Month: October 2019

Through a small-N approach, I intend to answer the question: What explains the difference in the success and failure of son preference policies in China, India and South Korea.

My DV will be the “success”, “failure” and “mixed-success” of implementation of son preference policies. Son preference policies have been defined as policies and legislation passed to improve and reduce gender inequality and gender discrimination by addressing women’s status, marriage rights, inheritance and property rights in comparison to men. The failure, success and mixed success of policy implementations are multidimensional measurements of 1) demonstrated ability in minimizing associated external affects such as sex ratios, fertility and marriage patterns over time (pre and post implementation) and 2) comprehensiveness of policies in creating change to the structure and persistence of preference.

I plan to use primary sources such as legislation and amendments like India’s Hindus Succession Act amended in 2005 [1], China’s 2005 revised: Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Rights and Interests of Women [2] and  The 1992 Revisions of Korea Family Law (Women Policies) [3]. These are not the only source I plan to use but demonstrate an outline of major laws and acts that have been revised or enacted to asses issues of gender inequality that can be compiled to compare success, failures and mixed success across different social, cultural and historical contexts.

Additional sources, along with policy (economic and social), court rulings, and legislation such as media (news) coverage of preference, national and international reactions and response  from global institutions such as the World Bank and UN would add depth and perspective in evaluating policy implementation. These sources are collected to better understand policy implementation that can directly or indirectly shape women’s preference for sons and uphold or limit women’s status and value in society.

Reuter’s SCMP article on the South Korea’s 2019 court appeal to remove exemptions in their 1953 Abortion Law[4]  demonstrates that the negation of existing law (repeals) could be due to existing policy on women’s fertility rights and constitutional framing on women’s rights and valuation in society. Current news sources could be helpful in outlining whether certain policy implementations were more potent in upholding women’s status and supportive of their decisions and the continued influence of policy related decisions affecting women and preferential treatment.

 

[1]  Hindu Succession Act 1956 Amended in 2005. s 6. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1883337/. ( Accessed 27 October 2019).

[2], National People’s Congressional Standing Committee. Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Rights and Interests of Women. US Congressional-Executive Commission on China. 1992. https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/protection-of-womens-rights-and-interests-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of. (Accessed 26 October 2019).

[3] Korean Civil Code, Books N and V, reprinted in Korean Women’s Development Institute, Statute Book On Korean Women 53-118 (1992).

[4] Reuters. “Law Limits women’s rights’: South Korea’s Constitutional Court Strikes down abortion ban in landmark ruling.” South-China Morning Post (SCMP). 11 April 2019. https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/3005693/south-korean-constitutional-court-overturns-abortion-ban.  (Accessed 27 October 2019).

 

Bibliography

Korean Civil Code. Books N and V. Statute Book On Korean Women. Korean Women’s Development Institute. 53-118 (1992).

National People’s Congressional Standing Committee. Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Rights and Interests of Women. US Congressional-Executive Commission on China. 1992. https://www.cecc.gov/resources/legal-provisions/protection-of-womens-rights-and-interests-law-of-the-peoples-republic-of. (Accessed 26 October 2019).

Hindu Succession Amendment Act 2005. Amended. s 6. 2005. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1923186/. (Accessed 27 October 2019).

Reuters. “Law Limits women’s rights’: South Korea’s Constitutional Court Strikes down abortion ban in landmark ruling.” South-China Morning Post (SCMP). 11 April 2019. https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/3005693/south-korean-constitutional-court-overturns-abortion-ban.  (Accessed 27 October 2019).

I am proposing to research female infanticide because I want to find out what explains the prevalence of son preference during fertility declines, in order to help my reader, understand how women’s decisions to commit infanticide can be reinforced.

Q: What explains variations in son preference across certain family structures during declining fertility rates?

India’s 2011 Census conducted by the Government of India is a survey from both country and regional level featuring demographic stats such as fertility rates, birth rates, income and female and male population but also includes survey statistics on social factors such as religion and households. The key data set I found and that will be relevant to include in my RD was on Household Composition and Size in India. [1]

Within this data set, family compositions is categorized by family structure such as, “Single person household, Nuclear household, Sub-Nuclear household, Supplemented nuclear household, Broken extended household, Joint household, and Others”. [2] In evaluating this data set, I would like to use the social dynamics of households, more specifically, family structures to explain variances in son preference as not only explanations to the existence of preference but explanations to its prevalence within certain family structures than others.  I also wish to evaluate the relationship between family structure and son preference and possibly look at how family structures are identified and outlined by other scholars and how I would possibly differ in labeling them.

I would operationalize this dataset using nominal measurement of 0 or 1 in meaning these structures demonstrated son preference as either present or absent. Additionally, it may be safe to consider measuring each family structure type from 1-8 based on their category and then significance in degree of preference (stronger or weaker) within each family structures type.

Limitations of this data set may be in its assumptions of certain household types and then in turn maybe more specific to certain regional variations rather than variations in son preference so it will be important to make such a differentiation to avoid confusion and assumption from the data. I think in creating my data set I would need to make such a distinction between expected family structures and how they are organized versus how I intended to label and measure them.

 

[1]  “Households by composition and size – 2011”. Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner (New Delhi, India: Government of India, 2011).

[2] Ibid. 

 

Bibliography

“Households by composition and size – 2011”. Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner (New Delhi,      India: Government of India, 2011). http://www.censusindia.gov.in/2011census/hh-series/hh04.html (Accessed October 10, 2019).