Archives for October 2018

For my small-n research question, I am asking what explains the legal implications of state recognition for those who are not internationally recognized. Using the constitutive theory, I plan on looking at the shift in criteria for needing recognition to be considered a state in the international system. My dependent variable would be the number of states that recognize a state that is unrecognized (ex. Kosovo, Taiwan). The issue with using these types of states is that there is not too much information from databases that will usually include these states when conducting their research. I want to use a source such as the Fragile States index, but they do not research Kosovo or Taiwan.[1]  That is why I am planning to use the Fragile States Index but will have to use their indicators but composite my score for their indicators. This will take extra time as some of their sources for indicators may not have statistics on the cases that I think are the best fit for my research. These cases would be most likely as they represent some of the most influential and most prominently known ideas of states that do not have full recognition from other states internationally.[2]

My dependent variable focuses on looking at the amount of recognition a state has from others and from there looking at its relative stability and performance. Going into this dependent variable, the information I find can sometimes vary on things like who formally recognizes a state and who does not. As of recently especially in cases of Taiwan where there have been cases of checkbook diplomacy some states will rescind recognition of states and databases may not capture that.  I am planning on trying to do a deep dive into finding accurate sources that show what states recognize Kosovo or Taiwan.[3] Most research that I have found on Kosovo analyzed the aspects of it being partially unrecognized but do not examine the specific relationship of if elements of the economy increase with more diplomatic ties from recognition.

[1]  “Fragile States Index | The Fund for Peace.” n.d. Accessed October 29, 2018. http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/

[2]  “When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict on JSTOR.” n.d. Accessed October 29, 2018. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137510?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents

[3] [3]“When Good Fences Make Bad Neighbors Fixed Borders, State Weakness, and International Conflict on JSTOR.” n.d. Accessed October 29, 2018. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4137510?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents.

 

During the shift to using a large-n approach to research, I found complications in finding data sets to help research the question I was asking. My question shifted to ask what explains the trend in needing recognition to be considered a state. Through researching various databases, I was able to find a few sources that would help me be able to unpack my question better. I decided to use years as a state system member as my dependent variable to help explain the stability of the state. The idea behind this was to see if there was any correlation in the stability of a state compared to how long they have been considered a member of the state system.

The first dataset I located is from the Correlates of War Project database that focuses on State System Membership.[1] The data measures from 1816 year-by-year of what states have been included as part of the state system. A state is considered part of the state system before 1920 if they have a population greater than 500,000 and have diplomatic missions at or above rank with Britain and England. Post-1920 they must be a member of the League of Nations or UN or have a population of more than 500,000 and have diplomatic missions from two major powers.   This can be beneficial especially when seeing large amounts of new states being entered such as in post-World War II and collapse of the Soviet Union. The limitations are that the data can be somewhat limited in the considerations of the state system as the data could be differentiated heavily if the conditions were ever so slightly tweaked.

Another resource I wanted to use was the Fragile State Index Report of 2016.[2] This report uses different analytics to a sum of scores from twelve separate indicators that can show a state’s strengths and weakness. They are rated on a scale of 1 to 10 and are divided into social, economic, and political categories. The data in 2016 covers 176 states, and I choose the 2016 report specifically because that is when the date ended for the Correlates of War Project database. The limitations of this source are that it focuses entirely on almost the negative aspects of state-building. Even the title implies that almost all states are fragile, it is limited including methods of state building and time period.

[1]  “State System Membership (V2016) — Correlates of War.” n.d. Folder. Accessed October 15, 2018. http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/state-system-membership.

[2] Fragile States Index 2016 – Annual Report | Fragile States Index.” n.d. Accessed October 15, 2018. http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/2016/06/27/fragile-states-index-2016-annual-report/.