Research Post #5: Research Puzzle Proposal

1. I am proposing to research China’s use of trade sanctions in territorial disputes in the South China Sea…
2. because I want to find out what explains the success or failure of trade sanctions…
3. in order to help my reader understand why states use different policy tools in different scenarios and, thus, understand how states will interact in conflict.

Historically, the scholarship on sanctions had long concluded that they were entirely ineffective policy instruments.[1] It wasn’t until the 1980s that the literature began to question that conclusion, and the literature has grown significantly as the world has become more interconnected and as strategic embargoes and economic warfare have given way to financial and targeted sanctions. At this point, most scholars would agree that sanctions can be effective, if only under certain conditions. Those conditions continue to be debated today, including how regime type affects sanction effectiveness, whether targeted sanctions are more effective than classic sanctions, the effectiveness of sanctions over time, what goals sanctions can achieve, and where sanctions’ effectiveness comes from (economic costs, domestic pressures to foreign governments, etc.).[2] Thus, several factors point to this topic as a puzzle: 1) the dramatic reversal in the literature of what was seemingly a settled matter; 2) the current debates over the conditions under which sanctions can be effective; and 3) the increasing (and new) ways that states are employing sanctions today.

What puzzles me about China’s trade sanctions in the South China Sea, specifically, is that they seem to defy most of the literature’s predictions. The first odd part about them is that they are trade sanctions, not financial sanctions. The US and the European Union will often use targeted financial sanctions to signal disapproval or to influence a government’s behavior, but trade sanctions are much rarer.[3] It is generally accepted that trade sanctions are a part of economic warfare,[4] but China routinely deploys them in non-war settings and on non-strategic goods. When deployed in non-war settings, these sanctions aren’t supposed to work.[5] Even when trade sanctions may be effective from a signaling perspective, scholars agree that they are unlikely to change a regime’s policy.[6] However, despite these findings, China has continually achieved policy concessions from its neighbors through these sanctions.[7]

Other scholars have pointed out that sanction success is often underestimated because of instances where sanctions are threatened but the target capitulates before they are imposed.[8] However, this argument also doesn’t fully explain China’s success, since Beijing frequently denies that these trade sanctions are even happening. When China banned rare earth element exports to Japan during a 2010 territory dispute, China’s Ministry of Commerce dismissed such accusations, claiming that there was “no foundation” for that reporting.[9] In other instances, however, China has openly threatened retaliation: when dissident Liu Xiaobo won the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize, China issued a statement warning of “consequences” for governments that attended the ceremony,[10] and retaliated against Norway by both halting FTA negotiations and imposing new inspections on Norwegian salmon that significantly curtailed imports.[11] Even in this case, though, the sanctions themselves were not rhetorically linked to the Nobel ceremony. Thus, another potential question regards what explains China’s inconsistent denials for its imposition of sanctions.[12]

Other explanations of sanction success seem equally insufficient when applied to China. Risa Brooks finds that trade sanctions are more effective on democracies, while targeted sanctions are more effective against autocracies[13]; however, China’s successful trade sanctions have occurred against non- or semi-democracies like Vietnam and the Philippines. Drezner finds that successful sanctions usually involve cordial prior relations with countries,[14] but China’s rocky relationships with its neighbors did not render the sanctions ineffective.

There do, however, seem to be a few possible explanations. Scholars like Lisa Martin have argued that credible commitment and willingness to shoulder costs are determining factors in sanction success, for example.[15] Since China is an authoritarian regime, it makes sense that it would be better able to credibly commit to a policy and absorb those costs. Other scholars credit declining hegemonic influence with failed sanction attempts.[16] Thus, a converse explanation invoking China’s rising hegemonic influence seems like it could be a source of China’s sanction success. Lastly, some scholars have argued that a military threat backing up sanctions increases their probability of success[17] – what Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot call a “companion policy.”[18] China’s military buildup in the South China Sea matches well with this explanation.

However, although these explanations all seem plausible, there seems to be little consensus on which factor is most important. Moreover, I haven’t come across a thorough treatment of these success factors applied to China, which could be a valuable case for teasing out the veracity of these explanations.

Although the lack of adequate explanations for China’s success should ipso facto demonstrate the topic’s significance for other researchers, I will also draw on Booth’s framework of negative questioning (i.e. what is lost if you don’t know this)[19] to discuss its significance. If we don’t understand why China is so successful in using trade sanctions to win territorial disputes, then we can’t fully understand the conditions under which sanctions can succeed; this means we can’t fully understand why states use different policy tools in different scenarios; and this means we can’t understand or predict how states will interact in conflict, a topic which has vast implications for both our own knowledge as well as global peace and security.

Thus, my proposed research questions are as follows:

What explains China’s success in using trade sanctions to win territorial disputes in the South China Sea?

What explains the success or failure of trade sanctions?

Or, alternatively:

Why does China officially deny some forms of economic retaliation but openly warn of others?

Notes

[1] Johan Galtung, “On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia,” World Politics 19, no. 3 (1967): 378; Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations : The Political Economy of International Relations (New York: Basic Books, 1975).

[2] These can be summed up as “the conditions under which sanctions can be effective.” While noted here, these debates are easier to explain in context. Thus, the following paragraphs address various aspects of these debates in greater detail, answering at the same time both why the general topic area is a puzzle and why this specific instance is significant and demands explanation. This should satisfy the second and third bullet points of the rubric, respectively.

[3] Daniel W. Drezner, “Targeted Sanctions in a World of Global Finance,” International Interactions 41, no. 4 (August 8, 2015): 755–64.

[4] Michael Mastanduno, “Strategies of Economic Containment: U.S. Trade Relations with the Soviet Union,” World Politics 37, no. 4 (1985): 503–31; Alan P. Dobson, US Economic Statecraft for Survival, 1933-1991: Of Sanctions, Embargoes and Economic Warfare (Abingdon, Oxon, UNITED KINGDOM: Routledge, 2003); Tor Egil Førland, “The History of Economic Warfare: International Law, Effectiveness, Strategies,” Journal of Peace Research 30, no. 2 (1993): 151–62.

[5] Robert A. Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,” International Security 22, no. 2 (1997): 90–136.

[6] James M. Lindsay, “Trade Sanctions As Policy Instruments: A Re-Examination,” International Studies Quarterly 30, no. 2 (1986): 153–73.

[7] Bonnie S. Glaser, “China’s Coercive Economic Diplomacy: A New and Worrying Trend,” Center for Stategic and International Studies, August 6, 2012, https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-coercive-economic-diplomacy-new-and-worrying-trend.

[8] Daniel W. Drezner, “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion,” International Organization 57, no. 3 (ed 2003): 643–59.

[9] Peter Foster and Julian Ryall. “China ‘places unofficial ban’ on key metals exports to Japan,” The Telegraph, 23 September 2010 < https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8020298/China-places-unofficial-ban-on-key-metals-exports-to-Japan.html> (Accessed: 30 September 2018).

[10] “China warns states not to support Nobel dissident,” BBC News Online, 5 November 2010 < https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11701725> (Accessed: 30 September 2018).

[11] Glaser, “China’s Coercive Economic Diplomacy.”

[12] The two contemporaneous news articles are intended as primary sources to exemplify China’s lack of rhetorical justification for sanctions and relate to the third potential research question posed at the end of the piece.

[13] Risa A. Brooks, “Sanctions and Regime Type: What Works, and When?,” Security Studies 11, no. 4 (June 1, 2002): 1–50.

[14] Daniel W. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox : Economic Statecraft and International Relations, Cambridge Studies in International Relations ; 65 (Cambridge [England] ; Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[15] Lisa L. Martin, Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).

[16] Bruce W. Jentleson, Pipeline Politics : The Complex Political Economy of East-West Energy Trade, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986).

[17] Pape, “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work.”

[18] Gary Clyde. Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd ed., Expanded ed. (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007).

[19] Wayne C.; Colomb Booth Gregory G.; Williams, Joseph M.; Bizup, Joseph; Fitzgerald, William T, The Craft of Research, vol. 16 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226065694.001.0001.

Bibliography

Brooks, Risa A. “Sanctions and Regime Type: What Works, and When?” Security Studies 11, no. 4 (June 1, 2002): 1–50. https://doi.org/10.1080/714005349.

“China warns states not to support Nobel dissident,” BBC News, 5 November 2010. < https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11701725> (Accessed: 30 September 2018).

Dobson, Alan P. US Economic Statecraft for Survival, 1933-1991: Of Sanctions, Embargoes and Economic Warfare. Abingdon, Oxon, UNITED KINGDOM: Routledge, 2003. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/aul/detail.action?docID=178874.

Drezner, Daniel W. “Targeted Sanctions in a World of Global Finance.” International Interactions 41, no. 4 (August 8, 2015): 755–64. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2015.1041297.

Drezner, Daniel W. “The Hidden Hand of Economic Coercion.” International Organization 57, no. 3 (ed 2003): 643–59. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818303573052.

Drezner, Daniel W. The Sanctions Paradox : Economic Statecraft and International Relations. Cambridge Studies in International Relations ; 65. Cambridge [England] ; Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Førland, Tor Egil. “The History of Economic Warfare: International Law, Effectiveness, Strategies.” Journal of Peace Research 30, no. 2 (1993): 151–62.

Foster, Peter and Julian Ryall. “China ‘places unofficial ban’ on key metals exports to Japan,” The Telegraph, 23 September 2010. < https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8020298/China-places-unofficial-ban-on-key-metals-exports-to-Japan.html> (Accessed: 30 September 2018).

Glaser, Bonnie S. “China’s Coercive Economic Diplomacy: A New and Worrying Trend.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 6, 2012. https://www.csis.org/analysis/chinas-coercive-economic-diplomacy-new-and-worrying-trend.

Hufbauer, Gary Clyde., Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliot. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. 3rd ed., Expanded ed. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007.

Jentleson, Bruce W. Pipeline Politics : The Complex Political Economy of East-West Energy Trade. Cornell Studies in Political Economy. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986.

Knorr, Klaus. The Power of Nations : The Political Economy of International Relations. New York: Basic Books, 1975.

Lindsay, James M. “Trade Sanctions As Policy Instruments: A Re-Examination.” International Studies Quarterly 30, no. 2 (1986): 153–73. https://doi.org/10.2307/2600674.

Martin, Lisa L. Coercive Cooperation : Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992.

Mastanduno, Michael. “Strategies of Economic Containment: U.S. Trade Relations with the Soviet Union.” World Politics 37, no. 4 (1985): 503–31. https://doi.org/10.2307/2010342.

Pape, Robert A. “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work.” International Security 22, no. 2 (1997): 90–136. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539368.