Research Design Presentation

Password: olson

Mentor Meeting

On December 5, 2018 I met with Dr. Campbell for a 1 hour meeting.[1]We discussed the progress I have made on thinking about my puzzle and my research question.

We drilled my original puzzle down to a more detailed question: How does the ambiguity of the mandate and directives to implement it shape the effectiveness of UN peace operations (through the case of MONUC/MONUSCO) in relation to the protection of civilians?

We discussed that although I did discourse analysis for my interpretivist piece, I will be able to use sources I gathered from my different sketches to propose a single case study for research. The depth of the single case study will allow me to explore variables to operationalize for how civilians are or are not protected in the MONUSCO peacekeeping mission.

She provided me three books that will help me understand peacekeeping operations better as we transition to SISU-306.[2][3][4]She also noted that I will need to conduct interviews and that we can discuss what those will look like when I return from winter break. The plan for my next steps post final paper is to read the books provided and to read Victoria Holt’s work. Holt works at the Stimson Center and “Her areas of expertise focus on issues relating to international security and multilateral tools, including peace operations and conflict prevention, the United Nations and Security Council, protection of civilians, crisis regions and U.S. policy-making.”[5]By reading her work I will better understand how to frame the question I am looking to answer.

I believe the biggest challenge I will have as we transition to SISU-306 is to plan everything out in advance. One of the realities of this program is that we must continue to learn at a certain speed but analyzing the problems we have identified will be time-consuming—though we do not know exactly how much time will be needed. I am optimistic that by planning ahead, I will strike the proper balance, and I anticipate that conducting research over the break without any deadlines will help.

[1]Campbell, Susanna. www.susanacampbell.com.

[2]Bellamy, Alex J., Paul D. Williams, and Stuart Griffin. Understanding Peacekeeping. Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010.

[3]Durch, William J. UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s 1st ed. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996.

[4]Durch, William J. Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace and the Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006.

[5]Stimson Center. https://www.stimson.org/staff/victoria-holt#smooth-scroll-top.

Notes

Bellamy, Alex J., Paul D. Williams, and Stuart Griffin. Understanding Peacekeeping.

Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2010.

Campbell, Susanna. www.susanacampbell.com.

Durch, William J. Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations Washington, D.C.: United States

Institute of Peace and the Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006.

Durch, William J. UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s 1st

  1. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996.

Stimson Center. https://www.stimson.org/staff/victoria-holt#smooth-scroll-top.

RPP 8

I am studying the official discourse from the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) since the new mandate from May 28, 2010 because I want to explain how the lack of a defined success in the mandate may be contributing to the continued instability on the ground.[1]

The citation for the main document from the United Nations in regard to the mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is:

UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1925 (2010) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)], 28 May 2010, S/RES/1925(2010), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/4c174e522.html [accessed 18 November 2018]

In any organization there will be a headquarters element that provides directives and instruction. The United Nations uses language that does not seem to provide specificity as to what the forces on the ground can actually do. Although the document states that the mission must “Ensure the effective protection of civilians, including humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders, under imminent threat of physical violence, in particular violence emanating from any of the parties engaged in the conflict;”, it does not lay out guidelines for how this should actually be done.[2]Looking at how the Security Council frames assistance in the mandate may shed light on the reports coming from the field. Does the document need to have more specific direction? Does it need to state something like “with armed peace enforcement soldier?” What do the follow on updates to the resolution state? These are pieces of the discourse that I believe may lack the necessary detail for success on the ground.

Comparing different field reports to the mandates, along with background provided in a literature review, may assist in shining light on what type of security situation the UN is really striving for. Are the UN and the mission on the ground in the DRC on the same page? This information could be valuable in identifying shortcomings in communication.

[1]UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1925 (2010) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)], 28 May 2010, S/RES/1925(2010), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/4c174e522.html [accessed 18 November 2018]

[2]UN Security Council, pp. 5.

Notes

UN Security Council, Security Council resolution 1925 (2010) [on extension of the mandate of the UN Organization           Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)], 28 May 2010, S/RES/1925(2010), available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/4c174e522.html [accessed 18 November 2018]

Quantitative Data Sources

As I started to look at forming a Large-n research design, I realized that it may be too complicated to try to measure when peacekeeping forces were utilized in a country, and when the United States took an irregular warfare approach in a country. This approach set me up for more of a comparative case study, so I needed to focus on one or the other to have a quantative research approach. I will be looking at the Intra-State War Data from the Correlates of War Project, specifically looking at civil wars for central control.[1]

I decided to look at the use of peacekeeping forces separately. The dataset I would like to look at is whether a civil war became an international conflict. Intervention in a certain conflict by the international community will be my dependent variable (DV). I would like to take the DV, and see if there is a correlation with the amount of time spent on the ground, as well as the outcome of a particular conflict. The Intra-State War Data provides data for both outcome, and time spent on the ground.[2]By choosing wars for central control, I am able to separate similar cases regardless of region. The codebook defines when “internationalized war” is now a war controlled by the intervening entity, but the limitation of this data set is that it does not take into account what constitutes the minimum requirement for “internationalized war.”[3]This could potentially harm the ability to make a correlation between intervention, and a correlation to time spent on the ground, or a correlation to a specified outcome.

[1]Correlates of War Project. “Intra-State Wars v4.1 Data.” 2018. http://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Correlates of War Project. “Intra-State Wars v4.0.” 2018. http://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war.

Notes

Correlates of War Project. “Intra-State Wars v4.0 Codebook.” 2018. http://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war.

Correlates of War Project. “Intra-State Wars v4.1 Data.” 2018. http://correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/COW-war.

Literature Sketch Review

The ability to stabilize a conflict-ridden region has proven challenging not only for the United States, but also the United Nations. The prime examples are Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, but these are nations that went from invasion and civil war into a protracted conflict with international involvement. In places like Africa, there is obviously still conflict, and some would consider it protracted conflict, but the solutions provided fall much more in the peacebuilding camp, rather than the warfighting camp. There are approaches to irregular warfare and peacebuilding that may be able to work in unison to form a new approach to peacebuilding.

The intent behind warfare is obviously much different than the intent behind peacebuilding. If you look at the underlying ideology of warfighting, the use of coercion to influence or exert power is the main approach.[1]However, if you look at peacebuilding, the underlying ideology revolves around deterrence.[2]

The first group of scholars that must be looked at are associated with warfighting. Specifically, within the realm of warfighting, I will be looking at Irregular Warfare. Irregular Warfare as defined by the Department of Defense is, “A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”[3]

-Scholars in this group emphasize counterinsurgency, irregular warfare, and hybrid warfare in explaining puzzles like mine.[4][5]

-The predominant methodology used by this group of scholars is small-n case study comparisons. I have found this to be the case whether they are analyzing current conflicts, or looking at past conflicts.

-The strategy of influencing government, population, and military from the DOD joint operating concept could apply to the framework that I eventually build.[6]

-The main disagreement I see is in framing 21stcentury warfare, specifically whether it is strictly in the irregular warfare camp, or a mix of different warfare approaches.[7]

     The second group of scholars represented are from the peacebuilding field. Specifically, within peacebuilding, I will be looking at peacekeeping. Peacekeeping is defined by the United Nations as, “Peacekeeping is a technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers.”[8]

-Scholars in this group emphasize the need for field focus and context awareness.[9]

-I found that scholars don’t commonly use a specific methodologies in this field.

-I think that the challenge of integration in the United Nations structure could potentially apply to my research.[10]

-There is an agreement with this group that armed solutions are not viable.[11]

Comparing the attributes of the peace building field to the attributes of the irregular warfare field could possibly shine the light on variables that peacekeeping has not considered when entering a conflict zone, or post conflict zone. My hope is that I can operationalize variables that can assist the peacekeeping field. I have not encountered scholarship that has combined the approaches to irregular warfare with the approaches of peacekeeping. I understand that there are generals, and diplomatics that look at these problem sets.

These problem sets a state looks at are usually looked at through lenses that have separate variables; however, they are concentric circles. I expect to find variables that overlap in each. As my research continues, I hope to be able to find variables that can assist in addressing issues that the peacekeeping field encounters. Force Intervention Brigades can learn from irregular warfare. My goal is to find data that supports possible courses of action that are more comprehensive in nature. A robust approach to peacekeeping that considers more of the field of the conflict could ensure a more stable peace.

Notes

[1]Andreas, Peter, and Richard Price. “From War Fighting to Crime Fighting: Transforming the American National Security State.” International Studies Review 3, no. 3 (2001): 31-52. http://www.jstor.org.proxyau.wrlc.org/stable/3186241.

[2]Bertram, Eva. “Reinventing Governments: The Promise and Perils of United Nations Peace Building.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 39, no. 3 (1995): 387-418. http://www.jstor.org.proxyau.wrlc.org/stable/174574.

[3]Department of Defense, United States of America. “Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept.” Department of Defense, pp. 2, 2007, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/iw-joc.pdf.

[4]Paul B. Rich. (2015) The Political Impossibility of Modern Counterinsurgency. Small Wars & Insurgencies 26:6, pages 977-983.

[5]Appleget,Jeffrey,  Curtis Blais, and Michael Jaye. “Best practices for US Department of Defense model validation: lessons learned from irregular warfare models. “The Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation.”Vol 10, Issue 4, pp. 395 – 410, 2013. https://doi-org.proxyau.wrlc.org/10.1177%2F1548512913482233.

[6]Department of Defense, United States of America. “Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept.”

[7]Scheipers, Sibylle. “Counterinsurgency or irregular warfare? Historiography and the study of ‘small wars.’” Small Wars & Insurgencies 25, no. 5-6 (n.d.): 879–899.

[8]United Nations. “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines.” United Nations, pp.18, 2010. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/capstone_eng_0.pdf.

[9]Stamnes, Eli, and Osland, Kari. Synthesis Report: Reviewing UN Peace Operations, the UN Peacebuilding Architecture and the Implementation of UNSCR 1325. Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, n.d. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1873243983/?pq-origsite=primo.

[10]Campbell, Susanna P., and Kaspersen, Anja T. “The UN’s Reforms: Confronting Integration Barriers.” International Peacekeeping 15, no. 4 (n.d.): 470–485.

[11]Cortright, David. “THE POWER OF PEACEBUILDING.” Sojourners Magazine 44, no. 4 (n.d.): 18–19. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1664463038/.

 

Research Topic Update

I am proposing to research the various activities that actors who are external to a conflict engage in during the peacebuilding process because I want to identify the specific variables and attempt to measure them in order to help my reader understand how those external entities can exert control over territory to interfere in the basic safety and stability that is critical to any successful peace process.

In discussing reports published by the United Nations Secretary General, the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund outlines five recurring priority areas for international assistance:[1]

  1. Support to basic safety and security
  2. Political Processes
  3. Provision of basic services
  4. Restoration of core government functions
  5. Economic revitalization

Policy makers have a tendency to look at conflict—especially civil war—as binary in nature. Under this rubric, two sovereign state entities come to the table (sometimes the international table, like the UN), and can come up with solutions to solve the conflict issues in one or all of the above five categories.  But this approach to civil war is overly simplistic.  As Stathis Kalyvas states, “civil wars are not binary conflicts but complex and ambiguous processes that foster an apparently massive, though variable, mix of identities and actions—to such a degree as to be defined by that mix.”[2]

My research topic falls under the 1stpriority area for international assistance—support to basic safety and security. In the preliminary research I conducted while preparing for my literature review, I came to find that there are a mix of entities and activities, some of which can be unique, at work in the theatre of safety and security.  At this early stage, my thought is that finding variables that can be measured could potentially help the intervention and peacebuilding fields craft more viable peacekeeping solutions.

One example of this can be found in my last post where I cited research conducted by Romain Malejacq. Malejacq looked at warlords and the coercive power they exert over a space that is normally governed by a state entity but is now plagued by war and crippling instability.[3]Understanding hostile forces on the ground is a necessity when attempting to develop long term strategies for success. There are many examples of conflicts where the military has intervened, or the United Nations peacekeeping forces have intervened. Malejacq’s research assessed the measurable effects that various activities conducted by outside actors could have on instability within a conflict-ridden state.

This is where the puzzle I am looking at starts to get even more interesting. There is other research similar to Malejacq’s out there that is attempting to understand the actors in conflict zones, but defining the variables that matter depends on the specific contextual field a researcher is looking at. This is complicated by the fact that the actors external to these conflicts seem to approach the basic safety and security problem with pre-established ideas about the nature of the problem and the best solution.  For example, the Counterinsurgency Manual now lays out an updated approach to insurgencies that is intended to counter the effects such insurgencies are attempting to maintain on the ground. The COIN Manual states the objectives of insurgents as the following, “Stated another way, an insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control.”[4]

On the other side of the fence from the military is the peacebuilding community. It is commonly known that the goal in peacekeeping is deterrence. As recent as December 2017, the United Nations funded a study called The Improving Security Peacebuilding Project, which presents an overall strategy for how the United Nations Peacekeepers should posture their forces.[5]This report repeatedly emphasizes the historical inability of peacekeeping leadership to understand hostile forces, and the necessity for a more aggressive posturing.[6]

Both the peacebuilding community and the military community have communicated a pressing need to identify new solutions to counter the actors who drive instability in high conflict areas. Both communities could benefit from attempts to understand the “complexity, and ambiguity” that Kalyvas discusses in the Ontology of Political Violence.[7]Finding ways to measure actors and actions in conflict zones—as Malejacq was able to do—will help bring both fields to a better understanding of how to most effectively train, posture, and direct their personnel on the ground for the purpose of facilitating and then maintaining peace.

Posing my thoughts on this puzzle as a general question:

-What are the factors that enable actors who are external to the binary civil war context to exert control over territory as they strive to facilitate the peace process?

To pose a more specific question:

-Why has the United States and its allies not been able to create a stable regime in the conflict-ridden country of Afghanistan?

Notes

[1]United Nations Peacebuilding Fund. “What is Peacebuilding?” United Nations Peacebuilding Fund Application Guidelines, 2018. http://www.unpbf.org/application-guidelines/what-is-peacebuilding/.

[2]Kalyvas, Stathis N. “The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil Wars.” Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 3 (2003): 475-94. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3688707.

[3]Malejacq, Romain. “Warlords, Intervention, and State Consolidation: A Typology of Political Orders in Weak and   Failed States.” Security Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2016): 85-110. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636412.2016.1134191?needAccess=true.

[4]Department of the Army. “Counterinsurgency.” FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 2006. https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=468442.

[5]Cruz, Lieutenant General (Retired) Carlos Alberto dos Santos. “Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We need to change the way we are doing business.” The Improving Security Peacekeeping Project, 2017. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/improving-security-of-united-nations-peacekeepers-independent-report.

[6]Ibid.

[7]Kalyvas, Stathis N. “The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil Wars.”

Bibliography

Cruz, Lieutenant General (Retired) Carlos Alberto dos Santos. “Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers: We need to change the way we are   doing business.” The Improving Security Peacekeeping Project, 2017. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/improving-security-of-united-nations-peacekeepers-independent-report.

Department of the Army. “Counterinsurgency.” FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5, 2006. https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=468442.

Kalyvas, Stathis N. “The Ontology of “Political Violence”: Action and Identity in Civil Wars.” Perspectives on Politics 1, no. 3 (2003): 475-94. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3688707.

Malejacq, Romain. “Warlords, Intervention, and State Consolidation: A Typology of Political Orders in Weak and   Failed States.” Security Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2016): 85-110. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636412.2016.1134191?needAccess=true.

United Nations Peacebuilding Fund. “What is Peacebuilding?” United Nations Peacebuilding Fund Application Guidelines, 2018. http://www.unpbf.org/application-guidelines/what-is-peacebuilding/.

An Article Comparison

This week, I examined two articles and did a comparison of how they discussed intervention. Specifically, I looked at the two following articles which addressed intervention in states that are considered weak and/or failed:

  1. Post Conflict Reconstruction in Africa by Pierre Englebert and Denis M. Tull
  2. Warlords, Intervention, and State Consolidation: A Typology of Political Orders in Weak and Failed States by Romain Malejacq

 

The prevailing argument for Englebert and Tull is that rebuilding states in Africa must be the entities controlling the means of coercion[1]. Englebert and Tull disagree with the three main following assertions in the conversation of intervention:

  • “Western state institutions can be successfully transferred to the continent”[2]
  • “The diagnosis of failure is shared among donors and Africans”[3]
  • “International actors have the capacity to rebuild African states”[4]

Englebert and Tull use comparative analysis with the elements of fiscal aid provided and troops provided (UN peacekeepers) to demonstrate that these three “flawed assumptions” are invalid.[5]

 

Romain Malejacq relies on extensive field research to explain why states like Afghanistan fail to recover even though the international community has made massive efforts to help them.[6]He uses “warlords” as a dependent variable, and resources available to those warlords as independent variables. Malejacq assigns different numerical values to the independent variables and a value for a specific combination of said variables. Through this process he is able to put the warlords on a continuum that ranges from low to high power. This typology is an addition to the current conversation because the data he presents displays a causal relationship between intervention and the prosecution of warlords in power. He claims this causes a power vacuum and can contribute to instability.[7]

 

The two articles present a small-n approach, and a large-n approach to issues found in cases of intervention, especially in already fragile environments. These two articles work in concert to show that there are individual actors on the ground who contribute to further instability in a state, and to highlight the factors that must be weighed when considering an intervention. These two articles helped me better understand the puzzle of state intervention. I plan to use both of these articles to further look at how local, or outside actors (insurgents) have effects on fragile states.

Notes

[1]Englebert and Tull, “Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa.”

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid.

[5]Ibid.

[6]Malejacq, “Warlords, Intervention, and State Consolidation: A Typology of Political Orders in Weak and Failed States.”

[7]Ibid.

Bibliography

Englebert, Pierre and Denis M. Tull. “Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about Failed States.” International Security, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Spring, 2008): 106-139. https://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/10.1162/isec.2008.32.4.106.

Malefjacq, Romain. “Warlords, Intervention, and State Consolidation: A Typology of Political Orders in Weak and Failed States.” Security Studies, Vol. 25, No. 1 (2016): 85-110. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09636412.2016.1134191?needAccess=true.

Puzzle Pieces

     I was not very familiar with the ontological debates that go on within international relations research before this course. Abbot presents polarized positions on the underlying belief systems people approach information. I found value in Abbot pointing out the polarization can happen due to a debate about the origin of knowledge. In class, we discussed what different people thought their positions were. It came as no surprise to me that people don’t fit perfectly in boxes.

Although I believe that you can observe evidence for research in the social world, I think that interpreting meaning can provide a challenge to an “objective” data set. In my opinion interpretivism has an important place in research, and it is especially important when trying to understand a culture you are not familiar with. I do know this approach has its short-comings though. Data can clearly show a possible link, but psychologically we may not like what the data “says.” On the other hand, the context of data is important, and we need to understand the underlying causes of the framework of any given situation. At a minimum, we need to understand that we are coming from a certain position, and make sure that it is a viable answer to the question we are asking.

I do not think it is a stretch to say statistical data can be used as hard evidence. The challenge arises in the situation I mentioned in the previous paragraph. What if the situation was under a certain set of circumstances, and you cannot replicate that in data.

In my last mentor meeting, I asked Dr. Campbell about being challenged due to your ontological approach. She told me that you have to know your audience, and exactly who you are talking to. We discussed this in class, but I didn’t realize you cannot be distracted by what I will call the “adjacent conversations.” Professor Boesenecker told us that a challenge based on whether your methodology helped to better illuminate the question at hand is important. Did the approach the researcher use add to the knowledge that already exists? Basically, we can’t disagree with research just because we don’t like their position. There can be value from a thought process we don’t necessarily agree with.

I think my biggest challenge as I look at my puzzle will be how Peacebuilders view conflict. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP) had an interesting perspective on conflict. It goes one of two ways: toward resolution, or toward violence. Going forward I want to look at the different categories the scholars within Peacebuilding have established, and start to break down the ontological approaches within the different categories. USIP doesn’t automatically assume that conflict means something bad is going to happen, but USIP explores how to prevent bad events from occurring, and start building a foundation of peace. How to be able to interpret conflict in this manner is something I am currently unpacking.

Patience in the Process

My mentor for this year is Dr. Susanna Campbell.

Here is an excerpt from her bio:

“Dr. Campbell’s research and teaching address war-to-peace transitions, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, development, global governance, and the micro-dynamics of civil war and peace. She uses mixed-method research designs and has conducted extensive fieldwork in conflict-affected countries, including Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Nepal, Sudan, South Sudan, and East Timor. She has received several large grants for her research, including from the Swiss National Science Foundation and the Swiss Network for International Studies, as well as a United States Institute of Peace Dissertation Fellowship.”

Here is a link to her website: http://www.susannacampbell.com.

Dr. Campbell and I met on Wednesday, September 5, 2018. I am the first Olson Scholar she has worked with, so we discussed the program and what our approach will be for the semester. Every week she is going to introduce me to a new piece of the research puzzle, and give me readings from peace-building experts. She advised me that the purpose of the readings will be to understand how to talk about peace-building. Learning the vocabulary of the field and research fundamentals will be my starting point. I appreciate that she encouraged me to be patient–we aren’t in a rush to find the specific question I’ll tackle this semester because I need to understand the conversation first.

She lent me her book, Global Governance and Local Peace (Cambridge University Press, 2018) so that I can see how she discusses peace-building. She also recommended I get my hands on The Process of Social Research (Dixon, Singleton, Straits; Oxford University Press, 2d edition 2019). I received the latter book on Friday, and have been looking through it already. I like that we are focusing on the fundamentals of research and the broader conversation of peace building, rather than prematurely rushing to find a specific research question. From past experience, I know that deepening my understanding of the sum of the parts will provide a necessary framework as I dive into the details of each individual piece of research and peace-building conversation.

We have another mentor meeting on Wednesday, and I will likely make another post after that meeting. The goal outside of the assignments from our Olson Scholars section will be to look through both the books she recommended.

Pursuit of a Problem

I have so many research interests, I think we all do. I have come to the realization that it is hard to put into words exactly what I want to research. My proposal when I was accepted to this program was to look at intra-state instability and how it bleeds over into inter-state conflict—sometimes even regional conflict. There are numerous examples I can look at for this problem. Somalia and the Horn of Africa is the first example that comes to mind. As I am learning more about research, and about how Olson Scholars is going to go, I see that I will end up looking at conflict in new and exciting ways. Everyone wants stability, and we hope everyone wants peace. I hope that by examining conflicts around the world, I can identify commonalities that contribute to continued instability in these areas of conflict. By identifying these commonalities, we may be able to minimize the impact they have, or even stop them from occurring in the first place. I am looking forward to going on this journey together.