Scholars have long disagreed as to why authoritarian states allow antiforeign protest when they have the ability to suppress them, with some calling them a threat to the regime (actually forcing leaders’ hands) and others calling them a way to bolster legitimacy. Weiss uses signal theory to propose an ambitious cost-benefit model of nationalist protest as a way for authoritarian states to signal resolve, but she does not analyze in depth the “benefit” side of her model (why and when autocrats want to signal resolve). This study builds on Weiss’s model to explore when authoritarian leaders signal resolve by allowing demonstrations and which foreign powers they choose to leverage. Specifically, it uses the different perspectives of Chinese news sources (The People’s Daily, The Global Times, and The South China Morning Post) and the analysis of scholars inside and outside of China to test for variables at different points in a sequential, structured case study analysis of three different widespread nationalist demonstrations (against the United States in 1999, Japan in 2005, and South Korea in 2014). I argue that Chinese leaders not only consider their immediate situation in their decision to allow protest but also their ability to influence the policy of the foreign power in the long-term, with older foreign administrations being less malleable, and so more attractive targets. Even marginally expanding knowledge the tools that China uses to shape foreign perceptions (such as allowing protests) can improve understanding of Chinese foreign policy.