**Explaining the French Partial Withdrawal From NATO**

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# Abstract

# Scholars have long debated whether strategic, cultural, political, or ideological factors best determine the continued involvement of states in military alliances. However, the literature does not take into account partial withdrawal from alliances, and this potentially limits our understanding in key ways. To shed light on the nature of military alliances, this research uses a neopositivist methodology to examine the most powerful state that ever withdrew from NATO: Charles de Gaulle’s France. My research focuses on what specific combination of factors caused France to partially withdraw from NATO in 1966. It examines and weighs three independent variables: the degree to which NATO met French strategic priorities, the extent of nationalism in France, and France’s threat perceptions. The variables are operationalized using speeches by leaders, declassified communications between members of NATO, and additional primary source material. The analysis indicates that nationalism, and thus constructivism, was a significant factor in the French partial withdrawal. By identifying the conditions influencing French withdrawal from NATO, this research improves our understanding of how the collision of constructivist, realist, and liberalist thought in a key NATO state lead to a partial withdrawal. Additionally, it works to determine whether political, ideological, or strategic factors are more important in holding an alliance together.

# Introduction

With 28 members, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) boasts an alliance containing 14 percent of the world’s countries. This is an astonishing statistic for an alliance that has had its doom prophesized from the moment of its inception. NATO continues to be, after 65 years, a relevant international organization whose policies benefit a variety of states. The Alliance currently retains its importance geopolitically,[[1]](#footnote-1) as it works to promote North American and European interests,[[2]](#footnote-2) maintain a collective defense structure for all members,[[3]](#footnote-3) and improve cooperation and communication on both sides of the Atlantic.[[4]](#footnote-4)

Yet despite its past success, NATO is currently in uncertain waters. The widening gulf between the US and Europe over political and military goals is concerning.[[5]](#footnote-5) Recent operations in places like Georgia and the Balkans were heavily criticized by the international community and military strategists alike as being ineffective or damaging.[[6]](#footnote-6) In addition, the European Union (EU) is starting to rise as a growing cultural and political alternative to NATO for European states, many of which are wondering if there is even a need for a military alliance like NATO.[[7]](#footnote-7) These factors all add fuel to a growing public relations crisis, as scholars continue to question NATO’s relevancy and efficiency in the 21st century.[[8]](#footnote-8) An alliance is only as strong as the members that form its ranks. NATO’s 28 members are not created equal, and if more powerful states like the United States, France, the UK, or Germany begin to question the relevancy of the alliance, its influence and military capabilities will suffer as these states disengage.

This paper investigates a single case: France under President Charles de Gaulle. The French partial withdrawal from NATO lasted over 40 years, from 1963 to the early 2000’s.[[9]](#footnote-9) Such a long withdrawal demands a compelling explanation. Additionally, the French withdrawal was partial, since France left NATO’s military command structure but remained politically tied to the alliance. I am conceptualizing partial withdrawal from a military alliance as the act of cutting all military cooperation with the alliance for at least five years (the shortest time a country (Greece) has left NATO),[[10]](#footnote-10) while retaining political ties to the alliance. In order to understand the rationale behind France’s decision it is critical to pose the question: what combination of factors caused France to partially withdraw from NATO in 1966? The answer will shed light on the factors that either destabilize, or unify, military alliances.

Moving forward, I explain why de Gaulle’s France leaving NATO cannot be explained by the literature reviewed, which does not take into account partial withdrawals, making France a deviant case.[[11]](#footnote-11) I then lay out a small-n neopositivist approach that incorporates qualitative and quantitative sources to examine three independent variables which would influence a state to leave a military alliance. The dependent variable measures a state’s desire to leave a military alliance. The first independent variable measures the degree to which the military alliance met the state’s strategic goals, the second measures a state’s level of nationalism, and the third variable is a state’s perception of external threat levels. Each of these variables is embedded in the literature reviewed and operationalized using the primary sources I gathered.

In conclusion, I find that high nationalism and the low utility of NATO to the French pushed France to partially withdraw from NATO’s military command structure. The dangers posed by the Warsaw Pact and West Germany is what convinced De Gaulle to remain politically engaged with NATO in order to retain a measure of political protection. I then apply these results to the current time period by explaining that high nationalism and disinterest in political and military alliances still affects Europe today, expanding on the dangers that poses for NATO. A small-n methodology allows these conclusions to remain generalizable while still drawing on extensive contextual sources that are critical to understand the time periods I am discussing.

**Literature Review**

An alliance is defined as a “voluntary agreement between states in which the signatories promise to take action (such as military intervention) under specific circumstances (usually war).”[[12]](#footnote-12) The literature on military alliances is categorized into three schools of thought: a realist school which postulates that alliances retain cohesion because members are united by common structural and strategic objectives, a liberalist school that suggests military alliances stay together because of common cultural factors or domestic considerations, and a constructivist school which suggests that military alliance cohesion is determined by the extent to which state identities are similar or different. Realism in this context refers to what is known as “defensive realism,” which recognizes that states live in a world that is fundamentally chaotic but seek to unify to create a balance of power while also defending their interests.[[13]](#footnote-13) Liberalism, in contrast, focuses on the sociopolitical characteristics of states and how these characteristics influence their decision making process.[[14]](#footnote-14) Constructivism challenges both schools on the notion that state identities are predictable, explaining that states develop fluid identities that are shaped by the interactions they have with other states and can therefore change over time.[[15]](#footnote-15) These schools of thought lay the necessary groundwork to understand and explain military alliance cohesion and, as a result, the decisions of individual member states.

Realists assume that states form military alliances to achieve goals. Unlike the constructivist and liberalist schools, the culture and domestic politics of states have little weight to realist scholars, and military alliances are seen as useful only if they help to achieve concrete policies. As a result, these scholars agree that states band together to achieve common tactical or security-related goals, as opposed to states coming together because they have similar cultures or similar forms of government.[[16]](#footnote-16) There are a variety of explanatory factors emphasized within this school. These include: the extent to which diplomatic goals are shared between states,[[17]](#footnote-17) the level of diplomatic recognition of state borders along with the ability to defend them militarily,[[18]](#footnote-18) and level of military and political clout states have regionally or globally.[[19]](#footnote-19) Debates within this school revolve around which of these priorities is more relevant to military alliance cohesion: security-related priorities specifically, or other foreign policy-related objectives. Scholars within this school of thought typically utilize statistical analysis to reach general conclusions about military alliance behavior.

The debate amongst realists focuses on what goals states are trying to achieve. States either ally with other states to increase their own security and/or to further their tactical priorities. Some scholars argue that military alliances create a structure that maintains a more stable and peaceful status quo which results in increased security to alliance members.[[20]](#footnote-20) Although the structure of alliances reduces state autonomy, states that are in military alliances are willing to accept this in order to be more secure.[[21]](#footnote-21) This increased security results from two factors: proximity and communication. Firstly, because most states in military alliances share a border with at least one fellow member, the chances that a state will be invaded by a neighboring country are reduced.[[22]](#footnote-22) Secondly, because alliances offer a formalized and streamlined structure for communication, the chances for misunderstanding or escalation are reduced.[[23]](#footnote-23) The more information states have about the intentions of other states, the less likely it is that war will break out between them.[[24]](#footnote-24)

Other realist scholars explain that states form military alliances in order to achieve tactical policies that only partially have to do with their military security.[[25]](#footnote-25) Italy serves as a good example. One major goal Italy wanted NATO to achieve was expansion into the Balkans, which in Italy’s eyes would have stabilized the region and increased Italy’s economic and political clout there, as Italy could not expand into the region by itself due to its relatively weak military.[[26]](#footnote-26) Alliances like NATO are an especially useful place to see states prioritizing strategic benefits over autonomy. Weaker states within these sorts of military alliances depend on a powerful state (or states) to absorb the costs of the alliance, while powerful states often manipulate weaker states to achieve their tactical objectives.[[27]](#footnote-27) In a realist world, these sorts of relationships do not have to be balanced, they just have to match up with the priorities of each state.

Certain decisions made by de Gaulle’s France fit into this realist paradigm. Under his leadership, France developed its own nuclear force,[[28]](#footnote-28) and one of de Gaulle’s central priorities was to restore French military, economic, and political dominance in Europe. Accordingly, in order to determine what combination of factors led France to partially withdraw from NATO, it is necessary to take into account realist thought as a factor which influenced de Gaulle’s decisions, because many of his goals centered around the issues realists focus on.

The second school of thought investigates the work of liberalist scholars. Unlike realists, liberalists prioritize political and cultural considerations within states, laying these out as the main factors that cause states to unify or draw apart. The debate within this school focuses on which of these two factors is more important when determining alliance formation.[[29]](#footnote-29) One branch of liberalists focuses on culture as being the primary catalyst driving alliance formation. They explain that states are more likely to come together when they share common backgrounds such as legal cultures.[[30]](#footnote-30) The literature takes culture into account by examining the unifying affect of international law on the international system, and how similar languages, ethnicities, and histories unify states.[[31]](#footnote-31) For example, states are greatly influenced by the lessons learned early in their histories and common historical lessons lead certain states to work towards similar goals in the future.[[32]](#footnote-32) India is a good example of this. When India rejected an alliance with the U.S. in 1954, it did so because it viewed such an alliance as once again placing foreign troops in Indian territory, which brought back bad memories of India’s occupation by Britain, not because an alliance with the U.S. was a poor strategic choice.[[33]](#footnote-33) As a result, the preponderance of common cultural factors has an impact on a diplomatic level, as government officials from different cultures make different choices in the same situations, which divides states by the different perspectives they have about similar problems.[[34]](#footnote-34) In India’s case, they agreed with the United States on certain security issues, but a difference in culture made them unwilling to fully cooperate with the West. These scholars stand in sharp contrast to realist thought, pointing to the historical and cultural backgrounds of different states to explain why states don’t always choose a realist foreign policy.

Cultural factors could even lead to issues within existing alliances, such as the U.S.-Japanese alliance, when a US submarine accidentally sank a Japanese fishing vessel in 2001 and cultural barriers made communication difficult.[[35]](#footnote-35) The major barrier was the difference in outlook. America has a more individualistic culture, so they viewed this incident as isolated. The Japanese, however, were furious. As a collectivist culture, the Japanese believe that one person’s actions cast shame on the whole population. As a result, they viewed this incident as an example of overall American carelessness, which made this already tense situation worse. Even when strategic priorities are aligned, this theoretical subcategory maintains that a state’s culture strongly impacts what alliances it chooses to enter and remain in. Another example of this is the current state of U.S.-EU relations and the transatlantic relationship as a whole. The EU, more concerned with the spread of its soft power, is drawing away from the United States because the US is focused on the spread of its hard power capabilities.[[36]](#footnote-36) Scholars explain this by pointing out the differences in the values and cultures of the EU and the US as a whole, highlighting variables such as: the importance of the military in everyday life, the degree to which citizens of states accept institutionalization, and the level of respect the governing bodies of the state have for international law.[[37]](#footnote-37)

However, there is a division within this school. Some liberalist scholars believe that domestic political concerns are the primary factor state leaders consider when choosing to join or remain in military alliances, as opposed to overall culture being the primary catalyst. When citizens of states, particularly democratic ones, push for a certain policy or a certain alliance, state actions change as a result, because state leaders feel beholden to their people and pursue actions that their voting blocks would find acceptable.[[38]](#footnote-38) This effect can certainly be observed in democratic states, such as the United States, where citizens’ voices matter.[[39]](#footnote-39) Even in more illiberal states, such as China, domestic forces such as nationalism need to be maintained through diplomatic and military successes, because leaders use these successes to bolster their popularity.[[40]](#footnote-40) However, the link between nationalism and the actual formation of policy is not explored extensively by liberalist scholars.

Regardless of whether the scholars within this school focus on culture or domestic political trends, they utilize a mix of statistical studies and case studies in their work. These scholars all reject the idea that realist tendencies are the main drivers of military alliance formation. Additionally, they reject the constructivist notion that the culture of a state is fluid, which sharply separates these two schools of thought. In terms of France, de Gaulle’s continued integration with the political aspects of NATO highlight the importance of similar political cultures and adds credence to this liberalist school. Regardless of differing strategic priorities, France chose to remain politically unified with the Atlantic Alliance, which may have occurred because France could have shared similar political or cultural systems with other NATO members. As a result, liberalism needs to be investigated as a potential influence on France.

The third school of thought investigates constructivist work, particularly scholars that identify nationalism as a central component of constructivism. Alexander Wendt, long considered a key constructivist scholar, identifies the differences between constructivism and realism. While realists assume that an anarchic international system creates policies that are geared towards self-preservation, Wendt points out that when states join military alliances, they create a system of “friendly anarchy” that gradually transforms their identities to ones that are more peaceful in nature, moving away from conflict.[[41]](#footnote-41) Overall, the constructivist notion that identities are not static is one of the major differences between this school of thought and the previous two, which both consider behaviors to be fluid but identities to be static.[[42]](#footnote-42) Additionally, this school strongly emphasizes state sovereignty. Sovereignty motivates states to define boundaries between themselves and those that they consider different, which results in a rejection of protection by other states and a resistance to join collective units like alliances until such sovereignty is established.[[43]](#footnote-43) Connected to sovereignty is the notion of nationalism, which seeks to defend a state’s sovereignty and in doing so grants legitimacy to the leader of the state.[[44]](#footnote-44) A nationalistic state leader frames their goals as the objectives of the state, using nationalism as a way to generate enthusiasm for their policies.[[45]](#footnote-45) In summary, a nationalistic leader will prioritize sovereignty over tactical or political concerns, and in doing so could pull their state from alliances or join ones that they deem maintains their sovereignty.

The literature reviewed sheds light on the overarching theories which seek to explain why states join or withdraw from military alliances. However, there are tensions within the literature that need to be addressed. The first is that of states partially withdrawing from an alliance. Nowhere in the literature is partial withdrawal even considered as a possibility, though it is faintly alluded to by constructivist scholars. By examining the specific set of variables that caused France to partially withdraw from NATO, This research will shed light on this seldom mentioned option for state leaders. Additionally, nationalism is considered differently by each school. Realists deem it irrelevant, liberalists consider it a unifying force but don’t investigate it further, and constructivists view nationalism as one of the primary forces causing states to leave a military alliance. De Gaulle’s France was exceptionally nationalistic,[[46]](#footnote-46) which I research in order to determine whether nationalism was one of the key reasons France partially withdrew from NATO. If so, this would prove the constructivist school to be correct about how nationalism affects military alliances. Overall, nationalism’s impact on multilateral military alliances is seldom considered, and this research seeks to address this gap. In addition, I investigate whether realism and liberalism influenced French partial withdrawal, and seek to explain why they did or did not do so.

**Greece: A State that matches Realist Theories**

Greece partially withdrew from NATO on August 15th, 1974, a move that has often been compared with the French withdrawal nine years earlier.[[47]](#footnote-47) However, I chose not to include Greece as an official case because it is well explained by realist thought. Greece withdrew from NATO for two reasons. First Greece was furious at the U.S. because America did not step in to help the Greeks when Turkey invaded Cyprus in 1974. Secondly, Greece viewed Turkey as an external threat, and lost confidence in NATO’s ability to resolve the conflict peacefully.[[48]](#footnote-48) The Greeks were correct in the second assessment. NATO did not have any mechanisms for addressing inter-alliance conflict and this worsened an already tense situation.[[49]](#footnote-49) This furthers realist scholars like Bennet, who stipulated that states join military alliances for their physical security and if they feel like the alliance no longer is willing to protect them, they will withdraw from these alliances.[[50]](#footnote-50) Unlike de Gaulle’s France, which had extreme nationalist elements that complicated the application of realist thought to its partial withdrawal, Greece was a clear application of the realist school of thought. As a result, I did not consider it as a formal unit.

# Methodology

# In order to determine the combination of variables behind the French partial withdrawal from NATO, I conduct a case study of France from 1958 to 1966. The overall goal of this project is to provide a critique of existing theory on military alliances by identifying key variables that fueled French partial withdrawal, then explaining the impacts, if any, that these variables had on France. A case study framework is useful for this, as it allows me to analyze qualitative primary source literature in order to add weight to my arguments, which strengthen my ability to critique existing theory.[[51]](#footnote-51) It also allows me to explain the significance of these variables on France and generalize these impacts to NATO as a whole, and to the conversation surrounding military alliance formation and fragmentation. The methodology is organized as follows: I first justify the parameters of this case study. Following this, I outline out the dependent variable and the independent variables that affect it. Lastly, I postulate a hypothesis and provide an overview of the analysis. The case, or formal unit,[[52]](#footnote-52) I am investigating is France, specifically France under Charles de Gaulle from 1958-1968. Charles de Gaulle led France away from NATO in 1966,[[53]](#footnote-53) thus the time that he was in power (up to the French withdrawal) is significant. There were several unusual elements that made the French withdrawal from NATO valuable to research. France was the only state to leave NATO for a significant period of time (over a decade, in this case around forty years),[[54]](#footnote-54) and one of a few examples of states in history that eschewed integrated military alliances like NATO.[[55]](#footnote-55) Many of these other states, such as India, were in a group known as the “Non-Aligned Movement”, a rough union of developing states which did not fit with the developed European order.[[56]](#footnote-56) Additionally, France was the only European state to significantly resist U.S. domination of NATO,[[57]](#footnote-57) and the only state in Europe to focus on reasserting its status as a Great Power after WWII.[[58]](#footnote-58) However, France continued to enmesh itself in European economic and political affairs, as de Gaulle wanted to free Europe from what he perceived to be U.S. control without destabilizing Europe’s economic and political stability.[[59]](#footnote-59) This strengthens my argument that France was a deviant case,[[60]](#footnote-60) as it did not conform to theoretical predictions for countries in military alliances, or for countries in NATO specifically. I want to analyze this case to determine how it contributes to an overall understanding of military alliance cohesion. To do so, I identify and measure three independent variables and analyze their combined effect on the dependent variable.

The dependent variable measures the French desire to leave NATO. To operationalize this variable, I assign an overall scale to it, with High, Medium, and Low levels.[[61]](#footnote-61) This variable has four indicators, the first investigating whether France expelled alliance personnel and bureaucracy from its territory.[[62]](#footnote-62) It is measured by reviewing telegrams sent from the American Embassy in France to the U.S. State Department in 1966.[[63]](#footnote-63) The second indicator is an increased amount of military operations occurring outside NATO jurisdiction.[[64]](#footnote-64) This is measured by examining letters from de Gaulle to the United States and Britain which discuss the rationale of French military operations ,[[65]](#footnote-65) or through articles from European and American newspapers which discuss public French military operations between 1958 to 1968. The third indicator investigates whether the French formally stated that they wanted to withdraw from NATO, [[66]](#footnote-66) which would involve Charles de Gaulle explicitly stating so in letters he sends to U.S. President Johnson in 1966.[[67]](#footnote-67) The last indicator examines the extent to which the French pursued diplomatic goals that were contrary to the goals of NATO.[[68]](#footnote-68) To determine this, declassified American intelligence reports are examined that detail diplomatic clashes between the French and the rest of NATO,[[69]](#footnote-69) and meetings between de Gaulle and Soviet leaders in 1966.[[70]](#footnote-70) Overall, this variable is supported by both the realist and liberalist schools of thought, which stated that the choice to leave a military alliance could occur for strategic reasons or, in the case of the second school, cultural reasons.[[71]](#footnote-71)

Three independent variables potentially affect the dependent variable. The first is NATO’s utility to France.[[72]](#footnote-72) This independent variable has two indicators. The first is the degree of NATO’s assistance to the French when France conducts an international military operation.[[73]](#footnote-73) This is determined by finding information specific to the Algerian civil war, which de Gaulle inherited from his predecessors and which raged till 1962. To determine if NATO supported France in stabilizing this conflict, I examine New York Times articles from 1958,[[74]](#footnote-74) memoirs from Lord Gladwyn, the British ambassador to France,[[75]](#footnote-75), and other members of the British government.[[76]](#footnote-76) The British were extremely vocal about the French in this time period, so they provided a great deal of useful information. The second indicator measures the degree of influence France has over NATO operations,[[77]](#footnote-77) and I studied this by reviewing New York Times articles from 1958 that detail meetings between de Gaulle and other NATO leaders,[[78]](#footnote-78) and by reviewing NATO strategy reports that detail meetings between NATO ministers.[[79]](#footnote-79) The connection this communication has to the literature is illustrated in the liberalist literature reviewed, in which a leader’s culture impacts the results of their meetings with officials from other states. [[80]](#footnote-80) If state leaders fail to communicate properly due to cultural prejudices or different worldviews, then diplomacy will become strained and potentially undermine military alliance cohesion.

The second independent variable measures the level of nationalism in France.[[81]](#footnote-81) Nationalism has roots in the constructivist literature reviewed, which indicated that it fuels a desire to promote a state’s sovereignty and in doing so grants legitimacy to the leader of the state.[[82]](#footnote-82) Lack of deference to one state specifically (the alliance hegemon), is a natural extension of the liberalist and realist literature reviewed, which explains that states within existing alliances can work poorly with other allied states because of cultural or strategic rifts.[[83]](#footnote-83) This variable has two indicators, the first being how charismatic de Gaulle is.[[84]](#footnote-84) To measure this indicator, speeches de Gaulle gave to the French people in the mid 1960’s,[[85]](#footnote-85) accounts by Stanley Clark and other historians alive at the time,[[86]](#footnote-86) and accounts from the Atlantic and New York Times are analyzed.[[87]](#footnote-87) The second indicator is a lack of French deference towards the alliance hegemon, which measures the willingness of the French to comply with the foreign policy objectives of United States.[[88]](#footnote-88) This is measured through an examination of documents between French government ministers such as de Beaumarchais,[[89]](#footnote-89) speeches or letters by de Gaulle to the leader to of the United States in which the general tone is one of noncompliance,[[90]](#footnote-90) and by examining the records of states such as Mexico referencing French diplomatic visits.[[91]](#footnote-91)

The third independent variable is a measure of the external threat levels for the French.[[92]](#footnote-92) The realist literature reviewed allows for this, when it explains that states band together for security-related purposes, which would indicate a recognized threat.[[93]](#footnote-93) I assess three informal units, the Warsaw Pact, the Chinese, and the West Germans, because these were the two most powerful members of the communist bloc and the one NATO state that the French were the most wary of, respectively. I assess each unit using three indicators. The first indicator is the proximity of the threat to France,[[94]](#footnote-94) which I measured by identifying the distance between the borders of both states between 1958 to 1968.[[95]](#footnote-95) This is grounded in the literature reviewed, as states can join military alliances for the purpose of protecting their borders and surrounding themselves with friendly states to extend this proximity.[[96]](#footnote-96) The second indicator details the relative power levels of the threat,[[97]](#footnote-97) which is measured using declassified intelligence reports examining the military power levels of the opposing state, such as troop levels and levels of military modernization.[[98]](#footnote-98) The last indicator investigates the French perception of the opposing actor, in terms of its economic, military, or political capabilities[[99]](#footnote-99) This is measured by analyzing French embassy telegrams at that time,[[100]](#footnote-100) as well as diplomatic meeting records between the French government and the government of each informal unit,[[101]](#footnote-101) I use these indicators to determine if the French government perceived these actors as threatening.

From these three independent variables, I am now able to construct a hypothesis, which is as follows: In the context of France, a combination of a low score on NATO’s utility to France, a high score on the level of French nationalism, and two or more informal units having a medium level of threat to France is sufficient to result in a medium level of French desire to leave NATO.

The analysis consisted of two primary steps. First, I determined where my case fell on my scales by assigning values to my variables. I then analyze the correctness of the hypothesis in order to determine if it has a degree of explanatory power. I lastly illustrate how this combination of causes pushed France towards partial withdrawal and expand on how this impacts our understanding of military alliance theory. To back up my analysis, I reach back to the literature review to determine which schools were most influential to the studied case, in addition to expanding upon further work that needs to be accomplished. In conclusion, I discuss implications for modern day NATO, connecting those implications back to the operationalizations and the literature reviewed.

**Analysis**

In order to determine the specific combination of factors that caused France to partially withdraw from NATO in 1966, I consider four variables.[[102]](#footnote-102) The dependent variable,[[103]](#footnote-103) French desire to leave NATO, scores at a Medium. The first notion that French interest in NATO was ebbing came in the form of two events which occurred in 1959: the establishment of a central French command in the Mediterranean that was independent of NATO and the development of a French controlled nuclear force.[[104]](#footnote-104) Both of these initiatives reduced French reliance on NATO’s central command. A letter from de Gaulle to US President Dwight Eisenhower, which pressed for equal political status with the U.S. and Great Britain, reinforced French displeasure with NATO’s current structure.[[105]](#footnote-105) Diplomatically, the French improved relations with the Warsaw Pact and recognized the People’s Republic of China,[[106]](#footnote-106) which ran contrary to the foreign policy goals of NATO, breaking the diplomatic consensus. All of these events culminated in an expulsion of NATO forces from French territory in 1966, indicating that the French were no longer concerned about the strategic priorities of other NATO members.[[107]](#footnote-107) As a result, France signaled its declining commitment to NATO by exiting its military command structure in 1966, while still remaining a member of the Alliance.

From the French perspective, NATO had a Low degree of utility. While France had an appreciable level of political power in NATO, the lack of NATO support for its military operations in Algeria and diplomatic tension between the U.S., the U.K, and France all decreased the strategic benefit of NATO in French eyes. This is illustrated by the following points. First, the degree of NATO’s assistance to France was nonexistent. The French did not want NATO meddling in French military operations, nor were other members of NATO comfortable with French unilateralism in North Africa. The only relevant military operation France conducted was the Algerian War, between 1954 and 1962. The French rejected NATO efforts to push for a diplomatic solution to the crisis, preventing British diplomats from expressing their views on French colonial policies, since the French government was not comfortable discussing these policies with outsiders.[[108]](#footnote-108) When the French military did request NATO’s help, they did so in a way that made the other NATO powers uneasy. The U.S. Secretary of State at the time, John Foster Dulles, explained that “the French military wanted unreserved NATO support without accepting any NATO role in the determination of France’s Algerian Strategy.”[[109]](#footnote-109) This served to alienate other member states from the French. As a whole, Algeria served to isolate France within NATO and to show the French that NATO would not support all their military objectives. As a result, NATO had little political or military utility for the French.

Second, France had a Medium amount of political clout within the alliance. In his attempts to reassert French dominance, de Gaulle demanded that NATO reorganize so as to ensure that France would play a more significant role in alliance decision making.[[110]](#footnote-110) The reaction to this demand by other member states was telling. Weaker member states, while sympathizing with French demands, expressed irritation that France did not push for a consensus-driven form of policy formation that did not only involve NATO’s most powerful members.[[111]](#footnote-111) Larger states, like the U.S., rejected these demands but were careful not to antagonize France, which was an important member of the alliance because of its strategic location and because member discontent towards France would undermine alliance unity.[[112]](#footnote-112) To prevent such disunity, President Lyndon Johnson simultaneously expressed respectful disagreement without attempting to discredit the French position.[[113]](#footnote-113) The sum of this evidence illustrates that, despite having enough influence to be listened to and have an impact, France did not have enough influence to change the alliance structure as it wished or convince other alliance members that its policies were worth following.

The second independent variable measured the nationalism of the French state. France scored at a high on my nationalism scale from 1958 to 1966, which is indicated by the “high” level of de Gaulle’s charisma and a high willingness to resist the U.S. in its foreign policy. In a speech he gave in 1954, de Gaulle emphasized French economic successes and the need for his country to remain unified and independent in the face of the fierce political and economic competition it faced from countries like the United States.[[114]](#footnote-114) In the beginning of his rule (1958 to around 1962), de Gaulle had the support of over fifty percent of France’s public, with a divided opposition that could not challenge his popularity.[[115]](#footnote-115) This popularity stemmed from “the force of his own dominating personality; a magnificent sense of timing and, perhaps most importantly, an uncanny ability to manipulate and to exploit the fears that haunt [France] country” to solidify his grip on France in times of crisis.[[116]](#footnote-116) This allowed de Gaulle a significant amount of domestic leverage over French international policy and illustrated the qualities that made him popular throughout his presidency.

Overall, de Gaulle made a significant effort to resist the U.S. in their foreign policy goals during his time in power. France was one of the first western countries since 1950 to establish diplomatic relations with Communist China, which further broke Western diplomatic unity against communist countries,[[117]](#footnote-117) he also frustrated U.S. efforts under Kennedy to further tie Western Europe economically to the U.S. by vetoing British entry into the European Economic Community, heavily campaigned against U.S. actions in Vietnam,[[118]](#footnote-118) and encouraged countries in Latin America and Africa to resist U.S. political domination wherever they could.[[119]](#footnote-119) There is no doubt that the U.S. felt threatened by these French actions, based on the negative language used to describe the French by U.S. ambassadors, yet they still emphasized the importance of continued engagement with France in the hope of changing de Gaulle’s anti-U.S. stance. [[120]](#footnote-120)

To determine the level of threats France faced involves looking at each potential threat individually, based on proximity to France, relative power levels, and French perceptions of such threats.[[121]](#footnote-121) West Germany receives a high ranking for proximity threat level, a low for relative power levels, and was perceived to be economically and politically dangerous by France, receiving a medium on my scales for total threat level. China receives a low ranking for proximity threat level, a medium ranking for relative power levels, and was perceived to be not dangerous by France, receiving a low on my scales. The Warsaw Pact receives a high ranking for proximity threat level, a high ranking for relative power levels, and was perceived to be dangerous by France, receiving a High level of threat on my scales.

The informal units I studied each scored differently on the indicator for proximity- based threat. With their capital in Bonn, West Germany was the closest potential threat France faced, essentially as close as the Warsaw Pact which could mass troops in East Berlin if they wished. With its closest city of Kashagar 5,729 kilometers away, the Chinese could not invade France as suddenly as the Warsaw Pact or Western Germany could. Additionally, each informal unit varied in terms of their relative power. West Germany spent less on its military than France did,[[122]](#footnote-122) and its budget was similar to that of smaller NATO member states.[[123]](#footnote-123) As a result, the German armed forces were quite weak in comparison with the French armed forces. The Warsaw Pact was a different story. With a military four times as large as the French and a larger military budget, they were significantly more powerful.[[124]](#footnote-124) In comparison, China spent between 16 to 37 billion U.S. dollars on its forces in the 1960’s, [[125]](#footnote-125) but the Sino-Soviet Split (in which the Soviet Union cut all aid to China), happened during this time period.[[126]](#footnote-126) This drastically weakened the Chinese armed forces, which were already weak in the sense that they depended on the Warsaw Pact for military aid.

De Gaulle viewed West Germany as a resurgent political force that could threaten French power in Europe.[[127]](#footnote-127) Although de Gaulle led a significant improvement in French-German relations, this improvement happened because de Gaulle wanted to secure German support for his diplomatic campaign to develop a German-French axis of power in Europe, contrary to the wishes of the United States.[[128]](#footnote-128) This failed, when in 1964 West Germany publically sided with the U.S. against French policies,[[129]](#footnote-129) chilling French-German relations well into the 1960’s and beyond.[[130]](#footnote-130)

France had amiable relations with China. De Gaulle was the first Western leader to reach out to Communist China, angering the United States and bolstering de Gaulle’s claim that France was the intermediary between the Eastern and Western blocs.[[131]](#footnote-131) Relations between France and the Warsaw Pact nations as a whole had also been steadily improving. In 1964, Romanian Prime Minister Ion Maurer visited Paris, strengthening Romanian-French ties.[[132]](#footnote-132) Despite this, de Gaulle still viewed the Warsaw Pact warily. When he visited Moscow in 1966,[[133]](#footnote-133) he emphasized greater cooperation with Russia and the Warsaw Pact as a whole, yet highlighted his continued loyalty to the Atlantic alliance and his refusal to recognize East Germany.[[134]](#footnote-134) De Gaulle, motivated as he was by realist thought, could maintain positive relations with a country and still perceive them to be a threat.

NATO’s low strategic and political utility to France was the first crack in NATO’s military command structure. When this was combined with the high levels of nationalism present in the country, which fueled de Gaulle’s desire for more French sovereignty and his disdain for the United States, France only needed one last push to leave. This push came in the form of West Germany’s declaration of unity with the United States, defying France as they did so. A resurgent West Germany, now a sovereign member of NATO, was too much for de Gaulle to bear.

As a result, high nationalism is one of the primary forces pushing France out of the alliance and this was best outlined by constructivist scholars. These scholars said that a nation would leave an alliance if they felt that their political and ideological sovereignty was under threat.[[135]](#footnote-135) The French push for such sovereignty was bolstered by de Gaulle’s high levels of nationalism, which he in turn spread to the state. The effect de Gaulle had on French nationalism was also supported by constructivist scholars.[[136]](#footnote-136) De Gaulle’s changing of the French identity in this way also supported the constructivist view that identities are not static.[[137]](#footnote-137) However, continued French integration with the political Atlantic Alliance, along with a continued willingness to support their allies in times of crisis, remained unanticipated by constructivism or liberalism. Liberalist arguments, while compelling, did not really factor into the reason’s surrounding French partial withdrawal.

Realist thought best explains the factors governing de Gaulle’s departure from NATO’s military command structure. Every decision he made was calculated to promote French strategic interests over all other priorities. Despite the importance de Gaulle placed on an independent France that was free from U.S. meddling, and the low utility of NATO to France (all of which pushed France from the Alliance), de Gaulle still viewed the Warsaw Pact as a greater threat and thus a greater priority. He realized that France could not fight this threat on its own and that it needed the support of its allies within the Atlantic Alliance. As a result, France remained integrated in the Atlantic Alliance while maintaining its sovereignty by staying out of NATO’s command structure. This means my hypothesis is correct. In the context of France, a combination of a low score on NATO’s utility to France, a High score on the level of French nationalism, and two or more informal units having a medium level of threat to France is sufficient to result in a medium level of French desire to leave NATO. In addition, the reason such a withdrawal lasted forty years, well after de Gaulle’s death, was that the impact he made on French foreign policy was upheld by French leaders up to the 2000’s. That further illustrates nationalism’s power, both then and now.

Since realist and constructivist thought best explains the influences on de Gaulle, it is those two sections of the literature review that have the most weight. Liberalism, with its focus on domestic politics, does not sufficiently explain his actions. Additionally, realism and constructivism still cannot explain de Gaulle individually. The realist literature reviewed assumed that states would only remain in a military alliance if their strategic priorities aligned with other members, whether those priorities were just increased security or the advancement of their tactical goals.[[138]](#footnote-138) In addition, the constructivist literature assumed that states would *always* leave if its current identity clashed with other members of the alliance.[[139]](#footnote-139) What the constructivist literature did not take into account was that a state, once it achieved greater sovereignty by leaving, would use politics as a vehicle for remaining in the alliance. And the realist literature did not anticipate constructivism to be powerful enough to push states out of military alliances. In brief, the literature did not consider leaders having competing interests, or that certain interests could convince a state to find creative ways to remain in an alliance, while still being formally disengaged from it. This is a weakness that this research attempted to address.

This research has implications for modern day Europe. Europe today is experiencing a rise in nationalist movements, in the form of right wing organizations, that are gaining more power with each election.[[140]](#footnote-140) This, coupled with the increasing differences NATO members have in terms of their tactical priorities,[[141]](#footnote-141) is starting to look similar to France in the 1960’s. The danger is that without a pragmatic leader, who can look past these priorities and act in a way that will promote the stability of their alliance and their country simultaneously, NATO could experience a range of *full withdrawals* in the future. Without being checked by firm realist priorities, nationalism is more than capable of driving states from alliances entirely, just like it almost did in 1960’s France.

There are a range of alternative explanations for my research. One could say that de Gaulle did not consider a recently shattered Germany to be a threat. In addition, scholars could point to literature which states that de Gaulle found the Warsaw Pact to be weak in the 1960’s, discrediting the operationalization of the third variable. However, I would argue the following: de Gaulle was influenced by realism in the sense that he viewed all political interactions as strategic in nature. It is precisely because he considered West Germany and the Warsaw Pact a threat that he continued to interact with them, thereby giving him a degree of insight into their leader’s thought processes. In addition, de Gaulle would not have insisted on an independent nuclear arsenal if he did not view the world the way defensive realists see it: as an anarchic place with “alliances” being a short term protective tool. A pure constructivist would say that alliances would cause a peaceful anarchy that would eventually fulfill state’s desires for protection.[[142]](#footnote-142) Realism rejects this argument and de Gaulle, whose distrust of NATO only grew with time, agreed with the realist school on this point. My research shows that, by partially withdrawing from NATO, de Gaulle maximized the benefits of Atlantic integration without the restrictions imposed by NATO military integration. He sacrifices political goodwill within NATO for this; however, France was still a strategic partner and thus retained a certain degree of influence in NATO even after they partially withdrew. It is tempting to view de Gaulle’s decisions as being fueled solely by *beliefs,* but my research indicated that it was fueled by *both tactics and belief,* both of which influenced his foreign policy in unpredictable ways, much to Europe’s misfortune.

**Conclusion**

Certain variables which led France to partially withdraw from NATO are not unique to 1960’s France. In Western countries today, there are voices which question NATO’s utility in a rapidly changing world, while militant nationalism is making itself heard in countries such as the United States, Russia, China, and several European states. The variable that prevented this mix from imploding in 1966, thereby preventing a total French withdrawal from the Atlantic Alliance as a whole, was the high level of external threats that France faced. Charles de Gaulle believed in French exceptionalism and did not view NATO positively, but understood the value of continued engagement because of his pragmatic nature. As a result, while nationalism and sovereignty- based concerns drove France away from NATO’s military command structure, the security of a political alliance became necessary to deal with external threats like the Warsaw Pact and West Germany, preventing France from fully withdrawing. The warning to the international community is clear: nationalistic fervor can throw military alliances into turmoil without realist-influenced leaders at the helm of their member states.

Returning to the literature reviewed, this research furthers all three schools in different ways. It highlights realism as a key unifying force, which contradicts the accepted belief that realism and military alliances don’t mix well. Constructivism is portrayed as a destabilizing force to military alliances where nationalism is concerned. My research portrays liberalism as the current status quo, with the majority of states that were in NATO in 1966 following liberalist patterns, but one that could be overridden with sufficient nationalism and skepticism with the goals of the alliance. Liberalism was not a critical explanatory factor for de Gaulle’s France. The only indicator that touched on liberalism was the degree of French political influence in NATO, and while that played a factor in French partial withdrawal, it presented an incomplete answer to the hypothesis. Realism and constructivism together provided the most concrete explanations for the conclusions I came to.

Some work remains to be done in future research. It would be useful to conduct this methodology utilizing French-language sources, in order to gain a deeper understanding of de Gaulle’s thinking. Additionally, it would be important to investigate how economics affects a state’s decision to withdraw from a military alliance in the form of economic liberalism. Additionally, future research should apply this methodology to modern day Europe, incorporating survey-based methods to determine the extent of nationalism in modern day France, Germany, or other European states. Interviewing current members of NATO or various governmental organizations would be a good start when doing so. Furthermore, not isolating the research to one case, but conducting a comparative case study, would further help to generalize this methodology to the point where a theory can be developed about what would motivate a state to partially withdraw from a military alliance as opposed to a full withdrawal.

Overall, future scholars should pay more attention to nationalist movements. Charles de Gaulle’s France was a deviant case that shook the Western World, but the effect of French partial withdrawal could have been far worse if nationalism went unchecked in de Gaulle’s administration. Military alliances such as NATO will need to adapt to the threat posed by such domestic movements occurring within their member states.

**Appendix**

**Dependent Variable**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Variable/ Indicator | Result |
|  |
| **Main Variable:** French Desire to Leave NATO | Medium |
| **Independent Variable 1:** Degree to Which NATO was perceived to be clashing with French strategic goals | High clash |
| **Independent Variable 2:** French Level of Nationalism | Extreme levels of nationalism |
| **Independent Variable 3:** Level of potential external threat to French | Medium Threat Level |

**NATO’s Utility To France (IV1)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Variable/ Indicator | Main Scale/ Sub-scale | Result |
|  |
| **Main Variable:** NATO’s Utility to France | **Low:** Low Utility  **Medium**: moderate utility  **High:** high utility | Low |
| **Indicator 1:** Degree of NATO assistance to France in its military operations | **Nonexistent**: no military, economic, or diplomatic support  **Minimal**: rare military, economic, or diplomatic support  **Frequent**: significant amounts of military, economic, or diplomatic support | Nonexistent |
| **Indicator 2:** Degree of French influence over NATO operations | **Low**: Minimal amount of political influence in the alliance.  **Medium**: Moderate amount of political influence in the alliance.  **High**: Significant political influence in the alliance | Medium |

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Variable/ Indicator | Main Scale/ Sub-scale | Result |
|  |
| **Main Variable:** French Nationalism Levels | **Low:** no to minimal levels of nationalism within state  **Medium:** Moderate levels of nationalism within the state  **High:** High Levels of Nationalism within the state | High |
| **Indicator 1:** Charles de Gaulle Charisma Levels | **Low**: minimal charisma  **Medium**: moderate charisma  **High**: significant charisma | High |
| **Indicator 2:** French Willingness to resist the U.S. in its Foreign Policy Goals. | **Low**: Rarely opposes U.S. in its foreign policy goals  **Medium**: Sometimes supports U.S.’s goals, sometimes opposes them.  **High**: Almost always opposes U.S. in its foreign policy goals | High |

**Level of French Nationalism (IV 2)**

**China’s Level of Threat To France (IV3:1)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Variable/ Indicator | Main Scale/ Sub-scale | Result |
|  |
| **Main Variable:** Level of potential external threat to France | **Low**: Distant state, weak military, not perceived to be a threat  **Medium:** Distant neighbor, moderate military power, is perceived warily by studied state  **High:** Close neighbor, high military power, studied state considers it a threat to its existence | Low |
| **Indicator 1:** Proximity of Potential threat to France | **Low**: No proximity. State is far away, making aggression costlier  **Medium**: Moderate proximity. Invasion would not be a surprise but state would not have much time to prepare  **High**: Close proximity. Invasion would occur with little warning | Low |
| **Indicator 2:** Power Levels of Threat | **Low**: Weak power. No military influence  **Medium**: Moderate power. Some military influence, but not the dominant military power  **High**: Significantly powerful. High amounts of military influence, regional hegemony in place | Medium |
| **Indicator 3:** French Perception of Threat | **Not Dangerous:** State does not consider the other state to be a threat to its existence  **Dangerous:** State considers the other state to be a threat to its existence | Not Dangerous |

**Warsaw Pact’s Level of Threat to France(IV3:2)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Variable/ Indicator | Main Scale/ Sub-scale | Result |
|  |
| **Main Variable:** Level of potential external threat to France | **Low**: Distant state, weak military, not perceived to be a threat  **Medium:** Distant neighbor, moderate military power, is perceived warily by studied state  **High:** Close neighbor, high military power, studied state considers it a threat to its existence | High |
| **Indicator 1:** Proximity of Potential threat to France | **Low**: No proximity. State is far away, making aggression costlier  **Medium**: Moderate proximity. Invasion would not be a surprise but state would not have much time to prepare  **High**: Close proximity. Invasion would occur with little warning | High |
| **Indicator 2:** Power Levels of Threat | **Low**: Weak power. No military influence  **Medium**: Moderate power. Some military influence, but not the dominant military power  **High**: Significantly powerful. High amounts of military influence, regional hegemony in place | High |
| **Indicator 3:** French Perception of Threat | **Not Dangerous:** State does not consider the other state to be a threat to its existence  **Dangerous:** State considers the other state to be a threat to its existence | Dangerous |

**West Germany’s Level of Threat to France(IV3:3)**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Variable/ Indicator | Main Scale/ Sub-scale | Result |
|  |
| **Main Variable:** Level of potential external threat to France | **Low**: Distant state, weak military, not perceived to be a threat  **Medium:** Distant neighbor, moderate military power, is perceived warily by studied state  **High:** Close neighbor, high military power, studied state considers it a threat to its existence | Medium |
| **Indicator 1:** Proximity of Potential threat to France | **Low**: No proximity. State is far away, making aggression costlier  **Medium**: Moderate proximity. Invasion would not be a surprise but state would not have much time to prepare  **High**: Close proximity. Invasion would occur with little warning | High |
| **Indicator 2:** Power Levels of Threat | **Low**: Weak power. No military influence  **Medium**: Moderate power. Some military influence, but not the dominant military power  **High**: Significantly powerful. High amounts of military influence, regional hegemony in place | Low |
| **Indicator 3:** French Perception of Threat | **Not Dangerous:** State does not consider the other state to be a threat to its existence  **Dangerous:** State considers the other state to be a threat to its existence | Dangerous |

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57. Charles de Gaulle. “[Correspondence on Several Issues Concerning NATO, Nuclear Weapons in France, and the Need for Unity in NATO]” (United States. Department of State. Division of Language Services: US State Department, 1959) [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Martin, 17-19 [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Ibid 19 [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Audie Klotz. pp 43-58. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. My scaling systems were inspired by Lise Morje Howard (Howard 1-20). For each of these variables, the overall scale is measured based on individual indicator level. In the dependent variable, a “High” means that a state wants to leave NATO’s military command structure *and* its political structure. A “Medium” means a state just wants to leave one or the other, and a “Low” indicates a state wants to remain enmeshed in both. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. The two possible values for this indicator being present are “yes” or “no”. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. Department of State. “Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State,” *VOLUME XII, WESTERN EUROPE, DOCUMENT 64*, last modified 1966, https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v12/d64. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Measured on a high-medium-low scale, depending on frequency. The scales would be determined by how much time, money, or manpower the state dedicated to these military operations, with a greater value for these elements resulting in a higher value for the indicator as a whole. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. Office of the President. “[Establishment of a French Command in the Mediterranean, and Frances Commitment to NATO]” (France. Office of the President, 1959) http://proxyau.wrlc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1679126954?accountid=8285. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. Possible values for this indicator are “yes” or “no”. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. “Letter from President Charles de Gaulle to President Lyndon Johnson on France’s Withdrawal from the NATO Command Structure,” *France in NATO: Permanent Representation of France to NATO*, last modified 1966, http://www.rpfrance-otan.org/Lettre-from-President-Charles-de. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. This would be measured on a high-medium-low scale. This scale would be determined by the amount of time and resources a state spends pursuing diplomatic relationships with states that have poor relations with the state’s current military alliance, and the less resources the state allocates, the lower the rating would be on this scale. [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. Herter. *Secret Telegram to the State Department* (Geneva, 1959) [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. De Gaulle-Brezhnev-Kosygin-Podgorny meeting, 21 June 1966, MAEF, SG, EM, Vol 27. qtd in Martin 109; “French Foreign Policy.”, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) no. 22-65, report, *Central Intelligence Agency,* Secret, Issue Date: Jun 2, 1965, Date Declassified: Sep 12, 2006, Complete, pg. 10, Web, Accessed 3/20/16, http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/DDRS?vrsn=1.0&view=image&slb=KE&locID=wash11212&srchtp=basic&c=3&img=.25&page=14&ste=4&txb=De+Gaulle+and+China&sortType=RevChron&docNum=CK2349684933 [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. D. Scott Bennett. 848.; Curtis H. Martin. 298 [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. This is measured on a High-Medium-Low, and the higher the score, the closer the strategic priorities of the alliance match up with the strategic priorities of the state being studied. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. This is measured on a Frequent-Occasional-Rare scale, and the higher the state ranks on this scale, the more military, economic, or diplomatic support it gets from its fellow members in its international military operations. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Robert C. Doty. “FRANCE PRESSES NATO FOR PLACE AT THE TOP,” *New York Times (1923-Current File)* (New York, N.Y., June 14, 1959), [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. Lord Gladwyn, *The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn* (London: Weidenfeld 1972) p.286. Lord Gladwyn was the United Kingdom’s ambassador to France. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. H.T. Bourdillon. “Bourdillon to A.D.M. Ross”, 21 Oct. 1958; qtd in Martin Thomas, “The British Government and the End of French Algeria 1958-1962”, Journal of Strategic Studies, June 4, 2010, 25:2, 172-198. H.T. Bourdillon was the Assistant Under-Secretary of the British Colonial Office. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. Measured on a high-medium-low scale, with greater values equating with more diplomatic dominance in the military alliance. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. Robert C. Doty. “DE GAULLE TALKS TO DIEFENBAKER,” *New York Times (1923-Current File)* (New York, N.Y., November 6, 1958), [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. Strategy paper for NATO ministerial meeting, 5/4/64, box 33, International meetings file. Qtd in H.W. Brands. “The Wages of Globalism: Lyndon Johnson and the Limits of American Power”, (Oxford University Press), pg. 101. [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Alastair Iain Johnston. 34-35. [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. Measured on a Low-Medium-High scale. The greater the state measures on this scale, the higher their level of nationalism. [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. J. Paul Goode and Davird R. Stroup. pg. 721. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. Curtis H Martin. 289-291;Christopher Sprecher. 331. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. This would be measured on a high-medium-low scale, which would be determined by level of government unity around the leader, amount of international respect afforded to the leader, and the level of media attention the leader receives. [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. Charles de Gaulle. “France 1965: Nationalism and Cooperation”. *Vital Speeches of the Day.* Volume 31. Issue 7. 01/15/1965. Pg. 213. [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. Stanley Frederick Clark. “The Man Who is France; The Story of General Charles de Gaulle.” (New York, Dodd, Mead, 1963). Pg. 228 [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. Henri Peyre.

    Curtis Cate. “Charles de Gaulle: The Last Romantic”. *The Atlantic Magazine.* November 1960. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. This indicator would be measured on a scale of high-medium-low, with lower scores illustrating that the state is highly resistant to support the alliance hegemon in their foreign policy goals. [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. “Instructions for de Beaumarchais,” 11 December 1963, DDF, 1963, Tome II. Qtd in Garret Joseph Martin. General de Gaulle’s Cold War: Challenging American Hegemony 1963-1968”, (published by Berghahn Books 2013), pg. 56. [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. “Letter from President Charles de Gaulle to President Lyndon Johnson." [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. Soledad Loaeza, “La visite du general de Gaulle au Mexique: le malentendu francomexicain,” in DGESS VI, ed. Institut Charles de Gaulle, p.508. qtd in Martin 88. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. It is measured on a scale from High to Low, with greater values indicating a larger threat to the existence of France or to French economic and political power. [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. D Scott Bennett. 848 [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. Measured on a high-medium-low scale. The higher the threat ranks on this indicator, the easier it is for it to inflict harm, either through proximity or rapid deployment capabilities. [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. Anna Locher et al. "Soviet Study of the Conduct of War in Nuclear Conditions*" (1964)*, *Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (PHP)*1-25., http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?lng=en&id=16248&navinfo=25996. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. D M Gibler and S Wolford. 153.

    John Peterson and Rebecca Steffenson. 40 [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. Measured on a high-medium-low scale, with a greater value indicating a greater degree of military dominance over the region. [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. “Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact," *Central Intelligence Agency* vol. Number 12 (1965)*Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (PHP)*1-25. http://www.php.isn.ethz.ch/collections/colltopic.cfm?lng=en&id=18591&navinfo=14968. [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. This can be measured on a scale of dangerous-not dangerous respectively, in terms of economic, political, and military power. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. Rusk. “Telegram From Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Document 70,” *FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1964–1968 VOLUME XII, WESTERN EUROPE*, last modified 1966. Accessed 11/16/15. ; Bohlen. “Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State, Document 46,” *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968 Volume XII, Western Europe,* last modified 1965. Accessed 11/16/15. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. “De Gaulle-Gromyko meeting”, 27 April 1965, MAEF, CM, CdM, Vol.379. Qtd in Martin 68; “CIA cable on Deputy Press Chief Conrad Ahlers Comments regarding French President Charles De Gaulle’s visit to West Germany”, Cable, *Central Intelligence Agency,* Omitted, Issue Date: October 7th, 1968, Date declassified Feb 08, 1996, Sanitized, Complete, Page 2. Web. Accessed 3/20/16. <http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/DDRS?vrsn=1.0&view=image&slb=KE&locID=wash11212&srchtp=basic&c=2&img=.25&page=2&ste=4&txb=De+Gaulle+and+Germany&sortType=RevChron&docNum=CK2349107829>; De Gaulle-Erhard meeting 1, 3 July 1964, MAEF, SG, EM, Vol.22. Qtd in Martin, 34; Couve de Murville to French embassies in Washington, London, And Moscow, telegram, 19 January 1961, Cabinet du minister, Couve de Murville, dossier: 346 (echange de messages et notes). Qtd in Erin R. Mahan. “Kennedy, de Gaulle, and Western Europe”, (Palgrave Macmillan 2002), pg. 24. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. My scaling system is laid out in detail on charts in my appendix. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. See charts in Appendix for indicator values. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. Charles de Gaulle. “*Establishment of a French command in the Mediterranean, and France’s commitment to NATO”*, *France Office of, t. P.* May 25th, 1959. http://proxyau.wrlc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1679126954?accountid=8285 [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. Charles de Gaulle. “Correspondence on several issues concerning NATO, nuclear weapons in France, and the need for unity in NATO”. http://proxyau.wrlc.org/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/1679127301?accountid=8285 [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. “De Gaulle-Brezhnev-Kosygin-Podgorny meeting,” [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. “Letter from President Charles de Gaulle to President Lyndon Johnson on France’s Withdrawal from the NATO Command Structure,” [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. H.T. Bourdillon. “Bourdillon to A.D.M. Ross,” 21 Oct. 1958; qtd in Martin Thomas [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. John Dulles. “Dulles letter to Lloyd,” 23 Nov. 1957; qtd in Martin Thomas, “The British Government and the End of French Algeria 1958-1962”, Journal of Strategic Studies, June 4, 2010 25:2, 172-198. [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. Robert C. Doty. [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. Ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. “Strategy paper for NATO ministerial meeting,” pg. 101. [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. Ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. Charles de Gaulle. “France 1965: Nationalism and Cooperation,” Pg. 213. [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. Henri Peyre. [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. Donald H.Louchheim. “De Gaulle Charisma Works Again.”. *Washington Post Foreign Service*. *The Washington Post.* 06/04/1968. [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. “Instructions for de Beaumarchais,”. Qtd in Martin. pg. 56. [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. Alphand. “*L’etonnement*,” Diary entry 7 May 1965, p.452, qtd. in Martin 93 [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. Soledad Loaeza. in Martin 88. [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. Bohlen., Ambassador Bohlen was the U.S. Ambassador to France. [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. All NATO member states, with the exception of West Germany, are not considered potential threats in this study because France remained a member of the Atlantic alliance. West Germany is analyzed due to its traditional aggression towards France which caused France to view it more warily than it would other NATO members. Other threats include the Warsaw Pact and China. [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. “SIPRI NATO Milex Data 1949- 2014”, *Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),* <http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database> I used this database to get figures on NATO military spending as a percentage of GDP. At an average of 5 to 6 % of their GDP allocated towards military spending, the French were consistently the second or third largest military spender in the Atlantic alliance, with the first being the U.S and the second/third being the U.K. The Germans spent between 3 to 4 % of their GDP on military spending. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. Jeffrey Simon. “NATO-Warsaw Pact Force Mobilization,” (National Defense University Press : 1988.), pg. 38. This chart compared NATO-Warsaw pact armies in terms of manpower ; Charles Wolf, Jr; et al. “Long-Term Economic and Military Trends, 1950-2010,” *The Rand Corporation,* April 1989, Table 5, pg. 17. This chart compared armies in terms of U.S. dollars spent. [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. Ibid. [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. "Nikita Khrushchev. “Letter to the Central Committee of The Socialist Unity Party of Germany, regarding Soviet Specialists in China," *The Wilson Center,* July 18, 1960, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, SAPMO DY 30/3605/25-27. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Austin Jersild. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116831> [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. “Couve de Murville to French embassies in Washington, London, And Moscow,” pg. 24. [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. “Memorandum of conversation between President Johnson and West German Chancellor Erhard…”, Memo, Department of State, SECRET, Issue Date: Dec 28th, 1963, Date Declassified: Jun 20, 1997, Unsanitized, Complete, Page 1-4, Web, accessed 3/20/16, <http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/DDRS?vrsn=1.0&view=image&slb=KE&locID=wash11212&srchtp=basic&c=81&img=.25&page=4&ste=4&txb=De+Gaulle+and+Germany&sortType=RevChron&docNum=CK2349120280> [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. “De Gaulle-Erhard meeting” Qtd in Martin, 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. “CIA cable on Deputy Press Chief Conrad Ahlers Comments regarding French President Charles De Gaulle’s visit to West Germany”, Cable, *Central Intelligence Agency,* Omitted, Issue Date: October 7th, 1968, Date declassified Feb 08, 1996, Sanitized, Complete, Page 2. Web. Accessed 3/20/16. http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/DDRS?vrsn=1.0&view=image&slb=KE&locID=wash11212&srchtp=basic&c=2&img=.25&page=2&ste=4&txb=De+Gaulle+and+Germany&sortType=RevChron&docNum=CK2349107829 [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
131. “French Foreign Policy.” [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. Telegram 1, 2 July 1964, DDF, 1964, Tome I; Burin des Roziers-Dimitriu meeting, 23 April 1964, ANF, 5AG1, Carton 183, Roumanie. Qtd in Martin, 59 [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. just before he pulled France out of NATO [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. “De Gaulle-Brezhnev-Kosygin-Podgorny meeting” [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. J. Paul Goode and Davird R. Stroup, ,pg. 721. [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. Ibid [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
137. See Seng Tan. 243 [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
138. Gibler and Wolford, 130. [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
139. See Seng Tan, 243 [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
140. Stevan Erlanger. “Rise of Far-Right Party in Denmark Reflects Europe’s Unease,” *The New York Times,* June 19, 2015, Web, accessed 4/1/16. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/20/world/europe/rise-of-far-right-party-in-denmark-reflects-europes-unease.html?\_r=0 [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
141. Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer. “Does a Multi-Tier NATO Matter?....", 211 [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
142. Wendt, 388 [↑](#footnote-ref-142)