The following is a segment from my paper “Egypt’s Revolutionary Past: Contextualizing the Reality of the Post Arab Spring State” written in 2016.  In this paper I used an abductive approach, which begins with a “puzzle, surprise or tension” and seeks to explain it by “identifying conditions that would make that puzzle… more of a ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ event.”[1]  The puzzle I am addressing is derived from the tensions between the expectations of success for the Arab Spring and reality of the failures of the movement:

 

The main institution that prohibited a complete transition to democracy was the military.  Once Mubarak stepped down, the military assumed power in order to direct the transition to democracy, in the same way that the military directed the change from British governance to the Free Officers after the 1952 coup.  As the transitional authority, the military held the responsibility of giving up political and economic privileges and allowing for civilian control.[2]  Scholars have not been able to agree what the correct course of action for the military should have been.  Maswood and Natarajan argue that there was a lack of internal and external pressure on the military to give up control quickly.[3]  This lack of action allowed corruption to continue to fester and encouraged the military’s love of power in ways that made military officers reluctant to allow the power to move to the control of the people.

Galal Amin directly contradicts this argument.  He claims that the military was too eager to give up power and instituted elections too soon after Mubarak left.[4]  According to Amin, the military acted quickly because of the aftermath of the 1952 coup when the military lingered over the democratic transition resulting in Nasser’s regime.[5]  Amin believes that the democratic transition would have been more stable if the military took the time to oversee the restoration of law and order and restoration of the judiciary before allowing elections.[6]  Not only would purging corruption in these institutions allow for greater freedom in the future, but it would also give the people time to express themselves after decades of repression.  This crucial period of time would allow for “leaders to emerge from the masses” so that the popularly elected candidates would be truly representing the Egyptian population and their interests.[7]  As it happened, these leaders and parties were unable to rise in the public sphere, forcing the people to turn to the religious group that had been a revolutionary leader instead of a group who people believed truly represented their interests and identity.

In contrast to these two arguments, Cook believes that the military never intended to give up power.  He makes the argument that there is an “informal [unlegislated] institutional link between the military and the presidency that has made the armed forces…powerful over time.”[8]  As long as the military continues to step in whenever the country becomes too unrestful as it has done for the past 60 years, this institutional link will remain the most important and rigid structure within Egypt.  Cook explains how “the end of both Mubarak and Morsi’s reigns were salvage exercises intended to reset what the coalition that took part in and supported the military’s interventions believe to be Egypt’s natural political order.” [9] The power that the Egyptian military holds over the head of government is the largest barrier to democracy in the country.

President Morsi, an experienced politician, realized the connections between the military and the head of government.  He understood that without military support he would be unlikely to be allowed to stay in power.  However, his rational choice to collude with the military while forming the new constitution reflected his own interests over the interests of the people.  The fact that Morsi was unable for formulate a constitution reflecting the interests of the people delegitimatized his regime.  András Sajó explains that constitutions are created based on public sentiments, meaning that the primary emotions embodied by the people are then consolidated into a constitution.[10]  For example, the United States was particularly fearful of the executive having too much power.  This fear is seen throughout the US constitution in the separation of powers.  In Egypt, President Morsi primarily focused on incorporating Islamist values into the new constitution while the people were more focused on economic reforms.  The emotions channeled into constitutions are chosen by those in power while the constitution is being written.[11]  For this reason, it is especially important to study whether or not those who consolidate power are representative of the revolutionaries.  When, like in Egypt, the people in power have substantially different emotions from the public, the constitution could introduce a cultural separation between the rulers and ruled that causes the government to lose legitimacy in the eyes of the people.

As a result of this disconnect, the people, who began to experience anti-hegemonic principles,[12] again took to the streets.  Anti-hegemony refers to the idea that the people refuse to identify with the programs of the ruling elites, which betrays a deep distrust in the institutions of power.[13]   Shokr argues that this distrust has continued after the revolution ended.  Shokr proves his theory of continued cynicism quantitatively by looking at the voting patterns in Egypt after Mubarak stepped down from power.  The first elections brought the majority of Egyptians to the polls, but each successive vote had a lower and lower turnout.[14]  By the time the referendum for the constitution came to the public, only 32 percent of the public voted.[15]  Shokr attributes this behavior to Egypt’s historical attempts at democracy and how often a dictator has been voted into power and then used the system to stay in power instead of peacefully abdicating power at the end of his term.[16]  The low voter turnout also suggests a lack of legitimacy towards the new government, even though it was formed democratically.  The lack of legitimacy following the election of President Morsi is related the inherent disconnect between the priorities of those in power and the initial protesters desires.  This detachment of priorities and the unrest that resulted from it led to the military coup that placed General el-Sisi in President Morsi’s position.

 

[1] Peregrine Schwartz-Shea, and Dvora Yanow. “Ways of Knowing.” Interpretive Research Design: Concepts and Processes. New York: 24-43.

[2] Jim Sciutto, “The Middle Eastern Revolution’s Bloody Second Act.” World Affairs, 2011. 224.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Galal Amin. “A Revolution or a Coup.” Whatever Happened to the Egyptian Revolution? (2013): 134.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Amin, “A Revolution or a Coup,” 134.

[8] Steven A. Cook. “The Middle Eastern Revolutions That Never Were.” The American Interest (October 26): 3.

[9] Ibid.

[10] András Sajó. Constitutional Sentiments. (Yale University Press, 2011).

[11] Sajó. Constitutional Sentiments, 12.

[12] Ahmed Shokr. “Two Revolutions.” Middle East Report 265. 2015

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Shokr. “Two Revolutions.”

[16] Ibid.