RPP 3

Gorski’s assertion that social science can offer genuine insights into human well-being is upsetting to the traditional order of separation between morality, ethics, and other normative worldviews, and the cold, clear, empirical methods of science. I agree with his arguments, particularly about fact-laden values and value-laden facts—Gorski essentially implies that “facts” as we commonly refer to them do not really exist. Because we cannot separate our values from our perception of the world, what we “know” as factual is inherently affected by our values. Moreover, our values are inherently founded in and “open to empirical investigation.” I think that Gorski brings to light something that is dangerously ignored by the majority of Western Civilization, which is our intrinsic attachment to our values and the level to which they influence our perceptions, and consequently our worldviews. While the progression of positivism as a reaction to the highly theological and mythical schools of thought that came before is understandable, it has developed into a willful refusal to acknowledge the role our humanity has to play in understanding and categorizing the world.
Sam Harris picks up the thread from Gorski, and touches on similar things. Both argue that the social sciences can be used normatively, but he also suggests that relativism is the confusing result of the separation between positivity and normativity. Harris uses the example of women who are forced to wear a burka, claiming that it does not contribute to human well-being. Harris acknowledges that the burka is only negative when it is forced on women, but I think that in some of his analysis, and perhaps in his choice for an example, that Harris commits the same error of blindness that so frustrates Gorski. In other words, Harris isn’t fully recognizing the values he brings to his analysis of the facts. This is where Comte comes in and argues for complete and total separation between facts and values, to the point that “no rational mind now doubts that the revolution” will inevitably continue. My pushback, in line with Harris, is that humans are inherently irrational, and that reality cannot be escaped.
I absolutely believe my research lends itself to normativity—it is entirely based on my assumption that durable peace agreements are desirable, that they should be as inclusive as possible, and that the international community should not stop working until there is complete inclusion of women in peace processes. I intend for my research to be useful to this effort by identifying the situations in which women’s inclusion in peace processes are successful, and I made the majority of my methodological choices on that intention. My research is oriented this way because I think it can help, and I hold the belief that if one can help, one ought to.