

# THE WORLD MIND

A Magazine for International and Public Affairs



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# About the Magazine

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The World Mind is the policy magazine for international and public affairs, published by Clocks and Clouds, American University's undergraduate research journal. Published twice per semester, the World Mind gives American University undergraduate students the opportunity to submit original work to a variety of thematic and regionally-focused columns. Our mission is to provide an engaging and stimulating magazine for the AU community, and an outlet for creative, intelligent, and informed minds.

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*Hailemariam Desalegn, Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, with President Barack Obama*  
Photo Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons

## Authoritarianism in Sub-Saharan Africa: Is Aid to Blame?

*While well intentioned, foreign aid can play a key role in enabling authoritarian regimes?*

By Adam Goldstein

When examining the effects of bilateral or NGO aid in Africa, Ethiopia is perhaps one of the most interesting cases. The East-African state was never formally colonized, yet aid enabled the same outcomes as it did in previously colonized states. The causal or correlational (depending on the author) link between colonization and authoritarianism is a well-established theory of African politics. However, Ethiopia's un-colonized history presents a new avenue to analyze authoritarian durability in African regimes. Given Ethiopian politics' unique past but unfortunately common illiberal present, it is not so much the direct legacy of colonialism that continues to enable dictatorial rule, but rather the characteristics of the colony and colonizer relationship, and their contemporary manifestation in the form of aid that purports these regimes. This type of relationship is necessary to keep in mind when considering why aid flows from the United States to so many different countries. Is it purely altruistic? Or does bilateral aid hold a more harsh practical interest in mind? Tracing the flows of aid from the United States to Ethiopia demonstrates that the latter should be considered over the former.

### **Theoretical Background: Selectorate Theory**

Selectorate Theory is a theory of politics that attempts to ascertain a scientific way of comprehending political relations, insofar as it classifies groups of actors and defines how they

interact. The theory is best applied to authoritarian regimes, which, when they are durable and resistant to political change, possess a great understanding of how dictatorial politics function. Individuals living in these systems are organized into three categories: Essentials, Influentials, and Interchangeables. Essentials, such as generals or those who possess a large persuasive or coercive capability, are those whose support is absolutely integral for the leader; influentials, or, individuals in the governing bureaucracy or party members, are those who possess the ability to influence politics but are not necessarily the most important actors; and interchangeables constitute the general population, whose enthusiastic support may not be required at all for tenable rule. For illiberal regimes, it is most important to purchase the loyalties of those in the essential class. In order to obtain the loyalties of the essentials in the long-term, a constant source of money is required. One sensible way to maintain sources of money is to receive aid from foreign governments.

Aid given to developing states typically fails to meet its supposed goal because of the way illiberal regimes organize their population. The demands of authoritarian rule mean that aid is typically earmarked for embezzlement rather than for altruism. Donor states cognitantly play the role of patron in this dynamic, and thus bilateral aid should be viewed through the neo-colonialist lens, in that the inter-state relationship adopts colonial

notions without the traditional colonizer-colony dynamic. In the same way that the European colonizers installed illiberal regimes to maintain control over their colonies, foreign aid is utilized by donor states to secure certain policies deemed favorable. This relationship inhibits democratization at the expense of supporting dictatorial regimes, and should thus be viewed as a colonial endeavor under the paradigm of colonialism.

Selectorate Theory, however, is not the only method for comprehending authoritarian regime durability in sub-Saharan Africa. Mamdani contests that either the tribal identities or anti-imperialist leaders facilitate democratic breakdown in Africa, while Ekeh suggests that the legacies of colonialism created two “publics”, wherein a civic and primordial public prevent state unity and breed illiberal rule. Although the theories posited by Ekeh and Mamdani may explain how different states initially developed authoritarianism, they fail to explain the durability of these regimes and why they continue to avoid democratization. Furthermore, Ethiopia, which had never been colonized, also failed to democratize. Given the common discourse on African politics’ failings to provide a general theory for the propensity and durability authoritarian politics in the region, Selectorate Theory’s call for a more scientific mode of analysis, that is, viewing African politics based on the mechanisms of authoritarian governance rather than through the guise of culture or other political currents, presents a possibility to understand why the un-colonized Ethiopia is as undemocratic as the former African colonies.

### **Haile Selassie: The Durable Dictator**

Ethiopia’s case can be understood in much the same way as that of myriad other states, the corrupting influence of power. Ethiopian rulers viewed that the path toward development lay in the emulation of other successful states who themselves had utilized power to develop. The Ethiopian polity, or political class, viewed Europe’s ability to colonize Africa as a direct product of their military and economic power, and intended to follow suit. Thus, the acquisition and preservation of power defined the parameters of

Ethiopian politics. Power, however, was predicated on the ability to secure the allegiances of the Essentials.

Ethiopia’s last emperor, Haile Selassie, ruled from 1930 until 1974, with only a brief interruption due to Italy’s attempted invasion. The Selassie regime was the last in a long line of emperors. Recognizing that a dictator’s true power rested in the hands of the Essentials, crucial aid supposedly destined for those suffering in the drought and famine of 1972 was re-appropriated for the Ethiopian government unless aid organizations paid a tax called for by vague regulations. When confronted, Selassie invented an excuse, claiming that it was in “accordance with the laws of nature” for drought and famine to strike, and that governmental action was unnecessary. These were not the ravings of a selfish dictator, but rather the shrewd navigation of illiberal politics.

Selassie understood that he needed to continue to reward his essential backers, the high-level bureaucrats and military personnel of his regime. Ethiopia, however, was not a wealthy country, and thus Selassie viewed incoming aid as an opportunity to gain funding to continue to allocate resources to his supporters. Rather than allocating aid or letting proper aid utilization occur untaxed, Selassie saw this disaster as an opportunity to reaffirm his relationship over his essential backers. Selassie’s response to the drought and subsequent famine demonstrates one part of why bilateral aid tends to fail: illiberal regimes need to maintain their support structures, and aid is an easy way for a poor country to secure the necessary funding to do so.

### **Neo-Colonialism and Bilateral Aid**

The flows of aid between the United States and Ethiopia, as well as the Soviet Union and Ethiopia, highlight the neo-colonial characteristics of bilateral aid. Bilateral aid, or, aid from one country given directly to another, is allocated to “deliver policies” that donor states want and the recipient regime needs. Throughout World War II and the Cold War, the United States allocated aid to various governments in order to secure anti-communist positions. Pro-American dictators

could afford to maintain the loyalty of their Essentials, while the United States prevented new communist states from materializing.

In 1943, at the height of the American Lend-Lease program, in which the United States provided aid to states combating Axis powers during World War II, conversations between Selassie and Roosevelt grew increasingly more common, as Roosevelt sought an African ally and Selassie solicited aid with which he could re-allocate to his Essentials. In addition to aid under the Lend-Lease program, a 1951 trade agreement between the United States and Ethiopia guaranteed economic benefits in exchange for “amity”. In essence, aid from the United States provided the Selassie regime with funding to maintain its network of essential backers in exchange for a pro-American stance.

The Selassie regime fell, however, due to mismanagement of the political field as a result of record levels of inflation that left the already poor country poorer. Recall that Ethiopian politics was based on the accumulation of power. Power generally manifested as military support, and thus the military constituted most of Selassie’s essential backers. Ethiopia’s patron in the United States did not provide enough resources for Selassie to reaffirm his authority, and when Selassie failed to reassure the military during the inflationary crisis of 1974, low to mid level military bureaucrats and enlisted men deposed him in a revolution. The United States’ failure to supply their client state with enough funding to maintain the status quo facilitated The Derg’s ascendance.

After the Selassie era, the new regime, called The Derg, or, Committee, was a military Junta with a communist ideology. Selassie’s pro-American leanings ensured him consistent access to bilateral aid because he was willing to implement policies amenable to American interests. The Derg, on the other hand, marked a switch in Ethiopia to communism, the United States’ ideological antithesis. One of the Derg’s worst policies was the forced land nationalization. This policy abolished tenancy and nationalized all land at the same time, leaving peasants to enforce the new project. This policy caused massive famines, and

was in fact a complete disaster. While these scenarios were playing out, aid from the United States sharply fell. The United States no longer felt that they had an ally in Ethiopia, and thus bilateral aid between the two countries during The Derg’s tenure became almost nonexistent. The Derg’s ultimate downfall came about as a result of the Soviet Union’s retreat from funding proxies and the refrain from ideological foreign policy under Soviet leader Gorbachev’s Perestroika and Glasnost reforms. Without support from The Derg’s communist patron in the Soviet Union, Ethiopia’s dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam could no longer afford to maintain his own network of Essential backers, and was forced into exile in Zimbabwe.

Following The Derg’s downfall, Ethiopia still has not democratized. Currently, Freedomhouse, a well known aggregator of democracy, states that Ethiopia’s score on political rights is a 7, its freedom rating is a 6.5, and its civil liberties ranking is a 6, where , a 7 is the least democratic while a 1 is the most. To reiterate, maintenance of a small coalition regime, in which the Essential backers need to be kept content, requires a significant amount of money. After the fall of The Derg, Ethiopia adopted nominal democratic reforms, but never really pursued them or fully institutionalized democratic norms. To explain Ethiopia’s failure to democratize post-Derg, we must look to the flows of bilateral aid.

The United States continues to provide Ethiopia with substantial amounts of monetary aid as well as other forms, such as food and technological aid . In exchange for these contributions, Ethiopia provides the United States with intelligence on Somalia. Viewing Ethiopia as an integral ally in the Global War on Terror, the United States is content with providing assistance in exchange for anti-terrorist policies and intelligence sharing. Just as Ethiopia was a pawn for the United States against communism, a pawn for the Soviet Union against capitalism, it is now a useful “ally” for the United States (again) against terrorism. In exchange for these policies, Ethiopia receives aid, enabling the states illiberality and impeding democratization through purporting the current regime.

## Conclusion

While colonialism derailed the tracks countless countries were following, it should not be viewed as the sole reason for authoritarianism in the developing world. The case of Ethiopia demonstrates that authoritarian durability is not a direct result of formal colonialism. Instead, a scientific view of the mechanisms of authoritarianism and the organization of individuals living in these systems provides us with a much better explanation. It is the need to secure the loyalties of essential backers that purports authoritarianism in sub-Saharan Africa. Colonialism explains why states that may initially have democratized failed to do so, but it does not explain why states in the developing world that had gone uncolonized, such as Ethiopia, failed the democratic project as well. The machinations of colonialism are indeed at play, but it is the subtleness of neo-colonial bilateral aid agreements, and how they enable authoritarian leaders to maintain their rule in exchange for policy concessions that explains the continual failure of robust democratization to take hold in sub-Saharan Africa.

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Members of the Kurdish Army stand at attention

Photo Courtesy of  
Wikimedia Commons



## Reckoning Kurdistan: The Question of Kurdish Autonomy and The Challenging Road to Statehood

*“The Kurdish problem is not only the problem of one part of my nation: it is a problem of every one of us, including myself.” – Recep Tayyip Erdogan*

By Caroline Rose

After nearly five years of fighting, Syria still bleeds instability. The death toll of the crisis has been estimated to surpass 470,000, and still climbs as President Bashar al-Assad wars with moderate and radicalized rebels. The once-isolated civil war has transformed into a globalized quandary, impacting the social and political fabric of the Middle East, Europe, and liberal international order through the largest refugee population in history. But the conflict has also emerged as a battleground of immense opportunity – for foreign powers pursuing regional hegemony, extremist groups seeking global prepotency, and autonomous peoples preparing for statehood.

The Kurdish population dispersed across northern Syria, Iraq, and southern Turkey, has capitalized upon the political labyrinth in the Levant. The United States has famously backed Kurdish brigades, the Peshmerga forces, defending crucial territories against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). They have become a popular alternative to placing American boots on the ground in the Washington policy arena, as well as a geopolitical asset in the region. Such reinforcement has skyrocketed the Kurdish population into the international limelight as a key contender for statehood once strife subsides. However, it is the American mischaracterization of the Kurdish people and the fragmented nature of their politics that will be the Achilles’ heel in any statehood objective. Unless

the Kurdish people overcome the obstacles of nationalist fragmentation, recognition will remain a distant reality.

### Deconstructing the Kurdish Objective

Kurdistan has become a subject of recent western fascination, however, has been a resilient force in the region for centuries. Before the construction of national identities and contemporary borders, the Kurds existed as an ethnic population of the Mesopotamian Plains. After generations under foreign and imperialist rule, Kurdistan received its first omen of statehood with the arrival of ethnonationalism in the demise of the First World War. The Treaty of Sevres fuelled their declaration of independence in 1927 in the Republic of Ararat -- yet was short-lived. Despite attempts by the United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and other foreign entities to install a Kurdish autonomous state, post-war waves of pan-Arabism and nationalism stood in the way of complete secession. Only were the Kurdish populace able to achieve a degree of political autonomy when under the guise of existing states, as Kingdoms, regions of limited self-rule, or autonomous zones. This power struggle is still very much alive today. The war between self-determination and the existing statehood landscape has transcended the 20th century; the fourth-largest stateless population has become one of the most significant flashpoints of the contem-

porary international order.

Despite challenging political circumstance, the Kurdish people have thrived. The robust city of Erbil has become an oasis within northern Iraq – oil rich, democratized, and a destination for many refugees. Exxon Mobil even announced an oil deal with the Kurdish regional government for resource development – a signal of rising Kurdish prominence in the political and economic realm. The city has its own parliament, police force, and even a license plate system. The inclusion of women in police system and fighter brigades, lack of heaved political Islam, and overall positive inclination towards the West has been welcomed by policymakers and Washington. The most impressive feat of the Kurds, however, has been their ability to dodge the seemingly inevitable power vacuum of the region. The Kurds were wise to mobilize militant forces not only to protect their own autonomous zones, but to ally with the weakened Iraqi forces and make a case for foreign assistance.

Yet, the West misses the mark in properly characterizing the Kurdish people, their plight, and their chance for future statehood autonomy. While the Kurds are often conglomerated as one movement, autonomous efforts could not be more fragmented. Many have analogized the Syrian conflict as a phenomenon where nationalism gives way to ethnic, religious, and sectarian identity – breaking down the barriers of the artificial 1917 Sykes-Picot borders. However, Kurdistan is severely splintered across Turkish, Syrian, and Iraqi nationalist lines. In Iraq, the Kurds live in an autonomous zone established after the Gulf War. In Syria, the Kurdish Democratic Party (PYD) rules in its autonomous zone, protecting the zone from rebels and ISIS fighters with their Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (People's Protection Units or YPG) forces. In southeast Turkey, the Kurdish population lives under constant suppression, despite a recent peace deal between the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan (the Kurdish Workers Party or PKK) and Erdogan's government.

While many predict Kurdistan to become a recognized, autonomous state after the crisis in the Levant, there are many obstacles in its wake. The

fragmented nature of Kurdistan across Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, is the largest challenge; different national “experiences” have transformed different Kurdish agendas. In Turkey, the PKK is more leftist, critical of the United States, and less inclined towards total independence, instead promoting an autonomous region within Ankara's political arena. In Syria and Iraq, the Kurdish population is more pro-west and has proven a greater interest in establishing a recognized Kurdistan. Another Kurdish handicap is the lack of diversified economic opportunity in southeast Turkey and northern Iraq and Syria. While the oil sector has brought immense wealth to the region – luring foreign investment and relative stability – any official statehood venture would require intense diversification of the Kurdish economy. The Iraqi Kurds have instituted relative independence of their oil sector from the Iraqi government, however have experienced back-and-forth battles over shares of revenue and economic reintegration. In 2015, Iraqi Kurdistan was able to increase oil production from 2011 figures by 600%, however was still gravely \$18 billion in debt. Like any oil-dependent country in the region, economic diversification will enable Kurdistan to transform from a de facto nation to a de jure statehood system. Recent Turkish dependence upon Iraqi Kurdish oil – all while relations sour with Turkish Kurdish peoples over the failed PKK peacetime deal – has complicated smooth relations between the PKK and PYD, something necessary for any future, unified Kurdistan. All regions will have to face these structural inefficiencies, objectives, and political fragmentation before the dream of an independent Kurdistan can become reality.

The United States' use of the Kurdish forces and population as a bulwark against regional terrorism has also perplexed chances of Kurdish statehood. A \$400 million aid package has enabled the Kurdish Peshmerga to join the Mosul offensive and drive the Islamic State from occupying one-third of Iraqi territory. Yet, limits will emerge in the United States' agenda against the Islamic State -- while the U.S. wishes to utilize the Kurds against radicalized factions, the Kurds hold a divergent objective of securing existing Kurdish-held territory in Iraq. In what many at-

tribute as a “marriage of convenience,” fragments of the Kurdish leadership -- such as the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) -- are convinced statehood is within their grasp with such American reliance. Using the Kurdish population as a mechanism and convenient alternative has gifted Kurdish leaders false hopes of independence. The Kurdish people are, to an extent, used to empty promises; successive governments have continually presented the Kurds with unfulfilled offers of independence or autonomy. Yet, the turbulent and ungovernable landscape of neighboring countries have illustrated a mirage of opportunity for an independent Kurdistan. The United States’ strategic interests in the region walk across a narrow tightrope between Turkey, Iran, Gulf powers, and Russian intervention in Syria. Full support of Kurdish statehood should be expected to further exacerbate regional complications, as well as the objective of halting the civil war.

### Conclusion

The conflict in the Levant is far from its culmination. Sectarian factions, radicalism, religious and ethnic identities, and foreign powers all collectively seek influence in the region. The Kurds have proven to be reliable force on both defensive and offensive fronts in a climate of complete discord. Through Kurdish assistance, the United States has become seemingly reliant on the Kurds in their fight against the Islamic State and other extremist factions and has considered the luxury a pro-American Kurdish buffer state would offer their foreign agenda in the region.

The public mischaracterization of the Kurdish population themselves increases chances of miscalculation, and can prove costly in what will be the most challenging foreign policy dilemma of the next administration. While Kurdistan has been an instrument played in American de facto presence, policymakers should realize the precarious Kurdish state of affairs, and understand the limits that accompany a fragmented, but resilient, nation.

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## Trump, National Myths, and the Rise of Populism

### *How we could have seen Trump coming*

By Emily Dalgo

**I**t happened. What was to me incredibly obvious a few months ago, that Donald Trump would be elected the 45th President of the United States, was a complete shock to most of the country and the world. Polls got it wrong. Experts got it wrong. GOP insiders got it wrong. American University's Allan Lichtman got it right, but he seems to be about the only one.

Why were we so sure that Trump would lose?

How, in the wake of so many populist movements across the world, so many uprisings from the disenfranchised, so many new and growing platforms for the people who have felt their identities slipping away — whose pain and anger with the systems in place swelled until it was the only newsworthy story — could we dare to pretend for one moment that the United States would be immune to the power of a populist revolt? Our “exceptionalism” is not invulnerable to those who put truth to power, even when their truth is one we think we can cast aside as uninformed or irrational.

Frustration with the economy and leadership in a post-economic crisis world has manifested itself in various ways across the world. The so-called Arab Spring, which engulfed the Middle East and North Africa in 2010, resulted in revolutions of various types. Populist parties have won elections in Hungary, France, Greece, the Czech Republic, and Poland, among others. Jeremy Corbyn, a fringe radical in the UK Labour Party, rode a wave of voter discontent to take his party's leadership. In Russia, Vladimir Putin's government has turned

to a nationalist foreign policy to distract a restive Russian middle class that has seen its quality of life decline. Britain voted to leave the European Union, arguing that the EU was restricting fair trade policies, strangling the UK's choices on immigration, and threatening the British way of life.

The international uprisings founded on discontent, the increasingly momentous populist movements, and the newly-empowered, vocal, and active American right-wing community should have made us stop and seriously question the polls that told us we were safe from a Trump Presidency.

The ascent of Donald Trump in the 2016 US presidential election, anticipated by no one just a year earlier, is driven by a deep dissatisfaction with the “Washington establishment.” All of the recent developments across the world have a common thread—their supporters seek to revise the status quo at the expense of established political, economic, and cultural institutions. Trump's appeal is no exception.

What makes a Trump supporter?

First, we must ask what makes an anti-establishment voter, since before people support Trump's specific policies (or lack thereof, frankly) on immigration, healthcare, etc., they support the idea of Trump. The ideology driving an anti-establishment, populist voter is that a new leader who represents the people can dismantle the systems and institutions currently in place, which the voter believes have made their quality of life worse. Those

who support anti-establishmentarianism want an honest candidate, unchained from the corrupt circle of elites.

Trump's populism is a form of voter backlash against long-term social changes that threaten to dismantle the country, culture, and society that they know. In other words, many Trump supporters live in fear that the America that they know is slipping through their fingers, and that the cultural values that they define as "American" are shifting, causing them to feel apprehensive of the future and overwhelmed with uncertainty of their place and role in the country. The fear of being marginalized and left behind causes what Jennifer Mitzen calls ontological insecurity. This refers to a person's sense of "being" in the world; an ontologically insecure person does not have a stable sense of self and place. This threat against one's identity creates a difficulty to act and maintain a steady self-conception. In contrast, the ontologically secure person has an unquestioned sense of self and is confident of his or her place in the world in relation to other people.

While all anti-establishment movements are based on grievances and all seek to revise traditional political and social institutions, they disagree on what those grievances and institutions are, causing a split in anti-establishment movements. Bernie Sanders was an anti-establishment candidate, but could not be more unlike Trump in his political beliefs. Sanders supporters absolutely fit the mold of disenfranchised, angry voter that I just outlined in regard to Trump supporters: they wanted to dismantle the institutions (i.e. Wall Street, NAFTA) and systems (i.e. structural racism, sexism, patriarchy) in place that make the quality of life worse, and wanted an honest candidate who was "above" the politics of the political world. We can see, then, that Sanders and Trump supporters initially agree ideologically, yet they place blame on extremely different institutions and systems. Why would people who, fundamentally, share so many of the same complaints about the status quo back leaders with two very different versions of a better future?

I contend that the answer lies in one's national Origin Story.

If we accept Role Theory, which states that people's perceptions of their place in society shape their actions and their expectations for the actions of others, then we can start to move toward an understanding of the Sanders/Trump split in modern American populist movements. The national role is one subset of Role Theory. Individuals use their interpretations of national role to set expectations for their in-group and out-groups. In other words, people rely on their answer to the questions "who are we?" and "what is our mission?" to develop preferences over political outcomes. In this sense, national role can co-constitute a set of very specific policy preferences for a voter.

If one's view of the national role shapes one's policy preferences, we should be able to see distinct correlations between certain policy preferences and certain perceptions of the national role. It's easy to put an empirical measure on policy preferences; support for a particular political party or candidate is perhaps the most obvious. But the idea of national identity is very nebulous, so measuring a person's perceptions of the national role is difficult. Besides just asking, "what do we do?" there are alternate ways to observe an individual's view of national role. This is where the national origin story comes in.

The origin story of America essentially answers when and why America became the America it is today. The story will change from person to person, and is dependent on a person's view of the country, of himself, and how he constructs his own identity. Thus, the origin story fits the national role. Where you come from defines who you are and what you do. So, if people have different ideas about what we do, it should trace back to different Origin Stories. I posit that the national origin story is a salient marker of identity that can be used to distinguish between varying conceptions of nation and national role.

Divergent interpretations of the national role (measured through one's origin story of America) are responsible for the split between anti-establishment movements based on pocketbook grievances and those focused on nationalistic and xenophobic grievances. If I have constructed my

identity based on a nation that begins to undergo radical social change, my identity will be shaken. If I believe America to be a white, Christian, English-speaking, conservative country, an influx of immigrants, the enactment of liberal social policies, or the advancement of women, LGBTQ, or non-Christian peoples will shake my perception of my country. For people who base their own sense of self on their interpretation of the country, changes like these can cause ontological insecurity.

In August, I put these theories to the test. After running statistical (regression and comparative) analyses on 500 survey responses, with 240 of these coming from Trump and Sanders supporters, I have come to the conclusion that origin story is a better predictor of political tendencies than previously understood. This means that how a person view's America's origin (when did America become America?) can shed light on whom he or she will vote for. Thus, the origin story can be seen as a predictor of voter behavior.

The survey collected respondents' demographics, their first choice for President in 2016, xenophobic indicator questions, and gave three origin stories and asked them to rate how warmly they felt toward the stories on a scale from 0-100. The stories, as they appeared on the survey, are written below.


*“America came into its true character after defeating the Germans and the Japanese in the second Great War. During this time, each U.S. state and territory unified to contribute to the war effort, leading to American agricultural and industrial supremacy. Our victory after WWII established international respect and honor for American citizens, our government, and our military, proved our unity as a nation, and showcased the power and importance of the United States of America.”*

*“America came into its true character during the Civil Rights Movement. In 1965, African-Americans and their allies worked through multiple channels to compel the American government to recognize that all Americans, regardless of the color of their skin, deserve equal protection under the law.”*


*“America came into its true character when the pilgrims landed on Plymouth Rock. The pilgrims and other early American settlers were people who were fleeing the horrors of the old world, where individuals could not be free. In the New World, these young Americans created a nation based on liberty and freedom.”*

Each of the three stories presented a distinct character of American identity and told a brief story of when America came into its “true character.” The story themes are based on David Bell Mislan's previous work on identity formation, which recognized them as significant categories. The first story reflected an American origin based on power, unity, military might, international prestige, and importance. I call this story the Exceptional Story. The second story, the Legal Story, emphasized equality, opportunity, hard work, and equal protection under the law. The third story, the Enlightened Story, underscored an America that was founded on liberty, freedom, and progress away from the European “old world.”

While I originally thought that Trump supporters would overwhelmingly choose the Exceptional Story, the table below reveals the results that, upon reflection, make a lot of sense.



Trump supporters did not have a clear winner when asked to choose from three American Origin Stories; all three were almost equally chosen, and twice as many Trump supporters ranked a combination of stories equally as compared to Sanders supporters, as can be seen in the graph below.



This tells us that there is not one conception of American origin that Trump supporters follow. There is no guiding story that enlightens the average Trump supporter about who we are, what we do, and what our mission is, as Americans. This tells us a few things about Trump’s win: first, that his vague and vacillating policies were probably more of a strong suit than we thought. By refusing to take firm stances and stick with them, and instead opting to allude to ideas or simply promise to “Make America Great Again,” Trump took advantage of the ontologically insecure voter and allowed him to employ whatever conception of the national role he liked.

Sanders, in contrast, very clearly symbolized one particular national role ideology, causing him to gain a cult-like following from those who shared his same view of the country’s national role. The second take-away from this data is that Trump’s supporters possess a wide-range of origin stories and are often unsure of their own opinion of the national role. This means that for a Trump supporter, one conception of national identity might be more or less salient depending national or global current events, or how he or she is feeling about their own personal life during any given time. Sanders supporters proved confident in their Legal Origin Story of America, while

Trump supporters did not all align in their beliefs and often chose more than one origin story. This could mean that Trump supporters are more easily convinced of new national roles or are more easily manipulated through messaging or false news, since they do not have a sturdy and steadfast perception of identity through which to view the world.

Trump tapped into the wave of international unrest of the establishment and of the “other,” a combination that fed perfectly into a disenfranchised, ontologically insecure voter. There is a correlation between one’s conceptions of the national role and the ability to be swayed by xenophobic ideologies. If a voter possesses ontological security, he is less likely to be convinced that groups, individuals, or ways of life outside of his own social network are an existential threat to his own safety, wellbeing, or way of life. Sanders supporters are nestled in this camp, since the Legal Story of American Origin emphasizes equality and community under the law. They feel that America did not really become America until all of its citizens were equal under the law. Thus, a Trumpian view of immigration does not fit their national narrative, because immigrants are fundamental to the understanding of America under the Legal Story framework. If a voter does not possess ontological security, he is more easily convinced that others are to blame for his own discontent.

So, it happened. In January, Donald Trump will be inaugurated. Shock, fear, anger – many Americans have felt it all since November 8th. What we need to remember, though, is that Trump supporters should not be cast aside as idiotic, uneducated, or almost anything else that prominent media outlets have called them. Yes, their political preferences might be racist, xenophobic, sexist, etc., and this should not be dismissed. But these preferences are based on deep seeded conceptions of national and personal identity, national role, and American origin. This, unfortunately, means that until we can teach “who we are” and “what we do” in a way that allows all Americans to feel ontologically secure in a globalizing world, we’re likely to see Trump-like nationalism live on well into the future.

*This article presents a new angle from a full research paper completed September 2016 on xenophobia and anti-establishmentarianism, which was co-authored by Emily Dalgo and Dr. David Bell Mislán and funded by the AU Summer Scholars Research Fellowship.*

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President-elect Donald Trump first ran for President in 2000

Photo Courtesy of Gage Skidmore via Flickr

## “A New Nationalism”: 1992 and the Birth of President Trump

*“I understand good times and I understand bad times. I mean, why is a politician going to do a better job than I am?” – Donald J. Trump on NBC’s Meet The Press, October 1999*

By Alyssa Savo

You could be forgiven for thinking that 2016 was the first time Donald Trump ran for President of the United States. Much was made about the Republican nominee’s lack of political experience, and his campaign certainly looked the part. The candidate regularly ignored the consensus and orders of Republican leadership, staffers were kicked out seemingly at random, and the campaign’s ground game consisted of little more than eye-catching rallies. Of course, Trump’s unorthodox campaign was ultimately enough to win him the presidency in violation of all political wisdom. But his campaign wasn’t quite as unprecedented as it’s made out to be, either.

During this election, surprisingly little attention was given to the first presidential campaign of Donald Trump—no, not this year’s, but his campaign for the Reform Party nomination in 2000. Granted, Trump’s first run for President wasn’t much to write home about, as his campaign lasted just four months and the Reform Party was little more than a footnote in the election. The eventual Reform Party nominee, Pat Buchanan, captured less than 1% of the national popular vote on Election Day. In the mythos built up around the 2000

presidential election, pundits and historians have been much more interested in debates over the Electoral College, Bush v. Gore, and Ralph Nader than the meager implications of the Reform Party.

But Pat Buchanan’s Reform campaign in 2000 was a remnant of a powerful wave of populism that swept the nation eight years earlier. Populist movements already had a proud tradition in American history, periodically resurging in national politics every couple of decades. The mid-nineteenth century witnessed the rise of the nativist Know-Nothing Party; the turn of the century saw the radical anti-bank campaigns of William Jennings Bryan; and in the 1960s, Alabama Governor George Wallace militantly defended Southern “states’ rights” and segregation. In the 1992 presidential election, another populist wave motivated by economic nationalism, cultural conservatism, and rabid anti-elitism propelled two fringe candidates to the front of the race and threatened to upend American political orthodoxy. Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign, though far more successful than the movements which came before it, simply picked up where the last wave of populism left off a quarter-century before.

## 1992: Pat Buchanan Takes On Washington

President George H. W. Bush was in poor shape entering the 1992 presidential election. Just a year earlier, President Bush had become a national hero due to his decisive leadership in the Operation Desert Storm campaign to drive Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. But the President had seen his approval ratings plummet since their high of 89% in early 1991. Bush infamously recanted on his 1988 campaign promise—“Read my lips: no new taxes”—by signing on tax increases to address the climbing federal deficit, costing him dearly among voters who once admired his integrity and commitment to the middle-class. The nation was struggling to recover from a recession, leaving many in doubt of the President’s ability to lead the country through economic crisis. Bush was also developing a reputation as an out-of-touch elitist, egged on by incidents including a clip that appeared to show the President marveling at a mundane supermarket scanner. Incumbent presidents rarely face serious challenges for their party’s nomination, but in 1992 one candidate saw an opportunity to take on George Bush: Pat Buchanan, a right-wing commentator and former advisor and speechwriter to Presidents Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan.

Pat Buchanan’s campaign against President Bush rings awfully familiar to modern ears. Buchanan described his campaign as “America first,” claiming a need for “a new nationalism” that would defend the American worker first and foremost heading into the 21st century. Buchanan attacked free trade deals that the United States signed with other nations and decried manufacturing jobs being outsourced to Japan. He called for a shut-down of immigration to the United States to prevent American jobs from being stolen by foreign labor. He rejected George Bush’s conception of an American-lead “New World Order” after the fall of the Soviet Union, asserting that the United States should stay out of unnecessary foreign conflicts and focus on domestic issues. Buchanan also railed against Washington elites, admonishing President Bush’s lack of energy and “vision.” He called for a “law and order” response to the crime wave seizing the nation, drawing criticism for racially suggestive comments he’d made in the past. And he undertook what he later coined as the “culture

war,” attacking multiculturalism and liberal sensibilities—an obvious precursor to Trump’s assault on political correctness, albeit based more in conservative Christianity than deliberate vulgarity.

Buchanan’s message hit home in New Hampshire, a state roiling from the recession and the first stop in the Republican primaries. Voters in the state, fraught with economic worries, were drawn to Pat Buchanan’s promise to restore American jobs and economic power. New Hampshire was also flooded with ads attacking President Bush’s dishonesty for caving on his “no new taxes” pledge, sinking his reputation in the state. Buchanan won 37% of the vote in the New Hampshire primaries, including over half of independents and most of the 30% of voters who said they wanted to “send a message to the White House.” Buchanan’s showing in New Hampshire was also his best; after giving President Bush a severe rattling in the first primary, Pat Buchanan’s campaign began to lose steam for the rest of the race. Buchanan won 22% of the total Republican primary vote to Bush’s 72.5%. The President emerged victorious in the Republican primary, but not without some serious fatigue. Later on at the Republican National Convention, Buchanan gave a concession speech touching on several familiar refrains. He assailed the “radical feminism” of future First Lady Hillary Clinton, criticized the Democratic Party for elitist pro-free trade policies, and called for Americans to “take back our country” in the wake of the Los Angeles riots, describing the city like a war zone.

Pat Buchanan was not the only challenger to the political establishment in 1992. Though many in the nation were looking for a change from President Bush, the Democratic nominee wasn’t proving to be a very appealing alternative. Emerging from a hard-fought and bitter primary, Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton was already battling an unsavory reputation due to his involvement in the Whitewater housing scheme and accusations of sexual impropriety from multiple women. Many Americans, dissatisfied with both major parties, found themselves supporting Ross Perot, an eccentric Texas billionaire and independent candidate who announced he would run for President on CNN’s Larry King Live in February. Much like Buchanan before him, Perot campaigned on a pro-

tectionist economic plan to restore American jobs and a strong response to the crime wave, all the while railing against Washington elites and government corruption.

Ross Perot began his national campaign with a huge wave of support, leading in several polls taken in early summer of 1992. But just as his lead was surging in July, Perot unexpectedly suspended his campaign due to a bizarre alleged blackmail plot involving his daughter's upcoming wedding, only re-entering the race a few weeks before the general election. Despite his months-long absence from the race, Perot still won 19% of the popular vote, the best of any third-party candidate since Theodore Roosevelt's Bull Moose run in 1912. Meanwhile, Bill Clinton was elected President with 43% of the popular vote, the smallest share by a winning president since Woodrow Wilson.

### The Aftermath of 1992

Pat Buchanan wasn't ready to rest after his 1992 defeat. He ran in the Republican primaries again in 1996, this time facing off against Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole. Though Buchanan had a better-organized campaign in his second run, he still couldn't keep up with Senator Dole, capturing just 21% of the total primary vote in a distant second to Dole's 59%. However, Buchanan's second campaign found a stronger audience in the industrial Midwest, where he pulled 34% of the primary vote in both Michigan and Wisconsin. Blue-collar voters, concerned about their economic future, were drawn again to Buchanan's rhetoric about an "America first" economy that would protect the working-class and sympathized with his distrust of immigration and multiculturalism. Though Buchanan was defeated for a second time, his campaign laid a blueprint for a populist candidate to court working-class voters in regions like the Rust Belt by appealing to economic nationalism and anti-elitism.

Ross Perot also ran again in 1996, this time on the Reform Party ticket after establishing the party himself a year earlier. But the less conservative and more reform-minded crowd that Perot captured four years ago had largely come around to President Clinton, who was by then quite popular nation-wide and easily leading the race. Perot was

able to win 8% of the popular vote—not a bad performance for a third-party candidate in the greater scheme of history, but a marked drop from his much more successful 1992 campaign.

The populist wave began to seriously wane after 1996. President Bill Clinton's popularity was only continuing to increase, and a period of immense economic growth left a satisfied country less skeptical of globalism and multiculturalism. The Reform Party would face a serious crisis of character in 2000; without Ross Perot's magnetism to unify it, many feared the primary could become a free-for-all of fringe candidates in search of a party. Pat Buchanan eventually won the Reform Party nomination, but not without enduring a bizarre and dramatic primary which at points involved Donald Trump calling Buchanan a "Hitler lover" and a counter-convention organized by John Hagelin supporters following his primary loss. Buchanan attracted just a fraction of the voters he won over in the Republican primaries, ultimately winning 0.43% of the popular vote.

The radical populist movement appeared to die off after the Reform Party's dismal performance in 2000. After Pat Buchanan's challenges to the Republican Party in 1992 and 1996, following primaries would be largely dominated by mainstream conservatives like George W. Bush and John McCain. Ron Paul was probably the closest successor to Pat Buchanan, a staunch libertarian with a devoted cult following who entered the Republican primaries in 2008 and 2012, but he never posed much more than a headache to party leaders. The Tea Party movement, a hard-right grassroots movement motivated by economic conservatism and anti-establishment rhetoric, briefly threatened to challenge Republican orthodoxy during Barack Obama's presidency. However, so-called "tea-party whisperers" like Paul Ryan and Marco Rubio were effective at bridging the gap between Republican leadership and the newest popular conservative movement, helping to preserve party order.

At least, until this year. After lying dormant for nearly a quarter-century, the radical populist movement once led by Pat Buchanan returned with a vengeance to elect Donald Trump President

of the United States. Trump's presidential campaign focused on many of the same issues that Buchanan did in 1992: economic protectionism, backlash against multiculturalism or "political correctness," resentment of the Washington establishment. But what was different about Donald Trump in 2016 that allowed him to win the presidency where Buchanan failed twenty-four years before?

### Why Trump Struck Lightning

Part of the answer can probably be chalked up to pure party structure. In 1992 and 1996, Pat Buchanan was facing off against the most powerful Republicans in the country, leaving him little path to challenge party leadership and win the nomination. In contrast, Trump entered a Republican primary where attention was split between over a dozen candidates, none of which held the blessing of party leaders. Trump could take advantage of sheer personality to bulldoze past his competitors, gaining enough momentum to be unstoppable once the primary field was worn down to something more manageable. And unlike Ross Perot, once Trump won the primary he had the force of the Republican Party behind him; he didn't have to worry about winning over conservative partisans or convincing pragmatically minded voters to throw their vote to him.

But there's more to Donald Trump's victory over Hillary Clinton than just being in the right place at the right time. Public opinion has shifted dramatically against globalization and the economic elite in the twenty years since the heyday of NAFTA and free trade. Many Americans believe that the economy now caters to elite interests and has ceased serving the working-class, increasing the appeal of economic populists like Trump. This sense of economic alienation only grew after the 2008 financial crisis, where to many it appeared that the federal government went out of its way to protect Wall Street and wealthy corporations while ignoring the workers those institutions left behind. For all of her progressive rhetoric, Hillary Clinton couldn't shake her reputation as a Washington insider unsympathetic to American workers. Donald Trump, in contrast, fed into the feelings of abandonment and resentment held by many

working-class voters, especially in the industrial Midwest.

Immigration is also a more salient issue now than it was in the 1990s—the number of illegal immigrants in the United States now numbers at about 11 million, compared to just 4 million in 1992. Declining faith in government and backlash against Congress also make anti-elitism and promises to "drain the swamp," in Trump's words, much more appealing to the public. In a 1992 interview with *Face the Nation's* Bob Scheiffer, Pat Buchanan claimed Americans wanted a decisive leader who would take on Washington in response to Scheiffer's description of the 102nd Congress as "the most partisan session that [he] could remember." Buchanan was right, but a few decades too early.

Pat Buchanan has not been silent on the similarities between his past campaigns and the modern-day campaign of Donald Trump. In a pre-election interview with *New York Magazine*, Buchanan said he was "delighted we were proven right," celebrating the similarities between Trump's message and his own vision from 1992. In another interview with the *Washington Post's* Chris Cillizza, Buchanan claimed the Republican Party will eventually realign around the values of nationalism and protectionism which Trump brought to the forefront, regardless of the will of the party establishment. He also correctly predicted Trump's winning strategy for the presidential race, calling for Trump to "go for victory in Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan and Wisconsin ... campaigning against the Clinton trade policies that de-industrialized Middle America." Now that Trump is president-elect, Buchanan has expressed hopes that his ideological successor will engage in battle with Congress and refuse to back down on his radical campaign promises.

We don't know yet if Buchanan's prediction that Donald Trump will transform the Republican Party are true. The president-elect's lack of political experience could make him vulnerable to manipulation from seasoned politicians, crippling his attempts to reshape the political culture of Washington. Attempts to predict Trump's path during the election have a mixed record at best, however,

casting doubt on any predictions of what a Trump Administration might look like. At any rate, the movement that propelled Donald Trump into the White House is far from new, building heavily on Pat Buchanan's campaign from a quarter-century ago. The main difference between Trump and populists of the past is that the former was able to win a presidential election, overcoming efforts by political leaders from both sides to stem the tide of populism. Trump's economic nationalism, backlash against political correctness, and militantly anti-elite rhetoric fed into feelings which had been fomenting among a significant portion of Americans for decades at the least. The political establishment will have to formulate a response to the Trump movement if they want to quash the populist uprising that seized the nation in 2016, or else pray that this bout of populism is just overstaying its welcome.

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Pro-Life protest in Washington, D.C.

Photo Courtesy of American Life League

## A Shift in Abortion: from Surgical to Medicinal

*Will outdated regulations trump new research?*

By Jeremy Clement

Since the Supreme Court's decision in 1973 to legalize abortion in all 50 states in the case of *Roe v. Wade* (410 U.S. 113), millions of abortions have been performed, most through surgical methods. Recent studies show that medication abortions are starting to rival surgical abortions in the United States, a phenomenon that has been occurring in Europe for some time. The FDA has developed a new evidence-based regime for the drugs used in medication abortion, but regulations in some states keep the rate of medication abortions around 43%, while states like Iowa and Michigan with no restrictions have higher rates, around 55-65%. Before discussing these state restrictions, it is important to know what exactly medication abortion is, as well as any issues surrounding it.

### Mifepristone and Misoprostol

The two drugs used to perform medically induced abortions are Mifepristone and Misoprostol. Mifepristone (approved in 2000 by the FDA) is given at the clinic where the patient chooses to have their abortion. The drug, according to Planned Parenthood, "works by blocking the hormone progesterone. Without progesterone, the lining of the uterus breaks down, and pregnancy cannot continue." Next, the patient takes Misoprostol at home, where they may be alone or with a loved one. Misoprostol causes the uterus

to empty and complete the abortion.

Anti-abortion groups have labeled the medicinal abortion option as dangerous. They especially disagree with the new FDA regulations that make the drug easier to acquire. The President of "Operation Rescue," an anti-abortion group in Kansas, said that "pharmaceutical companies will use the FDA's decision to persuade more 'vulnerable pregnant women' to use the 'unpredictable' drug."

The facts disagree with this "unpredictable" label. A study by the University of Illinois at Chicago regarding the effects of medication abortion on university students showed that the medication is safe and reliable. The researchers found very few difficulties with the procedure and concluded, "Medication abortion services in a student health care clinic are safe and feasible. However, additional treatment may be required with some patients."

Side by side with the surgical abortion option, medical abortion is just as safe as surgery with some minor tradeoffs. With the medication option, there is less chance for cervical or uterine injury due to the lack of medical instruments in proximity to the reproductive area. There are some minor downsides including more office visits, more bleeding for the patient (although the

surgical option will cause bleeding as well), and 1-3% more women will have to redo the procedure as compared to surgical abortion. However, a major advantage of the medication is that the procedure can be done in the privacy of the woman's own home with a loved one if she so chooses.

### The State of the States

As previously stated, the prevalence of medication abortions as a method varies across the states due to differing regulations. The new FDA regulations have helped surpass some of these regulations. Specifically, the regulations allow the medication to be taken for 70 days after the start of the woman's most recent menstrual period, up from 49 days under previous regulations. The prescription process was also simplified. So, following these new regulations, what is the current condition of the states' laws surrounding the medication abortion process?

There are three broad categories of regulations, and some states overlap containing more than one type. Three states (Texas, Ohio, and North Dakota) reject the new FDA regulations and follow the old, outdated, and more rigid regulations. Nineteen states require the clinician to be present when the medication is taken, taking away the home privacy aspect of the procedure. Lastly, 37 states require clinicians who "perform medication abortion procedures to be licensed physicians." This last category severely restricts the supply of medication abortions. These regulations are a primary reason why the U.S. is not on par with Europe on the overall percentage of abortions completed with medication as opposed to surgery.

### Implications and Future Trends

The public opinion on abortion has remained relatively the same (within 1-9 percentage points) since 1998. The majority has fluctuated between pro-life and pro-choice about 5 times since that date, with the pro-choice camp at roughly 47% and the pro-life camp at roughly 46% in 2016. This is a unique case for a social issue, given that many other social issues such as gun control, healthcare, same-sex marriage, and the death penalty have shifted left since the 1990's.

I offer a suggestion as to why medication abortions may possibly shift public opinion towards the pro-choice camp. The main factor for my reasoning is the private aspect of the medication route. Allowing women to perform the abortion at home takes the procedure out of the public view. This means that the concerns over graphic images of late term abortions and unsafe procedures are minimized. If this more private form of abortion does not shift public opinion, it may still allow women to avoid the scrutinizing eyes of the pro-life camp just enough to mitigate further regulations and restrictions.

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Trump supporters rally for their candidate before the 2016 election

Photo Courtesy of Darron Birgenheier via Flickr

## Immigration Policy Under President Trump: Toughening Up or More of the Same?

*The Trump administration might just follow in Obama's footsteps*

By Erin Campbell

Since the day he announced his candidacy for President of the United States, Trump has called for comprehensive immigration reform, usually spouting, “We’re gonna build a wall, and Mexico’s gonna pay for it!” Through telling his supporters that immigrants have taken jobs away from hard-working Americans and given only higher crime rates in return, Trump’s anti-immigrant rhetoric has energized xenophobic movements in the United States. Consequently, a palpable national tension between white nationalists and minority groups surges, leaving undocumented individuals fearing for their future and safety. As Trump’s political style lends itself to vague (yet “tremendous”) promises, it is difficult to forecast how exactly the President-elect will choose to reform immigration policy come January. Throughout the duration of his campaign, Trump has presented various – and at times contradictory – promises regarding how he will approach immigration issues while in office. Oscillating between hardline, mass-deportation strategies and the idea that skilled undocumented immigrants should be able to pursue legal status in the United States, Trump’s concrete plans for immigration reform remain somewhat of a mystery.

During a campaign rally in Phoenix, Arizona, Trump claimed, “Anyone who has entered the United States illegally is subject to deportation – that is what it means to have laws and to have a country.” Yet, at the same time, he has expressed that the United States economy stands to benefit from immigrants seeking further education. In an interview with Chuck Todd on NBC’s Meet the Press last fall, Trump explained, “We’re going to try and bring them back rapidly, the good ones... We have to bring [immigrants] that are university, you know, go to universities, that are doctors. We need a lot of people in this country.” Nonetheless, Trump’s immigration platform contends that the United States’ primary security interest lies in ensuring every inhabitant resides in the country legally, suggesting the ultimate goal of deporting the 11 million unauthorized immigrants currently in the U.S.

In order to ensure all undocumented immigrants are removed from the country, Trump has vowed to strike down every executive order Obama enacted during his time in the Oval Office, and as the next President of the United States, Trump has the power to do so. Such an act would termi-

nate the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), a policy that has granted protection and work permits to young immigrants brought into the country as children. Should Trump choose to enforce removal proceedings against those that DACA has benefited, more than 700,000 people face the risk of deportation. When pressed to detail his plans to pay for his more robust deportation efforts, Trump has hinted at reallocating funding from federal bureaus such as the Department of Education and the Environmental Protection agency.

Serving as an influential voice throughout the campaign, Trump's long-time supporter and recent pick for U.S. Attorney General, Alabama Senator Jeff Sessions, has built his political career on anti-immigration rhetoric and calls for mass deportations. As head of the Department of Justice, Sessions would have the ability to direct national resources toward the currently backlogged immigration courts. By encouraging federal prosecutors to increase the number of criminal cases brought against undocumented immigrants and by hiring more right-leaning judges for federal immigration courts, Sessions would have the power to speed up the removal proceedings for hundreds of thousands of undocumented immigrants. Additionally, with Sessions as Attorney General, Trump could withhold federal funding from more than 200 self-proclaimed sanctuary cities, including New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles, which offer refuge to undocumented immigrants in order to force local governments to share information and more fully cooperate with the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).

On a contrasting note, House Speaker Paul Ryan assured many fearful Americans that the President-elect's administration would not direct efforts toward Trump's "deportation task force," stating on CNN's State of the Union, "We believe an enforcement bill, a border security enforcement bill is really the first priority and that's what we're focused on." Indeed, Trump's border wall became a major talking point throughout his campaign. Though he often spoke of his wall as a modern feat of architecture during election season, he has since admitted that stretches of

the border wall may be guarded by a fence, or left to natural barriers. To help secure the border, Trump states he will hire several thousand new Border Patrol agents and end Obama's "catch-and-release" policy, instead forcing unauthorized aliens out of the country upon point of entry. Following his win in the election, however, Trump has seemingly taken a step back on some of his more polarizing campaign promises on immigration. To contrast the hate-inciting rhetoric he employed earlier in his campaign, Trump has offered that, upon completion of the fortified border wall/fence, he may soften his policies on deportation. During his 60 Minutes interview with Leslie Stahl, he stated, "After the border is secure and after everything gets normalized, we're going to make a determination on the people that they're talking about who are terrific people, they're terrific people, but we are going make a determination," though the implications of this position remain unclear. Moreover, while Trump has in the past portrayed undocumented immigrants in a broadly negative light ("They're bringing drugs. They're bringing crime. They're rapists," though, "some of them," he assumes, "are nice people") his tone appeared more nuanced in his 60 Minutes interview. He stated:

"What we are going to do is get the people that are criminal and have criminal records, gang members, drug dealers, we have a lot of these people, probably 2 million, it could be even 3 million, we are getting them out of our country or we're going to incarcerate. But we're getting them out of our country, they're here illegally."

Though the figures he presented in the interview have been disputed by immigration experts for being exaggerated (Pew Research Center estimates the total number of undocumented immigrants at 11 million - of that number, about 800,000 are criminals), Trump's decision to focus deportation efforts on undocumented immigrants with criminal records may alleviate the concerns felt in his initial anti-immigration rhetoric. What's more, his plan to focus deportation efforts on so-called "bad hombres" is not so unfamiliar to Washington - Obama has similarly

directed efforts toward removing criminal immigrants from the U.S.

Speaking on immigration in his final presidential debate with Hillary Clinton, Trump praised Obama's deportation numbers. "President Obama has moved millions of people out," he stated, "Nobody knows about it. Nobody talks about it, but under Obama, millions of people have been moved out of this country. They've been deported." Over the past decade, federal enforcement rates on deportation have steadily increased. With the removal of nearly 2.7 million undocumented immigrants during his two presidential terms, Obama stands to become the U.S. President with the greatest number of deportations enforced in history. In regards to Trump's comments on 60 Minutes, Migration Policy Institute director Muzafar Chishti expressed, "What he's saying is sort of consistent with present policy," given that he achieves his goal of 2 to 3 million deportations over the duration of his presidency.

Looking toward 2017, the forecast for the future of U.S. immigration policy remains uncertain. Unlike any of his predecessors, Trump embodies an unpredictable storm of pandering and promises, ever-shifting with the winds of public opinion. Though policy experts may construct an idea of what Trump's presidency will look like through his public statements, interviews, and contributions from his advisors and allies, millions of undocumented immigrants must play the waiting game to see what their future truly holds.

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*Julian Savulescu, Australian philosopher and bioethicist*

*Photo Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons*

# Transhumanism and Critical Theory as Alternatives to Liberalism

*Why it's time to move on from outdated schools of thought*

By Bill Kakenmaster

From where does political theory's contemporary opposition to the dominant Liberal political order arise? Surely few would deny the rise of alternative philosophical opinions in recent decades. Post-structuralism, postmodernism, neo-Marxism, and further schools of thought suggests the limits of our traditionally held views. To make a long story short, our current politics' validity was sold to us on such grounds as constitutionalism, human rights, and the rule of law, and now certain critical scholars simply aren't buying it.

Different alternatives to Liberalism vary in their emphasis on human conceptions from the top (e.g., the powerful, wealthy elite) or from the bottom (e.g., the powerless, impoverished multitude). Here, I attempt to provide a cursory sketch of these two alternatives and ultimately argue in favor of the latter.

## **Liberalism Who?**

Mostly, we accept that the world's current political order consists of various different arrangements of Enlightenment-inspired premises that we might characterize as "Liberal." At least four major premises make up this view of politics. First, any good Liberal firmly believes in human rights. Human rights are, most basically, those things to which we are entitled because of the fact of our humanity. The concept of human rights first arose as a prom-

inent Liberal ideal during the Enlightenment in the work of philosophers like John Locke, whose *Second Treatise of Government* issued modern politics' familiar claim to "life, liberty, and possessions."

Second, Liberals argue that the state's constitution best separates the government into different branches to prevent abuses of power. In *The Spirit of the Laws*, Montesquieu argues in favor of a republican, constitutional order based on a love of virtue—in contrast to monarchs, who love honor, and despots, who thrive off of fear. Montesquieu's work subsequently formed much of the basis for the American legal system; even today, "courts generally acknowledge his influence on the Constitution" and separation of powers. After all, what good are human rights if the state can revoke them at will?

Third, citizens within a Liberal state are considered equal. John Rawls claims in *A Theory of Justice* that, if you were placed behind a "veil of ignorance" that removes all social contexts like race, religion, sex, and nationality from a person's decision to whom rights should be granted, any rational person would choose equality. Because any other person theoretically behind the veil of ignorance could choose my share of rights just as I choose another's, I face an incentive to minimize the differences between the rights afforded to me

and those afforded to another. On the Liberal view, not only can the government not prevent you from exercising your rights, it must provide those rights equally to all its citizens.

Fourth, Liberal states opt for market capitalism over socialism's emphasis on state-owned enterprise. Adam Smith, arguably the founder of economic Liberalism and the ideological basis of the modern market system, wrote in *The Wealth of Nations* that the "invisible hand" of the market directs producers and consumers toward positive outcomes. By harnessing individuals' self-interest and leaving the market up to its own devices—e.g., a small public sector and a large private sector—we create competition, which in turn creates positive economic conditions like lower unemployment and higher wages.

This combination of human rights, separation of powers, equality, and capitalism forms the foundation of the modern world order. Countries strive to adopt all four of these premises or are pressured into doing so. In pundits' terms, liberal democracy is the "price of admission" to the international community. Transhumanism, however, does not square with at least one Liberal premise: equality.

### **The Transhumanist Alternative**

Transhumanism is a philosophy that posits that individuals and governments can and should use technology to surpass innate human potential. Their principal assumption treats humans as deficient in one way or another. Transhumanists might say, "We don't live long enough, we don't prevent enough natural disasters, we are susceptible to disease, we don't help refugees, we start wars and commit genocides, we cause climate change." Essentially, humans "have a lot of [unnecessary] limitations," in this view.

For example, Julian Savulescu advocates for transgenesis as an acceptable bioethical practice, claiming that we can and should manipulate human genomes because we face a moral imperative to correct such genetic deficiencies for future generations, even if we make them non-human in the process. In fact, making humans into non-humans presents itself as one of the main

goals of transhumanism's political project (literally, we should transcend humanity). Therefore, governments that limit and regulate practices like cloning and transgenesis can be seen as morally corrupt. "[W]e should," Savulescu argues, "allow [genetic] selection for non-disease genes [in embryos] even if this maintains or increases social inequality."

I want to briefly note that I only highlight the more extreme forms of human enhancement which propose to alter society's genetic composition. Using, for example, a notebook to augment one's memory capacity differs inordinately from replacing one or more genes in select embryos. I don't focus here on human enhancement, but rather on transhumanist human enhancement.

Transhumanism directly opposes the Liberal premise that all citizens merit equal treatment from the state because of the random distribution of talents qualities by nature. As Francis Fukuyama put it, "[t]he first victim of transhumanism might be equality." According to a Liberal worldview, whatever rights we are due from our government must be due equally to all. But, through biomedical processes like transgenesis and eugenic embryo selection, transhumanism seeks to (1) identify superior genetic traits, and (2) increase the proportion of those traits in society. If Liberalism proposes to reduce social inequalities, transhumanism accepts those inequalities, implying first off that they have less value to society than human enhancement, and second off that inequalities are such a low priority that they can be rooted into humans' genes without significant consequence.

Transhumanism's problem is not so much that it can't establish a principled typology of desirous and non-desirous genetic traits, nor that it can't or define the value those traits. Whether or not it remains "silent on the value" of people's lives with non-desirous traits, transhumanism proposes to alter the biological definition of humanity and create a new, elite class of super-humans. That elite class then could easily claim to be entitled to more state benefits, rights, seats in Congress, and so on than natural humans. As an alternative to Liberalism, therefore, transhumanism supposes

a vastly different political subject, where talents, strengths, and weaknesses are not distributed randomly by nature, but rather purposefully by individuals through the use of technology.

### The Critical Alternative

The critical alternative is one that one could characterize as a broad *mélange* of different ideologies sharing the same ultimate premise: the modern Liberal paradigm perpetuates and sometimes exacerbates political, economic, and social inequalities.

Consider, for instance, *Homo Sacer* by Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben. *Homo sacer*—as opposed to someone like *Homo politicus*—is a person stripped of his or her political life, or the life of the citizen and reduced to bare life, or the life of one outside the state, who therefore enjoys no guarantee on his/her individual rights, and can therefore be killed by the state. Agamben uses the ancient Greek terms *bios* and *zoē* to distinguish between these two forms of life. Practically, Hitler reduced people to bare life forms by removing Jewish and other “undesirable” members from the body politic both legally (by taking away citizenship rights) and physically (by sending “undesirables” to concentration camps). For Agamben, laws that reduce people to *zoē* represent a “state of exception” that dangerously violate human rights and characterize both modern authoritarian and democratic regimes. In other words, as legal entities, Auschwitz and Guantánamo Bay prison differ only in form, not essential character, since the latter hides behind a Liberal, democratic façade.

In the past, dictators survived because their states’ existence depended on territorial integrity. However, leaders of modern Liberal states depend more on public opinion than on territorial integrity, meaning that—according to the critical alternative to Liberalism—Liberal states have to sell their laws and policies under the guise of protecting or promoting Liberal values, even if those laws and policies further distance the world’s state of affairs from a Liberal state of affairs.

Slavoj Žižek echoes this sentiment. Liberals soften many of today’s problems, framing them as problems of ignorance or intolerance rather than

problems of injustice, inequality, or exploitation. According to Žižek, because of the “multiculturalist’s basic ideological operation;” namely that “political differences, differences conditioned by political inequality, economic exploitation, etc., are naturalized/neutralized into ‘cultural’ differences [...] which are something given, something that cannot be overcome, but merely ‘tolerated.’” In other words, Liberals’ view of toleration simply glosses over modern forms of injustice and indeed assumes that anyone labelling injustice as such is simply ignorant of other worldviews. This then obfuscates the distinction between good and evil. In fact, it means the Liberal paradigm is that much more dangerous for the critical alternative because prolonging and indeed remaining complicit in acts of injustice can be justified under such well-intentioned efforts at “tolerance.”

If Agamben claims that Auschwitz and GTMO prison are essentially the same, Žižek might argue that the disparate state of inequality between the global North and South differ only in form—not essential character—from colonial times. A modern Liberal economic system doesn’t alleviate that problem, it just sweeps it under the rug.

### Forks in the Road

At what ontological premise(s) do the two alternatives to Liberalism diverge? Beyond their shared enemy, the two schools of thought seemingly share nothing in common, with the latter claiming there is too much inequality in the world and the former claiming that there is too little.

Transhumanism represents a top-down political power structure, whereby elites decide policy and administer it down to the masses. The transhumanist alternative begins with an aristocratic premise—individual citizens able to do so should be given the choice to correct their human deficiencies and become a member of a superior, super-human class. The state should then sanction policies that allow (1) experiments to determine the specific areas in which humans require enhancement, and (2) the biomedical enhancement procedures themselves. Even arguing that we should enhance humans to be more moral beings does not solve this. Such a solution reflects, on the one hand, an aristocratic premise now as we must

decide which moral code will rule society or, on the other hand, an aristocratic premise later as the new super-humans must decide which moral code to rule society. Either way, transhumanism represents a top-down view of politics.

The critical alternative begins from the opposite perspective of oppressed classes. Individuals should pursue emancipation through political activism or “even armed struggle” because one class of people ruling another invariably leads to inequalities and injustice; and remaining passive or complicit in those instances is just as bad as committing them in the first place. Any viable body politic, therefore, must relinquish any theoretical, legal, or other capacity to implement a “state of exception” for one reason or another. Therefore, if transhumanism allows for—even if it doesn’t necessarily advocate for—a state of exception for its class of super-humans, it doesn’t just accept today’s injustices, it enables them, according to the critical vein.

It is this fork in the road that seems to most fundamentally separate these two contemporary alternatives to Liberalism. Transhumanism pursues an aristocratic political future while critical scholars pursue a radically egalitarian one. Transhumanism emphasizes helping those at the top while critical theory emphasizes helping those at the bottom.

### Conclusion

The alternatives to Liberalism are not limited to post-structuralism, postmodernism, neo-Marxism, and other leftist schools of thought. Of course, we should remain wary of any ideology that purports to have all the answers. However, we should also remain wary of ideologies that root inequality in human genetics. As it stands now, human inequality is limited to socially significant factors such as income, wealth, race, religion, and so on. Most contemporary political theory no longer attempts to defend aristocracies based on people’s heritage. And while the modern Liberal system may not be perfect, the transhumanist alternative which allows for the creation of a new class of elite super-humans potentially deepens social inequality, on the one hand, while certainly creating biological inequalities on the

other. Rather than more inequality, critical theory rightly views things from the bottom-up and strives to end oppression and injustice, not enable them.

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U.S. Tanks in Baghdad

Photo Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons

## The Middle East and the U.S. Invasion of Iraq: What Does Theory Tell Us?

*While neorealism is one of the most prominent theories through which scholars can make sense of the Middle East, it is not a total prescription*

By Stephanie Maravankin

The study of international relations presents a multitude of opportunities to make sense of the world through a variety of lenses; each lens is a different theoretical perspective. Neorealism is time and time again regarded as the most useful theoretical perspective through which to understand the international relations of the Middle East. This paper argues that while neorealism is one of the most prominent theories through which scholars can make sense of the Middle East, it is not a total prescription. The discussion will address what neorealism is, the role it plays in understanding the Middle East, as well as the underlying weaknesses of the theory. Through a case study analysis, this discussion will highlight existing gaps in the neorealist interpretation of the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and suggest additional theoretical perspectives to consider for understanding the international relations of the Middle East.

The theory of neorealism offers a framework for understanding the system of international relations by analyzing recurring patterns of state behavior and interactions among states. Coined in 1979 by Kenneth Waltz in *Theory of International Politics*, neorealism addresses the biggest issues in

international relations, including, but not limited to war and the avoidance of war, power balancing and seeking, the death of states, security competition, and alliance formation. The effects of the structure of neorealism serve as the distinctive element between this theory and others.

Neorealism is best understood in two parts. The first is that of the ordering principle of the international system—anarchy. Anarchy in a neorealist context implies that there is no authority higher than the states; states are autonomous, individualist in origin, and embedded in a “self-help” system where the fundamental objective is survival. Involvement in the system of international politics is dependent solely on the state best serving its national interests. The problem Waltz associates with this line of thought is the need to conceive of an order without an orderer. The second part of the theory is in relation to the structure of international politics. Each state structure is defined by its distribution of capabilities, or power. According to neorealists, the structure of anarchy is exogenous to statehood. In other words, states seek to maximize their power relative to others, precisely because there is no higher authority. Therefore, the balance of power of the system changes as the

distribution of capabilities of each state change. Despite this, there is a system of checks and balances in place that is useful for understanding the changes observed throughout history in alliances across the international political system.

Neorealist theory can be used to understand the Middle East—a region of volatile politics and constant shifting of alliances to achieve a specific set of domestic economic goals. The historical record of the Middle East discloses four key areas of focus with regard to the origins of alliances. First, Middle Eastern states, as a part of the international system, face external threats. And, these threats most frequently are the cause of international alliances. Second, balancing is more common than bandwagoning. Balancing refers to the allying of states against prevailing threats; bandwagoning is defined as the alignment of states with the source of danger, or threat. Recognizing this, it is important to draw attention to the neorealist framework's contention that as hegemony overextends themselves, their misuse of power provokes a balancing act against them. Third, states go beyond balancing against power to balance against threats. Simply put, in the same way that states are differentiated by how much power they possess, states are differentiated by the threats they emanate and those they overcome. Fourth, the likelihood of states joining forces is intensified as offensive capabilities and intentions increase. It should be noted that neorealist theory is not the first to draw attention to the study of alliances in the Middle East, particularly those founded in the premise of protection against threats. The Eastern Question, termed in 1820, refers to the study of the interrelationships between two unequal power systems: The European Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire. The Eastern Question is significant because the penetration of the Middle East's involvement with Europe is understood to have affected the nature of politics in the region today. In a broader scope the diplomacy of the Eastern Question refers to the political considerations and strategic competition that reflects a self-help system characterized by the distribution of capabilities and national interests. As this analysis moves forward, the four key areas of the origins of alliances will be applied

to the case study under examination—the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.

It must be clearly articulated that there are weaknesses pertaining to neorealist theory. Realism which predated neorealism serves as a foundation for the latter theory and contends that states are interested in security and the maximization of power. When applying this line of thought to the Middle East, one limitation is particularly evident: this is a misrepresentation of the region. This is true for two reasons. First, the Middle East's geopolitics differ from other regions of the world, given its territorial vastness and proximity to natural resources. The ideological perspective used to understand Middle Eastern geopolitics, and what is often times called the “anti-hegemonic approach,” stresses examining the interests, as well as the social and political composition of the region and states. A perspective grounded in ideology is necessary for obtaining a holistic understanding of how Middle Eastern states and the people within them regard international relations and the choices they make.

Second, there exists a variety of cultural perspectives that have proven useful in analyzing the Middle East—something neorealism does not account for. A constructivist perspective makes evident that state behavior and interaction is based on cultures in the sense of ideas, norms, and experiences. In examining that neorealism emphasizes motives of national security, power, and resources, a certain blindness is made apparent: there are culturally embedded aspects to these motivations. This will be further explained when assessing the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. For now, the takeaway from this discussion of the remaining weaknesses in neorealist theory is that due to analytic uncertainty and varying conceptual weaknesses neorealism cannot fully explain the international relations of the Middle East.

To evaluate why neorealism is not a full prescription of the politics of the Middle East this analysis focuses on the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The discussion will shift to an examination of the existing gaps that can be corrected by alternative international relations theories after illustrating the neorealist interpretation of the motivations

behind the invasion. The complexity of the case study merits an analysis that engages critically with the scholarship of the politics of the region.

Principally, a brief history of the role of the states involved in this case study will aid in the interpretation of the theoretical perspectives outlined below. Iraq's role and influence in the Middle East is rooted in geography given the state is at the crossroads of the two principal population fault lines in the region. Moreover, the demographics of Iraq are significant due to the fact that the state lies between its smaller oil-rich Gulf neighbors and Iran. Economically, Iraq's oil reserves were among the top-five largest in the world prior to the U.S. invasion. Collectively, autonomy of the Iraqi state to secure dominance over its population and its interest in extending its power to project it onto the Gulf area was evident. Therefore, regardless of which theoretical perspective is being considered, this paper contends that the 2003 invasion was focused on breaking the domestic and regional autonomy of the Iraqi state.

The political instability of Iraq did not emerge overnight. In the years leading up to the invasion of the Iraqi state, the authoritarian Ba'athist government marked Iraq with a narrative of "exclusivity, communal mistrust, patronage, and the exemplary use of violence." In August of 1990, Saddam Hussein ordered Iraqi forces to invade Kuwait with the purpose of achieving nationalist goals. The U.S. viewed this encroachment as problematic and committed itself to reinstating the status quo in Iraq. As a means of achieving the status quo, the international political system sought to impose order and limit the Iraqi states' capabilities. Two U.N. Security Council Resolutions are important—687 and 688, both of which forged international alliances, while rendering the most intense imposition of sanctions against one state in history. Saddam Husain's failure to comply with these resolutions, among others, led the U.S. to assume a military role in the international political system. The U.S. invasion of Iraq was in an attempt to rectify one of the central drivers of instability in the Middle East.

According to neorealism, the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 can be interpreted as follows. As a global

hegemon, the U.S. similar to any other state was in search of power and security. Given the recent events of September 11, 2001, the U.S. was in desperate need of avoiding decline. As a means of maintaining global hegemony, the U.S. demonstrated its will to use force by disregarding the lack of approval on behalf of the U.N. Security Council and invading Iraq in March of 2003.

The national interest for the U.S. of invading Iraq can be summed up with three objectives: territorial, economic, and military. In this case, the U.S. was interested in: (1) gaining regional military bases; (2) securing its access to oil resources; and (3) avoiding the nuclear proliferation of Iraq as a means of eliminating a prevailing threat to the U.S. and its allies. But there remain other interests that were of importance to the U.S. that led to the invasion of Iraq. The neorealist theory creates a gap, an inability, to explain these interests.

The reasons as to why neorealism is not a total prescription of the international relations of Middle East is twofold. First, there is a noteworthy identity politics component that led to the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Second, in order to understand alliances in the international political system during this time, identity must be first considered. Alternative international relations theories will be useful for the discussion of the aforementioned reasons.

Identity politics offers a good starting point. The events of September 11, 2001 left the U.S. in a state of "vulnerability, victimization, and national desire for revenge." These three aspects of national and cultural identity should be regarded as a part of the Bush Administration's decision for the invasion. When these ideological influences are coupled with the Orientalist images that flooded the media after the September 11 attacks, it becomes clearer that the differentiating between Arab and Muslim states and assessing their immediate threat became less of a necessity and more of a tool of deception. What was believed as an imminent Iraqi threat to U.S. security attributed to the suspected evidence of the Iraqi state manufacturing weapons of mass destruction, resulted in the unveiling of a fallacy. If not of most importance, however, was President George W. Bush's "vendetta against Saddam Hussein" and personal desire to

be “greater” than his father ever was. As the Bush Administration constructed interests and threats to mislead public opinion, the identity politics of the U.S. prevailed—decisions were made on the premise of emotions, actions were taken on the belief in fabricated evidence, and the distribution of capabilities among states became a personal matter.

Second, to warrant the argument in the context of the international political system, it is significant to consider state identity in alliance formation; identity being a moot point in neorealist theory and alliances being at the core of the international political system and a pillar of neorealism. Critics of neorealism explain that while neorealism focuses on the capabilities of the state in determining alliance formation, it fails to consider state identity as a factor that shapes the choice of alliance partners. In particular, when it comes to strategic association in the interest of the state, a shared interest is simply not enough. Instead, it is a shared identity that encourages attraction and mutual identification. It is the “language of community rather than the contractual language of alliance” that captures strategic association. In the case of the Middle East, generally speaking, inter-Arab politics are driven by ideational rather than materialist forces, but more specifically in alliance formation.

Thus, it is the politics of identity, more so than the logic of anarchy, that offers a stronger conceptualization of which states are viewed as a threat to the security of other states. Neoconservative U.S. President George W. Bush, at the time of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, adhered to the principal that democracies fear attack from non-democracies. Therefore, when considering alliances and the identity politics of strategic association, neoconservative theory should be applied to the analysis of the U.S.’s invasion of Iraq; neoconservatism is a factor that contributed to the West’s perception of Iraq as a threat. While this consideration too is not a complete prescription of the international relations of the Middle East, it is a necessary point of contention when analyzing the international political system.

This essay challenges the notion that neorealism

is considered to represent the most useful theoretical perspective through which to understand the international relations of the Middle East. At its root, neorealism is a competition of power among states in the international political system by which the ordering principle of anarchy explains outcomes in international politics. The criticism of this theoretical perspective is made clear—ideology and identity are disregarded. For while each state is autonomous, its demographic makeup, institutional policies, and national interests may vary in relation to other states. Each of these variables aid in the understanding of capability, and also action. To illustrate the diversity of the international political system, given that there are many explanations and variables regarding the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the discussion above emphasizes that one single analysis is not a total prescription due to gaps within a neorealist theoretical perspective. Theories such as constructivism and neo-conservatism, respectively offer an ideological and identity based approach to international politics and the actions of independent states within the system. In so far as the basis for international relations is to take into account multiple points of view; indeed, all situations will require a blending of theories and perspectives.

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Bank Queue in Kolkata

Photo Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons

# Fighting Corruption through Monetary Policy

## *Effects of India's 'Surgical Strike' on Black Money*

By Samuel Woods

While much of the world was focused on the day's US presidential election, India's Prime Minister and TIME's Person of Year Narendra Modi announced on November 8, 2016 that the current 500 and 1000 rupee (around \$7.5 and \$15 respectively) notes will no longer be considered legal tender in India. While citizens have until December 30 to exchange the old notes for their new versions, many airports, railway stations, hospitals, and fuel stations only accepted the soon-obsolete notes until November 11. The 500 and 1000 rupee notes are by far the most widely used denominations in India, together representing 86% of the bills in circulation in an economy where 98% of all consumer transactions use cash. Prior to Mr. Modi's surprise live announcement, there was little to no public indication of this move, inciting a flurry of panic and quick analysis.

### Why is this happening?

Deemed a 'surgical strike' on black money by Revenue Secretary Hasmukh Adhia, Mr. Modi implemented this program as a part of a larger effort to fight black money and corruption, which he has said "are the biggest obstacles in eradicating poverty". India's economy is heavily reliant on cash, therefore it is relatively easy for traders in

black and grey markets to launder money made in those markets. For example, it is difficult to tell the difference between a 500 rupee note that was obtained by selling illegal goods and a 500 rupee note obtained by selling fruit on the street corner. A cash-driven economy allows an individual to be more flexible with which markets that they participate in, making participation in black markets more profitable than it otherwise would be.

But this flexibility comes with a crippling weakness. By suddenly declaring the most popular denominations worthless, anyone who holds any of the worthless notes must go to a bank and exchange them for their replacement currency. For legitimate business, this shouldn't be too difficult, as they have income statements on hand that justifies their large cash deposits. Similarly, households who are not engaged in black markets are unlikely to have exorbitant amounts of cash lying around, and will thus face little questioning from banks when they attempt to trade their old notes in for new ones. However, individuals holding black money have a tougher time explaining where their money originated, meaning that much of this illegally obtained money will be lost.

However, there are ways for black money holders

to get around the new policy and recoup some of what they stand to lose. Before airports and railways stopped accepting the soon-obsolete notes, many airlines and railway companies saw a surge in first-class ticket purchases paid for in the newly obsolescent notes, followed by cancellations the same afternoon and demands for payment in new notes. Additionally, some black money hoarders have reportedly paid others to deposit medium amounts of hoarded cash (under 2,500 rupees so as not to alert authorities) in bank accounts accessible to the hoarder, or with the stipulation that the depositor would soon withdraw the money and pay it back to the hoarder when the new legal tender is available. Both of these methods, if inconvenient and laden with transaction costs, allow hoarders of black money to soften the blow of Mr. Modi's 'surgical strike'.

### **What is the extent of the problem of black money?**

While placing an exact number on the size of the Indian black money economy has proven difficult, estimates are consistently reported to be in the hundreds of billions of US dollars. In 2012, India's Central Bureau of Investigation reported that "Indians are the largest depositors in banks abroad with an estimated 500 billion US dollars[...]of illegal money stashed by them in tax havens". Ambit Capital Research, a research firm focused on Indian economic activity, estimated in June of 2016 that, while the black economy had been steadily contracting since the 1980s, its current size is around 20 percent of India's GDP, and larger than the GDP of countries like Thailand and Argentina.

Despite encouraging participation in illegal commerce, the size of the black economy also hides billions of taxable dollars from the Indian government, stunting the impact of development projects and anti-poverty programs put forth by the government. While the Indian government cannot easily recoup all or near all of its lost tax revenue, it has announced that deposits of more than 2.5 thousand rupee be taxed, and that individuals depositing large amounts inconsistent with personal income statements would be subject to be taxed at "the tax amount plus a penalty

of 200 per cent of the tax payable...per the Section 270(A) of the Income Tax Act". Assuredly, the government should see a large boost to its coffers by the new year, as well as a higher flow of incoming tax money in the future if participation in black markets is considered less safe economically as before, which one would expect it might.

### **Has this been done before?**

This is not the first time that the Indian government has demonetized certain bank notes. In January 1946, the 1,000, and 10,000 rupee notes were declared illegal, only to be reintroduced eight years later along with a new 5,000 rupee note. In an effort to curb the growing presence of black money in 1978, India again demonetized the 1,000, 5,000, and 10,000 rupee notes, thinking that the demonetization of the highest value notes would address corruption issues with minimal collateral damage. However, there had been unofficial consideration of this move since late 1972 when the Wanchoo committee, a direct tax inquiry set up by the government, released a report suggesting the then-hypothetical move would help curb the short-term influence of black money. This long run-up of unofficial talk undermined the surprise of the move when it was finally implemented, allowing hoarders of black money to prepare by depositing their earnings in banks or in assets like real estate and jewelry.

Elsewhere, demonetization - or stripping banknotes of their value - is relatively common worldwide. For example, the demonetization of various European currencies to make way for the euro is a salient example. However, demonetization for the specific purpose of fighting corruption is more rare, though the demonetization of higher value notes to fight illegal trade has gained some traction in the West as of late. Early in 2016, economist Peter Sands supported the elimination of the \$100 and £500 bills, stating that the use of electronic payment systems has made these bills far less useful for individuals involved in legal trade, whereas these high end bills are essential to carrying out large scale black market commerce. Still, some doubt the feasibility or use of retracting these higher end bills, and the idea has yet to be really seriously considered.

### What are the short-term and long-term economic impacts?

Undoubtedly, hoarders of large amounts of the illegal cash will be hurt by India's demonetization of specific notes, as their stashes of wealth are now hardly worth more than the paper that they are printed on. Though there are ways around the issue as aforementioned, the circuitous route taken to convert the illegal cash carries transaction costs that are inconvenient at best. However the precision of Mr. Modi's self-described 'surgical strike' leaves much to be desired. In addition to punishing purposeful tax evaders and black market tycoons, India's small and medium sized businesses are expected to see activity slow dramatically over the next few weeks. Unlike large businesses who can run on credit, these businesses rely on cash transactions from customers for their products and cash payments to secure inventory and goods. Undoubtedly the lack of access to the most popular denominations of cash will only hurt these cash-based businesses, though the exact severity of the impact depends on how quickly these businesses and their customers can obtain access to the new 500 and 1000 rupee notes. At this point, it is not clear how quickly this is expected to happen.

As time as gone on, it is becoming increasingly difficult to believe that Modi's government has sufficiently considered many of the details of managing the transition. Banks are still not receiving enough of the new notes to meet their needs, and 33 people had died from exhaustion standing in queues to exchange old bills for new. Also, a week after the announcement, over 60 percent of the nation's 9.3 million truck drivers have walked off the job after not having access to legal tender to pay road tolls. Considering that 65 percent of the country's freight is road-based, the government's lack of prioritizing the distribution of new currency threatens to slow the country's domestic economy considerably for the next couple of months.

Additionally, Indian housewives up and down the country stand to lose personal fortunes. "For many generations", it is said that Indian housewives have been stashing small shares of their

husband's incomes in shoeboxes and dark closet corners, which over time can build up into small fortunes. For many Indian women, these small fortunes represent a rare form of financial and personal freedom, as the fortune's unbeknownst-to-many form of existence allows the holders to spend them however they please. Now however, women across the country are facing the difficult decision to come clean about their conduct to their families and face ridicule and humiliation, or lose the fortune's altogether.

In the long term, this policy's effect on the Indian economy is unclear. On the one hand, shocks like this demonstrate the ironically fickle nature of fortunes based upon large holdings of cash, which might encourage Indians to open bank accounts and trust electronic payment systems more than they have in past. Doing so would allow the government to tax more efficiently, and make it more difficult to hoard large fortunes in cash from illegal activity. Additionally, the move will make obsolete the rash of counterfeit 500 rupee bills flowing in from Pakistan, often to fund terrorist activity.

While this move may well come to represent a potent one-time strike against black money fortunes, it is not clear whether it addresses the structural conditions that allow black money to flow freely in India. A one-time obsolescence of the most popular bills does not deter future black money holders from buying value-holding assets like real estate with illegally-obtained tender, and selling it later for legally-obtained tender. Indeed, much of India's black money is laundered this way through the real estate, jewelry, and gold markets. While in the short term one would expect these markets to depress in the absence of black money, it is highly unrealistic that these markets do not rebound in the near future and re-emerge as a haven for black money as black markets get back on their feet.

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Operation Continuing Promise provides aid to people in Latin America

Photo Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons

## Migration, Assimilation and Identity: The Effects of the Salvadoran Civil War and State Violence on Migration to the U.S.

*How can we better understand migration through the context of war?*

By Camille Torres

### Introduction

This research aims to investigate how the Salvadoran Civil War of the 1980s affected migration patterns from El Salvador to the United States of America and how these migrants have assimilated or are assimilating in the U.S. The research defines assimilation as the “[a]daptation of one ethnic or social group – usually a minority – to another. Assimilation involves the subsuming of language, traditions, values, morals and behavior or even fundamental vital interests.” Examining the change in the ethnic identities of migrants, specifically first and second generation migrants, will bring light to any future migratory patterns returning to El Salvador or potentially permanent plans to settle in the U.S. Interest in this topic stems from a lack of general awareness about the 1980s Civil War and its effects. In the Nations of Emigrants, the Salvadoran population in the United States has been conceptualized as the fifteenth department of El Salvador, because of its sheer size. Yet, there seems to be a lack of generalized knowledge on this population. Also, and significantly, the research aims to give a voice to the stories of many Salvadoran-Americans who have not been able to share their experiences, aiming therefore to create empathy and greater

understands for their circumstances. The research does not differentiate between illegal and legal migration, but rather considers anyone who has emigrated from El Salvador to the U.S. as within the population of study.

This research’s data consists of existing personal accounts of migrants, relevant published statistics, and original interviews conducted with the local migrant population. The research will first present a comprehensive case study of the 1980s conflict and its subsequent effects on El Salvador with the goal of then identifying demographics and patterns with a better understanding of their origins.

### Case Study

Thus far, over two million people have emigrated from El Salvador as a result of the civil war. The civil war is said to have been a result of agricultural concerns that led to military action. Leading up to the civil war, El Salvador’s governmental power relied on the success of coffee exports and the relationships of coffee plantation owners with the military. Because of how the power was concentrated in the hands of the coffee exporting sector, the government began to pass reforms “aimed

at creating splits in the middle and lower social groupings.” However, the concentration of power in the hands of the elite also created problems as the world became more globalized and modern technology began to play a larger role in coffee growing, thus disproportionately hurting poor, indigenous small-share landholders. This role meant larger rates of unemployment for those previously employed in the coffee industry, which led to increased strength and presence of labor unions in the late 70s. These labor unions combined with student groups and peasant organizations to rebel and seize several government buildings and embassies; however, they did not take into account the consequences of angering existing opposing armed forces. The Salvadoran military, known as the Fuerza Armada de El Salvador (FAES), countered with an armed attack against the perceived insurgency as tensions came to a climax on February 28th, 1977. Protests emerged, advocating for a fair election and military forces in response began to massacre opposing demonstrators, such as the main leftist group the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). Thus began a slew of massacres from both “terror squads of the ultra-right” and left-wing guerillas. People even in El Salvador’s middle classes were not spared and, under the guise of a “state of emergency,” the government justified sustained military action against those whom they perceived as leftist insurgents. One civilian wrote that “men were blindfolded and killed in the town’s center” and “young women were taken to the hill nearby, where they were raped, then killed and burned.” She further wrote that she listened to children being choked to death, three of whom were her own. Soon after,

in 1979, when Carlos Humberto Romero’s government was overthrown, right-wing death squads increased their activity to about 1,000 killings per month. This directly resulted in the forced displacement of over one million Salvadorans, most of whom were expelled from the country and sought refugee status abroad; about 61,000 died in total. To put these numbers into perspective, close to one-third of the total population was either killed or forced into exile, and this does not include those killed by “government cleansings.” The government and military specifically targeted the peasant populations. Due to these mass movements of communities within El Salvador, communities began to go without water, sanitary services, and electricity, thus exacerbating the existing infrastructural problems. By 1985, over 70% of displaced households lacked permanent employment, and of those, 20% were depending on the employment of children under the age of 16.

TABLE 1 *Salvadorean Emigration 1978–1987*

1978	68,400
1979	68,800
1980	83,200
1981	40,500
1982	129,400
1983	73,300
1984	55,600
1985	51,500
1986	52,600
1987	30,200

Source: MIPLAN (1988).

\*Note, this table is estimated to be 30x beneath actual values due to those who arrived illegally.

TABLE 2(a) *Number of Salvadoreans who are Refugees or Asylum-seekers in Need of Protection and Assistance*

Nation	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Belize	2000	2000	2000	2000	3000	2600	3100	3400	4000	21,000
Costa Rica	10,000	10,000	10,000	6100	6200	6200	6200	6300	3800	5900
Guatemala	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	N.A.	100	600	2250	3200	2500
Honduras	1700	16,000	18,300	32,600	30,000	20,700	21,000	13,300	10,400	2200
Mexico	3500	3500	5000	1000	4000	4000	3500	3800	3600	3200
Nicaragua	17,500	17,500	17,500	16,000	16,000	17,100	700	7000	2200	2400
Panama	1200	1200	1200	1200	1000	1000	800	N.A.	300	375

Source: World Refugee Reports (1982–1991).

TABLE 2(b) *Estimates of Displaced Salvadoreans*

<i>Nation</i>	<i>Community size</i>
USA	500,000–850,000
Mexico	120,000–250,000
Honduras	24,000
Guatemala	10,000
Nicaragua	7600
Costa Rica	6200
Canada	5317
Belize	3000
Panama	900
Internally displaced	500,000

Source: Stein (1989, table 3).

TABLE 3 *Gender and Educational Characteristics of Salvadorean Emigrants*

<i>Year</i>	<i>Instrument</i>	<i>Male (per cent)</i>	<i>15–44 Male (per cent)</i>	<i>College (per cent)</i>	<i>&gt;13 yrs education (per cent)</i>
(a) Total Salvadorean population					
1980	SHH	—	47	—	2
1985	SHH	—	45	—	3
(b) Salvadorean emigrants					
1980	FDR	83	—	41	—
1980	US Census	—	44	—	20
1983	Friends	67	—	50	—
1983	CPS	—	44	—	12
1987	SHH	—	59	—	—
1987	UCA(ES)	—	59	—	5
1987	UCA(US)	—	52	—	9
1988	CPS	—	51	—	13

Source: Funkhouser (1992: table 5.2, p. 140); Aguayo (1985).

The U.S.A. was seen as the primary destination for exiles turned refugees, with Mexico following close behind. This choice is most likely attributed to the perceived economic opportunities in these nations. The Salvadoran government has attempted to recognize exiled citizens and migrants as “allies” rather than enemies because of the economic contributions they make to the home population. About half of all refugees have stated that they would like to return to El Salvador. However, for those that have already returned, conditions were so poor and United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) return camps had such awful conditions that most did not actually stay. Additionally, because those who have returned even just for a small amount of time

tended to face discrimination and shame for lack of “patriotism,” most did not end up staying permanently. Most are also punished or targeted by the military upon return. Also, many who did at one point intend to return, have found that their villages have been completely destroyed. Leaving and returning is seen as a massive betrayal by the government and thus those who have been identified as returnees are usually targeted and killed. American deportations are seen as a source of increased conflict violence in El Salvador. Therefore, the cyclical migration process is much more feasible.

### Migration Patterns

Most Salvadoran emigrants who fled to Mexico or the U.S.A. were recognized by the UNHCR as having refugee status. However, between Mexico’s refusal to acknowledge the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Refugee Protocol, over 1 million Salvadorans were left at risk of deportation. Also, the U.S.A. did not help the situation as their immigration policy in the late 70s and early 80s only allowed in 20,000 immigrants from any one country in the Western Hemisphere.

Refugees of the Salvadoran Civil War and Salvadoran state violence have been categorized into three groups. Emigres are those who leave and do not return, while return migrants return to resettle and repatriate in El Salvador, and circulators, who migrate from El Salvador to various different countries with no specified end destination. Adrian Bailey and Joshua Hane cite most migrants from this crisis as being circulators who made “short-term myopic” decisions to escape the ongoing war. They also argue that the initial choices and forces behind this displacement affect future behavior due to higher rates of education and younger ages, providing them with the characteristics to continue to move from place to place. The majority of these circulators migrate with economic goals in an effort to “maximize family welfare and practice risk aversion.” These Salvadoran migrants relocate in one of the largest economic migrant circulation systems between the U.S.A., Mexico, and Puerto Rico. In the Washington D.C. metro area alone, a 1995 study cited a population upwards of 150,000 migrants from El

Salvador.

However, despite sustaining themselves in a cyclical migration pattern, issues with English proficiency stunt migrants' mobility. In a 1982 study by Guy Poitras, 259 Salvadoran refugees were interviewed and only 22% of the respondents could speak English "well" or "very well." This, in combination with having less education than many non-Salvadoran-Americans, gives migrants limited social mobility in U.S. society. Also, their obligation to family members in El Salvador deters upward mobility. In terms of sheer numbers though, it is predicted that the Salvadoran population will continue to increase steadily as migrants gain legality and can begin to petition for family members.

### **The Journey: Trials and Tribulations**

The journey of the migrants is not an easy one, with many forced to travel by foot for the majority of the way. Many people are lost along the way to coyotes, drowning, abuse, or murder when they return home. Some are literally dismembered by trains or have their fingers sliced while jumping fences. Mexican officials have also reported finding bloated bodies of those who have perished along the way, with their identification documents on their chest so that relatives at home can be notified. Their journey is classified as clandestine since migrants travel below the radar for safety. Many are also subject to the will of smugglers, who can detain or extort them. Most migrants travel illegally, thus forcing them to keep quiet about any injustices committed against them along the way. These migrants are multidimensional. Some gain legality to travel through Mexico, but not to arrive in the U.S. Some also leave unbeknownst to the people of their hometowns, shrouding their journey in mystery and creating more dangerous and vulnerable circumstances for the travels themselves. Also, many take out loans to finance their travels, which can become a major burden even if the journey is successful. One man named Miguel Lopez Herrera worked for six months at an hourly wage of \$4.25 to repay a \$750 loan he took out to finance his journey. The majority of people are willing to undertake these risks. In an interview conducted in August 2000, every one of three Sal-

vadorans was looking for a way to leave the country. The people who facilitate the smuggling are called coyotes, defined as smugglers or a smuggling group. The coyotes generally use illegal vehicles to transport migrants and sometimes force migrants to carry drugs across the border. Some have even begun to refuse to take women or children, because they believe they are too likely to die during the journey. In an interview with NPR, Rey Kowalski says the price of smuggling across the Mexico-U.S. border is about \$2,500. However, after crossing, the coyotes sometimes hold migrants for ransom if they understand their family members are already in the U.S. waiting for them to arrive. Also, many who arrive do not even know they have illegally immigrated to begin with. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is trying to improve school infrastructure and educational resources about the dangers of coyotes to try to decrease this practice of human trafficking. They, along with other organizations and the host governments, are trying to limit migration and work on remedying the causes of migration in El Salvador itself.

As stated earlier, there is a level of multidimensionality in the journey from El Salvador to the U.S. Many migrants arrive to Mexico legally, and the problem arises in their crossing of the U.S.-Mexico border. It is not illegal to leave Mexico without papers, therefore, many migrants do not realize that crossing into the U.S. is illegal. I had a chance to interview Salvadoran case worker Marina Ortiz recounted the story of her three siblings who made the trek to the U.S. in 2013. Her three siblings were being threatened by the government and chose to walk from El Salvador to the United States. When they arrived in the U.S., none of them applied for asylum. Ortiz says they did not know applying for asylum was even an option, and therefore they still remain undocumented today. The three live in a community of people with stories similar to theirs in New York city. None of their bachelor's degrees translated to the U.S. educational system, so between that and a lack of English proficiency, finding work is a difficult task.

On top of being unaware of their rights, if they make the journey, many migrants have access only to limited resources. According to an interview

I conducted with United We Dream Policy and Advocacy Analyst Zenen Perez, oftentimes migrants will give the little money they have left to a business that will claim to help them with their asylum process. Later, the business will have disappeared entirely, along with their money. Perez said that, in 2014, an analysis by the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse observed that less than 30% of Central American women and children had access to legal representation. Consequently, less than 1.5% of those were allowed to stay in the United States, compared to the 25% who were allowed to stay that did have attorneys.

### **An Ongoing Debate: Economic Migrants or Refugees?**

To this day, Salvadorans are mostly labeled as economic migrants and thus still face a great risk of deportation in the United States. Many come to the U.S. seeking protection from threats or possible death back home, but U.S. policymakers cite their illegal entrance via Mexico as evidence of their economic goals, rather than their legal eligibility for asylum under the 1951 Refugee Convention. However, asylum seekers Maria Yolanda Mejillo and Pedro Antonio Leibo strongly contest this point. I had the opportunity to talk to Maria and Pedro, and in late 2013, their second son was targeted by the military for having graduated and earned his bachelor's degree. As such, he made the decision to walk from El Salvador to the United States, where he believed he could be granted asylum. At the Texas border, due to increased border controls, he was turned away. In 2012, the Consequence Delivery System (CDS) was implemented by border enforcement, in which people caught crossing the border were less apt to be allowed their request for political asylum and underwent "expedited removal" instead. As an educated individual who knew about the asylum process, one can assume he fell victim to this system at the Texas border. Border patrol officers have also more than doubled in number since 2004, and even drones are being implemented to survey the area. Most of the people who arrive at the border are also abused, with up to 25% of arriving migrants reporting such instances. In the same year that border patrol doubled, a panel presentation was held in El Salvador where many

people posed the question "If they say it's a crime for us to travel to the United States without papers, then why don't they give us papers?" As of right now, one can only apply for asylum once inside the United States. It is not economically feasible for people to arrive by plane or other safe means though, and sometimes travelling by foot is the only option.

The Salvadoran military kidnapped and killed the interviewee's son upon his return on February 18th, 2014. To this day, his family does not know the kind of death he suffered or where his body was buried, only that he is dead. Following this, the oldest and youngest sons, who also have bachelor's degrees, fled the country. The two walked from El Salvador to New York, successfully crossing the border. The two have not had their bachelor's degree translated and currently work at a local bakery, waiting for their parents to immigrate and hopefully be granted asylum. In March 2016, Mejillo and her husband arrived in New York and applied for asylum with the help of a case worker, hoping to be a part of the over 60% of cases that are granted asylum in New York.

Stories like these are at the heart of heated policy debates, as the children of Mejillo and Leibo came to the United States to utilize the education they had acquired. They knew if they remained in El Salvador, they would face government persecution, but at the same time, would risk economic stagnation without the opportunity to use their bachelor's degrees. As William Stanley states, "The motivations of individuals are complex: some individuals who leave El Salvador out of fear may also hope for economic success in the United States." Additionally, migration from El Salvador is not exclusively rooted in the conflict of the civil war. Before 1980, people were already migrating for economic reasons on a seasonal basis. Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) statistics show a sharp increase in migration following the start of the war, however, indicating motives that are greater than just economic goals. Reports from many global organizations point to fear as the primary motive for migration although it is difficult to find precise data on this. Also, more than one thousand Salvadorans were killed by military forces in 1979 alone, and since

then, those numbers have only grown. The current atmosphere of fear makes it easy to label people as economic migrants and deny them asylum, but the extreme human rights violations occurring in El Salvador force huge numbers of people into exile and illustrate the deeper fear that exists.

### Migrant Demographics

A 2009 study found a strong correlation between major depressive episodes and downward social mobility of migrants. Since most migrants are not able to bring their papers validating their education over to the U.S., cannot fund returning to college, or cannot afford to take a recertification exam, many are forced to work jobs for which they are highly overqualified. Unfortunately, this comes in the form of menial jobs such as manual labor or janitorial work. This creates extreme downward social mobility. In this study, most migrants felt they faced downward mobility as opposed to stable lateral or upward mobility. This means that these migrants were far more likely to experience at least one major depressive episode, controlling for exogenous effects. This was also found to be especially true for migrants to which finding a job was of major importance to them.

Most of these migrants are in the lower classes of the U.S. economy because of institutional discrimination. Since many employers are aware that these migrants are unauthorized, there have been reports of them sending empty checks to migrants or forcing them to work overtime. The knowledge of their lack of authorization can also lead to worksite raids and sometimes deportation. This is incredibly problematic because, for those with American-born children, their children legally have U.S. citizenship. This fractures families and has severe traumatic consequences. Furthermore, a Migration Policy Institute (MPI) study shows that second-generation Salvadorans actually see a lower level of employment than their parents. The second-generation population cites 70% of those under eighteen working, and this number drops exorbitantly to a mere 30% after the eighteenth birthday. This is especially interesting as the second generation tends to see higher education levels than their parents. However, overall, their median household income was about \$10,000 less

than the average American household, indicating that they were entering the workforce with lower paying jobs than the average American.

Table 1. Distribution of Sociodemographic and Immigration-related Factors among Immigrants in the National Latino and Asian American Study 2002-2003.

	Sample Distribution			Major Depressive Episode past 12 mo.		Adjusted Wald Test for Difference	
	Unwgted. N	Wgted. Prop./ Mean	Wgted. SE	Unwgted. N	Wgted. Prop.	F	p value
12 mo. Major Depressive Episode	3056	0.064		192	--	--	--
Downward Mobility						1.08	0.302
Stable/Upward	1887	0.635	--	115	0.060		
Downward	1169	0.365	--	77	0.071		
SSS in country of origin						2.49	0.091
Rung 1 - 2	373	0.108	--	43	0.104		
Rung 3 - 8	2042	0.704	--	117	0.061		
Rung 9 - 10	641	0.188	--	32	0.053		
Sex						10.94	0.002
Male	1411	0.506	--	68	0.048		
Female	1645	0.494	--	124	0.080		
Ethnicity						9.46	0.003
Latino	1518	0.676	--	130	0.073		
Asian	1538	0.324	--	62	0.044		
Age (years)	3056	39.84	0.594		--		--
Educational Attainment						2.20	0.142
<=12 years	1547	0.619	--	117	0.070		
> 12 years	1509	0.381	--	75	0.053		
Time in United States						11.51	0.001
<= 5 years	533	0.176	--	20	0.031		
> 5 years	2523	0.824	--	172	0.071		
Citizenship Status						8.10	0.006
Not a U.S. Citizen	1437	0.584	--	80	0.053		
U.S. citizen	1619	0.416	--	112	0.079		
Spoken English Ability						1.56	0.215
Poor/Fair	1781	0.641	--	129	0.070		
Good/Excellent	1275	0.359	--	63	0.053		
Importance of Finding a Job						1.14	0.289
Very important	1868	0.665	--	121	0.059		
Somewhat Important/Not at all/DK	1188	0.335	--	71	0.074		

Note: All figures (except Ns) weighted to adjust for complex sampling design.

Returning to the Ortiz family, their story is not unique and most migrants are in situations similar to theirs. MPI says these communities are called ethnic enclaves, and although they make the migrants feel safe, they result in social and linguistic isolation and can thus propagate institutional discrimination. Understanding the scope of ethnic communities allows businesses to limit these communities' access to better jobs, quality schools and viable social networks. Also, they can be left out of zones of insurance coverage and not covered by personal physicians, creating a system of health effects as well, according to an MPI report.

Many of these migrants are classified as unaccompanied minors because coyotes incorrectly advertise the migration process. As was mentioned, many migrants are not aware of the legit-

imate process by which to cross the U.S.-Mexican border. As a result, coyotes capitalize on this and “increasingly influence the rate of migration through more aggressive and misleading marketing.” For instance, coyotes will tell families that if children are sent over unaccompanied, they will be able to request for their families to come over for reunification and as a result be allowed to stay in the United States. This however, is not true. This information was collected by looking at USAID focus groups, surveys, and deportee discussions. Along with information published by other organizations, this shows that, although there are many factors that push migrants to come to the U.S., they do not see a main one.

One major issue related to this kind of migration is the fact that many of these children can be so young that they do not know exactly where they came from, or only know the name of a larger nearby city instead of their city of origin. Additionally, there is a huge language barrier that limits progress in reunification with families or finding basic information about these children.

The language barrier is of course not only prevalent in deterring family reunification, but basic mobility once in the United States. This greatly affects migrant demographics as many states utilize the high school tracking system and students who are not fluent in English, get categorized as English Language Learners, and put on lower tracks. NPR follows the story of a student by the name of Alejandra Galindo who is a gifted student that was put in lower level classes because of her lack of English fluency. English Language Learners, or ELLs, get put in separate classes from native, white students. From a young age, kids are exposed to institutionalized racism which has severe psychological effects. Also, they are told that because of the color of their skin, they do not have as much potential these other students. ELLs are often not tested to be gifted, and as undocumented parents are not always informed about different tracks and programs in the school system, these children’s talents can be overlooked. Educators in Arizona, a state where 80,000 gifted students have been identified, say there is a moral obligation to better serve ELLs and create funding for those who are gifted with-

in the state.

### **Implications**

Existing statistics and research seem to show that the patterns of migration from El Salvador we have seen in the past thirty years shows no indication of letting up. Publications have shown increased gang violence pushing people to leave, and the increased number of deportations contributes to violence at home. Interviewed individuals say that when someone is found out to have tried to leave and then forced to return, they become a target for the government and local gangs. This cycle is vicious, and there currently does not seem to exist a solution to break it. Given current deportation numbers and anti-immigrant rhetoric in the U.S., the cycle of deportation and a hometown push to leave will most likely continue. These numbers will only continue to rise in coming years as more people seek to gain better economic opportunities and a viable life in the United States, something that is not feasible in their countries of origin.

### **Conclusion**

This research began with the aim of uncovering questions of assimilation and integration into the U.S. from El Salvador, but more questions arose as it began. Statistics showed surprising downward mobility from second-generation children of migrants, who, in theory, should have been more integrated. This raises questions about what is failing in our current methods of assimilation, and how can this be improved. Furthermore, there is much to be said about the debate between economic migrants and asylum seekers, and how this plays into admittance into the U.S. Based on the firsthand accounts of Salvadoran migrants, it is evident that these people are first and foremost asylum seekers. Although many do try to create better economic opportunities, this is only a latent factor to the overarching issue of violence and instability in El Salvador.

In January of 2016, the Restoring Family Links branch of the Red Cross published an article about the increase in gang violence and environmental concerns as a push factor for Salvadoran migration to the U.S. The U.S. has attempted to

stem migration by publishing ads to warn migrants against doing so. In tandem with this, the U.S. has increased deportation raids. However, most of these raids have been targeted on newly arrived families awaiting asylum as opposed to those with criminal records. Hopefully, seeing these new statistics, the argument for Salvadorans as asylum seekers will gain more traction seeing the violence and issues they face currently from their nation of origin.

In the future, research should aim to fill gaps in terms of how these people are integrating, as there was not much real life data on this. Additionally, as the second-generation gets older, their progress and mobility should be tracked as well as for their kids to see patterns among the generations that are living in the United States, and how they perceive their own mobility.

The migrants from El Salvador all have their own incredibly complex stories, some unfortunately with similarly saddening outcomes. Hopefully, as more of their stories come to light to humanize their journey and explain their experiences, people can use the compassion they use for those around them for them as well to help them integrate and achieve the quality of life they are working so hard for.

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Leila Janah, founder of Samasource  
Photo Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons

## Microwork: A New Approach for Labor Disparities

*How can we combat the challenge of lower-income people's exclusion from access to capital?*

By Deborah Carey

Labor disparities across the world have gained attention recently, regardless of income level. In wealthy countries like the United States, recent elections have addressed the “losers” of trade, with the unavailability of ‘blue collar’ jobs taking center stage. In many lesser-developed countries (LDCs), workers are historically excluded from global supply chains due to lack of education or technological knowledge. A new approach to labor development may be revolutionary in providing workers entry (or re-entry) back into the labor market, and it is similar to a development buzzword: microfinance.

### Employing ‘Micro’ in the Labor Market

To combat the challenge of lower-income people's exclusion from access to capital, microfinance was created by Mohammed Yunus and his colleagues at Grameen Bank. Just a couple of decades later, thousands of microfinance institutions are providing small loans to low-income populations, connecting them to capital markets and economic opportunity. The idea of splitting up a loan into bite-sized, accessible portions was revolutionary when it was proposed. In 2012, Leila Janah, founder of “Samasource”, begged the question—why not create a similar model for labor markets?

Janah recently spoke at the World Bank Annual Meetings in Washington, DC, and ex-

plained on a panel for cutting-edge innovation how a concept she created—microwork-- is revolutionizing the labor market. She founded “Samasource,” a NGO from San Francisco that uses technology to break up the job of one highly-skilled worker into ‘bite-sized’ pieces. Workers worldwide, with only a knowledge of reading and writing in English, receive on-the-job training, and easily program one part of a digital role in the supply chain. By focusing on just one aspect, they pass on the job to the next person, who completes their specific role, and so on. The end result is fully programmed technology that costs the same, if not less, as hiring a highly-skilled programmer. Many more people from the “bottom of the pyramid” are employed, and at higher wages than their peers.

### Challenges with Microwork in LDCs

Of course there are many challenges to this approach, as any new idea in development. First and foremost is local ownership. Convincing people to take part in a new, unfamiliar technology poses a challenge. Samasource, while the most famous, is not the only organization exploring “Microwork.” In the scholarly realm it is referred to as “Impact Sourcing” (ImS). A study by Sandeep and Ravinshankar found that it is difficult for impact sourcing companies to translate their objectives to local communities, but framing the endeavor as mutually beneficial will give ImS

ventures the most success possible. Samasource believes their role is simply to be a middleman. They compete for contracts with large tech companies, break up the work, and send the pieces to centers in lower-income countries. Local entrepreneurs who know their communities and have invested their own capital in the centers staff these centers. They complete the trainings and oversee operations to ensure ownership.

Another major challenge is access to technology. Samasource is based on the motto “Give work, not aid,” advertising that “all [workers] need are laptops, connectivity, and training.” While technology, especially mobile phones, are widespread in lower-income countries, there is still a digital divide that separates low-income populations from access to technology. Phone ownership is commonplace, but laptops are much more expensive. By requiring each worker to have his or her own laptop, Samasource risks rewarding the young middle and upper classes, and excluding the most disparate populations. Impact sourcing boasts business objectives in addition to a social component. It is designed to create social value by providing lower-income people access to markets they would not have access to otherwise. Samasource accounts for this social value through their extensive on-the-job training, but they (and other ImS organizations) should also consider financing necessary tools such as laptops.

A macroeconomic challenge to microwork is infrastructure development. Many countries in sub-Saharan Africa where Samasource works do not have access to the internet, or consistent electricity that allows them to complete their jobs on time. At the World Bank Meeting mentioned above, Janah appealed to policymakers not to view infrastructure as roads and bridges alone, but to provide connectivity through fiber-optic cables and a stronger electrical grid in lower-income countries.

Overall Impact Sourcing has proved effective in lower-income countries to provide higher-paying jobs to those who have ‘lost’ from globalization by exploiting the lucrative, globalized high-tech markets. However, in the past couple of years this model has also been accepted in high-income countries like the US with large populations of displaced workers due to glo-

balization and outsourcing. Janah stated in an interview with Readwrite “I’ve been to parts of America like Mississippi where it’s as difficult to access high speed Internet as it is in Africa.” This infrastructure failure contributes to a domestic digital divide, and further separates populations from the high-tech labor market. Samasource and other companies are targeting the most at-risk populations in America (mostly in the Midwest and Rust Belt) where displaced workers are frustrated and have fueled the protectionist sympathies evident in our recent presidential election.

### **Challenges to Microwork in the American Context**

The biggest employer of technological microworkers is Amazon Mechanical Turk. It lacks a social component, which categorizes it as a ‘crowdsourcing’ platform, rather than Impact Sourcing. It offers opportunities to complete ‘human intelligence tasks’ for small tasks for money, but with less structure. A 2012 article in the Portland Press Herald frames microwork as a self-employment mechanism, like Uber or dog-walking app Barkly: “‘Crowd-sourced labor started off as this weird thing with people doing these funny little jobs in their spare time, but now it’s really catching on.’” This approach, unlike Samasource’s, does not offer retraining skills or social value propositions. So while microwork does exist in the US, Samasource identifies the necessity of their nuanced model in addressing displaced workers.

While those who engage with microwork earn an income and new transferrable skills, there are still challenges that accompany this alternative approach to labor in the U.S. Microwork is nuanced and contract-based. For many displaced workers who may miss walking into a physical building every day, there is a cultural adjustment to self-starting each job and working on the computer, outside a physical space. Some workers may enjoy the independence, while others may feel further isolated. The establishment of microworker communities or meet-up groups could address this challenge.

A study that followed Amazon Mechanical Turk also found that workers may not be

treated as fairly, especially as they are non-salaried and do not physically interact with their superiors. Jorg Flecker's book "Space, Place and Global Digital Work" also reports that microworkers are less likely to create collective action, leading to exploitation. Samasource calls for those involved in Impact Sourcing to remember their social bottom line, as well as financial. Microwork, in the way Samasource originally founded it, is meant to lift communities out of poverty through access to the modern, digitized labor market. Social investments may need to be made in the communities of impact sourcing (such as health care access, financing local schools etc.), even when it does not maximize profitability.

### **Conclusion**

Microwork, when carried out creatively and responsibly, is an effective approach to disparities in the global labor market. The target population—those who have 'lost' from free trade in both high and low-income countries—has seen an increase in income, as well as social capital through digital training. During a time of free trade skepticism, development solutions like microwork offer an alternative narrative, that personal losses from globalization may present new opportunities for growth.

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## Re-contextualizing “The White Man’s Burden” to Understand France’s Recent Xenophobic Policies

*The Burkini ban represents a battle between French and Muslim identities*

By Claire Witherington-Perkins

On August 23, 2016, police forced a woman relaxing on the beach in France with her family clad in a blue long-sleeved tunic with black pants and a blue headscarf to either leave the beach or take off her headscarf and tunic; meanwhile, onlookers yelled “go home” and applauded the police while her daughter cried. This incident is just one example of the backlash on burkinis that began when a water park closed to only allow women covered from chest to knees. The opposition to burkinis further spread when many towns banned burkinis from their beaches, resulting in women being fined or asked to leave for wearing burkinis. The burkini waterpark day would provide an opportunity for women to observe their beliefs while enjoying typical summer activities such as going to a waterpark, which was the motive for the Lebanese-born Australian woman who created the burkini in 2004: to accommodate conservative values while still allowing observant women to swim. A local Member of Parliament (MP) voiced his concern that veils represent fundamentalists who want to control women, while the mayor of Les Pennes-Mirabeau opposed the Burkini Day because he thought it was threatening to public order. Even the French Prime Minister supported cities and resorts banning burkinis, stating that burkinis affirm “political Islam” in a public space. France has 5 million Muslims, about 2000 of which wear full veils. The burkini reveals an ideological battle in France over French identity and the influx of Muslim immigrants from France’s former colonies.



*The burkini has caused controversy in France  
Photo Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons*

France has a unique identity, which, like all other national identities, was established in a mainly homogenous society through a perceived difference from other identities and nationalities. The origins of French identity mean that fully-assimilated French citizens possess a high propensity for xenophobia, which causes citizens to view different identities as intrinsically opposite to their own identity. “The White Man’s Burden,” a poem written during the Scramble for Africa in 1899 expressing the sentiment of the colonial time-period, stated that colonies are a burden that empires should acquire in order to “civilize” inferior, or non-European, populations. While “The White Man’s Burden” originally influenced Europe’s colonial agendas, contemporary French policies toward immigrants, particularly Muslims, demonstrate that the poem’s ideological core continues to reproduce itself in French policies, including bans on burkinis, niqabs, and headscarves, surveillance of immigrants, and assimilation efforts.

Europe began colonizing Africa in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in a race to secure profits in the slave, sugar, gold, and spice trades. France’s colonies were mainly in North and West Africa. France continued to consolidate their colonies in the late nineteenth century in order to secure their colonial economic system. In order to do so, the French government harshly implemented their hegemony in order to maintain their oppressive system. “The White Man’s Burden” expressed the rationalization for these oppressive

policies, but by 1960, French-controlled West African states had gained independence, which spurred an increase of migrants in France.

Since 1960, there have been two streams of immigration: return, consisting of those of mostly European descent, and labor migration, resulting mainly from those indigenous to former colonies. After the independence of French West Africa, most labor migrants native to the former colonies were male workers looking for employment, whose settlement in French cities began postcolonial migration to France. However, these indigenous immigrants were not well-received, in part because of their history of exploitation which helps produce current prejudices and, in some cases, the fights for independence. Thus, colonization still impacts immigrants' lives today: indigenous immigrants from former colonies face racial or ethnic discrimination and stereotypes as a result of colonization and might view the host country with suspicion because of their history of colonization. Many immigrants therefore find it difficult to assimilate into French society, and the history of exploitation during colonization becomes a present reality in employment discrimination. Oppression of indigenous labor migrants in France has occurred since the colonial era and continues today.

Much of the present discrimination stems from xenophobic, racist, or islamophobic sentiments dating back to French colonization. One of the events highlighting this discrimination in recent French history was an investigation in 1943 based solely on immigrants' ethnicity. The 1943 investigation surrounded a rumor in French bureaucracy that Arab cafés in Paris were playing Arabic radio broadcasts that criticized French immigration policies. This rumor incited investigations into civil status, political affiliation, nationality, and other qualities of the immigrants going to these cafés, marking the start of surveillance of immigrants in France that continues today. In the 1960's and 1970's, French surveillance became subtly and symbolically violent because authorities were alarmed at the perceived radicalization in the African immigrant community because of the potential to destabilize French society and politics. French surveillance emphasized

control and undesirability of immigrants from former colonies in addition to understanding the immigrants and how to best assimilate them into French society. Since the 1980's, radical right-wing parties campaigning on xenophobic platforms have grown in popularity in Europe, and these parties take advantage of citizens' fears of threats from immigration in order to gain power and enact discriminatory legislation.

Presently, France's population is comprised of 6% immigrants, 61% of which are from outside the EU; however, most immigrants of non-European descent remain poor due to segregated institution, failing school, low upward mobility, and racism and discrimination in employment, which are all remnants of the colonial era. France has limited immigration data since the French census or other data sources pose no questions of ethnic origin in order to adhere to France's efforts to promote social cohesion. French citizens are generally more tolerant towards immigrants, but they demand more public order, which leads to intolerance, as they consider immigrants producing social disorder.

French colonial history has shaped the French government's attitude toward this wave of immigration, viewing immigrants as unlikely to fit into France's rigid society. France surveils its immigrants, as it surveilled indigenous peoples during colonial times. North African groups seek to be recognized as equal citizens instead of being viewed as natives because of their colonial history. Gaining citizenship as an immigrant from the Maghreb is difficult because of colonial history, and the colonial past is downplayed by justifying delays of granting citizenship as practical considerations. In order to obtain citizenship in France, candidates must prove they support the Republic's values and cultural standards in public and private life. The French government uses surveillance techniques not only to understand the immigrant populations, but also to determine how to develop or alter policies regarding their presence in France and to shape immigrant communities in France. Thus, surveillance contributes to conformist policies. Xenophobic Frenchman view cultural difference as an obstacle to integrating immigrants into French culture and society.

French authorities have low regard for African immigrants because they believe African migration poses problems for a cohesive French society, illustrating the need to assimilate immigrants into French society. Authorities also viewed immigrants as apolitical and grew concerned when immigrants became more politicized, thinking that African workers were radicalizing and thus threatening French society. This thought process justified the increase in efforts to detect radical or dangerous African immigrants. Recently, the populist extreme right has taken advantage of less social cohesion and status uncertainty by creating exclusionary policies, including the recent burkini bans, the 2004 headscarf ban in schools, the 2011 “burka ban” which banned face coverings from public spaces, and the May 2016 law passed in the National Assembly, giving police and prosecutors extensive power.

The 2004 headscarf ban protected the French Constitution’s interpretation of “liberté de la religion,” which literally translates to two possibilities: freedom from religion or freedom of religion. The French government is organized around the interpretation, freedom from religion, which is the basis for their secular policies, or *laïcité*. According to the French government, the headscarf ban protects France’s policy of *laïcité*. The 2004 law that bans headscarves also bans other conspicuous, religious symbols including wearing a turban or a cross in school. Supporters of the ban argue that France must start the notion of secularity in schools. This law was made in reaction to tensions between ethnic or religious groups in France and in order to cement ideas of *laïcité*. Despite the controversy of the headscarf ban, it remains in place.

Additionally, in 2011, former President Sarkozy banned the niqab in all public spaces, meaning full face coverings are not allowed in public. Some women who wear niqabs or burqas are essentially under house arrest because they are not allowed to go outside wearing niqab or burka but value it such that they will not appear outside without it. Exemptions from the face-covering ban include motorcycle helmets, face masks for medicinal reasons, and traditional face coverings such as for carnivals or religious processions.

One woman filed a claim that the ban violates her rights and freedoms, but the European Court of Human Rights upheld the ban in 2014. With the face-covering ban in place, Sarkozy hinted at banning all headscarves in public places if he wins the French presidential election in 2017.

Other French politicians have reiterated Sarkozy’s suggestion to ban any headscarves from public places. French Prime Minister, Manuel Valls, has suggested a ban on headscarves for universities, asserting that the majority of the French people think that headscarves contradict French values. However, the education minister opposes this suggestion, asserting that banning headscarves would unjustly deny access to foreigners attending French universities and that university students, as adults, can independently decide to wear a headscarf. In defense of the headscarf ban at universities, Valls told a French publication, *Libération*, that banning headscarves would prove that Islam is compatible with the French Republic’s values and that he thinks it is possible for Islam to be compatible with the values of the Republic. Valls’ statements imply that he currently thinks that Islam is not compatible with the French Republic and its values. These statements showcase the growing xenophobic and islamophobic sentiments among government officials, which both reflect and are reflected in the public opinion towards similar policies. Islamophobic sentiments trigger oppressive policies such as headscarf and niqab bans, which reflect sentiments of “civilizing an inferior population” in “The White Man’s Burden.” This poem continues to portray public and government opinions on immigration, and in this case, particularly immigration to France from former colonies in North Africa.

Triggered by the recent terrorist attacks in Paris and Brussels, another law, passed in May 2016, now gives police and prosecutors extensive new powers. Police can now detain a person for up to four hours without a lawyer to check his or her identity and can place someone returning from a terrorist hotbed on house arrest for up to a month, promoting racial or religious profiling and targeting those with immigrant backgrounds. Additionally, police have access to electronic eavesdropping technology that was previously only used by intel-

ligence agencies, and prosecutors can approve phone tapping, communication surveillance, and hidden cameras to observe suspects. Police can detain a suspect for 144 hours without a charge. Opponents of the law argue that it would allow exceptional measures used for states of emergency to become commonplace and that France is trying to institutionalize extended powers for when the state of emergency ends. This law further institutionalizes the already systemic issue of xenophobia, racism, and islamophobia that are all reflections of France's colonial past.

The large influx of immigrants to France has created a feeling of uncertainty in French society, so right-wing parties are campaigning on xenophobic platforms are gaining support. For example, the Front National makes immigrants from North Africa scapegoats, and under Sarkozy, France tightened criteria for immigration, including good language skills, minimum base of knowledge of French history, and accepting major norms and values. The idea that immigrants, particularly those with Muslim backgrounds, must be monitored and controlled as much as possible for France's safety stems directly from the ideas put forth during the colonial era. "The White Man's Burden" portrays opinion during colonization, and, as many immigrants in France originate from former French colonies, these sentiments still resonate today. Although much concern was placed over the burkini ban, the motivation for bans takes precedence. These bans and regulations are rooted in the dangerous and uninformed idea that immigrants, particularly those of another race or religion, are inferior populations and must be controlled and monitored.

France reproduces ideology from "The White Man's Burden" today through new laws extending police and prosecutorial powers over targeted immigrant groups, bans on headwear, and other discriminatory and exclusionary laws. French politicians are capitalizing on the public's fear of the "other," or the unfamiliar, by designing xenophobic, islamophobic, and racist platforms. However, this phenomenon is not only specific to France. The United Kingdom has announced plans following its referendum to leave the EU to make immigration from India, a former colony,

more difficult in order to protect business. Germany has been accused of offering money to asylum seekers to return to their countries of origin, including former colonies such as Ghana. Other European countries are experiencing similar results in terms of both elections of xenophobic parties and implementation of xenophobic policies. Recent terrorist attacks fuel these kinds of policies and xenophobic and islamophobic sentiment; however, the majority of these recent policies targeting immigrants stem from "The White Man's Burden" ideology, portraying the need to control and civilize "inferior" populations.

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*The flag of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)*

*Photo Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons*

## Why the World Needs NATO

*As many deem NATO obsolete, we should reexamine its usefulness in contemporary international relations*

By Fifi Baleva

If one follows today's geopolitical conversations, they are likely to notice that the current world order is being questioned by politicians and citizens across the world, most recently in the United States and the United Kingdom. Multilateral organizations and trade agreements are not functioning, with their costs overweighing their benefits.

One such organization, which has been persistently questioned, is NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO has been in existence since 1949 and it is an organization worth examining. In order to understand the importance of NATO, one must analyze its impact on European security, its adaptability to 21st century challenges and its significance to the U.S. In this essay, I explore how NATO enlargement contributed to security in Europe and how NATO has been restructured to meet 21st century challenges. In the end, I examine how the organization contributed to U.S. defense post 9/11 and even today.

While it seems tempting to dismiss NATO as obsolete, the organization's structure is necessary to resolve rising challenges. NATO is able to create collaborative spaces for countries across Europe

and beyond to discuss terrorism and cyber security. Without the cooperation of NATO the resolution of security challenges would be slower and less effective.

### NATO History and Enlargement

In 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was created in the midst of fears of Communist expansion. In 1948 the Soviet Union sponsored a coup in Czechoslovakia overthrowing its democratic government and replacing it with a communist one. The United States and Europe, fearing further destabilization in Europe, crafted a joint security agreement, which came to be known as NATO. This agreement was meant to protect European allies from Soviet invasion. The creation of NATO signaled an important shift of U.S. foreign policy because for the first time since the 1700s the U.S. tied its security to that of its European allies.

Today, NATO is a political and military alliance, consisting of 28 member states. Politically, NATO promotes democracy and encourages cooperation on security issues. Militarily, NATO manages crises that would pose a threat to the security of member states. Such crises can be humanitarian, political or military. Article 5 of NATO's Washing-

ton Treaty stipulates that an armed attack against one or more of the member states is an attack against them all. Member states agree that if such an attack occurs, they will assist each other to restore security.

The promise of collective defense has prompted many countries in Europe to seek NATO membership. The conditions placed for membership in NATO created a more peaceful Europe. The criteria for joining NATO spans across military and political dimensions. The membership action plans prepared for countries who want to join NATO are a process by which current members can review the progress of potential members in meeting the necessary conditions which encapsulate five areas: political economy, defense, resources, security; and legal issues. The political economic conditionality is that countries must have a democratic system of government, have good relations with their neighbors, show commitment to human rights and have a market economy. The defense section encourages countries to strengthen their military so they can contribute to collective defense and the resource section focuses on increased funding for defense. The security and legal sections require protection of sensitive information and bringing national legislation in line with the alliance.

The settlement of disputes with neighboring countries is a pivotal condition for joining NATO. Current member states do not want to inherit the territorial conflicts of new member states. These conflicts can turn into wars and can trigger Article 5, forcing member states to defend new members in conflicts that could have been prevented. Through its conditions for membership, NATO plays an integral role in mitigating potential disputes in Europe by encouraging countries to settle these disputes peacefully. In order to join NATO, for example, Hungary gave up territorial claims in Romania. NATO also encourages the strengthening of democratic institutions across Europe by placing an emphasis on stopping corruption and stopping maltreatment of minority groups. These contributions to the security of Europe must not be overlooked when debating the validity of NATO.

### **Adaptability to 21st Century Problems: Terrorism and Cyber Security**

While NATO began as a defense mechanism against the Soviet Union, the organization has restructured itself to meet the challenges of the 21st century such as terrorism and cyber security.

In an effort to ease the transfer of information between Middle Eastern states and NATO, NATO established the Mediterranean Dialogue. The Mediterranean Dialogue members are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. The annual Work Program of the dialogue includes seminars and workshops focused on border security, small arms and light weapons as well as consultations on terrorism. The annual program also includes an invitation to representatives of the Dialogue countries to observe NATO military exercises and attend courses at the NATO School in Germany and the NATO Defense College in Rome. The Mediterranean Dialogue is the main instrument available for these Middle Eastern countries to coordinate on shared security concerns.

Through the NATO Training Cooperation initiative, NATO also created a "NATO Regional Cooperation Course" which is a strategic course focused on security challenges faced in the Middle East. The course links issues of importance in the Middle East with the international community. The course is open to officers of the rank of Brigadier General, Colonel, and Lieutenant Colonel as well as civilian officials. It is geared toward Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Initiative member countries.

The Mediterranean Dialogue and the strategic courses focused on the Middle East show the flexibility and necessity of NATO. NATO has moved away from its original mandate to recognize the rising challenge of terrorism and it has created a space to deliberate best solutions for not only countries in Europe but also in the Middle East. Without NATO, the level of coordination on combatting terrorism across countries and continents would be difficult to realize.

After a Russian linked cyber attack on Estonia in 2007, NATO also implemented a cyber defense

capability, which did not exist previously. Through cyber defense initiatives, NATO seeks to prevent the theft or damage of software, hardware or information from computers. In 2014, NATO members agreed that cyber defense is part of the core task of collective defense committed to by NATO. In 2016, member states added cyberspace as an operational domain for NATO, in addition to sea, air, and land. Through its cyber security initiative, in 2017 NATO will define targets for countries to implement their own national cyber defense capabilities. Through the Smart Defense Initiative, member states work together to develop cyber security capabilities that they could not afford to create or procure on their own.

Through its cyber security program, NATO protects its own systems but also helps member states develop their own protection. NATO officials recognized the importance of cyberspace in today's world and developed innovative ways to integrate it into their defense mission. Again, without NATO the sharing of information and innovative ways to combat threats would be more costly and difficult. NATO is then necessary because it has the ability to unite countries across Europe and beyond to meet rising challenges. NATO is not outdated, as it has proven able to incorporate new global threats into its already established structure to find solutions.

### **NATO and the U.S. post 9/11**

Another reason why NATO should not be dismissed as unnecessary is the defense the alliance provided to the United States after 9/11. Despite persistent criticism that NATO allies are free riders by America's president elect, the only time the collective defense article of NATO was invoked was in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.

After an October 2nd, 2001 briefing, NATO's political decision making body agreed that if an attack was directed from abroad against the U.S, it would violate Article 5. NATO agreed to eight measures to support the United States in its fight against terrorism. These measures included an increase of intelligence sharing between the member states and a provision of capabilities for countries that may be subject to terrorist threats. NATO countries also agreed to provide over flight

clearance for U.S. flights related to anti- terrorism and to provide access to ports and airfields.

On the request of the U.S., NATO launched its first ever anti-terror operation, Eagle Assist from October 9, 2001 to May 16, 2002. Seven NATO aircraft patrolled U.S. skies in order to prevent any planned attacks by air.

On October 26th, 2001, the Alliance launched Active Endeavor from Naples, Italy. Under this mission, naval forces were sent to patrol the Eastern Mediterranean and monitor shipping to detect terrorist activity, including illegal trafficking. Active Endeavor also offers escorts to ships passing through the Straits of Gibraltar, between Spain and Morocco. In 2004, the operation was extended to monitor the whole Mediterranean Sea and to analyze regional shipping patterns in order to target suspicious activity. This NATO operation has both enhanced security and commerce in the Mediterranean region. After 9/11, NATO contributed to the defense of the United States and continued to support America in the fight against terrorism.

### **NATO and U.S. Today**

NATO continues to support the U.S. by facilitating military operations through logistical support. For instance, in 1991 NATO supplies and bases were used by the U.S. led coalition to force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. Today, the Incirlik Air Base in Turkey is used against ISIS in an operation not conducted by NATO. Without NATO, the U.S. military would need to craft separate bilateral and multilateral agreements in order to facilitate the use of bases and equipment from its European allies. Such agreements might even need legislative approval so U.S. military operations would be slowed down.

Since the United States' political and military agendas may not be acceptable to some countries, NATO also exists as a channel through which to sidestep potential bilateral tensions. In 2003, the United States proposed sharp cuts to U.S. forces in Germany after persistent German opposition to the Iraq War. Although Germany did not deny access to American bases during the war, the German government announced that it would not

recognize the validity of a war against Iraq without United Nations approval. At the time the Pentagon said that the withdrawal of troops had nothing to do with German opposition to the war. Yet, American officials showed a preference for stationing troops in places that approved of the unilateral invasion of Iraq. The multilateral nature of NATO operations decreases this type of tension. European allies are much more likely to approve military operations that are multilateral, and therefore such diplomatic tensions as the ones, which arose after the invasion of Iraq, can be avoided.

### Conclusion

While it seems tempting to dismiss multilateral organizations, NATO is an organization worth maintaining because of its adaptability and practicality. NATO managed to reimagine itself from an organization designed to promote democracy to one which combats terrorism and cyber warfare. Additionally, NATO facilitates the sharing of information across borders and access to bases and equipment around the world.

Moving forward, we must recognize that defense spending is a valid concern about NATO, but also acknowledge that the same levels of spending cannot be duplicated across countries. While the cost sharing within NATO can be renegotiated, there are also alternative methods to ensure that defense spending is maintained without burdening member nations. Recognizing their own tightening budgets, NATO countries have figured out innovative ways to share the costs of defense spending. The Nordic Defense Cooperation is one organization, made up of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. The organization works on cost sharing and developing joint solutions. Defense cooperation agreements between countries not only save money but are also a space for more information sharing and potential innovation.

Whether through cooperation agreements or re-negotiating contributions, NATO allies must move forward to create an organization that is equally valuable to all members. Throughout this process, however, leaders in Europe and the United States must reflect on the importance

of NATO to the security of Europe, the United States and even the Middle East. Only after such reflection will the world understand the importance of multilateral agreements such as NATO.

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Theresa May (left) is the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and Leader of the Conservative Party, in office since July 2016  
Photo Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons

## The EU Single Market and the Economics of Brexit

*After Brexit, the UK must develop a new plan to ensure continued economic growth*

By Gretchen Cloutier

The future of the United Kingdom's relationship with the European Union is unknown, though there has been much speculation on what the details of Brexit will entail. In regards to the Single Market, which guarantees free movement of people, goods, services, and capital among member states, some experts have called for a special deal to be made with the EU to uphold as many of these provisions as possible. While a unique agreement with the EU will help the UK maintain economic stability, it must also be met with many domestic and transnational policy reforms, as well as new trade negotiations. In light of the UK's decision to leave the EU, it must be willing to forfeit all benefits and privileges currently enjoyed by EU agreements, including the Single Market. As such, the UK must develop a new plan to ensure continued economic growth and secure trading partners.

Prime Minister Theresa May has been clear on her position, stating in a speech, "It is not going to be a 'Norway model.' It's not going to be a 'Switzerland model.' It is going to be an agreement between an independent, sovereign United Kingdom and the European Union." She went on to say that, "We will seek the best deal possible as we negotiate a new

agreement [on the single market] with the European Union." Currently, Norway and Switzerland, although not members of the EU, enjoy certain benefits of the union on an opt-in basis as established through various treaties and agreements. However, May's statement underlines the UK's increasingly isolationist position, and its determination to forge its own path in the international community. By insisting creating its own 'model,' the UK will have more opportunity to craft an agreement it sees as ideal; however, it also gives the remaining members of the EU more leverage in designing it as they see fit as well.

Regardless of the exact details of the new agreement, which will not be seen until well after Article 50 is triggered by March 2017, the UK will not have the same access to the EU Single Market that it does now. Even if the government secures some benefits of the current arrangement, the UK's economy is likely to suffer from increased transaction costs in trade and limited access to the open market. In order to look for the best possible deal in the future, as May stated, it is important to understand how the UK's economy currently interacts with the Single Market.

The UK's economy is intrinsically linked to the EU Single Market. Half of the UK's trade and foreign investments are involved with the EU, with 53 percent of imported goods and services originating in other member countries, and 44 percent of exports going to the EU. Like most developed countries, the UK primarily exports services, and this sector makes up over 75 percent of the country's economic output. Additionally, the UK has maintained a trade surplus of about 5 percent of GDP, meaning that more is exported than imported. When the UK loses access to the Single Market, it will become more difficult to export to the EU due to higher trade barriers. Unless the UK can tap into a different export market, they are likely to lose this trade surplus and experience a decrease in economic output, leading to a higher deficit and cuts in government spending.

The Single Market also guarantees job mobility and free movement of people. There are currently 1.2 million Britons living abroad in the EU, with about 800,000 of them working. Furthermore, there are currently 3.3 million EU citizens living in the UK, with 2.1 million of them employed. Immigration concerns were a main cause of Brexit, so it seems unlikely that the UK will negotiate for the free movement of people in a new agreement with the EU. While proponents of Brexit might call this a success in taking 'British' jobs back from immigrants, the high employment rate of EU citizens in the UK is a sign of national economic prosperity, not a race to the bottom for limited jobs with low wages. Large companies located in UK cities will also look to relocate to other EU commercial centers in order to continue benefiting from the free movement of their workers, goods, and services. The loss of both large employers and vast numbers of workers will lead to further depressed economic output in the UK.

Under the threat of stagnated or decreased economic growth and trade, the UK is already looking to potential new trade partners. At a state visit in early November, the president of Colombia said that a new agreement with the UK had the potential to be better than the current deal the South American country has with the EU. Colombia is part of the Pacific Alliance, a trade bloc composed of three other historically strong Latin

America economics – Chile, Peru, and Mexico – which would provide an even larger opportunity for new UK trade.

May also visited India in early November, in her first bilateral meeting outside Europe, to discuss, among other things, a new potential trade relationship. Unlike Colombia, India does not currently have a trade deal with the EU, and any attempts to create over the last decade have ultimately been unsuccessful. As discussed earlier, the UK must secure partners that are interested in service sector exports; however, India has tough restrictions on importing professional services, such as business, banking, and legal sectors. Immigration is also a controversial issue between the two countries, and India wants more temporary student and work visas to the UK in exchange for allowing more business. However, since a main component of Brexit involves reducing the number of immigrants in the country, this seems to be an unlikely concession.

Finally, the UK also recently hosted China for trade talks, announcing several new agreements to strengthen investment and business between the two countries. China has committed to investing in the London Royal Albert Docks project, while the UK will reciprocate with an investment in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. UK Chancellor Hammond remarked that the UK's "trade relationship with China is now more important than ever." Unlike India and Colombia, China will carry out this agreement before UK negotiations with the EU are finalized, signaling that China will remain a reliable trade partner regardless of the outcome of the UK's involvement with the Single Market.

The decision to leave the EU, and thus the Single Market, could have devastating effects on the UK's economy, unless it seeks new markets for service sector exports. Colombia, India, and China all represent opportunities to connect with robust economies that will provide the UK with the exit strategy it needs. However, similar to the question of Indian immigration, there are likely to be challenges along the way, especially as most countries will not negotiate a new trade until after the UK has triggered Article 50 and has completed talks with the EU. While the possibility

remains that the UK will successfully negotiate to retain provisions of the current Single Market, it is extremely unlikely that the EU will let the UK cherry-pick only the parts they want. No matter what deals are struck with any country, concessions will have to be made. Thus, the UK's economic plan moving forward must be pragmatic, as well as diplomatic.

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Protesting nuclear weapons outside the White House

Photo Courtesy of jesse via Flickr

## The New Nuclear Question(s)

*Nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament debates are back in fashion.*

By Erin Bovee

Serious discussions of nuclear weapons and their use have not left the international stage since the 1940s. This year has seen significant developments in nonproliferation and disarmament efforts – but also more uncertainty and divisiveness regarding nuclear policies in general. From the international community seeing both progress and setbacks regarding legal intervention in nonproliferation; to the US elections, which have caused a frantic reorganizing of academic projections for future US foreign policies and actions; to, of course, the fact that North Korea is inching ever closer to full nuclear launch capability, this is a time of increasing unpredictability regarding the global response to the threat of nuclear weapons, arguably unlike any time since the Cold War. It's 3 minutes to midnight, but that clock was set almost a year ago – and since then, nuclear tensions have only risen.

### **New international legislation: one step forward, one step back, one step sideways**

The United Nations (UN) has always stood for peace and responsibility in regards to nuclear weapons, and has facilitated key treaties like the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT, the most important nuclear legislation to this day, asserts member states' commitments to disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful use of nuclear energy, and reinforces a continued commitment to the treaty through periodic

conferences. Just last year at the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the P5 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) issued a statement praising the three pillars of the NPT, vowing to “pursue practical steps towards nuclear disarmament,” and committing to bring into full force another key piece of legislation: the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

2015 also saw efforts by the UN General Assembly (GA) to work towards disarmament with the passage of Resolution 70/33, which created a working group to advise on steps forward regarding multilateral disarmament negotiations. This working group's report, published September 2016, is revealing because it shows the underlying divides between states regarding the legality of disarmament, the limits to legal prevention, and the different understandings of the importance of nuclear weapons to collective security. The report also emphasized a focus on stigmatizing nukes and otherwise reinforcing an anti-nuclear weapon international community through other types of norm reinforcement. This report recommended convening in an official conference about disarmament, and from this suggestion spawned Resolution L.41 which attempts to take “forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations,” and was adopted by the GA on October 27th. L.41 became the catalyst in highlighting the divides within the international community's debate on nuclear disarmament and caused a major shift in

US policy: namely, the reversal of the Obama administration's anti-nuclear position, which meant the US, instead of supporting L.41, actively campaigned against it alongside other P5 members.

To put this shift in context, compare the US's campaign against L.41 with Obama's 2009 speech in Prague in which he became the first US president to express support for full disarmament. Even in June of 2016 when Obama visited Hiroshima, his speech focused on changing the nature of war itself to eliminate nuclear weapons from the conversation – a very normative approach, as was suggested by the GA working group report. In regards to the 2017 conference proposed by L.41, the US agreed with the rest of the P5, who all reiterated their nonparticipation in the voluntary conference, citing the current security climate and the lack of concrete solutions expected from the conference. The US even pressured NATO countries to vote against the resolution, arguing NATO was fundamentally incompatible with full disarmament.

So the new vote to, as one international anti-nuke campaign headlined triumphantly, “outlaw nuclear weapons in 2017” is actually not a very sure sign of progress. The resolution did pass and enjoyed a great deal of support within the GA, especially from Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific. What remains to be seen is how these states, especially rising regional powers who supported the resolution such as Brazil and South Africa, can use the conference as a platform in the favor of disarmament. While the conference will be a gathering of states that do not have nuclear weapons, and therefore might seem useless, there is also the potential to both reinforce anti-nuclear norms within the broad international community. This may include working to put into force the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, as well as possibly putting diplomatic pressure on the P5 to at least come to the table on nuclear disarmament.

### **Addressing the DPRK-shaped crisis in the room**

As much as the international security community works to regulate existing nuclear arsenals and frets about the massive destruction possible if a non-state actor like IS somehow got access to a

nuclear weapon, there is a real and rapidly evolving threat of enormous importance in North Korea. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is an authoritarian regime that, since the Korean War, has called for the destruction of the Republic of Korea (ROK), the US, and all of the US's allies. Following the successful development of its nuclear program, the DPRK is relentlessly pursuing nuclear strike capability. In the past four years alone the DPRK has conducted over 25 missile and nuclear tests, detonating a 10-kiloton bomb in September and conducting one of the most powerful rocket launches the same month. Heightened DPRK aggression prompted one of the largest military drills conducted yet between South Koreans and Americans, which for the first time included training on the “Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation” plan (KMPPR). KMPPR is a military response to be used in the event of a North Korean nuclear attack; the fact that the ROK and US have now felt the need to include it during the drill is a clear indicator that the US and its allies are increasingly concerned about the developing situation in the DPRK. Due to the lack of diplomatic contact between the DPRK and much of the international community, the US and allies have so far relied on exacting pressure through sanctions, mostly on luxury goods. China and the US worked together to increase sanctions last March in response to North Korean aggression. Due to recent tensions, however, some argue that sanctions should be increased to include non-luxury or resource goods. Increased economic sanctions on non-luxury goods, however, is neither a simple nor necessarily ethical solution, and the international community must keep in mind the effect of increased sanctions on the North Korean people. The human rights situation in the DPRK is, in a word, abysmal, as the UN continuously points out. The international community must make sure that a resource ban would not interfere with the North Korean people's ability to survive. This might mean relying even more on the Chinese to put more diplomatic pressure on the DPRK, a solution which would require delicate and probably difficult negotiations between the US, regional allies, and China, and which, due to the new uncertainty of the future of US foreign policy, might

prove un-obtainable.

### **The future of US commitments to nuclear disarmament**

The Obama administration's back-and-forth on full nuclear disarmament has certainly set the US on track to ignore the upcoming 2017 conference and maintain that nuclear weapons are a fundamental part of current international security doctrines, but the US's position could shift in the very near future. In a few months, of course, the Obama administration will exit and the uncertainty of the Trump administration will begin. The foreign policy platform Trump ran on is an ill-defined mixture of realism, isolationism, and American exceptionalism that seems to hinge on moving towards a more 'transactional' approach to US diplomatic relations, rather than continuing the tradition of broad alliance networks and participation in liberal institutions. Trump's remarks on the campaign trail ignited a combination of fury and fear regarding his nuclear and defense policies in Asia: not only did he suggest more countries should have nuclear weapons, he also suggested pulling back US support for security alliances and defense treaties (including with Japan and South Korea) since he believes the US disproportionately holds up these agreements. And, while his campaign was mostly consistent with its anti-nuclear and anti-proliferation rhetoric, Trump has been critical of the state of the US stockpile and additionally refused to "rule out anything" in regards to whether he would ever actually deploy them. This rhetoric has changed somewhat with his election, though. Trump denies that he ever meant Tokyo and Seoul should go nuclear, and senior foreign policy advisor Michael Flynn insists the Trump administration considers nuclear non-proliferation one of two top foreign policy concerns (the other being terrorism) and remains committed to US military presence and support. What remains to be seen is what specific actions the US will take in regards to Obama's 'pivot' in support and attention to Asian allies, and whether a potential regression of US presence in the region will open a power vacuum for others. While nothing is clear in terms of concrete policy, it is incredibly likely that the US will

remain firmly against banning nuclear weapons. Additionally, the US is likely to remain aloof, and perhaps will become more harshly against, binding international legal solutions to situations especially regarding security. The legitimacy of international courts in the US has little traction as is today, and Trump's "America First" viewpoint also means he's unlikely to compromise on American security in favor of what some countries would argue is better collective security through nonproliferation.

### **Going Forward**

During the Cold War, it likely seemed unfathomable to most that one day, the world would look back to the simple bilateral principle of Mutually Assured Destruction with anything resembling wistfulness. Yet the years of two main bilateral security blocs have obviously passed, and instead states must now attempt to find a solution to the most pressing nuclear development, the DPRK's increasing capability, even though they are fiercely divided on the legal, ethical, and practical merits of full disarmament.

Despite the P5's dismissal of the GA's disarmament discussions, there is significant merit in having those debates, and the GA should reflect on the working group report and continue to apply pressure to reinforce and tighten restrictions on nuclear stockpiles. Arguably, the most effective way the conference could change the nuclear security situation for the better is by figuring out how to get the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force, and looking to that and other legal precedents to work towards more long-term solutions.

In terms of the DPRK, too much depends on unknown factors: communication with the DPRK, and with China, could change because of US politics. The security alliances in Asia, while stable for now, are also a little uncertain post-election. Acknowledging the DPRK from an official, diplomatic standpoint is not an option for the US and many other states, and the DPRK is similarly unwilling to increase participation in the international community, so multilateral negotiations or mediations is unlikely. Instead, the states most vulnerable and most active in

preparing for a theoretical DPRK nuclear strike – the ROK, US, Japan, and other South Asian and Pacific states – must rely on the little diplomatic contact provided mostly by China and on economic and political sanctions to influence the DPRK as much as possible. Meanwhile, the logical increase in military exercises to prepare for combat is just one more antagonization of the DPRK regime, and their development of nuclear weapons continues. Whether the solution is in stricter sanctions, which is potentially a human rights concern, or working to possibly open more communication between China, the DPRK, and the rest of the P5 and allies, the international community is left with more unanswered questions.

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Prayer in a Bodhi Gaya temple in India

Photo Courtesy of Dennis Jarvis via Flickr

## The Way

### *Religion as a path for positive postcolonial identity creation in Asia*

By Andrew Fallone

As populations emerge from the fires of colonial oppression, alone and newly independent, they are left to make sense of the ashes with fires lit by imperialists still burning. Very often, groups embark on the journey to claiming their postcolonial identity devoid of any organized efforts to undo some of the strife that colonizers wrought. This juxtaposes nations on the cliff's edge, scrabbling to find some foothold, from which they can begin to push back up the slope. The road to identity creation that emerges from this tumult is a long and twisting one, which nearly all postcolonial nations and populations arising out of colonization endure in an effort to renarrativize the legacies of colonization. There exist paths through which positive identity creation can be facilitated, but those paths can be confounded by convenient pitfalls of identity creation which target or repress portions of the population with the society's newly invested power. One route to this positive identity creation can be reverting to or reclaiming a prior religious identity, which sees success due to its transferrable nature and its strong moral backbone. Using a religious identity to unite people and create an idiosyncratic cultural identity marks a stark contrast to instances of traditions which spontaneously arose out of the identity vacuum left by vacating colonizers. One such case manifests in the emergence of bride kidnapping in

Kyrgyzstan, which demarcates a deft lunge at formulating some sense of national identity. Instead of revitalizing some portion of identity which may have been previously castoff, in cases such as Kyrgyzstan, inhabitants create a united identity through the propagation of an invented tradition. Members of the populace can ignore any collateral damage caused by the tradition such as the threats it poses to women's education in Kyrgyzstan in lieu of protecting this new artificial practice. Professor Simon Gikandi quotes author Chinua Achebe to say that "most of the problems we see in our politics derive from the moment when we lost our initiative to other people, to colonizers." Indeed, in many cases where colonizers were able to supplant preexisting identities with a colonial identity, it is difficult for populations to find an on-ramp on the road towards modern identity creation. One way in which countries and cultures can make an effort to take their initiative back and create a positive postcolonial identity is through the use of religion, for religions are accompanied by moral structures that dissuade.

Identities can be created through many means, for the imperative is created once colonizers have withdrawn to unify nations and push forward together. The departure of a domineering power leaves a void that must be filled. An identity must be created on or around some unifying

concept. As highlighted by Professor Roger Keesing, it is superfluous whether the concept that a group's new identity is oriented by is 'real' or not, because its purpose is simply to distance the population from the legacy of the colonizer. The substance veiled behind the larger separation is extraneous to the end goal of the process of identity creation. Yet, this indifference to foundation is not without its dangers; it can allow avenues for identity creation that have no historical backing and complacently target subsets of the population. Gikandi summarizes another scholar Frantz Fanon to elucidate that the creation of new separate identities restores "...dignity to...peoples, describes and justifies, and praises 'the action through which that people has created itself and keeps itself in existence.'" Thus, it is important that the nuanced process of identity formation is done in a way that is conducive towards the formation of positive and inclusive postcolonial society. These newly created identities place their aspirants at a crossroads, between the different identities they have lived during different parts of their lives. In this confusing place, it is important to create a shared identity that is easily accessible so that all of society can move out of the shadow of colonization together. It is an easy derailment for identities to have certain exclusivities or specifically ostracize some groups, because that is one way to find commonality. Yet, it is of tantamount importance that any identity creation can be shared across an entire population so that a nation can assume its postcolonial identity.

A moral structure can serve as an important aspect of positive identity creation, which can often be found in religious structures. It is suggested that value is socially created, and thus what we value is a resultant of our socially created identities. Thus, in the creation of a group identity, it is important to have a moral structure that creates common moral values, so that those values are adhered to as the new identity forms. There can be societies who undergo drastic shifts in moral structures, but the imposition of a moral structure that is not common can have large ramifications. Religious structures often come with moral structures such as these, and can thusly serve as a positive compass to orient identity creation by.

All across Asia, religion has served as a tool for cultures to undertake identity reclamation and renarrativization. Religion can provide a structure to organize the new identity by, complete with its own moral guide stones to keep aspirants on course. Faiths throughout nearly every example have some larger moral structuring principles, telling followers what actions were permissible and what was to be eschewed. It also creates a unifying universal identity that can allow countries to take something that may have initially been imposed by colonizers and surpass this to join into the larger identity. Indeed, religious identity structures have also been shown to help spur increased social mobilization throughout South East Asia, which is key for societies recovering from trauma. Churches can also serve as a platform and catalyst for the creation of hybridity and facilitate cultural encounters. By involving populations all across the planet in the name of a single faith, churches can allow for the intermingling of populations possibly even previously in conflict with one another. Introducing aspects of hybridity into newly forming national identities can help to defer any tendencies towards hyper-nationalism, tendencies that may fan the flames of internal divisions and result in the targeting of a specific sect.

The final facet of religion that makes it a positive tool for postcolonial states is that it is entirely transferrable. No matter where someone is on the planet, their religion and the basic ways in which it is practiced are unified. In the case of the Hindu population on Portugal, all of its members can carry their religion with them as a way of maintaining their unique and separate identity. Faith can also be altered to fit the needs of the population it serves in relation to the identity it plays a part in. The Khojas of South Asia have had to change aspects of their faith to fit a need for a resilient identity, and these changes, as explained by researcher Inês Lourenço, are not "...in any case are not ultimately of great significance for a group that doctrinally considers the esoteric dimension of faith more significant than the exoteric." Similarly, the Ghazal hymns of the Himalayas have been adapted and modernized to fit the same organizing moral structure that they were created out of to modern pop-music

tastes. Just as a religious identity can help to give freshly born identities a bulwark to withstand the travails of a disparate populace, it can help to bridge the gaps between the desire to formulate a unique identity with encroaching modern global influences. With such significant evidence pointing towards the benefits of religion as a tool for identity creation, it is no wonder that one can observe Tengrism reemerging in Mongolia and a resurgence in Islamic movements all across the region.

Obstacles in the way of creating a new national identity arise out of the fact that there are no guiding lights to illuminate the path for positive methods of identity formation. Identity creation has a unified goal, as highlighted by Professor Keesing: “That is, colonized peoples have distanced themselves...from the culture of domination, selecting and shaping and celebrating the elements of their own traditions that most strikingly differentiate them from Europeans.” Yet, simply denoting that the goal of identity creation is to differentiate one’s self from European colonizers is hardly helpful, for there are numerous ways to drive a wedge between one’s own identity and one’s colonizer’s.

In Zimbabwe, the ZANU-PF exploited underlying national sentiments lusting for a new re-narrativized identity to create a nationalist identity that gave their ruling party an “exclusive postcolonial legitimacy to rule,” as explained by Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni. By turning the emotional tension of voters seeking an identity change, ZANU-PF was able to insert chauvinism into the new national identity and solidify their hold on power.

Other attempts to undo the pain of colonialism, such as land reparation or reclamation attempts in Australia and South Africa, where even though efforts were made to make recompense for the theft of ancestral homelands, ineffective implementation and a lack of orienting concept made both efforts ultimate failures. In the instances where people were given land or money, they were still left without the separation they sought from the colonizing power. There was no group identity that could spawn out of the poorly administered reparations, and thus the reparations without any orienting structure proved

to be of little help on the long path towards post-colonial identity creation. Even when there are attempts made to formulate or reclaim a cultural identity, the efforts are not always grounded on a sound foundation.

The primary example that scholars can turn to illustrate the dangers of identity creation is the invention of the supposed tradition of ‘bride kidnapping’ in Kyrgyzstan, which blurs the lines of consent, inhibits education, and disenfranchises a significant portion of the population. What is especially important to note is that this tradition is pure invention: the populous wanted to separate from the colonizer, yet this tradition had never existed previously outside of ambiguous references from hundreds of years prior. Vested with a lust for a new identity, but left without any predetermined foundation to start creating that identity from, states can become derailed by lackadaisical efforts that target some subset of the population in order to unify the majority. Thus, we can see that not only is having an orienting principle important to identity creation, but also the choice of principle is equally key.

Religion can serve as a funnel, pushing societies that are re-narrativizing their identities towards an ultimately positive end result through their inherent moral structure and their transferrable and alterable characteristics. As identity is created, it is important to adhere to a moral structure so that chauvinism or discrimination do not hijack the process. As nations continue to cast off their colonial bonds, we should not be surprised if we see an uptick in alternative or reemerging religious movements. With its transferrable universal character, strong moral mettle, and its propensity to grow and change with its devotees, while religion is not a panacea to the travails of postcolonial identity creation, it is certainly a strong and defensible foothold.

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