Research Portfolio Post #6: Article Comparison

In their article titled “How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument,” Gary King and his colleagues argue that the Chinese government’s goal in allowing or encouraging (or even fabricating) expressions of nationalism is mainly to do “cheerleading,” distracting from more divisive issues.(1) King et al. analyze thousands of posts belonging to the so-called “50-cent party” or “50c” — a government-sponsored group of nationalist internet users (confirmed by a series of leaked emails between local or provincial governments).(2) They use their evidence mainly to argue against the prevalent idea that 50c posts aim to engage in argument with other internet users.(3)

Conversely, in her article titled “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China,” Jessica Chen Weiss contends that the Chinese government utilizes nationalist protest as a costly signal of resolve for international observers.(4) By her analysis, popular nationalism is a force that the government either allows or restrains — it gives a “red light” or a “green light.”(5) Unlike King et al., she acknowledges that excessive nationalism can have drawbacks, as it costs political capital to suppress, lest it force the government into an unfavorable position if it is not effectively managed (putting the government in a dilemma, the outcome of which acts as a signal to the international community).(6)

While the two articles approach nationalism from radically different angles, it is important to note that their views are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Their compatibility is mainly a result of the fact that King et al. analyze how nationalism is utilized by the government online to manipulate public opinion and discourse.(7) In other words, their analysis stops at the formation of opinions on the internet. In contrast, Weiss does not analyze the formation of opinions but does analyze their manifestation and how and why the government can control when nationalist sentiment hits the streets.(8) Therefore it is possible, for example, that internet nationalism provides the CCP with a distraction for the masses and that the resulting nationalist protest provides a means of signaling resolve. That said, if, as Weiss argues, nationalist protests are both costly to suppress and risky to allow, it is unlikely that the government’s main objective in augmenting nationalist sentiment is a boost to legitimacy through distraction (even if the increased likelihood of protest is just a side effect).(9)

1. Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret Roberts. “How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument.” The American Political Science Review 111, no. 3 (August 2017): 484–501. doi:10.1017/S0003055417000144.
2. Ibid., 487.
3. Ibid., 497
4. Jessica Chen Weiss. “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China.” International Organization 67, no. 1 (January 2013): 30. doi:10.1017/S0020818312000380.
5. Ibid., 2.
6. Ibid., 7
7. King, “How the Chinese Government Fabricates Social Media Posts for Strategic Distraction, Not Engaged Argument,” 484-501.
8. Weiss, “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China,” 1-35.
9. Ibid., 3.