[{"id":20,"date":"2018-04-10T17:12:43","date_gmt":"2018-04-10T17:12:43","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/?page_id=20"},"modified":"2018-04-10T17:16:11","modified_gmt":"2018-04-10T17:16:11","slug":"the-economic-dynamics-of-nazi-germany-economic-implications-in-the-creation-and-implementation-of-nazi-ideology","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/the-economic-dynamics-of-nazi-germany-economic-implications-in-the-creation-and-implementation-of-nazi-ideology\/","title":{"rendered":"The Economic Dynamics of Nazi Germany"},"content":{"rendered":"

This is a segment from a paper contextualizing the rise of Nazi power in the economic realities preceding the Nazi Germany regime.\u00a0 I wrote it for a class that sought to explain how the rise of Nazi Germany can be normalized when viewed through the lens of the dominant social ideologies of the time.\u00a0 I extended the ideas discussed in class in my paper titled “The Economic Dynamics of Nazi Germany: Economic Implications in the Creation and Implementation of Nazi Ideology” by integrating the dominant social and economic ideologies to provide a background to the movement that\u00a0led to the Nazi Regime:<\/p>\n

The economic growth that Germany experienced in the early 1930\u2019s came out of the Nazi New Order.\u00a0 The Nazi New Order was developed from the economic, political, and ideological shifts in the German reality after World War I.\u00a0 It was deeply steeped in the Nazi ideology in foreign, domestic, and economic policy.<\/p>\n

The foreign policy of the Nazi New Order depended on the creation of what Nazi leaders believed would be the New World Order.\u00a0 The New World Order was determinant on German\u2019s expansion into the power structures of Europe as well as the rise of empires in other parts of the world.[1]<\/a>\u00a0 It \u201cpresupposed Greater East Asia under Japanese hegemony, a US dominated Pan-America, and a German dominated Eurasian Heartland with a Mediterranean-North African subregion under the shadow rule of Italy.\u201d[2]<\/a> In addition, it applied social Darwinism to geography, by envisioning the strongest nations thriving through ever expanding borders at the cost of weaker countries.<\/p>\n

Domestically, the Nazi New Order was a doctrine that attempted to control every aspect of public and private life.\u00a0 However, this resulted in an \u201cimpression of control\u201d[3]<\/a> rather than true command.\u00a0 Germany was caught between the influences of the West and East.\u00a0 The political institutions of the Weimar Republic were a marriage between the Western democratic system and the Eastern authoritarian tradition. \u00a0This meant the Weimar Republic was a representative government on paper, like Western democratic governments, but with more centralized power than was seen in those Western democracies and republics.<\/p>\n

It is important to note that the Weimar Republic never stepped far from the bureaucratic power of the Second Reich.\u00a0 While it is true that the monarch gave up power after World War I, the center of power shifted from \u201cthe monarch to the high civil service without creating representative institutions.\u201d[4]<\/a>\u00a0 This meant that once the Nazi\u2019s had control of the high civil service, there was little in their way when they began expanding.<\/p>\n

Due to the late industrialization in Germany, the tradition of a strong bureaucracy developed before capitalist markets.\u00a0 Because of this, markets introduced by German industrialization were seen as a threat to bureaucratic power[5]<\/a> because industrialization shifted decision making power from absolutist rule to \u201cdecisions made by private entrepreneurs, using profit and capital accumulation as major yardsticks.\u201d[6]<\/a>\u00a0 However, this shift did not destroy the economic reliance on bureaucratic structures within Germany.\u00a0 For example, faced with the economic destruction after World War I, the Nazi New Order attempted to relieve economic fears by shifting industry focus towards consumer goods that were determined via bureaucratic and government-controlled propaganda rather than capitalistic markets.[7]<\/a>\u00a0 With the historical legitimacy of the government playing these roles it was not hard for the Nazi Regime to move into these roles when looking to control the economy and social sphere once in power.<\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography<\/em>, (New York: Random House, 2012), 85.<\/p>\n

[2]<\/a> Ibid. 84.<\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> Wilhelm R\u00f6pke, “Fascist Economics,”\u00a0(Economica<\/em>, New Series, 2, no. 5 1935), 90.<\/p>\n

[4]<\/a> Jurgen Kocka, “Capitalism and Bureaucracy in German Industrialization before 1914.”\u00a0The Economic History Review<\/em>, New Series, 34, no. 3 (1981): 454.<\/p>\n

[5]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[6]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[7]<\/a> Volker R. Berghahn, American Big Business in Britain and Germany: A Comparative History of Two “Special Relationships” in the 20th Century<\/em>. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

This is a segment from a paper contextualizing the rise of Nazi power in the economic realities preceding the Nazi Germany regime.\u00a0 I wrote it for a class that sought to explain how the rise of Nazi Germany can be… Continue Reading →<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2591,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-20","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/20","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2591"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=20"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/20\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=20"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}},{"id":17,"date":"2018-04-10T16:54:27","date_gmt":"2018-04-10T16:54:27","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/?page_id=17"},"modified":"2018-04-10T16:54:53","modified_gmt":"2018-04-10T16:54:53","slug":"egypts-revolutionary-past-contextualizing-the-reality-of-the-post-arab-spring-state","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/egypts-revolutionary-past-contextualizing-the-reality-of-the-post-arab-spring-state\/","title":{"rendered":"Egypt\u2019s Revolutionary Past"},"content":{"rendered":"

The following is a segment from my paper \u201cEgypt\u2019s Revolutionary Past: Contextualizing the Reality of the Post Arab Spring State\u201d written in 2016.\u00a0 In this paper I used an abductive approach, which begins with a \u201cpuzzle, surprise or tension\u201d and seeks to explain it by \u201cidentifying conditions that would make that puzzle\u2026 more of a \u2018normal\u2019 or \u2018natural\u2019 event.\u201d[1]<\/a>\u00a0 The puzzle I am addressing is derived from the tensions between the expectations of success for the Arab Spring and reality of the failures of the movement:<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

The main institution that prohibited a complete transition to democracy was the military.\u00a0 Once Mubarak stepped down, the military assumed power in order to direct the transition to democracy, in the same way that the military directed the change from British governance to the Free Officers after the 1952 coup.\u00a0 As the transitional authority, the military held the responsibility of giving up political and economic privileges and allowing for civilian control.[2]<\/a>\u00a0 Scholars have not been able to agree what the correct course of action for the military should have been.\u00a0 Maswood and Natarajan argue that there was a lack of internal and external pressure on the military to give up control quickly.[3]<\/a>\u00a0 This lack of action allowed corruption to continue to fester and encouraged the military\u2019s love of power in ways that made military officers reluctant to allow the power to move to the control of the people.<\/p>\n

Galal Amin directly contradicts this argument.\u00a0 He claims that the military was too eager to give up power and instituted elections too soon after Mubarak left.[4]<\/a>\u00a0 According to Amin, the military acted quickly because of the aftermath of the 1952 coup when the military lingered over the democratic transition resulting in Nasser\u2019s regime.[5]<\/a>\u00a0 Amin believes that the democratic transition would have been more stable if the military took the time to oversee the restoration of law and order and restoration of the judiciary before allowing elections.[6]<\/a>\u00a0 Not only would purging corruption in these institutions allow for greater freedom in the future, but it would also give the people time to express themselves after decades of repression.\u00a0 This crucial period of time would allow for \u201cleaders to emerge from the masses\u201d so that the popularly elected candidates would be truly representing the Egyptian population and their interests.[7]<\/a>\u00a0 As it happened, these leaders and parties were unable to rise in the public sphere, forcing the people to turn to the religious group that had been a revolutionary leader instead of a group who people believed truly represented their interests and identity.<\/p>\n

In contrast to these two arguments, Cook believes that the military never intended to give up power.\u00a0 He makes the argument that there is an \u201cinformal [unlegislated] institutional link between the military and the presidency that has made the armed forces\u2026powerful over time.\u201d[8]<\/a>\u00a0 As long as the military continues to step in whenever the country becomes too unrestful as it has done for the past 60 years, this institutional link will remain the most important and rigid structure within Egypt.\u00a0 Cook explains how \u201cthe end of both Mubarak and Morsi\u2019s reigns were salvage exercises intended to reset what the coalition that took part in and supported the military\u2019s interventions believe to be Egypt\u2019s natural political order.\u201d [9]<\/a> The power that the Egyptian military holds over the head of government is the largest barrier to democracy in the country.<\/p>\n

President Morsi, an experienced politician, realized the connections between the military and the head of government.\u00a0 He understood that without military support he would be unlikely to be allowed to stay in power.\u00a0 However, his rational choice to collude with the military while forming the new constitution reflected his own interests over the interests of the people.\u00a0 The fact that Morsi was unable for formulate a constitution reflecting the interests of the people delegitimatized his regime.\u00a0 Andr\u00e1s\u00a0Saj\u00f3 explains that constitutions are created based on public sentiments, meaning that the primary emotions embodied by the people are then consolidated into a constitution.[10]<\/a>\u00a0 For example, the United States was particularly fearful of the executive having too much power.\u00a0 This fear is seen throughout the US constitution in the separation of powers.\u00a0 In Egypt, President Morsi primarily focused on incorporating Islamist values into the new constitution while the people were more focused on economic reforms.\u00a0 The emotions channeled into constitutions are chosen by those in power while the constitution is being written.[11]<\/a>\u00a0 For this reason, it is especially important to study whether or not those who consolidate power are representative of the revolutionaries.\u00a0 When, like in Egypt, the people in power have substantially different emotions from the public, the constitution could introduce a cultural separation between the rulers and ruled that causes the government to lose legitimacy in the eyes of the people.<\/p>\n

As a result of this disconnect, the people, who began to experience anti-hegemonic principles,[12]<\/a> again took to the streets.\u00a0 Anti-hegemony refers to the idea that the people refuse to identify with the programs of the ruling elites, which betrays a deep distrust in the institutions of power.[13]<\/a>\u00a0\u00a0 Shokr argues that this distrust has continued after the revolution ended. \u00a0Shokr proves his theory of continued cynicism quantitatively by looking at the voting patterns in Egypt after Mubarak stepped down from power.\u00a0 The first elections brought the majority of Egyptians to the polls, but each successive vote had a lower and lower turnout.[14]<\/a>\u00a0 By the time the referendum for the constitution came to the public, only 32 percent of the public voted.[15]<\/a>\u00a0 Shokr attributes this behavior to Egypt\u2019s historical attempts at democracy and how often a dictator has been voted into power and then used the system to stay in power instead of peacefully abdicating power at the end of his term.[16]<\/a>\u00a0 The low voter turnout also suggests a lack of legitimacy towards the new government, even though it was formed democratically.\u00a0 The lack of legitimacy following the election of President Morsi is related the inherent disconnect between the priorities of those in power and the initial protesters desires.\u00a0 This detachment of priorities and the unrest that resulted from it led to the military coup that placed General el-Sisi in President Morsi\u2019s position.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> Peregrine Schwartz-Shea, and Dvora Yanow. \u201cWays of Knowing.\u201d Interpretive Research Design: Concepts and Processes. <\/em>New York: 24-43.<\/p>\n

[2]<\/a> Jim Sciutto, \u201cThe Middle Eastern Revolution\u2019s Bloody Second Act.\u201d World Affairs, 2011. 224.<\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[4]<\/a> Galal Amin. \u201cA Revolution or a Coup.\u201d Whatever Happened to the Egyptian Revolution? (2013): 134.<\/p>\n

[5]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[6]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[7]<\/a> Amin, \u201cA Revolution or a Coup,\u201d 134.<\/p>\n

[8]<\/a> Steven A. Cook. \u201cThe Middle Eastern Revolutions That Never Were.\u201d The American Interest (October 26): 3.<\/p>\n

[9]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[10]<\/a> Andr\u00e1s Saj\u00f3. Constitutional Sentiments.<\/em> (Yale University Press, 2011).<\/p>\n

[11]<\/a> Saj\u00f3. Constitutional Sentiments, <\/em>12.<\/p>\n

[12]<\/a> Ahmed Shokr. \u201cTwo Revolutions.\u201d Middle East Report 265. 2015<\/p>\n

[13]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[14]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[15]<\/a> Shokr. \u201cTwo Revolutions.\u201d<\/p>\n

[16]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The following is a segment from my paper \u201cEgypt\u2019s Revolutionary Past: Contextualizing the Reality of the Post Arab Spring State\u201d written in 2016.\u00a0 In this paper I used an abductive approach, which begins with a \u201cpuzzle, surprise or tension\u201d and… Continue Reading →<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2591,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-17","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/17","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2591"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=17"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/17\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=17"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}},{"id":16,"date":"2018-04-10T16:53:40","date_gmt":"2018-04-10T16:53:40","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/?page_id=16"},"modified":"2018-04-10T16:55:22","modified_gmt":"2018-04-10T16:55:22","slug":"writing-sample","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/writing-sample\/","title":{"rendered":"Defining, Rationalizing, and Codifying the “Other”"},"content":{"rendered":"

The following is a segment from a paper I wrote last Fall about defining, rationalizing, and codifying the \u201cOther\u201d in the context of terrorist organizations:<\/p>\n

Terrorism has emerged as one of the major focal points of foreign policy in the United States.\u00a0 Since the tragic events on September 11, 2001, American intelligence and security agencies have increased their resources to attempt to stop terrorist attacks before they happen.\u00a0 This policy goal has often resulted in heavy-handed tactics that are often ineffective.\u00a0 One reason why policies towards terrorists are ineffective is because we do not yet understand why someone would become a terrorist.\u00a0 It is hard to explain why someone would commit such atrocious actions against innocent communities.\u00a0 There are many factors that can help explain the reason for participating in a terrorist organization, however I have chosen to focus on the process of rationalization that terrorists pursue in order to justify their attacks.\u00a0 I argue that by understanding how terrorists justify their actions, we can better understand why someone would be willing to commit terrorist attacks, which will help us create more effective policy to fight terrorists.<\/p>\n

In most instances of terrorist attacks, the first step to committing the atrocity is to create an \u201cother\u201d out of the people who will be harmed. \u00a0Throughout history, it has been clear that \u201cit is difficult to belittle and kill a person whom one knows and for whom one has no personal antipathy.\u201d[1]<\/a> Therefore, societies that focus on an \u201cus\u201d versus \u201cthem\u201d mentality, as extremist organizations tend to do, demonize the \u201cother\u201d as a \u201cfaceless collective enemy\u201d to make it easier for their members to carry out attacks against ordinary people.[2]<\/a>\u00a0 It is much harder to kill someone who you can relate to, while it is much easier to justify murder when it is done to general enemy.[3]<\/a>\u00a0 The dichotomy between \u201cwe\u201d and \u201cthey\u201d has existed throughout history and within this dichotomy the further away the \u201cthey\u201d can be from the \u201cwe,\u201d the greater the ease in which the \u201cother\u201d is destroyed.[4]<\/a> \u00a0In this paper, I will focus on how Islamist terrorist groups define the \u201cotherness\u201d of their targets and how they rationalize and codify this demonization of their victims.<\/p>\n

I will first discuss how terrorist organizations define the other, and how some organizations differ in their consideration of who is unworthy to live.\u00a0 Then I will discuss the rationalization of the other, including the ideology that is used to justify their definition of the other, where the need for creating an \u201cother\u201d comes from, and how organizations have codified their definitions.\u00a0 Finally, I will discuss implications of demonizing the other, and how we can use this knowledge to counter terrorist tactics.<\/p>\n

Defining the Other<\/strong><\/p>\n

The definition of the \u201cother\u201d according to Islamist terrorist groups has changed over the last few decades.\u00a0 Some of the first modern dialogue that began to distinguish between \u201ctrue\u201d Islam and how it has been corrupted in the modern age focused on reviving traditional values in the face of communism.[5]<\/a>\u00a0 In fact, the first years of Al-Qaeda were spent with a mission to expressly fight communism.[6]<\/a>\u00a0 The United States actually encouraged these groups as they were fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, which helped the American cause.\u00a0 However, rather than centering their ideology around fighting the Soviets, the Islamist focus was primarily a reaction to materialism, which both communism and capitalism embrace as a key tenet of their philosophies.[7]<\/a> \u00a0When the threat of communism had disappeared, the only materialist threat that Islamist groups saw in competition to the spirituality of Islam was capitalism, which was tied to America and their colonizing influences.[8]<\/a>\u00a0 For this reason, Al-Qaeda and other similar groups turned their attention to alienizing Western influences, specifically American influences, and defined anyone who was colluding with the West as \u201cother.\u201d<\/p>\n

Today\u2019s most influential group, the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS) has a different definition of targets.\u00a0 While they share Al-Qaeda\u2019s disdain for American influence in the Middle East, they focus their definition of the \u201cother\u201d on one\u2019s religious practices.\u00a0 ISIS has a very narrow interpretation of Islam, and anyone who does not behave in accordance to their definition becomes an \u201cother\u201d whose life needs to be sacrificed in the name of recreating the Islamic Caliphate.\u00a0 With this belief system, ISIS has expanded the \u201cother\u201d to include other Muslims who do not live up to ISIS\u2019s standard of purity.[9]<\/a><\/p>\n

The danger in defining the \u201cother\u201d is because it provides a narrow definition of who belongs in the group and who does not.\u00a0 In her discussion of ideology that leads to acts of terror within totalitarian states, Hannah Arendt explains how the logic of an idea can take precedent over the idea itself.[10]<\/a>\u00a0 Once the line between \u201cus\u201d and \u201cthem\u201d is drawn, the logic behind implementing that idea into practice can turn the idea into a target to kill because they are not in the group. \u00a0Once the group of the \u201cother\u201d has been defined as a target for killing, the action of killing them is easier because there is no expectation that the other deserves to live.<\/p>\n

For example, Al-Qaeda focused their attacks on Westerners, but attacks against other Muslims were taboo.[11]<\/a>\u00a0 This applied to Sunni Muslims, the sect that Al-Qaeda members belong to, as well as Shi\u2019a Muslims, who are often considered heretics who do not follow the true path of Islam according to Sunni Muslims.\u00a0 In the definition of \u201cother\u201d according to Al-Qaeda, Shi\u2019a Muslims were \u201cforgiven because of their ignorance\u201d so they still humanized and therefore were not targeted in attacks.[12]<\/a>\u00a0 In contrast, ISIS defined Shi\u2019a Muslims as apostates, who are worse than heretics because apostates have renounced the true word of God.[13]<\/a>\u00a0 As apostates, the Shi\u2019a became part of the \u201cother\u201d that can be killed without blame to the perpetrators.[14]<\/a>\u00a0 The strength of defining the \u201cother\u201d can have life or death consequences.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

[1]<\/a> Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence, <\/em>(Berkley: University of California Press, 2003) 173.<\/p>\n

[2]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[3]<\/a> Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God<\/em>. 173<\/p>\n

[4]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[5]<\/a> Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and The Road to 9\/11<\/em>, (New York: Penguin<\/p>\n

Random House, 2006) 17.<\/p>\n

[6]<\/a> Ibid. 150.<\/p>\n

[7]<\/a> Wright, The Looming Tower, <\/em>17.<\/p>\n

[8]<\/a> Ibid. 150.<\/p>\n

[9]<\/a> William McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State<\/em>, (New York: St. Martin\u2019s Press, 2015).<\/em><\/p>\n

[10]<\/a> Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism<\/em>, (Cleveland: First Meridian, 1951) 471.<\/p>\n

[11]<\/a> McCants, ISIS Apocalypse,<\/em> 34.<\/p>\n

[12]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[13]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n

[14]<\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The following is a segment from a paper I wrote last Fall about defining, rationalizing, and codifying the \u201cOther\u201d in the context of terrorist organizations: Terrorism has emerged as one of the major focal points of foreign policy in the… Continue Reading →<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2591,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-16","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/16","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2591"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=16"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/16\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=16"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}},{"id":11,"date":"2018-04-10T16:25:06","date_gmt":"2018-04-10T16:25:06","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/?page_id=11"},"modified":"2018-04-10T16:31:11","modified_gmt":"2018-04-10T16:31:11","slug":"resume","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/edspace.american.edu\/kullman\/resume\/","title":{"rendered":"Resume"},"content":{"rendered":"

Katherine Ullman<\/strong><\/h2>\n

kate.ullman@gmail.com<\/p>\n

https:\/\/www.linkedin.com\/in\/kate-ullman-236596109<\/p>\n

OBJECTIVE<\/strong><\/p>\n

Seeking a position that will allow me to research and apply my understanding of public and international policy.\u00a0 Especially interested in analyzing U.S. policy results in the Middle East and North Africa, economic development policy, and recent trends of extremism.<\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

EDUCATION<\/strong><\/p>\n

American University<\/strong>, Washington, DC<\/p>\n

Graduating May 2018<\/p>\n

School of International Service, Bachelor of Arts in International Studies<\/p>\n

GPA<\/em>: 3.81\/4.0<\/p>\n

Honors: AU Scholars Program; Dean\u2019s List (4 years)<\/p>\n