The dependent variable of my research project is the foreign policy outcomes of an international crisis — specifically, the presence of concessions in the recipient of the signal. In this case, the signal is conveyed via the allowance of protest by the Chinese government (in the THAAD crisis of early 2017) the recipient is South Korea. This variable can be difficult to measure because both sides can have an incentive to distort reality by exaggerating concessions — the recipient may want to demonstrate compliance without making substantial concessions, and the conveyor may want to save face. Nevertheless, a signal of concession can be a concession itself and useful for analysis in its own right.
Essentially, for a valid operationalization of this variable, we should search for the presence of a response signal from the recipient government — specifically, the presence or absence of public speeches from leaders or heads of state that emphasize some new strategic restraint or retreat. In the case of South Korea, Paul McLeary notes in Foreign Policy that Moon Jae-in seems to have attempted to signal a desire for concession and cooperation.(1) Having publicly emphasized the importance of Sino-Korean relations multiple times, Moon publicly suspended the deployment of THAAD for review.(2) Thus, the article seems to indicate a strong presence of this aspect of the dependent variable.
Yet, in operationalizing the dependent variable, an analysis of rhetoric may be the most apparent facet, but it is not necessarily the most important. We also need to analyze the presence of actual strategic concessions (within which there are multiple factors to consider, including concrete retreats, shifting alliance dynamics, and changing overall strategic posture). Taylor notes that Moon did agree to suspend deployment, which could indicate a concrete strategic retreat; however, on further analysis, he notes that deployment was later quietly resumed.(3) This indicates, that South Korea’s overall strategic posture has probably not changed outside of that single temporal concession, but also that its alliance dynamic may have changed, demonstrating a more nuanced ability to balance US and Chinese interests.
(1) Paul McLeary. “In Nod to China, South Korea Halts Deployment of THAAD Missile Defense.” Foreign Policy, July 7, 2017. https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/07/in-nod-to-china-south-korea-halts-deployment-of-thaad-missile-defense/.
(2) Ibid.
(3) Taylor, Adam. “South Korea and China Move to Normalize Relations after THAAD Dispute.” Washington Post, October 31, 2017, sec. Asia & Pacific. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/south-korea-and-china-move-to-normalize-relations-after-thaad-conflict/2017/10/31/60f2bad8-bde0-11e7-af84-d3e2ee4b2af1_story.html.
You’ve done a good job in searching out relevant data sources here, Jack. Some more information on the specific case/outcome that you propose to analyze would be good, though. Remember that in small-n research you need to *know* the outcomes that you are explaining (just as Howard knew, from the outset, that she was explaining the difference between some successful and some failed PKOs, or how Saunders knew that she was explaining a particular shift in US strategy). It seems that you have a particular case relating to China and S. Korea in mind, but that could be made more specific so that we know the precise value of the DV that you are proposing to explain.