Work Samples
From Various Courses
The Russian threat to the U.S. no longer comes in the form of its vast nuclear power arsenal. Instead, the threat entails a project promised to bring energy and power to the homes of millions of Europeans: Nord Stream II. The project entails the construction of a natural gas pipeline that is expected to be fully finished and operational by the end of 2021. The United States generally opposes Nord Stream II due to concerns that the pipeline would increase Russia’s influence in the region and the EU Member States’ dependence on Russian gas. Previous sanctions had only delayed the construction; however, more policies are required to halt the Nord Stream II project successfully.
This paper will outline the background, implications, and past Congress Resolutions related to the Nord Stream II pipeline construction. In the end, it will offer a set of policy recommendations to the new President Administration and Congress focused on (1) halting the construction of the Nord Stream II natural gas pipeline, (2) helping secure a diversified European gas market, and (3) recognizing environmental, security, and economic implications of the project.
Background
Figure 1
Map of the Nord Steam I and Nord Stream II
Note: Routes of the Nord Steam I and Nord Stream II pipelines in the Baltic Sea connecting Russia and Germany. Reprinted from Gazprom. Nord Stream 2. https://www.gazprom.com/projects/nord-stream2/
Nord Stream II (NS II) pipeline will have an annual capacity of 55 billion cubic meters. It will start in Russia in Ust-Luga, go through territorial waters of Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, and end in the German city of Greifswald (Prokip & Kusa, 2018). Paralleling the already-existent Nord Stream gas pipeline in the Baltic Sea, the project will yield a total annual capacity of 110 billion cubic meters. Most notably, it will bypass Ukraine as a gas transit country for the EU (Prokip & Kusa, 2018).
In 2017, the largest Russian gas company, Gazprom, agreed to be the sole owner of the pipeline, while ENGIE, OMV, Royal Dutch Shell, Uniper, and Wintershall were to be its co-financers. These five companies provide long-term financing for half of the NS II project’s total cost (Nord Steam 2). In 2018, Germany and France issued official permits for the construction, and the pipelaying operations began.
Netherlands, UK, and Germany currently contribute 75 percent of the E.U.’s domestic natural gas production (Nord Stream 2 – Rationale). However, their production had drastically fallen in recent years despite European gas demand remaining stable. Gazprom and Nord Stream II’s stakeholders project that the new pipeline will supplement the global liquified natural gas (LNG) market, filling in that supply gap.
Figure 2
Extra-EU imports of natural gas, by country of origin, 2018-2019
Note: Entries of natural gas from non-EU countries in the EU. Reprinted from Eurostat (2020, September). Natural Gas Supply Statistics.https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/pdfscache/10590.pdf
The demand for natural gas in the E.U. is currently supported by the extra-E.U. imports from Norway (24.0%), Ukraine (19.0 %), Russia (19.0 %), and Belarus (9.9 %). Since Ukraine and Belarus are transit countries for Russian gas, the E.U.’s current dependency on natural gas from Russia is much higher than on Norway’s (Natural Gas Supply Statistics). The completion of the Nord Stream II pipeline is only going to exacerbate this dependency. It would provide the Russian Federation with monopoly power in the European gas market.
Implications
Ukraine is expected to lose the most if the NS II project is complete. The pipeline will undermine the demand for Ukrainian Gas Transition Systems (GTS) capacities and Ukraine’s position as the E.U.’s gas supplier. Naturally, Ukraine is the most vocal opposition voice for the project. However, many Baltic states and the U.S. generally oppose the NS II gas pipeline construction just like Ukraine does. Their opposition, much like the U.S. “Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act” states, stems from stipulations that the pipeline will severely “undermine European Union’s energy security, gas market development in Central and Eastern Europe, and energy reforms in Ukraine” (Prokip & Kusa). Additionally, the Baltic states voice concerns that the pipeline may be used as a pretense to increase military presence in the region as a means of protecting its critical infrastructure. This argument stems from the incidence of the Russian annexation of Crimea and Russian troops’ infiltration into Eastern Ukraine.
On the other hand, Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands, as well as several other countries in Western Europe, tend to support the construction of the NS II gas pipeline. Once the pipeline is finished, Germany stands to become the largest gas trader in Europe. Additionally, those helping to actualize the NS 2 are already bearing profits. At least as of July 2017, the economic impact of investments to the NS II for the E.U. amounted to $6.063 billion of total output and created about 31,000 full-time jobs (Prokip & Kusa). Therefore, for Germany and several other E.U. Member States, the economic benefits outweigh any political pressures or implications.
Overall, there are two dimensions of the NS II pipeline construction: economic and political. While some countries are expected to reap economic profits and see strengthened positions within the E.U., others are threatened by the national security implications and losses resulting from Russia’s increased influence. The duality of implications and sentiments on the NS II makes any efforts to halt the construction complicated. The United States may be the only one capable of imposing an absolute moratorium on the NS II construction as it holds the most considerable geopolitical power.
History of U.S. Position and Congress Resolutions
Soon after the NS II construction announcement, Ukraine commenced lobbying efforts to halt the project. It implored the U.S., its strategic ally, to increase pressure on Russia and other project participants to at least stall the construction until 2021. Despite a common U.S. sentiment in favor of stopping the NS II construction, harsher policies are still required.
Obama Administration
During the Obama Administration, the White House was adamantly against the construction of the NS II pipeline. This position caused tensions in U.S.-German relations after Berlin stated that the U.S. has no right to interfere in the internal affairs of the E.U. The U.S. addressed the disputes with a statement that the NS II Project is a geopolitical matter and threatens to increase European states’ dependence on the Russian gas lobby (Prokip & Kusa). The situation was further escalated by the Russian war in Eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea at the onset of 2014. Still, the United States’ position under the Obama Administration remained clear: the United States would take serious measures to halt the construction of NS II.
Trump Administration
Since 2017, the official U.S. position on the issue lacked clarity. White House and Congress exhibited a notable dissonance in opinions. While President Trump bashed the U.S.’s historically adverse and hostile position toward Russia, his staff and Congress would continue to regard Russia as a direct threat to the U.S. (Prokip & Kusa). Still, the White House managed to impose several sanctions on NS II-related persons of interests, vessels, and partners. Additionally, Congress passed several House and Senate Resolutions related to NS II.
H.Res.1162 passed by the House of Representatives on December 11, 2018, called on European governments to halt the Nord Stream II pipeline’s construction. Additionally, it urged the President to support European energy security through policies aimed at reducing reliance on the Russian Federation’s gas supply (H.Res.1162, 2018). §4 and §5 outline the root of U.S. interests at the time of the Resolution’s introduction: to reaffirm the commitment “to provide the people of Ukraine with political, economic, and security assistance to enable them to secure their independence, democracy, and prosperity…[and] hold the Russian Federation accountable for its ongoing aggression against Ukraine” (H.Res.1162).
S.Res.27 (2019) included expanded U.S. national security interests related to the NS II construction. Amongst these were the security of the NATO states and promotion of European energy market diversification. Furthermore, it cited reasons for concerns associated with the construction of the NS II pipeline. Notably, S.Res.27 mentioned how Gazprom previously cut off natural gas exports to Europe in 2006 and 2009 over pricing disputes. Additionally, it outlined that after Russia completed the Nord Stream pipeline, gas transit through Ukraine fell from 80 percent to 40 percent of total Russian natural gas exports to Europe (S.Res.27). Since this trend directly undermines the Ukrainian economy, European energy autonomy, and thus the U.S. foreign policy interests, the Senate called on President to take action through sanctions.
Already, Congress approved the imposition of sanctions concerning the development of pipelines in the Russian Federation in Sec. 232 of Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (H.R.3364, 2017). S. Res. 27 §5 and §6 reiterate President’s ability to impose sanctions on the Russian Federation under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act. These sections also stress that existing sanctions will have to increase so long as Russia does not deviate from or halt its current aggressive strategy in Europe (S.Res.27).
Still, Protecting Europe’s Energy Security Act (PEESA) of 2019 laid out the most comprehensive sanctions strategy for the United States. According to PEESA Section 7503, the Secretary of State, alongside the Secretary of the Treasury, should submit a report identifying vessels engaged in pipe-laying activities related to the NS II project’s construction (PEESA, 2020). Subsection (a) (1) (B) of PEESA allows the President to impose sanctions on such vessels in addition to sanctions on individuals supporting the project in any way. These individuals specifically include those who knowingly “sold, leased, or provided those vessels for the construction of such a project or intentionally facilitated deceptive or structured transactions to provide those vessels for the construction of such a project” (S.1441, 2019).
Sanctions imposed on the identified persons under subsection (a) (1) (B) may take on many forms. For example, they can either be export or procurement sanctions. Additionally, the sanctions may include a halt on export-import bank assistance for exports to sanctioned persons, a block on transactions related to all property interests of identified persons, prohibitions on financial institutions, or a ban on investment in equity or debt of sanctioned person. The President may choose to impose these sanctions even on executive officers (S.1441).
The 2021 National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAA) continues to secure the right of the President’s administration to impose sanctions on those assisting in the construction of the pipeline. The NDAA passed in Congress with strong bipartisan support, overriding President Trump’s veto. Despite Congress’ efforts, President Biden had so far only imposed sanctions on the pipe-laying ship Fortuna and the Russian company that owns it, KVT-RUS. Former President Donald J. Trump already sanctioned both. Surprisingly, Biden failed to impose sanctions on the Nord Stream 2 AG, a company responsible for planning and constructing the NS II (McCaul & Risch, 2021). Today, the construction of the pipeline continues and is approximately 95 percent complete.
Policy Recommendations Going Forward:
Congress’ efforts to implement NDAA (2021), overriding President Trump’s veto and previous Resolutions, signal a strong message: the U.S. should take a stronger stance on the issue. While previous Resolutions such as H. Res. 1162 (2018) or S. Res. 27 (2019-2020) outlined growing U.S. interests in the Baltic Sea region, they were not exhaustive in outlining all implications of the pipeline construction. The following policy suggestions aim to (1) halt the construction of the Nord Stream II natural gas pipeline, (2) help secure a diversified European gas market, and (3) recognize environmental, security, and economic implications of the project.
Recently two Democratic lawmakers have urged Secretary of State Antony Blinken to take action. Senators Bob Menendez, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Jeanne Shaheen, the chairman of the panel’s Europe subcommittee, stated, “We…urge that the effort to build strong Nord Stream 2 sanctions packages be accelerated to meet the urgency of the moment” (Zengerle & Gardner, 2021). The urgency and call for harsher actions stem from the 95 percent completion of the project.
Immediate measures to protect U.S. foreign policy interests, ensure European market diversification, and guard against Russian Federation’s growing geopolitical influence should include the following policies:
- Recognize the role of the pipeline as a business venture for Germany. U.S. officials should no longer ignore the economic dimension of the Nord Stream II pipeline. Already, Berlin acknowledges the potential threat that Russia could halt the flow of gas through the Nord Stream II at any time. Nonetheless, it defends the construction to the United States, arguing that it will instate regulatory mechanisms to guard against Russian market manipulation (Pifer, 2021). To Germany, economic benefits outweigh potential economic and political security threats to the region. According to the Federal Institute for Geosciences and Resources, Germany experiences falling domestic natural gas production. Today, it sources about 94% of the natural gas it consumes from abroad (Wettengel, 2021). Because of this, the U.S. needs to re-focus its arguments to Germany and preferably impose a moratorium on the construction of the pipeline until these new discussions are complete.
- Acknowledgment of environmental implications related to the NS II construction. President Biden rejoined the Paris Agreement on his first day in office and continues to push for higher standards protecting air, water, and communities (White House Briefing Room, 2021). While Nord Stream II will transport natural gas, the cleanest form of fossil fuels, Nature and Biodiversity Conservation Union (NBCU) and other environmental agencies petition local courts and the Federal Constitutional Court to halt its construction. These agencies warn that the project will lock Germany in fossil fuel dependency (Wettengel). The dependency would delay the European transition to biofuel, wind power, solar, and hydropower energy usage. Anthropogenic climate change would continue for decades due to fossil fuels’ usage, even in their cleanest form. As the United States rejoins the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) this year, it is also vital to recognize the connection of the environment to human rights. In 2006, Mary Robinson, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, made a decisive statement to treat climate change as a human rights concern (Alston & Goodman, 2013, p. 1541). Her statement opens the door for human rights courts to provide legal and normative grounds to organizations like NBCU. The organizations may seek to halt NS II’s construction citing environmental concerns. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) notes that socio-political processes should determine what constitutes as dangerous anthropogenic interferences with the climate system based on equity, sustainability, and development factors (Alston & Goodman, p. 1542-1543). As the Nord Stream II construction signals greater dependence on fossil fuels in the coming decades, the U.S. should urge the international community through UN bodies to make greater efforts in stopping the construction of the NS II pipeline. It may do so either through the general address or a petition to either the UNHRC or the IPCC.
- Imposition of increased sanctions. Currently, the Biden Administration only sanctioned the pipelaying ship Fortuna and its owner, KVT-RUS. However, Joe Biden should also place sanctions on a vessel set to join Fortuna: a DP-enabled pipelaying vessel Akademik Cherskiy (The Maritime Executive, 2021). Co-sponsors of the NS II construction – ENGIE, OMV, Royal Dutch Shell, Uniper, and Wintershall – should also suffer the weight of sanctions. Additionally, Joe Biden should sanction Nord Stream 2 AG, a company “established for planning, construction and subsequent operation of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline” (McCaul & Risch). Congress should secure the acceleration of this new sanction package since the NS II project is almost complete.
- Establishing greater bilateral trade agreements with Ukraine. Increasing competitiveness and demand for the Ukrainian GTS through the adoption of new bilateral projects will guard Ukraine in case of the NS II pipeline launch. Alternatively, the U.S. may choose to finance the transformation of the Ukrainian transit route to appear more favorable for the E.U. However, these approaches require the willingness of the Ukrainian government to reform its gas market as well.
Conclusions
It is vital to acknowledge the potential drawbacks of these policy recommendations. For instance, sanctions may yield the worsening of the Transatlantic crisis and a general deterioration of U.S. relations with the E.U. Specifically, any sanctions halting the project may face Germany’s scrutiny. Therefore, there is no concrete way of measuring any sanctions’ potential effectiveness or knowing whether the European Commission or Germany alone would immediately block them.
Still, the United States needs to acknowledge its dominant position in the global geopolitical sphere. Ukraine needs a strong ally in the domain of energy security while Europe needs to address its falling domestic energy supply. The policies mentioned above will address the concerns of both. They address the security, economic, and environmental implications of the NS II construction through a multifaceted approach. Their implementation will ensure that Europe attains a diversified energy market without the threat of the Russian Federation jeopardizing the security of the region. Therefore, President Joe Biden and the 117th Congress of the United States should consider the policies above and increase their efforts to halt the construction of the NS II pipeline.
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Problem:
Within the United States, police brutality victims and their families rarely have avenues to hold police accountable. In 2020 alone, police had already killed 598 people. Between 2013 and 2019, about 90% of killings by police have not resulted in any officers being charged with a crime. At the same time, excuses that police violence is a byproduct of violent crime on the streets are misguided. For example, in Buffalo, New York, the violent crime rate is approximately 12 per 1000 people. Between 2013 and 2016, police forces killed zero individuals there. On the other hand, in Orlando, Florida, a lower violent crime rate of 9 per 1000 people resulted in 13 people’s deaths, killed by police officers between 2013 and 2016 (Sinyangwe, 2020).
One of the primary reasons behind the lack of accountability is the doctrine of qualified immunity. This legal doctrine protects government officials by allowing suits to be brought to court only when the officials have violated a clearly established statutory or constitutional right that “a hypothetical reasonable official would have known…violated the plaintiff’s rights” (Cornell Law School). In Pearson v. Callahan, Supreme Court established that qualified immunity is vital to shield officials from “harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably” (Cornell Law School). However, this doctrine is increasingly used to shield law enforcement officers from innumerable constitutional violations by providing them with virtual impunity.
In the news today, we hear an increased number of reports about police shootings. Nevertheless, due to their qualified immunity, police officers avoid punishment by the criminal justice system. Prosecutors deny charges, grand juries decline to indict, and juries acquit (Ali & Clark, 2019). As a result, police brutality and harassment victims get no relief, particularly the people of color and people of lower socioeconomic status. Additionally, if the victim’s case is dismissed or lost, their attorneys fail to recover fees, subsequently losing incentive to represent police brutality cases. At the same time, law enforcement is further incentivized to tarnish the law by continued abuses. Because of this, the federal government should abolish the doctrine of qualified immunity on the national level.
Policy:
The policy to end qualified immunity should consist of two parts. First and foremost, the policy should abolish the protections of qualified immunity for government officials, particularly law enforcement officers. Victims of police brutality and harassment should be able to seek relief by suing perpetrators and gaining their rightful compensation when the court finds in their favor.
The lawsuits concerning law enforcement agents should no longer be easily dismissed, nor should the officers guilty of mistreatment and violence remain within the law enforcement agencies. This part of the policy will ensure just accountability for actions and provide Americans with a greater sense that law enforcement agencies are there to provide safety for communities, rather than act as aggressors. About 63% of Americans already support abolishing qualified immunity (Ekins, 2020).
Second, the policy should establish a practice of two-way fee-shifting. Currently, our legal system includes “one-way fee-shifting” (Fitzpatrick, 2020). It forces the government to pay for an individual’s legal fees if they win; however, it does not force individuals to pay for the government’s legal fees in lawsuits if the individual loses. The one-way fee-shifting system therefore provides excessive incentives for lawyers to bring up cases to the criminal justice system. Currently, qualified immunity protects against such lawsuits arising from misguided impulses (Fitzpatrick, 2020). However, if qualified immunity is eliminated without any protections, the system would surely become packed with frivolous lawsuits. Therefore, the policy should establish a two-way fee-shifting, making both parties responsible for paying for another side’s legal fees in case they lose. This will make both parties careful when considering when and how to sue. Furthermore, it would incentivize the government to change more policies after consecutive payments for others’ legal fees when it continuously commences losing cases.
Alternatively, the government could increase funding for police departments to sponsor better training programs. Such efforts are already taking place which include virtual reality de- escalation and implicit bias training. However, especially the racial bias training, although useful, can lead to more harm. It may potentially make officers second-guess themselves resulting in deadly consequences. Moreover, Matthew Johnson, former president of the Los Angeles Police Commission argues that “If we think that we do…a week of de-escalation training or a week of anti-bias training and we’re gonna solve all the problems… we’re totally fooling ourselves” (CBS News, 2020). This once again reinforces the fact that policies holding officers accountable are required to substantiate other efforts at police reform. Despite this, utterly dismissing better training for law enforcement agencies is nonetheless counterproductive. Although costly, training programs substantiate the gaps within the proposed two-part policy previously mentioned and focus on reforming police force from inside.
To initiate the policy change aimed at eliminating qualified immunity and to establish a two-way fee-shifting system, there needs to be strong bipartisan support. Already, the right- leaning commentator David French and the left-leaning UCLA law professor Joanna Schwartz have both made arguments favoring the abolishment of qualified immunity (Stoughton, Noble, & Alpert, 2020). Interest groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the NAACP Legal Defence Fund, the Cato Institute, and the Alliance Defending Freedom have also voiced their support (Stoughton, Noble, & Alpert, 2020). While Democrats want to end special protections for government officials, Republicans have their reservations. Mainly, Republicans are concerned that eliminating protections such as those of qualified immunity would result in a substantial number of frivolous lawsuits leading to unnecessary government spending. The proposed two-part policy therefore successfully appeases both parties and the recent Black Lives Matter protests provide an ideal platform to initiate such policy change. Therefore, to initiate such policy change on the federal level, the public should continue to rally Congress and academics should write reports to Congressmen in support of this legislative change. They should argue that the aforementioned policy would increase accountability without the disruption of the criminal justice system.
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Benefits of Space Colonization
Space colonization alleviates the problem of resource scarcity on Earth. Celestial bodies, such as Ceres, the largest known asteroid, contain vast supplies of minerals. Additionally, as satellites and rovers have proven, settlements in space could provide access to invaluable new knowledge. Pew Research Center study showed that a statistically large percentage of Americans support space colonization for these two reasons.
Current Efforts for Colonization
Saudi Arabia recently announced the “Mars 2117” mission and, alongside Japan, launched the “Hope” rover in an effort to prepare for future colonization efforts. India and China also made notable efforts toward eventual colonization of celestial bodies, particularly Mars. In a pursuit of a similar mission, on July 30th, NASA launched “Perseverance” rover to Mars.
Regulatory Concerns Surrounding Colonization
The UN’s “Outer Space Treaty” provides a framework on international space law. In theory, its provisions guard against space dominance. It also hinders Elon Musk’s efforts of establishing an independent colony on Mars. Many academics, however, are skeptical about whether respecting the Outer Space Treaty will be Donald Trump’s top priority, especially after he established a new military branch, Space Force, to prove his dedication to U.S. involvement within the space domain.
How Can the Space Force Substantiate NASA’s Efforts?
Currently, NASA is experiencing an organizational decline. Space Force, on the other hand, is a new department that can act as a solution to future acquisition of resources in space as well as a military force necessary to ensure the free access to the space domain. USSF can also substantiate NASA’ goals by supporting its missions with personnel and technologies.
Recommendations and Reservation for the Future
United States has a history of refusing to ratify and adhere to international treaties. Notably, it neither signed nor ratified the “Moon Treaty” that establish space as a peaceful domain. Potential cooperation between NASA and the new military branch substantiates the academics’ concerns that the U.S. may choose to militarize space. However, many semi-autocratic nations are already making efforts at space colonization. To secure a free access to space and ensure adherence to international treaties, space needs a police force. Therefore, the U.S. should combine Space Force’s efforts with those of NASA and engage in space colonization alongside other nations. This will slow NASA’s organizational decline, allow the U.S. to reap benefits of space colonization for all humankind, and prevent semi-autocratic governments from making space anything but a free-access domain.
Each year, more and more nations are transitioning from agricultural to industrial societies, subsequently improving their living standards and increasing competition for Earth’s limited resources. To alleviate this pressing environmental concern, nations should pursue space colonization. U.S., especially, should engage in it to ensure that space remains a free-access domain.
Why should the U.S. engage in space colonization?
Benefits of Space Colonization
Space colonization could potentially alleviate the problem of resource scarcity. For example, Princeton physicist Gerard O’Neil strongly suggests that asteroids and lunar mines could even provide abundant materials to sustain future space colonies, besides enriching Earth1. Ceres, the largest known asteroid, has enough materials to construct orbital space settlements with a total living area exceeding the land areas of Earth a hundred times2. 3554 Amun, a small asteroid in comparison, has a potential $20 trillion worth of metals3. Mining could also act as a new industry that would wash over our solar system and work to supplement continued development on Earth4.
Additionally, starting with the U.S. and the USSR, nations worldwide have launched robotic emissaries to the Moon, Mars, Venus, and Titan to expand knowledge5. Permanent settlements on celestial bodies would provide an even greater understanding of space. In theory, space colonization may even answer the question of whether there is intelligent life beyond Earth.
Academics aren’t alone in supporting space colonization. According to Pew Research Center, 47% of American believe that conducting basic scientific research to increase knowledge and understanding of space should be a top priority and 34% of Americans support the idea that searching for raw materials and natural resources that could be used on Earth should be a top priority6. Interestingly enough, then, the academics and ordinary citizens alike support space colonization.
Current Efforts for Colonization
Multiple nations already commenced missions supporting space colonization. For example, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum, Saudi Arabia’s vice president and prime minister,
states that Saudi Arabia’s new mission to colonize Mars, Mars 2117, aims to build a fully self- sustainable city on mars, housing 600,000 people7. To eventually attain this goal, the country recently launched the Al-Amal rover with coordinated assistance from Japan8. Its mission is to provide a complete picture of the Red Planet’s atmosphere for the first time.
The Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO), in coordination with NASA, is also planning to develop similar missions and, in the past, already managed to put a probe in orbit around Mars9. China, too, had taken a step toward space colonization when, on July 23, it launched
the Tianwen-1, a lander, rover, and orbiter, set to reach Mars in February 202110. If the landing proves successful, China will be the second nation to put a rover on the Red Planet’s surface, right after the U.S.
Despite other nations’ efforts, NASA remains steadfast in its pursuit of knowledge through exploratory missions and commences to prepare for possible future colonization of Mars. Historically, NASA sent InSight, MarCO-A, and MarCO-B, all of which successfully landed in November 201811. On July 30, it launched the Perseverance rover, which is part of the larger goal of exploring celestial bodies, including the Moon, to prepare for human settlement on the Red Planet12.
Regulatory Concerns Surrounding Colonization
To ensure that space colonization benefits all of humankind, its efforts need to be a product of global cooperation. However, the administrations spanning from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush have blocked negotiations on treaties such as the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) that aim to limit the use of modern satellite and weapons technologies in space13. Academics backing these administrations argue that U.S. military and technological dominance in space is the only guarantee of peace in space, rather than trust and cooperation. However, this approach poses several regulatory concerns.
For example, the U.S.’s pursuit of space dominance is contradictory to the United Nations’ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. Nicknamed the “Outer Space Treaty,” it provides a framework on international space law. Most notably, it states that “outer space shall be free for exploration and use by all States and it will not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”14 This treaty ensures that space exploration benefits humanity by making space solely a shared domain.
According to Michael Listner, an attorney and founder of the private firm Space Law & Policy Solutions, this treaty also directly contradicts Elon Musk’s colonization plans for Mars15. Musk is already visualizing ideas as ambitious as sending 1,000 starships over the next ten years to Mars16. However, if he, as a private citizen, claims a territory on Mars, the United States would also be indirectly making that claim due to U.S. government’s continuous jurisdiction that establishes private companies’ legal ties to their mother country. Therefore, this action would directly breach the Outer Space Treaty.
While Elon Musk may ultimately forego such action, many academics are nonetheless skeptical about whether respecting the Outer Space Treaty will remain Donald Trump’s top priority. Already, he established the National Space Council and a constructive agenda to support private space commerce17. Byron Callan, a defense stock analyst for Capital Alpha Partners, believes that Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Harris Corporation may especially benefit from this18. Furthermore, in 2019, the White House established the sixth military branch, Space Force (USSF), to prove its dedication to efforts in space and substantiate NASA’s current goals and initiatives.
How Can the Space Force Substantiate NASA’s Efforts?
Despite NASA’s previous and continuous successes and leaps, it is crucial to ask whether it is best for NASA to continuously handle the majority of responsibilities related to space exploration and future efforts at space colonization. Currently, NASA has 19 Administrative Staff Offices, 4 Mission Directorates, 7 Mission Support Directorates, and 18 Centers and Facilities in varying locations19. It is also handling 12 different missions with an annual budget
of $22.63 billion, compared to Saudi Arabia’s space agency’s planned budget of $1 billion20. Because of the extensive number of supportive agencies, academics suggest that NASA is currently in an organizational deceleration. NASA’s existence follows a pattern described by Anthony Downs’ classic “life cycle of bureaus.” It represents an inexorable tendency of federal agencies to increase bureaucracy and conservative behavior that gradually leads to agencies’ falling efficiency21.
Space Force could become the solution to NASA’s organizational decline. It could also guard against legislative repercussions of private companies’ space colonization and attain the vast resources from space for the benefit of humankind. Established in December of 2019 under the Department of Air Force, Space Force is a military branch that organizes, trains, and equips space forces to protect U.S. and allied interests in space and provide space capabilities to the joint force22.
The USSF is currently coordinating with the U.S. Air Force to develop a holistic plan to transfer the appropriate forces to the new military branch by leveraging the U.S. Air Force for 75 percent of its enabling functions to reduce costs. The Department of Air Force plans to provide civilian personnel management, I.T. support, and base operating support to secure a fast development of the new military branch23.
Space Force plans to develop technologies to “defend our way of life on Earth through interests in space.”24 NASA, in contrast, aims to advance scientific knowledge and use the environment of space for research.25 Because USSF is still undergoing development, it can be structured to substantiate NASA’s goals and support NASA’s missions with personnel and technologies while securing the space domain.
The jobs within the Space Force include, most notably, Space Operations Officer, Space Systems Operations, and Intelligence Officer26. Airmen and appropriate Air Force space-related personnel are being transferred to serve in the USSF27. This means that USSF will include people trained for withstanding atmospheric pressures and demanding environments – a characteristic that could be useful for NASA’s future space exploration missions.
Recommendations and Reservations for the Future
Because of this, Barbara M. Barrett, the 25th Secretary of the Air Force, which is comprised of also the U.S. Space Force, should work to allocate more money from the overall $205 billion budget toward Space Force and work to encourage cooperation with Jim Bridenstine, the current NASA Administrator28. The collaboration between NASA and USSF will attain significant advancements within the space domain to secure life on Earth, the free access to the space domain, and a continued search for knowledge. Space Force’s Spacelift operations at the East and West Coast launch bases already provide assistance and facilities for the conduct of DOD, NASA, and commercial space launches29. USSF can also work to provide technical personnel and combatants to NASA for its future missions to combat NASA’s organizational deceleration.
Academics, however, hold several relevant reservations. Historically, the U.S. failed to adhere to a myriad of international treaties and refused to sign and ratify others, such as the Moon
Treaty, which expands the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty by providing that the Moon and other celestial bodies should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes30. Thus, the potential cooperation between NASA and USSF brings concerns; the efforts aimed at research and space exploration may transform into strides toward military dominance.
However, the cooperation between these two departments is necessary. China and Saudi Arabia have semi-autocratic governments and a running history of human rights abuses. Without a military police force to prevent them from restricting access to celestial bodies, free access to space would become obsolete. Therefore, the United States should look past its historical isolationist and hostile policies, ensure that Space Force continues its development by expanded its funding, and establish a working relationship between the NASA and Space Force. Such actions will provide the space domain’s continued free access for all humankind; it would yield an abundant amount of resources and unparalleled access to new knowledge, resolving the growing concerns about the astronomical rate of consumption of Earth’s resources.
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In the last few months, the COVID-19 pandemic had severely impacted the livelihoods of the American people. The state of Maryland alone has 91,854 total cases (CDC, 2020). Observing the number of growing cases and being mindful of the fact that correctional facilities are incapable of adhering to the social distancing guidelines, Governor Hogan of Maryland issued an executive order to release 2,000 individuals from correctional facilities over four months. In response to Governor Hogan’s decision, the Justice Policy Institute (JPI) released a policy brief titled, COVID-19 Threatens Explosion in Maryland Prisons Without Immediate Intervention.
The Purpose of JPI’s Policy Brief
JPI’s policy brief advocates for the immediate increase in the rate of “decarceration,” the process of reducing the number of imprisoned persons (Rose-Stern, 2020). The JPI’s policy brief also proposes a set of recommendations that address several shortfalls within Governor Hogan’s executive order to improve the policy and lessen the spread of COVID-19. Overall, this policy analysis is written for the correctional departments’ staff and Governor Hogan’s office.
Type of Analysis and Evaluation Criteria Used by JPI
JPI’s policy analysis opens with several observations from forecasting models. Namely, it refers to the Recidiviz model, which projects the “transmission of the COVID-19 virus using state-specific data on the prison population, age distribution, and steps taken to mitigate the spread of the virus” (JPI, 2020). The policy analysis also includes a brief discussion of Maryland’s past lack of transparency regarding data on testing as well as a criticism of Governor Hogan’s executive order. Because of this, JPI’s policy brief is both academic and political.
The majority of JPI’s policy brief, however, examines the effectiveness of the newly proposed decision to release 2,000 inmates over the next four months from Maryland’s correctional facilities. Particularly, Sadie Rose-Stern, Director of Communications and External Affairs at Justice Policy Institute, argues that such a proposed number is “too few, too slow, falling far short of the reductions needed to lessen the spread of COVID-19” (Rose-Stern, 2020). By utilizing this approach, JPI assesses the effectiveness of Governor Hogan’s order. It examines how likely the proposed action’s goals are going to be achieved and states that the proposal is going to be technically and marginally ineffective. By this, JPI prioritizes the evaluation of policy’s effectiveness over efficiency, equity, or ethics (Kraft & Furlong, 2018).
JPI’s Findings and Recommendations
Using forecasting models, JPI found that in a span of three weeks, after April 26th of this year, the number of incarcerated individuals infected with COVID-19 would rise from 157 to 6,474. It also found that, at a peak, nearly one in every five hospital beds within Maryland’s prisons will be occupied by a person who contracted the virus. Finally, using data from outside sources, JPI also portrayed that in Maryland, about 4 in 10 people in prison suffer from a chronic health issue. Therefore, it is imperative that immediate action be taken to safeguard them. Otherwise, more incarcerated people and correctional staff are going to be getting sick and dying (JPI, 2020).
While the first part of JPI’s analysis reflects findings surrounding forecasting models’ projections, the second half discusses the observations of Maryland’s lack of action in response to the growing number of cases. Notably, the policy brief discusses how Maryland exhibited a lack of transparency surrounding the number of administered tests. It also criticizes Governor Hogan’s decision to release 2,000 individuals from correctional facilities, citing the fact that such an effort would not amount to an effective decrease in the rate of the spread of the virus. In fact, JPI found that it would only result in a few hundred fewer cases of the infection over three weeks (JPI, 2020).
The last section of JPI’s policy brief includes a set of recommendations. Such include halting new admissions to correctional units within the state’s purview, releasing every incarcerated person who can be safely let back into society, temporarily increasing the capacity of community supervision, adjusting community supervision to CDC guidelines, and improving safety conditions for those who remain incarcerated (JPI, 2020). These recommendations were sent in a letter to Governor Hogan on April 8th of this year.
Critiques of JPI’s Policy Brief
While this particular policy analysis seems both analytical and well-structured, it is incredibly one-sided. The policy brief calls for immediate intervention; however, its failure to present an argument against the increase in decarceration implies bias. Specifically, while it discusses the necessity of inmate release to slow down the spread of the virus, citing the impossibility of maintaining social distancing guidelines within correctional facilities, it does not discuss the difficulty in maintaining the public feeling of safety after a release of incarcerated persons into their communities nor the discussion concerning the possibility of the rise in crime rates.
Moreover, JPI’s policy brief loses credibility when it presents varying numbers in its analysis and its press release that were released only three days apart. The press release published on April 23rd reports 136 positive cases in the state of Maryland and a three-week projection of 4,873 positive cases of incarcerated individuals (Rose-Stern, 2020) The policy brief published on April 26th, however, reports 207 positive cases and a projection of 6,474 positive cases of incarcerated individuals (JPI, 2020). To make findings seem more credible, JPI should have included at least a sentence explaining why its findings starkly differ from one another and why there is variability in data surrounding projections on the spread of the virus.
JPI also fails to use several relevant criteria for policy analysis. While it makes an effort to describe the shortfalls in the executive order’s effectiveness, it fails to consider potential downfalls in its efficiency, equity, or ethical structure. For example, JPI could have considered the demographics of the racial composition of the released inmates. Are the majority of released inmates white rather that of Hispanic or African American backgrounds? These findings would have substantiated JPI’s policy analysis by drawing attention to the potential racial bias within Governor Hogan’s executive order’s implementation process.
Finally, JPI fails to take public opinion adequately into account. Within the policy analysis, it is vital to consider the constituency’s opinion. Because of this, it could be possible that Governor Hogan’s decision to release 2,000 inmates, that JPI presumes to be too low, stems from the low public opinion in support of inmate release. Regardless of whether this is the case, JPI’s failure to discuss this possibility is a shortfall within its policy analysis.
Conclusion
Despite several shortcomings, JPI’s policy analysis is compelling. It conveys the urgency of the situation and presents viable recommendations that would increase the safety of the incarcerated population of Maryland. Maryland should follow in the footsteps of other states and immediately seek to release more prisoners to slow the spread of COVID-19 in prisons.