To operationalize my dependent variable in a small-n case study, I will again return to the question of what explains the success or failure of economic sanctions. In this pursuit, it is worth noting that the success or failure of sanctions must be defined in terms of the sender government rather than exogenously imposed. It will therefore be vital to investigate the motives behind certain sanctions cases rather than to judge their success or failure through imposed costs or through policy concessions alone. While fulfillment of goals will likely not be the only criterion by which I will measure sanction success, it is sufficiently important that it will be the primary subject of this post. To this end, I have identified four sources that will aid first in identifying sanction objectives and then in identifying the mechanisms by which they were imposed.
The first two works, which address both aims and mechanisms, are Treasury’s War by Juan Zarate[1] and The Art of Sanctions by Richard Nephew.[2] The first is a memoir by the architect of sanctions on Iraq, and the second is a memoir by the architect of sanctions on Iran. In both books, the authors recount the internal process of crafting sanctions against the two regimes, including specific members in the regime they targeted and the means by which the US executed the sanctions strategies.[3] These two works would be used to operationalize the dependent variable in that they identify specific US goals for the sanctions, the success of which I can judge using other sources. These sources are also beneficial in that they provide insight in cases with different results for the dependent variable of success: from my own knowledge and from my research heretofore, scholars have considered sanctions on Iraq to be a failure and sanctions on Iran to be a success.[4]
The next two works are also primary sources, namely the texts of the Global Magnitsky Act[5] and the broader US Code on Sanctions Against Certain Foreign Persons,[6] both of which enable the US to impose sanctions under certain circumstances. These texts would not be as helpful in identifying the aims of sanctions as the memoirs of administration officials would, but they do provide insight into the mechanisms by which these sanctions were imposed, including the agencies who are designated to report to Congress and some context behind their imposition. Moreover, by researching the congressional debates surrounding the bills and the texts of the committee hearings, I should be able to glean more regarding the goals and motivations of the bills. In addition, the Global Magnitsky Act in a way provides a different potential result for the dependent variable: mixed success. The bill was based on the previous Magnitsky Act, which applied only to Russian officials in response for aggression in Ukraine. While that bill succeeded regarding the economic effects it had on Russian officials, the policy success has been less clear. The economic success and mixed political effects thus reflect the need for an intermediate measure of sanction success.
Notes
[1] Juan Zarate, Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare (New York, UNITED STATES: PublicAffairs, 2013), http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/aul/detail.action?docID=1139762.
[2] Richard. Nephew, The Art of Sanctions : A View from the Field., Center on Global Energy Policy Series (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017).
[3] Zarate, Treasury’s War, Ch. 1; Nephew, The Art of Sanctions: A View from the Field, Ch. 3
[4] Barry E. Carter and Ryan M. Farha, “Overview and Operation of U.S. Financial Sanctions, Including the Example of Iran,” Georgetown Journal of International Law, 2013, LegalTrac.
[5] U.S. Congress, Senate, Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, 114th Congress, S. 284. Accessed on Thomas, 28 Oct 2018.
[6] 22 U.S.C. § 2798, accessed 28 Oct. 2018.
Bibliography
Carter, Barry E., and Ryan M. Farha. “Overview and Operation of U.S. Financial Sanctions, Including the Example of Iran.” Georgetown Journal of International Law, 2013. LegalTrac.
Nephew, Richard. The Art of Sanctions : A View from the Field. Center on Global Energy Policy Series. New York: Columbia University Press, 2017.
U.S. Code 22 § 2798, accessed 28 Oct. 2018.
U.S. Congress, Senate, Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act, 114th Congress, S. 284. Accessed on Thomas, 28 Oct 2018.
Zarate, Juan. Treasury’s War: The Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare. New York, UNITED STATES: PublicAffairs, 2013. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/aul/detail.action?docID=1139762.
Hi David!
It looks like you are off to a good start in identifying your qualitative dependent variables. The texts you have selected are clearly by authors closely involved in building the sanctions you discuss, which is clearly important to understanding the goals of those sanctions. I might also consider exploring the goals of other actors involved in passing each set of sanctions. You already discussed examining Congressional debates, which is a good place to start, but were there any lobbyist groups or other parties heavily involved in the decision making? Were their goals the same as the legislators? If not, it might be important to address who’s goals are being met through use of sanctions. Surely there must have been some contradictory goals at play.
Good luck with your second research design sketch!
Hannah
Overall you have some excellent data sources here, David, and a good start towards operationalizing your DV (which, I gather, could take the values of success / mixed / failure? It would be good to state the potential values clearly). As you consider potential cases for analysis, what would those cases be and what values does the DV have in those cases?