Month: October 2017

Research Portfolio Post #7: Quantitative Data Sources

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     Since my project will investigate the effect of nationalist protest on foreign policy decision making, my dependent variable will be the amount of nationalist protest activity (which, depending on the data available, I will hopefully end up operationalizing as the number of people who took place in protests). My independent variable will be the outcome of the international crisis that sparked the protests. It seems that the easiest part of operationalizing the variables involved in my research proposal is the dependent variable. I have chosen to operationalize this as the method of crisis resolution, which the International Crisis Behavior Project (ICBP) provides as nominal-level data (resolution via negotiation, resolution via nonmilitary pressure, resolution via violence, etc.) for 475 cases of international crises spanning from 1918-2015.(1) This data set is potentially very helpful because it codifies the involvement of great powers in each international crisis as an ordinal-level variable.(2) Thus, we can control for this variable that Trachtenberg painstakingly avoids in his case study analysis because it can hugely affect crisis outcome in terms of escalation or de-escalation.(3) Unfortunately, the amount and type of confrontational events that the ICBP has collected is so broad that often there is not a clear and neat confrontation with two or more sides having clearly defined and conflicting interests, suggesting that some events will need to be filtered out.(4)

    Essentially, the main problem that I am encountering at this point is operationalizing my main dependent variable in a valid and meaningful way. It has been extremely difficult to gather comprehensive data on worldwide protests events. The World Values survey has a dataset that includes the willingness of a person in a given country to participate in a protest (through petition, boycott, or demonstration — each is measured) in a given year and the number of people who have recently participated in various forms of protest.(5) Unfortunately, this survey data does not say anything about the actual number of protests that year because it was performed once every several years — and even if it did, it does not distinguish between protest on foreign or domestic issues.(6) An ideal dataset would include the number of anti-foreign protests in a given country-year; or would have data for each of many major protest events worldwide (in such a way that I could parse out the ones motivated by anti-foreign sentiment in the runup to each of the international crises), but finding such a dataset is proving to be a challenge.

 

  1. Michael Brecher, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Kyle Beardsley, Patrick James, and David Quinn. International Crisis Behavior Project data on conditions and outcomes of international crises 1918-2015. August 23, 2017. Raw data.
  2. Ibid.
  3. Trachtenberg, Marc. “Audience Costs: An Historical Analysis.” Security Studies 21, no. 1 (January 1, 2012): 3–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2012.650590.
  4. Brecher et al., International Crisis Behavior Project data on conditions and outcomes of international crises
  5. Chai, Jingjing, and Jie Yan. World Values Survey data on the percentage of people in China who have participated or are willing to participate in various forms of protest. April 18, 2015. Raw data. China, Beijing.
  6. Ibid.

Research Portfolio Post #6: Article Comparison

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In their article titled “How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument,” Gary King and his colleagues argue that the Chinese government’s goal in allowing or encouraging (or even fabricating) expressions of nationalism is mainly to do “cheerleading,” distracting from more divisive issues.(1) King et al. analyze thousands of posts belonging to the so-called “50-cent party” or “50c” — a government-sponsored group of nationalist internet users (confirmed by a series of leaked emails between local or provincial governments).(2) They use their evidence mainly to argue against the prevalent idea that 50c posts aim to engage in argument with other internet users.(3)

Conversely, in her article titled “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China,” Jessica Chen Weiss contends that the Chinese government utilizes nationalist protest as a costly signal of resolve for international observers.(4) By her analysis, popular nationalism is a force that the government either allows or restrains — it gives a “red light” or a “green light.”(5) Unlike King et al., she acknowledges that excessive nationalism can have drawbacks, as it costs political capital to suppress, lest it force the government into an unfavorable position if it is not effectively managed (putting the government in a dilemma, the outcome of which acts as a signal to the international community).(6)

While the two articles approach nationalism from radically different angles, it is important to note that their views are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Their compatibility is mainly a result of the fact that King et al. analyze how nationalism is utilized by the government online to manipulate public opinion and discourse.(7) In other words, their analysis stops at the formation of opinions on the internet. In contrast, Weiss does not analyze the formation of opinions but does analyze their manifestation and how and why the government can control when nationalist sentiment hits the streets.(8) Therefore it is possible, for example, that internet nationalism provides the CCP with a distraction for the masses and that the resulting nationalist protest provides a means of signaling resolve. That said, if, as Weiss argues, nationalist protests are both costly to suppress and risky to allow, it is unlikely that the government’s main objective in augmenting nationalist sentiment is a boost to legitimacy through distraction (even if the increased likelihood of protest is just a side effect).(9)

 

  1. Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret Roberts. “How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument.” The American Political Science Review 111, no. 3 (August 2017): 484–501. doi:10.1017/S0003055417000144.
  2. Ibid., 487.
  3. Ibid., 497
  4. Jessica Chen Weiss. “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China.” International Organization 67, no. 1 (January 2013): 30. doi:10.1017/S0020818312000380.
  5. Ibid., 2.
  6. Ibid., 7
  7. King, “How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument,” 484-501.
  8. Weiss, “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China,” 1-35.
  9. Ibid., 3.

Research Portfolio Post #5: Research Topic Post

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I am studying nationalist protest in China because I want to find out how recent cases of nationalist and antiforeign protest in China have affected China’s foreign policy outcomes in order to help my reader understand recent trends in China’s foreign policy.

In her article, “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China,” Jessica Chen Weiss argues that the decision to allow or suppress nationalist protest is a form of costly signaling because the protests are more likely to pose a risk to stability — or even to the existence of the regime — if the government allows them but does not stand up to whichever country is being cast as the foreign aggressor.(1) While she does take aim at the gap in scholarship on the subject of Chinese nationalism in international relations, Weiss does not analyze any cases since Xi has come to power.(2)

While Weiss views antiforeign sentiment as a relatively constant force that needs only to be given a “green light” from the government to boil over onto the streets, in his article called “An Angle on Nationalism in China Today: Attitudes Among Beijing Students after Belgrade 1999,” Dingxin Zhao disagrees.(3) He uses the attitudes towards America of Chinese students after the diplomatic crisis (in which American planes bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade) to argue that antiforeign attitudes among Chinese are surface-level, temporal, and not part of some deeply-rooted ideology.(4) Zhao’s assessment seems to at least partially negate that of Weiss. That an authoritarian regime should allow expressions of popular dissent at all is somewhat counterintuitive — and could be a puzzle itself. Moreover, it seems unlikely that protests could act as a credible signal if — as Zhao argues — protests are not representative of deeply held beliefs and so do not pose a large threat to regime stability.(5)

In an news article titled “Chinese Protest Against South Korea’s Lotte,” the Straits Times accounts how, in the wake of Lotte Group, a South Korean company, allowing the construction of an American missile-defense system (which is designed to defend against North Korea, but could also interrupt China’s deterrence) protesters gathered for a protest and called for a boycott of Lotte’s establishments.(6) This is an outlier from the cases discussed by Weiss because these protests — allowed by the Chinese government — were targeted South Korea (a country that has not historically been the subject of excessive Chinese public ire) and took place under a new regime — that of Xi Jinping.(7)

In an account of the same incident in an article called “China is Whipping up Public Anger Against South Korea,” The Economist takes a stance relatively consistent with that of Weiss — arguing that the protests served the political purpose of signaling resolve to South Korea’s next president, but does not place this argument in much wider context in terms of the policy of Xi Jinping.(8) Thus, scholars have done significant research into the rise of Chinese nationalism and even the effects on international relations of its previous cases, but little exploration of recent cases and trends.(9) However, while new sources have done significant coverage of recent cases, there has been a lack in the study of its wider implications and trends.(10)

Does Wiess’s explanation of historical Chinese protests hold true for the South Korean case; or has the signal lost credibility with its repeated use in a kind of the-boy-who-cried-wolf effect? South Korea is a new target and China is under new leadership, suggesting that this case — among others — requires further analysis of the above questions and of the decision making process of a new administration. It could lend credibility to Weiss’s assessment of the Chinese government’s motivations, or it could render some aspects of her theory products of context.

In terms of practical significance, a study of recent trends and continuities in Chinese nationalist as it pertains to international relations is important because nationalist protest has historically been a tool of China, yet the scholarship on the issue has so far failed to analyze recent cases.(11) Xi Jinping may or may not be more willing to use nationalism that his predecessors, which could have significant implications for Weiss’s theory and for current understandings of China’s nationalism — and is exactly why the scholarship on the issue requires an update in that regard. The relationship between China and America is the most important in the world and is increasingly so, making it very important that the two be able to correctly calibrate their respective foreign policies — something that this study should assist by shedding light on recent cases and trends.

This paper’s proposed research questions are the following:

-Under what conditions do Chinese nationalist protests lead to favorable foreign policy outcomes for China?

-Why did the Chinese government decide to allow protests against South Korea and Lotte Group in 2017?

 

  1. Jessica Chen Weiss. “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China.” International Organization 67, no. 1 (January 2013): 2-5. doi:10.1017/S0020818312000380.
  2. Ibid., 16.
  3. Dingxin Zhao. “An Angle on Nationalism in China Today: Attitudes Among Beijing Students after Belgrade 1999.” The China Quarterly 172 (December 2002): 885–905. doi:10.1017/S0009443902000542.
  4. Ibid., 902-905.
  5. Ibid.
  6. “Chinese Protest against South Korea’s Lotte.” Text. The Straits Times, March 5, 2017. http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/chinese-protest-against-south-koreas-lotte.
  7. Weiss, “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China,” 15-25.
  8. “China Is Whipping up Public Anger Against South Korea.” Text. The Economist, May 17, 2017. https://www.economist.com/news/china/21718876-it-wary-going-too-far-china-whipping-up-public-anger-against-south-korea.
  9. Weiss, “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China,” 15-25.
  10. “Chinese Protest against South Korea’s Lotte.”; “China Is Whipping up Public Anger Against South Korea.”
  11. Weiss, “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China,” 15-25.