Your Name: David Wilbourne
Literature Review Sketch Template
Puzzle: state your research puzzle in a short paragraph. Make sure to make clear the outcome, trend, state of affairs, or phenomenon that you are aiming to explain or understand with your research.
Over the past decade, an area of particular tension in the world has been the South China Sea. It being one of the world’s most-used trade routes, countries within the region have come into conflict with each other in their efforts to exert influence, with China being one of the most adroit practitioners. Military- and territory-based conflicts have boiled over into international disputes on several occasions. During these disputes, China has routinely employed – yet not officially acknowledged – trade-based sanctions, gaining policy concessions from target states in several high-profile standoffs, like the 2012 Scarborough Shoal dispute with the Philippines. This pattern stands directly counter to much of the current sanctions literature, which suggests that sanctions which bypass the threat stage, are trade-based, are unilateral, and are against non- or semi-democracies should not work. Thus, I am seeking to research what explains China’s recent success in using trade-based sanctions to achieve policy concessions in territory disputes.
Organization: write or diagram here the overall organization of your literature below.
Scholars studying the success or failure of sanctions generally fall into four camps: domestic conditionalists, complementarians, economic realists, and demand conditionalists. Domestic conditionalists then tend to either focus regime type or interest groups; complementarians divide between focusing on issue linkage versus military force; economic realists focus on either aggregate economic costs, the role of reputation and resolve, or multilateral versus unilateral sanctions; and demand conditionalists focus on both sender endogeneity and issue salience.
Details of Conceptual Groups:
Domestic conditionalists emphasize characteristics of states’ internal structures and institutions that render them vulnerable to pressure from sanctions. In general, there isn’t a main methodology employed by scholars in this camp: most pieces are mixed between large-n statistical studies and selected case studies. Much of this literature has analyzed vulnerability to sanctions as a function of regime type. Scholars like Bolks and Al-Sowayel argue, for example, that autocracies are better at resisting sanctions, which increases the length of sanction episodes.[2] Other scholars have argued that sanctions can impose political costs by increasing antigovernment activity, but caveat that they do not necessarily lead to regime change.[3] Risa Brooks’ lauded 2002 piece takes a comparative view, arguing that comprehensive sanctions are more effective against democracies while targeted sanctions are more effective against autocracies.[4] Scholars like Lektzian and Souva then extend Brooks’ conclusions, arguing that sweeping sanctions can even bolster autocracies by further enabling rent-seeking behaviors by regime elites.[5] In the literature, regime type is generally a proxy for the state’s ability to resist pressures associated with sanctions: along this line, Blanchard and Ripsman have argued that “stateness,” a variable they invent that correlates with regime type, explains sanction success best.[6] On the other side of the sanctioning episode, there is also evidence to suggest that democracies are more successful at using sanctions due to added signaling benefits.[7] However, some scholars within this paradigm consider autocracy-democracy too vague to fully explain sanction success, instead using public choice theory to focus on interest groups and population sectors. Much of this discussion revolves around “smart sanctions,” or those specifically targeted to hurt elites. Some scholars advance theoretical arguments regarding smart sanction efficacy in both target capitulation[8] and conflict reduction,[9] but these arguments have yet to be borne out empirically.[10] Even then, there is not a consensus that elites are always the right interest group to target: there is contention, for example, that sometimes targeting “innocent bystanders”[11] or signaling support to domestic opposition groups[12] is the most effective way to achieve policy concessions.
In general, the idea that regime type and public pressure influences sanction success might be valuable to my research. I’d agree with a lot of this literature, especially since it reminds of the Scarborough Shoal dispute when China (unofficially) banned imports of bananas from the Philippines, since banana farmers in the Philippines applied substantial pressure to the government in the weeks following the sanction. Controlling for regime type using the Polity scale, for example, could be valuable in a large-n study of China’s sanction threats and impositions. I would definitely agree with this camp that domestic conditions matter, but I don’t think the literature fully addresses the question of how senders might account for domestic conditions when planning their sanctions, so I’m not sure the domestic conditionalists can fully explain sanction success.
The second school of thought regarding sanction success is the complementarian school. There is also no dominant methodology in this grouping of the literature. Scholars in this group emphasize how sanctions complement other techniques of statecraft or other outside factors in order to achieve a result. Some have argued, for example, that the signaling value of sanctions magnifies diplomatic costs on other issues, owing sanction success to a state’s need of diplomatic leverage in other policy areas.[13] This finding has been echoed elsewhere, with many describing sanctions as an example of “issue-linkage.”[14] The main thrust of the complementarian school, however, lies in sanctions complementing military threats. Many studies have found sanctions to be much more successful in scenarios which also feature a military dimension,[15] likely due to sanctions’ ability to signal the seriousness of a state’s intentions.[16] Other scholars, such as Drezner, focus not on present conflict potential but on expectations of conflict by states, arguing that expectation of conflict increases the use of sanctions but, paradoxically, decreases their effectiveness.[17] It is also worth noting here that scholars in the complementarian camp usually argue that sanctions succeed mostly in secondary and tertiary objectives, advocating for a view of success along a spectrum rather than in the binary.[18]
One concept from this group that might prove interesting in my own research is Drezner’s argument surrounding conflict expectations.[19] Exploring the degree to which states around the South China Sea expect conflict and its effect on sanction success could be valuable in predicting sanction onset and success. Another concept I hope to pull from is Blanchard and Ripsman’s concept of diplomatic leverage within the issue-linkage literature. If states around the South China Sea have extra-dyadic diplomacy needs, that could affect their willingness to capitulate to trade sanctions. I think that this school brings valuable contributions to the literature on the whole, but I don’t can’t fully subscribe to this school because of the difficulty of ascribing attribution to partial sanction success. Thus, I think that in some instances this literature mistakes causality for correlation in its albeit admirable bid to provide a nuanced portrait of success.
Scholars in the economic realist camp emphasize expectations of and experience of economic losses to the state in explaining sanction success. This literature is, for the most part, dominated by large-n statistical models. I would emphasize that this camp differs from the domestic conditionalists in that the economic realist perspectives are state-centric, considering states the primary actors instead of groups, and in that economic losses are treated as a loss of power projection capabilities. Much of the early sanctions literature falls into this camp, discussing net costs to sender countries as a reason for avoiding the use of economic sanctions. Early empirical studies of sanctions episodes concluded that sanctions were ineffective due to, among other things, “black knights” that step in to supply goods to the target[20] and different price elasticities in sender and target countries.[21] Others, however, argue that even from an aggregate perspective, sanctions can be successful,[22] even if they disagree on the means. For example, some argue sanctions can be successful if they aim impose very high costs to the target,[23] while others claim that less costly sanctions are more likely to succeed.[24] Others within this field, however, focus more on how expectations of economic pain affect sanction episodes, reflecting different perceptions of reputation and credibility. A key piece of this literature comes from Drezner’s game-theoretic argument that many successful sanction episodes come in cases where sanctions are threatened but never imposed, since both states will want to avoid deadweight loss of sanction imposition.[25] Thus, some also argue that actual imposition of sanctions only results in capitulation when the target underestimated a sanction’s impact or miscalculated the sender’s resolve.[26] Extending this game theory argument, some scholars like Crescenzi argue that states learn from the previous behaviors of other states in conflict.[27] Peterson then extends this argument to reputations in sanction onset.[28] Some also contend that states’ domestic structures can act as audience costs, thereby credibly committing them to sanction enforcement and increasing sanction efficacy.[29] The last piece of the economic realist school of thought explains sanction efficacy in terms of whether sanctions are multilateral or unilateral, with advocates for both options represented in the literature. Cartel theory generally argues that multilateral sanctions will break down due to temptation for insiders to cheat on sanction imposition,[30] and some studies have confirmed this intuition.[31] However, other studies have supported the multilateral argument,[32] especially in instances where multilateral sanctions are supported by international institutions.[33]
In terms of contributions to my research direction, a few concepts I intend to draw from this school of thought are the idea that reputation is key in determining sanction success and that domestic factors in senders can function as commitment strategies, though the latter would be difficult to operationalize. In addition, Drezner’s point about the impact of market forces on financial sanctions versus trade sanctions – that market forces exacerbate financial sanctions while mitigating trade sanctions — would also be valuable in analyzing why China employs trade sanctions, specifically. Lastly, while the notion that the support of sanctions by international institutions increase their efficacy likely will not directly contribute to my research direction, I think that the idea that norms can contribute to expectations of economic costs and therefore sanction success is an important one, as well. I agree with many of this literature’s conclusions, but I think that the game-theoretic argument can easily be pushed too far. The game-theoretic prediction that sanctions will almost always end at the threat stage I think dismisses some of the symbolic value of sanctions advocated by the complementarians, for example, since a state might still implement sanctions and absorb some deadweight loss for the purpose of communicating a clear message.
The last school of thought regarding sanction efficacy are the demand conditionalists. Scholars in this group emphasize how senders craft demands (both in size and issue salience) to explain sanction success. Early literature in this domain aligned more closely with the economic realists, simply claiming that demands must be large to motivate action.[34] This made sense, given the broader claims of some scholars that strategic interests would always trump economic interests. More recently, however, the literature has moved towards game-theoretic models recognizing an endogeneity of sender demands. A remarkable study by Krustev, for example, argues that as leverage over the target state increases, the sender’s demands will also increase such that expected utility still increases but chances of success actually decrease.[35] This echoed earlier studies’ observations regarding threat success and sanction likelihood. In discussing when senders implement sanctions, others within this paradigm have studied issue salience to explain sanction success. Ang and Peksen, for example, found that as issues salience – that is, states’ conceptions of an issue’s relevance to their core interests – increased for targets, sanction success decreased.[36] A case study analysis of sanctions on China showed similar results, arguing that strategic sanctions (those attempting regime change or other large changes) were less successful than tactical sanctions (those advocating less fundamental changes).[37]
The demand conditionalist literature is dominated by game-theoretic models, some of whose predictions are tested using large-n statistical methods. The most important concept I can glean from this body of literature is the importance of recognizing sanction onset as endogenous rather than exogenous. If China’s initiation of sanctions is endogenous, then it’s possible that its reputation and past success increases its likelihood of future success. Another concept to keep in mind from this school of thought is how cultural factors and values could impact sanction success. Because states’ conceptualizations of their core interests are inevitably affected by their values, one should keep in mind such diversity when designing payoffs in a model. I agree with many of this camp’s conclusions about how sanctions operate and why they are successful. China’s conceptualization of its core interests –issue salience – certainly impacts why it is expanding its influence in the South China Sea, especially since China uses claims of historical control to assert that the area is included in its sovereignty.
Overall conclusion: write 2-3 concise paragraphs comparing/contrasting the groups of scholars that you have identified above and describing how your proposed research would engage with and connect to these scholarly conversations.
One of the largest differences between the groups of scholars identified above is whether they treat the state or groups within a state as the primary actors. The domestic conditionalists view intrastate actors as the most important, since they are the ones who can pressure a regime’s government into changing a policy. The economic realists, however, largely ignore the question of actors within a state, instead focusing on net costs to the state itself in order to formulate expected payoffs in strategic situations. Another difference between the groups is the way that they conceptualize success in sanction episodes. The complementarians in particular view sanction success through either the accomplishment of secondary/tertiary objectives or through the clear communication of preferences and symbols. While this concept is seen from time to time in the other fields, it has nowhere near the amount of emphasis. In comparison, the economic realists are much more likely to see success as a primary policy change or through the infliction of damage to the target economy. Demand conditionalists, in this context, lie somewhere in between, recognizing that demands have various levels of intensity. However, demand conditionalists are more likely to argue that states will set limited objectives and accomplish them entirely, whereas complementarians would argue that states are more likely to set ambitious objectives and only partially fulfill them.
I hope to use my research to connect these fields in a few minor ways. Domestic conditionalists emphasize internal factors in explaining sanction success, but I think that any argument that fails to take into account how senders formulate their demands in insufficient. Thus, one way to combine these field would be to recognize the endogeneity of sanction onset, but to assume that states are able to recognize internal factors in other states when formulating demands. Another way to connect these fields would be to build a model in the demand conditionalist camp that attempts to recognize whether symbols are effectively communicated. I look forward to having the chance to experiment with these in the context of a more formal research design.
Notes
[1] As Booth et al. point out, “You’re more likely to find a research problem when you disagree with a source, but you can also find one in sources you agree with.” You should use the specific steps for providing either creative agreement or creative disagreement as per Booth et al. in addressing (d) in your discussion of each of your conceptual groupings. Wayne C. Booth, Gregory G. Colomb, Joseph M. Williams, Joseph Bizup, and William T. Fitzgerald, The Craft of Research (4th ed.), Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016, pp. 89-92.
[2] Sean M Bolks and Dina Al-Sowayel, “How Long Do Economic Sanctions Last? Examining the Sanctioning Process through Duration,” Political Research Quarterly 53, no. 2 (2000): 241–65, https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290005300202.; Susan Hannah Allen, “The Determinants of Economic Sanctions Success and Failure,” International Interactions 31, no. 2 (2005): 117–38, https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620590950097..
[3] Susan Hannah Allen, “The Domestic Political Costs of Economic Sanctions,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 6 (2008): 916–44, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002708325044.
[4] Risa A. Brooks, “Sanctions and Regime Type: What Works, and When?,” Security Studies 11, no. 4 (2002): 1–50, https://doi.org/10.1080/714005349.
[5] David Lektzian and Mark Souva, “An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 6 (2007): 848–71.
[6] Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Norrin M. Ripsman, “A Political Theory of Economic Statecraft,” Foreign Policy Analysis 4, no. 4 (2008): 371–98, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2008.00076.x.
[7] Robert A. Hart, “Democracy and the Successful Use of Economic Sanctions,” Political Research Quarterly 53, no. 2 (2000): 267–84, https://doi.org/10.2307/449281.
[8] Michael Brzoska, “REVIEW ESSAY: From Dumb to Smart? Recent Reforms of UN Sanctions,” ed. United Nations et al., Global Governance 9, no. 4 (2003): 519–35.; Smart Sanctions : Targeting Economic Statecraft (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002).
[9] Elizabeth S. Rogers, “Using Economic Sanctions to Control Regional Conflicts,” Security Studies 5, no. 4 (1996): 43–72, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419608429288.
[10] Arne Tostensen and Beate Bull, “Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?,” World Politics 54, no. 03 (2002): 373–403, https://doi.org/10.1353/wp.2002.0010.
[11] Solomon Major and Anthony J. McGann, “Caught in the Crossfire: ‘Innocent Bystanders’ as Optimal Targets of Economic Sanctions,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 3 (2005): 337–59, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002705276568.
[12] William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg, “The Theory of International Economic Sanctions: A Public Choice Approach,” The American Economic Review 78, no. 4 (1988): 786–93.
[13] Jean-Marc F. Blanchard and Norrin M. Ripsman, “Asking the Right Question: When Do Economic Sanctions Work Best?,” Security Studies 9, no. 1–2 (1999): 219–53, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419908429400.
[14] Dean Lacy and Emerson M. S. Niou, “A Theory of Economic Sanctions and Issue Linkage: The Roles of Preferences, Information, and Threats,” The Journal of Politics 66, no. 1 (2004): 25–42, https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1468-2508.2004.00140.x.
[15] Irfan Nooruddin, “Modeling Selection Bias in Studies of Sanctions Efficacy,” International Interactions 28, no. 1 (2002): 59–75, https://doi.org/10.1080/03050620210394; Daniel W. Drezner, “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion,” International Organization 57, no. 3 (2003): 643–59, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818303573052.
[16] James M. Lindsay, “Trade Sanctions As Policy Instruments: A Re-Examination,” International Studies Quarterly 30, no. 2 (1986): 153–73, https://doi.org/10.2307/2600674.
[17] Daniel W. Drezner, “Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion,” International Studies Quarterly 42, no. 4 (1998): 709–31, https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00103.
[18] David Allen Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton University Press, 1985).
[19] Drezner, “Conflict Expectations and the Paradox of Economic Coercion.”
[20] Johan Galtung, “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia,” World Politics 19, no. 3 (1967): 378–416, https://doi.org/10.2307/2009785; Robert A. Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,” International Security 22, no. 2 (1997): 90–136, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539368.
[21] Jonathan Kirshner, “The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions,” Security Studies 6, no. 3 (1997): 32–64, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636419708429314.
[22] Daniel W. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox : Economic Statecraft and International Relations, Cambridge Studies in International Relations ; 65 (Cambridge [England] ; Cambridge University Press, 1999); Daniel W. Drezner, “Targeted Sanctions in a World of Global Finance,” International Interactions 41, no. 4 (2015): 755–64, https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2015.1041297.
[23] T. Clifton Morgan and Valerie L. Schwebach, “Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises,” International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 1 (1997): 27–50, https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00032.
[24] Jonathan Eaton and Maxim Engers, “Sanctions,” Journal of Political Economy 100, no. 5 (1992): 899–928.
[25] Daniel W. Drezner, “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion,” International Organization 57, no. 3 (2003): 643–59, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818303573052.
[26] Jon Hovi, Robert Huseby, and Detlef F. Sprinz, “When Do (Imposed) Economic Sanctions Work?,” World Politics 57, no. 4 (2005): 479–99.
[27] Mark J. C. Crescenzi, “Reputation and Interstate Conflict,” American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 2 (2007): 382–96, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00257.x.
[28] Timothy M. Peterson, “Sending a Message: The Reputation Effect of US Sanction Threat Behavior 1: The Reputation Effect of US Sanction Threat Behavior,” International Studies Quarterly 57, no. 4 (2013): 672–82, https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12017.
[29] Han Dorussen and Jongryn Mo, “Ending Economic Sanctions: Audience Costs and Rent-Seeking as Commitment Strategies,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 4 (2001): 395–426, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002701045004001; Michal Onderco, “Public Support for Coercive Diplomacy: Exploring Public Opinion Data from Ten European Countries,” European Journal of Political Research 56, no. 2 (2017): 401–18, https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12183.
[30] Lisa L. Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).
[31] Gary Clyde. Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd ed., Expanded ed. (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007); Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox : Economic Statecraft and International Relations.
[32] Navin A. Bapat and T. Clifton Morgan, “Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data,” International Studies Quarterly 53, no. 4 (2009): 1075–94, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00569.x.
[33] A. Cooper Drury, “Revisiting Economic Sanctions Reconsidered,” Journal of Peace Research 35, no. 4 (1998): 497–509; Daniel W. Drezner, “Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?,” International Organization 54, no. 1 (2000): 73–102.
[34] Morgan and Schwebach, “Fools Suffer Gladly.”
[35] Valentin L. Krustev, “Strategic Demands, Credible Threats, and Economic Coercion Outcomes,” International Studies Quarterly 54, no. 1 (2010): 147–74, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00581.x.
[36] Adrian U-Jin Ang and Dursun Peksen, “When Do Economic Sanctions Work?: Asymmetric Perceptions, Issue Salience, and Outcomes,” Political Research Quarterly 60, no. 1 (2007): 135–45, https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912906298632.
[37] Tong Zhao, “Sanction Experience and Sanction Behavior: An Analysis of Chinese Perception and Behavior on Economic Sanctions,” Contemporary Politics 16, no. 3 (2010): 263–78, https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2010.501639.
Bibliography
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Blanchard, Jean-Marc F., and Norrin M. Ripsman. “A Political Theory of Economic Statecraft.” Foreign Policy Analysis 4, no. 4 (2008): 371–98. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2008.00076.x.
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Bolks, Sean M, and Dina Al-Sowayel. “How Long Do Economic Sanctions Last? Examining the Sanctioning Process through Duration.” Political Research Quarterly 53, no. 2 (2000): 241–65. https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290005300202.
Brooks, Risa A. “Sanctions and Regime Type: What Works, and When?” Security Studies 11, no. 4 (2002): 1–50. https://doi.org/10.1080/714005349.
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Crescenzi, Mark J. C. “Reputation and Interstate Conflict.” American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 2 (2007): 382–96. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00257.x.
Dorussen, Han, and Jongryn Mo. “Ending Economic Sanctions: Audience Costs and Rent-Seeking as Commitment Strategies.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45, no. 4 (2001): 395–426. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002701045004001.
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Krustev, Valentin L. “Strategic Demands, Credible Threats, and Economic Coercion Outcomes.” International Studies Quarterly 54, no. 1 (2010): 147–74. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2009.00581.x.
Lacy, Dean, and Emerson M. S. Niou. “A Theory of Economic Sanctions and Issue Linkage: The Roles of Preferences, Information, and Threats.” The Journal of Politics 66, no. 1 (2004): 25–42. https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1468-2508.2004.00140.x.
Lektzian, David, and Mark Souva. “An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 6 (2007): 848–71.
Lindsay, James M. “Trade Sanctions As Policy Instruments: A Re-Examination.” International Studies Quarterly 30, no. 2 (1986): 153–73. https://doi.org/10.2307/2600674.
Major, Solomon, and Anthony J. McGann. “Caught in the Crossfire: ‘Innocent Bystanders’ as Optimal Targets of Economic Sanctions.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 3 (2005): 337–59. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002705276568.
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