levels should be higher than those who believe the economy is weak, controlling for income.

Null H4: Americans who believe the economy is strong are just as likely to believe immigration levels should be higher than those who believe the economy is weak, controlling for income.

These four hypotheses will be followed by a multivariate regression model to test the statistical significance of several independent variables.

Research Design and Variables

The paper draws survey data from the American National Election Survey of 2016. The sample composed of U.S. eligible voters and contained of both interviewed conducted face-to-face and over the internet both pre-election and post-election. The survey asks questions on electoral participation, voting behaviors, measures of public opinion, media exposure, values, and other predispositions.

Responses are drawn from persons living across the United States and measures are taken to characterize respondents in order to weight the data properly after accounting for responses and demographics.

The variable “Ideological Leaning” is measured by ideologydetailed and ideologylean. ideologydetailed is an ordinal variable with 3,630 valid cases with a minimum value of Extremely Liberal at 1, and a maximum of Extremely Conservative at 7. ideologylean is another

ordinal variable with 3,050 valid cases, a minimum value of Liberal at 1, and a maximum of Conservative at 3.

"Feelings towards Immigration" is measured by immigrationscale. It is an interval level variable (feeling thermometer) with 3,581 valid cases with a mode of 50, a median of 40, a mean of 41.46, a minimum of 0, and a maximum of 100. There are not value labels.

"Race" is measured by demographic. It is a nominal variable with 4,238 valid cases, and minimum and maximum values of 1 and 5 that match up with the groups "White, non-Hispanic" and "Other, including multiracial" respectively. To achieve enough valid cases in most of the categories, I have put several unique racial groups into the "Other, including multiracial" category. Although I observed that they did not differ considerably in attitudes towards immigration, it is not likely they share the share beliefs and thus cannot be reliably described as a monolithic group.

"Immigration Level Views" is measured by immigrationlevels. It is an ordinal level variable with 3,622 valid cases, a minimum value of 1 that aligns with "Increased" and a maximum value of 3 that aligns with "Decreased."

"Strength of Economy" is measured by economy. It is an ordinal level variable with 3,642 valid cases, a minimum value of 1 that aligns with "Strong" and a maximum value of 5 that aligns with "Weak." I chose to use the perceived strength of the economy rather than perceived changes to the economy because I feel that the strength of the economy plays more on the minds of respondent's then the recent developments in it over a one-year span.

"Education" is measured by education. It is a nominal level variable with 4,227 valid cases, a minimum value of 1 that aligns with "No High School Diploma" and a maximum value of 4 that aligns with "Bachelor's and Other Professional Degrees."

"Traditionalist Culture" is measured by combining several questions into one additive variable named culture_scale. It is an additive variable with 3,601 valid cases, no value labels, a minimum of 0, and a maximum of 5.

"Perceived economic well-being of R" is measured by econwellbeing. This ordinal variable has 4,258 valid cases, a minimum value of 1 with the label "Much better off," and a maximum value of 5 with the label "Much worse off."

"Income of Respondent" is measured by income. It is an ordinal level variable with 4,271 valid cases, a minimum value of 1 that aligns with "Lower Third," and a maximum value of 3 that aligns with "Upper Third."

"Perceptions of Threat to Job Opportunities by Immigrants" is measured by jobthreat. This is an ordinal variable with 3,630 valid cases, a minimum value of 0 that aligns with "Not Likely," and a maximum value of 3 that aligns with "Extremely Likely."

All data will be weighted with V160101 for the PRE- questions and V160102 for the POST- questions.

Data Analysis

For H1, if a relationship exists between ideology and attitudes towards illegal immigrants, we would expect that the more conservative a respondent is, the less favorably they look upon illegal immigrants. This relationship exists in the data, as shown in Table 1a, as it is observed that as the value of ideology goes up towards more conservative views, feelings towards illegal immigrants goes down and becomes colder. The trend is highly visible, as the mean score for the feeling thermometer for illegal immigrants goes down in each response category. Starting at "Extremely Liberal" at a score of 63.87, attitudes toward illegal immigrants

become more negative, going to 58.67, then to 49.98, and continues this trend down to "Extremely Conservative" with a mean score of 25.64.

With the t-test and the P>|t| value being 0.000 (meaning this relationship will occur 0% of the time by random chance), we can reject the null hypothesis of ideology having no effect on feelings towards illegal immigrants as the $p<0.05$. This is a negative relationship, since as ideology scores go up, feelings towards illegal immigrants go down. By accepting the alternative hypothesis, my findings align with those of previous scholars (Abrajano and Jahnal 2015).

H2 looks to see in the ideology relationship is dependent upon race. Often times, the same party attracts many people of the same demographic. Thus, it could be that it is not the party values that are at play for the feeling towards immigration, but rather cultural beliefs based on one's racial upbringing. The relationship holds in the data as an interaction.

As shown in Table 2a, for "Whites, non-Hispanic", "Asians and other Pacific Islanders", and the "Other, including multiracial" category, feelings towards illegal immigrants get colder the less liberal the respondent is. White liberal respondents have a mean score of 54.06, white moderates have a score of 38.78, and white conservatives have a mean score of 26.72. This trend follows for the other two response categories, but not for the "Black, non-Hispanic" and "Hispanics" groups. The black moderate category has the highest favorability towards illegal immigrants, with each category hovering around a mean score of a little over 50. This black moderate category differs from the other categories and suggests more ambivalence, with only slight support. This conflicts with previous research, however this may be indicative of a larger trend. While blacks were previously apprehensive about immigration, they have now shifted between having positive feelings and might be shifting back to neutrality as they continue to

reclaim their own African heritage and can only relate indirectly to illegal immigrants (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996).

Lastly, an interesting finding is that Hispanic liberals and Hispanic moderates have the same attitudes towards illegal immigrants, both reporting at a mean score of around 65. Then, there is a considerable drop down to 44.14 for Hispanic conservative respondent. Even for a group as closely associated with illegal immigrants as Hispanics are, party ideology still proves to play a role in determining feelings towards illegal immigrants. This aligns with previous research that race plays a small effect (Valentino, et al. 2012), but that subscription to a political ideology accounts for much of the trends seen and that most ethnicities only have a moderating effect. With P = 0.000, we can reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis.

H3 asks "How does R believe immigration levels should be changed?" and it is organized by perceptions of the strength of the economy. The expected trend is that those who believe the economy is strong are less likely to believe the level of immigration should be decreased. This pattern is observed in the data, as seen in Table 3a, as only 13.76% of respondents who believe the economy is strong believe immigration levels should be decreased, while 58.39% of respondents who respond that the economy is weak believe so. There is a clear pattern, as 40.82% of those how believe the economy is strong respond that immigration levels should increase, compared to the 27.35% of those who believe the economy is weak. For beliefs that the economy is neither strong nor weak, 36.4% believe immigration levels should be left the same while the rest are split fairly evenly along increase and decrease. This aligns with previous research (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996). If respondents feel the economy is doing fine, they see little reason to keep migrants out. Alternatively, if they see the economy as weak, they will be more restrictionist in self-interest to protect themselves in a time of perceived economic

frailty. This analysis returns a chi2(4) value of 301.62, which is statistically significant (P = 0.000, relationship happens 0% of the time by chance). Thus, we can reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis.

H4 then controls for income amongst these respondents for H3. Previous research is divided on what should be expected. The relationship holds in the control data and shows a sort of interaction relationship. The wealthier the respondent, the more likely they are to support higher levels of immigration when they believe the economy is strong, and the less likely they are to support lower levels of immigration when they believe the economy is weak. In the lower third income bracket, as shown in Table 4a, 28.54% of respondents who believe the economy is strong believe immigration levels should be increased, compared to 35.74% of those who answered the same in the middle-income bracket, as shown in Table 4b, and 54.19% of those who answered that way in the upper third income bracket, as shown in Table 4c. Alternatively, 62.76% of respondents in the lower third income bracket who believe the economy is weak respond that the immigration levels should be decreased, compared to 58.45% of those in the middle-income bracket who believe the economy is weak and 53.58% of those in the upper third income bracket who believe the same.

All three control tables reach statistical significance (thus we can reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis). Importantly, these results are inconsistent with previous research (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993, Valentino, et al. 2012). It is likely that the Great Recession played a role in shaping perceptions of immigration for Americans, making them more aware of their socioeconomic status and how fragile their livelihood may be if the economy is in a weak state like it was in 2008.

In the multivariate regression model, as shown in Table 5c, all the independent variables come back as statistically significant, and all have the expected relationship except for education, as shown in Table 5a, and income, as shown in Table 5b. The feelings towards illegal immigrants gets colder from "No High School Diploma" until significantly rises again at "Bachelor's Degree and other Professional Degrees," showing a negative relationship between education and receptiveness to illegal immigrants. This goes against previous research (Espenshade and Calhoun 1996, Valentina, et al. 2012), as the group that is the second most warm to illegal immigrants is those with no high school diploma, have a mean score of 43.21 compared to the 40.47 score for high school graduates, the 39.65 mean score for respondents with associate degrees, and 44.60 for those with professional degrees. When looking at sample mean, one cannot reject the null hypothesis for no effect of education on feelings towards illegal immigrants between high school graduates and those with associate degrees. However, this could be explained by cultural affinity hypothesis and the respondents could relate to the struggles of the illegal immigrants. Additionally, the lowest mean score is the middle-income bracket, have a mean score of 39.65. It is possible that income is just a supporting factor and that there is a variable under the surface that if added to the multivariate regression would make it statistically insignificant.

As for the other relationships, they are all negative as expected. Being conservative aligns with having colder feelings towards illegal immigration in the ideologydetailed variable. Believing the economy is weaker aligns with being less receptive to illegal immigrants in the economy variable. Have more traditionalist culture attitudes is associated with lower mean scores on the feeling thermometer for immigrants. Being worse off in the past year and

perceiving more of a threat to the job market both also tend to lead respondents towards more negative attitudes towards immigrants.

Conclusions

The findings in this research paper show that a mix of economic, demographic, and social factors all coalesce to formulate American attitudes towards immigration. After using a multivariate regression model, all independent variables reached statistical significance.

However, limitations do exist. I feel as if my findings on education are incomplete due to my statistical manipulation of it. In order to reach a significant number of cases in each group, I had to combine several low-academic groups. This forced the "No High School Diploma" category to have a wide range of responses due to the highly diverse education backgrounds. While none of the respondents finished high school, they all seemingly had different attitudes towards illegal immigrants. This narrative is complicated further when looking at the other sections. The other three categories had a narrow 95% confidence interval, suggesting they share similarities within the group. However, respondents with associate degrees were not statistically more significant to be more receptive to immigration than high school graduates. While professional degrees did have the highest support for illegal immigrants, if would be pertinent to see if future research finds similar analyses. If so, a relationship has to be discussed in that education may not have a considerable impact unless the respondent is highly educated. After testing sample means, the significance of the data between different levels is lost, however the analysis does align with previous research that finds the highest levels of education contain respondents most receptive to immigration. Additionally, in the demographics variable, "Asians and Other Pacific Islanders" does not reach the 40-count threshold in any cell. Even if a clear

pattern emerged among those respondents, these results should not be taken at face value. Future research should yield results that better reflect this minority population.

These findings suggest there are some more tests that would need to be run in the future to have more substantial findings in regard to immigration. It would be curious to see if geographical location lends towards a positive or negative disposition to immigration. As California, Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico all touch the Mexican border, it would curious if a trend exists towards either side. Researchers have used data from California in the past due to their concentration of immigrants, however there has not be a scholarly push towards determining if the geographical location one holds plays a role. This would not just be in relation to Mexico, but also concentration of immigrants due to geography. New York has Ellis Island, a renowned port for immigration into our country, and Florida has a large Cuban population from those fleeing to United States. The question remains whether exposure to these immigrants has a positive effect on respondents, and how relative proximity plays a role. This plays back into job threat and the demographic factors discussed previously. Immigration is a complicated issue in America, as it simultaneously is the story of the American Dream while eliciting strong restrictionist and traditionalist sentiments by those who feel the American way of life is threatened. There is not one clear factor that can be said that determines attitudes towards immigration, as all play a large role. While ideology play a massive role, it is unclear if Republicans hold restrictionist sentiments due to being Republican, or they are Republican because they hold restrictionist sentiments. The lack of a clear causal direction serves to further dilute the research.

A shift opposite to the one observed in the late 1970's towards more restrictionist sentiments is unlikely to occur today. However, it will be interesting to track attitudes towards

immigration in the next few elections and compare data in order to determine which variables are more pertinent in Americans deciding what opinions they hold towards immigration, and the attitudes towards immigrants as a whole.

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Tables

Data Appendix:

Variable	Minimum Value	Maximum Value	Minimum Label	Maximum Label	Number of Valid Cases	Other
V162171/ ideologylean	1	3	Liberal	Conservative	3,050	Mean: 2.01
V162171 recoded with V162171a/ ideologydetail	1	7	Extremely Liberal	Extremely Conservative	3,630	Mean: 4.17
V162313/ immigrationscale	0	100	N/A	N/A	3,581	Mean: 41.89 Median: 40
V161310x/ demographic	1	5	White, non-Hispanic	Other, including multiracial	4,238	Nominal Variable
V162157/ immigrationlevels	1	3	Increased	Decreased	3,622	Mean: 2.28
V161139/ economy	1	3	Strong	Weak	4,262	Mean: 2.21
V161270/ education	1	4	No High School Diploma	Bachelor's and Professional Degree	4,227	Mean: 2.65
V162269-74/ culture_scale	0	6	N/A	N/A	3,592	Mean: 3.06 Median: 3
V161110/ econwellbeing	1	5	Much better off	Much worse off	4,258	Mean: 3.98
V161361x/ income	1	3	Lower Third	Upper Third	4,271	Mean: 1.99
V162158/ jobthreat	0	3	Not Likely	Extremely Likely	3,630	Mean: 2.29

Figure 1a

How does R feel towards illegal immigrants?

Where on the ideology scale does R lie?	Mean	Frequency
Extremely Liberal	63.87	106
Liberal	58.67	423
Somewhat Liberal	49.98	660
Moderate	43.78	773
Slightly Conservative	36.37	871
Conservative	26.44	610
Extremely Conservative	25.64	123
Total	41.88	3,568

T = -20.20, P = 0.000

Source: ANES 2016

Figure 2a

Key:
Mean scores
Weighted count

How does R feel towards illegal immigrants, after controlling for race?

Demographics	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Total
White, non-Hispanic	54.06 641.33	38.78 575.86	26.72 942.07	38.06 2,159.26
Black, non-Hispanic	51.66 108.98	55.19 92.09	50.66 48.30	52.77 249.37
Asian and other Pacific Islanders	57.57 36.01	44.40 26.75	39.37 24.58	48.42 87.34
Hispanic	64.64 95.29	64.90 118.11	44.14 91.50	58.59 304.90
Other, including multiracial	63.11 40.68	39.12 34.50	24.5 41.31	42.33 116.49
Total	55.41 922.29	44.40 847.31	29.31 1,147.76	41.94 2,917.36

P = 0.000

Source: ANES 2016

Figure 3a

Key:
Column percentages
Weighted count

How does R believe immigration levels should be changed?

How strong is the economy presently?	Increase	Left the same	Decrease	Total
Strong	40.82% 232.9	28.35% 413.5	13.76% 218.1	23.92% 864.5
Neither strong nor weak	31.83% 181.6	36.4% 530.9	27.85% 441.5	31.93% 1,154
Weak	27.35% 156	35.25% 514.1	58.39% 925.5	44.15% 1,595.6
Total	100% 570.5	100% 1458.5	100% 1585.1	100% 3,614.1

chi2(4) = 301.62, P = 0.000

Source: ANES 2016

Figure 4a

Key:
Column percentages
Weighted count

How does R believe immigration levels should be changed? (Lower Third Income Bracket)

	How strong is the economy presently?			
How strong is the economy presently?	Increase	Left the same	Decrease	Total
Strong	28.54% 52.18	22.69% 111.5	12.88% 68.54	19.25% 232.22
Neither strong nor weak	39.39% 72.02	39.42% 193.8	24.36% 129.6	32.77% 395.42
Weak	32.07% 58.63	37.89% 186.3	62.76% 333.9	47.98% 578.83
Total	100% 182.83	100% 491.6	100% 532.04	100% 1,206.47

chi2(4) = 89.99, P = 0.000

Source: ANES 2016

Figure 4b

Key:
Column percentages
Weighted count

How does R believe immigration levels should be changed? (Middle Third Income Bracket)

How strong is the economy presently?	Increase	Left the same	Decrease	Total
Strong	35.74% 56.94	25.1% 109.2	12.86% 72.41	20.61% 238.55
Neither strong nor weak	32.45% 51.71	34.33% 149.3	28.68% 161.5	31.32% 362.51
Weak	31.81% 50.69	40.57% 176.4	58.45% 329	48.06% 556.09
Total	100% 159.34	100% 434.9	100% 562.91	100% 1,157.15

chi2(4) = 68.66, P = 0.000

Source: ANES 2016

Figure 4c

Key:
Column percentages
Weighted count

How does R believe immigration levels should be changed (Upper Third Income Bracket?

How strong is the economy presently?	Increase	Left the same	Decrease	Total
Strong	54.19% 123.8	36.23% 192.7	15.73% 77.1	31.47% 393.6
Neither strong nor weak	25.36% 57.91	35.32% 187.9	30.69% 150.4	31.68% 396.21
Weak	20.45% 46.71	28.46% 151.4	53.58% 262.6	36.84% 460.71
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

chi2(4) = 142.43, P = 0.000

Source: ANES 2016

Figure 5a

How does R feel towards illegal immigrants?

What is R's highest level of education?	Mean	Frequency
No High School Diploma	43.21	320
High School Graduate	40.47	1,675
Associate Degree	39.65	426
Bachelor's Degree and other Professional Degrees	44.60	1,141
Total	41.94	3,561

Source: ANES 2016

Figure 5b

How does R feel towards illegal immigrants?

What income bracket is R in?	Mean	Frequency
Lower Third	43.41	1,186
Middle Third	39.65	1,144
Upper Third	42.47	1,249
Total	41.88	3,578

Source: ANES 2016

Figure 5c

Multivariate Regression Model

immigrationscale	Coefficient	t-score	P>|t|	[95% Confidence Interval	
ideologydetailed	-3.74	-9.11	0.000	-4.54	-2.93
economy	-3.31	-4.23	0.000	-4.86	-1.78
education	-1.29	-2.63	0.009	-2.26	-.33
culture_scale	-3.64	-10.17	0.000	-4.34	-2.94
econwellbeing	-1.93	-3.40	0.001	-3.04	-.82
income	-2.82	-4.37	0.000	-4.09	-1.56
jobthreat	-5.85	-9.21	0.000	-7.09	-4.60
Constant	104.28	34.21	0.000	98.31	110.26

Number of observations = 3,482
Adjusted R2 = .292

Source: ANES 2016