In other words, how can violent criminal enterprises guarantee the security and accountability of their members without the protection of the law? a potential answer can be found in the structure and success of golden age pirates.
What we can learn from the surprising equity and complexity of pirates.
When you think of a pirate, what do you imagine? Do you envision a peg-leg, an eyepatch, and a hook? Maybe some crossbones, a flintlock, and a tricorn hat? Certainly, a pirate must have a talking parrot and his trusty rum. Well, despite the myriad of weapons, attire, and iconography that we associate with pirates, most of us are only familiar with a single pirate narrative; that of the sea-loving lunatics who rejected the pleasures of land for an outlaw-esque life of plundering and adventure on the seven seas. While shadows of this pirate character definitely existed—Blackbeard, Calico Jack, and Henry Morgan to name a few—they were certainly the exception to the rule. However, with the prevalence of overexaggerated pirate figures in our media, it is often easy to forget that 17th-century pirates were not swashbuckling caricatures, but instead highly successful organized criminals. In fact, famous pirates from their golden age (1650-1726), remain some of the wealthiest criminals in history. [1] Yet, what is more surprising is how—without the protection of established law and order—these pirates managed to create systems of organization and governance that were centuries ahead of their time.
Legal trade on the seven seas: Where pirates were born.
In order to understand the admittedly complex success of pirates, we first need to examine their close counterparts, the sea merchants. Historically, almost all pirates during the golden age labored as merchant seamen, Royal Navy sailors, or privateersmen. [2] In the golden age of piracy, merchant ships were almost always purchased by a collection of wealthy landowners, who employed a crew on a fixed salary to transport cargo between merchant trade ports. This legal cargo typically comprised tea, furs, weapons, minerals, and often people. [3] Because of their affluence, the merchants who funded these expeditions nearly always remained on land and thus had little control over their vessels once departed. [4] Consequently, these wealthy merchants began to worry that without meaningful oversight, their sailors would have no incentive to behave. They feared that this lack of accountability would lead sailors to damage cargo, refuse to clean the ship, embezzle goods, overuse supplies, and even outright steal the ship. To fight this fear, sea merchant vessels were organized hierarchically, appointing captains to maximize profit and prevent sailor misconduct. [5] These captains—who were nearly always paid a percentage of the merchant’s profit rather than a flat wage—ran their ships as an efficient dictatorship. As Leeson puts it, “centralizing power in a captain’s hands to direct sailors’ tasks, control the distribution of [food] and payment, and discipline and punish crew members allowed merchant ship owners to minimize sailor opportunism” [6] In other words, captains had sole control over every aspect of the merchant ships.
"There is no justice or injustice on board ship, my lad. There are only two things: duty and mutiny—mind that. All that you are ordered to do is duty. All that you refuse to do is mutiny." Quoted from Marcus Rediker's Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, Page 211.
No captain! my captain! The prevalence of Captain abuse on merchant vessels.
While the introduction of the autocratic captain on merchant ships neutralized the threat of sailor misbehavior, it led to a far larger problem: captain predation. A powerful captain was deeply beneficial for the merchants, but it proved immensely problematic for the sailors. As Leeson concludes, “the trouble was that a captain endowed with the authority required to manage his crew on the ship owners’ behalf could also easily turn this authority against his seamen for personal benefit”. [7] Sea merchant captain’s served as judges, juries, and executioners, often using their power to settle personal disputes with crewmates. Merchant captain power was so widespread that one sailor warned a rookie, “There is no justice or injustice on board ship, my lad. There are only two things: duty and mutiny—mind that. All that you are ordered to do is duty. All that you refuse to do is mutiny”. [8] In fact, as author Marcus Rediker highlights, from the viewpoint of most pirates, mistreatment from merchant captains was primarily responsible for driving sailors towards piracy. Rediker specifically quotes the pirate John Archer, who cried out minutes before his execution, “I could wish that Masters of Vessels would not use their Men with so much Severity, as many of them do, which exposes us to great Temptations”. [9] It was evident—even to criminals and pirates who engaged regularly with violence—that a captain should never be given that much power.
PIRACY AND THE WORKING CLASS.
While captain predation on merchant ships was largely responsible for the increase of piracy in the late 17th century, there were certain economic factors that made piracy a compelling opportunity for the poor. Firstly, the economic barrier of entry was huge for legal cargo transportation. Often, wealthy merchants not only had enough money to buy considerably expensive ships, but they also had port connections and relationships with buyers. This meant that even if the average sailor saved enough money to purchase a ship, they would be far less likely to profit without merchant connections. As a result, participating in legal trade was not an option for the lower or middle class. [10] On the other hand, piracy incentivized participation from the lower class because of one important difference: pirates stole the ships that they operated, so no one needed to raise money. [11] Because pirates could acquire vessels for free, they no longer had to contend with unfair merchant practices. This change eliminated the need for merchants entirely, switching ownership from one wealthy person, to every pirate on board.
A unique Pirate Balancing act: confronting the history of captain abuse
Still reeling from the abuses of their merchant ship captains, pirates were determined to protect their rights and limit their captain’s power. The difficulty was that much like merchant ships, captains were essential for a functioning pirate ship. [12] Captains needed enough power to respond to emergencies, instruct their crew, and discipline wrongdoers, but not too much power to become abusive. To compromise, pirates created one of the earliest systems of checks and balances. [13] It had two parts. Firstly, crewmates had the democratic right to vote their captain out of office. According to Leeson, “Pirate democracy ensured that pirates got precisely the kind of captain they desired. Because pirates could popularly depose any captain who did not suit them and elect another in his place, pirate captains’ ability to prey on crew members was greatly constrained”. [14] Secondly, pirates incorporated the role of quartermaster, a position unique to its kind; in times outside of emergencies, the quartermaster had as much power as the captain. In fact, in his book A General History of the Pyrates, captain Johnson states that “The quartermaster’s opinion is like the mufti’s among the Turks. The captain can undertake nothing which the quartermaster does not approve…he speaks for and looks after the interest of the crew”. [15] This balance of power and limits proved overwhelmingly successful in preventing captain abuse on pirate ships, but it posed yet another question. How can collaboration between pirates be successful without abuse, especially when surrounded by scoundrels and thieves?
accountability aboard thy ship
As Leeson puts it, “[Pirates] opposed any situation that threatened to jeopardize their ability to cooperate for organized banditry”. [16] The less coordinated pirates were, the less they stole, and thus the less money they made. A pirate’s life was also characterized by uncertainty; he was uncertain if he would have enough food to survive the voyage; uncertain if a mutiny would overthrow his captain; and uncertain if the pirate ship would make enough money to survive. To eliminate the risks of operating in a sea of criminals, there were two primary ways that pirates regulated the behavior of themselves and others.
PIRATE CONSTITUIONS
Pirate Constitutions, also referred to as pirate codes, dictated the rules and regulations aboard the ship. These articles of agreement have been compared to government constitutions, a contract that kept order among the pirates. [17] Often times these rules were voted on and ratified by a majority of the crew, then enforced by the captain. This private form of self-governance—typically enforced by violence or lack of payment—eliminated uncertainty as much as possible. Because the articles needed unanimous approval they highly limited abuse, while maintaining a strong system of accountability. [18]
History shows that pirate constitutions were a deeply successful form of self governance. Here is an example of the articles of agreement from captain Bartholomew Roberts, one of the wealthiest and most controlled pirates of the Golden age of Piracy.
The pirate code of conduct of captain bartholomew roberts.
I. Every man has a vote in affairs of moment; has equal title to the fresh provisions, or strong liquors, at any time seized, and may use them at pleasure, unless a scarcity (not an uncommon thing among them) makes it necessary, for the good of all, to vote a retrenchment.
II. Every man to be called fairly in turn, by list, on board of prizes because, (over and above their proper share) they were on these occasions allowed a shift of clothes: but if they defrauded the company to the value of a dollar in plate, jewels, or money, marooning was their punishment. If the robbery was only betwixt one another, they contented themselves with slitting the ears and nose of him that was guilty, and set him on shore, not in an uninhabited place, but somewhere, where he was sure to encounter hardships.
III. No person to game at cards or dice for money.
IV. The lights and candles to be put out at eight o’clock at night: if any of the crew, after that hour still remained inclined for drinking, they were to do it on the open deck.
V. To keep their piece, pistols, and cutlass clean and fit for service.
VI. No boy or woman to be allowed amongst them. If any man were to be found seducing any of the latter sex, and carried her to sea, disguised, he was to suffer death; (so that when any fell into their hands, as it chanced in the Onslow, they put a sentinel immediately over her to prevent ill consequences from so dangerous an instrument of division and quarrel; but then here lies the roguery; they contend who shall be sentinel, which happens generally to one of the greatest bullies, who, to secure the lady’s virtue, will let none lie with her but himself.)
VII. To desert the ship or their quarters in battle, was punished with death or marooning.
VIII. No striking one another on board, but every man’s quarrels to be ended on shore, at sword and pistol. (The quarter-master of the ship, when the parties will not come to any reconciliation, accompanies them on shore with what assistance he thinks proper, and turns the disputant back to back, at so many paces distance; at the word of command, they turn and fire immediately (or else the piece is knocked out of their hands). If both miss, they come to their cutlasses, and then he is declared the victor who draws the first blood.)
IX. No man to talk of breaking up their way of living, till each had shared one thousand pounds. If in order to this, any man should lose a limb, or become a cripple in their service, he was to have eight hundred dollars, out of the public stock, and for lesser hurts, proportionately.
X. The Captain and Quartermaster to receive two shares of a prize: the master, boatswain, and gunner, one share and a half, and other officers one and quarter.
XI. The musicians to have rest on the Sabbath Day, but the other six days and nights, none without special favour. [19]
However, just because there is a set agreement to follow rules, doesn’t always mean they are recognized. Especially among those who made lying and thieving their occupation, how could there be any system of accountability? This was the second way of behavior regulation:
“All sea bandits followed the basic rule of “no prey, no pay.” Unless a pirating expedition was successful, no man received any payment” – Quoted From Peter Leeson’s “An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization, Page 1070
The invisible governence of criminals: Mutual economic interest
Put simply, pirates nearly always behaved because they had an economic incentive. The elimination of merchant captains also eliminated wages. This change made pirate wages contingent on profit, so a pirate ship that functioned poorly would not exist for long. Pirates also created a new system of profit distribution, based on contribution. According to Rediker, “The distribution of plunder was regulated explicitly by the ship’s articles, which allowed booty according to skills and duty. Captains and quartermasters received between one and one-half and two shares…and all [sailors] got one share each”. [20] The Pirates’ new system of wealth distribution was based on meritocracy. As a result, captains—who used to directly control the wages of their sailors—had far less power. No longer an essential part of the economic structure at sea, captains were now replaceable. Mutual interest served as yet another powerful tool for pirate organizations. [21] While violence was certainly enforced to maintain order on a pirate ship, pirates’ mutual interest in money was what truly encouraged and incentivized collaboration.
LOOKING BACK ON GOLDEN AGE PIRATES: WHAT WE CAN LEARN
We can learn three things from our examination of piracy in the 17th century:
- Much like citizens with elected officials, “foot soldiers” in a criminal enterprise are vulnerable to the abuses of their leaders (captains). [22]
- The institutions aboard pirate ships—checks and balances, voting rights, and constitutions—are remarkably similar to the legal forms of governance in our world. This suggests that tools governments employ to keep their leaders accountable, can be utilized effectively by criminals to maintain order. [23]
- Organized criminals are as interested in creating systems of order among themselves as non-criminals are. [24]
It may now seem strange to examine 17th-century pirates simply as charismatic crazy-men delighting in their plunders at sea. Instead, pirates intentionally created several intricate systems of checks and balances, constitutions, collective interest, and other forms of self-governance to protect their rights and prevent abuse. The success of these golden age pirates demonstrate that systems of order and accountability are essential for everyone, whether you are a citizen of a government or a member of a criminal syndicate.
Image Sources:
https://www.metmuseum.org/art/collection/search/361527
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:A_sailor_is_stripped_to_the_waist,_tied_to_a_ladder_and_bein_Wellcome_V0041675.jpg
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:The_Capture_of_the_Pirate_Blackbeard.jpg
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:%22Signing_the_Articles%22_from_the_1936_Pac-Kups_%22Jolly_Roger_Pirates%22_trading_card_set.png
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pg_154_-_So_the_Treasure_was_Divided.jpg
Additional Citations:
Leeson T, Peter. Personal Interview. 20 Mar. 2022