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“Investigating the Failure to Rebel: The Case of the Russian Minority of Northeast Estonia from  
1992-1993”

### **Abstract**

There is a large body of scholarship that explores why some ethnic minorities, when faced with a threat from an ethnic majority, mobilize for violent conflict while other minorities do not. Stuart Kaufman in an investigation of the ethnic rebellion of Moldova's Russian minority, posits nine key conditions that are necessary for ethnic rebellion to occur. However, the Russians of Estonia did not engage in ethnic rebellion despite the presence of these nine conditions. To explore the theoretically unexpected outcome of the Russian minority of Estonia I utilize a process tracing method. I hypothesize that the Russian political elites made efforts to dampen the threat perceived by the general population of the Russian minority in Estonia posed by the Estonian government, thus mitigating the effects of the antecedent conditions. However, through a structured analysis of contemporary Russian newspapers, I find that opposite to be the case. The Russian political elites engaged in threat-inducing rhetoric. I find evidence that although the general Russian minority population of Estonia was impacted by the threat inducing rhetoric, they felt that they had an illegitimate claim to the territory in which they resided. This was due to the fact that the majority of the Russian population of Estonia were first or second-generation immigrants. This finding suggests that a historical claim to the territory in which an ethnic minority resides is critical for an ethnic minority to engage in rebellion, a factor that was neglected in Kaufman's model. This finding contributes to broader literature on ethnic violence and could be utilized to predict when ethnic minorities are more likely to mobilize for conflict.

## Introduction

After World War Two, the Soviet Union encouraged migration of ethnic Russians from the “core” of Union to the newly acquired periphery.<sup>1</sup> Due to this migration, when the Soviet Union collapsed a new Russian diaspora, 25 million in number, was created.<sup>2</sup> In many cases this Russian diaspora saw the systematic restriction of their rights by the government of the former Soviet states as these states attempted to reassert their national identity after decades of Soviet domination. In some cases, such as the Russians of Moldova, the Russians mobilized and engaged in interethnic war in response to these restrictions. In other cases, such as the Russian minority of Estonia, the Russians accepted their minority status and the primacy of the titular majority.

Starting in 1991 the government of Estonia passed a series of laws that limited the political rights of its Russian minority. In February of 1992, the Estonian government reinstated the 1938 law on citizenship which deprived the vast majority of the Russian population of citizenship and by extension, the right to vote.<sup>3</sup> The Alien Registration Law, passed in 1993 required all Russians who immigrated to Estonia since 1940 and their descendants to register with the government.<sup>4</sup> These laws received international condemnation as an attack on the human rights of the Russian minority.<sup>5</sup> However, despite these attacks on their rights, and the

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<sup>1</sup> David D. Laitin, "Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Nationality in the Post-Soviet Diaspora," *European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie / Europäisches Archiv für Soziologie* 36, no. 2 (1995), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/23997787>.

<sup>2</sup> Kolst et al., "The New Russian Diaspora: Minority Protection in the Soviet Successor States," *Journal of Peace Research* 30, no. 2 (1993): 198, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/425199>.

<sup>3</sup> “Chronology of Russians in Estonia”. Minority at Risks Database. University of Maryland. <http://www.mar.umd.edu/chronology.asp?groupId=36601>

<sup>4</sup> Ibid

<sup>5</sup> “Estonia-Russians”. World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. Minority Groups Right International. <http://minorityrights.org/minorities/russians-3/>

presence of other factors that in theory made the Russians of Estonia likely to rebel they never mobilized for conflict.

It is critical to develop a more complete model of ethnic secessionist movements, inter-ethnic relations and civil war. Understanding the troubled inter-ethnic relationships within states of the past could provide critical insights into the inter-ethnic relationships of the present and the future. How will the current conflict between ethnic Russians and the Ukrainian government play out? Will the secessionist tendencies of the Catalonians of Spain ever come to fruition? Or will they integrate like the Russians of Estonia? What is the future of the Uyghurs minority in China? Scholars and policy makers can derive benefits from the insights that careful examination of contentious inter-ethnic relations of the past can provide when trying to address inter-ethnic relations of the future. This paper seeks to add to the theoretical literature on ethnic rebellions and inter-ethnic relations by investigating a case where the literature failed to predict the actual outcome.

This paper investigates the failure of the Russian minority of Estonia to mobilize for ethnic conflict after the fall of the Soviet Union. The goal of this research is to develop a more complete and nuanced understanding of inter-ethnic conflict and secessionist movements by examining an ethnic minority that the theoretical literature predicts should have engaged in rebellion but did not, by using a process tracing methodology. Much of the previous research on inter-ethnic conflict and civil wars focuses on establishing connections between certain variables and the proclivity or aversion of a minority to engage in rebellion. In contrast, I draw on a process tracing methodology to explore how an ethnic minority with the conditions that the literature predicts should have rebelled ended up not rebelling.

I begin this paper by completing a review of the literature regarding interethnic conflict and civil war. I pay particular attention to illustrating the theoretical precedents established by other scholars. I then move into a methodological explanation of my case selection and operationalization of variables that I analyze. Also, in this section I provide an explanation and justification of a process tracing method of analysis. Following this methodology section, I introduce my hypothetical causal model and demonstrate how the preexisting scholarship fits into the model. I then test my theoretical model by applying it to the case of the Russians of Estonia.

## Literature Review

This study investigates the Russian minority of Estonia's decision to not engage in ethnic rebellion. I have identified the three most relevant bodies of scholarship that offer theories as to why minority groups take different courses of action. These include the Structuralist school of thought, the Security Dilemma school of thought and the Leadership school of thought. The Structuralist literature examines non-dynamic aspects of a society, such as geography, demographics, population distribution and long-term societal hierarchies, to explain why some groups seek independence or autonomy. The Security Dilemma literature seeks to explain ethnic rebellion in terms of ethnic groups attempting to attain security. Finally, the leadership literature studies individual actors behaving as either instigators or mitigators of conflict.

### Structural Theories

The structuralist school of thought is the largest and most developed body of literature in regards to the study of ethnic rebellion. Structural theories study how antecedent conditions of a society and an ethnic minority contribute to the likelihood of an ethnic minority engaging in rebellion. Geography has been investigated as a means to explain the different courses of actions of minority groups. For example, extensive statistical analysis by Fearon and Laitin suggests that

states with a mountainous geography are significantly more likely to experience civil war.<sup>6</sup> In another statistical analysis examining the duration and results of a civil war Derouen and Sobek found that mountainous terrain significantly increases the probability of a rebel victory.<sup>7</sup> These findings suggest that the more difficult the terrain of the territory that an ethnic group minority resides in, the more likely that the group will engage in rebellion and succeed.

Scholars in the Structuralist school of thought also analyze demographics and the distribution of an ethnic group in a state to explain why some ethnic groups rebel and others do not. Scholars have found that states that are characterized by ethnic dominance, when one group makes up more than fifty percent of the population, are more likely to experience civil war than states characterized by ethnic fractionalization, when no ethnic group makes up more than 50 percent of the population.<sup>8</sup> This suggests that the higher degree of ethnic dominance in a state or region, the more likely that a minority in that state would seek autonomy. Other scholars who investigate demographics find that an ethnic group's likelihood of seeking political autonomy or succession hinges largely on their distribution within a state.<sup>9</sup> Groups that constitute a concentrated majority in a region of a state are the most likely to demand sovereignty and mobilize for conflict.<sup>10</sup> This finding supports the dominance/ fractionalization theory because an ethnic group that is categorized as a concentrated majority in a region will, by definition, make up more than fifty percent of the population.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War," *The American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 85, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3118222>.

<sup>7</sup> K. R. DeRouen Jr and D. Sobek, "The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome," *Journal of Peace Research* 41, no. 3 (2004): 314, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0022343304043771>.

<sup>8</sup> P. Collier, "Implications of Ethnic Diversity," *Economic Policy*, no. 32 (2001): 150-55, <https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-0035057163&partnerID=40&md5=e398693cbe2e7dcb40ef5d5acf22522d>.

<sup>9</sup> Monica Duffy Toft, "Indivisible Territory, Geographic Concentration, and Ethnic War," *Security Studies* 12, no. 2 (2002/12/01 2002): 84, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09636410212120010>.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 92.

<sup>11</sup> Collier, 150-55.

The phenomena of ethnic, linguistic, and racial segregation also are utilized to explain the outbreak of conflict. Corvalan and Vargas conducted a large-N study that found that segregation and conflict are highly correlated.<sup>12</sup> This finding would again support the fractionalization/dominance theory.<sup>13</sup> If groups are highly segregated a group that might be a minority on the national level could constitute a concentrated majority at a particular local area, giving them dominance and resulting in a claim for sovereignty.<sup>14</sup>

Finally, another subset of the Structuralist school of thought study the political and social hierarchies within a society. Scholars investigating the role of hierarchies in the mobilization of groups for rebellion have found that when access to political participation, power or economic opportunities is limited by ethnic affiliation, the risk of a minority group engaging in rebellion rises.<sup>15</sup> This is commonly referred to as the “grievances theory” in the literature. The higher levels of grievances that a group experiences the higher the probability that the group will mobilize to reconstruct the political system.<sup>16</sup>

The Structuralist literature orients itself very heavily towards the X to Y paradigm that my research attempts to challenge. It concerns itself with how an antecedent condition, whether it be ethnic fractionalization, political and economic suppression, geographic distribution, or geography itself leads in one of two outcomes, conflict or the absence of conflict. These conclusions of the Structuralist literature have much to do with the large-N methodology

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<sup>12</sup> A. Corvalan and M. Vargas, "Segregation and Conflict: An Empirical Analysis," *Journal of Development Economics* 116 (2015): 216, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2015.05.002>.

<sup>13</sup> Collier, 150-55.

<sup>14</sup> Duffy Toft, 88-90.

<sup>15</sup> Halvard Buhaug, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "Square Pegs in Round Holes: Inequalities, Grievances, and Civil War," *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 2 (2014): 426, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12068>. AND L. E. Cederman, N. B. Weidmann, and K. S. Gleditsch, "Horizontal Inequalities and Ethnonationalist Civil War: A Global Comparison," *American Political Science Review* 105, no. 3 (2011): 492, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055411000207>.

<sup>16</sup> Buhaug, Cederman, and Gleditsch, 425.

predominantly utilized in this school of thought. My research draws on the Structuralist theories to demonstrate that the Russians of Estonia were theoretically quite likely to engage in rebellion. However, in order to explore how this theoretically unusual case and in order to construct a more complex causal model that can provide more explanatory utility I utilize a process tracing methodology.

### Security Dilemma Theories

Scholars of Security Dilemma theories draw on realist international relations theory to explain why some ethnic minorities engage in conflict and other do not. Posen asserts that collapsing empires often create intrastate conditions of anarchy.<sup>17</sup> Scholars assert that the collapse of the Soviet Union constituted the death of the last colonial empire.<sup>18</sup> In the context of the collapse of this empire, a quasi-state of anarchy was created where various ethnic minorities could not count on governments to protect them. In this state of intrastate anarchy, ethnic groups will act on their own accord to attain their security. Kaufman asserts that the most severe interethnic security dilemma occur when the “fears of extinction [are] mutual [and] actions taken by one side to avert extinction be seen by the other side as threatening extinction for themselves.”<sup>19</sup>

Various factors can determine how threatened ethnic groups feel by one another. Hardin writes that “successful social coordination, whether intended or not, can create extraordinary power.”<sup>20</sup> It is in this same vein of thinking Posen asserts that “groupness of the ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic collectives that emerge from collapsed empires gives each of them an

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<sup>17</sup> B. R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival* 35, no. 1 (1993): 28, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00396339308442672>.

<sup>18</sup> Taras Kuzio, "History, Memory and Nation Building in the Post-Soviet Colonial Space," *Nationalities Papers* 30, no. 2 (2002), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905990220140649>.

<sup>19</sup> Stuart J. Kaufman, "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War," *International Security* 21, no. 2 (1996): 109, <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2539072>.

<sup>20</sup> Russell Hardin, *One for All : The Logic of Group Conflict* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), 28.



inherent offensive military capability”.<sup>21</sup> Scholars of the Security Dilemma school of thought assert that the “groupness”, of an ethnic group endows them with an inherent capability for conflict.<sup>22</sup> Groupness is a somewhat vague concept that roughly means the ability for a group to take collective action because of a group identity. Posen argues that if multiple ethnic groups in a society have a high level of “groupness”, the result is a security dilemma where each ethnic group feels threatened by the military capabilities that the other groups possess.<sup>23</sup> It is this dilemma that ultimately leads to mobilization for conflict.<sup>24</sup> Scholars have outlined other factors that can make a group be perceived as particularly threatening. Many of these factors are derived from the Structuralist school of thought. Essentially, the Security Dilemma literature acts as a link that explains why the various factors outlined in the Structuralist theories correlate with higher likelihoods of a minority to rebel.

In my hypothetical causal model, the degree that an ethnic minority fears persecution or attack by the titular majority is critical in explaining the action a minority takes. In my hypothetical causal model, I hypothesize that the severity of the security dilemma that a minority’s population perceives directly impacts the severity of the course of action that the group takes.

### Leadership Theories

The leadership scholars investigate the role of individual leaders in instigating or mitigating intergroup conflict. Kaufman sorts leaders that promote intergroup conflict into two categories; one group that instigates conflicts because they are “Zealots for their ethno-

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<sup>21</sup> Posen, 29.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid

<sup>23</sup> Posen.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

nationalist cause”, the other uses inter-group conflict to monopolize personal power.<sup>25</sup> Both categories of leaders can exaggerate the grievances of a group or use their position of prominence to invent a security dilemma, and either one of these methods can achieve the mobilization of a group.

Although leaders can act as instigators to a conflict, they could also potentially act as mitigators. Hurrelmann et al argue that “motivated, well-educated and well-motivated” local leaders can promote intergroup cooperation.<sup>26</sup> These leaders could potentially prevent mobilization for political autonomy or succession by acting as bridges between the titular majority and the minority.

In an investigation of the Russians of Moldova’s path to civil war, Kaufman constructs a theory that bridges the Structuralist, Security Dilemma and elite manipulation theories. Kaufman posits nine key conditions that are necessary for elites to be able to manipulate populations. These nine conditions are “ethnically defined grievances, demographic threats, negative ethnic stereotypes, a history of ethnic domination, ethnic symbols, a reciprocal fear of group extinction, a de facto situation of anarchy, the military means to fight, and the political space for ethnic outbidding”.<sup>27</sup> However, while structuralist theorists would argue that this these nine conditions make groups statistically more likely to mobilize for conflict, Kaufman asserts that these conditions are meaningless if elites choose not to engage in threat inducing rhetoric or if elites of different ethnic groups choose to cooperate.<sup>28</sup> Essentially, Kaufman argues that these nine factors

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<sup>25</sup> Kaufman, 117. AND Anthony Oberschall, "The Manipulation of Ethnicity: From Ethnic Cooperation to Violence and War in Yugoslavia," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23, no. 6 (2000/01/01 2000), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/014198700750018388>.

<sup>26</sup> Annette Hurrelmann, Catherine Murray, and Volker Beckmann, "Social Capital and Leadership: Rural Cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe," *Society and Economy* 28, no. 3 (2006), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41472062>.

<sup>27</sup> Kaufman, 113.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 115.

are necessary preconditions for rebellion to occur but if the elites of a group do not act as instigators then the group will not rebel.

However, in the literature there is somewhat of a gap in the study of the precise process of elite manipulation. Combining the literature on Press indexing and Press framing could provide a possible theory as to how elites can effectively manipulate populations. Scholars have posited and presented evidence that the Press index to the consensus of elites.<sup>29</sup> That is, whatever rhetoric that elites use will be replicated in the press. Scholars have also presented evidence that indicates that the way in which the press presents an issue has a significant impact on how the public perceives said issue.<sup>30</sup> These two processes contribute to a more nuanced understanding of how elites can influence a group.

Drawing on Kaufman's combination of these three bodies of scholarship and the literature on press indexing and media framing I construct a hypothetical causal model that potentially explains why the Russians of Estonia did not rebel despite the high theoretical likelihood of this group to engage in rebellion. Elites could partake in fear reducing rhetoric. This rhetoric via the process of press indexing is replicated in the Press. This rhetoric in the Press makes the general population feel less threatened via the process of media framing. Because the

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<sup>29</sup> P. Robinson, "Theorizing the Influence of Media on World Politics: Models of Media Influence on Foreign Policy," *European Journal of Communication* 16, no. 4 (2001): 530-31, <https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-0035540898&partnerID=40&md5=30e2e90baa91840a4ddccc13175ecf32>; Steven Livingston and W. Lance Bennett, "Gatekeeping, Indexing, and Live-Event News: Is Technology Altering the Construction of News?," *Political Communication* 20, no. 4 (2003/10/01 2003), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10584600390244121>; W. Lance Bennett, Regina G. Lawrence, and Steven Livingston, *When the Press Fails : Political Power and the News Media from Iraq to Katrina, Studies in Communication, Media, and Public Opinion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).

<sup>30</sup> M. E. McCombs and D. L. Shaw, "The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 36, no. 2 (1972), <https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-34247946961&partnerID=40&md5=a59bf1ecb7eb18df4c3be1a9e020abaa>; Joseph E. Uscinski, "When Does the Public's Issue Agenda Affect the Media's Issue Agenda (and Vice-Versa)? Developing a Framework for Media-Public Influence," *Social Science Quarterly* 90, no. 4 (2009), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42940641>; Amy E. Jasperson et al., "Framing and the Public Agenda: Media Effects on the Importance of the Federal Budget Deficit," *Political Communication* 15, no. 2 (1998/04/01 1998), <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10584609809342366>.

population feels less threatened, in line with the Security Dilemma literature, the population does not feel the need to mobilize to attain their security. In this study, I utilized a process tracing methodology to test this hypothetical model.

## Methodology

The preexisting scholarship on interethnic conflict mostly studies the correlation of certain variables to certain outcome with very little focus on the actual process that takes place “between” a variable and an outcome. Drawing on process tracing methodology allows me to peer inside the “black box” between the variables and outcomes that the literature on the topic usually omits. By utilizing elite manipulation, press indexing, media framing and security dilemma theories to derive intervening variables I can work towards deducing causality and not simply correlation.

I begin this section with a justification of my case selection. I then describe the variables which I analyze and their precise operationalization. I then give a more in-depth explanation of my method of analysis and an account of my hypothesized causal model.

## Case Selection

I analyze the Russian minority of Estonia between 1992 and 1993. This minority group exhibits many of the conditions that, according to theory, would make this group very likely to mobilize for interethnic conflict. However, as the historical record demonstrates, the Russians of Estonia never ended up mobilizing for interethnic conflict.<sup>31</sup> Thus, investigating the process by which this theoretically unexpected outcome occurred offers insights regarding the broader phenomena of interethnic conflict.

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<sup>31</sup> “Chronology for Russians in Estonia”. Minorities at Risk Data. University of Maryland. <http://www.mar.umd.edu/chronology.asp?groupId=36601>

The nine conditions that Kaufman posits are necessary for ethnic conflict to occur were present in the case of the Russians of Estonia.

Kaufman's nine conditions:

- 1. Ethnically defined grievances**
- 2. Negative stereotypes**
- 3. Threatening Demographics**
- 4. History of ethnic domination**
- 5. Disputes over emotional symbols**
- 6. A *de-facto* state of anarchy**
- 7. Mutual fear of extinction**
- 8. Political space for elites to operate in**
- 9. A territorial base to mobilize from**

There were ethnically defined grievances of the Russians of Estonia towards the government of Estonia that were economic in nature. The rate of unemployment of Russians in Estonia was significantly higher than the unemployment rate of the general population.<sup>32</sup> The Russians and the Estonians had negative stereotypes and attitudes towards one another. The Russians perceived the Estonians as aggressive nationalist as a result of the Estonians attempt to reassert their national identity and the Estonians perceived the Russians as "dirty" oppressive colonists.<sup>33</sup> There were threatening demographics at play as well. After the fall of the Soviet Union the Russians of Estonia suddenly went from being an ethnic majority (as Russians were the dominant ethnic group in the Soviet Union) to being an ethnic minority in Estonia. The Estonians on their part felt threatened by the fact that Russians made up thirty percent of the state's

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<sup>32</sup> G. Smith, "Transnational Politics and the Politics of the Russian Diaspora," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22, no. 3 (1999): 512, <https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-0032768226&partnerID=40&md5=d4df59b9ed3d6521f14b15e15d084ad9>.

<sup>33</sup> Anatol Lieven, *The Baltic Revolution : Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence*, Second edition. ed. (New Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 1994), 174-216; Judith G. Kelley, *Ethnic Politics in Europe the Power of Norms and Incentives* (Princeton University Press, 2004), 94.; See articles 34 and 28 in appendix

population—the Estonians felt that they were in danger of becoming a minority within their own country.<sup>34</sup> There was a history of ethnic dominance of the Russians over the Estonians and as a result, there was a fear among the Russian population that the Estonians would take “revenge” for this history of domination.<sup>35</sup> Finally, the Estonian government was attacking a fundamental symbol of the Russian minority- the Russian language. The Estonian government instituted anti-Russian language laws that attempted to reassert Estonian as the dominant public language.<sup>36</sup>

Kaufman asserts that for an intrastate security dilemma to form the state must be unable or unwilling to protect all major groups resulting in a *de-facto* state of anarchy.<sup>37</sup> As previously mentioned, the Estonian state was not only unwilling to protect its Russian minority but actually took active steps to persecute it. In addition, for an intrastate security dilemma to form, action taken by one group to avoid extinction must be viewed by the other ethnic group as threatening them with extinction. Actions taken by the Estonians to reassert their national identity, which they viewed as an imperative to their survival, was perceived by the Russian minority as a threat their own survival. Similarly, actions by the Russian minority to protect themselves from anti-Russian policies, such as seeking autonomy, were viewed by Estonians as threatening to the territorial integrity of Estonia and thus, a threat to their survival. Kaufman posits that for a security dilemma to form the minority must have a territorial base from where they can mobilize. The Russians of Estonia had this in the Northeast region of Estonia where they made up over 80 percent of the population.<sup>38</sup> Finally, Kaufman asserts that there must be a political space in

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<sup>34</sup> Smith, 513.

<sup>35</sup> Kaufman, 113; Lieven, 174-216.

<sup>36</sup> Pami Aalto, "Revisiting the Security/Identity Puzzle in Russo-Estonian Relations," *Journal of Peace Research* 40, no. 5 (2003): 574, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3648362>.

<sup>37</sup> Kaufman, 113.

<sup>38</sup> David J. Smith, "Narva Region within the Estonian Republic. From Autonomism to Accommodation?," *Regional & Federal Studies* 12, no. 2 (2002/06/01 2002): 89, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/714004740>.

which elites can operate in. Throughout the period of Glasnost there was a general loosening of the Press and public sphere throughout the Soviet Union- including the Baltic states. Thus, by 1990 there was ample political space for elites to operate in.

Kaufman argues that the combination of these nine factors allowed the political leaders of the Russians in Moldova to create a security dilemma and manipulate the population into participating in ethnic war.<sup>39</sup> These same conditions were also present among the Russians of Estonia, but despite the presence of these conditions, these Russians did not rebel. This makes the failure of the Russians of Estonia to rebel theoretically unexpected and worthy of investigation.

## Method of Analysis

I conduct a process tracing investigation of the Russian minority of Estonia to understand the theoretically unexpected outcome of this group. A process tracing method allows me to investigate the causal mechanisms and thus deduce causality instead of just uncovering a correlation between two variables.<sup>40</sup> Utilizing a process tracing method allows me to analyze the events and actions of actors of my case to explore the process by which this unexpected outcome was produced. Waldner defines process tracing as a,

“longitudinal research design whose data consist of a sequence of events (individual or collective acts or changes of a state) represented by nonstandardized observations drawn from a single unit of analysis”.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Kaufman.


<sup>40</sup> John Gerring, "What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good For?," *The American Political Science Review* 98, no. 2 (2004): 348, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4145316>.

<sup>41</sup> Quoted in “B. Bengtsson and H. Ruonavaara, "Comparative Process Tracing: Making Historical Comparison Structured and Focused," *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 47, no. 1 (2017): 46, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0048393116658549>.

A process tracing method allows me to construct a causal chain that connects the initial event to outcomes.<sup>42</sup> I constructed a hypothetical causal model that links each one of intervening variables to one another based on the preexisting theoretical literature. In my research I searched for evidence for each link in the model in the temporal order that I supposed.<sup>43</sup> If I do not find sufficient evidence for a particular step in my casual chain or find that the events happened in a different order then I theorized I would be able to deduce that the model is not representative of the actual process that occurred. This methodology ensures that my theories and hypothesizes are falsifiable, a key measure of the validity of any neo-positivist research.

### Theoretical Causal Process and Hypothesis

My hypothesis is a test of Kaufman's theory. Because all of the risk factors that were present in Moldova were present in Estonia, this means, according to Kaufman, that the Russian political leaders must have acted as mitigators of conflict. Thus, I hypothesize that the Russian population of Estonia did not rebel due to the actions of their political leaders. Furthermore, I constructed hypothetical causal model that explains how precisely these political leaders were able to determine this outcome. This process is illustrated in figure 1.



<sup>42</sup> Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 64.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid



(Figure 1)

In line with a process tracing methodology, I have theorized a set of intervening variables *a priori* that could theoretically explain how the initial conditions of my cases are translated into outcomes.<sup>44</sup> I hypothesize that the Russian political leaders engaged in a threat dampening rhetoric which was then mimicked by the Russian Press via a process of media indexing. This threat dampening rhetoric of the Press then decreased the public perception of the threat posed by Estonians and the Estonian government via a process of media framing. A lowered perception of threat and thus avoided an intrastate security dilemma and resulted in the Russian minority not engaging in interethnic war.

In gathering data to tests my hypothesis and causal model, I primarily draw on four distinct sources. To be able to easily access a wide variety of archival new sources contemporary to my specified time frame I utilize the Factiva Data Base and Nexis Uni databases. These databases have extensive contemporary news articles from Russian sources such as ITAR-TASS news service and also secondary reporting of Russian news from the BBC.<sup>45</sup> In addition, foreign newspapers often conducted interviews with political leaders and everyday citizens which I analyze. In addition, I use the “Current Digests of the Soviet and Russian Press” Data Base. This database consists of “English translations of news articles published in the Soviet Union and Russia from 1949 to 2010. Includes translations of Soviet government documents, laws and treaties, five-year plans and reports of their implementation, as well as speeches by leaders.” The combination of the Factiva, Nexis Uni and, the Current Digest of the Soviet and Russian press

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<sup>44</sup> Van Evera, 64.

<sup>45</sup> I found many BBC reports that were direct translations from Estonian radio broadcasts

databases will allow me to cross reference the data that I collect from each source off of data that I collect from the other.

In addition to these databases I will also be analyzing certain prominent historiographies pertinent to my subject. These secondary sources will allow me to further triangulate data that I collect from primary sources. The historiographies that I draw on are Anatol Lieven's *The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and the Path to Independence* and Robert Service's *Comrades! A History of World Communism*.

Using these sources of data, I analyze three distinct variables; the rhetoric of Russian political leaders, the rhetoric of the Russian Press and the public perception of threat. I define Russian political leaders as any Russian in Estonia and in the Russian Federation who occupies a political leadership position or advises a political leader. I included Political leaders of the Russian Federation because many of the political leaders of the Russian Federation were leaders in the Soviet Union and by extension leaders of the Russian population of Estonia. Since my temporal time frame of analysis is quite adjacent to the fall of the Soviet Union, it is reasonable to assume that Russians of Estonia still felt connected to the former Russian leaders of the Soviet Union.

My second variable of analysis is the rhetoric of the Russian Press. I define the Russian Press as any widely published and circulated Press in the Russian language. Ideally, I would limit my analysis to the Russian press of Estonia, however, these newspapers were never archived or digitized and thus are inaccessible to me for analysis. However, many of the major Russian language news sources, originating in the Russian Federation, were archived and digitized. These newspapers were widely circulated both within the Russian Federation and among the Former Soviet republics. In addition, due to the shared border of the Russian

Federation and Northeast it is reasonable to assume that the Russians of Estonia had significant exposure to the Press originating from the Russian Federation.

My final variable that I analyze is the perception of threat that the Russian minority of Estonia feels by the Estonian government. To measure this variable, I analyze statements from everyday Russians reported in the Press, observation from researchers in Estonia at the time and public opinion polling. Ideally, I would have conducted interviews with Russians who were living in Estonia at this time, particularly in the Northeast region. However, due to constraints I was unable to conduct interviews.

Although I am anticipating that I will find my theorized variables occurred in the temporal order that I predict, they might not. I might find that, for example, in the Narva region of Estonia that the popular reaction came first and then that drove the press reaction which drove the political leader's reaction. Regardless of what I actually find, my causal model and my variables give me a framework with which to engage with the data that I have collected. Furthermore, irrespective of my findings this type of investigation of an unusual case should yield theoretical implications for the broader literature.

Furthermore, I am utilizing a small-N methodology and as such the generalizability of any conclusions that I draw from this research are limited.<sup>46</sup> My findings particularly lack external validity because I do not conduct any cross-case comparisons. Ethnic minorities that are subject to different geo-politics, histories and social realities might respond to the implementation of anti-minority language, culture and citizenship laws very differently. There

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<sup>46</sup> Gerring, 347.

could be a whole different causal model that transfers initial conditions to outcomes depending on the ethnic minority.

In addition, my limited access to individuals who actually lived in these regions during my stated time period, my non-existent access to the political elites of these communities whose reactions I am trying to analyze and my still somewhat limited Russian language skills negatively affect the validity of my research. However, since I am being extremely explicit about how I am undertaking this research, another researcher with access to the previously mentioned data sources and superior Russian language skills, could replicate my research and verify any conclusion that I draw.

## Analysis

The databases that I utilized for this investigation have hundreds of articles regarding the Russian minority of Estonia's situation between January of 1992 and late 1993. For the sake of brevity this analysis references around fifty. These articles are representative of the general characteristics of my variables of analysis.

I begin this analysis with a presentation of the rhetoric of the Russian political leaders in my specified time frame. I then present the rhetoric of the Russian Press. Finally, I described the general perception of threat that the Russian minority felt. After a presentation of the data I analyze the implications of the data on my hypothetical causal model. Finally, I discuss a possible explanation for the theoretically unexpected path of the Russian minority of Estonia between early 1992 and late 1993.

## Political Leaders' Rhetoric

Foreign Russian leaders expressed a high level of concern regarding the systematic violation of the rights of the Russian minority of Estonia. At points the rhetoric of these foreign

Russian leaders crossed over into rhetoric that went beyond concern and into a rhetoric that would increase the public perception of an intrastate security dilemma. The local Russian political leaders' rhetoric was a "level" up from the rhetoric of foreign Russian leaders. The rhetoric of local Russian leaders' asserted that the Estonian government's goal was an ethnic cleansing of the Russian population and suggested that the Russian minority should take steps to independently attain their security. At no point in my analysis of the behavior and rhetoric of Russian political leaders did I find evidence of these leaders acting as mitigators of ethnic conflict or taking steps to promote inter-ethnic cooperation.<sup>47</sup>

The foreign Russian leaders expressed apprehension over the passage of various anti-Russian laws by the government of Estonia. Early in 1992, F. Shelov-Kovedyaye, the Deputy First Minister of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that "a number of provisions of the [Law on Citizenship] are of serious concern to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, since there is a real possibility that, if they are implemented, the rights of the non-Estonian[read Russian] population of the Estonian Republic will be infringed upon."<sup>48</sup> This type of rhetoric certainly does not take steps to promote interethnic cooperation and although it raises the specter of persecution it does not have nationalistic, secessionist or highly security dilemma provoking characteristics. This rhetoric propagated by foreign Russian leaders regarding the situation of the Russian minority of Estonia was predominate in early and mid-1992.<sup>49</sup>

In late 1992, the rhetoric of foreign Russian leaders started to take on a more extreme message. In December of 1992, Yuly Vorontsov, Russia's representative to the United Nations stated that "one gets the impression that the objective of the policy being implemented in Latvia

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<sup>47</sup> Hurrelmann, Murray, and Beckmann.

<sup>48</sup> See article 1 located in appendix

<sup>49</sup> See articles 2,3, 3,4 and 5 located in appendix

and Estonia to strictly limit and even deny certain human rights and fundamental freedoms with respect to members of nonindigenous nationalities [read: Russian] is the formation of a mono-ethnic state, to be brought about by creating, for a segment of the population, conditions that would compel it to 'voluntarily' change its place of residence and leave the country."<sup>50</sup> In another example of more extreme rhetoric Sergei Stankevich, political adviser to the Russian President claimed that Estonia was treating its Russian minority as "disposable citizens".<sup>51</sup> As 1992 turned into 1993 the foreign Russian Leaders' rhetoric became more and more extreme.<sup>52</sup> Andrei Kozyrev, the first Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation proclaimed that the policies of Estonia towards its Russian minority constituted apartheid and would lead to ethnic cleansing.<sup>53</sup> Rhetoric of this type by foreign Russian leaders dominated in late 1992 and throughout 1993.<sup>54</sup> This rhetoric not only is the anti-thesis of promoting inter-ethnic cooperation but also highly security dilemma invoking.

The local Russian leaders of Estonia engaged in secessionist and security dilemma provoking rhetoric as early as March of 1992. Vladislav Chuikin, chairman of the Narva city Soviet threatened that if "the Estonian Parliament fails to grant the region a special status, we will hold a referendum on joining the Russian Federation".<sup>55</sup> In addition, in early 1992, Vladimir Kuznetsov, a Member of Parliament and Deputy Chairman of the Narva town council characterized the Estonian government as an "ultra-radical force".<sup>56</sup> As time progressed the

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<sup>50</sup> See article 6 located in appendix

<sup>51</sup> See article 7 located in appendix

<sup>52</sup> See article 28 located in appendix

<sup>53</sup> See article 8 located in appendix

<sup>54</sup> See articles 9,10,11,12 located in appendix

<sup>55</sup> See Article 13 located in appendix. In addition, it should be noted that the political leaders of the Russian population of Estonia seemed to change their position on outright secession almost constantly and on whim. See articles 15,17 and 18.

<sup>56</sup> See article 14 located in appendix

rhetoric became more dangerous. In late 1992 Chuikin proclaimed that “The intent of these laws is clear: to frighten the Russian- speaking population and push it out of Estonia.”<sup>57</sup> By early 1993 local Russian leaders in Estonia labeled the Estonian government’s continued passage of anti-Russian laws as “a war of discrimination”.<sup>58</sup> Later in 1993 the local leaders started to make calls for the population to engaged in work stoppages, block railways and high ways, and take steps to independently secure their rights.<sup>59</sup> This rhetoric was concerning similar to the rhetoric of the Russian political minority leaders in Moldova leading up their war of secession.<sup>60</sup> However, the Russian population of Estonia did not end up engaging in war of secession thus, the difference between the path of the two minorities is not traceable to different behavior of their respective political leaders.

### Press Framing and Indexing

In my analysis of the Russian press between January of 1992 and November of 1993 I found evidence of the Russian Press indexing to the rhetoric of the Russian political elites. That is, when the political leaders engaged in secessionist, fear inducing and security dilemma provoking rhetoric, so did the Press. This is in line with the prediction of the literature on Press indexing.<sup>61</sup>

In early 1992 the Russian Press adopted the same apprehensive rhetoric of the political leaders. The Russian Press in early 1992 conveyed a concern for the violation of the Russian minority’s rights but did not engage in security dilemma provoking rhetoric.<sup>62</sup> However, by mid-1992 the Russian Press started adopting the security dilemma-esque rhetoric that had been being

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<sup>57</sup> See article 16 located in appendix

<sup>58</sup> See article 19 located in appendix

<sup>59</sup> See articles 19 20 ,21 and 22 located in appendix

<sup>60</sup> Kaufman.

<sup>61</sup> Livingston and Bennett; Robinson; Bennett, Lawrence, and Livingston.

<sup>62</sup> See article 23 and 24 located in appendix

utilized for a few months by the Russian political leaders both within and outside of Estonia. At this time, the Russian Press began characterizing various laws passed by the Estonian government as being discriminatory in nature, much like the Russian political leaders did.<sup>63</sup> The Russian Press also started to propagate stories that utilized rhetoric that painted the general Russian minority population in Estonia as being unsecure. In one article, the Russian Press reported that paramilitary Kodukaitse and Kaitseliit units were harassing and attacking Russians and that the Estonian authorities refused to act.<sup>64</sup> By mid-1992 the predominate narrative of Estonia expressed by the Russian Press was that Estonia was a hostile place for Russians to inhabit.<sup>65</sup> By late 1992 the Press had adopted the more extreme rhetoric of the Russian political leaders. The press published articles that referred to the laws passed by the Estonian government as a “a policy of national segregation”.<sup>66</sup> As 1993 progressed, the Russian Press mimicked the “Estonia-on-the-brink” rhetoric of the political leaders. Articles were published in the Press that stated that the Russian minority was “doomed to a situation in which they have no rights and are under open police surveillance [and that] the formation of an apartheid regime will begin and ethnic conflicts will start.”<sup>67</sup> The rhetoric of ethnic cleansing and imminent war became prolific in much the same way that it became prolific in the rhetoric of the political leaders.<sup>68</sup>

## Public Perception of Threat

The literature on media framing suggests that the manner in which the media frames an issue should have a direct effect on how the public perceives an issue.<sup>69</sup> Following from this

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<sup>63</sup> See article 31 Located in appendix

<sup>64</sup> See article 26 located in appendix

<sup>65</sup> See articles 25,27,29 and 30 located in appendix

<sup>66</sup> See article 32 located in appendix

<sup>67</sup> See article 33 located in appendix

<sup>68</sup> See articles 34 and 35 located in appendix

<sup>69</sup> McCombs and Shaw; Uscinski; Jasperson et al.



literature, it should be expected that the threat rhetoric that the Russian Press took part in should result in the general Russian minority population feeling as if they are under attack. If the general Russian minority population internalized the threatening rhetoric of the political leaders and the Press, then, in line with the security dilemma literature, the minority should have mobilized for ethnic conflict. In my analysis of the general Russian population's perception of threat from January of 1992 to November of 1993 I found that indeed the Russian minority felt extremely threatened by the Estonian government. However, the Russians refused to mobilize for armed conflict to attain security.

In early 1992 the Russian population was not exhibiting evidence of feeling unjustly persecuted or attacked. An ordinary Russian living in Estonia gave an interview to the Guardian in which he stated that "this [ Estonia] is my country. I've no relatives or close friends to go back to. I wouldn't get a job or an apartment in Russia [ and that] I'm really sorry I haven't learned Estonian," he said. "But in the north-east of the country where I was born there were hardly any Estonians, and hardly any language teachers in the schools".<sup>70</sup> Although the everyday Russians of Estonia were concerned by the passage of laws that restricted their rights, they did not feel like their security was at stake. This attitude persisted into the summer months of 1992. In his historiography *The Baltic Revolution: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Path to Independence*, Anatol Lieven stated that "in my own visits to Narva up to the summer of 1992, I found the overwhelming majority of local Russians opposed to secession, including those very critical of Estonian behavior. 'After all, this is Estonian land', one elderly woman told me."<sup>71</sup> This observation is borne out by public opinion polling in the summer of 1992 that indicated while the

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<sup>70</sup> See article 36 located in appendix

<sup>71</sup> Lieven, 201.

majority of Russians living in Estonia deemed it acceptable for Moscow to put economic and political pressure on Estonia in retaliation for the government's restriction of Russian rights, between 67 and 70 percent strongly opposed any military intervention.<sup>72</sup>

However, by late 1992 the general Russian population of Estonia had started to adopt and express similar sentiments as the Press had in mid-1992. In an interview an ordinary Russian living in Estonia exclaimed, "How can they refuse us citizenship?' It's so absurd and preposterous."<sup>73</sup> The Russian population began to feel that they were threatened during the late 1992.<sup>74</sup> During this time period it was reported that over 30,000 individuals emigrated from Estonia to Russia.<sup>75</sup> Instead of taking action to acquire their security and rights in Estonia, many Russians chose to flee.

This tense atmosphere eventually came to a head in the summer of 1993. In mid-June, 10,000 ethnic Russians turned out for a protest in Narva against the looming passage of "Law on Foreigners" by the Estonian parliament which would have constituted another restriction of the rights of the Russian minority.<sup>76</sup> Reports stated that the protesters proclaimed that "the nonindigenous population will use all available means in exercising its right to self-defense."<sup>77</sup> Another article reported that protesters stated, "according to a Russian tradition, only the black earth will be left for attackers."<sup>78</sup> The protest and the rhetoric utilized by the protesters appears to indicate that the general Russian minority population perceived a security dilemma and was willing to utilize force to attain their security.

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<sup>72</sup> See article 37 located in appendix

<sup>73</sup> See Article 38 located in appendix

<sup>74</sup> See articles 39,40,41 and 42 located in appendix

<sup>75</sup> See article 32 located in appendix

<sup>76</sup> See article 43 located in appendix

<sup>77</sup> See article 44 located in appendix

<sup>78</sup> See article 45 located in appendix

The local political leaders in Northeast Estonia held a referendum on July 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> of 1993 that asked just one question “ Do you want Narva to have the status of a national-territorial autonomous entity?”<sup>79</sup> An estimated 67 percent of Narva’s population turned out for the referendum and 97 percent voted in favor of autonomy.<sup>80</sup> However, even before the referendum took place the Government of Estonia deemed the referendum unconstitutional and a threat to the territorial integrity of Estonia.<sup>81</sup> The Supreme Court of Estonia reaffirmed the position of the Government and invalidated the referendum.<sup>82</sup> One contemporary analysis of the Narva referendum stated that “the referendum in Narva is best explained as an attempt by a traditionalist elite to hold on to political power.”<sup>83</sup> What is striking is that after the Estonian supreme court invalidated the court there were no farther examples of mass mobilization of the Russian population.<sup>84</sup> Despite protesters claiming that they would utilize any means necessary to defend themselves, this rhetoric never resulted in action. The Russian minority appeared to simply accept the ruling of the court and by extension, the continued restriction of their rights.

## Implications for Hypothesized Causal Process

The theory of elite manipulation acting as a driver of ethnic conflict is well-established within the literature. However, the precise process that allows elites to manipulate general populations is underexplored. I constructed a hypothetical causal process that drew on the media indexing, media framing, and security dilemma literature. Drawing on the media indexing literature, I hypothesized that media would mimic the rhetoric of elites. I then hypothesized

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<sup>79</sup> See article 46 located in appendix

<sup>80</sup> See article 47 located in appendix

<sup>81</sup> See article 48 located in appendix


<sup>82</sup> “Chronology of Russians in Estonia”. Minority at Risks Database. University of Maryland. <http://www.mar.umd.edu/chronology.asp?groupId=36601>

<sup>83</sup> Raun, Toivo U. “Ethnic Relation in the Baltic States”. Indiana University. 1994.

<sup>84</sup> “Chronology of Russians in Estonia”. Minority at Risks Database. University of Maryland. <http://www.mar.umd.edu/chronology.asp?groupId=36601>

based off the media framing literature that the rhetoric of the media would impact how threatened the general population felt. Finally, I hypothesized based off of the security dilemma literature that the level of threat the minority felt would dictate their actions.

I originally hypothesized that the Russian minority population of Estonia did not engage in ethnic conflict because the political leaders engaged in threat dampening rhetoric. This threat dampening rhetoric, via my hypothesized causal process, resulted in the general Russian minority population feeling less threatened and thus prevented the formation of a security dilemma. This would have then explained why the ethnic Russians did not partake in an ethnic conflict similar to that of the ethnic Russians in Moldova. However, my hypothesis was rejected. I found very little evidence of the Russian political leaders engaging in threat dampening rhetoric. I instead found that political leaders of the Russian minority participated in threat provoking and security dilemma inducing rhetoric. This rhetoric was picked up by the Press, and via media framing increased the perception of the threat that the general population felt. However, even though the rhetoric that was being transferred was actually threat inducing and not threat dampening the way that it was transferred supports the hypothetical causal process that I constructed. The below timeline illustrates how the increasingly extreme rhetoric of the Political leaders of the Russian minority influenced the rhetoric of the press and furthermore influenced the general population.



This timeline is based off an analysis of fifty news articles published between January of 1991 and August of 1993. Although this timeline supports my hypothesized causal process the evidence is not conclusive in nature. This analysis lends credibility to my causal model but further analysis of a far greater number of news articles across a variety of cases should be analyzed to establish stronger correlation and causation between the rhetoric of elites, the press and the public perception of a security dilemma.

## The Importance of Homeland Legitimacy in the Process of Elite Manipulation

Kaufman outlines how elites of the Russian population of Moldova were able to create an intrastate security dilemma and thus, mobilize the general Russian minority to engage in intergroup conflict.<sup>85</sup> In Moldova and Estonia Kaufman's conditions necessary for elite manipulation to be successful, were present. In addition, this analysis demonstrates that the different path of the Russians in both of these states is not traceable to the behavior of their respective political leaders. Another scholars work could provide insight into the different paths of these similar groups. Toft argues that without this sense of legitimacy an ethnic minority will

<sup>85</sup> Kaufman.

not engage in ethnic rebellion.<sup>86</sup> Toft suggests that the concept of “majority rule”, meaning that a national minority constitutes a local majority, is the most important factor in establishing a sense of legitimacy among a minority ethnic group.<sup>87</sup> Utilizing Tofts framework of majority rule, the Russians of Estonia, who made up over 90 percent of the population in Northeast Estonia should have been more likely to engage in ethnic rebellion than the Russians of Moldova who only made up 48 percent of the population of the Transnistria region.<sup>88</sup> However, as the historical record shows, the Russians of Transnistria rebelled and the Russians of Northeast Estonia did not.

Toft also outlines another variable that she claims is less important, but still plays a role in establishing legitimacy. She calls this variable “homeland”. Toft states that the homeland factor “is the idea that a people with deep roots and a historical attachment to the land have a right to control it.”<sup>89</sup> This variable offers significant utility in explaining why the Russians of Moldova rebelled, while the Russians of the Estonia did not. The Russians in the Transnistria region of Moldova had been present there for hundreds of years while the Russians in Narva had most immigrated to that region only after the Second World War.<sup>90</sup> In my analysis of the Russian minority of Estonia I found evidence that suggests that the Russians did not feel like Estonia was truly their homeland.<sup>91</sup> Thus, although the Russian minority was willing to mobilize for protest and even participate in a referendum on local autonomy, they were not willing to violently fight

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<sup>86</sup> Ibid

<sup>87</sup> Monica Duffy Toft, *The Geography of Ethnic Violence : Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), 32.

<sup>88</sup> Smith, 89; Kaufman, 119.

<sup>89</sup> Toft, 23.

<sup>90</sup> Ellu Saar, Siim Krusell, and Jelena Helemae, "Russian-Speaking Immigrants in Post-Soviet Estonia: Towards Generation Fragmentation or Integration in Estonian Society," *Sociological Research Online* 22, no. 2 (2017): 4, <http://dx.doi.org/10.5153/sro.4228>.

<sup>91</sup> Lieven, 174-205.

for control of a territory that they believe they were not entitled to. After partaking in a protest and referendum the general population had exhausted the self-perceived acceptable avenues to attain their security. This finding suggests that for elites to effectively manipulate the general population to engage in ethnic conflict the population must feel that they have a legitimate claim, based on the homeland principle, to the territory that they reside in. Without this homeland based claimed to legitimacy there is a hard limit to the actions that a minority group is willing to take to attain security. Thus, I suggest that a feeling of a homeland claim could be a necessary precondition for minorities to rebel. However, further research is required to legitimize and generalize this theory.

## Conclusion

Although my proposed hypothesis is conclusively rejected by an analysis of the data, this study did produce interesting findings. Firstly, this study produced evidence that supported my hypothetical casual model. The model that I constructed is worthy of further testing across a diversity of cases and cross case comparisons. If further testing validates my model it could be utilized to better understand how elites in a society can influence the general population. However, the applications of this model could extend far beyond just understanding patterns of ethnic rebellion and help understand general phenomena in our political and social world.

Secondly, in the context of the broader scholarship on ethnic rebellion and elite manipulation, this study draws further attention to the role of homeland in understanding why some ethnic minorities engage in rebellion while others do not. This study suggests that without a legitimate claim to the territory that an ethnic minority resides in, derived from the homeland principle, there is a hard limit to actions that an ethnic minority will take to attain their security.

Again, this finding is worthy of further investigation across more cases to analyze its cross-case validity.

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