Summary of “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China” by Jessica Chen Weiss
In her article called “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China,” Jessica Chen Weiss asks how leaders of authoritarian states effectively and credibly signal their intentions to foreign observers. Essentially, she argues that the government’s decision to allow antiforiegn protests in China is a costly signal of resolve because the protests could turn against the regime — imposing costs in the form of instability or even revolution — if the government doesn’t stand up to the target of the protests. Conversely, signal theory can also explain the decision not to allow protests (if the government spends the resources to quash the demonstrations before they begin, it demonstrates a desire for cooperation. To analyze this phenomenon, Weiss settles on a detailed case study analysis of antiforiegn protests in China, explaining that the opacity of authoritarian regimes makes in-depth analysis especially necessary to discern decision making processes. It also allows her to ascertain the interpretations of foreign observers in contrasting cases. For her data, she utilizes primary and secondary sources, including Chinese government deliberations, news articles from China and America, and memoirs, as well as personally conducted interviews. Weiss concludes that the decision to allow or suppress nationalist protest was a significant factor in foreign observers’ interpretations of events in the anti-American protests of 1999 and 2001 and that authoritarian governments have much to gain (regarding signaling) from effective management. She also notes that there are other ways to signal resolve, such as allowing hawkish politicians to win legislative elections. (1)
(1) Weiss, Jessica Chen. “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China.” International Organization 67, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 1-35. Accessed September 23, 2017. doi:10.1017/s0020818312000380