CHAPTER 5

The State, Religious Institutions, and Welfare Delivery: The Case of Portugal

Paul Christopher Manuel and Miguel Glatzer

This chapter examines the role and function of religious-based organizations in the delivery of social services and the strengthening of associational life in Portugal.[1] It asks whether the concept of muted vibrancy provides a theoretical understanding of the role of Catholicism in contemporary Portuguese society. That is, how might a church in a newly consolidated democratic regime, in a time of economic crisis, with a past relationship to a fascist regime, that has lost high-visibility battles on divorce, gay marriage, and abortion, and whose numbers of adherents is declining, contribute to the deepening of democracy? The Portuguese case is complicated by the path of development of its civil society: independent interest organizations have historically been weak, and in the place of other civic associations, the Roman Catholic Church—and especially its many charitable organizations—has traditionally been viewed as the embodiment of Portuguese civil society. In light of the fact that the

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Catholic Church has been experiencing a drop of adherents over the past 30 years, this chapter also examines an apparent contradiction facing contemporary Portugal: since there are decreasing numbers of Catholics available to perform needed social services, what kinds of pressures would be placed on the secular welfare state if the Catholic associations were someday to close? Are Catholic third sector organizations indications of a muted vibrancy of Portuguese Catholicism, and do they contribute to a robust associational life in Portugal?

Five Key Questions

This chapter will proceed by an examination of the following five key questions, three of which were developed by Jeffrey Haynes and Anja Henning.[2] *Grosso modo*, they seek to identify the historical path, objectives, means, strategies, effects, and public perception of Catholic civic organizations in Portuguese society.

- *Path Development*: What is the path of the church–state relationship in Portugal?
- *Objectives*: What do Portuguese religious actors intend to achieve in their public actions?
- *Means and Strategies*: How do religious actors operate in the Portuguese public square?
- *Effects*: What are the consequences (intended or unintended) of religious actors' political/public involvement?
- *Public Perception*: How is Catholicism viewed by the Portuguese population?

Question One: Path Development

The path development of the Portuguese "religious marketplace," following the concept developed by Ted Jelen and Clyde Wilcox,[3] has been dominated by a single religious tradition for the last 800 years. The issuance of the papal bull *Manifestis Probatum* started this historical path, when Pope Alexander III recognized Afonso Henriques as the first King of Portugal in 1179. This papal bull followed a string of military victories against the occupying Moorish forces who had ruled Portugal since 711, ultimately leading to the complete reconquest of the national territory—known in Portugal as the Reconquista.

Manifestis Probatum was arguably the start of a close and formal relationship between Roman Catholicism and the Portuguese nation-state. Over the subsequent 800 years, church–state relations have revolved around the fact that the pope named the first king. Some Portuguese like that fact, and others do not. This path set the terms of many subsequent problems for those interested in democratizing society and separating church and state, usually referred to as the clerical/anti-clerical divide. The Portuguese church–state cleavage may thus be traced to the very founding moment of the nation; this cleavage served as an important dividing line between Enlightenment-era reformers (younger, well-educated aristocrats) who promoted secular forms of political and societal authority relations, and the defenders of traditional forms of authority (the crown, the military, the aristocracy, and the Roman Catholic Church) who adhered to the divine right of rule. Centuries later, Pope Pius IX issued the *Syllabus of Errors* in 1864, which condemned the modern project and called on good Catholics to resist. The battle lines were thus drawn and would subsequently define church–state relations in twentieth-century Portugal. Accordingly, over the last 100 years, there have been periods of clericalism and anti-clericalism; pro-church legislation and anti-church legislation; an embrace of church teachings and a rejection of the same; and a devotion to, and rejection of, Catholic rituals, saints, and teachings.

Since the first Portuguese republic was declared in 1910, Portugal has experienced three distinct phases of church–state relations. The anti-clerical Republican regime (1910–1926) sought to remove the church from the public square; the pro-clerical fascist and corporatist Salazar regime (1926–1974) reintegrated the church into society but always kept it at arm's length from political power; and, in the time since the April 25, 1974, revolution (1974–present), contemporary Portugal has undergone a dramatic political, economic, and cultural transformation. The new democratic regime has sought to regularize its relationship with the church and to support its good works, where possible.

Throughout all of this—democracy and Fascism, war in Europe and with its African colonies, isolation from Europe and integration into Europe, clericalism, and anti-clericalism—the legacy of *Manifestis Probatum* has arguably remained ingrained in the societal fabric of Portuguese society. This religious legacy functions as a sort of cognitive lock for many Portuguese, who cannot even envision a non-Catholic Portugal. It also serves as an ongoing source of ontological sustenance and

continuity with the past. In addition, a fidelity to the Gospel and to the vision of Queen Leonor perhaps still fuels an ongoing societal mission to help those in need, predicated on corporal works of mercy.[4]

Changing Patterns of Religious Devotion in Portugal

The Centro de Estudos e Sondagens de Opinião at the Universidade Católica Portuguesa completed a survey in 2011 (in the midst of the austerity crisis) on devotional patterns and belief systems in Portugal.[5] The results have identified a significant change in religious devotion patterns among the Portuguese. Whereas Roman Catholicism accounted for well over 90 percent of the total population at the start of the twentieth century, these new results suggest that the population of Portugal is not as Catholic as it used to be.[6] Both Table 5.1 and Fig. 5.1 indicate that although Portugal remains a Roman Catholic-majority country, there is marked diversity in its contemporary religious marketplace. Of note, some 14 percent of the respondents indicated that they had no organized religion or were indifferent, agnostic, or atheist.

Table 5.1 Religious affiliation in Portugal, 2011

Questions	*% of population*
Belief in God, but without a religion	4.6
Indifferent	3.2
Agnostic	2.2
Atheist	4.1
Roman Catholic	79.5
Evangelical Christian	2.2
Other protestant	0.2
Orthodox Christian	0.5
Muslim	0.3
Jehovah's witnesses	1.3
Other Christian	0.3
Other non-Christian (including Jewish)	0.4 (Jewish 0.1)
No response/don't know	0.6

Source: Centro de Estudos e Sondagens de Opinião and Centro de Estudos de Religiões e Culturas, "Identidades Religiosas em Portugal: Representações, Valores e Práticas," ed. Alfredo Teixeira, 2011 (summary of paper presented at the Plenary Assembly of the Conferência Episcopal Portuguesa, Fátima, April 16–19, 2012, Universidade Católica Portuguesa Com o patrocínio da Conferência Episcopal Portuguesa), Table 4, p. 3, http://www.esb.ucp.pt/sites/default/files/images/inquerito_2011_resumo.pdf



Fig. 5.1 Religious affiliation in Portugal, 2011. Source: Centro de Estudos e Sondagens de Opinião and Centro de Estudos de Religiões e Culturas, "Identidades Religiosas em Portugal: Representações, Valores e Práticas," ed. Alfredo Teixeira, 2011 (summary of paper presented at the Plenary Assembly of the Conferência Episcopal Portuguesa, Fátima, April 16–19, 2012, Universidade Católica Portuguesa Com o patrocínio da Conferência Episcopal Portuguesa), Table 4, p. 3, http://www.esb.ucp.pt/sites/default/files/images/inquerito_2011_resumo.pdf

Table 5.2 and Fig. 5.2 show some movement away from Roman Catholicism in Portugal. Since 1999, those self-identifying as Roman Catholic have dropped by 7 percent, and those self-identifying as without religion have increased by almost the same percentage. One could deduce from these results that those leaving the Catholic faith are not joining another confession, and that they simply consider themselves as persons without religion.

Table 5.3 focuses on the 79.5 percent of the Portuguese population self-identifying as Roman Catholic (reported in Table 5.1) in terms of how they practice their faith, by region. The results show that nationally, 49.2 percent of Roman Catholics regularly practice their faith, 40.6 percent do so occasionally, and 20 percent never do so. In other words, out of a population of approximately 10 million people, about 7.9 million claim Catholicism; according to our calculations, about 4 million Portuguese are irregular or non-practicing Catholics who are hedging their spiritual bets, so to speak; and around 3.9 million Portuguese regularly practice their Catholic faith.

Table 5.3 also shows some significant regional distinctions in the practice of Portuguese Catholicism: regular religious practice is stronger in the north (56 percent regular participation) and in the center (56.2 percent)

Table 5.2 Categories of religious positions among believers (in percentages)

Categories	*1999*	*2011*	*Change*
Roman Catholic	86.9	79.5	−7.4
Other religions	2.7	5.7	+3.0
Without religion	8.2	14.2	+6.0
Don't know/no response	2.2	0.6	−1.6
Total	100	100	

Source: Centro de Estudos e Sondagens de Opinião and Centro de Estudos de Religiões e Culturas, "Identidades Religiosas em Portugal: Representações, Valores e Práticas," ed. Alfredo Teixeira, 2011 (summary of paper presented at the Plenary Assembly of the Conferência Episcopal Portuguesa, Fátima, April 16–19, 2012, Universidade Católica Portuguesa Com o patrocínio da Conferência Episcopal Portuguesa), Table 4, p. 3, http://www.esb.ucp.pt/sites/default/files/images/inquerito_2011_resumo.pdf



Fig. 5.2 Change in religious affiliation in Portugal, 1999–2011. Source: Centro de Estudos e Sondagens de Opinião and Centro de Estudos de Religiões e Culturas, "Identidades Religiosas em Portugal: Representações, Valores e Práticas," ed. Alfredo Teixeira, 2011 (summary of paper presented at the Plenary Assembly of the Conferência Episcopal Portuguesa, Fátima, April 16–19, 2012, Universidade Católica Portuguesa Com o patrocínio da Conferência Episcopal Portuguesa), Table 4, p. 3, http://www.esb.ucp.pt/sites/default/files/images/inquerito_2011_resumo.pdf

Table 5.3 Religious practices of Roman Catholics in Portugal, 2011 (in percentages)

Catholics, according to practice (aggregate data based on question "How often do you attend Mass")	*North*	*Center*	*Lisbon and environs*	*Alentejo*	*Algarve*	*National total*
1. Nominal Catholic (never)	8.9	6.9	13.3	11.9	20.0	20
2. Occasionally practicing Catholic (1–2 times per year)	22.2	19.8	32.0	27.8	36.0	25.2
3. Irregularly practicing Catholic (up to 11 times per year)	12.9	17.1	17.7	16.6	18.0	15.4
4. Regularly practicing Catholic (1–2 times per month)	14.8	16.7	12.9	15.9	7.0	14.5
5. Observant Catholic (all Sundays and holy days, more than once per week)	29.0	28.0	15.1	17.9	10.0	23.7
6. Devout Catholic (deeply involved in the life of the parish)	12.2	11.5	9.0	9.9	9.0	11.0

Source: Centro de Estudos e Sondagens de Opinião and Centro de Estudos de Religiões e Culturas, "Identidades Religiosas em Portugal: Representações, Valores e Práticas," ed. Alfredo Teixeira, 2011 (summary of paper presented at the Plenary Assembly of the Conferência Episcopal Portuguesa, Fátima, April 16–19, 2012, Universidade Católica Portuguesa Com o patrocínio da Conferência Episcopal Portuguesa), http://www.esb.ucp.pt/sites/default/files/images/inquerito_2011_resumo.pdf

than in the south, in Alentejo (43.7 percent) and the Algarve (26 percent). Thirty-seven percent of those living in the urban area of Lisbon and its environs regularly practice their Catholic faith.

Although national numbers indicate that Portugal remains a Catholic-majority country, they also reveal Portugal to be a Catholic-minority practicing country. Summing up the findings:

- A significant majority of Portuguese (79 percent) self-identify as Roman Catholic, but this number has been dropping over the last 30 years.
- A significant minority of Portuguese regularly practice their faith (approximately 3.9 million people).
- Portuguese Catholicism is practiced with greater frequency in the center and northern parts of the country than in the south or in the greater Lisbon metropolitan areas.

These numbers suggest that the Catholic Church in Portugal is not the religious monopoly it used to be; they also suggest that the impression that the Catholic Church is in rapid decline in Portuguese society may be overstated. There is a decline in the overall numbers, but the fact that four million people regularly practice their faith suggests an ongoing vibrancy of Portuguese Catholicism. To that point, the Jesuit priest Hermínio Rico argues that many young people in Portugal regularly attend Mass, "not in every parish, of course, but in many—those which adapt to a younger audience." In Rico's view, Catholicism in Portugal is more vibrant than elsewhere in Europe, including Spain.[7]

The Complicated Historical Path of the Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa

One province where one can see a *vibrantly muted* Catholic life in Portugal is in the many charitable organizations. Father Lino Maia, president of the Confederação Nacional das Instituições de Solidariedade—CNIS (National Confederation of Solidarity Institutions), states that the CNIS has about 2850 associated institutions nationally, including Misericórdias and Mutualidades.[8] Arguably, the most visible Catholic-inspired charitable organization in Portugal is the Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa. Other Santa Casa da Misericórdia institutions were subsequently created throughout the Portuguese-speaking world. More recently, Portuguese immigrants in France founded the Santa Casa de Misericórdia de Paris in 1994. The unifying and trans-historical mission of the Santa Casa da Misericórdia—and indeed of all the Catholic charitable organizations—is predicated in the Christian Gospel: namely, to provide needed assistance to the vulnerable and the marginalized and to improve individual lives, social relations, institutions, and collective projects. Or, in theological terms, believers are required to perform corporal works of mercy to those in need.[9]

However, the close church–state relationship during much of Portugal's history complicates efforts today to separate Catholic-associated charitable societies from secular state-run ones. The Portuguese state—in the person of Queen Leonor—created the non-profit in 1498, which causes much confusion today.[10] That is, Queen Leonor combined what we now would differentiate as state services and religious services into one entity with the creation of the Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa in 1498 (the same year Vasco da Gama reached India). What may have made sense under a

late fifteenth-century Catholic monarch creates conceptual confusion under a twenty-first-century secular democratic regime: the Misericórdia de Lisboa has been on a twisted and complicated church–state institutional path for the last 500 years, fraught with definitional problems.

Let's start with definitions. To be classified as a religious organization, a group ordinarily needs to function as an independent agency from the government. If an organization relies on state funding, one can reasonably ask where the public/private boundaries lie. In Portugal, most of the private groups have cooperation agreements with the government, normally under the statute of Instituições Particulares de Solidariedade Social—IPSS (Private Institutions of Social Solidarity). Religious-based organizations are classified as Pessoas Colectivas Religiosas (Register of Legal Religious Persons), as established by Decreto-Lei no. 134/2003.[11]

What is the Misericórdia, exactly? Is it a third sector organization, a governmental one, or some unique combination that only makes sense in a Portuguese historical context? It could certainly be argued that the Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa is not a third sector institution, because it is not fully private and independent of government. The Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa is independent from the rest of the Misericórdias and is funded by the state lottery. To this point, Lino Maia explains:

> The Misericórdia of Lisbon is not the third sector, but it is in an institutional relationship (it is state-owned). Beyond the Misericórdia of Lisbon there are over 380 Misericórdias nationally. Between 1500 and the present, there has been a widespread idea among the Portuguese that in every county (and city), there should be a Misericórdia. All these Misericórdias in Portugal are canonical structures linked to the Catholic Church (under the Cardinal of Lisbon) and thus are the third sector.[12]

Rui Branco, following the seminal 1979 article on corporatism by Collier and Collier, suggests that one could argue the Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa is a strange form of a third sector organization. That is, in their article, Collier and Collier nuance state–civil society relations based on a continuum that extends from full autonomy (not the case of the Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa) to some sort of "corporatism" within the framework of inducements and constraints (closer to the case of the Misericórdia de Lisboa).[13] As a semi-public body, it is not fully independent from government for its governance, but still maintains a religious-based, and not a secular, mission.[14] A quick glance at its website (under

mission and values) reveals its commitment to corporal works of mercy—not something the secular government usually talks about.[15] So, at the very least, one could say that the Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa is a Catholic historical residue in a secular state—not unlike the enigma of a Christian cross sitting atop the secular state-owned Panthéon in Paris.[16]

The twisted path of church–state relations in Portugal has led to the current situation, in which the functions of the state and the Misericórdia have overlapped and continue to be obfuscated by historical traditions and other factors. The Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa is a singular case: it has delegated public functions, enjoys a semi-public status, and receives almost the full amount of the national lottery to fund its activities. Silvia Ferreira argues that:

> The Misericórdia de Lisboa is a special type of organization, distinguishable from other Misericórdias. It has a semi-public status (the board includes members of the public sector, and the provedor (director) is chosen by the government). It receives almost the full amount of the national lottery and it has delegated public functions. With that money it is in charge of social assistance in the region of Lisbon and it makes agreements with other non-profits for the delivery of social services. It plays in Lisbon the role that the social security administration has in the remaining parts of the country. This special status corresponds to the framework these kinds of organizations had before the Portuguese revolution, and is almost unique.[17]

Likewise, Hermínio Rico points out that "[t]here are many IPSS in Portugal. Misericórdias are just one kind—the older ones—but they all work through contracts with the State Social Security, in which they receive from the state (the welfare system) a certain amount for the services they provide each of their beneficiaries. Thus, the state finances private providers of social services. In the end, it's only the management of the funds that is private, not the source of the funds."[18]

Indeed, all the Misericórdias claim a mission based in corporal works of mercy—which are at the foundation of twentieth-century Catholic social teaching. The desire to help those in need harmonizes with the core objectives of the secular welfare state, but these are still two distinct institutions. The Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa is the oldest one, and the one most closely associated with the government. The União das Misericórdias—responsible for the rest of the country—is significantly more independent of the government, but still relies on state support.

Setting aside the question of whether the Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa is a third sector organization, we can identify many other social service organizations in Portugal. Loosely following the useful categories developed by Andres Walliser and Sara Villanueva, we can identify three main types of Christian-based third sector organizations in Portugal.

- First, the *policy implementation sector* describes those legal organizations operating under a state-granted formal statute. In this category, the IPSS status formally recognizes and supports the work of the organization in a specific area of need. This describes the Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa (Lisbon Holy House of Mercy) as well as the União das Misericórdias Portuguesa (Portuguese Union of Houses of Mercy); the Confederação Nacional das Instituições de Solidariedade Social—CNIS (National Confederation of Social Solidarity Institutions); the Associações de Solidariedade Social (Social Solidarity Associations); the União das Mutualidades Portuguesas (Union of Portuguese Mutual Societies); the Associações de Socorro Mútuo (League of Mutual Aid Associations); and the Centros Sociais e Paroquiais de Bem-Estar Social (Parochial Social Centers of Social Well-Being). Lino Maia reports that "relations between the leaders of the CNIS and the *Misericórdias* are very good, with regular meetings setting common strategy."[19]
- Second, the *community sector* describes those Catholic and other Christian organizations which are motivated by scripture to work directly with the most vulnerable, ordinarily outside of the state. These groups include Cáritas Portuguesa, Sociedade de São Vicente de Paulo (SSVP), and the Legião da Boa Vontade (Good Will Legion).
- Third, the *philanthropic associations sector*, which has a policy-specific focus, has clear social aims, does not engage in economic activity, and is very reliant on donations. These groups—sometimes in conjunction with the state—seek to provide needed services and improve efficiencies in the delivery of goods in specific policy areas (including refugees, poverty, prisons, and many others). They include O Serviço Jesuíta aos Refugiados—JRS (Jesuit Refugee Service); Obra Católica Portuguesa das Migrações (Portuguese Catholic Work for Migrants); Coordenação Nacional da Pastoral Penitenciária (National Coordination for Prison Ministry); Obra Nacional da Pastoral dos Ciganos (National Pastoral Work for Gypsies); Ajuda à Igreja que Sofre (Help to a Suffering Church); Terra dos Sonhos (Field of Dreams, for children suffering from incurable diseases); and many others.

These three categories show the complexity of faith-based third sector work in Portugal. Sónia Sousa has importantly observed that if the inquiry is limited to the Misericórdias, a substantial portion of social services institutions would be left out. In her view, "faith-based and privately-owned not-for-profit organizations account for the bulk of the social services in Portugal, more so than the Misericórdias. For example, there are about 2,500 institutions which are members of CNIS and another 1,800 non-CNIS members outside the sphere of Misericórdias."[20] Arguably, the long and twisted path of the church–state relationship in Portugal has led to the development of this wide array of social service third sector organizations, many of which are founded upon the principles of corporal works of mercy.

Question Two: Objectives

Let us now consider their objective: What do Catholic civic organizations hope to accomplish in the public square? This question brings us to what J. Von Essen has referred to as "the problem of goodness"—that is, determining whether these organizations are being altruistic for its own sake, or in expectation of some form of payment.[21] At first glance, one form of "payment"—for lack of a better word—for religious-motivated people is eternal salvation, rooted in the corporal works of mercy. Theologically, performing good works alone does not replace a belief in Christ, but such actions do put into practice a love of Christ. There are several scriptural bases for this work. Consider, for example, John 10:3 37–38:

> If I do not perform my Father's works, do not believe me; but if I perform them, even if you do not believe me, believe the works, so that you may realize (and understand) that the Father is in me and I am in the Father.

And again, in James 2:26:

> For just as a body without a spirit is dead, so also faith without works is dead.

Scriptural passages such as these motivated Queen Leonor to launch the Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa in 1498. Simply put, corporal works of mercy—which are the center of Roman Catholic understanding of intrinsic good—place scripture into practical applications; modern

Catholic social teachings spring up from these understandings. The societal footprint of the Misericórdia, Cáritas Portugal, and other Catholic organizations (including orphanages and other child care facilities, nursing homes, medical clinics, family counseling centers, and hospitals) reflects this notion of intrinsic good and accounts for why these groups exist in the first place.

The Economic Crisis of 2008 and Refundação

The global financial crisis of 2008 brought renewed focus on the societal need of non-governmental Catholic-based civic associations. As Miguel Glatzer points out in an earlier paper, Portugal was hit hard by the global financial crisis.[22] Although the government initially responded with stimulus (along with most of its European partners as well as the United States), interest rates on government debt rose significantly. Portugal passed austerity budgets in 2010 but was soon forced to seek an international bailout. The troika (the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) approved a bailout package of 78 billion Euros in May 2011, the third after Greece and Ireland. Tightened credit, reduced private sector demand, government austerity, and a slowdown in growth and slide into recession among most of its European trading partners caused the Portuguese economy to decline. The crisis led Portugal to experience a lost decade, with real GDP per capita returning to 2008 levels only in 2017.

In response to the economic crisis and the bailout conditions of the agreement with the troika, the Portuguese government committed itself to both austerity and structural reforms. It undertook a process referred to as rethinking, or *refundação*, of how the state provides services; that process eventually led the state to adopt several sharp policy changes, including reductions of public services, transfers, public investments, social pensions, and public employee salaries.[23]

The government tightened tax policies. Indirect taxes on goods and services (the Value Added Tax) were increased, pensions above 500 Euros were subject to a solidarity tax, and a number of personal income tax credits were eliminated.[24] Pensions were reduced on a progressive scale. Child benefits and the benefit of the social integration scheme (Rendimento Social de Inserção) were cut by close to a third, with eligibility for the latter also tightened.[25] Labor market regulations were liberalized, with protections reduced. The minimum wage was frozen, overtime pay was

reduced by 50 percent, the thirteenth and fourteenth months of pay were eliminated, severance costs were cut, and criteria for dismissals were widened.[26]

Many people were badly hurt by the crisis and the measures implemented in response to it. Between 2010 and 2014, the poverty rate for working age adults (aged 18–64) increased from 12.9 to 19.3 percent.[27] Poverty increased by similar amounts among children. Reflecting limited access to unemployment benefits as well as cuts in both benefit levels and duration, poverty reached very high levels among the unemployed, 40.2 percent of whom were poor in 2012.[28] The number of unemployed soared, rising from 7.6 percent in 2008 to a peak of 16.2 percent in 2013 before falling to 12.4 percent in 2015. Broader definitions of unemployment, which include people discouraged from looking for work as well as part-time workers who wish to work full-time, reached 25.4 percent in 2013.[29] Cáritas Portugal—the official institution of the Portuguese Bishops' Conference—reports that demands for its services significantly increased, with almost a doubling in the numbers of families who were receiving support in 2011–2012. Similarly, Valentina Pop observes:

> Five years since the beginning of the crisis in 2008, there is little or no growth, there are ongoing massive increases in unemployment, and millions of people are living in poverty … The *Cáritas* report shows how these reforms translated into practice: people with disabilities and pensioners having to wait for months for their allowances and pensions because there is not enough personnel to process all the claims.[30]

To provide additional service, the government launched the Social Emergency Program in 2011 (Programa de Emergência Social—PES).[31] This program also attempted to increase the capacity of local non-profit organizations to deal with the crisis and to alleviate the suffering of the affected groups. Lino Maia reports that the government reached out to the CNIS as it developed this program, and that this association of third sector charitable organizations continues an excellent working relationship with the government:

> The CNIS gave many contributions to the definition of the Social Emergency Program for 2011. It was indeed consulted in advance and was the main "construction" of the program. Cooperation between the government and the CNIS is very good; we have monthly meetings with three social minis-

> tries (Ministry of Solidarity, Employment and Social Security, Ministry of Education, and Ministry of Health). The CNIS is continually consulted to give advice on all legal documents of interest to the sector and a cooperative agreement just got approved by the Council of Ministers in a Decree Law. Not being a government organization and affiliated with no party (it cooperates and systematically dialogues with all parties), the CNIS feels very comfortable in the dialogue and cooperation with this government.[32]

Clearly, the government understood that the austerity program would have significant human consequences, and that its own state-run welfare services would not be able to keep up with the demand. The role of the CNIS, along with Union of Misericórdias (which has about 380 members) and the Union of Mutual Societies (with about 90 members), was essential to maintaining some degree of social harmony during the implementation of the austerity program.[33]

Anti-austerity Protests

At first, the Portuguese seemed resigned to these austerity measures. In time, however, anti-austerity protests were organized and reached a scale not seen in Portugal since the heady days of the April 25, 1974, revolution. Unlike the 1970s, however, some of these new groups were organized over social media.[34] One of the largest anti-austerity protests took place on March 12, 2011, when an estimated 300,000 people, calling themselves the Movimento 12 de Março (March 12, Movement) and the Geração à Rasca (Struggling Generation), protested in Oporto and in Lisbon. These protests did not reach the crisis level seen in Greece, but they nonetheless posed a potential challenge for the government: a civil society outraged against its elected officials does not bode well for the health of democracy. Indeed, a worrying effect of the 2008 crisis in the worst-affected countries was a steep drop in trust in national and European Union institutions. To the degree that Catholic civic organizations are responding to the needs of those hurt by the austerity measures—and thus toning down some of the anti-government and anti-system rhetoric of the protesters—one can say that the role and function they play in strengthening associational life indeed assists the larger deepening of Portuguese democracy.

Question Three: Means and Strategies

The question of means and strategies implies two interrelated concerns: first, the legal framework of how religious actors operate in the Portuguese public square; and second, their sources of income.

Legal Framework

The law of Religious Liberty of 2001 frames contemporary church–state relations in Portugal.[35] Among other provisions, it guarantees equal treatment for all confessions and the right of a religion to establish churches and run schools. Of note, Article 58 of the Law on Religious Liberty guarantees the Roman Catholic Church certain privileges not allowed to other confessions, because it left the Salazar-era 1940 Concordat between the Vatican and Portugal intact. That issue was remedied with the 2004 Concordat between the Vatican and Portugal, in which the Portuguese state affirmed the juridical position of the Catholic Church and its institutions, especially the church's jurisdiction in ecclesiastical matters, whereas the church recognized religious freedom in Portugal as a fundamental right for all people, and agreed to live within the democratic processes outlined in the constitution.

The four main legal documents governing how religious actors operate in the Portuguese public square are the 1983 IPSS statue, the 1992 *Despacho Normativo* (Legislative Order), the 1996 *Cooperation Agreement*, and the 2003 *Registo de Pessoas Colectivas Religiosas* (Register of Collective Religious Persons).[36] Combined, these measures aim at bringing some balance and structure to the relationship between the government and third sector organizations that had previously been very confused and unclear—due in part to the complicated historical path of the church–state relationship.

The IPSS statute of 1983 was the first step. Maria Barroco notes that this statute granted legal recognition to third sector organizations that advance societal justice and solidarity, and was a first attempt at harmonizing church–state relations in this area.[37] The 1992 *Despacho Normativo* allowed the state to provide technical support and subsidies to third sector organizations, as well as through the tax code (reimbursements, exemptions, abatements).[38] The ambitious 1996 *Cooperation Agreement for Social Solidarity* signed by the government, the Associação Nacional de Municípios (National Associations of Municipal and Civil Parish

Governments), the Associação Nacional de Freguesias (National Association of Local Parish Governments), representative bodies of IPSS members, the Misericórdias, and the Mutual Association members provides the legal basis for the coordination of social service work at both national and local levels of government, as well as the relevant civil society organizations.[39] Finally, the Registo de Pessoas Colectivas Religiosas, a register of faith-based organizations, was formally created by Decreto-Lei no. 134/2003 on June 28, 2003. Combined, these four steps have enabled the state to formally identify and regularize their relationship with religious third sector organizations and thereby to begin to bring some structure and logic to this relationship. With these developments, most works of third sector charity that were founded on a volunteer basis have now been framed within the IPSS structure, with access to public funding.[40]

Sources of Income

Given the terms of the 1996 Cooperation Agreement, many IPSS organizations now receive government subsidies. This arrangement is in harmony with Paul Hirst's argument that "the state should cede functions to such associations, and create the mechanisms of public finance whereby they can undertake them."[41] The policy implementation sector groups Santa Casa de Misericórdia de Lisboa, União das Misericórdias Portuguesa, CNIS, União das Mutualidades Portuguesas, and parochial social centers all receive substantial state support, working through contracts with the government which allocate funds for their services. Community sector groups such as Cáritas Portuguesa, SSVP, and Legião da Boa Vontade receive some government support, and philanthropic associations typically work outside of governmental grants. A 2005 study by the European Union found earned income (fees and sales) to be the dominant source of civil society organization revenue in Portugal (48 percent), followed closely by public sector support (40 percent), and finally, private philanthropy (12 percent).[42]

As these findings suggest, the church/state lines remain blurred. Catholic associations rely on state funding, and the state also relies on these institutions to deliver much needed social services at a lower cost than if the state performed all this work by itself. In this regard, Rui Branco notes that "one of the takeaways of the literature on social assistance in Portugal is that the state's direct effort is comparatively small, as it relies a great deal

on the third sector … another is that the welfare civil society, and within it the religious welfare civil society, is one of the best, if not the best, organized sectors in the Portuguese civil society, and also one of the largest."[43]

Question Four: Effects

Numerous studies have documented the important contributions of third sector organizations in Portugal.[44] The October 2014 publication *Impactes Económico e Social das IPSS* (Economic and Social Impact of the IPSS), by the Confederação Nacional das Instituições de Solidariedade (National Confederation of the Solidarity Institutions), details the economic and social benefits of religious-based third sector activities.[45] Among the findings, the report reveals that the combined work of the main legal forms of IPSS, including the Santas Casas das Misericórdias; Centros Sociais e Paroquiais de Bem-Estar Social; Associações de Socorro Mútuo ou Mutualidades; and Associações de Solidariedade Social—the policy implementation sector—produced in the social economy in FY 2010, "36.8 % of production, 50.1 % of GVA (Gross Value Added), 63.4 % of employment, 42.6 % of earnings, 40.9 % of final consumption expenditure and 38.2 % of net borrowing of the social economy."[46] Similarly, Cáritas Portugal reports that in 2014 its Fundo Social Solidário (Social Solidarity Fund) supported 3957 persons facing difficulties with issues like housing costs, health, education, or jobs. Its Prioridade às Crianças (all priority to children) program assisted 115 children in 2014.[47]

In terms of gross numbers of Catholic-sponsored charitable organizations in Portugal, Miguel de Oliveira reports that as of 1994, there were 295 homes for the infirm, 26 hospitals, 42 outpatient departments and dispensaries, 201 child care centers, 795 social and parochial centers, and 3897 Catholic civic associations.[48] These numbers have increased over the last 20 years for both Catholic and non-religious third sector organizations. The Center for Civil Society reports that in 2010 there were 5022 IPSS. The European Union reports that as of September 2014, there were 5099 IPSS registered with the Portuguese social security system, including 3309 associations, 1004 social and parochial centers, 234 foundations, 208 institutes of religious organizations, and 344 Misericórdias.

As these numbers indicate, the effects of the work by these sector organizations in Portuguese civil society are quite important.[49] Significant pressures would be placed on the welfare state if these groups did not exist. Glatzer has noted that "the state has an important financial interest

in delivering social services through the IPSS," given the significant cost savings of the delivery of these vital services. Agreeing, Manuel Morujão observes that "it's impossible to imagine the welfare state without the work of the Santas Casas da Misericórdia. If the *Misericórdias* were to close, the welfare state would collapse." Expanding on that notion, Morujão explains that in his view, "it would be extremely difficult to find alternatives. The Misericórdias have great structures, buildings, know-how, prepared personnel, strong tradition, and Christian inspiration to serve brothers and sisters, and this is significantly more than bureaucratic structures have to help people."[50]

Question Five: Public Perception

How are these good works perceived by the population? Returning to the surveys completed in 2011 during the austerity crisis by the Centro de Estudos e Sondagens de Opinião at the Universidade Católica Portuguesa, and presented in Tables 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9, we can find an overall appreciation of the role of Catholicism in contemporary Portuguese society.[51] Given the long and pronounced presence of the Roman Catholic Church in Portuguese society, these questions are particularly revealing: they help us gauge a general feeling of whether the people think that the Catholic Church is an antiquated vestige of the fascist past, or whether it continues to play a vital role in contemporary Portuguese society.

Table 5.4 Would there be more poverty if there were no Roman Catholic Church in Portugal?

	Percentage of respondents
Totally agree	29.1
Partially agree	20.3
Neither agree nor disagree	13.7
Partially disagree	8.1
Totally disagree	18.7
Don't know/no response	10.0
Total	100.0

Source: Centro de Estudos e Sondagens de Opinião and Centro de Estudos de Religiões e Culturas, "Identidades Religiosas em Portugal: Representações, Valores e Práticas," ed. Alfredo Teixeira, 2011 (summary of paper presented at the Plenary Assembly of the Conferência Episcopal Portuguesa, Fátima, April 16–19, 2012, Universidade Católica Portuguesa Com o patrocínio da Conferência Episcopal Portuguesa), http://www.esb.ucp.pt/sites/default/files/images/inquerito_2011_resumo.pdf

Table 5.5 Would many lack a purpose in life if there were no Roman Catholic Church in Portugal?

	Percentage of respondents
Totally agree	38.7
Partially agree	26.9
Neither agree nor disagree	11.4
Partially disagree	5.0
Totally disagree	10.3
Don't know/no response	7.7
Total	100.0

Source: Centro de Estudos e Sondagens de Opinião and Centro de Estudos de Religiões e Culturas, "Identidades Religiosas em Portugal: Representações, Valores e Práticas," ed. Alfredo Teixeira, 2011 (summary of paper presented at the Plenary Assembly of the Conferência Episcopal Portuguesa, Fátima, April 16–19, 2012, Universidade Católica Portuguesa Com o patrocínio da Conferência Episcopal Portuguesa), http://www.esb.ucp.pt/sites/default/files/images/inquerito_2011_resumo.pdf

Table 5.6 Would many die without hope if there were no Roman Catholic Church in Portugal?

	Percentage of respondents
Totally agree	44.2
Partially agree	24.7
Neither agree nor disagree	9.1
Partially disagree	4.9
Totally disagree	9.6
Don't know/no response	7.4
Total	100.0

Source: Centro de Estudos e Sondagens de Opinião and Centro de Estudos de Religiões e Culturas, "Identidades Religiosas em Portugal: Representações, Valores e Práticas," ed. Alfredo Teixeira, 2011 (summary of paper presented at the Plenary Assembly of the Conferência Episcopal Portuguesa, Fátima, April 16–19, 2012, Universidade Católica Portuguesa Com o patrocínio da Conferência Episcopal Portuguesa), http://www.esb.ucp.pt/sites/default/files/images/inquerito_2011_resumo.pdf

Table 5.7 Would there be more progress if there were no Roman Catholic Church in Portugal?

	Percentage of respondents
Totally agree	6.5
Partially agree	10.0
Neither agree nor disagree	20.0
Partially disagree	13.7
Totally disagree	36.5
Don't know/no response	13.2
Total	100.0

Source: Centro de Estudos e Sondagens de Opinião and Centro de Estudos de Religiões e Culturas, "Identidades Religiosas em Portugal: Representações, Valores e Práticas," ed. Alfredo Teixeira, 2011 (summary of paper presented at the Plenary Assembly of the Conferência Episcopal Portuguesa, Fátima, April 16–19, 2012, Universidade Católica Portuguesa Com o patrocínio da Conferência Episcopal Portuguesa), http://www.esb.ucp.pt/sites/default/files/images/inquerito_2011_resumo.pdf

Table 5.8 Would there be more individual freedom if there were no Roman Catholic Church in Portugal?

	Percentage of respondents
Totally agree	8.7
Partially agree	12.4
Neither agree nor disagree	16.0
Partially disagree	13.6
Totally disagree	37.2
Don't know/no response	12.1
Total	100.0

Source: Centro de Estudos e Sondagens de Opinião and Centro de Estudos de Religiões e Culturas, "Identidades Religiosas em Portugal: Representações, Valores e Práticas," ed. Alfredo Teixeira, 2011 (summary of paper presented at the Plenary Assembly of the Conferência Episcopal Portuguesa, Fátima, April 16–19, 2012, Universidade Católica Portuguesa Com o patrocínio da Conferência Episcopal Portuguesa), http://www.esb.ucp.pt/sites/default/files/images/inquerito_2011_resumo.pdf

Table 5.9 Would there be more religious freedom if there were no Roman Catholic Church in Portugal?

	Percentage of respondents
Totally agree	13.4
Partially agree	12.2
Neither agree nor disagree	16.5
Partially disagree	10.7
Totally disagree	35.9
Don't know/no response	11.3
Total	100.0

Source: Centro de Estudos e Sondagens de Opinião and Centro de Estudos de Religiões e Culturas, "Identidades Religiosas em Portugal: Representações, Valores e Práticas," ed. Alfredo Teixeira, 2011 (summary of paper presented at the Plenary Assembly of the Conferência Episcopal Portuguesa, Fátima, April 16–19, 2012, Universidade Católica Portuguesa Com o patrocínio da Conferência Episcopal Portuguesa), http://www.esb.ucp.pt/sites/default/files/images/inquerito_2011_resumo.pdf

The Central Role of Combating Poverty

Table 5.4 asks about the social work of church and asks if there would be more poverty in Portugal without the Catholic Church. The survey finds that 49.4 percent of the Portuguese believe that there would be more poverty in Portugal without the Roman Catholic Church, with only 26.6 percent disagreeing. The 49 percent number approximates the number of practicing Roman Catholics in Portugal, but this result does seem to indicate a general appreciation for the charitable works of church-based organizations.

Tables 5.5 and 5.6 inquire about the ontological teachings of the church and ask if there would be less hope in Portugal without the Roman Catholic Church. The results indicate an appreciation for both the corporal works of mercy sponsored by church organizations and the hope contained in church teachings. Table 5.5 asks if people think there would be a lack of purpose in life without the Roman Catholic Church. A large percentage, 65.5 percent, agree that church teachings offer a purpose of life, with only 15.3 percent disagreeing. The strongest opinion was held by those who strongly agree with that statement, at 38.7 percent.

Similarly, Table 5.6 finds that 66.9 percent think that people would die without hope if there were no Catholic Church in Portugal. The strongest group, 44.2, totally agreed with the statement.

Tables 5.7, 5.8, and 5.9 all ask variations of questions concerning whether Portuguese society would be freer without the presence of the Roman Catholic Church. The results are somewhat surprising: the majority of Portuguese do not find the church to be an obstacle to individual freedom.

Table 5.7 asks whether Portugal would have more progress without the Roman Catholic Church. Only 16.5 percent agree with that statement, with 50.2 percent disagreeing. Of note, the strongest responses in this survey came from those who totally disagree with the statement.

Table 5.8 asks whether there would be more individual freedom in Portugal if there were no Roman Catholic Church. The results parallel the findings in Table 5.7: only 21 percent of the respondents agree with the statement, and 50.8 percent disagree. The strongest opinion was voiced by those who strongly disagree, at 37.2 percent.

Finally, Table 5.9 asks if people think that there would be more religious freedom if there were no Roman Catholic Church in Portugal; 46.6 percent disagree with that statement, and 25.6 percent agree. As is the case with the other tables, the largest percentage, 35.9 percent, totally disagrees with that statement.

These results clearly indicate a high appreciation of, and satisfaction with, the works of the Roman Catholic Church and its organizations in Portugal. Lino Maia explains:

> Maybe because of the great involvement of the Catholic Church and its IPSS (in combating poverty), there is a general appreciation for the Catholic Church, which has helped people to forget some "sins" of the Church. It is generally recognized that those who have done more to ensure that problems are not so onerous for the Portuguese, particularly in this (austerity) crisis, have been the Church and its institutions—not only the canonical structures in the IPSS, but also the Vincentians and *Cáritas*.[52]

Summing up the findings:

- A majority of Portuguese find that the Catholic Church provides needed services to combat poverty.
- A strong majority of Portuguese find that the Catholic Church provides ontological support (meaning and purpose of life).
- A plurality of Portuguese find that the Catholic Church does not impede personal or religious freedom.

Conclusion

How can a church in a newly consolidated democratic regime, in a time of economic crisis, with a past relationship to a fascist regime, and with declining numbers of adherents, contribute to the deepening of democracy? The concept of muted vibrancy is a particularly useful way to approach that question. It provides a nuanced understanding of the contemporary role of Catholicism in Portugal and takes us past a facile reading of their recent legislative defeats on moral issues.

Indeed, although the Portuguese Catholic Church has experienced a decrease in adherents over the past 30 years and has lost much influence in policy formation—as seen in the recent decisions by the government to decriminalize abortion and legalize same-sex marriage—the Portuguese Church remains vibrant. As the preceding discussion around our five key questions demonstrates, the social services provided by Catholic third sector organizations—whether they are part of the policy implementation sector, the community sector, or philanthropic associations—are greatly valued and have contributed to a strengthening of Portuguese associational life, especially so during the recent austerity crisis.[53] Father Lino Maia points out that "in Portugal there is a great sense of solidarity … almost all identify with the Judeo-Christian culture, and we are well aware that we are 'guards' of brothers and are called to 'feed the hungry.'"[54] Catholic social services—rooted in classic Christian understandings of the corporal works of mercy—have perhaps never been more in need. They are essential to combat poverty and to help to build a social consensus based on communitarian values. As such, they have clearly helped to strengthen Portuguese associational life, especially so after the austerity crisis of 2008.[55]

All of this brings us back to a fundamental contradiction in contemporary Portuguese society: although the numbers of baptized Catholics in Portugal participating in the life of their faith community have been decreasing over the past 30 years, perhaps due to the larger processes of secularization, the secular state in Lisbon still relies on the welfare services provided by those believing in corporal works of mercy. The twin processes of secularization and austerity have brought Portuguese Catholicism to this contradiction. Simply put, as the process of secularization tends to move people away from a daily spiritual reliance on organized religion, the politics of austerity requires more service to the poor by third sector organizations. Even though the good works of Catholic third sector

organizations are clear signs of a vibrant, but perhaps muted, church, one must still wonder if the steady decline in the practice of Portuguese Catholicism may someday result in fewer numbers of Catholics able and willing to perform these services—thereby forcing the delivery of social services in Portugal onto a more secular path.

Notes

1. Our thanks to Alfredo Teixeira for his permission to use the 2011 survey data in this chapter gathered by the Centro de Estudos e Sondagens de Opinião at the Universidade Católica Portuguesa.
2. Jeffrey Haynes and Anja Henning, *Religious Actors in the Public Square: Means, Objectives and Effects* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 3. Haynes and Hennig developed the questions on objectives, means and strategies, and effects.
3. W. Clyde Wilcox and Ted Jelen, *The One, the Few and the Many: Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
4. Alfred Stepan, *Arguing Comparative Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 221. Stepan notes that Portugal is the only member of the European Union that expressly prohibits political parties from the use of religious symbols. This law dates from the 1974–1996 revolutionary period and is mitigated by the fact that there is a de facto Christian Democratic Party—the CDS, or Centro Democrático e Social-Partido Popular, CDS-PP—that is a member of international Christian Democratic organizations.
5. Centro de Estudos e Sondagens de Opinião and Centro de Estudos de Religiões e Culturas, "Identidades Religiosas em Portugal: Representações, Valores e Práticas," ed. Alfredo Teixeira, 2011 (summary of paper presented at the Plenary Assembly of the Conferência Episcopal Portuguesa, Fátima, April 16–19, 2012, Universidade Católica Portuguesa Com o patrocínio da Conferência Episcopal Portuguesa), http://www.esb.ucp.pt/sites/default/files/images/inquerito_2011_resumo.pdf.
6. "Portugal," Catholic Encyclopedia, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12297a.htm. See also Caroline Brettell, "The Priest and His People: The Contractual Basis for Religious Practice in Rural Portugal," in *Religious Orthodoxy and Popular Faith in European Society*, ed. Ellen Badone, 55–75 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Thomas Bruneau, "Church and State in Portugal: Crisis of Cross and Sword," *Journal of Church and State* 18, no. 3 (1976): 463–90; Tom Buchanan and Martin Conway, *Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918–1954*

(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996); Gene Burns, *The Frontiers of Catholicism: The Politics of Ideology in a Liberal World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Manuel Braga da Cruz, "A Igreja na Transição Democrática Portuguesa," *Lusitania Sacra* 8/9 (1996–1997): 519–36; Joyce Riegelhaupt, "Festas and Padres: The Organization of Religious Action in a Portuguese Parish," *American Anthropologist* (1973/75): 835–52; Paul Christopher Manuel, "Religion and Politics in Iberia: Clericalism, Anticlericalism and Democratization in Portugal and Spain," in *The One, the Few and the Many: Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective*, ed. W. Clyde Wilcox and Ted Jelen, 71–96 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Helena Vilaça, *Da Torre de Babel às Terras Prometidas—Pluralismo Religioso em Portugal* [From the Tower of Babel to the Promised Lands—Religious Pluralism in Portugal] (Porto, Edições Afrontamento, 2006); and Helena Vilaça, "Secularization and Religious Vitality of the Roman Catholic Church in a Southern European Country," in *The Social Significance of Religion in an Enlarged Europe: Secularization, Individualization and Pluralization*, ed. Gert Pickel, Olaf Müller, and Detlef Pollack, 77–94 (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2012).

7. Hermínio Rico, email interview with Paul Manuel, May 6, 2015.
8. Lino Maia, email interview with Paul Manuel, June 8, 2015.
9. The corporal works of mercy are (1) to feed the hungry, (2) to give drink to the thirsty, (3) to clothe the naked, (4) to visit and ransom the captives, (5) to shelter the homeless, (6) to visit the sick, (7) to bury the dead. See United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, "The Corporal Works of Mercy," http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/how-we-teach/new-evangelization/jubilee-of-mercy/the-corporal-works-of-mercy.cfm. See also United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, "The Spiritual Works of Mercy," http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/how-we-teach/new-evangelization/jubilee-of-mercy/the-spiritual-works-of-mercy.cfm. The scriptural basis for the corporal works of mercy may be found in the Gospel of Matthew 25: 31–45, "*The Judgment of the Nations.* ˚31," http://www.usccb.org/bible/matthew/25.
10. See Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa (SCML), http://www.scml.pt/pt-PT/scml/5_seculos_de_historia/seculos_xv_e_xvi/.
11. *Registo de Pessoas Colectivas Religiosas* is governed under Decree Law 16/2001.
12. Lino Maia, email interview with Paul Manuel, June 8, 2015.
13. David Collier and Ruth Berins Collier, "Inducements verses Constraints: Disaggregating 'Corporatism,'" *The American Political Science Review* 73, no. 4 (1979): 967–86.

14. The Instituto Nacional de Estatística [National Statistical Institute] website contains the 2010 Satellite Account for Social Economy (SASE) and the 2012 survey on Volunteer Work, https://www.ine.pt/xportal/xmain?xpid=INE&xpgid=ine_publicacoes&PUBLICACOESpub_boui=157543613&PUBLICACOESmodo=2.
15. Santa Casa da Misericórdia de Lisboa, "Missão e Valores" [Mission and Values], http://www.scml.pt/pt-PT/scml/missao_e_valores/.
16. The Panthéon in the Latin Quarter in Paris was originally built as a Roman Catholic Church dedicated to St. Genevieve—the patroness of Paris. After many changes following the French revolution, it now functions as a secular mausoleum containing the remains of French heroes. However, a Christian cross remains atop the secular structure. See "Facts About the Pantheon in Paris," *The Pantheon Paris*, http://www.pantheonparis.com/history/facts.
17. Silvia Ferreira, email interview with Paul Manuel, May 5, 2015.
18. Hermínio Rico, email interview with Paul Manuel, May 6, 2015.
19. Lino Maia, email interview with Paul Manuel, June 8, 2015.
20. Sónia Sousa, email interview with Paul Manuel, May 11, 2015.
21. Von Essen, "Religious Perspective of Volunteering," 148.
22. Miguel Glatzer, "Fostering Civil Society: The Portuguese Welfare State and the Development of a Non-Profit Sector—from Growth to Euro Crisis," in *The European Union Beyond the Crisis: Evolving Governance, Contested Policies and Disenchanted Publics*, ed. Boyka Stefanova, 213–30 (London: Lexington Books, 2015).
23. See Ricardo Gonçalves, "A refundação do Estado em Portugal" [Refoundation of the State in Portugal], November 11, 2012, *EcosEconomia blog*, http://ecoseconomia.blogspot.com/2012/11/a-refundacao-do-estado-em-portugal.html. See also Sandra Henriques, "Passos Coelho defende que refundação evita segundo resgate" [Passos Coelho claims that refoundation avoids second bailout], *Antena 1, RTP Portugal*, October 30, 2012, http://www.rtp.pt/noticias/index.php?article=599307&tm=9&layout=123&visual=61.
24. See European Trade Union Confederation, Austerity Measures Adopted in Portugal, at http://www.etuc.org/portugal; International Monetary Fund, IMF Country Report No. 13/6, Portugal: Rethinking the State—Selected Expenditure Reform Options, January 2013, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr1306.pdf.
25. Maria Petmesidou and Miguel Glatzer, "The Crisis Imperative, Reform Dynamics and Rescaling in Greece and Portugal," *European Journal of Social Security* 17, no. 2 (2015): 151–81.

26. Amilcar Moreira, Ángel Alonso Domínguez, Cátia Antunes, Maria Karamessini, Michele Raitano, and Miguel Glatzer, "Austerity-Driven Labour Market Reforms in Southern Europe: Eroding the Security of Labour Market Insiders," *European Journal of Social Security* 17, no. 2 (2015): 202–25.
27. José António Pereirinha, "Pobreza e Novos Riscos Sociais em Portugal: Uma Análise da Despesa Social" [Poverty and New Social Risks in Portugal: An Analysis of Social Expenditure], in *Políticas Sociais em Tempo de Crise: Perspectivas, Tendências e Questões Criticas* [Social Policies in Times of Crisis: Perspectives, Trends and Critical Issues], ed. Cristina Albuquerque and Helena Amara da Luz, 125–44 (Lisbon: PACTOR, 2016), 128.
28. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), *Economic Surveys: Portugal 2014*, 94, https://doi.org/10.1787/eco_surveys-prt-2014-en.
29. Ministério do Trabalho, Solidariedade e Segurança Social, *Livro Verde Sobre as Relações Laborais 2016* (Lisbon: Gabinete de Estratégia e Planeasmento do Ministério do Trabalho, Solidariedade e Segurança Social, 2016), 83.
30. Valentina Pop, "Charity documents 'human cost' of EU austerity," *EU Observer*, March 27, 2014, https://euobserver.com/social/123643; Ann Leahy, Seán Healy, and Michelle Murphy, *A Caritas Monitoring Report: The European Crisis and Its Human Cost: A Call for Fair Alternatives and Solutions. A Study of the Impact of the Crisis and Austerity on People, with a special focus on Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Romania and Spain*, http://www.caritas.eu/sites/default/files/caritascrisisreport_2014_en.pdf.
31. Government of Portugal, 2012 Social Emergency Program, http://www.mercadosocialarrendamento.msss.pt/docs/programa-de-emergencia-social.pdf. Also available at http://www.mercadosocialarrendamento.msss.pt/programa_emergencia_social.jsp; Paul Krugman, "Can Europe be Saved?," *New York Times Magazine*, January 16, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/magazine/16Europe-t.html?_r=0.
32. Lino Maia, email interview with Paul Manuel, June 8, 2015.
33. Lino Maia, email interview with Paul Manuel, June 8, 2015. It is unclear to what extent the social emergency plan of the PDS-CDS government during the recent crisis was just purely a matter of *policy choice* as opposed to a *policy legacy* inherited from previous governments. It is certainly true that contrary to Spain and Greece, Portugal has a rich history of third sector involvement in policy making via articulation agreements with the state.

34. The social media anti-austerity movement was led by Alexandre de Sousa Carvalho, João Labrincha, and Paula Gil.
35. José de Sousa de Brito, "Covenantal and Non-Covenantal Cooperation of State and Religion in Portugal," in *Religion and Law in Dialogue: Covenantal and Non-Covenantal Cooperation between State and Religion in Europe*…, ed. Richard Puza and Norman Doe (Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 2006).
36. Ascoli, Glatzer, and Sotiropulos, "Southern European Welfare," 19. Glatzer has usefully observed that prior to the 1983 statue "the relationship of the state to civil society organizations in this field was ad hoc, unsystematic and based on a high level of discretion."
37. Maria de Fátima Barroco, "As Instituições Particulares de Solidariedade Social: Seu Enquadramento e Regime Juridico," in *As Instituições Não-Lucrativas e a Acção Social em Portugal*, ed. Carlos Pestana Barros and José C. Gomes Santos, 59–74 (Lisbon: Editora Vulgata, 1997), 66.
38. Barroco, "As Instituições Particulares de Solidariedade Social." Barroco notes that the exact details of the subsidies, etc., are revisited and codified annually in agreements between the relevant ministry and the IPSS union. See also Maria de Fátima Barroco, *Pessoas Colectivas e Solidariedade Social: Legislação e Diplomas Complementares* (Lisbon: Arco-Íris: Cosmos, 1996).
39. Barroco, "As Instituições Particulares de Solidariedade Social."
40. Rui Branco, email interview with Paul Manuel, May 5, 2015. More recently, the government has sought to extend the role of these organizations. Rui Branco notes that "one of the recent developments during the (austerity) crisis has been the expanding role of the third sector following a number of extended protocols and agreements since the present government took office in 2011; namely, the extension of third sector activities to school canteens or to funeral services. Actually, one bone of contention with the current socialist opposition is the will to roll back some of the added influence the welfare civil society has gained."
41. Paul Hirst, *Associative Democracy: New Forms of Economic and Social Governance* (Oxford: John Wiley & Sons, 2013), 21.
42. European Union, *Study on volunteering in the European Union: Country Report on Portugal*, 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/citizenship/pdf/national_report_pt_en.pdf.
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