Blanchard and Ripsman argue in their paper “A Political Theory of Economic Statecraft” that current models of sanctions do not adequately account for domestic interest groups as a determinant of sanction success[1]. In the paper, they propose a new model based on a “stateness” variable and use a case-study comparison to test it against three traditional schools of thought: a realist model, which presumes that sanctions cannot alter states’ strategic calculus; an economic liberal model, which presumes that economic concerns often outweigh strategic concerns; and a domestic conditionalist model, which assesses regime type to be the primary factor predicting sanction success[2]. These are tested in two instances: US/EU sanctions against Romania and Hungary in the 1990s and Indian sanctions against Nepal in the 1980s[3]. The specific data they use include interest group strength, economic costs, and specific strategic objectives.
Daniel Drezner argues in his article “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion” that the success rate of sanctions has been systematically underestimated because existing models do not account for sanctions which are threatened but achieve their objectives before being implemented[4]. After using game theory to outline an argument, he uses a large-n analysis of sanctions episodes including those which are threatened but not implemented to support his hypothesis[5]. The types of data in this analysis are both theoretical models (a syntactical type of explanatory program) as well as Boolean values for sanctions threatened/enacted and various degrees of policy concessions.
Both articles deal with the puzzle of sanction efficacy but approach it differently. First, Blanchard and Ripsman use a small-n case study while Drezner uses a large-n method. In terms of content, though, the former deals with what makes sanctions effective whereas the latter deals with how to measure that effectiveness. Moreover, both share the assumption that sanctions can be effective in the first place, a belief which is not a consensus in the literature (although it has been trending that way).
These articles each provide interesting avenues for research. I think it would be exciting to build on Drezner’s work by comparing China’s success in threatening sanctions with that of others, although determining what counts as a “sanction” given Beijing’s official denial in almost all cases might be difficult. It would also be interesting to apply Blanchard and Ripsman’s model to China because of the complex relationships of state-owned enterprises and other domestic lobbies in China’s political system.
Notes
- Blanchard and Ripsman, “A Political Theory of Economic Statecraft.”
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Drezner, “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion.”
- Ibid.
Bibliography
Blanchard, Jean-Marc F., and Norrin M. Ripsman. “A Political Theory of Economic Statecraft.” Foreign Policy Analysis 4, no. 4 (October 1, 2008): 371–98. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2008.00076.x.
Drezner, Daniel W. “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion.” International Organization 57, no. 3 (ed 2003): 643–59. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818303573052.
David,
I found your analysis of the articles as well as the different approaches that they each take to be very interesting. I particularly found the application of game theory to be compelling because it seems to extend beyond the usual application of game theory to economics. In relation to your overall analysis, you seem to have found 2 different aspects that you can focus on: the effectiveness of sanctions and units to measure it. However, I would be curious what alternate perspectives on each of those topics would be and the larger conversation surrounding them. In addition, both of your cases were neopositivist. I’m curious as to what an interpretivist approach to this topic would be and how it would differ. I look forward to seeing how your research progresses.
A very good post, David. Both of these articles are clearly relevant to your own research project, and you do a good job of outlining and discussing the main claims of each as well as their broad methodological perspectives. My only suggestion going forward would be to also make sure to incorporate the specific terms and concepts that we’ve covered (what is the DV? key IV? specific hypotheses tested?) as you read, analyze, and discuss research. You mention these factors in a general sense in your post, but make sure to make the link to the specific terms/concepts. Keep reading with an eye to these things as you continue your research!