Category: Research

I have attached the poster I used at the poster conference as well as the video of my research presentation to this post.

I suppose part of me always knew that human knowledge and the way that we as scholars understand that knowledge was the product of decisions that were all too human as opposed to some objective process. When I was still just a military history nerd back in middle school, I was highly aware of the fact that most history of conflict is written by those who emerged victorious from individual conflicts. I also understood that this principle also applied to history more generally, with powerful groups and individuals wielding outsized influence over how we tell the story of the past. Despite this understanding of the role of power and privilege in the creation of history, I had never really applied much critical thought to the nature of knowledge in the social sciences before coming to college. This is likely a result of me sharing the identity of many of the traditional foundational thinkers in the social sciences: white, male, and straight.

Prior to the readings for seminar 7, I did not even know that W.E.B. Du Bois was an academic, let alone that he can credibly claim to be the first American sociologist. I knew he was a prominent writer and civil rights activist, but little else about the man. I was shocked, but not terribly surprised, to learn of the way he was shunned and denied due credit for his work because of his race and radical challenge to the then dominant discourse on race in academia.[1] What I mean by the phrase “shocked but not surprised” is that I was shocked to have never heard this specific story before but was not surprised to learn of its existence. American history is full of stories of the members of marginalized groups having their voices silenced and their accomplishments claimed by others.

The other half of this equation of marginalization is the building up of the historical reputation of certain western scholars to the point where one doesn’t even consider questioning them or their ideas. This half was also protested by students at Soas, with one stating “We’re not trying to exclude European thinkers, we’re trying to desacralize European thinkers, stopping them from being treated as unquestionable.” As I believe that scholars should be in the habit of thinking critically about everything, I agree with this student with the importance of removing the Western greats from their pedestals. If one is truly committed to the spirit of inquiry that dominates academic research, challenging the traditional Western cannon and bringing in formally marginalized voices is absolutely essential.

[1] “The Case for Scholarly Reparations,” Berkeley Journal of Sociology, January 11, 2016, http://berkeleyjournal.org/2016/01/the-case-for-scholarly-reparations/.

There are several reasons that both Bacon and Weber insist on a sharp division between the realm of the sciences and that of morality. In Bacon’s case, part of this insistence appears to spring from religious principles or a desire not to upset the religious authorities. He is quite explicit in claiming that moral knowledge in revelatory in nature and that humans should not attempt to apply worldly methodologies, such as science, to the investigation of morality.[1] He illustrates this neatly with a discussion of the Biblical story of Adam and the difference between Adam naming all the creatures God had created and Adam eating of the apple to learn knowledge of good and evil. Meanwhile, there are two important reasons Weber gives for supporting a division between science and morality. Firstly, Weber does not believe that the scientists be of trumpeting their moral and political beliefs as it will undermine their integrity writing “the prophet and the demagogue do not belong on an academic platform.”[2] Secondly, Weber points out that science is fundamentally about progress while that’s really not the case with value laden disciplines concerned with fulfillment like art and, by extension, morality.[3] Therefore, applying the metrics of one in an attempt to examine the other is fundamentally inappropriate and counterproductive.

One advantage of insisting on a divide between the realm of science and the realm of morality is that we, as social scientists, avoid the accusation of seeking to establish some sort of elitist rule where scientists occupy the role of philosopher-king. This division also stops the sciences from actually being co-opted by those who seek to implement their own preferred morality on society, like those techno-fascists that keep popping up in class. There are also benefits that accrue to both scientists and those who investigate morality in the form of specialization. It would be inefficient for scientists to extensively devote their time to moral questions and vice versa. I know that for my project it is certainly more efficient to accept some normative assumptions rather than expend a lot of energy and ink seeking to recreate these normative assumptions for myself. That is not to say that I should be unaware of my normative assumptions regarding liberal democracy or avoid critically analyzing these assumptions, but it is certainly helpful to reverify these assumptions with each foray into the realm of the social sciences.

[1]  Francis Bacon, “The Great Renewal,” in The New Organon, 12.

[2] Max Weber, Science as a Vocation, 8.

[3] Ibid. 4.

While I am uncertain as to whether Gorski’s basic suggestion that social science can offer genuine insights into human-wellbeing was strongly persuasive to me or whether his suggestion just confirmed a belief I already held, it is fair to say that I do believe in his hypothesis that moral facts exist. Personally, I do not see a ton of differences between his ethical naturalism and however Sam Harris would identify his belief system. Gorski’s ethical naturalism is focused on human well-being achieved through means that are non-theistic.[1] Similarly, Sam Harris focuses on how to achieve human flourishing and, as I picked up on in his video and confirmed via a quick Google search, he certainly is no fan of religion.[2] While the reasoning each adopts to get to their respective conclusions might be slightly different, the conclusions themselves are not.

As an aside, while I agree with Sam Harris that there are right and wrong answers to the question of achieving human-wellbeing,[3] and that accepting the existence of a plurality of right answers is a key part of holding this belief, I think he’s far too certain about the universality of his own convictions. This is not to say that I accept the premise that all value claims are equal or that cultural differences never result in differences in the wellbeing of people. Far from it, I agree with Harris on both of those points. However, I think he is far to quick to discount value systems and conceptions of human well-being that are based on religion. He fails to understand that even if he does not see any value in religious beliefs that religion remains an important part of the lives of billions of people worldwide. To deride it as mere irrationality is the height of arrogance. Furthermore, while Gorski does not make any such negative claims about religion, his ethical naturalism is explicitly non-theistic. I feel this is also a mistake as, once again, religion remains an important part of the lives of billions of people and therefore the discourse on morality that has been built up over generations by adherents of all the world’s religions deserves to be part of any discussion of moral facts.

But I digress. With regards to my own research, I do not feel as if my research lends itself particularly well to normative discovery of this kind. The reason for this is simply that my research is not designed to ask such moral questions. While I am starting from a normative assumption that liberal democracy is overall a positive for human well-being, I am attempting to explore the causality of democratic decline rather than interrogating the validity of my preexisting normative assumption. Perhaps I will come across something in my research that will force me to reevaluate my beliefs, but that is not the intent of my research.

[1] Philip S. Gorski, “Beyond the Fact/Value Distinction: Ethical Naturalism and the Social Sciences,” Society 50, no. 6 (December 1, 2013): 543–553.

[2] Sam Harris, Science Can Answer Moral Questions, n.d., accessed February 13, 2018, https://www.ted.com/talks/sam_harris_science_can_show_what_s_right.

[3] Ibid.

Plato, Tocqueville, and Dr. Johnson all argue the democratic peoples dislike making ethical arguments and further dislike discussing the ends people ought to pursue. They all go about making this argument in slightly different ways. Plato argues that one of the defining characteristics of a democratic society is that its members are given the freedom to organize their private lives how they see fit.[1] Alongside this freedom, there is also a pervasive sense of equality in democracy. That is, each member of the body politic is seen as equal to each other and their opinions are held in equal weight. This combination of freedom and equality, according to Plato, leads to a society where men lurch from base vice to base vice as their whims demand, each refusing to pass judgement of the others’ decisions as each desire equal to every other as they’ve all originated from equal members of the society.

Meanwhile, Tocqueville’s argument about opposition of democratic peoples to ethical arguments has less to do with do with the propensity of people in democracies to pursue only their base vices and more to do with the lack of respect they, they in this case being Americans but Tocqueville implies its universal, have for authority. In opposition to more aristocratic societies which are willing to accept that some have superior levels of reason, democratic societies tend to believe that truth is most often found on the side of public opinion.[2] This belief also springs from the belief in the inherent equality of man in a democratic society. The reason this focus on public opinion precludes discussion of ethical concerns is put quite nicely by Tocqueville when he writes “[t]he public therefore has a singular power among democratic peoples, the very idea of which aristocratic nations could not conceive. It does not persuade [one] of its beliefs, it imposes them and makes them penetrate souls by a sort of immense pressure of the minds of all on the intellect of each.”[3]

Dr. Johnson’s take on why democratic societies are predisposed against making ethical arguments is that we often cannot distinguish between defending our own values and imposing them.[4] As imposing values would go against the fundamental democratic assumptions of freedom and equality, many people in democratic societies are reluctant to even attempt these conversations.

I disagree with both Plato and Tocqueville’s assessment of how democratic societies are fundamentally opposed to ethical arguments. Regarding Plato, while individuals are certainly given a great deal of latitude in determining the path of their own lives in democratic societies like the contemporary United States, that does not mean that the members of societies do not make ethical judgement on the decisions of others. Regarding Tocqueville, I believe he overstates the ability of public opinion in democratic societies to simply impose its own ethical judgement on every individual in society without discussion. Public opinion is fundamentally malleable and can change substantially over time. For example, in my lifetime alone the United States has undergone a revolution in how it perceives members of the LGBT+ community. The very fact that such a change occurred demonstrates that discussion of values and attempts to persuade those who do not share your ethical belief do occur in democratic societies. I do agree with Dr. Johnson about the lazy relativism present in our contemporary culture and I personally have found it to be very pervasive among people of my generation, especially those at American University. Which is a shame because I think that such discussions are key to the viability of a democratic society.

[1] Plato, “Book VIII,” The Republic.

[2]Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Winthrop (Mansfield: 2000)

[3]Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Winthrop (Mansfield: 2000)

[4]Leigh M. Johnson, “Lazy Relativism,” ReadMoreWriteMoreThinkMoreBeMore (November 2009), http://www.readmorewritemorethinkmorebemore.com/2009/11/lazy-relativism.html.

I am pursuing my topic, democratic decline in Hungary, because I want to find out what is causing the democratic recession that currently dominates large parts of public discourse. The reason I am seeking this knowledge is that I want to learn how democratic decline can be stopped and reversed. One of the reasons for this motivation is that I am firmly of the belief that the primary purpose of social science research is to improve human welfare.

Implicit in this motivation is the assumption that democracy is fundamentally a good thing. That assumption is something I most definitely subscribe to. I believe that liberal democracy provides the best outcomes of any form of government for those who live under it. Furthermore, I am a strong proponent of democratic peace theory and believe that the norms espoused by liberal democracies have been all-important to the construction of the liberal international order. Therefore, I view the decline of liberal democracy worldwide as a fundamental threat to international order and the unprecedented peace and prosperity that order has brought to the world. My belief in the importance of democracy to the well-being of the people of the world is another reason I have chosen the investigate its decline. One further observation of my normative beliefs is that I view peace and prosperity as positives.

The primary effect of this motivation on my methodological decisions is that it leads me to utilize methodologies that emphasize the search for causal relationships. This is what led me to neopositivism in general and small-n analysis in particular. While less of a normative assumption and more a matter of personal preference, the decision to focus in on Hungary as my primary case springs from my interest in Europe. Europe is my regional focus within SIS and has long been of interest to me. Furthermore, the rise of illiberal regimes throughout Europe, especially when those regimes tend towards nationalism, is not usually associated with good things. In the last century, a similar concoction of illiberalism and nationalism in Europe killed tens of millions of people. While I don’t believe that Europe is by any means returning to the state it was in in the years prior to World War II, the return of illiberalism and nationalism to Europe is worrying. These worries are what drove me to my topic and they continue to inform my methodological decisions and case selection today.

The discourse I intend to analyze is the one that occurs at the European Union regarding the erosion of democracy in Hungary. More specifically, I will be looking at resolutions and debates originating in the European Parliament to understand the various meanings attached to concepts of pan-European values, national sovereignty, and the relationship between these two concepts by different actors within the European Parliament.

Speeches by multiple members of the European Parliament during a debate on the situation in Hungary provide a snapshot of these different discussions of European values and national sovereignty. On the one hand we have speeches by Franz Timmermans, who is the Vice-President of the European commission, and Phillipe Lamberts, a MEP and the leader of the Greens-European Free Alliance political group in the European Parliament. Both leaders emphasize the common European values of democracy and the rule of law.[1] Timmermans in particular also claims that “protecting freedom is a common European task.”[2] In contrast, Nigel Farage, a prominent Brexiteer and Eurosceptic, claimed that his fellow MEP’s attacks on actions by the Hungarian government were the result of that government’s opposition to the EU’s asylum policies rather than any actual concern about democracy.[3] Farage framed the remarks by MEPs supposedly concerned about democracy in Hungary as instead an assault on the national sovereignty of Hungary.[4]

In this discourse we can clearly see conflict between those who emphasize the various national identities held by Europeans and those who emphasize the pan-European identity and values. This discourse is connected at a very fundamental level to the subsequent vote in the European Parliament on whether to call for a launching of Article 7 of the Treaty of the European Union, which allows for the European Council to determine whether a member is in breach of European values.[5] There are also connections between this discourse and other speeches and political documents that deal with the relationship of the European Union and its member states when it comes to supposedly shared values like democracy.

[1] European Parliament, “EP Plenary Session: Debate on Situation in Hungary.” accessed November 22, 2017, http://audiovisual.europarl.europa.eu/Package.aspx?id=51766.

[2] Ibid.

[3] European Parliament, “(11) EP Plenary Session: Debate on Situation in Hungary. Round of Political Group Speakers. Nigel FARAGE (EFDD, UK) (16:19 – 16:22),” accessed November 22, 2017, http://audiovisual.europarl.europa.eu/Assetdetail.aspx?id=17e7157b-d109-40c5-ab67-a76100f1bff5.

[4] Ibid.

[5] “MEPs Call for EU Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Watchdog | News | European Parliament,” last modified October 25, 2016, accessed November 22, 2017, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20161020IPR47863/meps-call-for-eu-democracy-rule-of-law-and-fundamental-rights-watchdog.

As my dependent variable, democratic decline, is quite broad there are several different axes on which to define it. These axes include the independence of institutions and the rule of law, freedom of the press, and the existence of fair and competitive elections. To find qualitative sources on these aspects of my dependent variable, I have been searching for news articles that document these issues in Hungary, the country that I have selected as my case study.  One qualitative data source that focuses on the freedom of the press axis is a 2014 news article written by a Hungarian journalist and published by the BBC on the efforts of the Hungarian government to constrain press freedom. The article discusses the methods utilized by the government to influence news coverage such as rewarding state advertising to companies with friendly coverage and ensuring that unfriendly broadcasters run into problems when it comes to renewing their broadcast licenses.[1] Another article, this one by The Economist Intelligence Unit, documents the effects of a then-proposed tax on advertising revenue written is such a way to drive the German-owned media company RTL Klub, one of the few that still airs critical coverage of the government, out of business.[2] These actions, especially the intervention of the supposedly independent media regulator to deny broadcast licenses to critics, also indicate a lack of institutional independence and respect for the rule of law in Hungary.  Other actions, such as a crackdown on NGOs opposed to the government’s agenda by Hungary’s auditing agency[3] and how the government body designed to regulate monopolies has turned a blind eye to the consolidation of most media outlets in the hands of government allies also do not speak well of respect for the rule of law or the existence of a free press.[4]

From the articles and issues discussed in the above paragraph, it is quite clear to me that democratic decline is quite prevalent in Hungary. The above paragraph also indicates that I would operationally define democratic decline by breaking down important aspects of democracy such as freedom of the press and respect for the rule of law into smaller components and then asking questions such as “have there been any new legal restrictions imposed on the press?” or “does the government regularly label the press as an ‘enemy?’” to assess if decline occurred in the level of these elements within a state. I would also rate the degree of the decline on the simple scale of small, moderate, or high depending on how many of these questions were answered in the affirmative.

[1] “Hungary’s Media Battle ‘Economic Pressure, Intimidation,’” BBC Monitoring Media, July 8, 2014, accessed November 8, 2017, http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMM00020140708ea780005l&cat=a&ep=ASE.

[2] “Hungary Economy: Media Tax Revives Worries over Tax Policy, Press Freedom,” Economist Intelligence Unit – ViewsWire, June 18, 2014, ViewsWire edition.

[3] “Hungary’s Media Battle ‘Economic Pressure, Intimidation.’”

[4] Pablo Gorondi, “US Worried about Dwindling Independent Media in Hungary,” The Canadian Press, October 17, 2017, accessed November 8, 2017, http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=CPR0000020171017edah007hn&cat=a&ep=ASE.

My research is primarily focused on what conditions lead a liberal democracy to transition into an authoritarian regime. My dependent variable is thus the level of democracy and the liberalism within a state. There are several different ways to measure this variable statistically. One quantitative dataset that attempts to measure this variable comes from the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project. The particular dataset I am using from the Global Attitudes Project is the report put together by Richard Wike and Katie Simmons and is entitled “Global Support for Principle of Free Expression, but Opposition to Some Forms of Speech.”[1] Despite its title, this report contains information on more than just free expression. Instead, it is a report on support for democratic values. Democratic values in this case referring to religious freedom, gender equality, freedom of the press, freedom of expression, and competitive elections.[2] In order to measure this variable, the researchers polled people in 38 countries, asking “how important is ____ in our country?” where the blank spot was filled by a phrase that encapsulated the value the researchers were trying to measure. For example, when measuring support for competitive elections the researcher would ask “how important is it that honest elections are held regularly with choice of at least two parties?” to which respondents would select their belief of the level of importance.

In a large-n version of my research project I would use this dataset to measure the relative levels of support for democratic principles from country to country. I would be curious to see whether a correlation exists between the level of support the people of a country have for democracy and any of the factors, such as inequality, that have been implicated as undermining support for democracy in the academic literature. One limitation of this dataset is that it only covers 38 countries. Additionally, this dataset is just a snapshot from 2015 and, while I have found other Pew Survey’s on support for democracy, there do not appear to be other surveys by them which ask the same questions over the course of several years. This second limitation is especially important when it comes to researching a topic, such as mine, where the trend over time is important.

[1] Richard Wike and Katie Simmons, “Global Support for Principle of Free Expression but Opposition to Some Forms of Speech” Pew Research Center.

[2] Ibid.