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Plato, Tocqueville, and Dr. Johnson all argue the democratic peoples dislike making ethical arguments and further dislike discussing the ends people ought to pursue. They all go about making this argument in slightly different ways. Plato argues that one of the defining characteristics of a democratic society is that its members are given the freedom to organize their private lives how they see fit.[1] Alongside this freedom, there is also a pervasive sense of equality in democracy. That is, each member of the body politic is seen as equal to each other and their opinions are held in equal weight. This combination of freedom and equality, according to Plato, leads to a society where men lurch from base vice to base vice as their whims demand, each refusing to pass judgement of the others’ decisions as each desire equal to every other as they’ve all originated from equal members of the society.

Meanwhile, Tocqueville’s argument about opposition of democratic peoples to ethical arguments has less to do with do with the propensity of people in democracies to pursue only their base vices and more to do with the lack of respect they, they in this case being Americans but Tocqueville implies its universal, have for authority. In opposition to more aristocratic societies which are willing to accept that some have superior levels of reason, democratic societies tend to believe that truth is most often found on the side of public opinion.[2] This belief also springs from the belief in the inherent equality of man in a democratic society. The reason this focus on public opinion precludes discussion of ethical concerns is put quite nicely by Tocqueville when he writes “[t]he public therefore has a singular power among democratic peoples, the very idea of which aristocratic nations could not conceive. It does not persuade [one] of its beliefs, it imposes them and makes them penetrate souls by a sort of immense pressure of the minds of all on the intellect of each.”[3]

Dr. Johnson’s take on why democratic societies are predisposed against making ethical arguments is that we often cannot distinguish between defending our own values and imposing them.[4] As imposing values would go against the fundamental democratic assumptions of freedom and equality, many people in democratic societies are reluctant to even attempt these conversations.

I disagree with both Plato and Tocqueville’s assessment of how democratic societies are fundamentally opposed to ethical arguments. Regarding Plato, while individuals are certainly given a great deal of latitude in determining the path of their own lives in democratic societies like the contemporary United States, that does not mean that the members of societies do not make ethical judgement on the decisions of others. Regarding Tocqueville, I believe he overstates the ability of public opinion in democratic societies to simply impose its own ethical judgement on every individual in society without discussion. Public opinion is fundamentally malleable and can change substantially over time. For example, in my lifetime alone the United States has undergone a revolution in how it perceives members of the LGBT+ community. The very fact that such a change occurred demonstrates that discussion of values and attempts to persuade those who do not share your ethical belief do occur in democratic societies. I do agree with Dr. Johnson about the lazy relativism present in our contemporary culture and I personally have found it to be very pervasive among people of my generation, especially those at American University. Which is a shame because I think that such discussions are key to the viability of a democratic society.

[1] Plato, “Book VIII,” The Republic.

[2]Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Winthrop (Mansfield: 2000)

[3]Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Winthrop (Mansfield: 2000)

[4]Leigh M. Johnson, “Lazy Relativism,” ReadMoreWriteMoreThinkMoreBeMore (November 2009), http://www.readmorewritemorethinkmorebemore.com/2009/11/lazy-relativism.html.

I am pursuing my topic, democratic decline in Hungary, because I want to find out what is causing the democratic recession that currently dominates large parts of public discourse. The reason I am seeking this knowledge is that I want to learn how democratic decline can be stopped and reversed. One of the reasons for this motivation is that I am firmly of the belief that the primary purpose of social science research is to improve human welfare.

Implicit in this motivation is the assumption that democracy is fundamentally a good thing. That assumption is something I most definitely subscribe to. I believe that liberal democracy provides the best outcomes of any form of government for those who live under it. Furthermore, I am a strong proponent of democratic peace theory and believe that the norms espoused by liberal democracies have been all-important to the construction of the liberal international order. Therefore, I view the decline of liberal democracy worldwide as a fundamental threat to international order and the unprecedented peace and prosperity that order has brought to the world. My belief in the importance of democracy to the well-being of the people of the world is another reason I have chosen the investigate its decline. One further observation of my normative beliefs is that I view peace and prosperity as positives.

The primary effect of this motivation on my methodological decisions is that it leads me to utilize methodologies that emphasize the search for causal relationships. This is what led me to neopositivism in general and small-n analysis in particular. While less of a normative assumption and more a matter of personal preference, the decision to focus in on Hungary as my primary case springs from my interest in Europe. Europe is my regional focus within SIS and has long been of interest to me. Furthermore, the rise of illiberal regimes throughout Europe, especially when those regimes tend towards nationalism, is not usually associated with good things. In the last century, a similar concoction of illiberalism and nationalism in Europe killed tens of millions of people. While I don’t believe that Europe is by any means returning to the state it was in in the years prior to World War II, the return of illiberalism and nationalism to Europe is worrying. These worries are what drove me to my topic and they continue to inform my methodological decisions and case selection today.

The discourse I intend to analyze is the one that occurs at the European Union regarding the erosion of democracy in Hungary. More specifically, I will be looking at resolutions and debates originating in the European Parliament to understand the various meanings attached to concepts of pan-European values, national sovereignty, and the relationship between these two concepts by different actors within the European Parliament.

Speeches by multiple members of the European Parliament during a debate on the situation in Hungary provide a snapshot of these different discussions of European values and national sovereignty. On the one hand we have speeches by Franz Timmermans, who is the Vice-President of the European commission, and Phillipe Lamberts, a MEP and the leader of the Greens-European Free Alliance political group in the European Parliament. Both leaders emphasize the common European values of democracy and the rule of law.[1] Timmermans in particular also claims that “protecting freedom is a common European task.”[2] In contrast, Nigel Farage, a prominent Brexiteer and Eurosceptic, claimed that his fellow MEP’s attacks on actions by the Hungarian government were the result of that government’s opposition to the EU’s asylum policies rather than any actual concern about democracy.[3] Farage framed the remarks by MEPs supposedly concerned about democracy in Hungary as instead an assault on the national sovereignty of Hungary.[4]

In this discourse we can clearly see conflict between those who emphasize the various national identities held by Europeans and those who emphasize the pan-European identity and values. This discourse is connected at a very fundamental level to the subsequent vote in the European Parliament on whether to call for a launching of Article 7 of the Treaty of the European Union, which allows for the European Council to determine whether a member is in breach of European values.[5] There are also connections between this discourse and other speeches and political documents that deal with the relationship of the European Union and its member states when it comes to supposedly shared values like democracy.

[1] European Parliament, “EP Plenary Session: Debate on Situation in Hungary.” accessed November 22, 2017, http://audiovisual.europarl.europa.eu/Package.aspx?id=51766.

[2] Ibid.

[3] European Parliament, “(11) EP Plenary Session: Debate on Situation in Hungary. Round of Political Group Speakers. Nigel FARAGE (EFDD, UK) (16:19 – 16:22),” accessed November 22, 2017, http://audiovisual.europarl.europa.eu/Assetdetail.aspx?id=17e7157b-d109-40c5-ab67-a76100f1bff5.

[4] Ibid.

[5] “MEPs Call for EU Democracy, Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights Watchdog | News | European Parliament,” last modified October 25, 2016, accessed November 22, 2017, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20161020IPR47863/meps-call-for-eu-democracy-rule-of-law-and-fundamental-rights-watchdog.

As my dependent variable, democratic decline, is quite broad there are several different axes on which to define it. These axes include the independence of institutions and the rule of law, freedom of the press, and the existence of fair and competitive elections. To find qualitative sources on these aspects of my dependent variable, I have been searching for news articles that document these issues in Hungary, the country that I have selected as my case study.  One qualitative data source that focuses on the freedom of the press axis is a 2014 news article written by a Hungarian journalist and published by the BBC on the efforts of the Hungarian government to constrain press freedom. The article discusses the methods utilized by the government to influence news coverage such as rewarding state advertising to companies with friendly coverage and ensuring that unfriendly broadcasters run into problems when it comes to renewing their broadcast licenses.[1] Another article, this one by The Economist Intelligence Unit, documents the effects of a then-proposed tax on advertising revenue written is such a way to drive the German-owned media company RTL Klub, one of the few that still airs critical coverage of the government, out of business.[2] These actions, especially the intervention of the supposedly independent media regulator to deny broadcast licenses to critics, also indicate a lack of institutional independence and respect for the rule of law in Hungary.  Other actions, such as a crackdown on NGOs opposed to the government’s agenda by Hungary’s auditing agency[3] and how the government body designed to regulate monopolies has turned a blind eye to the consolidation of most media outlets in the hands of government allies also do not speak well of respect for the rule of law or the existence of a free press.[4]

From the articles and issues discussed in the above paragraph, it is quite clear to me that democratic decline is quite prevalent in Hungary. The above paragraph also indicates that I would operationally define democratic decline by breaking down important aspects of democracy such as freedom of the press and respect for the rule of law into smaller components and then asking questions such as “have there been any new legal restrictions imposed on the press?” or “does the government regularly label the press as an ‘enemy?’” to assess if decline occurred in the level of these elements within a state. I would also rate the degree of the decline on the simple scale of small, moderate, or high depending on how many of these questions were answered in the affirmative.

 

[1] “Hungary’s Media Battle ‘Economic Pressure, Intimidation,’” BBC Monitoring Media, July 8, 2014, accessed November 8, 2017, http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=BBCMM00020140708ea780005l&cat=a&ep=ASE.

[2] “Hungary Economy: Media Tax Revives Worries over Tax Policy, Press Freedom,” Economist Intelligence Unit – ViewsWire, June 18, 2014, ViewsWire edition.

[3] “Hungary’s Media Battle ‘Economic Pressure, Intimidation.’”

[4] Pablo Gorondi, “US Worried about Dwindling Independent Media in Hungary,” The Canadian Press, October 17, 2017, accessed November 8, 2017, http://global.factiva.com/redir/default.aspx?P=sa&an=CPR0000020171017edah007hn&cat=a&ep=ASE.

My research is primarily focused on what conditions lead a liberal democracy to transition into an authoritarian regime. My dependent variable is thus the level of democracy and the liberalism within a state. There are several different ways to measure this variable statistically. One quantitative dataset that attempts to measure this variable comes from the Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project. The particular dataset I am using from the Global Attitudes Project is the report put together by Richard Wike and Katie Simmons and is entitled “Global Support for Principle of Free Expression, but Opposition to Some Forms of Speech.”[1] Despite its title, this report contains information on more than just free expression. Instead, it is a report on support for democratic values. Democratic values in this case referring to religious freedom, gender equality, freedom of the press, freedom of expression, and competitive elections.[2] In order to measure this variable, the researchers polled people in 38 countries, asking “how important is ____ in our country?” where the blank spot was filled by a phrase that encapsulated the value the researchers were trying to measure. For example, when measuring support for competitive elections the researcher would ask “how important is it that honest elections are held regularly with choice of at least two parties?” to which respondents would select their belief of the level of importance.

In a large-n version of my research project I would use this dataset to measure the relative levels of support for democratic principles from country to country. I would be curious to see whether a correlation exists between the level of support the people of a country have for democracy and any of the factors, such as inequality, that have been implicated as undermining support for democracy in the academic literature. One limitation of this dataset is that it only covers 38 countries. Additionally, this dataset is just a snapshot from 2015 and, while I have found other Pew Survey’s on support for democracy, there do not appear to be other surveys by them which ask the same questions over the course of several years. This second limitation is especially important when it comes to researching a topic, such as mine, where the trend over time is important.

[1] Richard Wike and Katie Simmons, “Global Support for Principle of Free Expression but Opposition to Some Forms of Speech” Pew Research Center.

[2] Ibid.

The ideas expressed in both Francis Fukuyama’s article Democracy and the Quality of the State and Terry Lynn Karl’s Economics Inequality and Democratic Instability belong to the same broad school of thought, the domestic failure school, when it comes to analyzing democratic decline. However, these two articles capture a key division within that school of thought between those scholars, like Fukuyama, who emphasize state capacity to provide public services[1] and other scholars, like Karl, who emphasize the state’s inability to effectively combat economic inequality.[2]

In Democracy and the Quality of the State, Fukuyama emphasizes the essentiality of a state’s ability to provide public goods to its citizens to the legitimacy of that state’s form of government.[3] Throughout his article, he explores the role of an efficient bureaucracy in providing essential public goods and whether democracy is conducive to the development of just such a bureaucracy in a series of case studies.[4] Meanwhile, Karl focuses on the various ways that high levels of inequality can undermine democracy. More specifically, she emphasizes the tendency of citizens of highly unequal countries to have lower amounts of satisfaction with democracy and increased openness to authoritarianism.[5] She mainly explores this tendency in the context of Latin America, which is the most unequal continent in the world and also has seen its fair share of democratic backsliding over the years.

Both Fukuyama’s focus on state capacity and Karl’s focus on inequality inform my research by providing me with potential variables to focus in on my research. While both Karl and Fukuyama’s articles are essentially a mix of theory and case study, it is possible to look at the factors they bring up in a more systematic way. For example, I could potentially explore the relationship between the perceptions of corruption index and democratic backsliding as a way of testing the degree to which state capacity effects democratic governance. Regardless of whether I end up focusing on either of these segments of the domestic failure school of thought, they are important arguments to keep in mind as I continue my research.

 

Bibliography:

Fukuyama, Francis. “Democracy and the Quality of the State.” Journal of Democracy 24, no. 4 (October 10, 2013): 5–16.

Karl, Terry Lynn. “Economic Inequality and Democratic Instability.” Journal of Democracy 11, no. 1 (January 1, 2000): 149–156.

[1] Francis Fukuyama, “Democracy and the Quality of the State,” Journal of Democracy 24, no. 4 (October 10, 2013): 5–16.

[2] Terry Lynn Karl, “Economic Inequality and Democratic Instability,” Journal of Democracy 11, no. 1 (January 1, 2000): 149–156.

[3] Fukuyama, “Democracy and the Quality of the State.” 6.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Karl, “Economic Inequality and Democratic Instability.” 156.

I am proposing to research the worldwide decline of liberal democracy in recent years because I want to find out under what conditions does a liberal democracy transition to an authoritarian regime in order to help readers understand what explains the regression of several liberal democracies in recent years.

In their 2017 Report on Freedom in the World, Freedom House noted that 2016 was the sixteenth straight year in which the level of political freedom in the world had declined.[1] Strikingly, in 2016 the declines were concentrated not among states that were already authoritarian but instead among the ranks of already established democracies.[2] However, while this recent acceleration of democratic decline has made the issue more urgent, scholars have taken note of the puzzle of democratic decline over the past decade as former liberal democracies like Hungary, Turkey, and Venezuela began moving in distinctly illiberal directions. Scholars have proposed several different explanations for this democratic backsliding and the exact causes of this phenomena are up for debate.

One school of thought regarding democratic decline has to do with the effect of geopolitics and the power of example on voters and elites in liberal democracies. This is the school of thought subscribed to by Robert Kagan who posits that the increasing geopolitical heft of authoritarian regimes like China as compared to the declining power of the United States and European Union is the primary culprit when it comes to the decline in the level of democracy worldwide.[3] This is also the theory that underlies Andrew Nathan’s exploration of the role an increasingly powerful China plays in undermining democracy in his article China’s Challenge.[4] While Nathan also discusses how China actively promotes its authoritarian values overseas, props up fellow authoritarian regimes, and seeks to limit the emphasis international institutions place on democracy, he is clearly places the power of example at the forefront of his argument.[5] This primacy makes sense given that leaders of liberal democracies that have moved their states in decidedly illiberal directions have cited the example of successful illiberal regimes as part of their justification.

One example of this phenomena is a 2014 speech given by Viktor Orban, the Prime Minister of Hungary, in 2014.  In it, he claims that the dominant issue of the day was finding a method of organizing government that can compete in the global system and furthermore that “systems that are not Western, not liberal, not liberal democracies and perhaps not even democracies, can nevertheless make their nations successful. The stars of the international analysts today are Singapore, China, India, Russia and Turkey.”[6] Clearly, the example of these other regimes, though I would disagree with his assessment that India is not a liberal democracy, had an influence on Orban’s decision to move Hungary in an illiberal direction. Curiously, the example of China, Russia, and others has seemingly had an influence on voters in Hungary as well. Orban opens his speech by noting the recent strong performance of his party, Fidesz, in national and European elections. Additionally, he looks forward to upcoming municipal elections, elections that Fidesz also won quite handily.[7] These electoral results indicate that there is a substantial number of Hungarians who have lost faith in liberal democracy, which adds another interesting wrinkle to my puzzle.

Of course, the argument that shifting geopolitics and the power of the authoritarian example is the primary cause of democracy’s decline is not the only theory out there. Other scholars, like Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way in their article The Myth of the Democratic Recession, deny that there is even anything approaching a general decline in democracy going on.[8] Instead, they claim that the level of democracy worldwide has been stable for the last decade.[9] They view the recent furor over “democratic decline” as a response to scholars, in the euphoria that accompanied the democratic expansion in the 1990s ,overestimating the level of democracy achieved by various countries.[10] If their school of thought is the correct one, than my research will be less salient that I initially thought but it is of course important to keep in mind the possibility that the phenomena you are researching may not be as widespread as initially thought.

The significance of my topic area is to help readers understand how liberal democracies turn into illiberal regimes in the hope that greater understanding can lead to an arrest in the decline of democracy. While it is of course possible that Levitsky and Way are correct and no overall decline is occurring, even they acknowledge that there are several countries which were in fact unambiguous democracies that have made the transition to autocracy in recent years.[11] Even if democratic decline is only limited to a few cases, understanding those cases and their implications for our knowledge of how states change their forms of government are essential to comprehending the international system. And if democratic decline is in fact a worldwide phenomenon, then understanding this transition in particular, from liberal democracy to illiberal regime, will be even more important.

Question 1: Under what conditions does a liberal democracy transition into an illiberal regime?

Question 2: What explains Hungary’s transition from liberal democracy to illiberal state?

[1] “Freedom in the World 2017,” last modified January 24, 2017, accessed September 30, 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2017.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Robert Kagan, “The Weight of Geopolitics,” Journal of Democracy 26, no. 1 (January 7, 2015): 21–31.

[4] Andrew J. Nathan, “China’s Challenge,” Journal of Democracy; Baltimore 26, no. 1 (January 2015): 157–170.

[5] Ibid. 158-162, 165-167.

[6] “Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s Speech at the 25th Bálványos Summer Free University and Student Camp,” Government, accessed September 30, 2017, http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp.

“National Election Office – Local Elections 2014,” accessed September 30, 2017, http://valasztas.hu/en/onkval2014/443/443_0_index.html.

[8] Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, “The Myth of Democratic Recession,” Journal of Democracy 26, no. 1 (January 7, 2015): 45–58.

[9] Ibid. 48.

[10] Ibid. 50.

[11] Ibid. 47.