The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) data set is a list of enacted and threatened sanction episodes from the period 1945-2005.[1] It is the primary data set used in modern sanctions literature, and it codes for variables such as why sanctions were issued, the type of sanction threatened/imposed, the origin/intensity of a sanction threat, costs to both the sender and target, and the success of the sanction episode.[2]
The most important variable I would pull from the data set for my project is the ordinal measurement of success, since sanction success will be the dependent variable in my large-n research design. The fact that the indicator is ordinal (in this case from 1-10) instead of a binary nominal indicator is also helpful in that it allows for the partial attribution of success advocated by the complementarian school of thought in sanctions literature. Beyond the success measure, I would also likely use the nominal variables for the issue prompting the sanction and the threatened target interest as well as the ordinal variable of sender commitment.
The data set’s coverage is rather exhaustive, including 1412 cases over the years 1945-2005.[3] A key element of the set’s coverage is its inclusion of cases in which sanctions were threatened but never enacted, since many scholars emphasize the importance of threats in sanction success.[4] Previous studies had relied on sanctions cases from Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot’s Economic Sanctions Reconsidered,[5] which were both fewer in number and did not include threats.
As extensive as this data set is, however, it does not cover episodes as recent as those resulting from the territory disputes in the South China Sea. Thus, I will need to readjust my research question toward my general puzzle of what explains the success or failure of trade sanctions if I intend to use this data set. However, this is probably a good thing, especially because to my knowledge, there wouldn’t be enough cases from the South China Sea conflicts for a proper large-n study anyways.
Though this data set is the standard in the field at this point, it certainly has its limitations. The biggest limitation is that the set contains mostly ordinal and nominal variables and few interval-ratio variables. Moreover, for the interval-ratio variables the set includes (like sanction costs to sender, for example), data is missing for the vast majority of episodes. When I met with the librarian Clement again earlier this week, he suggested that a reliance on nominal and ordinal variables could weaken a statistical analysis of these episodes and thus suggested I consult the World Bank’s Development Indicators to find interval-ratio data for potential independent variables. My next step, then, is to consider what interval-ratio variables might pair well with this data set.
Notes
[1] The data set’s citation, in the style as directed by its codebook, is as follows:
Morgan, T. Clifton, Navin Bapat, and Yoshi Kobayashi. 2014. “The Threat and Imposition of Sanctions: Updating the TIES dataset.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 31(5): 541-558.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] For a few examples, see: Daniel W. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations, Cambridge Studies in International Relations; 65, (Cambridge [England]; Cambridge University Press, 1999); Navin A. Bapat et al., “Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data,” International Interactions 39, no. 1 (2013): 79–98, https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2013.751298; and Timothy M. Peterson, “Sending a Message: The Reputation Effect of US Sanction Threat Behavior,” International Studies Quarterly 57, no. 4 (2013): 672–82, https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12017.
[5] Gary Clyde. Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd ed., Expanded ed. (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007).
Bibliography
Bapat, Navin A., Tobias Heinrich, Yoshiharu Kobayashi, and T. Clifton Morgan. “Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data.” International Interactions 39, no. 1 (2013): 79–98. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2013.751298.
Drezner, Daniel W. The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations. Cambridge Studies in International Relations; 65. Cambridge [England] ; Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Hufbauer, Gary Clyde., Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliot. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. 3rd ed., Expanded ed. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007.
Morgan, T. Clifton, Navin Bapat, and Yoshi Kobayashi. 2014. “The Threat and Imposition of Sanctions: Updating the TIES dataset.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 31(5): 541-558.
Peterson, Timothy M. “Sending a Message: The Reputation Effect of US Sanction Threat Behavior.” International Studies Quarterly 57, no. 4 (2013): 672–82. https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12017.
