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I am studying nationalist protest in China because I want to find out how recent cases of nationalist and antiforeign protest in China have affected China’s foreign policy outcomes in order to help my reader understand recent trends in China’s foreign policy.

In her article, “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China,” Jessica Chen Weiss argues that the decision to allow or suppress nationalist protest is a form of costly signaling because the protests are more likely to pose a risk to stability — or even to the existence of the regime — if the government allows them but does not stand up to whichever country is being cast as the foreign aggressor.(1) While she does take aim at the gap in scholarship on the subject of Chinese nationalism in international relations, Weiss does not analyze any cases since Xi has come to power.(2)

While Weiss views antiforeign sentiment as a relatively constant force that needs only to be given a “green light” from the government to boil over onto the streets, in his article called “An Angle on Nationalism in China Today: Attitudes Among Beijing Students after Belgrade 1999,” Dingxin Zhao disagrees.(3) He uses the attitudes towards America of Chinese students after the diplomatic crisis (in which American planes bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade) to argue that antiforeign attitudes among Chinese are surface-level, temporal, and not part of some deeply-rooted ideology.(4) Zhao’s assessment seems to at least partially negate that of Weiss. That an authoritarian regime should allow expressions of popular dissent at all is somewhat counterintuitive — and could be a puzzle itself. Moreover, it seems unlikely that protests could act as a credible signal if — as Zhao argues — protests are not representative of deeply held beliefs and so do not pose a large threat to regime stability.(5)

In an news article titled “Chinese Protest Against South Korea’s Lotte,” the Straits Times accounts how, in the wake of Lotte Group, a South Korean company, allowing the construction of an American missile-defense system (which is designed to defend against North Korea, but could also interrupt China’s deterrence) protesters gathered for a protest and called for a boycott of Lotte’s establishments.(6) This is an outlier from the cases discussed by Weiss because these protests — allowed by the Chinese government — were targeted South Korea (a country that has not historically been the subject of excessive Chinese public ire) and took place under a new regime — that of Xi Jinping.(7)

In an account of the same incident in an article called “China is Whipping up Public Anger Against South Korea,” The Economist takes a stance relatively consistent with that of Weiss — arguing that the protests served the political purpose of signaling resolve to South Korea’s next president, but does not place this argument in much wider context in terms of the policy of Xi Jinping.(8) Thus, scholars have done significant research into the rise of Chinese nationalism and even the effects on international relations of its previous cases, but little exploration of recent cases and trends.(9) However, while new sources have done significant coverage of recent cases, there has been a lack in the study of its wider implications and trends.(10)

Does Wiess’s explanation of historical Chinese protests hold true for the South Korean case; or has the signal lost credibility with its repeated use in a kind of the-boy-who-cried-wolf effect? South Korea is a new target and China is under new leadership, suggesting that this case — among others — requires further analysis of the above questions and of the decision making process of a new administration. It could lend credibility to Weiss’s assessment of the Chinese government’s motivations, or it could render some aspects of her theory products of context.

In terms of practical significance, a study of recent trends and continuities in Chinese nationalist as it pertains to international relations is important because nationalist protest has historically been a tool of China, yet the scholarship on the issue has so far failed to analyze recent cases.(11) Xi Jinping may or may not be more willing to use nationalism that his predecessors, which could have significant implications for Weiss’s theory and for current understandings of China’s nationalism — and is exactly why the scholarship on the issue requires an update in that regard. The relationship between China and America is the most important in the world and is increasingly so, making it very important that the two be able to correctly calibrate their respective foreign policies — something that this study should assist by shedding light on recent cases and trends.

This paper’s proposed research questions are the following:

-Under what conditions do Chinese nationalist protests lead to favorable foreign policy outcomes for China?

-Why did the Chinese government decide to allow protests against South Korea and Lotte Group in 2017?

 

1. Jessica Chen Weiss. “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China.” International Organization 67, no. 1 (January 2013): 2-5. doi:10.1017/S0020818312000380.
2. Ibid., 16.
3. Dingxin Zhao. “An Angle on Nationalism in China Today: Attitudes Among Beijing Students after Belgrade 1999.” The China Quarterly 172 (December 2002): 885–905. doi:10.1017/S0009443902000542.
4. Ibid., 902-905.
5. Ibid.
6. “Chinese Protest against South Korea’s Lotte.” Text. The Straits Times, March 5, 2017. http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/chinese-protest-against-south-koreas-lotte.
7. Weiss, “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China,” 15-25.
8. “China Is Whipping up Public Anger Against South Korea.” Text. The Economist, May 17, 2017. https://www.economist.com/news/china/21718876-it-wary-going-too-far-china-whipping-up-public-anger-against-south-korea.
9. Weiss, “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China,” 15-25.
10. “Chinese Protest against South Korea’s Lotte.”; “China Is Whipping up Public Anger Against South Korea.”
11. Weiss, “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China,” 15-25.

Summary of “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China” by Jessica Chen Weiss

In her article called “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China,” Jessica Chen Weiss asks how leaders of authoritarian states effectively and credibly signal their intentions to foreign observers. Essentially, she argues that the government’s decision to allow antiforiegn protests in China is a costly signal of resolve because the protests could turn against the regime — imposing costs in the form of instability or even revolution — if the government doesn’t stand up to the target of the protests. Conversely, signal theory can also explain the decision not to allow protests (if the government spends the resources to quash the demonstrations before they begin, it demonstrates a desire for cooperation. To analyze this phenomenon, Weiss settles on a detailed case study analysis of antiforiegn protests in China, explaining that the opacity of authoritarian regimes makes in-depth analysis especially necessary to discern decision making processes. It also allows her to ascertain the interpretations of foreign observers in contrasting cases. For her data, she utilizes primary and secondary sources, including Chinese government deliberations, news articles from China and America, and memoirs, as well as personally conducted interviews. Weiss concludes that the decision to allow or suppress nationalist protest was a significant factor in foreign observers’ interpretations of events in the anti-American protests of 1999 and 2001 and that authoritarian governments have much to gain (regarding signaling) from effective management. She also notes that there are other ways to signal resolve, such as allowing hawkish politicians to win legislative elections. (1)

(1) Weiss, Jessica Chen. “Authoritarian Signaling, Mass Audiences, and Nationalist Protest in China.” International Organization 67, no. 1 (Winter 2013): 1-35. Accessed September 23, 2017. doi:10.1017/s0020818312000380

I understand ontology to be a philosophical conversation about the fundamental characteristics of the social world. I tend to believe that social realities exist separately from people (and the researcher) and are enduring in their own right. This opinion would certainly fall on the side of objectivism. Conversely, a constructionist would probably argue that social phenomena are constantly destructed and reconstructed, meaning that any attempt by a researcher to study a phenomenon is not an objective “reality” that can be studied, but rather a product of its context. If, as Andrew Abbott says of constructionism, phenomena are “simply produced (or reproduced) in a social interaction as need be” (1), then it is difficult for me to reconcile this belief with what I feel to be the purpose of research in the social sciences: to better understand the social world by discovering or applying general laws or theories to explain social phenomena. It is thus easy to see how my conceptions and beliefs about the nature of what we can study in the social sciences would have significant ramifications for my methodology.

 

Likewise, I understand methodology to be the logical conversation that one has with oneself about the best methods to acquire knowledge about a topic. Since I believe that social realities exist separately from people and are enduring, it logically follows that I believe my goal as a researcher to be the collection of knowledge and (the most important part), its distillation — a word at which an interpretivist would no doubt recoil — into overarching conclusions that either apply some rule to the phenomenon, qualify an existing one, or synthesize some new one. Therefore, I do believe that we can generate valid general knowledge about social phenomena, norms, patterns, customs, and trends in much the same way that we can generate valid general knowledge about physical phenomena, since we can, in fact, objectively observe the social world as researchers. Just as Abbott says that positivists believe that social phenomena can be measured in ways that “are independent of context, replicable by different people, and comparable for accuracy and validity,” I believe that the social science research should live up to its name in exactly this way; and I ground this methodological belief in my ontological one — that the social world is independent and lasting.

 

(1) Abbott, Andrew Delano. Methods of Discovery: Heuristics for the Social Sciences. New York: W.W. Norton, 2004.

(2) Abbott, Andrew Delano. Methods of Discovery: Heuristics for the Social Sciences. New York: W.W. Norton, 2004.

My meeting with Dr. Yang Zhang took place on Wednesday, September 6 from 3:15 to about 3:55 (so approximately 40 minutes). The first thing we discussed was our respective research interests. He explained that he had done significant research projects on Chinese ground-up grassroots politics and activism, the historical relationship between ethnic groups in China and the state, and — the most relevant to my research interests — historical and comparative analysis of nationalist activism in China. After he encouraged me to give careful consideration to my research topic, I explained that I wasn’t entirely sure about it and was considering another topic — an exploration of the negative effects of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on the Chinese economy. Dr. Zhang explained that while the SOE question was hotly debated in the 90’s and so has been well explored by the scholarly community, the issue of Chinese nationalism is relatively new as a tool for influencing international relations.

We also discussed why, although previous leaders stayed away from manipulating nationalist sentiment openly, President Xi seems to be significantly more willing to use it as a “stick” in relations with America and its allies. I suggested that it could partially be due to the decline of communism as an ideological binding force, and he added that it could have something to do with Xi’s privileged upbringing. The latter could be a partial explanation, but my suggestion does not account for why open (often anti-Western) nationalism seems to have spiked in the past 5 or so years (something that could be a possible puzzle worth exploring). Our meeting ended with book recommendations: A Nation-State by Construction by Suisheng Zhao(1), and Powerful Patriots by Jessica Chen Weiss(2).

My main concerns about my project right now involve finding a puzzle with which I can work. Moreover, I’m worried that my topic is too broad, but this issue could remedy itself as I circle in on a specific puzzle. Another source of anxiety is my selection of a research method. Dr. Zhang suggested that this subject lends itself to small-n case study analysis, but I am eager to consider other options as we do a more in-depth analysis of each method in the coming weeks. As far as my worries about switching topics (as well as my next steps) go, Dr. Zhang suggested that I read the books over the next two weeks and use that experience and time to consider my topic. Thus, in the two weeks between now and our next meeting, I intend to use the two books to hone in on one or more puzzles and to consider the topic itself and whether I can move forward on this project in its currently planned form.

(1) Zhao, Suisheng. A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism. Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 2004.

(2) Weiss, Jessica Chen. Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in Chinas Foreign Relations. Oxford, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014.

Typically, scholars and news sources focus on the content that the government of the People’s Republic of China ends up censoring: online posts or articles that could incite protests for civil liberties, democracy, or other causes. Yet the Chinese government’s manipulation of the laobaixing (the “common people”) goes much farther than that. Most interesting to me is what the Chinese government chooses not to censor. In an article titled “China is whipping up public anger against South Korea,” The Economist discusses how the Chinese government, while it usually keeps a tight grip on any internet conversations or posts that might incite protests, shrewdly allowed public anger about new American missile defense installments on land owned by Lotte, a South Korean company to manifest itself on the streets. Numerous protests and boycotts inflicted significant economic pain on Lotte.

One puzzle here — albeit one already well explored by scholars — is that the internet is something people in the West often assume is a tool of liberation for the masses in movements such as the Arab Spring (though scholars still debate the internet’s role); but in China it seems that the government has actually turned it into a tool of oppression. In my opinion, the more interesting puzzle here (and the one that I intend to focus on in my research) is that China’s authoritarian regime seems to have found a way to use the public to manifest its will. Especially to people only familiar with living in democracies, this seems somewhat counterintuitive – as if the tail is wagging the dog.

The Lotte incident suggests that these actions by the Chinese government with regard to social media and other internet media might affect international relations, especially with Japan, South Korea, and the West. I intend to explore further these phenomena to determine what kind (if any) effect they have on international relations. Whether the effects are significant or not, understanding them can improve the way I think about international relations with East Asia as I proceed into upper-level courses on the subject. Also, it may be interesting to utilize my experience studying abroad to observe first hand how social media can affect the Chinese public’s attitudes towards foreign countries either through interviews or passive observation. Moreover, it can further our knowledge about China’s relationship with its neighbors and with the West, and thus it can improve US foreign policy towards China and East Asia as a whole.